Carrier: A Guided Tour of an Aircraft Carrier

Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs) are the single most useful military force available in time of crisis or conflict. No other military unit, be it an airborne brigade or a wing of strategic bombers, gives the leadership of a nation the options and power that such a force commands. This is because the real value of CVBGs goes far beyond the simple existence of the unit and its availability for combat; CVBGs also provide presence. America's forward-deployed battle groups in the Middle East and the Western Pacific are the most visible symbol of the nation's global commitments. Because of these battle groups, our nation has a say in the affairs of nations and people who threaten our vital national interests. The commander of such a battle group bears an awesome responsibility.

Rear Admiral Jay Yakley was one of those commanders. He's gone from flying fighters in Vietnam to commanding his own aircraft carrier battle group (CVBG), based around the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72). Back in the early days of August 1990, he was the one of the point men facing down the forces of Saddam Hussein following the invasion of Kuwait. As commander of Carrier Air Wing Fourteen (CVW-14) aboard the USS Independence (CV-61), he was in charge of the first organized combat air unit to reach the region following the invasion. In this capacity, together with roughly ten thousand other Americans of the Independence CVBG, he had the job of holding the line until other reinforcements could arrive.

He did not have long to wait. Within days, Allied units began to pour in and form the core of the coalition that eventually liberated Kuwait and defeated Saddam's forces. But for those first few days, Jay Yakley and his roughly ninety airplanes were the only credible aerial force that might have struck at Saddam's armored columns, had they chosen to continue their advance into the oil fields and ports of northern Saudi Arabia. Only Hussein himself knows whether or not the Independence group was the deterrent that kept Saddam from invading Saudi Arabia.

However, the ability to quickly move the Independence and her battle group from their forward-deployed position near Diego Garcia made it possible to demonstrate American resolve to the Iraqi dictator. That is the real point of aircraft carriers: to be seen. Once seen, they can cause an aggressor to show common sense and back off. But if the aggressor fails to show common sense, then the CVBG can act to make them back off with force.

It is not just the obvious power of the carriers-or more particularly, of the aircraft that fly off them-that is the source of the options a CVBG provides national leadership. In fact, to look at a CVBG without seeing beyond the carrier is to look at an iceberg without seeing what lies submerged. The real power of a CVBG is far more than what the flattop with its air wing can bring to bear. Each CVBG is a carefully balanced mix of ships, aircraft, personnel, and weapons, designed to provide the national command authorities with an optimum mix of firepower and capabilities. That the group can be forward-deployed means that it has a presence wherever it goes, and that American leaders have options when events take a sudden or unpleasant turn on the other side of the planet. The downside is cost. CVBGs are among the most expensive military units to build, operate, train, and maintain; a country can only buy so many. Nevertheless, in the years since the end of the Cold War, CVBGs have demonstrated how very useful they can be on a number of occasions. Operations like Southern Watch (Iraqi no-fly patrols, 1991 to present), Uphold Democracy (Haiti, 1994), and Deliberate Force (Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995) are only a few of these.

Carrier Battle Group Development

Common sense dictates protecting the most valuable warships in your arsenal when they head into potentially hostile waters. And that-simply-is the reason why aircraft carriers are placed in battle groups. Aircraft carriers are useless unless they are carrying aircraft. But it takes more than just airplanes to insure the carrier's survival. More important, using the CVW's assets for carrier defense defeats the real strength of sea-based aviation. Unless carrier-based aircraft are flying attack missions or defending other fleet vessels (and aircraft are not in fact able to stay airborne long enough to fully accomplish that job), they are being wasted. In other words, sentinels with more staying power than aircraft must protect the carrier against threats-particularly submarines-that can leave it so much burned and twisted scrap metal on the ocean floor. Any ship, no matter how well built, even a huge ninety-thousand-plus-ton Nimitz-class (CVN-68) carrier, can be sunk by conventional weapons. Without some sort of escort, a carrier is just a very large opportunity for some enemy officer.

The original configuration that gave birth to CVBG development dates from the early experiments with carriers in the late 1920's. Because of their high speeds and medium-caliber gun armament, the large carriers that emerged from the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty tended to be assigned to the scouting or cruiser forces of navies. They initially were used as "eyes" for the lines of battleships that were then the real measure of seapower. But before long, carrier admirals found ways to operate independently, showing that they could survive without the backing of a line of battleships. By the outbreak of the Second World War, they were the battle forces.

In 1939, no nation had more than a half-dozen large-deck carriers, and most CVBGs had only a single flattop, with a handful of cruisers and destroyers as escorts. However, this practice began to change very rapidly with the outbreak of World War II. Early in the war, the British began to add fast battleships and battle cruisers to carrier groups, providing protection against enemy surface units. Then the Japanese grouped their six big-deck carriers into a single unit called the Kido Butai (Japanese for "Striking Force"). Its escort included a pair of fast battleships, some cruisers, and over a dozen destroyers-enough to stand up against all but the largest surface fleet. With multiple flight decks and hundreds of fighters and strike aircraft, Kido Butai could overwhelm any fleet or air force it encountered. Officially known as the "First Air Fleet," and commanded by Admiral Chichi Nagumo, it was Kido Butai that struck Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941. For the next six months, Nagumo and Kido Butai ranged across half the globe, the most powerful force in Naval history. Only the "miracle at Midway" stopped Kido Butai, and returned the initiative in CVBG evolution to the Americans.

By early 1943, the power of American industry began to make itself felt as a stream of new Essex (CV-9) and Independence-class (CVL-22) fast fleet carriers steamed across the Pacific. Before heading for action, they would stop at Pearl Harbor to conduct training and be integrated with fast, new battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and other support ships, and then formed into Task Groups. (Two or more Task Groups formed a Task Force.) Experience gained during raids on Japanese island outposts in 1943 showed that the optimum size for such groups was three or four carriers, a pair of fast battleships, four cruisers, and twelve to sixteen destroyers. More carriers than that tended to make the groups unwieldy. Task Groups were commanded by a senior naval aviator, who assigned strike missions, refueling assignments, independent raids, and other jobs.

By early 1944, Task Force 34/58 had developed into the most powerful Naval force in history. This force, based around four Task Groups and commanded by Admiral Marc Mitscher, won key battles-in the Philippine Sea, off Formosa, at Leyte Gulf, in the South China Sea, and around Okinawa-that eventually led to Allied victory in the Pacific. Task Force 34/58 never lost a battle, and throughout its two-year life span lost only a single flattop, the light carrier Princeton (CVL-23).

The end of World War II brought a number of changes to CVBGs. In fact, the massive force reductions following the war almost spelled their end. Results of the early atomic tests at Bikini showed the need to disperse carrier groups. Thus single-carrier CVBGs again became the norm. On the other hand, new technologies began to make these individual carriers much more effective and powerful. Angled flight decks, steam catapults, jet engines, air-to-air missiles (AAMs), and atomic weapons marked just a few of the new systems that Naval aviators saw arrive in the decade of Elvis and Ike. As new technologies arrived, CVBGs began to change their mixes of aircraft and ships. Piston-engined propeller aircraft were sent to the boneyard, and replaced by supersonic jets and high-performance turboprops. The battleships and big-gun cruisers were also retired, as new guided-missile destroyers and cruisers took over the job of escorting a new generation of flattops. Even without the destructive power of the nuclear weapons they carried, each carrier now had more firepower than an entire World War II Task Group.

At the start of the Vietnam War in the mid-1960's, America had more carriers than the rest of the world combined, allowing the USN to easily station three or four CVBGs in the South China Sea. Each group normally had one attack carrier, as well as a guided-missile destroyer or cruiser to provide surface-to-air missile (SAM) coverage. Known as Task Force 77, the flattops were on station near Vietnam from the torpedo boat attacks of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in 1964 to the evacuation of Saigon a decade later. By then, the older World War II-era carriers were worn out and had to be retired. Yet, with the defense budget drained by the Vietnam War, one-for-one replacement of ships and aircraft was impossible. Instead, the Navy built a new generation of amphibious ships with flight decks for helicopters (the Tarawa-class (LHA-1)), and combined the attack and ASW missions into the air wings (CVWs) on the fifteen newer carriers commissioned since the end of World War II. By adding a squadron each of S-3 Vikings and SH-3 Sea King helicopters to the existing attack carrier wings, the so-called "CV Air Wing" was created in 1975. This remained the basic CVW structure for the rest of the Cold War.

While the Navy was reducing the number of carriers and beefing up their air groups, the new Nimitz-class (CVN-68) nuclear supercarriers began to arrive. A new generation of aircraft also began to appear on the decks of American flattops. In 1974, the F-14 Tomcat arrived in the fleet, along with new models of the A-6 Intruder and A-7 Corsair attack bombers, and improved models of the E-2 Hawkeye and EA-6B Prowler electronic aircraft.

By the late 1970's the driving force in CVBG development was no longer American plans or technology. That honor fell to Admiral of the Soviet Navy Sergei Gorshkov. In the generation following the high seas humiliation of his fleet during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Gorshkov had managed to create the largest navy in the world. Though much of the Soviet naval buildup was designed to support and protect its growing fleet of ballistic-missile submarines, a large share of its maritime budget was devoted to the destruction of American CVBGs.

Over a period of two decades, Gorshkov grew his fleet with a focus on the large air-to-surface (ASMs) and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) that I discussed in the fifth chapter. Supporting this construction effort was a program of tactical development, exemplified by Gorshkov's concept of "the Battle of the First Salvo." His plan was to win a naval war by crippling enemy CVBGs by means of an early series of missile strikes, some of them pre-emptive. By the late 1970's, the Soviet fleet of ASM-armed bombers, and SSM-armed surface ships and submarines, was thought by some to be ready to take on the USN for global maritime dominance.

