^{Appendix 1} “Counterrevolution” in Prague

Report by the ambassador of the GDR in the ČSSR, P. Florin, on the situation in the country.¹

10 March 1968

[Prague]

The activities of the oppositional forces have been stepped up over the last few days; they are displaying counter-revolutionary traits ever more openly. Systematic attacks are being launched against the organs of the power of the state, against their representatives, against the pillars of a socialist society and against basic socialist principles. [The] writer Kohout calls for the publication of the so-called “Writers’ Manifesto,” which famously contains the demand for a return to a bourgeois parliamentary republic. On the 118th anniversary of Masaryk’s birthday articles were published containing such passages as: “Our socialist society and its political system are connected by an umbilical cord to this historical development [i.e. the era of Masaryk] and not to the Soviet system, which came into being in totally different circumstances… Masaryk is for us a living compass between the past and the present” (Mladá fronta). The Trade Union paper Prace quotes Masaryk’s phrase of a “social socialism” and states that today is the time to realize this idea.

[…] The press in general or at least the key papers, TV, radio, CTK and a large number of periodicals are in the hands of the oppositional forces. They are doing everything they can to foment an atmosphere of opposition, they allow no space for counterarguments and are working systematically to organize the counterrevolution. They have managed to bring about the abolition of censorship and a new media law, in whose drafting the journalists themselves are to be given a say. Both measures have been passed by the presidium of the CC. The presidium of the CC CPCz has also passed a resolution that allows the practically unchecked importation of foreign literature and news media.

[…] It is quite obvious that the oppositional forces are centrally coordinated. Presumably they have both an open center and an illegal one. The personages of the open center include today Smrkovský (member of the CC CPCz and Minister for Forestry), Šik (member of the CC), Goldstücker (professor at Charles University and president of the writers’ union), Pelikan (director of state TV), Kohout (writer) and several journalists and students. As can be gathered from the Western press, the illegal center is in touch with capitalist circles and their organs abroad. Some Czechoslovak comrades in leading positions have been attempting to this day to interpret the activities of the oppositional forces as isolated extremist phenomena. However in reality we are confronted with the centrally coordinated and systematically developed preparation of a counterrevolution.

To date the situation has developed in analogy to the one on the eve of the counter-revolutionary putsch of 1956 in Hungary. […] If the comrades in the party leadership do not take a determined stand soon, the other side will be able to realize their plans in regard to public violent provocations.

(Florin)²

Ambassador

1. For the policies of the GDR in connection with the events in Czechoslovakia, see Manfred Wilke’s chapter in this volume.

2. Autograph signature.

SAPMO-BA, DY 30/3616, S. 52–57 (reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente, #3).

^{Appendix 2} “We Are Ready at Any Time… to Assist the Czechoslovak People Together with the Armies… of the Warsaw Pact”

Speech of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, at the plenum of the CC CPSU.

10 April 1968

[…] The policies of our Party are continuously and fervently echoed by the Army and the Navy and meet with the unanimous approval of the entire personnel of the Armed Forces. The soldiers of the Soviet Union share the thoughts and the feelings of the party and the people. They are perfectly aware that they must be ready for international deployments, which are a consequence of the tremendous significance that our military power has for international events. They identify with everything that the party decrees, also in regard to foreign politics. Many of our soldiers have to serve outside the country. At present tens of thousands of communist and non-party soldiers are serving abroad in thirty-six different countries, where, as I am proud to report to the plenum, they discharge their duty with dignity and as propagators of the Leninist policy of the party.

The present situation is characterized by a tremendous surge in the bellicosity of the imperialists in general and of the Americans in particular. They resort increasingly frequently to the use of force in their attempts to crush the forces of progress and social liberation and they stage dangerous provocative acts in various regions of the world. Instigated by their masters in Washington, West German militarists and revanchistes openly demand a revision of the results of WWII and are becoming more assertive by the day. […]

A source of deep concern for us are the events in China and the betrayal of Marxism-Leninism, the principles of proletarian internationalism, the unity of the worldwide communist movement and of the security of the Socialist states in the east by the group around Mao Tse-tung, which is going to inflict great harm.

The leaders in Peking are to blame for the fact that the stretch of the Socialist countries’ defensive line that the Chinese are in charge of has proved to be the weakest. It is no coincidence that it is here, in Southeast Asia, that the American imperialism is at its most active.

[…] We are ready at any time, pending a party resolution, to assist the Czechoslovak people together with the armies of the countries of the Warsaw Pact if the imperialists and counterrevolutionaries should attempt to wrest socialist Czechoslovakia from the socialist camp.

[…] Let me add a few words on the situation in Vietnam. We all know about the latest triumphs that the Vietnamese army has achieved in its struggle with American imperialism. The steadfastness and perseverance of the Vietnamese people and its fighters are a source of deep satisfaction for all of us. At the same time it must be said that the military gains of the Vietnamese patriots are inseparably linked to the efforts of our people and our country that are aimed at assisting this heroic nation. To put it bluntly: this war is waged not only by the Vietnamese but by the Soviet people as well. It is common knowledge that both in the North and in the South it is our weapons that are used to fight the American aggressors.

Let me give you some figures. Only recently did we deliver to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam hundreds of Flak rocket launching pads and thousands of rockets; 3,000 or so flak cannon, 2,500 field cannon and grenade launchers, approximately 250,000 machine guns and carbines, approximately 400 airplanes and choppers and a great deal of other weapons and military technology. All this was given free of charge, with only one aim in mind—to assist the Vietnamese people in their struggle against the American aggressors. Our assistance is set to continue and we despatch weapons and military technology to Vietnam on a daily basis.

In addition to this we train whole regiments of flak soldiers, pilots and other specialists who are sent to the front when they are needed. In Vietnam there are hundreds of our advisers who help the Vietnamese control the war and handle modern weapons. Often our officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers take part in the fighting, and many of the airplanes destroyed in the war were brought down by our brave fighters.

It needs to be said however that our Soviet military personnel are not treated as comrades taking part in a joint struggle. Contacts between our people and the Vietnamese soldiers are discouraged, their contacts with Vietnamese troops are limited, and those Vietnamese with sympathies for the Soviet state are subject to persecution. The truth about the war is kept secret and access to destroyed American airplanes is made difficult under one pretext or another.

All this seems to happen at the instigation of the Chinese who are active in the Vietnamese army as advisers and observers of one kind or another. Such attitudes towards soldiers from the Soviet Union obviously sadden us but we carry out our work regardless because we have been mandated to do so by the party in the name of our internationalist duty to pay tribute to our friendship with the Vietnamese people and to fight our common enemy, imperialism, and we will continue to do so by assisting the Vietnamese people.

[…] On behalf of the Armed Forces allow me to signal my unqualified approval […] of the realization of the plenum’s resolutions; the Armed Forces are standing by to implement them. [Applause.]

RGANI, F. 2, op. 3, d. 94, S. 1–15. Unedited stenographic notes. Translated from the German translation of the original Russian document (original Russian and German translation in Karner et al., Dokumente, #33).

^{Appendix 3} “Secret” Memorandum: Eugene V. Rostow to Dean Rusk, 10 May 1968

Subject: Soviet Threat to Czechoslovakia¹

I have thought further about our conversation yesterday.

I conclude that it would be a serious mistake not to give the Soviets a private signal of concern about troop movements near Czechoslovakia.

1. In retrospect, our failure to deter the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in 1948 was one of the most serious mistakes of our foreign policy since the war. Firm diplomatic action then—a period of our nuclear monopoly—could well have prevented the Cold War. Similarly, our public statement in 1956 that we would not intervene gave the Soviets a full license. Obviously, the situation has profoundly changed.

