The Putin Interviews

Trip 3—Day 1—May 9, 2016

OS: Well, first of all, I want to say it was exciting to be at the parade. It was a beautiful, wonderful day.

VP: Was that the first time you’ve seen the parade?

OS: Yes. I wish I could have come last year, but, anyway… The marching, the precision, the pride—it was very powerful.

VP: They’ve been preparing for six weeks.

OS: I liked the women troops too.

VP: This is the first time the women’s battalion has participated.

OS: It’s a shame the US ambassador was not there. I’d like to ask you, overall, can you reflect on the last year from when you had the 70th anniversary—your feelings on the security of Russia. Has it changed since last year?

VP: Are you referring to the internal or external security?

OS: Both.

VP: I think that Russia is thoroughly protected. We have implemented a program to re-arm our fleet and military forces so that 70% of our weaponry and armed forces should live up to the highest international standards. We are restructuring our armed forces. The number of those working on the basis of a military contract is increasing. That is compared to the structure currently where most of our military are conscripts. Because we need military professionals—those with a very high level of education to operate the new military systems.

OS: So it sounds like you are following the Pentagon example of using contractors.

VP: Yes, to a certain extent, but not entirely. We’re still keeping a great number of conscripts.

OS: But in Russia you must serve, right?

VP: Yes.

OS: So that’s important to the concept of this day, May 9th.

VP: Yes, absolutely. In our country, serving in the army has always been received as a responsibility and duty, but also as a sacred right. As the authority of the Russian armed forces is growing, the number of those who want to serve in the army, who want to be trained in military institutions and universities has grown as well.

OS: What is the state of the Pacific forces?

VP: To a large extent, we have increased the number of our forces stationed there.

OS: Increased? Why?

VP: We have increased the number of our military as a whole. Our target is 1 million new who will serve. Right now we have 1.2 million people serving. But we have reduced to a large extent the numbers stationed in the Russian Far East. Given the size of Russia—Russia is still the largest country in the world—we need an armed force that is able to guarantee our security at any point all across Russia, and we are trying to do that, to achieve that. That is why we’re going to develop a network of our airports and our airbases—to increase the ability of our armed forces to deploy rapidly when necessary. We’re also going to develop transport, aviation—that’s what we’re doing right now—and also our naval fleet.

OS: What do NATO and the US think of these exercises today?

VP: I think you’ll have to ask them. I can say what I think about what they are doing. What are they doing? Last year they carried out at least 70 exercises within the close proximity of Russian borders, and that certainly draws our attention. And that means that we have to respond in some way. Last year we adopted a new national security strategy. There are no revolutionary themes. This is a document which is designed to help us build a security system. But our main task is not about confrontation or intimidation. This is about building conditions for co-operation on security in the areas which we believe are the most challenging, the most menacing to us and to our neighbors.

You asked about NATO and unfortunately it was not our initiative that back in 2014, NATO cut off all contact with us in the framework of the Russia-NATO council.[135] And within the previous months, we’ve heard it said often that Russia was responsible for that, but we are not. We didn’t want to cut this contact and we’re not the initiators of that. And just recently, at NATO’s initiative, we had first contacts—I think it was at the level of ambassadors—and we have to follow up on that. We have to seek common ground, there are many conflicts, many challenges that we can rise up to together.

OS: Someone told me that two days ago there was some US training going on in Georgia—the US were training troops, I’m not sure what kind—were they NATO troops?

VP: Yes, that’s possible. Because on our borders, either there or in some other place, we’re always witnessing some intensification of military activity. I spoke in public about these matters and I also talked about that directly to my counterparts, and that is why I can tell you exactly what my attitude is to what NATO is doing. I think that NATO is a rudimentary organism left to us from the Cold War period. NATO was set up when there was a confrontation between the Eastern Bloc and the Western Bloc. And right now the Warsaw Treaty has faded into oblivion—there is no Soviet Union, no Eastern Bloc.[136] And the question begs itself—why does NATO exist? And right now I have the impression that in order to justify their existence, NATO is in constant search of an external foe. And that is why there are some provocations to name someone as an adversary. [As I’ve told you before,] I remember in one of my last meetings with President Clinton. I told him that I didn’t rule out the possibility of Russia joining NATO and Clinton said, “Why not!” But the delegation of the United States was very nervous. Why? Because they need an external foe, and if Russia were to join NATO, then there would be no external foe and no reason for NATO to exist.

OS: Have you applied?

VP: Let me explain to you why the American delegation was so nervous about the possibility of Russia joining NATO. First, if that happened, then Russia would have a vote, and have to be taken into account when a decision was made. Apart from that, the very point of the existence of NATO would simply disappear.

OS: Can you join NATO and keep an independent force?

VP: Certainly. Right now the armed forces of NATO countries are not entirely integrated.

OS: It would be a good public relations coup for Russia to announce that it has applied for NATO membership.

VP: Our American friends would not even consider that. I think that in the current world, the current status quo, we have to follow a different path. We have to leave behind the Bloc versus Bloc mentality. We shouldn’t go about building up new blocs—the Eastern Bloc, the Western Bloc, NATO, the Warsaw Treaty organization. Security should be based on an international basis and also on equal footing

OS: So tell me—I mean, all these incidents like in Georgia where the US troops were there training advisors… Do you hear about them?

VP: Certainly we’re aware of what’s going on. So a certain country is demonstrating that they’re supporting a neighboring country of ours. But in order to build conditions favorable to establishing security, we need something else—not what’s going on right now. We do not need military exercises, we need to build up an atmosphere of trust. Just an example—Mr. Saakashvili, who incidentally has shamelessly renounced his nationality—right now he’s governor of Odessa[137]—which in my view is absolutely absurd. But he decided to take a chance and act opportunely and he attacked. He should’ve been dissuaded from taking this step. On many occasions, on the whole, we had a normal relationship back when he was president. On many occasions I told him that I understood how difficult it was to rebuild relations, but I told him that he had to have patience and that he should never take this terrible step of escalating the situation into a military conflict. And he responded, “yes”—he understood that, and said he would never take this step, and yet he did. When the United States talked about that a hundred times and I told them that we had to prevent a military conflict, and that we also had to rectify the situation and also rebuild relations. But they didn’t listen to us and what happened, happened. And we had to respond, because one of the first actions they took was to kill our peacekeepers from our peacekeeping battalion,[138] and that’s why we had to react. If this had not happened, then we wouldn’t need any provocations or military exercises at all.

OS: Where is most of the activity? Are most of Russia’s defense/security forces in the north or the south?

VP: We have more or less equal distribution of armed forces all across Russia.

OS: Except in the Russian Far East.

VP: Yes, a little bit less in the Russian Far East, but right now it’s not really that important where they are stationed, because the modern weaponry doesn’t need military on the front lines. It’s not really important where, during peacetime, military forces are located and stationed. What’s important is the means of waging war—how defensive and offensive capabilities are employed, how the military responds. We’re even going to implement a new reform of stationing our armed forces so as to create more favorable conditions—not just for the military, but also the members of their families—so that their children could go to school on a normal basis, so that they live in civilized conditions.

OS: Quick updates on Syria and Ukraine—I’m talking about security on the borders of Russia. I was very impressed with the classical music symphony in Palmyra,[139] but can you give me a quick update on Syria as it concerns Russian security and Ukraine?

VP: As far as Ukraine is concerned, I think you know what is going on. They have this crisis which, in a slackened form, is still going on. I think that the most important component of the Minsk Agreement[140] is the political settlement, but regrettably it is up to the Kiev authorities to implement this part of the agreement, and so far they are not doing that. They should have amended the Constitution in accordance with the Minsk Agreement, and that should have been done before the end of 2015. But they didn’t do that. They were supposed to pass a bill, a law on amnesty. This law was adopted by the parliament, but it was not signed by the president, nor has it entered into force yet. There is another law that should be adopted and that should enter into force—that is the law on the special status of these unrecognized republics. The current Ukrainian leadership says the following: they say that since, at the line of conflict, there are still clashes, there is still violence, then they say the conditions are not yet in place to implement this political settlement. But in my view, this is only a hollow pretext because you can easily create a clash somewhere at the line of contact and then this is going to go on ad infinitum. The most important thing right now is to achieve a political settlement. Then there is a second course which explains why this is being done according to the Ukrainian counterparts. The Ukrainian leadership insisting that the Russian-Ukrainian border where the unrecognized republics are located, should be closed. And indeed the Minsk Agreements presuppose the closing of the Russian border by the Ukrainian frontier offices, but only after the key political decisions have been taken.

But until these political decisions have been taken and implemented, until people are safe in those unrecognized republics, the closing of the border will only mean one thing—that they are going to be encircled and later eliminated. We talked about that during the long night when we hammered out the Minsk agreements. We talked about that in great detail. And our Ukrainian counterparts first agreed to that, but right now they seem as if they do not understand what is going on. Right now we support a proposal set forth by President Poroshenko to reinforce the observer contingent on the line of contact. He is the one who initiated this proposal and I have supported it. Moreover, he suggested that the OSC observers should be equipped with arms and we support that as well. The problem is further aggravated by the fact that the economic and internal political situation in Ukraine has deteriorated dramatically. And right now, some of our partners—I’m not going to name them—are saying that the Ukrainian president is not capable of making these political decisions due to the difficult internal political situation in Ukraine. And a year ago, I suggested that President Poroshenko should hold early elections and thereby reinforce his position, so that, even though we had differences, he would be able to push through all the required political decisions. But back then, our American friends, our European friends told us that the prime minister—back then it was Mr. Yatsenyuk and President Poroshenko had to pull their efforts together, they had to work together and we know how it ended[141]—by a split up in the government and a very difficult political situation. And right now when I remind our partners of that, they simply shrug their shoulders. The question is, how does Russia fit into all this. And the United States and Europe keep coming up with new accusations, trying to accuse Russia of something new because they cannot publicly admit that they’ve made mistakes. That’s why they choose to blame Russia. We have quite a famous poet who wrote fables—his name was Krylov—and one of these fables features a dialogue between a wolf and a lamb. In this dialogue with the wolf, the lamb is trying to justify himself, saying that he is not to blame for anything. And once the wolf has run out of arguments, he decides to put an end to this discussion. And he says, “Dear lamb, you are only to blame because I am hungry.” [laughter]

OS: If this happens—you used the word “eliminated” I believe—what’s the worst-case? I mean, how many Russian-Ukrainians would be at risk?

VP: It’s not about the leadership of those unrecognized republics. You see, it’s that everyone who lives in those unrecognized republics—there are about three million citizens there—they participated in the election campaign, they took to the polls, and that’s why—in the absence of a law on amnesty—they can all be persecuted as separatists.