None of these Soviet developments went unnoticed, and systems like the F-14A Tomcat, AIM-54 Phoenix AAM, and E-2C Hawkeye were the first responses. Then, with the arrival on the scene of President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of the Navy John Lehman in 1981, the men of America's CVBGs finally got the new ships and equipment that had been needed since the 1960's. After years of being undermanned, underpaid, and short on spares and ordnance, the U.S. Navy was ready to win its share of the Cold War's final victory. To meet the increasingly sophisticated Soviet threat, the Navy bought new Aegis SAM ships, and improved aircraft and weapons. However, the basic structure of the CVBG remained unchanged in the 1980's, and would stay that way until the end of the Cold War and the coming of Desert Storm in the early 1990's. What did change was the strategy by which carrier operations were to be conducted. In Secretary Lehman's vision (called "The Maritime Strategy"), in the event of war with the Soviets, massed groups of three or more CVBGs would advance into the Norwegian Sea or North Pacific to strike military bases on the Soviet mainland. In the event, the collapse of the Soviet Empire put an end to "The Maritime Strategy."

The post-Cold War American military drawdown scaled John Lehman's vision of a "600 Ship Navy" back to just over half that number. In addition, the structure of battle groups and air wings was radically altered. Older classes of ships were rapidly retired, along with the entire fleet of A-6 attack bombers and KA-6 tanker aircraft. The Cold War-era CVW of approximately ninety aircraft shrank to just over seventy. Because the Soviet threat of ASMs launched from bombers and SSMs fired by submarines and surface ships was no longer significant, the need for fleet air defense was greatly reduced and the CVW could become an almost purely offensive force. The "outer air battle" was therefore handed off from the squadrons of F-14's, F/A-18's, and E-2's to the Aegis radars and SM-2 Standard SAMs of the battle group's cruisers and destroyers.

Today, the Tomcats and Hornets have been assigned to carry a variety of air-to-ground ordnance, including precision guided munitions (PGMs) for delivery onto targets ashore. In the current era of "littoral warfare" (as defined in "From the Sea" and "Forward from the Sea"), this is to be the primary function of sea-based naval aviation units. Along with delivering air strikes, the battle groups of the 1990's have been given other powerful offensive capabilities. Now CVBGs have each been teamed with a three-or-four-ship amphibious ready group (ARG) embarking a battalion-sized "Marine Expeditionary Unit-Special Operations Capable" (MEU (SOC)).[64] This means that as the first century of naval aviation comes to a close, the CVBG/CVW team stands as an almost purely offensive targeting and striking force for supporting units and objectives ashore in the littoral zones.

Force Structure: How Many Carriers?

Though the power, flexibility, and mobility of CVBGs make them a critical asset for national leaders, and this is unlikely to change in the 21st century, those same leaders must justify the costs of building, training, operating, and maintaining such forces. The costs of CVBGs are immense. The price tag for the U.S. version probably runs close to $20 billion to build and equip, and another $1 billion a year to operate and maintain-a lot of money! With those mind-numbing numbers in mind, let me put a question to you: How many carriers do we need? The answer is complex.

For starters, there are very few nations in the world with the means to even own flattops. The Royal Navy is committed to maintaining two carriers, as is France. Spain and Italy also plan to build additional flattops to give them each two CVBGs. Russia, Brazil, Thailand, and India will struggle to maintain the single carrier groups they currently possess-largely for reasons of national prestige. And then, standing alone, the United States is currently committed to keeping a dozen carriers in commission-as many flattops as the rest of the world combined. In the 1980's, John Lehman's "600 Ship Fleet" included fifteen CVBGs, a total driven by the strategy of simultaneous strikes around the Soviet Union's vast periphery. Launching strikes from the Norwegian Sea, the Mediterranean, and the North Pacific required between six and eight groups ready to get under way at any time. Today, with no monolithic threat on the horizon, the need for a dozen carriers in commission seems less obvious. So is twelve CVBGs overkill? No, not really.

The number of carriers our nation requires is ultimately determined by its commitments in the post-Cold War world. In a world without superpower confrontation, our "enemies" become "rogue states," like North Korea and Iraq, while international terrorists, criminal cartels, and chaotic regional, ethnic, or tribal conflicts now are the key threats to day-to-day peace. In today's world order, America's major overseas commitments and interests lie mainly outside the Western Hemisphere. At the same time, our victory in the Cold War has burdened the U.S. with responsibility for peacekeeping and stability in areas that, frankly, most Americans would prefer to ignore. Consider the following list of global flashpoints:

• North Korea-On the verge of starvation and collapse, North Korea continues to threaten the South Koreans and other nations in the region. It has recently deployed the Tapo-Dong ballistic missile, and may have one or two nuclear warheads.

• People's Republic of China (PRC)/Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan)- Following their confrontation over democratic elections and ballistic-missile tests/exercises in 1996 (in which two American CVBGs intervened), these two estranged countries continue to face off in a slow simmer.

• India/Pakistan-As both countries celebrate their golden anniversaries, they confront each other over disputed borders and ethnic and religious differences. An accelerating nuclear arms race raises threats of regional nuclear war, and the proximity of China only exacerbates the problem.

• Persian Gulf-UN-sponsored sanctions and "no-fly" operations against Iraq continue, while Iran increases the size and capability of its military forces, causing concern among other countries in the region. Iran and Iraq once again are disputing border areas in the northern end of the Persian Gulf, and firing into each other's territory.

• Balkans-The crisis in the Balkans has continued, despite attempts to implement the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. Bosnia continues to be a hot spot, requiring continuous monitoring by NATO forces, while old ethnic hostilities are erupting in Kosovo and other areas.

• Algeria-A chronic Islamic insurrection faces a repressive military regime, as fanatic groups commit brutal massacres in villages near the country's large cities, killing hundreds of innocent civilians.

• Central Africa-Hutu and Tutsi factions wage genocidal war, spilling across national borders and defying international relief efforts.

• West Africa-Destitute nations continue to be wracked by coups and civil wars that have been endemic since the end of colonial rule in the 1960's, requiring frequent evacuations of foreign civilians.

Current U.S. national military strategy calls for a force structure sufficient to deal with two "major regional contingencies" (small wars or big crises) plus one "complex humanitarian emergency" (natural disaster, epidemic, famine, refugee migration, etc.). You might think that a dozen CVBGs would be enough to handle all that. Unfortunately, the unforgiving demands of complex machinery and the natural limits of human endurance set boundaries that make a dozen carrier groups just barely sufficient to maintain two or three carriers on distant deployment at any one time. Let me explain.

When you build a warship like an aircraft carrier, it is not available for deployment overseas all the time. Warships require regular maintenance and upgrades. Thus, in the forty-five-year planned life of an aircraft carrier, it will spend as much as a fifth of its time in docks and yards being repaired and maintained. For example, for every year the ship is in service, two or three months are spent on minor upgrades and maintenance to keep the ship going between "deep" overhauls (when the warship is brought into dry dock for major work). These major overhauls are done every five years or so, take from eight to twelve months to complete, and include everything from repainting the hull to upgrading the living quarters and combat systems. Additionally, nuclear-powered carriers are periodically out of service for a three-year refueling, an intricate surgery (with meticulous attention to radiation safety) that requires cutting great holes through decks and bulkheads and then welding everything back together. All this means that a warship is only available to sail about three years out of every five.

The crew, also, requires its own "overhaul," for the multitude of combat skills embodied in the battle group's ten thousand sailors, marines, and aviators are "perishable." If skills are not taught, practiced, and tested regularly, the combat potential of a ship or air group rapidly deteriorates, even when deployed into a forward area. So a battle group must be assembled and "worked up" for almost six months before each six-month deployment.

Finally, and no less important, today's sailors and marines demand and deserve a personal life. People are not robots; they need rest, family relationships, and opportunities to advance personally and professionally. Warship crews need some portion of their service careers at or near their home ports. This human factor is the first casualty when politicians deny pay increases and hardship bonuses, or extend emergency deployments to extreme lengths. Because relatively few of today's national leaders have the personal experience of long military deployments, the sea services have especially suffered. To remedy this problem, Admiral Johnson has instituted a six-month "portal to portal" deployment policy. That is, the Navy has promised that sailors will spend 50 % of their time in home port.

Navy planners struggle constantly to build schedules that maximize the number of carrier groups available for deployment, while providing the best quality of life for embarked sailors and marines. Given a carrier force level of a dozen units, it works out something like this:

• Deep Overhaul/Nuclear Refueling-Two or three units at a time. Currently, there are three shipyards (Bremerton, Washington; Norfolk, Virginia; and Newport News Shipbuilding) capable of doing this intensive job, which essentially "zeros the mileage" on a ship.

• Yearly/Periodic Maintenance-Two or three additional carriers are usually conducting yearly/periodic maintenance, which is mainly done dockside at the ship's home port.

• Deployment/Workup Cycle-The remaining six or seven carriers are on an eighteen-month cycle, broken into the following phases:

— Leave/Unit Training Period-The first six months of the cycle are devoted to resting crews coming off deployment, with leave and training time. Some individual ship or unit training is also conducted then.

— Workup Period-The second six months of the cycle are designed to refresh unit combat skills, conduct combine training, and validate the unit's ability to conduct joint operations prior to deployment.

• Deployment-Designed to be six months long, this is the period where the combined battle group is packaged and forward-deployed for actual operations.

Assuming that this cycle is not interrupted by a major regional contingency, two or three CVBGs can be forward-deployed at any given time. There is always one from the East Coast, which can be assigned to the 2nd (Atlantic), 5th (Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean), or 6th (Mediterranean) Fleets. The West Coast usually has one or two groups available, which work with the 3rd (Eastern Pacific), 5th (Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean), or 7th (Western Pacific) Fleets.[65]

Yes, it takes a great deal of effort and investment to keep just two or three carrier groups forward-deployed at one time. Yet the lack of forward U.S. bases in areas critical to American national interests makes these mobile air bases critical to the national leadership. If America wants to have a voice in a crisis somewhere on the other side of the world, then we need either a friendly allied host nation[66] or a carrier battle group offshore. And CVBGs have one major advantage: They do not need anyone's permission to sail anywhere in recognized international waters.

