Afterburn

CHAPTER 11

“Mr. Waring, this could be the most important opportunity we’ve seen since the fall of the Berlin Wall. We’d be fools not to take advantage of it.”

Admiral Thomas Magruder looked from the speaker, Secretary of State Robert Heideman, to the President’s National Security Adviser, Herb Waring. He was used to the Secretary’s stance on foreign affairs questions but found it hard to believe that even a dedicated liberal globalist like Heideman could be urging a policy at odds with everything the United States had stood for since the days of the Founding Fathers.

He was even more surprised at Waring’s evident interest. The President had been taking a real beating lately in foreign policy, and the smart money said he should stick with domestic problems rather than getting involved in yet another ill-advised adventure abroad. Magruder would have expected Waring ― who always had an eye for the main chance ― to back off from another round of foreign intervention, if only to appease the growing numbers of isolationists among the President’s noisier critics.

Clearly, though, Heideman’s presentation had struck a chord with Waring.

“Let me see if I understand what you’re saying, Bob,” Waring said. “This Russian general, Boychenko, will surrender to the United Nations, but the UN will only go along if our carrier battle group is part of the process.”

“That’s essentially it, Mr. Waring-” Heideman began. His measured, precise voice was overridden by another, louder and less cultivated.

“Mr. Waring, I want to go on record as having disagreed with this entire idea. It is a mistake from first to last, and it flies in the face of everything this country has ever stood for.”

Magruder found himself nodding in agreement. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Brandon Scott, leaned back in his chair. With his mane of white hair and his flashing eyes, Scott looked like a biblical prophet. His angry words seemed to hang in the room.

“I’m sorry you feel that way, Brandon,” Waring said slowly… and with an oiliness that warned of masked feelings. “But I think Secretary Heideman may be right, here. This situation offers some interesting possibilities we really should explore.”

“Going along with this is tantamount to giving up our sovereignty,” Scott maintained harshly. “A U.S. carrier battle group cannot simply be loaned out to the United Nations this way, any more than we would consider loaning out part of our nuclear arsenal! It violates two centuries of policy, damned good policy. Throwing it all away is nothing short of idiotic!”

“If I may, Mr. Waring?” Heideman cut in. “Admiral, we all know your views. You’ve expressed them often enough, and loudly enough, for all of us to know where you stand. But this is a political decision, not a military one.”

“It means putting more American servicemen in harm’s way, Mr. Secretary,” Scott said. “And that is always a military decision, regardless of the politics involved.”

“Damn it, Scott, this perennial foot-dragging is getting damned old!”

Gordon West, the White House Chief of Staff, exploded. “If you can’t get with the program, for God’s sake, at least get out of the way so the rest of us can do something constructive for a change!”

“Take it easy, Gordon,” the Security Adviser said. “I invited his opinion, and he gave it. We have enough hot spots around the world without turning the Cabinet Room into another one, okay?”

West didn’t answer, but he visibly controlled his temper and settled back in his seat. The other presidential advisers gathered around the long oak table relaxed, but there was still an air of tension in the room. After nearly two years of this administration, quarrels like this one were an almost routine part of any foreign policy meeting. This one, though, had all the earmarks of a really serious fight ― the kind that ended in resignations offered and accepted, and in Senate hearings over new nominees for top-level government posts.

It wouldn’t be the first time, either, Magruder thought as he glanced around the table. As a matter of fact, Admiral Scott wouldn’t have been quite so touchy if it hadn’t been for the last such argument, the one that had led to the resignation of Secretary of Defense Vane six months previously. Vane had always backed his military experts when it came to questions of foreign policy and American power projection, but those days were gone now. Scott wasn’t exactly a lone voice in the wilderness, but sometimes it must have seemed that way to the man. It couldn’t be easy working for the new secretary.

Magruder’s eyes rested on Secretary of Defense Samantha Reed, former congresswoman from California, one-time member of the House Armed Services Committee, and powerful friend to the feminist left and champion of a liberal social agenda. Her appointment to the Cabinet had barely squeaked through the required Senate approval process despite the political pressures that made it all but impossible for many senators to vote against her. The nomination of the first woman ever considered for a powerhouse Cabinet position like Defense was one of those historic moments for women everywhere, and headline-conscious politicians weren’t about to go on record as voting against the tide of history. Too many of them remembered the “They just don’t get it” mentality engendered in the early ‘90s by incidents like the Anita Hill allegations against Clarence Thomas, and the fight over the retirement of Admiral Frank Kelso, the Navy Secretary who had presided over the Tailhook scandal.