OS: Three million people at the great risk. So it could turn into another situation like in Serbia, Bosnia?

VP: Certainly, that’s what it looks like. We remember the tragedy of what took place in Odessa. More than 40 people—innocent, unarmed—were encircled and burned to death. And those who tried to get away were beaten to death with iron rods. And who was responsible? People adhering to extreme, radical views and such people can enter the territory of these republics and do the same thing there. When I talk about this issue with some of my Western partners, when I’m telling them that mass infringements of human rights can be transpiring there, do you know what they tell me? They tell me that these people have to go to human rights organizations to seek protection. They have to ask for help—different international organizations. Think of what took place at the trade union building in Odessa and ask yourself who is going to apply to an international organization after the massacre that took place there?

OS: I can’t imagine Russia standing by and watching that happen.

VP: Not in the least—certainly not. We are going to help, but we cannot do so unilaterally. Because the key decisions are to be taken by the Kiev authorities.

You asked about Syria—despite all of the military achievements we are witnessing there, the most important thing that has to be done in Syria is a political settlement. We have made a contribution. Through our actions we have reinforced the government institutions. And we have dealt a great deal of damage to the international terrorists, but let us bear in mind, [as I’ve said before], that ISIS comprises militants from 80 different countries. And let me tell you that ISIS is not just laying claim to Syria or to Iran, they are also laying their claim to Libya and other territories up to Medea, Mecca, and Israel. Certainly we’ve done a great deal of damage to these organizations [ISIS]. But Syria’s problems do not simply stem from international terrorism, they also suffer from internal political difficulties and they have to be settled politically by engagement with the opposition. In our view President Assad is willing to engage in such a dialogue. But what is necessary is that the other side is also willing to do that. We often hear it said that President Assad has to go, but when we ask, “What comes next?” no one is able to respond. There is no answer to that. So I believe that the best, most natural and democratic way forward is to adopt a new constitution to which President Assad has agreed. [As I’ve said], this new constitution would be used as a basis for early elections.

OS: It’s sad when you hear… I’m not sure who speaks for America. Obama says one thing and then Kerry says one thing and then Obama says, “Assad must go.” It’s confusing.

VP: Well, now you understand what’s going on in the United States. But the partners are also very difficult to deal with—there are many differences in the region itself. Certainly attempts have to be made to take into consideration the interests of all those who have participated in this process. The most important thing is to ensure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria, of the Syrian people, and create conditions for refugees to be able to get back to their homes.

OS: It was a nice thing about Palmyra—what the Russians did in Palmyra.

VP: That was the initiative of Mr. Gergiev, the conductor.

OS: But clearing the landmines by the Russian troops—that was hard work.

VP: Certainly, but other things also had to be done such as securing safe passage to the airport in Palmyra. We also had to create conditions for them to be able to stay there overnight. And also we had to push back as far as possible the terrorists from the city. In certain places, the terrorists were only 25 km from the place where the concert took place. And the musicians could hear the artillery firing. In the sun, the temperature was plus 50-degrees Celsius and their instruments were not playing very well. It took courage and also a great deal of effort.

OS: Can we talk about Sochi for a few minutes? What is your feeling about Sochi personally? Your relationship to the city?

VP: You know, when we were preparing the Olympic project in Sochi, we had in mind turning Sochi into a sort of all-season resort. A resort at the international level. And when we first announced that, there were many who were skeptical, who were saying that this wasn’t possible. The transport infrastructure was not ready, they said, the energy infrastructure neither. The environmental considerations were also cited, the sewage system, there were not enough hotels. I’m not even talking about the sport infrastructure that back then didn’t exist there at all. And right now it is an all-season resort. In the winter you can go skiing and you can stay in a hotel on the coast at the seaside because there is a high-speed railroad connecting the mountain cluster and the seaside. There are two automobile routes and it takes around 20-30 minutes. And indeed Sochi has either turned or is now turning into a very good all-season resort at the international level.

OS: Would you live there, if you get to retire in peace?

VP: No, too hot.

OS: They say Russia spent $51 billion—is that right?

VP: I don’t want to give you the wrong number right now—I’ll tell you later. The question is about where the money went. We have built two gas pipelines—one under the sea and the other one through the mountainside. We have built a power plant and a sub-power plant. We’ve built bridges and tunnels, highways through the mountainside and a railroad circling Sochi, and 40,000 new hotel rooms.

OS: Your critics say that a lot of that money went to your friends—oligarch friends.

VP: [laughter] That’s absurd—it’s nonsense. Everything was decided on the basis of merit. And much of this money went to foreign companies which were contractors and they earned more than 1 billion US dollars. In some places we had international teams building tunnels, we had specialists working with us from Canada.

OS: Your defenders say that $44 billion of the $51 billion went to infrastructure.[142]

VP: I don’t remember the exact number or the exact figure, but probably that’s the case.

OS: Okay, we’re landing, but in Sochi you must have some kind of movie theater or screening room. I would like to show you at least 20 minutes of the film Dr. Strangelove.

VP: We will find one.

OS: It’s important for my film because you have talked about this idea of a nuclear hot war. And I’d love to see your reactions to the war room scenes, which are funny. I know you say you don’t have time for movies, but please.

VP: Let me give some thought to a place and time. How long are you going to stay in Sochi?

OS: Well, it depends—until Friday at least.

VP: Do you play hockey?

OS: I don’t play, but we’re filming you. My wife is here too.

[The plane lands.]

OS: Are you okay, Dmitry? [laughter] This is a very funny scene—the press secretary holding the boom.

VP: Yes, from time to time he has to work too.

OS: I saw Mr. Gorbachev was there today. You didn’t stop and say hello. [laughter]

VP: Yes, protocol invites him to official ceremonies.

OS: I know, but I’m saying you did not stop on your way out to say hello.

VP: I didn’t notice he was there. I didn’t see him. Where did he sit?

OS: In the stands—he was right there. You didn’t know he was there? You never see him?

VP: I received him in the Kremlin in my working cabinet.

OS: Many years ago…

VP: Several years ago.

OS: Well, I just think if you liked him you would have stopped to say hi—“Hello Gorby!”

VP: I saw him at a recent event organized by our media.

OS: Did you say hello?

VP: Certainly.

OS: First?

VP: No.

OS: [laughter]

VP: I do not have any prejudices. Gorbachev had very bad relations with the first president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin.

OS: Yes, I know.

VP: But our history is not overshadowed by that. And I met him and I have no problem with him.

OS: But he certainly supports you on the NATO issue.

VP: Yes, NATO, and also on the Crimean issue as far as I understand it. There was a time when he supported the opposition, but he has an opinion of his own and in some things we see eye to eye, in others we don’t. As former president he enjoys the protection of the Federal Protection Service.

OS: That’s nice. I would imagine you protected Yeltsin too.

VP: Yes, certainly. We have a law and certainly we stick to that law.

OS: Maybe next time succession.

VP: Good.

OS: [laughter] Okay, thank you very much.

Trip 3—Day 2—May 10, 2016

OS: Well, that was a nice game.

VP: We could have done better, but it’s okay. For me, without a warm-up, that wasn’t very good.

OS: You fell down one time—you were tired?

VP: I just stumbled.

OS: You started playing hockey at 40?

VP: No, two, three years ago.

OS: Three years ago? Really? At age 50?

VP: 60.

OS: [laughs] I keep thinking you’re 53 instead of 63. That’s cool. Wow.

VP: I couldn’t skate before that.

OS: I know, I heard that. Skiing too.

VP: And that’s very interesting—it’s always interesting to learn something new.

OS: What’s next at the age of 70?

VP: I don’t know. Bush Sr. went skydiving.

OS: Have you done deep-sea diving?

VP: I’ve done that already. I can’t say that I liked it all, but it was very interesting.

OS: Well, they didn’t hit you too hard—I didn’t expect them to. I mean, you get checked and you could easily break a bone, right?

VP: Well, sometimes that happens, but that’s sport. I played Judo all my life and didn’t have any injuries.

OS: But these are hard hits, these are like football. What if one of the men on the team, on either side, admitted in Russia that he was gay? Would you keep it quiet?

VP: [laughs] I’m fed up with all of that talk about homosexuals and lesbians. There’s one thing I’d like to tell you. We don’t have any restrictions, any persecutions based on gender. We simply don’t have these restrictions in Russia. Moreover, there are many people who have proclaimed their nontraditional sexual orientation and we’ve maintained relationships with them—many of them have achieved prominent results in their fields of activities. They’ve even been awarded state awards for the success they’ve achieved. There are no restrictions whatsoever. This is just a myth that has been devised, saying that in Russia there are persecutions against sexual minorities.

OS: Well, you have the “propaganda” law.

VP: There is a law that prohibits propaganda about homosexuality among minors. And the reason behind this law is to provide children with an opportunity to grow up without impacting their consciousness. A child, or juvenile adolescent cannot make a decision of their own, and unless you’re not trying to exert any pressure over him or her, and once he or she grows up, they can make any decision as to how they are going to organize their life, including their sexual lives. And once they become adults at 18, there are no restrictions whatsoever.

OS: I believe you. But there is a tradition, a macho tradition in Russia—a strong one. I mean, I don’t know if any of these guys would say if he had been gay all this time, in-the-closet so to speak, would come out and reveal it openly to his teammates? I don’t think so.

VP: Well, to a certain extent you might be right. But in Russia we still don’t have a situation like they have in certain Islamic states where there is the death penalty threatening homosexuals. In Russia, our society is liberal-minded to a great extent, and if someone were to declare that they are homosexual, that wouldn’t be a tragedy. Sometimes I visit events where people who publicly declare that they’re homosexuals, these events are attended by such people and we communicate and have good relations.

OS: Is that true in the military as well?

VP: There’s no restriction.

OS: No restriction in the military? I mean, if you’re taking a shower in a submarine and you know he’s gay, do they have a problem with that?

VP: [laughs] Well, I prefer not to go to the shower with him. Why provoke him?

OS: Well, it’s a traditional thing about it. You know, it’s hard for some men to accept that the guy in the shower with his dick hanging out may have designs on me and all that stuff.

VP: But you know, I’m a Judo master so…

[laughter]

OS: Also, I noticed that lesbians are not—the Russians don’t care about female/female sex because the tradition again is that babies have to be vital and babies have to be born and man/woman is a natural, Biblical relationship and that gives the child the strength and the vigor to be a citizen of society. So there is no interest in the female who is not interested in being fertilized.