The current scheme of carrier group rotations assumes a generous (by past standards) allotment of home-port time for ships and sailors, given the operations tempos (OpTempos) of today. In an emergency, though, the groups working up can be rapidly "surged" forward to reinforce groups already in the crisis zone. This is exactly what happened in 1990 and 1991 during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. By the time war broke out in early 1991, six CVBGs were in place for strikes against Iraq. Two other American CVBGs had operated in support of Operation Desert Shield and rotated home, while a British carrier group covered the Eastern Mediterranean to fill NATO commitments. In other words, even if forward-deployed carriers are tasked in a crisis, there is enough "flex" in the rotational schedule to allow units at home in the U.S. to "backfill" other American commitments.

USS George Washington (CVN-73)

Let's take a look at one of these groups "up close and personal." Specifically, the CVBG based around the USS George Washington (CVN-73), one of the East Coast carrier groups assigned to 2nd Fleet at Norfolk. "GW," as her crew calls her, is an improved Nimitz-class (CVN-68) nuclear aircraft carrier. One of the second group of three built during John Lehman's glory years of the 1980's, she was laid down at Newport News Shipbuilding on August 26th, 1986; launched from the dry dock on July 21st, 1990; and commissioned on July 4th, 1992. Manned by over six thousand sailors and Marines, the GW has conducted three Mediterranean and Persian Gulf deployments since commissioning, a very heavy OpTempo. During her maiden voyage she was ceremonial flagship for the 50th Anniversary Celebration of the D-Day Landings in Normandy, and has conducted "no-fly" operations like Southern Watch (Iraq) and Deny Flight (Bosnia).

As a "working class" carrier, GW lacks some of the glamor and polish that fleet "showboats" enjoy (the carrier John F. Kennedy, CV-67, once had this reputation). This is a warship, not some floating palace to impress visiting dignitaries. You'll notice on GW's bridge, for example, the row of "E" (Efficiency) awards painted there. These are fleet awards, which are given within each class of ships (aircraft carriers, guided-missile cruisers, etc.) to display the ship's visible accomplishments. Each award reflects a particular specialty, ranging from engineering and weapons to food service and tactical ability. In fact, just before leaving on her 1997 cruise, the GW crew got the word that they had been selected to wear the Battle "E" (marking them as the top warship for the entire Atlantic Fleet) for 1997, their third such award in just five years. From the bridge to the pump rooms, the men and women who serve aboard the GW know they are expected to be the best in the fleet. They make a pretty good case that they have achieved that goal.

What follows is a "snapshot" of the GW team in the late summer and fall of 1997, and should help you appreciate the kind of people who make a carrier battle group work. But be aware that Navy crews, like all military units, are in a state of constant transition. The sailors and aviators that appear here will certainly have changed assignments by the time you read this book. One other quick point. Because of the mixed Navy/Marine Corps personnel base aboard the battle group, it is easy to confuse the ranks of officers. To help straighten these out, refer to the following table for clarification:

Heading the GW command team when we were aboard was Captain Lindell G. "Yank" Rutheford, USN. A graduate of the University of Missouri, "Yank" has spent much of his career as an F-14 Tomcat pilot (he also flew A-4 Skyhawks and F-4 Phantom IIs). He commanded a squadron, VF-142 (the "Ghostriders"), aboard USS Eisenhower (CVN-69) in 1988 and 1989. Following a staff tour abroad the Theodore Roosevelt (nicknamed "TR," CVN-71) during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, he decided to take the carrier command track (described in the third chapter).

Two years later, following nuclear power training and command school, he became the Executive Officer (XO) of TR for two deployments to the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf. Captain Rutheford then spent eighteen months as Commanding Officer (CO) of the replenishment ship USS Seattle (AOE-3), which qualified him for deep-draft command. While driving Seattle, he acquired a reputation around the fleet for superb ship-handling and organizational skills-very useful talents during the next step in his career. Following his relief as CO of the Seattle in November of 1996, he joined the GW as commanding officer. Along with his partner, the commander of the embarked Carrier Air Wing One (CVW-1), Captain John Stufflebeem (whom we will meet later), he provides the commander of the GW battle group with a powerful core of striking capability.

The Navy supports its carrier captains with handpicked subordinates who run the day-to-day activities of the boat and her three-thousand-plus-person crew (the air wing brings along more than 2,500 more). Of these, the most critical job on board is the Executive Officer, or XO. While we were aboard the GW, we were fortunate to observe a handover between two XOs, when Captain Michael R. Groothousen (the GW's XO since May 1996) left to take command of Seattle, and the new XO, Commander Chuck Smith, arrived to take his place. Captain Groothousen, a longtime F/A-18 Hornet aviator, was on his way to a deep-draft command in preparation for commanding a carrier of his own, while Commander Smith is something else entirely, having served in S-3 Viking ASW/Sea Control squadrons.

A tall, lean professional (he resembles a young Peter O'Toole), Chuck Smith is the kind of aviator you'd want at the controls if your plane had to make a night landing in a storm with one engine out. Carrier captains usually come from fighter and attack aviation backgrounds. The "right stuff" mystique and old-boy network of TopGun fighter jockeys make it tough for aviators from electronic warfare, ASW, AEW, and sea control specialties to claw their way to the top of the promotion ladder. However, the increasing importance and versatility of the S-3 in carrier operations, has enabled a few former Viking drivers to get choice commands: big-deck amphibious ships (like the Tarawa (LHA-1) and Wasp-class (LHD-1) helicopter carriers), and even some supercarriers. Chuck Smith will make a terrific carrier CO when he "fleets up" in a few years. Commander Smith took over the XO job in late August 1997, while GW was steaming into the battle group's final training exercise prior to deploying to the Mediterranean. The change happened quickly and seamlessly. The only sign of it aboard the ship was the few minutes it took for every officer who could fit into flight-deck control to see Captain Groothousen off the ship, en route to his next assignment.

Of the three thousand crewmembers aboard the GW, something like 95 % are enlisted sailors. Their representative, advocate, and ambassador to the Captain is GW's Command Master Chief (CMC) Petty Officer, the senior NCO on board. This is a job of great responsibility. If the food or laundry service in the enlisted spaces is unsatisfactory, it is the CMC who makes sure the Captain knows about it. If a sailor's family member ashore needs assistance, he is the one to coordinate solutions through the Red Cross or other appropriate authority. On GW, the job is ably filled by CMC Kevin Lavin. When you meet him he seems more like the vice-president of a start-up computer company than the traditional gruff, tattooed Navy chief (his background is in electronics maintenance). Chief Lavin is Commander Smith's senior enlisted advisor, and when he speaks both the CO and XO listen closely!

Captain Rutherford and Commander Smith manage an organization that seems more like a small city or corporation than a ship. Its various departments are key to keeping the GW running smoothly for the six months or more that she may spend deployed, or "on cruise" as her crew calls it. Each department performs specific tasks, which make possible the operation of her men, aircraft, and weapons. The alphabetical breakdown of these departments and their heads in the fall of 1997 is shown below:

• Administration (ADMIN)-Headed by Lieutenant Jerry Morrison, this is the primary record-keeping group for the ship, and includes personnel, maintenance, supply, financial, and other files.

• Aircraft Maintenance Division (AIMD)-With almost six hundred personnel assigned, AIMD provides the GW's embarked air wing with spare parts, maintenance facilities, and specialized support personnel. Commander Gordon Coward heads this division.

• Air Department (AIR)-One of the busiest groups aboard the GW, the Air Department controls the operations of the GW's hangar and flight decks, as well as the airspace directly around the ship. The Air Department is led by an officer nicknamed the "Air Boss," and his deputy, the "Mini Boss." While we were aboard GW, the Air Boss was Commander John Kindred, while the "Mini" was Commander Carl June. Both are experienced pilots who have the skills and knowledge to control every type of carrier-capable aircraft under all weather and sea conditions. In late 1997, Commander Kindred was planning to move on to his next assignment, while Commander June would stay aboard and "fleet up" as the new GW Air Boss. Then it will be his job to train a new "Mini" before he moves on in a year or so.

• Crew Recreation and Morale Department (CRMD)-This department deals with the crew's spiritual and moral welfare, and is headed by GW's Command Chaplain, Captain Jim Nichols.

• Deck Division (DECK)-Even in a "high-tech" age of networked computers and PGMs, there is still a need on every Naval vessel for sailors who can handle lines, small boats, anchors, and all the paraphernalia of traditional seamanship. The GW's "Deck Division" handles everything from launching the ship's boats to manning the replenishment stations during underway refueling and replenishment (UNREP). Lieutenant Commander Johnnie Draughton, who will retire in late 1997, and will be replaced by Lieutenant Greg Worley, leads the sailors of the Deck Division.

• Dental Department (DENTAL)-A community of over six thousand people is bound to have some cavities, broken teeth, and dental emergencies while on cruise. Sending them ashore for treatment to a Navy hospital would be impractical and expensive, so GW is equipped with a full dental clinic. Headed by Commander Roger Houk, DDS, the Dental Department has everything necessary for good dental hygiene, not only for the crew of the GW, but also for the crews on the other ships of the battle group.

• Engineering Department (ENG)-The Engineering Department operates and maintains almost every system aboard GW except the two A4W nuclear reactors. These systems include electrical power, air-conditioning, jet and diesel fuel, and sewage transfer systems. Supervising literally hundreds of miles of pipes, ducts, and cable runs, and thousands of valves, pumps, switches, transformers, and gadgets, is GW Chief Engineer (CHENG) Lieutenant Commander Pete Petry.

• Combat Systems Division (CSD)-Without sensors and electronics, modern weapons systems are about as useful in battle as paperweights. The Combat Systems Division cares for the vast array of controlling hardware and software that makes the GW an effective weapons and aviation platform. Heading the CSD is the GW's Combat Systems Officer (CSO), Commander Diana Turonis.

