aisles,
grabbing as much food as
possible
before
the
hyperinflation
caused
the
goods to be repriced. A man
walked through the aisles all
day
doing
nothing
but
repricing the items on the
shelves to keep up with the
rapidly changing value of the
peso. When Wences and his
mother got to the register, he
and his sisters would run back
and grab more food if they
still had any money left.
Holding on to money was
equal to losing it.
These experiences gave
Wences insights into the
nature of money that most
people in the world learn only
from textbooks. In America,
the dollar seamlessly serves
the three functions of money:
providing
a
medium
of
exchange,
a
unit
for
measuring the cost of goods,
and an asset where value can
be stored. In Argentina, on
the other hand, while the peso
was used as a medium of
exchange—for
daily
purchases—no one used it as
a store of value. Keeping
savings in the peso was
equivalent to throwing away
money. So people exchanged
any pesos they wanted to save
for dollars, which kept their
value better than the peso.
Because the peso was so
volatile,
people
usually
remembered prices in dollars,
which
provided
a
more
reliable unit of measure over
time.
As Wences avidly pored
over all the available writing
about Bitcoin in the first
months after discovering it, it
seemed clear to him that for
people
in
places
like
Argentina,
Bitcoin
might
provide
a
much
more
efficient place to store money
than the dollar. In Argentina,
dollars had to be purchased
through
shady
money
changers, and were saved in
closets or under the mattress.
The promise of a virtual
currency that could be bought
and stored online, accessed
from anywhere, and secured
with a private key looked like
a significant improvement.
Wences
began
by
purchasing
a
growing
stockpile of Bitcoins from
Mt. Gox in early 2012 and
joined in the conversation on
the forums and chat channels.
When he wasn’t playing with
Bitcoin, he devoured several
books on the history of
money, most significantly
Debt: The First 5,000 Years, a cult favorite in the Occupy
Wall Street movement and in
certain transgressive corners
of Wall Street. The book, by
anthropologist
David
Graeber,
argued
that
historians and economists
have wrongly assumed that
money grew out of barter. In
fact, Graeber argued, and
Wences came to believe,
barter was never common and
money
was
actually
an
evolution of credit—a way of
tracking what people owed to
each other. People used to
just keep a mental tally of
what they owed each other,
but money provided a way to
expand the system more
broadly among people who
didn’t know each other.
As he read, Wences felt
that after twenty years of
working
on
financial
technology, he was finally
coming to understand money
for the first time. He saw that
Bitcoin’s lack of any apparent
intrinsic value didn’t matter
when looked at against the
history of money. The reason
gold itself had been used as
money was not that it was
valuable; it had become
valuable because it was used
as money. And it was used as
money because it did what all
good money did: it served as
a sort of physical ledger on
which society could keep
track of who was owed what.
Each
piece
of
gold
represented a slot on the
ledger of all outstanding gold,
which anyone could verify by
checking
the
mass
and
volume of the gold.
“We
don’t
use
gold
because it’s pretty—that was
a stupid assumption of mine
and many other people,”
Wences would tell anyone
who would listen during these
days when he was totally
immersed in the history. “No,
we use it in jewelry because
it’s very expensive. It’s not
expensive because we use it
in jewelry.”
“What is the value?” he
would ask. “It’s that it is the
ledger. You put the ledger on
your neck to show power and
wealth. It isn’t a ledger where
you have to trust a bank or
anyone else.”
Bitcoin, Wences came to
believe, was a purer version
of that sort of ledger—a
commonly verifiable place
where everyone could keep
track of who owned what.
Despite
his
fervor,
Wences initially had trouble
drumming up much interest
among his Silicon Valley
friends beyond a few fellow
South Americans, who had
grown up in places with
similarly
screwed-up
currencies. Mostly he just got
skeptical looks. For those
who had heard of it, the first
question was usually about
whether it was anything more
than a token for online drug
dealers. Some remembered
David Chaum’s DigiCash
back in the 1990s, but anyone
familiar with that experiment
knew that it had gone under.