Even so, the vote to confirm her in her new position had been a close one.

Tall, dignified, and with the experienced politician’s charm and ready smile, Samantha Reed turned to face the President’s chief adviser. “Mr. Waring,” she said. “As far as I can see, this could be an excellent trade. We remove a potentially dangerous military force from the Crimea, and the UN moves in and takes charge. The UN’s prestige is enhanced as a world peacekeeper. I don’t need to remind anyone here that the American public is not enthusiastic about our becoming the world’s policeman, do I?”

“Madam Secretary,” Scott said. “With all due respect, where’s the difference? If our military is policing the world as a part of U.S. foreign policy or at the behest of the United Nations, we’re still footing the bill.”

“Not at all, Admiral,” she replied, her voice silk-smooth behind a glacial smile. “The UN would pay the costs of the deployment. A share of that is ours, of course, ultimately, but it won’t be as though the American taxpayer is shouldering the entire burden.”

“The bill I was referring to, Madam Secretary, was the butcher’s bill.

The cost in American lives. Putting our people under the command of foreign officers is nothing short of a military disaster waiting to happen.”

She seemed to consider this for a moment, then turned and spoke softly to one of the aides flanking her. The man reached inside a briefcase and produced a manila folder. She accepted it, leafing through several pages inside before finding what she wanted. “Admiral, it seems to me that our current policy of supporting UN operations but maintaining separate and distinct lines of command and communication offers an even better opportunity for ‘military disaster,’ as you put it. You’ve seen this?”

She slid the paper across the table. Scott barely glanced at it and did not pick it up. “Of course, Madam Secretary.”

“Gentlemen,” Reed said, addressing the entire room. “Two days ago, as any of you who watch cable news is well aware by now, one of our Navy jets shot down a U.S. Army helicopter that was flying a UN mission. No one was killed, fortunately, but the incident has pointed up the flaws in interservice operations. There were breakdowns in communication up and down the entire chain of command. It seems that the naval personnel making the decisions in the carrier battle group had not been notified that Army helicopters were operating in the no-fly zone and had not received the computer codes that let their radars recognize those helicopters as friendly.

“The day before that, this same carrier group sank a Russian submarine, again by accident. At least fifteen Russian nationals were killed.

“Now, it seems to me that putting all of our forces under one command infrastructure would be the best possible way of avoiding unfortunate mistakes like these in the future. Placing our forces under UN command will simplify the lines of communications. It will simplify intelligence and ensure that our military forces know who is in the area and what they are doing.

“I must say, it also sets a worthwhile precedent for the future. If we start putting larger numbers of troops under UN authority, it would give the organization some real teeth. That would save the United States from more embarrassments like Somalia and Haiti.”

Magruder resisted the urge to speak up, to argue against what he saw as a blatant misuse of American military forces. His position was an unusual one. At the time of the Norwegian War he’d held the post of Director of Operations for the Joint Staff, but during that crisis and the Russian Civil War that followed it, the President had come to depend on him as a personal military adviser. Now he was attached to Admiral Scott’s personal staff, a position that gave him access to these high-level meetings but no real authority. Anything he said now would be viewed as a “Me, too” echo of Scott’s position.

Damn it, he wished the gold on his shoulder boards and jacket cuffs counted for something in this roomful of career politicians. For years globalists had been talking about increasing the authority of the United Nations and giving it control over larger and more powerful military units. They pointed to the organization’s complete helplessness during the Cold War era and to the fiascoes of the early days of the New World Order as good reasons to stiffen UN power and prestige with troops, equipment, and armaments controlled by the Security Council. They pointed out that UN attempts to engage in nation-building in Somalia in 1993 had been derailed by the U.S. decision to withdraw all ground troops from the nation after a firefight where American troops had been killed and their bodies dragged through the streets in front of TV cameras for all to see. And UN Haiti policy had never quite gelled because of vacillating American leadership.

But the thought of handing over a sizable portion of American military power to the United Nations was, for Magruder, a chilling one. If the UN could send Americans into Georgia… or the Crimea… how long would it be before they sent troops into Los Angeles to quell the next round of rioting? Or into American homes to search for handguns? Or to arrest American citizens for speaking out against this dark and twisted vision of the New World Order? …

Admiral Magruder had too fond a regard for the lessons of history to ignore the possibility ― no, the probability ― that such power, once granted, would grow, corrupt, and ultimately enslave.