• Legal Department (LEGAL)-Six thousand sailors, Marines, and their families add up to a lot of legal advice. To support this, the GW has a fully staffed Legal Department to ensure that everyone aboard has an up-to-date will and power of attorney before deployment, and to handle any investigations and courts-martial that might arise. As it happens, today's military personnel don't get in trouble with the law nearly as often as previous generations. However, long deployments make for high divorce rates and complex family problems. The ship's Legal Officer (LEGAL-OFF) is Lieutenant Commander Jim Roth, a sharp and able young lawyer. The Legal Officer is also the Captain's technical advisor on Rules of Engagement (ROE), the intricate and ever-changing documents that specify where, when, and how you can shoot.

• Medical Department (MEDICAL)-The GW Medical Department is equipped and staffed to handle everything from minor lacerations and sunburns to life-threatening trauma and accident cases. Because smaller ships of the battle group have only modest medical facilities and staff, GW acts as a central hospital for the force. Heading the GW medical team is the Ship's Medical Officer (SMO), Commander Dean Bailey, MD. He is due for relief in the fall of 1997 by Commander Mike Krentz, MD.

• Marine Detachment (MARDET)-Traditionally, the twenty-six-man Marine Detachment aboard supercarriers provided security for the "special" (the euphemism for "nuclear") weapons that used to be carried aboard. Today, nuclear weapons are no longer carried aboard carriers, and in late 1997 the Corps reassigned its MARDETs. But until that happened, the GW's MARDET commander was 1st Lieutenant Grant Goodrich.

• Navigation Department (NAV)-The traditional nautical skill of navigation has been revolutionized by GPS, digital charts, and real-time satellite weather updates. But it still takes an experienced navigator to advise the bridge watch about how exactly to steer the ship in a narrow channel or a tricky tactical situation. GW's Navigation Department is equipped with every kind of navigational instrument, from sextants to GPS receivers. The Navigational Officer (known as "GATOR" for short) is Commander Ron Raymer. He is expecting to leave the ship in early 1998, and will be relieved by Commander Brian Cosgrove.

• Operations Department (OPS)-Everything from eating schedules and flight operations to making a rendezvous with a replenishment ship requires a high degree of skill and coordination. This is the job of the GW Operations Department, the group that recommends to the CO and XO how they will actually operate and "fight" the GW, should the need arise. The GW Operations Officer (OPSO) is Commander Don Hepfer, who is a sly and skillful officer.

• Reactor Department (REACTOR)-Of all the departments aboard the GW, none is shrouded in tighter security than the "Nukes." On non-nuclear Navy vessels the Engineering Department controls the ship's propulsion. But on the GW, a dedicated Reactor Department controls the two mighty AW4 units and other associated machinery. They don't like publicity. They won't talk to you. Don't even ask. The department is controlled by a career nuclear surface officer, Captain Joe Krenzel, who will become the commander of the USS South Carolina (CGN-37) when he finishes his tour as Reactor Officer (RO) aboard GW.

• Safety Department (SAFETY)-GW is basically a large steel box filled with jet fuel, explosives and rocket fuel, toxic chemicals and waste, fissile material-and, of course, people! Working hard to keep them under control is the GW's Safety Department. This group is charged with monitoring hazardous materials, inspecting firefighting equipment and sanitation gear, and coordinating damage control with the other ship's departments. The GW's Safety Officer (SAFETYO) is Commander Jack Hassinger, who will be relieved in the fall of 1997 by Commander Dave Hegland.

• Supply Department (SUPPLY)-The GW utilizes thousands of different items during day-to-day operations at sea. Jet fuel and floppy disks, ground beef and paper towels are all used in quantities that stagger the imagination. Keeping up with the ordering, stowing, and record-keeping required to keep GW running is the Supply Department. The GW's Supply Officer or SUPPO is Commander Jim Ellison, who can be either the most or least popular officer aboard!

• Training Department (TRAINING)-One of the biggest challenges for the GW's crew is to continue their professional growth and training while embarked on cruise. Doing this requires regular refresher training and qualification for various skills and equipment, which is the responsibility of the Training Department, commanded by Lieutenant Matt Hempel. He is due to be relieved in late 1997 by Lieutenant Ann Hollenbeck. This department supports correspondence courses to help personnel qualify for their next promotion, distance-learning classes, and video classes, for new tactics and onboard equipment.

• Weapons Department (WEPS)-Though GW is not as heavily armed as her battle group escorts, she still packs a considerable self-defense "punch"-including Mk. 29 Sea Sparrow SAM launchers and 20mm Mk. 15 Phalanx CIWS systems. GW additionally has a number of M-2.50-caliber machine guns for defense against swimmers and small boats. These are maintained by the Weapons Department, which is headed by the "Gunner," Commander Lee Price. Actual weapons firing is controlled by the Tactical Officer (TACO) in the ship's Combat Direction Center (CDC).

Carrier Air Wing One (CVW-1): THE SHARP END

That the GW's embarked air wing, CVW-1, is a powerful offensive tool is a surprisingly recent development. During the Cold War, the focus of American carriers and their air wings was not the projection of offensive power but the defense of the carrier groups and other naval forces (convoys, amphibious groups, etc.). In those days, air wing training and weapons were mainly oriented toward war-at-sea missions against the Navy of the former Soviet Union, not toward land targets requiring precision deliveries. This is one of the reasons why the performance of Navy aircraft and units during the 1991 Persian Gulf War was so disappointing. Though Navy aircraft flew almost a third of the attack sorties into Iraq, they lacked the PGMs and sensors necessary to kill precision targets. On the positive side, Navy reconnaissance and electronic-warfare aircraft did really useful work, as did the A-6E Intruder all-weather attack bombers (recall that the weather over Iraq was terrible during much of the air campaign). Incredibly, in the name of cost-saving, the entire fleet of A-6E bombers and KA-6D tankers was retired after the Gulf War!

So, after building their plans and policies around a now-dead threat, and buying and retaining the "wrong" aircraft and weapons for the turn-of-the-millennium world, naval aviation entered the post-Cold War era in disarray. Happily, naval aviators are resourceful people, and during the mid-1990's Navy aviators gradually developed technical "quick fixes" and organizational reforms that will equip the Cold War CVW to tackle the challenges of the next decade. Understanding that it would take years and billions of dollars to develop and build new aircraft and weapons, they concentrated on upgrading existing airframes with new systems and weapons.

These focused on supporting the initiatives presented in high-level policy statements like "From the Sea" and "Forward from the Sea," while grimly defending the huge funding allocation necessary for the next-generation "Super Hornet" (F/A-18E/F). Some of the fixes-like acquiring the improved Nighthawk targeting pod for the F/A-18 Hornet and buying more laser-guided bomb kits-were just a matter of money. Others-like turning the F-14 Tomcat (traditionally an air defense interceptor) into a strike and interdiction aircraft-were a bit more difficult. Still, in just a few years things began to turn around. Operation Deliberate Force (the bombing of Bosnian Serb military facilities in 1995) proved that the Navy and Marines could deliver PGMs and suppress enemy air defenses just as well as their Air Force counterparts. Today, the embarked carrier air wings are just as deadly and efficient as any of their land-based counterparts.

CVW-1 is one of the ten air wings in active-duty service today, a survivor of numerous post-Cold War cuts and drawdowns. The wing spent much of its Cold War career aboard USS America (CV-66, which was recently retired), and moved over to the GW in 1996. A Navy captain (traditionally called the "CAG" for "commander, air group") commands the air wing; and he is a partner, not a subordinate, to the carrier's skipper. They both report to the admiral who commands the battle group (generally a two-star rear admiral), and work together as a team. It's an article of faith that flight operations are always controlled and authorized by trained naval aviators, not some distant senior commander who never sat in a cockpit.

As the GW battle group prepared to deploy in the late summer of 1997, the commander of CVW-1 was Captain John D. "Boomer" Stufflebeem, USN. Stufflebeem began his naval career as an enlisted sailor aboard a destroyer. He then went to the Naval Academy, graduating in 1975. After duty aboard a frigate, he learned to fly the F-14 Tomcat, rising to command squadron VF-84 (the "Jolly Rogers"). He then took command of CVW-1 in July 1996. While he has spent most of his career flying Tomcats, he generally flies F/A-18 Hornets today. But like most "CAGs," Captain Stufflebeem is qualified to fly the majority of the aircraft assigned to his CVW.[68] A quiet, modest, focused warrior, he prefers to let his air crews and their results speak for him. Stufflebeem's XO is the Deputy CAG (DCAG), Captain Craig Cuninghame. Together they supervise the CVW staff, which acts as a "shell" for managing the various embarked squadrons, each of which may be flying a different aircraft type or model.

As squadrons are shuffled, merged, disbanded, or re-equipped, the makeup of an air wing may change, but the grouping of squadrons tends to be fairly stable over a period of years. The actual wing staff is quite small, just a few dozen officers and enlisted personnel. Because it is a "downsized" post-Cold War air wing, CVW-1 has given up one squadron of F-14's as well as the A-6/KA-6 Intruder squadron, and picked up a third F/A-18 Hornet strike fighter squadron in return. The CVW-1 squadron assignments looked like this in late 1997:

• Fighter Squadron 102 (VF-102-The "Diamondbacks") — One of the old F-14 squadrons that survived the drawdown a few years back,an "Air Group" instead of an Air Wing, thus the term "Commander, Air Group." For most naval aviators, the honor of being addressed as "CAG" by the officers and enlisted men of their wing is considered to be one of the greatest achievements of their careers. VF-102 is commanded by Commander Kurt Daill. Based at Naval Air Station (NAS) Oceana, Virginia, and flying F-14Bs (equipped with F-110 engines), the Diamondbacks began the 1997/98 cruise with several new capabilities. They were equipped with the new AAQ-14 LANTIRN/GPS targeting pod, the improved Digital TARPS pod, and the GBU-24 Paveway III laser-guided bomb with BLU-109 penetrator warhead. These new systems make the Tomcat a powerful day and night strike fighter, as well as a potent reconnaissance platform. VF-102 operates fourteen F-14Bs, of which four are wired for the new D/TARPS pod. The squadron is also assigned six of the LANTIRN/GPS targeting pods. Of course, the Diamondbacks are still highly capable fighters, deploying the AIM-9M Sidewinder, AIM-7M Sparrow, and AIM-54C Phoenix air-to-air missiles (AAMs).