The bigger question was why
something like this was
necessary in the first place.
Credit cards and $20 bills did
everything
that
most
of
Wences’s
friends
needed
when it came to spending
money. Why should they trust
a digital code that had
nothing backing it but the
computers of some libertarian
nerds?
After months of trying,
Wences
finally
made
a
breakthrough with one of his
best friends, and the one
whose opinion in this area
mattered
most:
David
Marcus, who had recently
become the president of
PayPal. Like Wences, Marcus
was a foreigner in the Valley.
He had grown up in France
and Switzerland, and had the
same
slender
stature,
unassuming presence, and
seemingly
effortless
sophistication as Wences. But
after spending a decade on
payment startups, Marcus
was used to hearing grand
claims about technologies
that would revolutionize the
way money moved around
the Internet. He also had
experienced the overbearing
regulatory scrutiny that falls
on any company that wants to
deal with money.
But in the fall of 2012
Marcus had a conversion
moment
when
the
Argentinian
government
ordered his company, PayPal,
to cut off direct payments
between Argentinians, a new
prong in the government’s
effort to slow the movement
of pesos into other currencies.
With Wences’s arguments
ringing in his head, Marcus
watched as the policy went
into effect and the price of
Bitcoin rose, suggesting to
Marcus
that
Argentinians
were seeking out Bitcoin as a
way around the government’s
restrictions. He quietly set up
an account with Mt. Gox and
began buying coins. In doing
so, Marcus became one of the
first
of
many
important
converts that Wences would
win to the Bitcoin cause.
WENCES RAN HIS digital-wallet
company with an old friend in
Argentina, Federico Murrone,
or Fede. Unlike Wences, who
had an aristocratic lineage,
Fede came from a working-
class family and looked like a
tough biker. The two had
connected as teenagers on
Wences’s
first
startup,
creating
Argentina’s
first
Internet provider, and they
had been close friends ever
since, with Fede providing
the programming smarts for
Wences’s ideas, always from
Argentina, where Fede stayed
to be close to his family.
Wences
traveled
to
Buenos Aires every few
months to check in with Fede
and his team of Argentinian
coders. Each time Wences
visited in 2012, the reminders
of what it was like to live in a
country with broken money
strengthened his belief in the
potential for Bitcoin.
Like other smart visitors
to the country, Wences went
to a black market money
changer whenever he needed
pesos to spend. Credit cards
and ATMs were available,
but they provided pesos at the
official government exchange
rate, which was about 35
percent lower than the rate
available on the street in
2012.
The
government
wanted to make changing
money
into
dollars
unattractive, with its official
exchange rate, because it was
afraid that its citizens would
sell off all their pesos for
dollars, driving the exchange
rate down even further and
devastating the economy. The
government
had
recently
started fining economists who
challenged
its
official
exchange rate. As 2012 went
on,
the
situation
grew
progressively worse, and this
is
what
had
led
the
government to crack down on
PayPal.
The inflation rate wasn’t
the only problem with the
local financial system. As in
many developing countries, it
was incredibly hard to open a
bank account and even harder
to get a credit card. Despite
having
grown
up
in
Argentina, Wences had never
had an Argentinian bank
account. People were left to
pay their bills in cash at the
drugstore, so they had to
carry around wads of 100-
peso bills. This too, seemed
like something that Bitcoin,
with its secure digital wallet,
could help address.
At the Lemon offices in
Buenos Aires, Wences and
Fede were supposed to be
working on their new startup,
but they would end up
spending hours playing with
Bitcoin and talking about
how they might harness its
potential. In late 2012 the two
men organized the first-ever
Bitcoin Meetup in Argentina
at a favorite whiskey bar. It
was sparsely attended, other
than by the friends that
Wences and Fede had already
sold on the technology. The
small
crowd
was
not
surprising given how hard it
was to get Bitcoins in
Argentina. It was incredibly
expensive and difficult to
transfer money from an
Argentinian bank to Mt. Gox
or another foreign Bitcoin
exchange.