Unfortunately, he and Scott were very much in the minority at this table.

“I’m not sure giving the UN more power is a very good idea,” Scott said, leaning forward in his chair and clasping his hands on the table before him. “In any event, this is a surrender of American sovereignty. We have never agreed to such a thing in our entire history. American forces have never been placed under the operational control of foreigners. The French tried it in World War I, and Montgomery wanted to try it in World War II, but in each case we did everything in our power to maintain control over our own people. The closest we ever came was in Somalia, and I’ll point out that it was the UN component there that got our people involved in that firefight that killed our boys… and then failed to support them when they got into trouble.”

“Admiral,” Heideman said, “I respect your views, but I cannot agree with them. We cannot live in the past any longer. National sovereignty is a nice, high-sounding phrase, but it’s soon going to be as antiquated as Communism. Look, you know how hard it is to get Congress or the public to back an intervention effort. Even when that intervention is in the national interest.”

“In other words, you intend to sidestep the Constitution by putting our troops under the UN,” Scott said bluntly.

Heideman flushed. “Stop twisting my words, Admiral. Troop commitment is a foreign policy decision. Executive Branch has the authority.”

“Except that Congress has the War Powers Act sitting there waiting for you, and you don’t want to force a confrontation on whether it’s legal for the Executive Branch to exercise the kind of authority you’re talking about.” Scott shook his head. “The simple fact is that UN intervention often has nothing whatsoever to do with our national interests.”

“It does in the Black Sea,” Waring said. “Right now the whole of the former Soviet Union is balanced on the thin edge of complete anarchy. Our presence in the Black Sea will serve to stabilize the area.”

Reed nodded. “My point exactly, Herb. I’ll also point out that intervention in this case helps our interests in the short term.”

Short-term interests, Magruder echoed in his mind. Penny-wise, pound-foolish.

If the other people at the table were looking for disasters waiting to happen, they didn’t need to look beyond the current situation unfolding between Ukraine and the fragmenting Russian Federation. Magruder glanced at Roger Lloyd, the new director of the CIA. He’d already given his briefing on the geopolitical situation in that part of the world and did not look happy with the way the discussion was going.

And Magruder didn’t blame him one bit.

The vast expanse of rolling, fertile, black-earth prairies that was Ukraine had been one of the original founding states of the Soviet Union in 1922, but its people had never fully reconciled themselves to Russian domination. Ethnically, Ukrainians were not Russians; they remembered still with blood-soaked bitterness Stalin’s forced collectivization during the 1930s, a policy of genocide by starvation that may have killed as many as twenty million people. Glasnost had come slowly to Ukraine; long after Gorbachev came to power, the head of the Communist party there had been one of Brezhnev’s cronies, and the arrests, repressions, and police harassments had continued until his dismissal in 1989.

After extended flirtations with various union treaties, Ukraine had declared complete independence in 1991, shortly after the failed coup attempt against Gorbachev, then turned around and signed the Minsk Agreement with Russia and Belarus, creating the Commonwealth of Independent States. For a time, during the Norwegian War, Ukraine had again been part of the Soviet empire, but with the collapse of Moscow’s central government and the outbreak of a general civil war, Kiev had again declared independence… and this time around seemed downright eager to redress old wrongs.

Unlike many other autonomous regions throughout the old Soviet Union, Ukraine had few internal ethnic conflicts. Most of the region’s large Tatar populations had been forcibly resettled in Central Asia during the 1940s; the only real ethnic hostilities remaining were those between Ukrainians and Russians. Eastern Ukraine had a high percentage of Russians in the population, most of whom favored strong ties with Moscow; from the few reports coming out of Russia to the West, strongly nationalistic Ukrainians had precipitated a blood-bath among ethnic Russians, killing hundreds of thousands ― perhaps millions ― and sending millions more fleeing across the border into the already devastated lands of the Russian Federation.

Besides that, the old dispute between Kiev and Moscow over the ownership of the Crimean Peninsula and the Black Sea Fleet remained. With Russia involved in its civil war, Ukraine appeared poised to settle the issue once and for all… by threat if possible, by military force if necessary. According to the most recent intelligence available to the Jefferson battle group, the Ukrainian Fifth and Seventh National Armies were in position at Odessa and at Melitopol, ready to move in and seize the Crimea from its Russian caretakers. Amphibious landing craft were being gathered at Odessa and at both Ocakov and Svobodnyj Port at the mouth of the Dnieper, lending credence to CIA and U.S. Naval Intelligence predictions that an invasion of the Crimea ― both overland across the narrow isthmus to the north and by sea, along the beaches north of Sevastopol ― was imminent.