2. What is at stake now is the process of movement towards détente—the policy of the President’s speech of October 7, 1966; the NATO Resolution of last September accepting the Harmel Exercise Report; the German Eastern policy, and the possibility of real improvement in the political climate in Europe, leading to mutual balanced force reductions. Progress in this direction would be set back if the Soviets intervened in Czechoslovakia. I simply do not agree that Soviet efforts in Eastern Europe would fail to stamp out liberal trends. They have long since proved their capacity to keep the animals tame by police methods, and their willingness to do so.

3. The Russians must be hesitating. The moment to give them a deterrent signal is therefore now. It will be too late once they cross the border.

1. On top of this memorandum is the handwritten note “No action DR” (Dean Rusk).

Folder “6/1/68,” Box 1558, POL Czech—USSR DEF 4 NATO, Central Foreign Policy Files 1968–1969, RG 59, NARA.

^{Appendix 4} On the Results of the Warsaw Meeting of the Delegations of Communist Parties and Workers’ Parties from Socialist Countries

Plenary Session of the CC CPSU

Speech by the General Secretary of the CC CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev

17 July 1968

Comrades!

The Poliburo of the CC CPSU has considered it imperative to convene this meeting, where our purpose is to report on the results of a meeting that took place in Warsaw on 14/15 July of the party and government leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and the Soviet Union.

The most important issue discussed at this meeting, indeed the issue around which the whole meeting revolved, was the dangerous sequence of events in Czechoslovakia. Before I proceed to present to this meeting the relevant documents let me remind you that after the April plenum of the CC the prevalent notion in the Politburo of the CC CPSU with regard to the events in Czechoslovakia had been the one expressed at that plenum; it held that assistance should be given to the healthy forces and above all to the communist party of Czechoslovakia in their efforts to fend off the loss of socialist achievements in Czechoslovakia as well as the country’s alienation from the socialist camp. […]

As they encountered no courageous and determined resistance, the rightist forces threw all moderation over board, with the result that four leading Czechoslovak papers simultaneously published an openly counterrevolutionary manifesto—the so-called “2,000 Words.” It bore the signatures of a number of people, some of them well-known, others unknown. A detail that should be mentioned is the fact that some of the signatures are those of nonexistent people who have obviously been invented for the purpose.

This document is a direct attack on the KSČ, it is no less than a call to take up arms against the constitutional government. As we speak, it is being used to unite the antisocialist forces and to serve as a platform for their activities.

Immediately after the emergence of this hostile platform I spoke on the phone to Comrade Dubček and told him on behalf of the Poliburo of the CC that no time must be lost in engaging the antisocialist counterrevolutionary forces. We pointed out to him that the “2,000 Words” called for concerted actions against these forces, involving the support of the healthy forces in the party, in the working class and in the armed units of the People’s Militia. Comrade Dubček told me that a meeting of the presidium of the CC KSČ was in progress at the time and that he was going to pass on our recommendations to the meeting; he assured us that a radical condemnation was forthcoming and that highly effective countermeasures were about to be taken. Unfortunately none of these things came to pass.

[…] What is happening in Czechoslovakia in our view is this: a carefully disguised, fully up-to-date counter-revolutionary process is taking place that is aiming to fundamentally alter the social structure, possibly without changing its outward attributes and without causing any changes up to now in the society’s political and state leadership. The particular danger of this development consists in the initial confusion of the Czechoslovak working population and indeed even of the working class, who were completely in the dark as to where this development would eventually lead. It is also likely to cause confusion in communist circles outside the Soviet Union, as we can see from symptoms displayed by the Communist Parties of France, Italy and England.

[…] This manifest counterrevolution may yet cost the communists in Czechoslovakia dearly. The experience of events in Hungary teaches us that those who surrender to the reaction or strike a compromise with it expose the party to the onslaught of the counterrevolution.

[…] And the attempt to stem this process cannot be interpreted as an interference in the country’s internal affairs. It is no more than the expression of our internationalist duty towards the communist movement, towards the working population of Czechoslovakia. [Applause.] Face to face with the danger that one of the member states of the socialist community might deviate from the path of Socialism, we have no right to lock ourselves up in our national houses. This would mean a betrayal of the interests of Communism.

Communism unfolds as an international movement and this in fact describes its very existence. This is the key to its victories and its achievements. Whoever deviates from internationalism has lost the right to call himself a communist. Our countries are tied to the ČSSR through treaties and agreements. These are no mere agreements between individuals but commitments entered into by peoples and states. They are based on the general striving to preserve Socialism in our countries and to protect it against fluke events.

No one has the right to shirk their internationalist duties, the duties that are part of our contractual obligations, and the demagoguery that one occasionally encounters in this context is, to be quite frank, totally misplaced.

We respect the rights that each party has, the rights of each people. We acknowledge the special characteristics that the construction of Socialism may assume in different countries. Yet we are equally convinced of the bond that unites our historical destinies. Protecting Socialism—that is the task to which all of us must be prepared to contribute. Our parties all agreed on this point when we met in Moscow in early May. We are convinced that the same consensus is going to prevail at our meeting this time.

It is simply without precedent for capitalism to reassert itself where victory has once fallen to Socialism and where Socialism has established itself. This has never been the case and we feel sure it never will. [Applause.] The guarantee for this is our joint readiness to do anything that is necessary to help a fraternal party and its people to scupper the plans of the counterrevolution and to foil the imperialists’ designs on Czechoslovakia.

[…] As you can see, the imperialists’ tactics are marked by cunning and subterfuge; we must be prepared to counter their machinations and to unmask them in a timely and irrefutable manner. We must not close our eyes to the direct link that unites the tactics of the imperialist reaction and the activities of the antisocialist and counter-revolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia.

[…] Before we resort to the most extreme measures at our disposal we will concentrate on political means in collaboration with the healthiest forces in the communist party of Czechoslovakia to decisively repulse the antisocialist and counter-revolutionary elements and to maintain the KSČ in its role of the leading force of Czechoslovak socialism. We count on your unqualified support, comrades, and are looking forward to your speeches. [Applause.]

RGANI, F. 2, op. 3, d. 114, pp. 27–54. Unedited stenographic notes. Translated from the German translation of the original Russian document (original Russian and German translation in Karner et al., Dokumente, #38).

^{Appendix 5} CC Urging the United States to Halt “Hostile U.S. Media Campaign” against the Soviet Union

Politburo resolution of the CC CPSU.

P 92/82

26 July 1968

82. On the verbal message to the US Ambassador in Moscow concerning events in Czechoslovakia.¹

The draft of the verbal message of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow on the issue in question is to be countersigned (Attachment).

[Attachment]

On Item 82 of Prot. no. 92

Text of the verbal message of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow

Information has been received in Moscow about the verbal message Secretary of State Rusk delivered to the ambassador of the USSR in Washington, A. F. Dobrynin, on 22 July of this year in connection with the events in Czechoslovakia. Referring to comments in the Soviet press, notably to a Pravda article of 19 June, the Secretary of State expressed his concern about allegedly unfounded charges leveled at the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] regarding their interference in Czechoslovak affairs.

In this context it is necessary to make it quite clear at the outset that there is no reason why the American side should express their concern to the Soviet side. The Pravda article of 19 July that was cited by the Secretary of State is based on well documented evidence and the American authorities are obviously aware of the authenticity and credibility of the facts in question.

Generally speaking, we would have much more reason to direct the attention of the U.S. administration to the hostile campaign that is at present being waged in the United States against the USSR in connection with the events in Czechoslovakia. On a daily basis the American press, radio and TV spread all kinds of exaggerated reports, with the aim of giving comfort to the anti-Socialist counterrevolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia on one hand and, on the other, of causing bad feelings towards the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries and use these to stoke tensions in Czechoslovakia.