VP: That’s true indeed. We have this tradition. I’m not trying to offend anyone but we highly appreciate that these traditions exist, we hold them dear. And I can tell you this that, as head of state, today I believe it’s my duty to uphold traditional values and family values. And why? That is because same sex marriages will not produce any children. God has decided so and we have to care about birth rates, in our country we have care for the health of our citizens, for families. We have to reinforce families. This is a natural stance any authorities should take if they want to strengthen the country. But that doesn’t mean that there should be any persecutions against anyone and in Russia there are no persecutions.

OS: May I just point out that even in a society where there’s some malfunction there will be many orphans and some of those orphans could be adopted by same sex couples.

VP: Yes, that’s possible. I cannot say our society welcomes that, and I’m quite frank about that. Incidentally I’d like to draw attention to the fact that many who are homosexuals are themselves against the right to adopt children by same sex couples. Do you understand why that is happening? There is not the same position in all of the gay community that same sex couples should have to have the right to adopt children. A child, I believe, will have more freedom once they grow up if they are brought up in a traditional family. Then they have greater choice.

OS: Good point. As we draw to a close, I mean our time is limited. We are coming to a close this trip. I have one more day with you on Thursday. I’ve looked at all the footage and I have to ask you some questions again just to clarify. Because sometimes I was not so sure about the answer and I had to ask again. And I also had to raise some concerns that are raised by Foreign Affairs magazine which I consider—not mainstream, but more like the official government viewpoint. This is the Council on Foreign Relations, which is very powerful. They publish this and they have all these experts who come in and they write on their fields in Russia. So some of these questions are raised by them.

VP: Someone, you know, dreams and someone wants to think this about me. These are only dreams, something they want. But that is not the reality and those who write about that know about that.

OS: I understand. This is an official point of view and therefore it is listened to in Washington and this is what you have to deal with.

VP: You know, there are different people in Europe and the United States—different people with different opinions. There are people who look 25, 30 years forward, they think about challenges that will emerge in the future. And they have a different attitude towards Russia.

OS: I’m not going to argue that.

VP: And there are some who would live from election to election and they only think about their own self-serving political interests.

OS: You have to understand my next question—most Americans think that Russia is certainly as bad as the US when it comes to surveillance—as bad. That’s just an assumption. Because of the old KGB.

VP: We are not better than the United States because we do not have the capabilities the United States has at its disposal. If we had, we would probably be as good as you. [laughs]

OS: You’re serious about that? You don’t think you’re as good technically? I’m not talking about money, I’m talking about technically.

VP: The US has great funding for special services—we cannot afford that. And their technical equipment that’s been developed. You know, after the Soviet era, after complete authoritarianism in our country, we have certain dislike for special services if they have too much power. We don’t like that. And we have this internal repulsion and the authorities have to take that into account.

OS: Is Russia collecting any bulk communication in any form?

VP: No, and I can assure you of that.

OS: Everything is sort of targeted?

VP: Absolutely. Special services are working with a targeted approach, but we do not collect bulk communications with the subsequent selection. That’s not what’s happening.

OS: I’m just talking about collection. Not reading it, just collecting it. Just using all the phone systems and all the Internet.

VP: No, we’re not doing that on a mass basis. We don’t have this network.

OS: It’d be nice if you said to me, if you made the point and said to me: “Not only are we not doing it, but we have found a way to do selective targeting without picking up a mass like the US.” In other words technically we have solved that problem.

VP: No, this is not about the technical side of the issue. This is about operational maintenance. Our special services work based on who they consider a suspect, based on their connections. We are not trying to take bulk information to search for suspects.

OS: 15 percent of the population is Islamic in Russia.[143] That’s what I’m told. And many of them are in Moscow, so you’re telling me that there is no bulk collection on Muslims.

VP: No, I can assure you of that 100 percent. Certainly there was violence at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s due to the Chechen events. But on the whole, Russia was built as a multi-religious country. We have a certain culture of maintaining relationships between different religions. And this has been built for many centuries. The Chechen peoples, just as many other peoples of the former Soviet Union, suffered greatly during the Stalin persecutions. But they didn’t suffer as representatives of the Islamic world. They suffered for political reasons. As for conflicts between Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. We’ve never had those. And this positive background is a great help to us. And besides, our Islamic community are all citizens of Russia. They have no other homeland. Russia is their motherland. They’re not migrants or migrant’s children.

OS: I’d like to go back to that right after this question. Can you tell me how much Russia spends on intelligence? The United States spends, this is published, $75 billion a year on intelligence of that $52 billion is civilian[144]—CIA, FBI, NSA, and the rest is military.

VP: If the United States built good partnership relationships with Russia, especially in the field of fighting terrorism, then they would be able to at least halve the budget on intelligence. And they would make the activities of their special services far more efficient.

OS: They could halve their budget if they did this?

VP: Yes, if we cooperated on an efficient basis they wouldn’t have to spend so much. And their activities would be far more efficient than now.

OS: So you’re suggesting that Russia would be spending like $30 billion?

VP: It doesn’t matter how much Russia would spend—what’s important is that if we pooled our efforts together then we would both work more efficiently together.

OS: So you’re not going to tell me the amount.

VP: No, it’s a secret. [laughs]

OS: All right.

VP: We have some published data, but I don’t remember exactly how much. But as I’ve already told you, we spend, for these ends, much less than the United States. And as we’ve discussed, the United States spends more than all other countries in the world combined.[145]

OS: And Russia spends 10 percent of that.

VP: 10 percent of the United States expenditure.

OS: It’s amazing because of what you’ve achieved. Now, back to Chechnya for a moment. A lot of people don’t agree with you about Chechnya which has been really a hornet’s nest for 20 years now. Okay there’s a radical element in Chechnya—we know about the terrorists—and there is a very authoritarian element in Chechnya run by the leader Kadyrov, who is very loyal to you. Many Russians have been critical of that. Many that I’ve seen have written about it—not necessarily dissidents, but people who are not comfortable having this relationship with him. He’s considered a war criminal and so forth. Other people ask, you know, “Why does the Russian Federation have to include countries that are so crazy like this? Why don’t you go and unify the Russian Federation with Russian people?” I know you’ve argued that Chechnya is part of the motherland, ‘Rodina,’ but talk to me more about it.

VP: As for the developments in the Chechen Republic and in the Caucasus, I’m not going to tell you any breaking news. These developments started right after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Once a great country dissolves, it’s natural that these disillusioned processes permeate all of its territory, and Russia was no exception. That’s the first point. Secondly, our economy collapsed as well as our social sphere entirely. And people were searching for a way out of the situation. And on the borderlands of Russia, people started to think how they could improve their life and overcome the difficulties they were faced with. And many, not just in the Chechen Republic, they fueled these separatist ideas. Nothing new about that. But as for the Chechen Republic, all of that was aggravated by the legacy of the Stalin repressions. People remembered the grievances that they had suffered after the Second World War. And that’s why the conflict erupted. It was developing and it followed a very tragic scenario. Do you know what was the critical turning point? Not just the military successes of the Russian armed forces. You know the conflict escalated and an attack was carried out from the Chechen Republic against the adjacent territories in Russia. There was even an attack against Dagestan, another Republic with an Islamic population, and the people of Dagestan didn’t wait for the federal center to respond, they took up arms to defend themselves. But the turning point was the realization by the Chechen authorities themselves, and the Chechen leadership that Chechnya’s development as part of Russia would be far more promising and far more beneficial for the Chechen people themselves than the aspirations for so-called independence. Traditional Islam didn’t want to submit itself to certain currents in Islam that outsiders were trying to bring to Chechnya from the Near East. There was a conflict among the local religious leaders, one of them was the father of Kadyrov, and the new religious leaders that had come from abroad from certain countries. And back then I had my first conversation with him and he told me that they were thinking about building a relationship with Russia. It was his initiative entirely. And he was not pressured into doing that. As a result, he became the first president of the Chechen Republic. And his son, the current President, fought together with his father against the federal forces. And together with his father he came to understand that the interests of the Chechen people could not be separated from the interests of Russia. Certainly, there were many people and there are still many people here that have a certain mentality—a heroic type of mentality as it were. Besides, we have gone through the tribulation of a civil war—a bloody one. Today, I’m asked to explain why Kadyrov or one of his entourage are so critical the opposition. I talked about that with him on many occasions and he promised that he would change his rhetoric. But his explanation is very simple. He says, “We’ve gone through blood and tears—we know what a civil war looks like—and we can’t afford to have anyone lead us back there.” I do not think this reasoning is correct. I do not support that. I am simply trying to tell you what his position is, what his explanation is. I believe that today he is president of the Chechen Republic and that’s why he has to show restraint and he has to abide by Russian law. And I do hope that in the end that’s going to happen. But we should not forget about his life before—about his life experience.

OS: But still, you’re supporting 80 percent of the budget of the Chechen government—it’s paid for by Russia. I forget the exact budget number.

VP: Not just the budget of Chechnya. This is a targeted approach the Russian government has taken. It’s aimed at redistributing our budget revenues with a view to leveling out the economic development all across Russia in all its constituent entities. We seek a situation in which all of the economies of all Russian regions are going to be self-sufficient, and in that case we will not have to grant them any support forever. Let me reiterate, this is not just about Chechnya. Out of 85 constituent entities across Russia, there are 10 who bring more money than they spend. But we use our federal budget to support many other entities—the Northern Caucasus, the Russian Far East, the Southern Federal District and some other regions. So the Chechen Republic is no exception.

OS: Did Chechnya have some troops or men inside Ukraine in this last conflict?

VP: They were volunteers. I know about that. That’s true.

OS: Let’s go—shifting subjects now. I mean you’ve talked about this in part, but I need to get it clear. Why did you, after 2001, acquiesce in the US military encroachment across Central Asia?

VP: We didn’t acquiesce. The US president asked me for support, and I also talked to some leaders of the Central Asian Republics and I asked them to respond positively to the request from the United States.[146] Partly to allow the United States to use their territory for stationing their troops and infrastructure and airports. I assumed that we had a common challenge before us—the threat of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan. And I thought that we had to work together to support the United States. Moreover, the US president told me that they’re not going to stay there forever. He didn’t say that they were going to stay for decades.

OS: He said that they weren’t going to stay forever?

VP: Yes, that’s exactly what he said. He said please help us—just for a few years. And we said all right we’re going to do that. We will support you. That’s what we said.