And
no
Argentinian bank would work
with a domestic Bitcoin
company.
But there was a budding
conversation about Bitcoin on
an
Argentinian
website
dedicated to protecting online
freedom. When Wences was
in Argentina, he would offer
to sell some of his Bitcoins
after work at a bar near the
Lemon offices. Each time, a
different crew of people
would show up, but one older
gentleman kept coming back,
buying a little more each
time. He had a silent, sullen
countenance and didn’t seem
technologically sophisticated.
After the man made a
particularly large purchase
one day, Wences gently asked
him if he understood the risks
involved with Bitcoin.
“It seems to me like this
is a lot of money, and this is
very risky,” Wences told him
as politely as he could. “You
know you could lose it all?”
“How many times has
your family lost everything
keeping their money in the
peso?”
the
man
asked
Wences.
“Three,
maybe
four,
times,” Wences said.
“Yes. For me it’s been
more times than that,” the
man said.
The man admitted that he
had the option of putting his
money in dollars but that this
would require him to take a
distorted exchange rate and
then hide the bills in his
closet. And who knew when
the dollar might suffer the
same problems as the peso?
“There is no way you can
convince me to keep my
money in the peso,” he said.
BITCOIN HAD CAUGHT Wences
at a decisive moment in his
life—what
an
American
might call a midlife crisis. He
already had many successes
under his belt, as was evident
from his estate in the rolling
hills above Palo Alto, with
two homes, a swimming pool,
tennis courts, and views down
to the bay. In addition to the
tens of millions of dollars
Wences had earned from
selling past startups, he had
been surprised to discover
that he also had a knack for
picking winning investments
in his friends’ companies.
But he had recently been
hitting up against failure for
the first time. Lemon, his
current startup, had grown out
of the decline of his previous
startup, Bling Nation, and
many of Wences’s friends
wondered whether Lemon
was the result of the kind of
passion necessary to succeed
in Silicon Valley or was just
Wences’s attempt to prove
that the failure of Bling
Nation had been an anomaly.
There were already signs that
Lemon was not getting the
kind of pickup that Wences
had imagined. And, as with
all startups, it required more
time from its chief executive
than any one person had in a
day. This was Wences’s
twelfth startup, depending on
how you counted, and his
wife once again felt like a
single mother for their three
children. Wences and Belle
had
already
agreed
that
Lemon would be his last
startup.
These difficulties played
into larger insecurities that
Wences had managed to
sweep under the carpet until
now. For all the money his
past startups had made him,
none had quite achieved their
grand original goals. Back in
Argentina, he had hoped that
his first company, Patagon,
would provide a way to
extend financial services to
the hundreds of millions of
South Americans without a
basic bank. In the end,
though, he couldn’t get a
banking license, and the
online financial firm he
created was used mainly by
South
America’s
wealthy
elite.
For
Wences,
Bitcoin
seemed to address many of
the problems that he’d long
wanted to solve, providing a
financial account that could
be opened anywhere, by
anyone, without requiring
permission
from
any
authority. He also saw an
infant technology that he
believed he could help grow
to dimensions greater than
anything he had previously
achieved.
Wences’s wife, Belle, was
used to watching Wences
dive
headfirst
into
new
technological discoveries. His
easily incited passion and his
ability to convey it were part
of what made him such a
great startup salesman. He
could impart his excitement
with a rare skill. But usually
the initial ardor passed before
long. That was showing no
signs of happening with
Bitcoin. As 2012 went on,
Belle realized that this might
be different from his previous
endeavors.
Belle
herself
resented how much time
Bitcoin was taking out of
Wences’s
already
full
schedule. But even she was
becoming entranced by the
almost mythical nature of this
currency and its mysterious
founder. She soon started
swapping her own theories
with Wences on the identity
of Satoshi.