Many statements of various U.S. officeholders, including members of the U.S. Congress, have been made with the same objectives in mind.

In the above mentioned conversation with the ambassador of the USSR, Secretary of State Rusk declared that events in Czechoslovakia were a matter that concerned solely the Czechs and the other countries of the Warsaw Pact; the U.S. administration did not want to get in any way involved.

If the U.S. administration does not want the situation concerning the events in Czechoslovakia to deteriorate drastically, the US administration should in our view do everything in its power to halt the campaign that is being waged against the Soviet Union in the United States. It goes without saying that this campaign has a very negative influence on public opinion in our country and on Soviet-American relations in general. The Soviet government believes it is essential to avoid anything that might lead to a deterioration in the relationship between our countries and to continue to seek ways and means to improve them. This is also the declared aim of President Johnson.

1. The resolution was put to the vote and passed. Those who voted in favor were L. I. Brezhnev, G. I. Voronov, A. P. Kirilenko, A. N. Kosygin, K. T. Mazurov, A. J. Pel’she, N. V. Podgornyi, D. S. Polyanskii, M. A. Suslov, A. N. Shelepin, and P. E. Shelest.

RGANI, F. 3, op 72, d. 191, pp. 84–85. Translated from the German translation of the original Russian document (original Russian and German translation in Karner et al., Dokumente, #191).

^{Appendix 6} “Secret” Memorandum by Nathaniel Davis, “Czechoslovak Contingencies”

[No date, but from file location end of July/beginning of August 1968]

Tension continues to build, partly because tomorrow is the day the Czechs say the Soviets will start moving out. These are added disquieting signs: (1) [one line redacted] (2) Reportedly, an agreed paragraph in the Warsaw Pact announcement, saying Soviet troops would be leaving, was deleted when the announcement was made; and (3) An unspecified People’s Militia “operation” is due to start at 9:00 tonight.

Possibilities include:

• The beginning of at least token withdrawals, followed by Czech-Soviet bilateral talks early next week and some sort of inconclusive accommodation.

• Soviet unwillingness to remove any troops, continued pressure and continued maneuver.

• Soviet provocation of an incident, perhaps in connection with an ostensible movement to withdraw, followed by a Warsaw Pact call for re-enforcements to protect existing forces.

• Public disorder and violence, in Prague or elsewhere, which would trigger an unraveling of the Czech party and government.

• Militia arrests of liberals, with or without Dubcek acquiescence, or moves toward a coup of some kind.

Alternatives for the United States:

We are obviously not prepared to intervene militarily. Recourse to the UN is probably an “after-the-fact” alternative—certainly not an immediate option. In the very short term, the following seem to be areas where we have alternatives:

1. World public attention. We could find ways to intensify world-wide press, public and government attention and concern. This might have some inhibiting effect on the Soviets. The disadvantage is that it could further destabilize the situation in Czechoslovakia—including the discipline and calm of the Czech public.

2. As a further step, we could make various kinds of official U.S. government statements. We could also stimulate European governments to parallel action. However, we must be careful we do not repeat the mistake of 1956, in creating expectations we are not prepared to follow through on.

3. [A word redacted] may have some capability of stimulating Western European or other Communist Parties and press to call on the Soviets to stop interfering in the internal affairs of a brother Communist Party and nation.

Anything we could do to mobilize independent-minded Communist opinion, before rather than after the fact, would seem worth doing.

4. We might consider what kind of approach to the Romanians and/or Yugoslavs might be useful. Perhaps some discreet comparing of notes would be helpful.

5. We might consider what kind of diplomatic approach to the Russians could be helpful. The difficulty is that we are dealing with a vital interest of the USSR, and it is doubtful they would be responsive to any pressures we could apply or would be willing to bring to bear. Nevertheless, there might be some possibilities.

We have a whole range of things we could do in our Soviet relationship—including cancelling the PanAm inaugural, suspending exchange negotiations, bringing Ambassador Thompson home on consultations, deferring our strategic-arms talks proposals, etc. However, our relationship with the Soviets has historically always been paramount, and our Eastern European interest secondary. This is, no doubt, still true.

6. Conceivably we might have some way through a third party, etc; to signal to the Czech leadership to “cool it,” pull in their horns on reform, curb their press, etc.—if we think this is the best and only way to avert a debacle. There are certainly observers who think we should have done this sort of thing at an earlier stage in Hungary. On the other hand, we are not close enough to Czech developments or their leadership to have much realistic chance of trying to steer them.

Folder 5 “Memos Czechoslovakia, 1/68–8/68,” Box 179, Country File Europe, USSR, Czechoslovakia, National Security File, LBJ Library.

^{Appendix 7} Memorandum from Ambassador McGhee to the Secretary of State, 21 August 1968

Subject: U.S. Reaction to Soviet Move Against Czechoslovakia

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

1. We should, I believe, denounce in the clearest possible terms the action of the Soviets and certain of their Warsaw Pact allies against Czechoslovakia as being an unprovoked and unjustified act of aggression—both publicly at the highest level, in the Security Council and in the NATO, because:

a. We must make it clear that we do not accept the Soviet interpretation of the move as being a purely internal Communist affair. Otherwise, both the Soviets and the peoples of Eastern Europe will assume that we have given the Soviets a free hand within the Communist sphere.

b. We must disprove that we, as is often alleged in Europe, accept the status quo in Europe because of a desire to achieve a détente with the Soviets or a settlement in Vietnam.

c. Since the UN was formed largely to prevent aggression, we have no choice but to raise a case of aggression against one of its members, even in the face of a certain veto in the Security Council.

d. NATO, having been founded to defend against Communist encroachment against the Atlantic Nations, cannot ignore the drastic change in the European power balance caused by the Soviet move.

2. We should, at the same time, not give any impression that we intend to take unilateral action. It is not necessary to enunciate or explain this since the world fully understands it. We should not, on the other hand, give as explanation the fact that the Czech leaders did not ask for assistance. Everyone understands that this was not practical in the circumstances.

3. The Soviet move demonstrates once more, as clearly as in Hungary in 1956 and in East Germany in 1953, their continuing intent to use whatever means are required to keep control over the Communist nations, even in the face of overwhelming world—and even other Communist opinion. This sets severe practical limits on our détente effort, which must be taken into account in our future negotiations with the Soviet Union. This is particularly true in the case of the FRG, whose goals in this regard have become increasingly unrealistic.

4. Although we should not, I believe backtrack on any bilateral agreements already negotiated, i.e. Civil Air and Consular, we should not in deference to reality and world opinion proceed with discussion of any new détente efforts for the time being. Our engagement in disarmament discussions would appear to many as being as cynical on our part—as on the part of the Soviets. The NPT, which is a largely fait accompli and stands on its own merits, should not be affected.

5. The Soviet action opens up excellent possibilities for exploitation to our and the free world advantage.

a. Without any effort on our part, the implications of the present move are such that the world should now fully understand the nature of the Soviet regime and the lengths to which it will go to maintain its control over other countries. Although we should not stand back, we should let others carry the burden of explaining this wherever possible. In showing their hand so clearly, the Soviets move should have a particular effect on the attitude of the world youth. It should, if the young people involved are sincere in the goals they profess, bring the Soviets into their direct line of criticism and attack. Efforts should be made discreetly to encourage this.

b. A new opportunity should be provided to obtain many of our objectives within NATO which we have not been able to accomplish on account of a general apathy on the part of other states. We should be able at least to stabilize present force goals.

c. There is possibility that the Soviet action might precipitate a fundamental review of French policy, possibly leading to the French being willing to establish closer relations with the NATO organization and closer cooperation with U.S. and other NATO countries in their relations with the Soviet Union.

d. The Soviet move will, it is believed, take the steam out of the efforts of those in Congress who have sought a drastic unilateral reduction in U.S. forces in Europe. The opportunity should be taken to try to get public statements recognizing the changed situation by some of the Congressional leaders involved, particularly Senators Russell, Mansfield and Symington.