OS: So when was the wool pulled from your eyes? You know that expression? So, I mean, by 2006 right? 2007 in Munich you’re casting another eye on this relationship, correct? In 2008 you have the Georgian war? So what happens between 2002-3—there’s the Iraqi invasion, then you have the Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2004. What did you think when the Ukrainian revolution went down?

VP: Nothing happened. Nothing changed and that’s what’s important. When I was speaking in Munich, I said that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, when Russia turned full face to the United States to Europe, we were hoping for joint work, we were hoping that our interests would be taken into consideration so we could cooperate. But instead of that we saw the West expanding their political power and influence in those territories which we considered sensitive and important for us to ensure our global strategic security.[147]

OS: Well, if the US was involved in Ukraine at all at that point, what were you thinking? That the US was provoking these independent movements?

VP: The answer is very simple. The philosophy of American foreign policy in this region consists of and I’m absolutely sure about that, the need to prevent, by all means necessary, Ukraine cooperating with Russia. Because this rapprochement is perceived as a threat. Some people think that would lead to an increase in Russia’s power and influence and they think they should use all means possible to prevent a rapprochement between Ukraine and Russia. I think it was based on this ideology and not about seeking freedom for the Ukrainian people. That was the basis for the actions of our partners in the United States and Europe. Supporting radical nationalist elements in Ukraine to create a split—a fissure—in relations between Russia and Ukraine. But if Russia starts responding to that, then it’s very easy to demonize Russia, to accuse it of all the deadly sins and to draw allies, because a visible adversary emerges. So in this sense those who were behind it have accomplished their goals and they did that impeccably. But we have a broader look at the picture. Not from the point of view of confrontation, of trying to draw satellites to your side on the basis of the external threat. If you look forward 25 years into the future, if you have a look at how the world situation is going to develop, then you need to change the philosophy, the approach you take with regard to international relations, including those with Russia.

OS: But then somewhere between 2004 and 2007 in Munich, the ball moves the other way. Iraq’s a disaster, Afghanistan’s a disaster. Somewhere in there you change your point of view.

VP: In Munich, I said how do we assess the situation? The Soviet Union collapsed. There is no longer a foe, an adversary to the United States and to the West as a whole. So what’s the point in expanding NATO? Against who? And after that there were two waves of NATO expansion following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, sort of this myth that every country can choose how they’re going to ensure their security. Well we’ve heard that on many occasions. But this myth is nonsense. In order to ensure the security of many countries, if they feel threatened, it’s not necessary to expand NATO. You can conclude bilateral agreements on mutual assistance and security. There is no need to create a false image of an adversary. There have been two expansion waves. But after that, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty. That’s a very important issue. An essential one. And they are always saying to us that we are not concerned by that, this is not a threat to Russia. Allegedly they did that to counter the threat of Iran. But right now the Iranian issue has gone. A treaty has been signed. Iran has renounced any military nuclear programs. The United States has agreed to that. They have said they have signed the relevant document. But the ABM development program is still underway in Europe—some of its elements are to be stationed there. Against whom are they doing that? And this requires a response from Russia. There was a prominent world leader, Otto Von Bismarck, who said that in similar situations, conversations are not important—potentials are important. And a potential is being built up right next to our borders. What are we to do? But we have to give it some thought, but we can follow up on this conversation later.

OS: Yes, have a good night sir.

VP: Thank you. Did you like the game?

OS: Yes, it was fun, I enjoyed it. You must be tired in the muscles.

VP: No, it’s all right—I’ll try to catch up with my sleep.

Trip 3—Day 3—May 11, 2016

OS: Hello, Mr. President, how are you today?

VP: Okay, how are you?

OS: I’m tired today. Didn’t sleep well.

VP: I played hockey, but you’re the one who’s tired!

OS: Yeah, but your muscles hurt. I took a nice walk with my wife in the park.

VP: Oh, that’s wonderful.

OS: I was thinking about Sochi in the Fourth Century B.C.—what it must’ve been like.

VP: You know, Odysseus went to collect the Golden Fleece here.

OS: Yes, that’s what I’m saying—the Fourth Century, Fifth Century too. This is legendary.

VP: And when the travelers were approaching the place where the Sea of Azov unites with the Black Sea—that place is called Tanang here in Russia—and they decided that that place caused the descent to Tartarus, that is, to the underworld. Because in that place there were many underground streams, geysers and earthquakes all the time. In the United States there is a valley like that, and we have a similar valley in the Russian Far East.

OS: And also, Jason and the Golden Fleece, the Amazons in Theseus, all the horse-people. And also in Sochi, weren’t they like Americans looking for oil?

VP: No, it didn’t used to be like that. Right now we have certain plans to extract hydrocarbons here. We have to be cautious, because traditionally this place has been a resort in Russia. Not far from here, on the coast, there was quite a large oil refinery, and Exxon Mobil has shown some interest in using those ports and operating them.

OS: Last night we stopped at the 2007 Munich speech.

VP: I forgot about that.

OS: That’s okay.

OS: So recovering from 2001, when you made this alliance with the US to now—to 2016. But for the readers, I just want to recount quickly—bear with me as I recount the events and then you can correct me when I finish. So, you know, in the ’90s you’d been around and you’d certainly been aware of the US actions in Kosovo, and the bombing of Belgrade. And obviously the break-up of Yugoslavia. But in 2001, you offer an alliance and cooperation and friendship with the US administration and it leads of course to the disappointments and failures of the US-NATO coalition in Afghanistan and Iraq. In that period there’s a NATO expansion, another wave of NATO expansion, and the ABM Treaty of 1972 is cancelled by the United States. We have, in that same time period in 2004, you have the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. And we talked about it last night but I gather there is no threat to you—to Russia, yet, of a breakaway by Ukraine. It’s not considered. The factions in Ukraine start breaking up, start arguing with each other and fighting with each other, and the threat, the fear, of a unified Ukraine leaving Russian is not yet there.

I gather, in this same period, you’re a bit enamored of the idea of a partnership with the United States, and being courted by Wall Street, being encouraged by Wall Street. In 2004, for example, you’re seen singing with Sharon Stone. I want to remind you of that. Come over here, Fernando, and show him. It’s a very funny clip. [wrong clip plays] Well, keep trying because I would love to get his reaction to it.

So, your first term is coming to an end. In the middle of all this, and you told me a fascinating conversation on my first visit, in 2005 you complained to Bush about US support of terrorism in Central Asia. And that was an interesting story. And you said, I think it was the CIA had sent your Special Services a letter saying that they in fact supported the terrorists in Central Asia—something to that effect. Am I wrong?

VP: Yes, we had that conversation, but this was not about Central Asia. This was the following—according to the data we received, employees of the United States in Azerbaijan contacted militants from the Caucasus. And I told the US president about that, and he said that he would sort it out, and that he would look into it. Later, through our partner channels, we received a letter from the CIA which stated that “our colleagues thought they had the right to maintain contact with all the representatives of the opposition and that they were going to continue to do that.” It even named the employee of the US Special Services who worked in the US embassy in Baku.

OS: And all this while they’re fighting the war against terror in Afghanistan.

VP: I do not remember the exact year, but it seems like that.

OS: That seems like contradictory behavior and strange.

VP: We have gotten used to these contradictions. Back then I also thought this was somewhat contradictory. But this attitude when you want to use someone for your purposes and you don’t want to cooperate to achieve the goals your partners are pursuing, this certainly leads to mutual suspicion and this doesn’t create favorable conditions for efficient joint work.

OS: I guess the letter is top secret so it’s not available for viewing?

VP: I don’t think that would be appropriate. Suffice it to say that I already shared this information with you. Somewhere in the archives this letter is being kept. I think George [Bush] remembers our conversation. We met at an event in another country. I think it was the UK, but I don’t remember exactly.

OS: So now it’s 2008 and two big things happened in that year. The financial crisis hits the West, but it deeply affects Russia. It’s almost as if a rug were pulled out from under you.

VP: Yes, that was a troubling time.

OS: And Russia is told by Wall Street it has to change its ways?

VP: No, I wouldn’t say that. There was no dictate, we didn’t feel that. A lot was incumbent upon us. Back then I was the chairman of the government of the Russian Federation. According to the Russian constitution, the government is the supreme executive authority of the country and it is responsible for managing the economy of the country. And that’s why we acted quite swiftly elaborating an anti-crisis plan which provided support to the most vulnerable branches of our economy. We emphasized supporting the banking sector because that is the cardiovascular system of the whole economy. We tried to create conditions that would allow banks to not just get support from the government and from the central bank of Russia. We also wanted our banks to perform the main functions, that is providing lending, loaning money to the real economy. That was a real problem both to us and to the United States, to Europe. We needed to ensure, amidst great risks, that financial sectors flow into the real economy.[148]

We set forth this special plan to fight unemployment, to create new jobs. And also actual plans to support the most vulnerable, the most damaged sectors of our economy. I refer in particular to the automobile industry, aircraft construction industry, and some of others. So one of the main goals that we were addressing was to ensure that we performed all our social obligations to the population. We had to pay salaries and pensions and social benefits.

OS: It’s a tough time.

VP: But on the whole, we did manage to live up to the expectations.

OS: Right. But, I remember in the West it was scary. And obviously they were bringing up the spectre again—because the private banks misbehaved—they were bringing up the spectre of “you’ve got to diversify your economy.”

VP: I cannot agree with you that someone was not satisfied with the behavior of our private banks. There were great concerns that those banks suffered from margin calls, which were due to economic changes. They had an obligation to pay their credits back to Western banks. And so our enterprises were concerned that they would not be able to. Everyone was asking the government to lend a hand to our private banks and our enterprises that had borrowed money from foreign banks. And that’s exactly what we did—we lent a hand—through different tools, like direct funding, quasi-state financial institutions. We prevented all mistakes—in hindsight I can say that there were no serious mistakes made. Moreover, we didn’t change the structure of the Russian economy for the worse. You need these conditions in Russia, in the United States and others in the developed countries. There is a great temptation to expand the state-run sector of the economy. We didn’t do that. In spite of the fact that certain private companies’ owners came to me as chairman of the government and they suggested that the government should purchase their companies at a minimum level—one Ruble—that’s the price they offered, because they wanted us to assume the responsibility to pay back their debts and to maintain a certain number of jobs.

OS: Were those the auto companies?

VP: These were different companies. But we didn’t do that. We didn’t take this path. We decided to support the private sector, and to a certain extent we have saved a great number of private enterprises. The fact is that the business community itself showed great maturity in their judgment. And to me, that was quite a surprise to be honest. Indeed, they were willing to risk their private capital, their money, to assume responsibility. They were ready to fight for their enterprises, and in the end, out of this situation we have emerged without new losses. Moreover, this government used all these measures, providing support to the banking sector, and even made money on that. The government not only helped the private sector, it also got money from that. And this gives me grounds to believe that the plans and consequences had turned out to be quite efficient.