CVW-1 has three squadrons of Navy and Marine F/A-18C Hornet strike fighters. Each squadron can conduct strike or fighter missions, dropping Paveway II/III LGBs and other PGMs, firing AGM-88 HARM missiles, as well as AIM-9M and AIM-120 AMRAAM AAMs. Normally, each squadron of twelve aircraft deploys with six Nighthawk FLIR/laser targeting pods and three data-link pods for AGM-84E SLAM missiles. However, there are minor differences in the three units, which I'll describe below:

• Strike Fighter Squadron 82 (VFA-82-the "Marauders")-Based at NAS Cecil Field, Florida and led by Commander Steven Callahan, the Marauders fly the new Block 18 version of the F/A-18C, with sharper eyes in the form of the new APG-73 radar. This is the radar that will go into the nose of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet when it comes into service. The APG-73 will finally give the Navy the ability to perform high-resolution ground mapping in any weather, as well as non-cooperative target recognition (NCTR) against enemy aircraft.

• Strike Fighter Squadron 86 (VFA-86-the "Sidewinders")-Also based at NAS Cecil Field, Florida, VFA-86 has long been a sister squadron to VFA-82. VFA-86 flies the Block 10 version of the Hornet, and is commanded by Commander Robert Harrington.

• Marine Strike Fighter Squadron 251 (VFMA-251-the "Thunderbolts") — The Navy periodically requests the loan of Marine Corps carrier-capable strike-fighter and electronic-warfare squadrons to fill out air wings for deployment. Based out of MCAS Beaufort, South Carolina, the Thunderbolts fly the Block 16 version of the F/A-18C, and are commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Tony Valentino.

Along with strike and fighter "muscle," the air wing includes several support squadrons, which provide specialized services to the battle group.

• Airborne Early Warning Squadron 123 (VAW-123-The "Screwtops") — Flying the E-2C Hawkeye, the Screwtops provide the GW battle group with airborne early warning (AEW). Based at NAS Norfolk, Virginia, VAW-123 is one of the Navy's oldest E-2 squadrons. The squadron's nickname is reflected in a bold blue and yellow spiral pattern painted on the radome of each aircraft. They are commanded by Lieutenant Commander Edward Rosenquist, and deploy with four late-model E-2C aircraft.

• Sea Control Squadron 32 (VS-32-The "Maulers")-Of all the squadrons assigned to CVW-1, none has seen its role changed and enlarged more than the Maulers of VS-32. Flying eight S-3B Vikings, they provide the battle group with surface and ASW services. But their most valuable job is as aerial tankers for the rest of the wing's thirsty aircraft. Based at NAS Cecil Field, Florida, they are led by Lieutenant Commander John J. Labelle.

• Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 137 (VAQ-137-The "Rooks")-VAQ-137 is tasked with suppressing and jamming enemy radars and communications. The Rooks fly a quartet of EA-6B Prowler aircraft. VAQ-137 is based out of NAS Whidbey Island, Washington, and is commanded by a "retreaded" A-6 Intruder crewman, Commander Craig Geron.

• Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron 11 (HS-11-The "Dragon Slayers") — The Dragon Slayers of HS-11 are another squadron that has seen its capabilities and responsibilities grow in recent years. In addition to the traditional role of providing the battle group with ASW protection in the "inner" defensive zone, they have taken on new roles of special operations support and search and rescue. They fly four SH-60F (ASW) and two HH-60H (SAR/Special Operations) variants of the Seahawk. HS-11 is based at NAS Jacksonville, Florida, and is led by Commander Michael Mulcahy.

• Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron 6, Detachment "C" (VQ-6, Det. C-The "Black Ravens")-Flying one of the newest aircraft in Naval aviation, the Black Ravens Detachment "C" provides the battle group with electronic surveillance, intelligence, and targeting. Flying a trio of ES-3 Shadow aircraft, the detachment can, in a pinch, load up with a refueling pod and extra fuel tanks, to provide additional airborne tanking services. The small size of the ES-3 force means that squadron headquarters and schoolhouse remain home-based at NAS Cecil Field, Florida, while small detachments or "Dets" deploy with each CVW. In the fall of 1997, VQ-6 was commanded by Commander Robert "Bob" Wilson, and Det "C" aboard the GW is headed by their Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Lieutenant Commander Terry Isley.

• Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 40, Detachment 1 (VRC-40, Det. 1-The "Rawhides")-Perhaps the least appreciated task in CVW-1 is the vital task of logistical support. The Rawhides fly a pair of C-2A Trader aircraft for CVW-1 out of their Detachment 1. VRC-40 is based out of NAS Norfolk, VA, and is commanded by Commander Paula Hinger. Lieutenant Commander Steven Faggart led Det. 1 while on cruise.

All of these resources give Captain Stufflebeem a compact and powerful air unit, capable of dishing out impressive amounts of firepower upon targets afloat and ashore. If CVW-1 has a vice, it is the lack of depth in its attached units. With just over seventy aircraft assigned, any loss will be felt in both lost resources and unit morale. Nevertheless, it is a well-structured and balanced force, which can hurt an enemy if properly handled.

Cruiser-Destroyer Group Two: Guarding and Guiding "The Boat"

Aircraft carriers and submarines may be the glamorous and expensive superstars of seapower, but the "surface warfare" sailors and their cruisers, destroyers, and frigates are an increasingly visible and vital part of the battle group. These "small" ships (if you can call a ten-thousand-ton cruiser "small") carry an increasing proportion of the Navy's usable "in-your-face" combat power. Systems like the Aegis combat system, SM-2 SAM, Tomahawk cruise missile, and SH-60 LAMPS III helicopter are common aboard surface combatants. In the drawn-down Navy of the 1990's, the Cold War frictions between surface, submarine, and aviation communities have rapidly broken down, making way for a unique kind of "joint" warfare.

To get a view of this synergy, you need to take a look at how today's CVBGs are organized and commanded. Following Desert Storm and the end of the Cold War, a new arrangement was set up to spread CVBG leadership opportunities more fairly. Previously, each CVBG was controlled by a Carrier Group (CARGRU) headed by a Naval aviator rear admiral. The escorts formed a Cruiser-Destroyer Group (CRUDESGRU), and the two groups to-gether became the battle group. Now, only half the CVBGs are structured this way. The rest (usually three or four at a time) are headed by the CRUDESGRU commander (a rear admiral, lower half, traditionally addressed as "Commodore"), with the carrier and CVW subordinated. Other elements may be attached-the ARG, MEU (SOC), MCM (minesweeping) squadrons, SEAL teams, etc.-and this is the force that deploys for six months at a time.

The GW group includes the ships of Cruiser-Destroyer Group Two (CRUDESGRU Two), home-ported at Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia. Commanded by Rear Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN, it is a well-balanced mix of older and newer ships. Admiral Mullen is a career surface warrior, in the tradition of great surface leaders like Admiral Elmo Zumwalt and Vice Admiral Joseph "Little Joe" Metcalf. He previously commanded the destroyer USS Goldsborough (DDG-20) and the Aegis cruiser USS Yorktown (CG-48), both top-of-the-line SAM ships. A graduate of the Annapolis Class of 1968 (his notable classmates include Admiral Jay Johnson, the current CNO), he went on to earn a Master's degree from Harvard University. Admiral Mullen represents the new generation of Naval leader, as well educated and savvy as any corporate executive. We'll get to know him better in the next chapter.

Admiral Mullen's "flagship" is a section of the O-3 level "blue tile country" of the George Washington, comfortable and nicely furnished, but quite noisy from aircraft operations one deck above. Here he makes his home and office afloat, along with the staff of CRUDESGRU Two. From there he commands the various ships of the force. Let's look at CRUDESGRU Two:[69]

• USS Normandy (CG-64)-An improved Ticonderoga-class (CG-47) Aegis guided-missile cruiser, Normandy is commanded by Captain James F. Deppe. Normandy has already accumulated an outstanding combat record. In fact, she has fired more BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles in anger (thirteen during Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia back in 1995) than any other Navy cruiser. The heart of Normandy's combat power is the Aegis combat system, with four SPY-1 phased-array radars to track hun-dredsof targets at once. Aegis-equipped ships can engage dozens of airborne targets (aircraft and missiles) with SM-2 SAMs, while also controlling the weapons of other ships in the battle group. She carries up to 122 missiles in two Mk. 41 vertical launch systems (VLS), including SM-2 Standard SAMs, BGM-109 Tomahawks, and RUM-139A Vertical Launch Anti-Submarine Rockets. In addition to her twin 5-in/127mm guns and missiles, Normandy carries a pair of SH-60B Seahawk helicopters that can deliver ASW torpedoes and AGM-119 Penguin antiship missiles. During 1997 and 1998, Normandy's Seahawks came from Helicopter Squadron-Light Forty-Eight, Detachment Eight (HSL-48, Det. 8), headed by Commander Brent Barrow. For the 1997/1998 cruise, the Detachment 8 OIC was Lieutenant Commander Steve Blaisdell, who commanded two SH-60B aircraft, as well as their flight and maintenance crews.

• USS South Carolina (CGN-37)-Commanded by Captain David K. Brown, South Carolina will be the last U.S. nuclear-powered cruiser in commission. Because of budget pressures, this ship and her sister, California (CGN-36), will retire in 1999. Until then, South Carolina gives the GW battle group excellent service. Thanks to her nuclear power plant, she is the only escort in the group that can stay with the carrier in a long-range, high-speed dash to a distant crisis. South Carolina also has the "New Threat Update" (NTU), an electronics package that establishes a data link with Aegis ships, and accepts firing commands from their computers. This is especially useful, since South Carolina's missile directors (steerable dish antennas projecting an intense, narrow microwave beam to "light up" the target for a missile's seeker head) are considered more effective in coastal areas than those of Aegis ships.

