Примечания

1

Prigogine, The End of Certainty: Time, Chaos, and the New Laws of Nature (New York: Free Press, 1996), 166.

2

I explain this process in “The Concept of Hegemony in a World-Economy,” in Prologue to the 2011 Edition of The Modern World-System, II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600–1750 (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2011), xxii–xxvii.

3

It is true that the “Marxists” divided into two camps as of the Russian Revolution, the Social Democrats (or 2nd International) and the Communists (or 3rd International). However, their differences were not about the two-step strategy, but rather about how to achieve the first step—taking state power. Furthermore, by 1968, the Social Democrats had stopped calling themselves Marxists, while the Communists were now calling themselves Marxist-Leninists. For the young persons who made up the bulk of the participants in the world-revolution of 1968, this debate between the adherents of the two Internationals, so important to the Old Left, seemed almost irrelevant, as these young persons tended to have disparaging opinions about both varieties of Old Left social movements.

4

One has to remember that, at that time, the principal policy of the Social Democratic parties—the welfare state—was accepted by their conservative alternate parties, which merely quibbled about the details. I consider New Deal liberals in the United States to be a variety of Social Democrats who simply declined to utilize the label for reasons peculiar to the political history of the United States.

5

Most Latin American countries had become formally independent in the first half of the nineteenth century. But populist movements there showed analogous strength to national liberation movements in the still formally colonial world.

1

I discuss them much more intensively in the last two volumes of my The Sources of Social Power: The Great Depression in Volume 3, Chapter 7, and Volume 4, Chapter 11: Global Empires and Revolution, 1890–1945. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), and the Great Recession in Volume 4: Globalizations, 1945–2012 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.)

1

The episode is related in Randall Collins, “Prediction in Macrosociology: The Case of the Soviet Collapse,” American Journal of Sociology 100.6 (May 1995): 1552–93. The original prediction of Soviet collapse was published by Randall Collins as “Long-Term Social Change and the Territorial Power of States,” Research in Social Movements, Conflict, and Change 1 (1978): 1–34.

2

There are many essays and books where Immanuel Wallerstein discusses the U.S.S.R. in world-systemic perspective. See his 1973 programmatic essay “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System” reprinted in the Essential Wallerstein (New York: New Press, 2000), 71–105. Also see Wallerstein’s paper co-authored in the spring of 1991 (i.e., before the Soviet collapse) with Giovanni Arrighi and Terence Hopkins, “1989, The Continuation of 1968,” REVIEW 15.2, (1992) 221–42.

1

Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire. (London: Verso, 2003); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Decline of American Power. (New York: New Press, 2003).

2

Randall Collins, Macro-History: Essays in Sociology of the Long Run. (Stanford): Stanford University Press, 1999, CA.

3

Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power. Vol. I: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760. New York: (Cambridge University Press, 1986). Also see the synthesizing essay of Randall Collins “Market Dynamics as the Engine of Historical Change,” Sociological Theory 8 (1990): 111–35.

4

Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times. (Updated edition). (London: Verso, 2010).

5

More in Craig Calhoun, Nations Matter: Culture, History and the Cosmopolitan Dream. New York: Routledge, 2007.

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