6. The move against Czechoslovakia clearly demonstrates the renewed strong influence of Ulbricht on the Soviets (after what appeared to be a temporary eclipse), even though this influence largely stems from his personal weakness and that of his regime. Since this may presage Ulbricht’s desire for renewed attacks against the FRG and threats to Berlin access, it might be advisable to warn the Soviets in advance of the serious consequences of such action.

Folder 1, Box 1, Czech Crisis Files, Lot 70 D 19, Office of the Executive Secretariat, RG 59, NARA.

^{Appendix 8} Svoboda about Dubček: “If He Were to Resign from His Post, It Would Be Better for All of Us”

Stenographic notes of the conversation between the Soviet leadership and the president of the ČSSR, L. Svoboda, and M. Klusák

23 August 1968¹

[7:00 p.m.]

Top Secret²

Svoboda: In Prague parliament held a session and so did the government; there has also been a CC meeting. I was asked yesterday to form a new government but I think this would be unconstitutional.

Brezhnev: Sorry, I don’t quite understand.

Svoboda: The situation has now changed for the better… In the Czechoslovak army 265 have been wounded and twenty-three killed, who are being buried now.

Podgornyi: And how many casualties among the Soviet comrades?

Svoboda: I can’t say for sure but there are some. We have taken all measures so that there are as few casualties as possible.

(Comrade Svoboda proposes that Comrade Dubček go to Prague, openly confess his guilt and resign his powers. If some other course was adopted instead, it was likely to result in popular discontent.)

Brezhnev: Ludvík Ivanović [Svoboda], if Comrade Dubček resigns his powers, who would then become First Secretary?

Svoboda: It is obvious you have not understood me quite correctly. Where is Dubček now?

Brezhnev: He is alright.

Svoboda: If he were to resign from his post, it would be better for all of us. If he remains where he is, that is alright as well. In any case it is necessary for Comrade Dubček to step forward.

Brezhnev: Where, here?

Svoboda: No, in Prague. All the members of the government have said that they will keep their posts only if Černík becomes the head of the government. People say about Bil’ak that he is a traitor. Bil’ak cannot be the head of the government, he has no authority with most members of our party.

Brezhnev: That’s all very well, Ludvík Ivanovič [Svoboda], but right now we should not be looking back, we should be looking ahead how we are going to avoid great bloodshed. Let’s be frank: the whole country is in a psychosis. Even before the trip to Čierná nad Tisou an atmosphere of utmost nationalist tension was created. No other slogans were shouted there apart from Dubček, Dubček, save Dubček. A great tension was in evidence even then. I do believe there must be reason why this situation was brought about. Moreover it now transpires that various underground radio transmitters and arms caches have been discovered. Today for instance submachine guns and other arms were found in a cellar of the Ministry of Agriculture. The whole thing looks as if there was some group, let’s cautiously call them rightists, counterrevolutionaries, that had been expecting things to take this turn. That they conducted the party conference in the way they did is further proof.

If we proceed in the manner that you suggest, if Dubček were to go to Prague, openly confess his guilt and resign his powers—let’s call this an option—what would happen? So he accepts the role of scapegoat and explains why he resigns his powers. And who is going to succeed him as First Secretary? To elect a First Secretary you first need to make sure there is agreement in the presidium of the CC in its old form. As it is, neither Piller nor Kolder nor Bil’ak nor Indra are included. Who is supposed to be elected? Will Dubček’s influence be sufficient for the purpose?

It is necessary for Comrades Dubček, Smrkovský and Černík as well as for your whole delegation to declare in advance that the present party conference has been convened illegally and has no function. This declaration has to be made first of all. Then the presidium becomes active in the old form which is considered legitimate. If you’re going to consider the party conference as legally convened and neither Bil’ak nor Indra nor Švestka nor Kolder are there, if there are, to put it quite frankly, no healthy forces present, who is then supposed to be elected? This is a course we simply cannot give our consent to because it is for this very reason that we have sent our troops into Czechoslovakia: to prevent the country from going down the wrong road. […]

We will evacuate our troops only when we have a binding commitment from you. We are under obligation to our allies, the other Socialist countries, and are unable to evacuate troops on our own.

Klusák: Were there German soldiers on Czechoslovak territory?

Podgornyi: No, not a single German set foot on Czechoslovak territory.

Klusák: Is it maybe necessary to put this point to the Minister of Defense?

Brezhnev: It is absolutely certain that there were no German soldiers on Czechoslovak territory. We kept them back.

Klusák: In Prague people are absolutely convinced that they’re there even now.

Brezhnev: This is an act of provocation. Between you and me: the German comrades were offended because they felt that they were not being trusted somehow.

Podgornyi: We did this at your request. We took the whole situation into account even though they were to have marched with the others initially.³

1. Added by hand in the original.

2. “Strictly classified” added by hand.

3. This is the final proof that the decision to refrain from deploying the NVA was made in Moscow at the request of the Czechoslovaks. See Rüdiger Wenzke, “Die Nationale Volksarmee der DDR: Kein Einsatz in Prag,” in Karner et al., Beiträge, 673–86.

RGANI, F. 89, op. 38, d. 57, pp. 1–19. Translated from the German translation of the original Russian document (original Russian and German translation in Karner et al., Dokumente, #107).

^{Appendix 9} “Secret” and “Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meetings, 1968

“Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 1 July 1968

Mr. Clifford, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Resor, General Johnson, Mr. Ignatius, Admiral Moorer, Dr. Brown, General McConnell, General Wheeler, General Chapman, Dr. Enthoven, Mr. Warnke, et al.

1. Personnel Matters

Mr. Clifford began the meeting at 0937.

[…]

7. Troop Reductions in Europe

Mr. Clifford said that we are having an exceedingly difficult problem regarding our troops in Europe. He has talked with Senator Russell on this matter. Senator Symington has offered an amendment to the Appropriations Bill, which might pass in the current Congressional climate. He proposes to cut U.S. troops in Europe to 50,000. Senator Russell has indicated that he is prepared to vote for the proposal. Senator Mansfield has stated that he has sought Department of Defense cooperation to cut our troops in Europe. Unless Defense comes up with an alternative proposal, the Senate plans to go ahead with the Symington amendment. Mr. Clifford said he had taken up the matter with the President and he has expressed deep concern. He does not wish in the closing days of his Administration to have the dismantling of NATO take place. The Senate has the bit in its teeth and they plan to take action. Mr. Clifford said he believed that the House was with us. Senator Russell feels we have to have a substitute plan because we can’t beat something with nothing. We will want to give our preferred attention to this matter. We need to have a plan in addition to the 34,000 that are now scheduled to be out by 30 August 1968. When these troops return, our European forces will total around 300,000. This latter figure is the one being used on the Hill and which they is excessive and should be brought down. We need to come up with a plan and take it up with our NATO allies. We may be able to work out something reasonable and intelligent.

Mr. Nitze stated that there would be the problem of coordinating any proposed reductions with State. Mr. Clifford said that the State Department feels that any reductions is all wrong. They have said that they can’t agree with any kind of reduction. They want to stand firm. We feel we must “bend” with the wind. He will discuss the matter with Secretary Rusk.

[…]

The meeting adjourned at 1023

R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary

“Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 15 July 1968

Mr. Nitze, Mr. Resor, General Westmoreland, General Walt (for General Chapman, Dr. Brown, General McConnell, Admiral Johnson (for General Wheeler), Mr. Earle (for Mr. Warnke), Mr. McGiffert, Mr. Stempler et al. Staff meeting convened at 0937 under Mr. Nitze’s chairmanship.