• USS Carney (DDG-64)-One of the newer ships in the Navy, Carney is an Arleigh Burke-class (DDG-51) Aegis destroyer. Displacing only 8,300 tons (as compared to almost ten thousand tons for Ticonderoga-class cruisers), the Burkes are considered the finest surface combat vessels in the world on a ton-for-ton/capability basis. The first U.S. warships designed with stealth technology to reduce their radar and infrared signatures, they pack the same Aegis combat system and weapons mix as the larger cruisers. They carry fewer weapons (ninety-six missiles in her VLS launchers and a single 5-in/54 mm gun mount), though, and no helicopter hangar is fitted. Carney is based at Naval Station Mayport, Florida, and commanded by Commander Mark H. Buzby.

• USS John Rogers (DD-983)-An updated Spruance-class destroyer, John Rogers is based at Naval Station Mayport, Florida. Her skipper is Commander James M. Carr, and the two embarked SH-60B LAMPS helicopters are drawn from HSL-46 (headed by Commander Tim Alexander) at Mayport. For the GW battle group's 1997/1998 cruise, the HSL-46 Det. 6 OIC was Lieutenant Commander Kenan Shaffer.

Along with the four cruisers and destroyers, CRUDESGRU Two includes a pair of Oliver Hazard Perry-class (FFG-7) guided-missile frigates. These smaller (3,660 tons) escort ships are particularly useful for inshore work common in littoral operations. Though limited in gun and SAM capabilities, FFG-7's have good sonars for shallow-water ASW, excellent helicopter facilities, and vast experience in maritime embargo and joint counter-drug operations. Like their namesakes from the age of fighting sail, frigates are fast ships that frequently go in harm's way.[70]

• USS Boone (FFG-28)-Based at Naval Station Mayport, Florida, Boone is commanded by Commander Arthur S. Mobley. Her SH-60B Seahawk helicopter came from HSL-42 (commanded by Commander Robert Presler) during her 1997/1998 cruise with the GW group. This unit, HSL-42 Det. 1, is headed by Lieutenant Commander Stuart Howard.

• USS Underwood (FFG-36)-Underwood is based at Naval Station Mayport, Florida, and commanded by Commander Daniel M. Smith. She also has a single SH-60B Seahawk detachment, this one from HSL-44 (headed by Commander Wayne Tunick). The HSL-44 Det. 7 OIC is Lieutenant Commander Jack Shepard.

The last two combat vessels of the GW battle group are a pair of improved Los Angeles-class (1688) nuclear-attack submarines, which give Admiral Mullen additional capabilities that we can only describe in general terms because of the tight security restrictions that surround and protect the "Silent Service." In addition to hunting down potential enemy submarines inshore, they can fire Tomahawk cruise missiles, track maritime targets, gather electronic intelligence, and covertly deliver and retrieve special operations forces. The assigned SSNs are:

• USS Toledo (SSN-769)-Based at the submarine base in Groton, Connecticut, Toledo is commanded by Commander Bill Burke.

• USS Annapolis (SSN-760)-Also home-ported at Groton, Annapolis is led by Commander Daniel Parson.

Logistics may be the least "sexy" part of Naval operations, but supplies are always the first concern and constant worry of the professional warrior. You don't leave port without carefully planning how the fleet supply train will support your operations at sea over many months and thousands of miles. The mark of a real "blue-water" Navy is the ability to sustain operations at sea indefinitely. The U.S. Navy pioneered at-sea replenishment over six decades ago.

• USS Seattle (AOE-3)-The great advantage of nuclear-powered warships is that they do not require fuel oil for propulsion. With four nuclear ships (a carrier, cruiser, and both submarines), the GW battle group has no need for a flotilla of supporting oil tankers. Only one combat support ship is assigned to the GW battle group, but what a ship! With over 53,000 tons displacement fully loaded, USS Seattle (of the Sacramento class) carries bunker and aviation fuel, fresh food, spare parts, supplies, and ammunition. She can defend herself with a Mk. 29 Sea Sparrow SAM system, a pair of 20mm Mk. 15 Phalanx CIWS, and a full SLQ-32 ESM/ECM system. Captain Stephen Firks commands Seattle.

Partners: The Guam Amphibious Ready Group

When I wrote about the Marine Corps a few years ago, teaming CVBGs and ARGs/MEU (SOC)s into combined task forces was still a very new concept.[71] Though joining these two powerful and flexible units makes great sense, big technical, institutional, and cultural barriers had to be overcome in order to make it happen. Once the concept was implemented, however, it quickly proved its worth, in the Balkans, the Taiwan Straits, Africa, and the Persian Gulf. The CVBG/ARG/MEU (SOC) teams have held the line for American interests and kept a lid on the chaos of the 1990s.

For their 1997/1998 Mediterranean cruise, the GW battle group teamed with an ARG based around Amphibious Squadron Two (PHIBRON-2). These four ships are commanded by an "ARG Commodore," Captain Phillip Sowa, USN, from his flagship, the amphibious helicopter carrier (LPH) USS Guam (LPH-9). Though Guam lacks the larger flight deck, well deck, and hangar found on newer Tarawa (LHA-1) and Wasp-class (LHD-1) assault ships, the ARG has found ways to compensate for these shortcomings. To make up for the shortage of well deck space as well as vehicle and cargo capacity, the ARG has an extra Dock Landing Ship (LSD) to carry the full range of gear needed by an MEU (SOC). Since flight deck parking space on Guam is minimal, the AV-8B Harrier II detachment assigned to the MEU (SOC) was reduced to four aircraft. For close air support, the MEU (SOC) can rely on VMFA-251, the Marine Corps F/A-18 Hornet squadron embarked on GW. Marines prefer to have their own aviators flying cover over a hot beach or landing zone.

• USS Guam (LPH-9)-Guam is among the last of her kind-one of only two of the Iwo Jima class (LPH-2) still in service-and is scheduled to be decommissioned after the 1997/1998 cruise. Until then she will be Commodore Sowa's flagship and the headquarters for the embarked MEU (SOC). While she lacks the comforts, as well as some of the advanced communications and electronics, of her younger LHA/LHD cousins, Guam is an old warhorse, able to carry up to 1,500 Marines and twenty-four helicopters. Captain William J. Luti commands her.

• USS Shreveport (LPD-12)-Another "rusty but trusty" veteran of American amphibious operations. An Austin-class (LPD-4) Amphibious Transport Dock, Shreveport is the "inshore" element of the ARG, with much of the "special" warfare capability of the MEU (SOC) aboard. This includes an organic remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) unit of Pioneer reconnaissance drones, as well as the rubber boats, the force recon element, and a Navy Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) team. Led by Captain Denby Starling II, she can expect at least a decade of service ahead before her final trip to the scrap yard and replacement by a new San Antonio-class (LPD-17) amphibious ship.

• USS Ashland (LSD-48)-Designed to carry a mix of landing craft, vehicles, and cargo, Ashland is a Whidby Island-class (LSD-41) amphibious ship, capable of carrying up to four Landing Craft, Air Cushioned (LCAC), which are favored in today's amphibious operations. Captained by Commander Timothy R. Hanley, Ashland is a modern and very comfortable ship for its crew and embarked Marines.

• USS Oak Hill (LSD-51)-Oak Hill is one of four Harpers Ferry-class LSDs, cargo variants of the Whidby Island class. By shortening the well deck so that it only has a capacity for two LCACs, Oak Hill gains vastly increased stowage for vehicles and cargo. Oak Hill is an another state-of-the-art amphibious ship, with Commander Michael A. Durnan at the helm.

Amphibious ships like these are hardly sleek greyhounds of the sea. Sailors joke that the designator "LSD" stands for "large slow duck!" For this reason, Admiral Mullen has teamed several of his escorts for regular operations with the Guam ARG, depending upon the mission. For example, during inshore amphibious operations, South Carolina and John Rogers usually provide cover for the ARG. This includes ASW and gunfire support, as well as a SAM air defense "bubble." Thanks to her NTU system, South Carolina can tap into the sensor and automation systems of the Aegis ships, and take firing cues from them.

The ARG's combat power is the cargo it can deliver-Marines and their "stuff." For the Guam ARG, that cargo is the 24th MEU (SOC). The 24th was the unit that plucked Air Force Captain Scott O'Grady out of Bosnia back in 1995, after his F-16C Fighting Falcon was shot down by a Bosnian Serb SA-6 SAM. Today the unit is commanded by Colonel Richard Natonski, USMC, and has roughly the same structure as in 1995. The 24th's components include:

• Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 3–6 — The core of the 24th MEU (SOC) is built around BLT 3–6, a reinforced Marine rifle battalion. Its 1,200 Marines have their own armor, artillery, and transport, providing a capability to launch small coastal raids or spearhead large invasions. During 1997 and 1998, the 24th MEU (SOC) has been commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Richard P. Mills.

• Medium Marine Helicopter Squadron 263 (HMM-263) — The air component of the 24th MEU (SOC) is a reinforced squadron of twelve CH-46E Sea Knight medium-transport helicopters. Attached are quartets of CH-53E Super Stallion heavy-lift, UH-1N Iroquois command-and-control, and AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters. Normally there is a detachment of six AV-8B Harrier II fighter-bombers assigned, but Guam's limited deck parking space reduced this to just four. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Duva is the commander of HMM-263, and is equipped to operate as a Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC-commanding Army, Navy and Air Force aviation assets on the scene) if necessary.

• MEU Service Support Group 24 (MSSG-24) — the 24th MEU (SOC)'s logistical tail is the 24th MSSG. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Brian L. Tonnacliff, this compact unit keeps the 24th supplied with everything from floppy disks and ammunition to jet fuel and water.

All of the above components make for one of the best-balanced, most compact fighting forces in the world. What it lacks, like its CVW-1 teammate, is depth-it is only a couple thousand sailors and Marines in a world where dictators command tens of thousands of soldiers. But one of the nice things about being a "gator" sailor or Marine is that if you go in harm's way, a lot more Marines and other American warriors can be on the way, soon to back you up.