OS: Would it be mistaken of me to say that by 2008 your courtship with the West was reaching an end? That’s the period when you could be seen with Sharon Stone and seen as pro-American. You had come to a new beginning, and a new phase?[149]

VP: We have never adhered to a pro-American position, per-se. We have always assumed a position aimed at ensuring our national interests. Back then, we thought it was necessary to forge good relations with the United States. And I still think that. I didn’t change my position in this regard. Our partners have to change their attitude towards us. We have to understand that there are not just their interests, there are also our interests. And in order to develop these relations harmoniously we have to treat each other with respect. Right now, you recalled the 2008 crisis. Apart from supporting the national business and lending a hand to the banking system, the Government provided this support to everyone without exception. Including to foreign shareholders and financial institutions in Russia with 100 percent capital of foreign origin, despite the fact that in certain countries, when they were fighting the crisis, they accepted from those who weren’t entitled to get government support from Russian enterprises. And what’s more important, we didn’t take the path of restricting the flow of capital even amid financial constraints. We could have restricted the flow of capital—there are many restrictive instruments like that, but we didn’t use any of those instruments. And in the end I think that was the right call, because that brings trust from investors in the government actions.

OS: Okay, let me put it another way. Would you say that in a sense you were being courted by Wall Street before 2008. You were, in a sense, a junior partner of the American century—in their view—and then all of a sudden this happens, as many of us in the West began to doubt the foundations of Wall Street, the foundations of the West. We’re not thinking about Russia. We’re thinking about the whole economic system—global system. Does it make sense? Were you naïve in other words, to believe in that system?

VP: I’m not going to talk about Wall Street, about what they think, and how they act and how they used to act and think. Wall Street is suffering itself from the faulty, erroneous actions the US administration takes in foreign policy. I’m talking about Wall Street in the broader sense of the term, not just about the financial component of the American economy. I can say that many more American enterprises would still be willing, with great pleasure, to work in Russia—and they want to do that. But their activities are restricted. And in my view that is a great mistake the US administration is making. We have an expression which says that if a place is free, then surely someone will come grab it. And indeed, these places are going to be grabbed by rivals. And business people from Wall Street understand that full well. And we have many friends and allies there—that’s why I have to defend and protect them from your accusations. [laughter]

OS: Well, I’m looking for a change in your thinking but it doesn’t seem like you admit to it now, so let’s move on.

VP: You know, there is one thing I have to say where we agree—the certain naiveté with regards to our relations with our partners—it was there. We thought that our country had changed drastically. We had voluntarily taken due political actions of great importance. We had prevented violent actions from happening when the Soviet Union dissolved. We had opened up to our Western partners. Suffice it to say to remind you that the former head of the KGB had opened to the US partners the whole system of surveillance in the American Embassy in Moscow.[150] He told them everything about that thinking that the US was ready to do the same, with the Embassy of Russia in the United States. And that was not the most well-thought-through decision, because there was nothing in response from the United States.

OS: Well, a lot of the neoconservative historians misinterpreted a lot of the files to favor their point of view in history. So there were a lot of arguments about the old Cold War files that came out of the Kremlin, as well as people who were looking for the JFK assassination papers. There was all kinds of stuff going on—it was quite a commotion in the mid-’90s, as I remember.

VP: I know all these speculations about that tragedy—the assassination of JFK—and attempts at trying to implicate the Soviet Union. As former head of the Russian FSB, I can say that the Soviet Union had nothing to do with the JFK assassination.

OS: [laughter] I believe you. And I think other people believe you.

VP: You know, if you stick to that logic, you can shift all the blame on Russia saying that all assassinations were done with the participation of the Soviet Union.

OS: Yeah, I was never one of those.

OS: In 2008, from the American point of view, the war in Georgia marks a prominent return of Russia to an independent position showing off military muscle for the first time since 1991—correct me if I’m wrong.

VP: Sure, something like that. I told you, we have reduced significantly our armed forces. Moreover, we still have plans to reduce our armed forces even more. We’re going to do that calmly as new military equipment arrives. Right now we do not have any plans for immediate reductions. But on the whole, as we receive new military equipment, the personnel is also going to change.

OS: That’s not what I’m asking. I’m asking, from the US point of view, it’s seen as a significant departure from the Russian behavior of the previous years. Tell us a little bit about the war and what was at stake and why you committed the troops.

VP: In the first place, I was not the one who made this decision, it was taken by President Medvedev—the then-president of Russia. I’m not going to conceal it. Indeed, I knew about this decision. Moreover, when I had been president for my second term, we had thought about possible actions, these kinds of actions, from Georgia. But certainly we had hoped that this would not come to pass. And let me remind you how this conflict erupted. President Saakashvili ordered his troops to attack the territory of South Ossetia. And during the first strike they performed, they destroyed the peacekeeper space—Russian peacekeepers. During the first strike, 10 or 15 people died. The strike performed by the Georgian troops with multiple rocket launcher systems, and people simply didn’t have time to get out of their barracks. And afterward, Georgia performed a large-scale military assault. I’d like to look at other countries’ representatives and ask them what they would do if one strike were to destroy all their peacekeepers. So we did lend a hand to South Ossetia, but we were also—and I’d like to emphasize that—performing our duties as peacekeepers. And apart from that, we suffered losses, unprovoked. We could have perceived that as an attack against the Russian Federation. On many occasions, repeatedly, I told the US, the European partners, the Georgian leadership—I asked them to prevent the escalation of this conflict.[151] I’d like to draw attention to the fact that when I was president, I had met the leadership of the then-unrecognized republics of Ossetia or Abkhazia. I met with them because we harbored a thought that this internal conflict that had been going on for many decades, would be resolved by peaceful means. I’m not talking about what they could have achieved, about the territorial integrity, or other form of association that they could have arrived at, but through peaceful means. Instead, President Saakashvili chose to commit this act of provocation. Back then, I talked to a number of my counterparts and they were saying, “What do you expect, he’s mad?”[152] I’m talking about my counterparts from the Western countries.

OS: Oh, so you talked to your counterparts in the West and they blamed it on Saakashvili?

VP: Yes, during the first days of the conflict, and I told them, “Yes, probably he is mad, but he’s killing our people. Either stop him, or we will have to act ourselves.” But no one was going to check him or they simply couldn’t, I don’t know. And that’s why we had to respond. And I’d like to draw attention to the fact that we didn’t respond immediately—it took us several days after the beginning of the aggression. We did expect someone to interfere, to make him withdraw troops from South Ossetia, to stop these actions. But nothing like that happened. So in our perspective, nothing had changed. They simply pushed us beyond a certain point and we couldn’t let anyone go beyond that line. We were provoked into doing what we did.

OS: Do you think that the US or NATO, in any way, are supporting Saakashvili to do this or told him that it was okay to try?

VP: I do not have 100% surety that someone had provoked him, that someone had been behind this. I don’t know about that. But I think that he would never be bold enough to do that on his own. In any case, no one tried to stop him.

OS: That was where the issue occurred where President Medvedev apparently delayed a day or two, and you urged him to get in, per treaty.

VP: Yes, that’s true. However, this decision was being taken. Russia showed restraint, patience, even amid an armed attack against our peacekeepers and killings of innocent people. Afterwards, I’d like to repeat that. It turned out that no one was trying to stop that agent provocateur. In the end, President Medvedev made the right decision.

OS: I heard that the Russian government realized they had to modernize their forces after that brief war—call it a war. The performance of the troops was underwhelming.

VP: They performed quite well. They were quite efficient. But it turned out that indeed modernization was required, new adjustments. These developments convinced us that we had to do it. Because no one was dissuaded from taking such actions against us.

OS: So the modernization of the army starts to really increase and the budget goes up, the machinery gets better.

VP: You know, this is not just about the Georgian development, because this was simply about the expiration date of our equipment. It had to be changed because the expiration date was approaching.

OS: Right. What about the nuclear force? What was the status of it then?

VP: Since that time, indeed, we have done a great deal of work to modernize our nuclear potential.

OS: Starting then?

VP: We had done that before we had plans. And we had been implementing those plans in accordance with the schedule we had set forth. But afterwards, after these developments, we became disciplined carrying out those plans—the financial discipline, technological discipline. And as of now, our nuclear deterrent forces are in very good shape. This is the most modernized component of the Russian armed forces, including the systems that are devised to surmount the ABM system of a potential adversary.

OS: Okay, I’d like to skip forward from 2008 into the Ukraine crisis. We’ve had this discussion before on my first visit, on the terrace, and I’ve listened to it and realized there are things I didn’t ask. And I want to go over it, just to be really clear, because this will be very important to the people who will be watching the documentary or reading this transcript.

VP: Certainly. Indeed, it requires a great deal of effort to clarify all that. Because your colleagues, your Western journalists are very talented people. They are capable of convincing people that black is white and vice versa. Just as an example—the tragic events, the assault against South Ossetia—Mr. Saakashvili publicly announced that he ordered his troops to commence that action. One of his dignitaries even spoke on television saying the same thing. I didn’t believe it when I heard it, when the media was accusing Russia of this attack. And millions of TV viewers believed that all across the world. This is just astounding, this capacity that your American and European journalists can have. You’re all very talented. But when our journalists try to protect Russian national interests, when they take a stance, they are declared immediately the mouthpiece of Kremlin propaganda—much to my chagrin.

OS: It’s a double standard. I would love to see a debate—a meeting between Mr. Saakashvili and you—it would be great to see the two of you in a room.

VP: We met on many occasions.

OS: Are you convinced he’s still mad?

VP: I have never said that.

OS: I thought you said he was mad?

VP: No, I was told by my Western counterparts that he was mad. And I could never afford to say anything like that to my counterpart, either the incumbent or the previous ones.

OS: When’s the last time you saw him?

VP: I do not remember. Certainly before the crisis in South Ossetia.

OS: Not after the war, though?

VP: No, but on many occasions I said to him, “Mikheil Nikolaevich, please do everything to prevent bloodshed. If you want to restore relations with these parts of Georgia, you have to be very cautious.” These fictions, these divergences, they had a reason a long time ago—not hundreds of years of ago—but back in 1919 when the Russian empire was splitting up. Those parts of Georgia, which incidentally had been part of the Russian Empire as independent states before Georgia became part of the Russian empire. Back then, those parts declared that they were ready, that they wanted to still be part of Russia. And back then very harsh actions, military measures were employed against them. Local populations still view those actions as genocide and mass elimination of people. In order to surmount all these difficulties, patience was required, as well as certain diplomatic art.