Symington Amendment

Mr. Nitze summarized Mr. Clifford’s and his meeting of last Thursday (11 July) with Senators Russell, Stennis, and Jackson. He reported that Mr. Clifford emphasized to the Senators:

1. The importance of NATO to our strategic defense;

2. The relationship and sensitivity of our European force deployments to:

a. the political situation in France,

b. the current commercial and travel problems involving Berlin,

c. the Soviet deployments to the Mediterranean, and

d. the political and economic changes in eastern Europe;

3. The relationships of U.S. force reductions to the general proposition of NATO and Warsaw pact force reductions and to the forthcoming discussions with the Soviet union on arms limitations; and

4. The troops withdrawals which have already been made (e.g., REFORGER).

Senator Russell replied that while he recognized the eloquence of Mr. Clifford’s arguments, he had heard eloquent pleas before. The Senator remarked that the only new developments were the recent political changes in Czechoslovakia. Senator Russell said that while we had been maintaining sizable forces in Europe for twenty-three years, he wondered how much longer the U.S. planned to keep them there. He felt that our allies were not contributing their proportional share and that Mr. McNamara has not made the reductions in U.S. European force levels the Congress thought he was going to make. Senator Russell also said while he had not realized previously that the Symington proposal would reduce U.S. forces to 50,000, he thought [the] Symington Amendment would carry—in some form or another—unless an adequate substitute amendment could be presented. The Senator mentioned the possibility of developing a five-year reductionin-strength program, or, alternatively, the withdrawal of some 50,000 men over an eighteen-month period.

Senator Stennis generally supported current U.S./NATO policies but was disturbed by the lack of adequate force contributions to the common NATO defense by our European allies. He noted that serious balance of payments problems still persist and that the various bilateral offset agreements hadn’t been very satisfactory. Senator Stennis also said that a substitute amendment was desirable.

Senator Jackson was generally more sympathetic to the views expressed by Messrs. Clifford and Nitze and concurred in the view that the most practical alternative to the Symington Amendment was an acceptable substitute amendment.

Mr. Nitze expressed the view that the Executive branch should not be asked to develop “for-the-record” a substitute amendment because of the subsequent problems it would create with our NATO allies. The Senators accepted Mr. Nitze’s suggestion but asked if State and Defense could work informally with them in developing an acceptable substitute.

At a White House meeting last Friday evening, (which General Wheeler and Mr. Clifford attended) Mr. Nitze had been told that while the President was pleased that Messrs. Clifford and Nitze had met with the Senators, he didn’t want anyone in the Executive Branch taking positions which would endorse a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. The net result of the President’s instruction is that work should continue on the REDCOSTE proposals but that we should characterize this effort as an “investigation of possibilities and not as a “decision document.”

Mr. Nitze said that notwithstanding the President’s instructions of Friday evening, serious balance of payments problems persist. Dr. Brown remarked that the RECOSTE effort had been characterized as a series of proposals to reduce “people,” not “forces.” Mr. McGiffert asked if we were still obliged to work privately with Senators Jackson and Stennis. Mr. Stempler noted that the ground rule affecting our informal work on an acceptable substitute amendment with the Senators apparently had been changed. Mr. Nitze said that since the Senatorial debate over the Symington Amendment would not take place for about two weeks, there would be an opportunity to review again the Executive Branch’s position with the President. Mr. Nitze then suggested that if anyone had a good idea on how Senatorial support could be mobilized for current NATO deployments he should contact Jack Stempler.

[…]

Staff meeting adjourned at 1035.

Abbott C. Greenleaf, Colonel, USAF, Military Assistant

“Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 22 July 1968

Mr. Clifford, Nr. Nitze, Mr. Resor, General Westmoreland, Mr. Baird (for Mr. Ignatius), Admiral Claret (for Admiral Moorer), Dr. Brown, General Wheeler, Dr Enthoven, Mr. Warnke et al.

1. Mr. Clifford’s trip to Southeast Asia

Mr. Clifford began the meeting at 0940.

[…]

5. U.S. Forces in Europe

Mr. Nitze said that with regard to the Symington Amendment to reduce U.S. military forces in Europe we have had two good editorials recently in the New York [T]imes and the Washington Post. We have the problem of how to handle Senator Jackson and work with him on alternative proposals. The President does not want to suggest moving any troops out of Europe. We have talked with Dorothy Fordick of Senator Jackson’s staff. We are suggesting language in the report of the Senate committee covering several kinds of amendments that could be made rather than suggesting an amendment to the bill. Mr. Clifford emphasized that the President feels strongly on this matter and doesn’t want to cut our forces in Europe at all at this time.

[…]

The meeting adjourned at 1042.

R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary

“Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 29 July 1968

Mr. Clifford, Mr. Nitze, Mr. McGiffert (for Mr. Resor), General Palmer (for General Westmoreland), Mr. Ignatius, Admiral Moorer, Mr. Hoopes (for Dr. Brown), Lt. General McKee (for General McConnell), General Wheeler, Dr. Enthoven, Mr. Warnke et al.

1. Negotiations in Paris

Mr. Clifford began the meeting 0938.

[….]

3. Negotiations with the Soviets on Strategic Weapons

Mr. Clifford said there is widespread public interest in the strategic talks with the Soviet Union. There is some indication that these could start within a month or two. He would caution that the press will be wanting to pick up pieces of information from Defense and State. All should be careful in this regard. No information of any kind whatsoever is to be given out. We can remain hopeful on the results of these talks. The talks will have a better chance of success if the lid is kept on comments.

4. USSR/Czechoslovakia Confrontation

Mr. Clifford said we are staying out of this one. We believe the best policy is to permit the Soviets and the Czechs to adjust their differences. We have a number of items going with the Soviet Union and it would be exceedingly unfortunate time to get involved. Here again he cautioned against comments on the situation by Defense personnel.

[…]

The meeting adjourned at 1038

R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary

“Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 5 August 1968

Mr. Clifford, Mr. Nitze, Mr. McGiffert (for Mr. Resor), General Westmoreland, Mr. Ignatius, Admiral Moorer, Dr. Brown, General McConnell, General Wheeler, Dr. Enthoven, Mr. Warnke et al.

1. Negotiations in Paris

Mr. Clifford began the meeting at 0940.

[…]

2. USSR/Czechoslovakia

Mr. Clifford said although we do not have the whole story on the discussion by the Czechs, the Soviets and others, the results appear to be a signal accomplishment for Dubcek and the Czechs. The effects will run through the rest of Eastern Europe. The Soviets had a sticky problem. The 1968 Czechoslovakian crisis is a far cry from the 1956 Hungarian crisis. He feels that the Soviets wanted to do everything except march into Czechoslovakia. The manner in which the Soviets and other communist nations deployed troops around Czechoslovakia was interesting. General Wheeler said the Communists had elements of between eleven and eighteen divisions deployed in the southern portion of East Germany. Three Polish divisions plus Soviets were deployed in Poland at the border. Other Soviet divisions were in the Carpathian District of the Soviet Union. In addition, there were two Soviet Divisions inside Czechoslovakia. Our intelligence people are looking into why we were unable to identify earlier some of the divisions deployed. One moved in radio silence and was not known to be in Czechoslovakia until our military attaché saw it while on a trip through the countryside. He noted around 3,000 vehicles. This casts some doubt on assumptions that we have made in the past that if the Communists plan a possible attack against NATO we would receive strategic warning. The Soviets imposed press censorship, security measures, radio silence and concentrated sizeable numbers of troops without our getting early notice. There is no question that they could have overrun Czechoslovakia in a matter of about two days. It would have been an easier task than in Hungary.