Though distracted, the Russians had been trying their best to bolster their defenses in the Crimea. Since Ukraine blocked all approaches across the isthmus, their main line of communication ran across the narrow straits of Kerch, from an arm of the Russian Federation that flanked the Black and Azov Seas from Novoazovsk to the Georgian frontier at Gagra. Most of that bolstering had taken the form of military flights ― transports and air escorts ― flying in from Krasnodar. No one was quite sure at the moment whether Red or Blue forces held the upper hand, either in the Crimea or at Krasnodar. For a time, there’d been speculation among U.S. intelligence officers that those flights out of Krasnodar were in fact an invasion, one civil-war faction moving in to take Sevastopol away from the other in a three-cornered tug-of-war between Reds, Blues, and Ukrainians. So far, though, there was no indication that this was the case. Supply flights were moving in and out of the various Crimean military and commercial airfields with an almost clock-like regularity, and so far the Ukrainian forces had not attempted to hinder them… or to deliver the expected attack on the peninsula’s defenders.

But the situation was becoming more dangerous ― explosively so ― day by day. If the northern half of the Black Sea, from Odessa to Gagra, became a war zone, it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, for the UN-U.S. forces in the area to stay clear of the fighting.

And now, three days after the accidental sinking of a Russian sub in the southern Black Sea, a Russian general named Boychenko, the de facto military ruler of the Crimean Peninsula, had just offered to surrender military control of the district to the United Nations. One of Boychenko’s people had approached the U.S. ambassador to the UN with the proposal during discussions of the return of the Russian submariners now aboard the Jefferson.

“I really wonder if it’s our interests that are being served here,” Scott said. “Let’s put this in perspective. First off, Boychenko is the Military Governor of the Crimea. After Krasilnikov declared martial law during the coup against Leonov, he became what amounts to the absolute ruler of the entire Crimean region. We’re not talking about some small unit commander wanting to turn over a few pieces of heavy artillery here. This is the equivalent of having an entire country ask for UN intervention.”

Lloyd nodded agreement. “Admiral Scott’s right,” he said. “It’s completely unprecedented. If the UN accepts this arrangement, they’re in effect declaring the Crimea to be under the authority ― and the protection ― of the United Nations Security Council.”

“That’s what Boychenko’s counting on,” Scott went on. “The only reason he’s decided to make this offer is the fact that he’s got a Ukrainian army knocking at his front door. The Ukrainians want the Crimea, and they want it bad. They want the prestige of controlling what they consider to be Ukrainian territory. They want the military supplies and materiel there. The bases, The ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet that haven’t been seized or defected to them. Most especially, they want the Pobedonosnyy Rodina.”

“Excuse me?” Reed looked baffled.

“Pobedonosnyy Rodina, Madam Secretary,” Magruder offered. “It means “Victorious Motherland’ in Russian. That’s the name of the largest remaining ship in the Red fleet, a nuclear carrier as big as any of ours.”

“I thought we took out their carriers in the Norwegian War,” Waring said.

“We accounted for two out of three, sir,” Magruder said. “Kreml and Soyuz, their first two carriers. This one wasn’t ready for action when the fighting broke out in Norway, though. She was still undergoing sea trials in the Black Sea. You can be sure the Ukrainians would love to add her to their fleet. There’s nothing like a supercarrier to enhance a country’s image as a world power.”

“Unless it’s a nuclear arsenal,” Reed said, her mouth twisted in distaste. “Which Ukraine has, I might add. And Russia. All of this simply supports my argument, that we must intervene to maintain the peace.”

“What peace, Madam Secretary?” Scott demanded. “The whole area is tearing itself apart now.”

“Ukraine has not attacked yet,” she said. “By taking control of the Crimea, the UN will help ensure that the war does not spread. As it would if Ukraine attacked Russian possessions in the area. They would not risk angering the United Nations with an attack.”

“Madam Secretary,” Admiral Scott said wearily, “how can you possibly know what the Ukrainians will or will not do?”

“There are also humanitarian considerations at stake here,” Heideman said with a disdainful look at Scott. “The Ukrainian government seems to have embarked upon a program of ethnic cleansing against the non-Ukrainian population within their borders. A large number of ethnic Russians have been killed or driven out already. And the population of Crimea is mostly ethnic Russian. Allowing the Ukrainians to take over the Crimea unopposed would open the floodgates to genocide.”