OS: Yeah, I understand.

VP: And that was lacking apparently. That’s what the Georgian leadership back then was lacking. Moreover, the current Georgian leadership believe that this action Saakashvili performed was a terrible crime against the Georgian people in the first place, because it has led to very grave consequences.

OS: I was shocked when Shevardnadze—hard name to pronounce—I was shocked because I really respected him as a foreign minister with Gorbachev. You may not agree, but I was shocked when he wanted to join NATO and he became corrupt, I heard.[153] He was a very respected figure in the 1980s.

VP: Well, everything passes, everything changes.

OS: That’s true. But just quickly—Obama’s in office now, take it from 2008 to the Ukraine crisis and how this… nothing really major, dramatic happened, as I remember, except for the Snowden affair in 2013.[154] He was offered asylum here in Russia and that upset America. But was there anything else in that period that you remember, between you and the US that was exacerbated, was argued about?

VP: Well, how can you say that nothing major happened? When President Kuchma’s term came to an end—I do not remember exactly the year—presidential elections took place in Ukraine.

And Mr. Yanukovych won that presidential election, but the opposition didn’t like that. And mass riots erupted. These riots were fueled quiet actively by the United States. And a third round of elections was announced—in violation of the country’s constitution. Per se, this can be perceived as a coup d’état. And pro-Western politicians arrived in power after that—Mr. Yushchenko and Timoshenko. I cannot say that I welcomed this way of changing the government. Nowhere is that proper, but in the post-Soviet space, especially, constitutions cannot be broken. Luckily no bloodshed took place there.

OS: Did you have a phone call with Obama about this issue?

VP: That was before Obama came to office, and yet we maintained cooperation with the Ukrainian leadership of Mr. Yushchenko and Timoshenko. I went to Kiev, they came back to Moscow. We met in third party countries. And we implemented all our plans of cooperation, but their policy, it was not well-liked by the Ukrainian people. That is why after the presidential term of President Yushchenko ended, Mr. Yanukovych won the election once again and everyone acknowledged that. It was recognized by everyone. But apparently this was not the best form of government either. Economic difficulties, together with social difficulties, to a great extent had undermined the trust in the new leadership as well. What needed to be done in order to rectify the situation? They should have organized another election. And they should have chosen people with different economic and social views. These people should have made another attempt at arriving back in power. But certainly they should have prevented any escalation to bloodshed, and what’s absolutely certain is that no one should have supported these bloody events.

OS: But you’re talking about 2014—you’re jumping ahead.

VP: Yes, in 2014.

OS: But between ’08 and ’14, there was this one election you’re talking about which is in 2012, I think?

VP: I do not remember

OS: There were so many, I mean, the Ukraine to us—we were not paying attention.

VP; Yes, well you personally might not have been paying attention, but the CIA was paying a great deal of attention.

OS: I know. It was very confusing. There was a guy with a poisoned face earlier in the century.

VP: Yes, you’re talking about Yushchenko—he said that he’d been poisoned during the election campaign.[155] And yet he was elected to office. And he worked and I met with him on many occasions. Why did they need to resort to violence? That’s something I cannot quite understand. Moreover, I talked about that repeatedly and the 2014 President Yanukovych was in office and he signed an agreement with the opposition. He agreed to all the requirements that they had set forth.

OS: In the crisis, in the final days?

VP: Yes and he even agreed to hold early elections. So why do they need to perform this coup d’état? I do not understand.

OS: Okay. So we all remember, I remember you vividly on television saying—I think it was with Charlie Rose, I forgot—but you said there was much evidence and you smiled as you said it. There was much evidence—implying that a thousand eyes were upon this. You know that expression, a thousand eyes were upon this coup. It was a coup in slow motion. It was pretty evident, transparent to the Russians.

VP: Certainly.

OS: And you said that on television, but I think the American people find it difficult to understand but, by talking about the evidence and showing it, we might be able to convince the American public that they were being fooled by the Western narrative of events and that there indeed was a coup d’état that went down.

VP: That’s very easy to achieve—you simply have to look at the developments. After Yanukovych announced that he had to postpone the signing of the association agreement with the European Union, no one listened to the reasons why, to the terms, to the timetables—mass riots erupted right away after the announcement.[156] These riots led to the seizure of his residence, and on the eve of that, he had signed an agreement with the opposition on settling the situation, on the possible organization of early elections, and three foreign ministers of European countries added their signatures to the agreement. Where are these guarantees? Once the president went to the second largest city of the country to attended a political event, armed men seized the residence of the president. Imagine something like that in the US, if the White House was seized—what would it be called? A coup d’état, or would you say that they have come to sweep the floors. The prosecutor general was shot at. There were so many shootings, so much violence.

OS: I had an interview with Mr. Yanukovych, so I know his version, but it was characterized in the US press as if Yanukovych abandoned Kiev, because he felt the crowd would tear him apart.

VP: Yes, that’s the version used to justify the support granted to the coup d’état. Mr. Yanukovych didn’t leave to go abroad. He was in the country when his residence was taken.[157] Moreover, one day afterwards, he used our support and he relocated to the Crimea. Back then, the Crimea was still part of Ukraine. And Yanukovych stayed there for more than 10 days—at least a week in the Crimea, thinking there was still a chance that those people who had put their signatures under the agreement with the opposition would make some attempt, with a view to settling this conflict by civilized, democratic, legal means. But it never happened. It became evident that if he was taken by these people he would simply be killed by them. And, afterwards, he found himself in Russia. Everything can be perverted or distorted, millions of people can be deceived if you have a monopoly on the media. But in the end, I believe for an objective and impartial spectator it’s clear what happened. A coup d’état had taken place. All right, if this coup d’état had made some positive changes… but, on the contrary, the situation deteriorated even further. Ukraine lost territory, not due to Russia’s actions, but due to the choice made by those who are live in Crimea. These people didn’t want to live under the banner of nationalists. A civil war erupted in the southeastern part of Ukraine, in the Donbass. After that, the country witnessed a terrible drop in the GDP. The largest industrial enterprises shut down. Unemployment soared. The real income of the population, their salaries, plunged, inflation hit 45 or 47 percent. And no one knew how to address these issues, or that this would be further exacerbated by an internal political crisis, by a fight between the Prime Minister and the President. In the end, it led to Prime Minister Yatsenyuk resigning. He had actively supported, and had been supported by, the American administration throughout the crises. And what happened next? The European Union opened its borders to Ukraine. It zeroed out the tariff for Ukrainian goods. But Ukraine’s trade with the European Union decreased by 23 percent, and with Russia it decreased by 50 percent. Ukrainian industrial output is not in high demand in European markets and now they have no access to the Russian market. The agricultural produce that used to be traded successfully in Western Europe is restricted by quotas. And these quotas were introduced by the Europeans. They were exhausted during the first two months after the signing of the agreement. Right now Ukraine is fighting to get a visa-free arrangement for its citizens. Do you know why they are doing that? So they could ensure free exit from the country to find new jobs outside of the country. But the people are once again being tricked, because even if a visa-free deal were granted to Ukraine, that would not enable them to work abroad.

OS: Visa-free to Russia?

VP: No, visa-free to the European Union. People heard that they would be able to relocate and work in another country in Europe. There’s something I’d like to tell you. Ukraine has always been an industrialized country as part of the Soviet Union. And right now, a Ukrainian’s dream is to work as a nurse or a gardener or a nanny in a European country amid the complete de-industrialization of the country. Why did they need all that? I simply cannot imagine.

OS: Well, it seems to me what you’re saying is that Russia doesn’t need Ukraine.

VP: Russia is a self-sufficient country. We do not need anyone, but with Ukraine we are connected by thousands of ties. On many occasions I’ve said that and I’d like to reiterate. I’m deeply convinced that the Ukrainian people and the Russian people are not simply close relatives. They are almost the same. As for the language, the culture, the history, each certainly has to be treated with respect. And even when we were one single country, we treated them with respect. Suffice it to say that the whole of the Soviet Union for decades, was managed by those who originated from Ukraine. I think that testifies to a lot.

OS: Yes, but economically, as you say, you’re self-sufficient. They’re gone—let them have their problems. It’s not going to destroy your country.

VP: No, certainly—not in the least.

OS: One point you made in our last meeting. I asked, “What about the Russian submarine base in Crimea?” Sebastopol I think it was. And you said it was not important because you have another base across the water—somewhere around here. In other words, you weren’t threatened by the loss of the base. That’s what you told me at the time.

VP: Losing the base in Sebastopol was a threat, but it was not too sensitive. Because by that time… right now we are commissioning a new military base—indeed not far from here in Novorossiysk.[158] What was presenting certain difficulties to us was the severing of ties between the companies of the defense sector. Because the defense sectors of Ukraine and Russia during the Soviet period were one single system. And if these relations were severed, then that certainly would lead to a certain negative impact on our defense industry. But we have devised a whole system for input-substitution as we call it. And right now, we are actively surmounting all of these difficulties. We are establishing new enterprises from scratch, and these enterprises produce a new generation of military equipment. And that defense industry in Ukraine which used to provide support to Russia is now simply dying out—I’m talking about the missile industry, aircraft industry and also engine construction.

OS: I understand. In other words, the US succeeded in starting the coup, and winning as they did many times over the years. And it was a loss, but not a fatal loss.

VP: You could say that. Moreover, when I say that we started establishing new enterprises that help propel us to new technological levels, I often cite this example. All of our helicopters used to be equipped with engines produced in Ukraine—100% of our helicopters. Once the supplies from Ukraine stopped, we built a new plant, right now we are completing another one. All helicopters can fly—fully functional—and we have engines of a new generation. So as you can see, what our air force is doing in Syria testifies to the fact that we are doing quite well.

OS: Even if NATO entered into an agreement with Ukraine, I still don’t see too much of a threat, with the new weaponry.

VP: I see a threat. This threat consists of the fact that once NATO comes to this or that country, then as a whole the political leadership of that country, as well as the population there, cannot influence the decisions NATO makes—including the decisions related to stationing the military infrastructure. Even very sensitive weapons systems can be deployed. I’m talking also about the antiballistic missile systems. And that means that we would have to respond somehow to that.

OS: Plus all the weapons we’ve put into the Baltic States?