[…]

The meeting adjourned at 1048

R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretry

“Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 12 August 1968

Mr. Clifford, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Resor, General Westmoreland, Mr. Ignatius, Admiral Clarey (for Admiral Moorer), Mr. Hoopes (for Dr. Brown), General McConnell, Lt. General McPherson (for General Wheeler), Dr. Enthoven, Mr. Warnke et al.

1. Negotiations in Paris

Mr. Clifford began meeting 0936.

[…]

2. MIRVs

Mr. Clifford made reference to the decision to test MINUTEMAN III and POSEIDON. He again cautioned and asked all not to get into any discussions involving the U.S./USSR strategic missiles talks or these tests. We expect that the talks will be coming up within the next month or so. It will be a long, arduous, and sometimes frustrating negotiation. It will add to the burden of the negotiators if unauthorized statements are made. Over the weekend there was an article in the Washington Post by George Wilson entitled “Russians Slow Work on Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Etc.” The information in the article indicates that he got some of it from somebody either in the Pentagon or in the State Department. With problems on the Hill, being in the midst of a political campaign, it will prevent a lot of alarms and excursions if we do not talk about the talks and MIRVs.

[No separate item on “USSR/Czechoslovakia in the minutes of this meeting!]

[…]

The meeting adjourned at 1048

R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary

“Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 26 August 1968

Mr. Clifford, Mr. McGiffert (for Mr. Resor), General Westmoreland, Mr. Ignatius, Admiral Moorer, Dr. Brown, General McConnell, General Chapman, Dr. Foster, Mr. Warnke et al.

1. Review of Past Week

Mr. Clifford began meeting 0937

[…]

a. Southeast Asia

[…]

b. Czechoslovakia

Mr. Clifford said on Tuesday came the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviets and other Warsaw Pact military forces. The first he heard of this action was in a phone call a little after 9:00 p.m. that evening to advise him to come to the White House for an NSC meeting. Soviet Ambassador Dobroynin [sic] had called on the President shortly after 8:00 p.m. to advise him as to why the Soviets were taking this step because of the presence of internal and external aggression against Czechoslovakia. Dobroynin [sic] stated that the Soviets had been petitioned to interfere by the government of Czechoslovakia. These statements created great skepticism that night. There is still no indication of who the individuals are that allegedly called on the Soviets to interfere.

Mr. Clifford said it is difficult to understand the manner of the Soviet action. From a military standpoint it was a sophisticated operation but politically it was a bust. He would have expected a prearranged plan for a new government in Czechoslovakia. He would have expected a group to step forward and say they are the individuals who asked the Soviets to interfere, and who were willing to have a new form of government. He personally thinks there was a debate within the Soviet politburo. He knows that they were having extensive meetings. The decision appears to have been made hurriedly. They were ready to move because of the training exercises and practice for invasion which have been conducted over a long period of time. The buttons were pushed and once they moved into Czechoslovakia the whole thing collapsed. Some of the Soviet troops shot at the Czechs and some didn’t. The Russians could have made a contrived case of the external aggression accusing West Germany of infiltrating. The Soviet’s [sic] haven’t made a case in any sense of the word. World opinion thinks it is a shocking and appalling case of naked aggression.

Mr. Clifford said at the NSC meeting there was a discussion in great detail as to what we could do about the Soviet moves. From a military standpoint there was no doubt from the beginning that there was nothing we could do about it. Although we deplored the action no one suggested military action on our part. It was decided to proceed in the United Nations, first in the Security Council and then to the General Assembly. Instructions were issued for Ambassador Ball’s presentation. They also discussed the possibility of issuing a presidential statement on the crisis. General Wheeler thought that the president should issue a statement that evening while Mr. Clifford said he voted for a delay until we could see out events were shaping up [sic]. In retrospect he believes that General Wheeler was right, although he doubts a twelve hour delay hurt much. When issued, the President’s statement was a good one and forthright.

c. Briefing of Governor Maddox

Mr. Clifford said on Wednesday he participated in an incident which was a signal privilege. Mr. Rusk, Mr. Helms and he briefed Governor Maddox Twice the governor asked questions, but they not sure whether he was referring to Vietnam or Czechoslovakia so they covered both situations. Mr. Clifford said that he read in the paper yesterday that some arsonists had tried to burn down the Governor’s library. It was reported that both books were destroyed, even one which he had not yet had a chance to color. Mr. Clifford said it was less than an inspiring experience.

d. Deployment of Troops to Chicago

On Thursday Mr. Clifford said he began conversations about possible trouble in Chicago [at the National Convention of the Democratic Party]. He and Mr. McGiffert attended a meeting in the White House, first with Mr. Califano and then with the President. As a result, the President decided to preposition troops. If the police first, and then the National Guard can’t handle the situation, we would already have Army troops available on the scene. The president is concerned that if real trouble started it might turn out to be so big that the arrival of troops some 8 hours or so later would be able to do the job. The time to have the troops on hand is right after trouble starts. We have not given out the number of troops moved. The President hopes that their presence in Chicago will act as a deterrent.

e. Congressional Briefing

[…]

2. Military Situation in Southeast Asia

[…]

3. Czechoslovakia

Mr. Clifford asked General Wheeler to take a few minutes and give his observation and reactions on the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and its effect on the European situation. General Wheeler said that over the weekend the Soviets had increased the number of their forces in Prague from about 30,000 to 50,000. The Soviets are starting now to rotate some Soviet units which came from East Germany. The French in a NATO Council meeting called attention to the fact that East German troops deployed into the area of the Sudentenland,¹ which the Germans have historically claimed; the Polish forces deployed into the areas claimed historically by Poland; and the Hungarian troops into the areas historically claimed by Hungary. The French raised the question as to whether this presages the partition of Czechoslovakia. Dr. Brown said this deployment could be explained geographically since these areas are adjacent to these countries.

General Wheeler said that there has been more trouble between the population and the occupation troops. There have been several incidents where the Soviets opened fire against demonstrators. Our embassy in Prague reports their people have suffered a series of incidents: their vehicles have been searched; the Soviets fired guns over a military attaché’s car as he drove through Prague. Soviet soldiers broke into the apartment of an American and took a shot gun; and the Soviets intruded on the embassy grounds. Mr. Clifford said he read a cable in which the embassy reported it was surrounded. General Wheeler said yes, this was at the same time two or three Soviet soldiers broke into the grounds.

General Wheeler said that there is no confirmation that the Soviets plan to move into Rumania although they have the capability to do so. The Yugoslavs are getting somewhat upset. A meeting of the Yugoslav Communist party called for an end to the confrontation. They issued a warning that they would maintain Yugoslav sovereignty. They have cancelled military leaves and kept on duty those individuals who were scheduled to return to civilian life shortly.

Mr. Clifford asked how many foreign troops are in Czechoslovakia. General Wheeler said around 200,000. These consist of twelve to fifteen Soviet divisions, elements of four East German and four Polish divisions, and small detachments of Hungarian and Bulgarian forces. The Hungarians are stationed on the outskirts of Czechoslovakia. Tactical aircraft have been deployed to twelve Czechoslovakian airfields from the Western Soviet Union. The invasion forces have grown from 150,000 to 200,000 or more. Mr. Clifford asked how many of the 200,000 there are non-Soviet forces. General Wheeler said he would guess around 30 percent. Mr. Clifford said that this was higher than he would have thought.

Mr. Clifford asked Mr. Warnke for his comments. Mr. Warnke said it is difficult to sort out the various impacts. He would hope that the worst impact would be on the Soviet Union. Militarily it was a fine operation but politically a debacle that has stirred up adverse opinion around the world. In spite of our efforts at a détente the Soviets have made this move. The impact in Europe appears extreme. There will be a loss of influence of various communist parties. He feels that the French and Italian communist parties will be negligible factors. As a result, the Rumanians and Yugoslavs are restless. The Soviet efforts have increased their diplomatic deficit. Both the Yugoslavs, the arch-heretics, and Communist China, the true believers, have criticized the Soviets.