“It would make Bosnia look like a picnic,” Reed added.

“So by allowing the Reds in the Crimea to surrender to the UN, we keep the Ukrainians out,” Waring said. “We stop a blood-bath, we reduce the risk of a general war between Ukraine and Russia, and we stop Kiev from seizing military assets in the Black Sea that could further destabilize the region. I’m not sure I understand your objection, Admiral Scott.”

“And think of the opportunity we have here,” Heideman said. “An historic opportunity! Since the end of World War II, we’ve been looking for a way to make the UN a strong voice for world peace, and this could be just what we need to do it. The picture of a Red officer surrendering to the United Nations, not to any one country but to the world itself, that would be a symbol that would count.”

Reed nodded. “I agree. For years now Admiral Scott and others like him have been telling us that the U.S. can’t keep playing the role of world policeman. That’s true. But it’s also true that the world needs a policeman, and the only way I can see us getting one is to give the UN both the power and the prestige to do the job. This would be an ideal first step.”

“Be careful what you wish for,” Magruder said quietly. “You just might get it.”

Reed raised an eyebrow. “You’ve been quiet this morning, Admiral Magruder. I suppose you share Admiral Scott’s viewpoint in this? Military tradition and national sovereignty and historical precedent and all the rest?” There was a note of contempt in her voice. Of all the services, the Navy was widely known to be Reed’s pet peeve, and she made little effort to hide how she felt.

“I’m as much concerned with practical questions as I am with tradition and precedent, Madam Secretary,” Magruder said slowly, keeping his voice flat and emotionless. “Since Desert Storm, everyone’s looked on the UN as the ideal foundation for the “New World Order.’ But for most of its history the UN has been anything but a reliable friend to the United States. How many times did we have to impose our veto to protect our national interests, or our allies’?”

“That was in the Cold War, Admiral,” Heideman said. “Now that we’re the world’s only superpower, we’re in a much better position to influence the UN agenda.”

“And when China is powerful enough to influence the agenda, are we going to feel the same way? Or Japan? Or Europe? If the twentieth century has taught us anything, it’s the fleeting nature of power blocs and alliances and national status. Before World War I, England, France, and Germany were the world’s superpowers. Less than a hundred years have passed, and look at the world today. Major powers have come and gone, alliances have changed, priorities are different. The world has changed in ways they never could have imagined a century ago. And it will keep on changing. New World Orders may be politically fashionable now, but don’t gamble our freedom on short-term fashions that could change tomorrow!”

“Your fears are groundless,” Heideman said. “The UN would never intervene against the United States.”

“That’s right,” Reed said. “We’d still have our power of veto.”

Magruder paused, his fingers drumming the tabletop. “I wonder. Does anybody here remember when the UN passed sanctions against Australia to force them to overrule one of their state governments when it passed laws against sodomy?”

“It was an archaic attitude.”

“Madam Secretary, it was an internal matter that the UN blatantly decided to get involved in. They might just as well have decided to pass sanctions against us because of the antisodomy laws still on the books in Mississippi or Alabama. And the time could come when a United Nations with all this symbolic prestige and real military power you want to give it could turn that power against us for reasons that are just as trivial.”

“Admiral, I think we all take your point,” Waring said. “Certainly the question of giving the UN control over any part of our military forces is one we shouldn’t decide on hastily. But I think you’re overreacting when it comes to this Crimean matter. Frankly, the President is concerned about the buildup of tensions in this part of the world. He wants to send a message to the warring factions that this sort of anarchy can’t be tolerated, not when the rest of the world’s population could be at risk if this thing turns nuclear. Anything, anything that will defuse this unfortunate situation should be seriously considered.” He paused, frowning, then rapped twice on the tabletop. “I will recommend to the President that our battle group in the Black Sea be placed under UN command and cooperate with them in receiving the surrender of the Crimea.”

“Sir-” Admiral Scott began.

“That is all,” Waring said. “This meeting is adjurned.”

With a rustling of papers and the scraping of chairs, the men and women in the conference room began gathering their things and getting up from the table. Scott exchanged a long, weary look with Magruder. Neither man said anything, however.

One long-standing tradition of America’s military remained firm and unshaken, and that was the tradition of political control of the armed forces. Determining policy was the job of the politicians, not of the military; admirals and generals could advise, but when the policy decisions were handed down, it was their duty to shut up and carry out their orders.

Magruder just hoped that this wouldn’t turn out to be one policy decision that the United States would end up bitterly regretting.