"Cats and Dogs": Miscellaneous Attached Units

CVBGs, ARGs, and MEU (SOC)s are just three of the many units "owned," trained, and "packaged" by U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) in Norfolk, Virginia.[72] Before a CVBG or ARG/MEU (SOC) goes into combat, it will likely be reinforced with additional support units. While this may not be a complete list, it is representative of what has been regularly used in the last decade or so.

• Land Based Air Support-In addition to CVW-1 and HMM-263, the GW battle group frequently needs support from land-based aviation to sustain long-term operations in high-threat areas. This was seen clearly during Operations Desert Storm and Joint Endeavor. These aviation units can include:

— Airborne Tanker Support-Every CAG dreams, hopes, and lusts for more airborne tanker support. Since the retirement of the KA-6D Intruder, the only tankers he actually "owns" are S-3 Viking and ES-3 Shadow aircraft, which can carry under-wing "buddy" refueling pods. Each of these can "give away" about 8,000 lb/3,627 kg of fuel for tanking. This is less than a third of what used to be dispensed by a single KA-6D, so any land-based tanker support is precious. One option is a Marine KC-130 Hercules tanker detachment "on-call" for the 24th MEU (SOC). In addition to Marine tanker support, other tanker assets can make the life of CVW-1 easier. Navy carrier aircraft have refueling probes that fit almost any Air Force, Navy, or NATO tanker aircraft available. Especially valuable are the big Air Force KC-10A Extenders, which can refuel aircraft with either boom or probe refueling systems. One KC-10A carries over ten times the "give-away" fuel load of an S-3/ES-3 tanker, and has much greater loiter time. A favorite Navy "trick" is to use a large land-based tanker, like a KC-135, as a "milk cow" to top off S-3/ES-3 tankers, which then distribute the fuel to other carrier aircraft.

— Airborne Early Warning (AEW) Support-Back in 1982, the Royal Navy learned a hard lesson about operating without AEW support in a high-threat environment. Ships were sunk, sailors died, and the expedition to retake the Falkland Islands was seriously jeopardized. While VAW- 123's four E-2C Hawkeyes provide excellent AEW capability, Admiral Mullen is happy to have additional "eyes in the sky." If support from Air Force E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft is available, count on him using it with gusto. Data links on Navy ships can talk to computers on Air Force and NATO Sentries. Secure voice radios are also compatible, assuming everyone has correctly loaded the proper codes (this is a common foul-up in exercises, and it's been known to happen in combat).

— J-STARS Ground Surveillance-The GW CVBG has powerful sensors to monitor the sky, but its ability to detect and track surface and ground-based targets is more limited. The S-3Bs of VS-32 can fly effective day and night maritime surface surveillance missions, but this competes with their other missions as tankers, ASW aircraft, and sea control platforms. Real-time tracking of ground targets ashore is even more difficult. If you need to monitor a ground threat, have your CinC ask the Air Force for the loan of few E-8 Joint Surveillance, Tracking, and Reconnaissance System (J-STARS) aircraft. Based on a commercial Boeing 707 airframe, the E-8's carry side-looking synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) that can detect both stationary and moving targets on the earth's surface. The J-STARS system also has special modes for detecting and tracking maritime targets, then passing the data to the battle group via a data link. Because J-STARS is designed for "wide area" surveillance, it can monitor thousands of square miles of territory at a time.

— Air Force Wings-CVW-1 is trained and equipped to work jointly with air units of other services, or even of allied countries. This reflects a profound transformation in Navy thinking since 1990, and even as late as 1995 the capability was marginal. But now the CVBG finally has its own capability to generate and use Air Tasking Orders to synchronize and "de-conflict" all kinds of air operations (strikes, sweeps, recon, cargo delivery, airmobile assault, cruise-missile salvos, search and rescue-you name it!). Someday we may see "expeditionary" Air Force wings (like the 366th, a composite unit of fighters, bombers, and tankers) directly supporting carrier operations or providing cover for a CVBG or ARG.

— Marine Aviation Support-The Marine Corps can quickly deploy squadron of two-seat F/A-18D Hornet all-weather strike fighters to support CVBG, ARG, and MEU (SOC) operations. Equipped with Nighthawk laser-targeting pods for LGBs, as well as AIM-120 AMRAAM and AGM- 65 Maverick missiles, the F/A-18Ds are highly capable strike fighters. Marines also fly land-based EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare (EW) and jammer aircraft to augment those already aboard the carrier. Also, Marine Hornets and Prowlers can easily operate from carriers if necessary, since they too have tailhooks!

• Reconnaissance Support-To plan air strikes effectively you need high-quality, up-to-the-minute imagery of potential targets, and intelligence analysts who understand how to interpret these images. The main reconnaissance asset on the carrier is a quartet of TARPS-equipped F-14's. Older TARPS pods bring back reels of film that has to be developed in an onboard photographic lab. New Digital TARPS pods have a data link that can return a stream of pictures to the carrier before the F-14 lands. Other sources for imagery tend to sound like a bowl of alphabet soup: Satellite imagery will come from the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in Chantilly, Virginia, with its fleet or orbital imaging and radar satellites. UAVs and other airborne imaging systems can also be tasked for the CVBG staff. To process and distribute imagery and other products, the National Imaging and Mapping Agency (NIMA) was created in 1996. NIMA will combine the services of NRO, the Central Imaging Office (CIO), the National Photographic Center (NPIC), and the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), all under a single roof. Digital and paper maps, annotated photography, and customized target graphics will be "pulled" on demand by regional joint intelligence centers and "pushed" down to the wing and squadron intelligence officers who will need it.

The big NRO satellites produce a huge volume of high-quality "close look" and "wide area" imagery, but many urgent demands compete for limited time slots on these precious national assets. Smaller and less expensive collection systems will come on line in the early 21st century. NRO is trying to improve the timeliness of the images they deliver, and to "downgrade" the Super-Secret classification of final products, so that more people and organizations can see them. An alternative that will become available in 1998 is commercial satellite imagery at one-meter resolution (good enough to distinguish tanks from trucks, but not to identify specific models). In the long run, the military will probably be one of the biggest users of commercial imagery, since it will be cheap, timely, and best of all, unclassified!

UAV systems continue to make steady progress toward the goal of long-duration, stealthy, unmanned airborne reconnaissance. The Pioneer UAV continues in service with the Marine Corps. Also, the first Air Force Predator unit (the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron), at Nellis AFB, Nevada, formed several years ago. Predator is derived from the Gnat 750 UAVs, which were combat-tested by the CIA in Bosnia back in 1994; and Predators were used during a recent workup of the Carl Vinson (CVN-70) CVBG off the southern California coast. The Navy today can receive the data feed from Predators, and control them from carriers. Trials have even tested controlling the big UAVs from nuclear submarines! On the downside, there are no facilities for carrier takeoffs or landings, and Predators must be launched from a land site. But the multi-day endurance of the Predator makes this a minor limitation in most areas.

In addition to the Predator and Pioneer programs, progress is being made on long-endurance surveillance UAVs, like Dark Star, produced by the Lockheed Martin "Skunk Works." The even-longer-range Teledyne Ryan Global Hawk is also on track, as well as the data links and common control stations needed to make the UAV available to users. Traditional manned reconnaissance systems include the RF-18D Hornet introduced in 1997, equipped with a new Advanced Tactical Reconnaissance System (ATARS).

• Intelligence Support-In addition to imagery and mapping support, the GW battle group can also make use of many of the other products generated by the various "spook" agencies. Some of these include:

— National Security Agency (NSA)-The NSA, which controls all electronic and signals intelligence collection, is a significant supporting agency for an amphibious unit like the GW battle group. A cramped, high-security compartment called the "Ships Signals Exploitation Space" (SSES) lets battle group, ARG, and MEU (SOC) commanders tap into a wealth of electronic intelligence sources including RC-135 Rivet Joint and EP-3 Orion electronic intelligence aircraft, as well as communications intelligence satellites. Ship-based sensors (like the Classic Outboard ESM system) can intercept and analyze electronic signals, from SAM and air traffic radar to cellular phones and television signals.

— U.S. Space Command (US SPACECOM)-Based at Falcon AFB, Colorado, US SPACECOM provides space-based services to support combat operations. Key assets include weather, GPS navigation and communications satellites, ballistic missile warnings, and in the future, theater missile defense command and control.

— Cable News Network (CNN)-Intelligence analysts, after a few drinks, will usually agree that CNN is the finest real-time intelligence-gathering service in the world. In fact, one of the greatest benefits of the Challenge Athena system was to give commanders and staffs access to networks like CNN, Skynet, and MSNBC. A side benefit is improved crew morale when up-to-the-minute news and sports from home are available.

Battle Group Operations: The Concept

When the Army guys talk about "doctrine," Navy guys talk about CONOPS. "Doctrine" or CONOPS is how we think about the way we fight. For American Naval commanders, tradition, more than technology, dominates the way they look at CONOPS. Carrier-based air units tend to be more "brittle" than land-based wings and squadrons. When you have very few aircraft, and reinforcements may be weeks away, the loss of each plane and crew hurts-a lot. That means that battle group and air wing commanders have to be very cautious when they commit their limited resources, yet very bold in employing them to make the effort effective. Balancing such conflicting objectives takes a special gift-even a kind of operational and tactical genius. The capacity for such judgment is rare.

Aviators are an incredibly select group to begin with, and only the best of the best ever rise to command carriers, air wings, and battle groups. Perhaps this explains why naval aviators seem to be so successful, not only in the top ranks of the military, but also in government and industry. They don't just have "the right stuff." They have the right CONOPS.

A trained, well-led battle group is an ideal tool for many different missions. These missions include:

• Presence-Global naval presence is the primary mission of every peacetime CVBG deployment. Just having a carrier group in the neighborhood encourages regional bullies and opponents to back off, as seems to have happened in the Straits of Taiwan in 1996 when a pair of CVBGs deterred aggression by the People's Republic of China against Taiwan. It's really very simple: If you attack even a small American ship, you've got yourself an international incident. If you attack an American carrier, you've got yourself a war against the people of the United States. You lose. Any questions?