VP: I’m talking about this strategic anti-ballistic missile system (ABMs). There are only two facilities like that in Eastern Europe—in Romania and in Poland. And at sea in the Mediterranean, there are plans to deploy these systems on ships. Right now negotiations are under way to do the same in South Korea. All that certainly creates a threat to our nuclear deterrence system. Let me remind you that I myself proposed to our American partners that we should work on these systems together. What would that imply? That would imply that we would designate the missile threats together, and we would create a joint system for ABM management. Then we would exchange technological information. And all of that in my view would spell cardinal drastic changes in the world as far as national security is concerned. I’m not going into details right now. But our proposal was declined by our American counterparts, [as I’ve said many times].

OS: Of course. Okay. But it seems to me that Russia adapts and you are adapting to these ABMs. Am I wrong?

VP: We have these capabilities, we are improving them, and when we talked with our American counterparts, we told them that we deemed the construction of those systems as a threat, and they always responded that this was not against us. This was against the missile aspirations of Iran. As of now an agreement has been reached, fortunately, with Iran. But the deployment of this system still goes forward. What does it tell us? We were right. But back then when we were discussing that, we were saying we would have to take actions in response, and these actions were to partly consist in improving our offensive capabilities. Their response was as follows. The ABM system they told us was not established against us. And what we were going to do—that is, to improve our own offensive capability—would be considered by the United States as not aimed against the United States. And we agreed on that.

OS: You know, the American Indians made treaties with the US government and they were the first to experience the treachery of the US government. You’re not the first.

VP: We wouldn’t like to be the last. [laughter]

OS: In that regard, I’d like to show you a piece of film from Stanley Kubrick’s “Dr. Strangelove” set in the war rooms of the United States. One scene we can see and then if you like we can see another one. But first, to just finish this Ukraine thing. My ultimate question is, in hindsight, looking back, did you make a mistake by annexing Crimea because it cost you tremendously—the sanctions, the whole EU turns on Russia, the US—it becomes big news because it’s regarded as illegal in the international post-war treaty world. Not to say that other people haven’t broken their treaties, but… Anyway, it did cost you big time and you perhaps miscalculated. Perhaps you thought it would be acceptable in some way. Have you ever thought about that decision in retrospect?

VP: We did not force Crimea into Russia. Those who live in Crimea have decided to join Russia. And when following this path we were very cautious, and in full compliance with international law and the United Nations charter. The first thing that was done in Crimea itself was not by us, but by those who inhabit Crimea. The legitimate parliament of Crimea that was elected based on the Ukrainian legislation, announced a referendum. The Crimean parliament, by an overwhelming vote, decided, after the referendum, to join Russia.

I know of no other way that would be more democratic to address issues of this kind than the free will of the people. The expression of this free will, was that an overwhelming majority had voted for independence and for joining Russia.[159] On the whole, during the referendum, it was 90 percent or even more. If there is a better or more democratic way to address this issue, please tell me about that. Today, I hear only the opinion that contains the attempt at justifying that our actions, with regard to Crimea, were not correct. That is, the central authorities of Ukraine did not agree to that. That’s what they argue. But let me remind you that when a decision on Kosovo’s independence was taken, the United Nations International Court of Justice decided that on issues related to independence and self-determination, no consent from the central authorities of this or that country were required. And please say for those who will see this film [or read this transcript], that the letter from the State Department of the United States addressed to the UN Security Council on this matter says the State Department supports Kosovo’s decision on independence wholeheartedly.[160] Other European countries spoke in the same vein. And in this regard I do not quite understand why the Kosovars would have these rights, whereas Russians, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars who live in Crimea in a similar situation would not enjoy the same rights. I think that is absolutely unacceptable.

That is what we call having double standards. And we do not regret anything. This is not just about the future of Soviet territories. We’re talking about the future of millions of people, and we didn’t have a choice, really. Only one decision was possible—to agree with this request from the Crimeans about the reunification with Russia. Just one more thing—our troops were there. But these troops didn’t take a single shot. The only thing they did was to create conditions for these elections to take place and for the referendum to take place. And I reiterate, even though I said that on many occasions, in the course of these events there was not a single victim.

OS: Let me put it this way—did you expect to be excommunicated by the European community because of this?

VP: Certainly I did expect this kind of reaction. But before making this decision, we had conducted a very deep social research in Russia, and the overwhelming majority of Russian citizens—around 80 percent or more—when responding to the question whether it was possible to re-unify Crimea with Russia, even though that would mean a deterioration of relations with the West and other countries of the world, they said yes they thought it was possible. So when making this decision, I was guided not by the preferences of my counterparts from other countries. I responded to the sentiment of the Russian people.

OS: And the Crimeans as of this date, are they grateful? Or are they pissed off?

VP; There are many problems in Crimea, but on the whole, people support the decision which was taken. The best estimate of that support was the poll that was recently conducted in Crimea because the Kiev authorities tried to set up an energy blockade of the peninsula. The overwhelming majority—I’m talking about the same figures—the overwhelming majority re-affirmed the decision they had made earlier on joining Russia.

OS: And Donbass? Well, this is a real problem, I guess, in terms of the thorn that doesn’t go away. How do you get out of this one?

VP: Certainly, I think the Minsk Agreement has to be implemented.

OS: But it doesn’t seem like Kiev has any intention of doing so.

VP: I do have all the plans, and the Russian leadership as a whole, we have these plans. But the key components of the Minsk agreements are the political components, and the main political component is to make amendments to the Ukrainian constitution. It should have been done, not by us, but by the Kiev authorities, by the end of 2015. And a law on amnesty has to be adopted and it has to have force. It has been adopted, but it has not been promulgated by the president. A special status law in these territories has to be enforced. This law has also been adopted. It has been voted on by the Ukrainian parliament but it has not been enforced. We cannot do that for them. But I’m hopeful that in the end this is going to be done. And the conflict is going to end.

OS: So we should maybe look at some film? We’ll adjust the lights and darken the room. You can sit there and we can talk about the scenes afterwards.

Trip 3—Day 3—May 11, 2016

OS: Thank you for indulging me by watching “Dr. Strangelove.” I thought the Russian Premier was very good.

VP: Thank you. There are certain things in this film that indeed make us think. Despite the fact that it’s all just imagination—the things that we see onscreen—there are certain serious issues, things that make us think about real challenges, real threats that exist. I think from a technical point of view, he anticipated many things.

OS: The concept of “nuclear winter’—the end of the world—that was the hydrogen bomb. Scientists talked about this after the war and Truman went ahead anyway. This was about communication. The Russians have The Doomsday Machine, the US goes ahead with a unilateral attack and all of the planes are recalled except for this one pilot who is very clever and manages to elude the radar system.

VP: The thing is, since that time, little has changed, honestly. The only difference is that modern weapon systems have become more sophisticated, more complex. But this idea of a retaliatory strike and the inability to manage these systems, yes, all of these things are relevant today. It will become even more difficult and more dangerous.

OS: I believe that. Should we finish our conversation? The next question has a few parts to it. It has to do with the economy, it has to do with the oligarchs. No question that under you, Russia has seen a period of great growth in overall living standards. But the US criticisms are essentially that you have created a system of centralization, authoritarianism, and what they call “an oligarchic state capitalism.” Which they say is similar to the old styles of Tsarism and communism. On the other hand, they were quite pleased with the 1990s Russia, where the oligarchs thrived, before you came in. And then you knocked out or derailed some of them—you told me that story in our first meeting—that you had a meeting with them in Moscow and you made a point in this meeting that there was a responsibility to the people and the state.

So the Western elite says that you have put your oligarchs into power in the last 15 years, whereas these older oligarchs are sitting in places like London. That’s the situation as phrased by the West. I have to say, I have friends in London and when I go there, there’s incredible stories and many of the oligarchs in England tell people that they have accumulated great wealth, but they say that you led them to the wealth and that you shared in it. It’s clear that these people are trying to deflect the heat from themselves by blaming someone else. But what amazes me is the intelligent people I know in London who truly begin to believe this story over the years—that you are, in fact, the single richest person in the world.[161] Not since Rockefeller, or Morgan, or Onassis—[Putin laughs] you may laugh, and I appreciate it, but as a leader, of your people, like Chavez or Castro or many other people who have been accused of corruption, is there some way you could make your personal wealth clearer.

VP: Well, to be honest, I do not have the wealth they attribute to me. To make it clear, this phenomenon of oligarchy, we have to remember what was going on at the beginning of the 1990s in Russia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, regrettably, democracy began to be abused by many people who were seeking to gain money through political power. This democracy began to be seen as all-permissiveness. I remember when I moved to Moscow from St. Petersburg, I was astounded and shocked by how many of them had gathered here in Moscow. And their behavior was so astounding I couldn’t get used to it for a very long time. Those people didn’t have any scruples at all. What is oligarchy? It is the integration of money and power, with a view to influencing the decisions that are being taken, and the final aim to continue to accumulate wealth.

Back in the 1990s we had this notion of seven bankers.[162] Many of them were saying that the Russian economy was too small to allow additional players. They said that seven to ten players were enough. And in order to change the situation that was noted by many in the West to be a corrupt system, and many of those who live in Moscow today or in other parts of the world were forbidden to enter Western countries—they were not granted visas. But once we started fighting against these oligarchs, they started to turn into a sort of internal opposition. And the Western attitude toward them, these ruling classes, started to change drastically. These oligarchs started to get support. When necessary, they got asylum abroad, despite crimes they had committed before—very serious ones. I don’t know who manages to say they got money thanks to my help. If they did get money thanks to my help, what are they doing in London? Well, probably it’s not as simple as that. When the emblematic figures of the oligarchic community, a person who’s no longer with us, as Mr. Berezovsky, at the end of his life wrote a letter to me asking my forgiveness and for a chance to get back to Russia. Certainly one conversation was not enough with whomever that might have been. We had to stick to a consistent harsh policy so as to dissuade people who had managed to enrich themselves through power from influencing this power. And I did that step by step. But it was a consistent policy. Just to make it clear how it was implemented from the very beginning, let me cite an example. One of the employees of the President’s administration back then, once he got into office, he was approached by the head of one of our largest companies. And that person said he would be in charge of whatever that employee was going to do. He would help him with administrative issues as well as with his financial situation. And indeed some of these people are now hiding abroad. My task was to differentiate between power and money. And to prevent people from influencing power through unconstitutional means, either in economy or in politics. On the whole I think I’ve managed with some success in this regard. As for those who have accumulated their capital over the last decade, indeed there were many people like that. Some of them I had been acquainted with before I became president, some of them I became acquainted with while serving as president or prime minister. But all of them have gotten their money honestly and fairly. And they don’t have any connection to the power or any capacity to influence the decisions that are being made. I think that’s the key element to fighting this oligarchic system of power. But the most important thing is, starting from 2000, we have increased almost two-fold our national economy, and during this time many enterprises have risen including private companies. Certainly the main emphasis is being made on the people that I know personally, but when this emphasis is made it is only a tool for manipulating public opinion and using it for political purposes, primarily by those who were ex-communicated from that power. But this doesn’t mean at all that we have managed to address all of the issues related to abuse of power or corruption, and we are going to continue this work in the future.