Mr. Warnke said these events show the need for a significant American presence in Europe. The Soviets have not been transformed. It shows that we still cannot forecast whether the Soviets might take action against NATO. The invasion should put an end to the Symington amendment. We should maintain a strong defensive posture rather than credit the Soviets with becoming magnanimous.

Mr. Clifford said he feels these events point up the basic soundness of the DoD position taken on the Hill. It is better to negotiate with the Soviets from a position of strength. The Soviet actions have added to the efficacy of this argument. He recalled the effort required to sustain our position on the Hill on the SENTINEL ABM program. Opponents argued that the Soviets and communism had changed. We successfully debated this move. The opposition group should have substantially less support in the future. As General Wheeler said the whole area of support for NATO had a serious problem on hand. In Senator Mansfield’s report to the President upon his recent return from Europe he was sanguine and optimistic about US/USSR relations. The ink had hardly dried on this report when the Soviets invaded. Unfortunately, however, the Soviet invasion will have an adverse effect on various important efforts we were making. The non-proliferation treaty is still hanging in the balance. The West Germans have not yet signed, the Israelis have not yet chosen to sign it, and many other nations haven’t signed. The Soviet actions may have an adverse effect. Further, steps were fast approaching a climax to start the talks with the Soviets on the limitation of strategic weapons. He hoped as time moves on that we can select the right time and get started on these talks. In some respects the climate might even be better for these talks as a result of their moves. There will be more realistic feeling about the Soviet Union’s attitudes.

4. Civil Disturbances

[…]

5. French Hydrogen Bomb

[…]

6. Project 693 and FY 1970 Budget

[…]

7. Legislative Matters

[…]

8. F-111

[…]

9. South Vietnamese Navy

[…]

10. Czechoslovakia Postscript

General Chapman said that the Soviet’s [sic] invaded Czechoslovakia because Mother Russia was directly threatened. We would expect the Soviets to take additional preemptive actions under similar circumstances.

The meeting adjourned at 1053

R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary

“Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 3 September 1968

Mr. Clifford, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Resor, General Palmer (for Westmoreland), Mr. Ignatius, Admiral Clarey (for Admiral Moorer), Dr. Brown, General McConnell, General Wheeler et al.

1. Secretary Clifford’s First Six Months

Mr. Clifford began meeting 0935 stating that it was thoroughly fitting and proper to state that on 1 September he marked his first six months of service as the present Secretary of Defense.

[….]

3. Eastern Europe

At one stage during the past week there were a number of reports that Soviet military forces were engaged in large scale maneuvers. Troops and arms appeared to be moving toward Rumania. There were also activities in Bulgaria and Hungary. Only Yugoslavia was not involved. These reports came in with such consistency as to create the greatest concern here. Mr. Clifford noted that the President’s statements of the threat to world peace if the Soviets moved into Rumania. The Soviets have assured the President that they have no intentions toward Rumania and no desire to create trouble. They state that the Czechoslovakia situation is a family problem which is no concern to or of interest to the United States or otherwise. We should leave their personal problems to them and they will leave ours to us. All this is said in an amicable and conciliatory manner. They have stated that they hoped that the events of the last few weeks will not effect U.S./USSR talks on strategic weapons. Mr. Clifford said our posture should be one of careful, guarded, watchful waiting. He asked General Wheeler to report on the military situation in Eastern Europe.

General Wheeler said there are from fourteen to seventeen Soviet divisions, four Polish divisions, and elements of East German, Bulgarian and Hungarian forces of less than division size in Czechoslovakia. The Soviets have moved some aircraft back to their home stations. These moves appear to be consolidating their hold on Czechoslovakia and do so with lower visibility. Western military attaches have seen no evidence of troop activity in Hungary. There have been field training exercises in Bulgaria. To date there have been primarily communications exercises, with no movement of ground troops. Yugoslavia is in a high state of alert. Rumania is on alert but has been dampening their polemics. We should keep an attitude of watchful waiting. General Wheeler is not convinced at all that we have seen the end of this.

Mr. Clifford said NATO is faced with a situation of considerable concern. NATO has noted with alarm the considerable number of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia which has a common border with West Germany. NATO has demonstrated deep concern at the movement of Warsaw Pact forces which are in position to effect the interest of one of the NATO countries, Germany. There will be more discussion this week and he will report on these at next Monday’s staff meeting.

[…]

The meeting adjourned at 1052

R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary

“Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 9 September 1968

Mr. Clifford, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Resor, General Palmer (for General Westmoreland), Mr. Ignatius, Admiral Moorer, Dr. Brown, Dr. Enthoven, Mr. Warnke et al.

1. Eastern Europe and NATO

Mr. Clifford began meeting at 0935. […]

Mr. Clifford said that each Monday he says this has been quite a week. The fact is that each week has been quite a week. There were a number of meetings at the White House. The Tuesday luncheon meeting was held on Wednesday with a long list of agenda items. The NSC meeting on Wednesday was devoted to Czechoslovakia and problems in Central Europe. The Cabinet meeting Thursday was devoted to Vietnam and reports on Czechoslovakia and Central Europe. A great deal of effort last week was devoted to these problems.

At this point the existing situation in Czechoslovakia is fluid. It is difficult to say which way it will turn. The Czechs are taking it as you would suppose they would. This has been an extraordinarily bitter pill for them to swallow. It will take a long time to get over the Soviet invasion. A disturbing factor in the whole situation is the erratic manner in which the Soviets went about their move. Militarily it went well, politically very bad. He would have expected the Soviets to have a good plan for the takeover. He would have expected that they would have had a group set up to invite them in, however, they couldn’t find anyone who would step forward and say it was they who invited the Soviets in. This made the Soviets look foolish. Further they produced no evidence of either internal or external aggression. Mr. Clifford takes some comfort from the fact they did it so badly. However, if they can make mistakes in Czechoslovakia they could make them elsewhere. Apparently it is a dichotomy in the Kremlin. Apparently the hardliners have prevailed over the softliners. Since the hardliners took over they moved immediately without laying the diplomatic and political basis for their moves. We have to watch the Soviets with the greatest care.

Where Yugoslavia is now is also a matter of great concern. The Soviets have long deplored what went on there. If there is continued trouble in Czechoslovakia and the Rumanian comments are disturbing to the Soviets, the hardliners in the Kremlin might decide the time has come to clean up the whole situation. As far as Austria is concerned, if they should move against the Austrians we have a strong involvement there.

What NATO should do has been the subject of discussions and different approaches. Mr. Clifford said that he and General Wheeler had recommended that this is a good time for a NATO meeting. There are substantial Warsaw Pact forces across from a NATO ally, West Germany. Also, should NATO give attention to the Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe situation. Sometimes aggressors are held back by warnings.

Mr. Clifford said that he, Mr. Nitze and Mr. Warnke met with Ambassador Cleveland. He reported that our NATO allies are concerned that our reaction to the Soviet/Czechoslovakian venture continues mild and restrained. Some Europeans have the impression that our desire to have negotiations with the Soviets on Strategic Missiles is so great that there is an implied understanding that the Soviets will look after their sphere and we ours and that we will move towards agreement. An interesting sideline of this is that during the initial days of the Soviet invasion there was an alert in Cuba. The Cubans were concerned that the United States would move in and take them over because they were in our sphere. Mr. Clifford said we could put a stop to this type of talk by having a NATO meeting. It would show that we are deeply concerned over these events.