• Show of Force-This might be best described as a one-time application of military power for the purpose of sending a message. It is a punitive military action designed to apply a measured amount of force against a specific target. Operation Desert Strike against Iraq in 1996 and the 1986 raid on Libya are prime examples.

• Maritime Embargo-In the days of sailing ships, this mission was called a blockade. Though modern interpretations of international law have made the historic concept of blockade obsolete, maritime embargo and inspection operations are a staple of CVBG operations today. At one point in 1994, the U.S. and its allies were simultaneously running embargo operations against Iraq, Haiti, and in the Balkans.

• Freedom of Navigation Exercise-"Freedom of the Seas" is a concept the U.S. Navy inherits from the Pax Britannica-the age of British global empire, when the Royal Navy enforced the "right of innocent passage" at gunpoint, anywhere in the world. To tyrannical regimes, the notion of free navigation is as incomprehensible as most other freedoms. Dictators are often tempted to simply close their coastal waters, applying the surfer punk's rule of "my beach, my wave!" As a matter of policy, the United States will challenge any attempt to prevent or restrict free navigation in recognized international waters. Our operations on the Libyan "Line of Death" in the Gulf of Sidra in 1981 and 1986 are classic examples of this mission.

• Maritime Escort-High-value commercial vessels, like tankers and container ships, or military transports (like Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons) sometimes have to be escorted past hostile shores and through dangerous waters. CVBGs provide powerful force for escort missions, with their array of air, surface, and subsurface capabilities. Our escort of American-flagged Kuwaiti-owned tankers during 1988 and 1989 in the Persian Gulf demonstrates this mission.

• Expeditionary Support-"Expeditionary" is a fancy word for invasion, the ultimate exercise of force. Though rare, invasions still happen. Recent examples are the 1983 invasion of Grenada, our landings in Beirut during the same period, and the liberation of Haiti in 1994. CVBGs and ARGs were the key units in prosecuting each of these actions.

• Power Projection-Sometimes, you just have to fly a lot of sorties over some beach for a long time to support a long-term national commitment. Desert Storm and operations in the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnam War are examples. This kind of operation usually involves two or more CVBGs sharing the burden of operations over a period of days or weeks. The key to this kind of warfare is pacing the air crews and maintaining an adequate supply of munitions for delivery onto the targets.

Each of these missions depends on having all the elements of the CVBG team in place, so that the battle group commander has a full range of options to block or defeat any hostile action. A battle group commander can only do his job, however, if he has political support from the National Command Authorities, necessary freedom of action from his regional CinC, and Rules of Engagement (ROE) that allow him to accomplish the mission.

So how would a CVBG commanded like Admiral Mullen use the tools at his command to prosecute an actual crisis? Consider the problem facing many American travelers in some of the world's rougher neighborhoods: walking into the middle of a civil war. Since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990's, literally dozens of national, tribal, ethnic, or religious conflicts have sprung up. They drag on for years without one side or the other gaining a decisive advantage. During particularly chaotic periods, immediate evacuation of American citizens and other non-combatants from the war zone is required to prevent massacres or hostage situations from developing, as they did in Iran back in 1979.

In a "typical" NEO (Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation), Marines from the MEU (SOC) fly into a capital city to reinforce the guard in the American embassy, and then safeguard the helicopter evacuation of non-combatants to the waiting ships offshore. The U.S. and our allies have conducted literally dozens of NEOs in the last few years, particularly in West Africa and the Balkans. Usually an NEO is accomplished by detaching and dispatching the ARG/MEU (SOC) team and a few escorts to conduct the mission independently. During Desert Shield (1990), simultaneous NEOs were required in Somalia and Liberia, without taking forces away from the buildup in the Gulf. Most combatants in civil wars these days have the good sense to let us run our NEOs without getting in the way. However, some truly fanatical terrorists or tribal warriors just can't resist the urge to test their prowess against the Marines.

A "worst case" NEO in our time might involve rebel forces closing in on a city; not just ragtag guerrillas with AK-47's and RPG-7's, but well-equipped and trained forces with artillery, armor, helicopters, and fighter-bombers. Let's say that they have taken a hard stand against American intervention; not just nasty rhetoric but closing off normal evacuation routes. Overland roads, seaports, and airports have been closed, and several thousand civilians are trapped inside embassies in the surrounded city. To emphasize their dislike of Westerners, rebels have taken shots at embassy guards and killed some news crews, inciting outrage from the world media.

Since the situation is clearly getting out of hand, an entire CVBG/ARG/ MEU (SOC) team is dispatched to bring the civilians out with a minimum of losses. With the orders and ROE from the National Command Authorities in hand, the battle group commander brings the force to the offshore waters of the embattled country, then calls his unit commanders together for a planning conference aboard the flagship. Meanwhile, intelligence agencies will be working overtime to gather, generate, and deliver the necessary imagery, maps, and data on potential threats.

As the battle group arrives offshore, rebel and loyalist forces are fighting in the streets around the embassies, and the rebel air force is bombing the capital city. The embarked CVW is tasked to take out the air threat to the Marine helicopters, and escort and protect the evacuees as they are flown back to the ships of the ARG. The CVW sets up a combat air patrol (CAP) station of F-14 Tomcats backed up by an E-2C Hawkeye AEW aircraft. At the same time, the State and Defense Department spokesmen back in Washington, D.C., are making the intentions of the force clear to the rebels and the rest of the world: Americans will fire on anyone interfering with the evacuation.

Initially, the show of force deters any rebel response, which is exactly the intent. Meanwhile, additional air units are already being prepared for operations. Each operational mission is known as an "event" to the air boss on the carrier, who manages and controls the local airspace to ensure that no midair collisions or enemy incursions interfere with operations. Events are normally scheduled about one hour apart to allow a little slack time for flight and deck crews to "respot" aircraft (shuffle them around on the deck) and take a few breaks. These "cyclic ops" can be maintained indefinitely if required.

Meanwhile, an Aegis ship moves closer inshore, with one of the HH- 60G SAR/special operations helicopters aboard standing by for Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) in case a plane goes down. The escort provides inshore radar coverage of the airspace, and establishes a forward SAM "bubble" to protect the ships of the ARG should the rebels try an air strike against them. About this time, the first wave of Marine reinforcements aboard its helicopter transports arrives at the embassy and prepares to take out the first of the evacuees. Within a few hours of the initial Marine guard reinforcement, the helicopters loaded with evacuees will be shuttling out to the ARG ships on a regular schedule. Since evacuations can involve rescuing hundreds and sometimes thousands of civilians, and it can take hours to get them all clear of the war zone, trouble can easily occur during this period.

A few hours into the evacuation cycle, the rebels have carefully noted the timing and routes of the evacuation helicopters, with a view to teaching the Americans a lesson. Under cover of darkness a mobile battery of radar-controlled SAMs moves into the evacuation corridor. And just as dawn is breaking, a flight of MiG fighters attempts to intercept one of the helicopter groups. These threats do not go unnoticed. A few miles offshore, systems operators in the backseats of an ES-3 Shadow ESM aircraft intercept radio messages between the SAM battery and rebel headquarters, as well as communications traffic going out to the MiG base outside the city. To deal with this threat, the battle group commander reinforces the next rescue group with additional CAP escorts, and orders alternative route planning for the helicopters.

Suddenly an escorting EA-6B Prowler begins to detect the telltale signals of the SAM surveillance radar. The Prowler fires a pair of AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles at the radar vehicle, destroying it in seconds. Moments later, a pair of F/A-18 Hornet fighter-bombers dive into the area, destroying the SAM launch vehicles with LGBs and AGM-65 Maverick missiles.

As the strike aircraft finish their deadly work, word goes out over the secure data links that the AEW Hawkeye and ES-3 have detected several flights of MiG fighters being vectored into the area. Rapidly, the CVW commander maneuvers his fighters into position to stop them. He orders his most capable fighters to intercept (these aircraft have Low Probability of Intercept-LPI-radars equipped with NCTR operating modes). As the American fighters move into place, they acquire the rebel fighters on radar, and fire their AIM-120 AMRAAM AAMs at maximum range. Over half of the rebel MiGs are vaporized in clusters of oily fireballs. The rest flee back to their base. Now that the immediate danger is past, the evacuation continues without a break until the last of the civilians and embassy staff have safely reached the ships of the ARG.

As the Marine guard and reinforcement force is recovered, the National Command Authorities decide to punish the rebel violations of international law prior to withdrawal. With the Marines and helicopters back aboard, the ARG heads back out to sea, and one last strike is planned, briefed, and assembled aboard the carrier. Throughout the NEO operations, national intelligence agencies and the CVBG's own TARPS F-14's have been trying to locate and identify critical rebel command posts and heavy-weapons sites. Because of the earlier attacks on U.S. forces, a one-time show of force against the rebels is authorized and rapidly executed.

Close inshore, the Aegis ship launches several dozen BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles to attack fixed radars and command posts. Behind them come a wave of fighter-bombers and support aircraft, which attack the rebel MiG base, as well as the headquarters of the insurgent forces. To minimize collateral damage, only PGMs are used to hit bunkers and aircraft shelters. Once their ordnance is expended, all aircraft safely return to the "boat" for a well-deserved rest.

As the battle group withdraws, Aegis ships and one CAP section provide a "rear guard" until the force exits the threat area. A few days later, the evacuees safely disembark; and weapons, fuel, and supplies are replenished. Then the battle group moves on to its next destination, the cycles of normal operations are reestablished, and the crews begin to think about their next port call and the exercises that will follow. While this scenario is much simplified, it illustrates how CVBGs can rapidly adapt to a fast-breaking situation. Getting a battle group into such a high state of readiness is, of course, no simple matter. The next chapter explains how Admiral Mullen, Captain Rutheford, and CAG Stufflebeem spent the hot summer of 1997 preparing their people, ships, and aircraft for the challenge of an actual deployment. Join me, and I'll show you how they spent their vacation!