Right now I’m concerned not by oligarchs, who we are going to keep in place where they are supposed to be. We do not have the oligarchic system that used to exist in Russia. In 2008, I said that many entrepreneurs with whom I had not been acquainted before, to my surprise they showed great qualities, they assumed great responsibility for the state of our enterprises, for keeping their employees, they were even willing to risk their capital. I’m hopeful that in compliance with the legislation we’re going to continue to develop our private businesses. But as of now, the issue of oligarchs and power is not as acute as it used to be in the 1990s. But we have a greater task right now, and that task is about the gap in income between the rich and those people who have a low level of income. This gap, this divide, is where the injustice lies and the legitimate grievances of people against the current state of affairs in this hemisphere. In this regard, ahead of us lies the task of reducing the number of people who live below the poverty line. Unfortunately, amid the crisis in our economy it is difficult for us to accomplish this task. Even though the number of those who lived below the poverty line between 2000 and right now has decreased by almost 50 percent. Back in 2000, we had around 40 million people living in poverty. Right now the figure is still high, but it’s almost halved.

So as for the oligarchs, I do not pursue it as a problem anymore. Large businesses know their place, they know the tasks that are ahead of them, and we treat the captains of our industry with respect. Any issues we discuss within the government before taking decisions, are also discussed in a forum with entrepreneurs, but this is done transparently and openly. Not behind closed doors with the view toward making decisions in the interest of this or that industrial or financial group. Even though, yes, I admit there are groups that lobby in their interests—sometimes we witness that and know it’s happening—but we fight that and will continue to fight that.

OS: So there is no oligarchic state capitalism. How would you describe it, then—the economy?

VP: I think that we have a market economy. No doubt about that. Otherwise I do not think we would have been able to exceed WTO standards. But there are certain issues related to the large role the state plays in the economy. Indubitably, we will follow the path of gradually decreasing the state share in certain sectors of our economy. But we’re going to tread cautiously, bearing in mind that certain economic sectors are very monopolized all across the world, in general. Just as an example—the energy sector, the electricity sector, railroads, space exploration, aviation—certain countries have their own forms of these industries and their development. But these sectors are monopolized everywhere. And everywhere there are direct ties to the government and there is government support. We see that and understand that full well. And we are going to improve the structure of our economy to prevent the destruction and dissolution of large enterprises and large industries.

OS: So, there are no bank accounts in Cypress?

VP: No, and never have been. That’s just nonsense. If that were the case, then we would have had to face it a long time ago?

OS: What did you think of the Panama Papers when they came out?[163] They named you in the headlines.

VP: We had known they were going to be published. We knew that in advance. We didn’t know the details, so it was with interest that we were expecting their appearance. But the thing is, my name is not in those papers, the names of my friends and acquaintances, yes, but those people are not in the government. And the thing is they had not violated any laws—either Russian laws or the legislation of other countries. Well, I knew that they would make a connection with my name, everything else would remain in the shadows and my name would be in the headlines. This is just an attempt at using this instrument to influence the internal politics of Russia. Russian citizens are quite literate and intelligent enough to sort it all out—I have no doubt about that. People see who is doing what and who is pursuing what interests. And I’m grateful to our citizens because they see the attempts I and my colleagues are making with a view to reinforcing our economy, our social sphere, and also the defense capabilities of our country.

OS: Well, I have to say, from personal observation, I would have a hell of a lot more fun if I was rich.

VP: You know, I don’t think that is what brings great happiness. And with this crisis you would be thinking what to do with your assets, how to save them, where to place them. It would only bring you headaches. You are far wealthier than those who have great amounts of money in their accounts. You have an opinion of your own, you have talent, you have the chance to show this talent, and you also have the chance to leave a great legacy afterwards. Money doesn’t bring this kind of happiness. Because when you are in a coffin you don’t have any pockets to take your money to the grave with you.

OS: If you run again in 2018 and you win, you will be in power for another six years until 2024. You would have been in power as president and prime minister for 24 years—longer than Roosevelt, who was 15 years, less than Castro, who was close to 50 years, and close to Stalin who was give-or-take 30 years… Mao, 27 years. Does that not scare you? Do you not get used to power? Does it not distort your point of view? Do you feel that Russia needs you that badly or can there not be a healthy competition for successors inside the system? The Chinese one-party system being an example of competition within the party—the successors are checked out over many years as party members in different provinces.

VP: The Soviet Union also tested those people for many years and yet it collapsed.

OS: That’s true.

VP: So the question is not about selection. The question you had formulated about whether Russia needs anyone that bad—it’s up to Russia itself to decide. No one from outside can enforce this choice, and influencing this choice is very difficult. People in Russia have felt that they have a chance to make a decision of their own, and no one will take away this right from them. As for this alteration of power, it has to exist. Indubitably there needs to be a healthy competition in these processes. But this competition should be among our people who have in mind the interests of the nation. We have to think about the interests of the Russian people. In the end, let me reiterate, the citizens of Russia are going to make the final decision concerning the 2018 elections. First, I’d like to say that for four years I was not president. I was the chairman of the government, whereas Mr. Medvedev was the president. And what was being said by his political opponents and my political opponents about his not being independent, that’s not true. He was the real president of the Russian Federation. It was not difficult for him to stay in power after he came in after me. And yet he lived up to high standards. So counting all of these years as my being in power, that’s not the correct thing to do. As to what is going to happen during the 2018 elections, I’d like to say there are things about which there should be some intrigue, some mystery. So I’m not going to answer this part of your question.

OS: I understand that—I said “if”.

VP: Well, it’s not about the subjunctive mood you know—we shouldn’t use it.

OS: Mr. Putin, I don’t doubt for one moment your love and pride in serving Russia. It’s clear you’re a son of Russia and you’ve done very well by her. I think we all know the price of power, and when we’ve been in power for long, we feel people need us. At the same time, we’ve changed and we don’t even know it sometimes.

VP: Indeed—this is a very dangerous state. And for persons in power who feel they have lost it, this nerve, this bond connecting this person to the country and to the rank and file citizens of the country, it’s time for them to go. But in the end, it’s something I’ve already said, and I’m going to repeat it—the ordinary citizens and voters, they are the ones who decide the future of power. No doubt power is connected to a great burden and it requires sacrifice.

OS: There is also great grace in yielding power. And many great examples of men and women who had succeeded in history and who gave up the desire to rule and let someone else do it.

VP: For everyone, there comes a time when you have to do it.

OS: And of course, democracy itself, whatever we call it, is flawed. And America’s system is hardly perfect. We know that money often buys power in America. Certainly Russia has a flawed system, everyone says it from outside. No one could say that it’s a system that’s wholly responsive to the voters. The voters in Russia are probably split on many lines—a lot of chaos might result and that is always a danger. And given the short history of Russia and its democratic experiment which you said has only existed since 1991-92, it is very unlikely that the next election will convince the world that this is a functioning democracy, unless international monitors are brought in, as Mr. Chavez did in Venezuela, so that it became a really transparent process.

VP: Do you think our goal is to prove anything to anyone? Our goal is to reinforce our country, to make our country better for life, more attractive, to make our country more valuable, to turn our country into something that could respond swiftly to the challenges of time. To strengthen it from the internal political point of view, and to strengthen our external political stance as well. Those are the goals we are pursuing. We’re not trying to please anyone.

OS: That is a dangerous argument because it works both ways. Those who abuse power always say it’s a question of survival.

VP: We’re not talking about survival and we’re not trying to justify ourselves. Are we talking about the need to keep this or that authority in emergency conditions? Right now there is no emergency situation. What we have to do is to ensure a stable, sustainable development of the country. So in taking into account all of the negative tendencies you’ve been talking about, the Soviet legacy, the imperial legacy—that’s something of the past. But we also have to think about the positive legacy that’s been passed down to us. Russia has been built over a thousand years. It has a tradition of its own. We have our notions of what is just and unjust. We have our own understanding of how an efficient government should work. When I said that the Russia of the future should be very mobile, that it should respond swiftly to the challenges of the times, it should adapt efficiently, this means we should use everything we have as the groundwork, but still we should look into the future. This is not about helping someone cling to power, or cling to power myself, this is about ensuring economic growth, sustain its rate, improve the quality of life, including the defense capabilities, on a regular basis. Not amid crises or political difficulties. There is only one criteria to help us with regard to power. There is the law and there is also the Constitution. If the Constitution is violated or if it’s twisted to suit the interests of this or that group or this or that individual, then that is unacceptable. But if a democratically accepted constitution is observed, then this has to be treated with respect.

OS: I don’t doubt that the Constitution of Russia is a great constitution, it’s always the execution of it that’s been problematic. And I have no problem with the Asian economies, the “tiger economies” with Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, for example, announced he was going to make an authoritarian regime that would work and would make the economy work and the economy would come first in Asia—very practical. South Korea, Japan to some degree, certainly Taiwan, and then ultimately China. China emerged with a very strong party and a major power but definitely not a democracy. So I don’t know that it’s necessary to dress up the language in democracy.

VP: There’s no need to disguise anything or to dress it, but there are some fundamentals like the constitution of Russia which I’ve been talking about. It has never been questioned as a constitution of a democratic society, a democratic country. Since the constitution was devised it was considered as such. No one said there were flaws that allowed someone to talk about the undemocratic nature of Russian society. If you tried to twist this constitution to suit the interests of an individual or group, then suspicions certainly might emerge. But if this doesn’t happen, then we have to treat what is happening with respect.

OS: Okay. So what time is it?

VP; It’s time.

[laughter]

OS: Thank you very much.

VP: You’ve never been beaten before in your life?

OS: Oh yes, many times.

VP: Then it’s not going to be anything new, because you’re going to suffer for what you are about to do.

OS: No, I know… but it’s worth it. It’s worth it to try to bring some more peace and consciousness to the world.

VP: Thank you so much.

[Stone hands Putin the DVD case.]

OS: You might want to watch this at some point.

[Putin thanks Stone, waves, walks away, opens the DVD case, sees nothing inside. Everyone laughs.]

VP: Typical American gift!

[Rob takes the DVD out of the player and gives it to Putin.]