2. National Press Club Speech

Mr. Clifford said his speech came at a most propitious time. It was a sound and firm speech. The questions that he received after the speech were directed at current problems. He stressed that in order to negotiate in today’s imperfect world one had to negotiate from strength. […] It would be calamitous if the Soviets reached the conclusion that the world is not concerned about their adventures. Once this kind of adventurism begins experience in the past indicates that part of the world can become inflamed.

[…]

[…]

The meeting adjourned at 1048

R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary

“Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 16 September 1968

Mr. Clifford, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Resor, General Westmoreland, Mr. Ignatius, Admiral Moorer, Dr. Brown, General McConnell, General Wheeler, Dr. Enthoven, Mr. Warnke et al.

1. Return of Marine Corps 27th Regimental Landing Team

Mr. Clifford began meeting 0935.

[…]

2. Central and East European Developments

Mr. Clifford said that we and others are engaged in a study to determine why the Soviets moved and when and how. We are seeking information concerning the size, deployment and equipment, and giving attention to possible next Soviet moves. He noticed an article in the morning paper that the Yugoslavs are deeply concerned. We feel that the Czech invasion is not the end of the story. These developments have led to a great deal of thinking by the NATO countries. There have been discussions of the holding of special meetings and the development of special reactions. He asked Mr. Warnke to report.

Mr. Warnke said the State Department has proposed a series of NATO meetings to make sure that when there is a full NATO ministerial meeting that specific results can be achieved. One alternative is to have sessions of the NATO foreign ministers at the United Nations, followed by a full ministerial meeting in November, advancing the regularly scheduled one in December by thirty days. Replies from NATO countries to these proposed meetings have been mixed. The Germans feel that the Soviets would be tempted to construe a unilateral declaration by the Germans as typical of German aggressiveness. One opposition raised to the meetings included the fact that the first meeting is proposed in connection with the United Nations. West Germany is not a member of the UNO. Also in such circumstances should Mr. Brosio, the Secretary General, be present? Nevertheless it looks like there will be a preliminary meeting later this month involving the permanent representatives plus a few deputy foreign ministers. There will be bilateral talks at the UN and the ministerial meeting will be moved up to November. He doubts that there will be concrete proposals for strengthening NATO until after theses meetings. Mr. Clifford said that the Nuclear Planning Group meeting is scheduled for 10–11 October. So far there is no change in the schedule. This meeting could be significant. General Wheeler said he will attend. The Germans are vitally interested in these developments as they feel the impact of events the most. They have a common border with Czechoslovakia. Dr. Birrenbach, Chancellor Kiesinger’s personal representative, and Herr Schmidt, a party leader in the Bundestag, have been among the German visitors to Washington. He asked Mr. Nitze to comment on his meetings with them.

Mr. Nitze said that Dr. Birrenbach arrived with a paper provided by Chancellor Kiesinger. This paper discussed the origin of the Czechoslovakia crisis. It suggested that the real interest of the USSR is West Germany and the Czechoslovakian crisis was only a phase. The Soviets had previously sent notes to West Germany citing Article 47 and 103 of the UN Charter. These articles give UN Security Council members authority to take certain actions against former enemies without Security Council veto. Mr. Nitze said we in the U.S. feel that the Czechoslovakian crisis originated in developments in Czechoslovakia. The Germans also discussed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Mr. Nitze said he pointed out to both Dr. Birrenbach and Herr Schmidt that prior to the Czech crisis that we were encountering serious questions of maintaining forces in Europe without offset help. The twenty-three years that we have maintained forces in Europe has caused us a balance of payments problem. The key indication we needed on their part was that they are prepared to do something about it. They indicated they would do so but they could not be out in front. It was suggested we organize secret negotiations with the West Germans to get them to increase their Defense budget. If we can get others to bear part of the cost we might do, say, a tenth as much. Mr. Warnke said he had discussed this with State and JCS. Dr. Brown asked how would they offset our costs, by U.S. purchases? Mr. Warnke said yes and in addition take over some of the U.S. functions. Also we would like for them to fill out their own forces. It is important to get going on this.

General Wheeler said there is some consensus developing. Minister Harlan of Belgium feels they need the support of actions by other NATO nations to help them reverse the present Belgium course. We need concerted NATO effort. General Wheeler feels the Soviets seized the Czechoslovakian opportunity to put additional pressures on West Germany although the genesis of the Czech crisis was the situation developing in Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Clifford said he told Dr. Birrenbach that prior to the Czech crisis we had expected restrictions on what we could do. The crisis has been postponed because of the situation. He feels this may be NATO’s last chance to take a new approach. We need to reconstruct, refurbish and reaffirm the Principles with which it was set up.

[…]

The meeting adjourned at 1055

R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary

1. Contrary to the widely held view of American intelligence and contemporary observers, no East German forces were deployed in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. See Brezhnev’s statement, “It is absolutely certain that there were no German soldiers on Czechoslovak territory. We kept them back […] the German comrades were offended because they felt that they were not being trusted somehow,” in appendix 8.

Folder “Minutes, Secretary of Defense, Staff Meeting, March–September 1968,” Box 18, Papers of Clark Clifford, LBJ Library.

^{Appendix 10} “U.S. Propaganda Strengthening NATO”

Political report of the Soviet ambassador to the United States, A. Dobrynin.

3 October 1968

Washington

Classified

Copy Nr. 3

American anti-Soviet and anticommunist propaganda on the occasion of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by alliance troops was directed from the start towards achieving a number of clearly defined goals in the ideological and political struggle with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. It was moreover a means used by reactionary forces to influence the US domestic situation and the mood prevailing in American society.

The question of the USA providing direct military “assistance” to Czechoslovakia arose neither on the spur of the moment nor later on. Even though for the purposes of propaganda the US administration does not support the “recognition of the attribution of spheres of influence” to the USA and the USSR respectively, both the United States’ first reaction and its subsequent behavior in regard to Czechoslovakia are based on the factual acknowledgement that the country belongs to the socialist camp, to the USSR’s sphere of interest and to the Warsaw Pact countries.

Against the backdrop of the weakening of U.S. positions abroad both in terms of ideology and foreign politics, which is mainly due to the Vietnam War and to the aggravation of racial and social conflicts in America, the US administration, its foreign policy and propaganda apparatus and diverse reactionary circles have attempted to initiate and to exploit a comprehensive campaign of anti-Soviet and anticommunist propaganda. […]

At present attempts are made in the US to present the events in Czechoslovakia and the circumstances surrounding them as “proof of the Soviet Union’s bellicosity” ¹ and of the doctrine that the US must build its relationship with the Soviet Union from a “position of strength,” while making sure at the same time that it does not fail to engage in a dialogue on important international problems that are of general interest. (The latter argument is proof that the irrelevance of former Cold War slogans has been generally recognized in the US and that the events in Czechoslovakia have not led to a backsliding into the pro-war sentiments of the past.)

Propaganda efforts in this direction are very much in evidence in the U.S. —people are toying in this context with the idea of making American policy “tougher” and of boosting the arms race. American propaganda has been making much of the effectiveness and the precision with which the troop invasion was carried out in Czechoslovakia and has emphasized that the U.S. had “underrated Russian military might. At the same time the idea is mooted that Soviet troops could invade Romania, Yugoslavia or the FRG at equally short notice. Diverse rumors are being propagated about the “amassing” of Soviet troops on the borders of this or that country adjacent to the USSR etc.

Measures that are being recommended in this context are the strengthening of NATO, the “implementation of defensive measures” in the Mediterranean, etc. […]

The Ambassador of the USSR in the USA

A. Dobrynin

1. The text italicized here is underlined in the original document.

RGANI, F. 5, op. 60, d. 469, S. 57–69. Translated from the German translation of the original Russian document (original Russian and German translation in Karner et al., Dokumente, #217).