IN EARLY JANUARY, Wences
traveled with a group of some
of the West Coast’s most
wealthy and powerful men to
an isolated lodge in the
Canadian Rockies with its
own wine cellar, sauna, and
private staff. Their host was
Pete Briger, whom Wences
had met a few years earlier
through an organization for
young chief executives. Even
among the rich and powerful,
Briger
stood
out.
After
attending
Princeton
and
working at Goldman Sachs
for fifteen years, he had risen
to the top of the Fortress
Investment Group, a firm
overseeing
an
array
of
enormous private equity and
hedge funds.
Briger was a big gruff
man, who was known for his
bold bets on distressed debt—
the troubled bonds and loans
that everyone else was too
afraid to touch, and that gave
Briger and his firm arm-
twisting leverage over large
companies and occasionally
small
countries.
He
sometimes called himself a
“financial garbage collector”
and he looked the part. In
2009 Briger had been named
cochairman
of
Fortress,
which
then
controlled
investments worth around
$30 billion, including the
resort company that owned
the lodge where the men were
staying.
Wences was not an alpha
male like most of the other
guests. He liked to stay in
touch with his humble origins
in
Patagonia,
and
his
driveway was filled with
Subarus instead of Teslas or
sport cars. Rather than taking
luxury vacations, Wences
used his time off to go with
his wife to Burning Man, and
he had recently done a vision
quest—involving
days
without any creature comforts
—in the wilderness of the
Andes with one of his best
friends from his younger
years
in
Argentina.
But
Wences had a good-natured
self-confidence
and
a
willingness to listen that had
always allowed him to get
along easily with hard-driving
power players.
The morning after they
arrived at the Valemont
lodge, Wences, Briger, and
the rest of the men climbed
into a red-and-white Bell 212
helicopter sitting just outside
the lodge and lifted off
toward the high white peaks,
for a day of heli-skiing. In the
afternoon, the group returned
to the lodge and sat around in
the expansive common room,
an enormous fire crackling
away. This was not a crowd
to chat about kids and the
upcoming Super Bowl. The
men had dedicated their lives
to making money and Pete
pressed them to present their
best investment ideas.
“Pete, I told you, I’m
interested
in
Bitcoin,”
Wences said when his turn
came to talk. “It hasn’t
changed.”
Wences drew the group in
with an explanation of the
basic notion of a new kind of
network that could allow
people
to
move
money
anywhere
in
the
world,
instantaneously—something
that these financiers, who
were
frequently
moving
millions between banks in
different
countries,
could
surely appreciate.
“You can call someone in
Jakarta on Skype,” Wences
told them. “You can see them
and you can hear them and
there’s
a
synchronous
connection with a lot of
bandwidth. There’s a ton of
magic happening, which is
incredible. And you hang up
and you want to send them
one cent and that’s not
possible. That’s ridiculous. It
should be a lot easier to send
a cent than to see video and
audio.”
The
blockchain
technology
made
that
previously impossible task
possible. But it was much
more than that, Wences
emphasized. It was the next
step in the evolution of
money. He tried to explain
his recent discoveries about
the ledger as the foundation
of all money. With Bitcoins,
unlike
pesos
or
dollars,
everyone using them knew
exactly how many existed,
and they were not tied to one
country. Unlike gold, which
was universal but difficult to
acquire and hold, Bitcoins
could be bought, held, and
transferred by anyone with an
Internet connection, with the
click of a mouse.
“Bitcoin is the first time
in five thousand years that we
have something better than
gold,” he said. “And it’s not a
little
bit
better,
it’s
significantly better. It’s much
more scarce. More divisible,
more durable. It’s much more
transportable. It’s just simply
better.”
Pete had a habit of taking
long, anxiety-inducing pauses
before
responding
to
anything,
and
his
first
questions for Wences were
distinctly skeptical. But his
subsequent
questions
suggested that something was
clicking. Pete’s job as an
investor
in
distressed
companies made him good at
spotting broken systems, and
the more he thought about it,
the more broken the current
methods of moving money
around the world seemed to
him.
Something else caught
Pete’s attention. Wences had
put his wallet where his
mouth was. Throughout 2012
Wences had methodically
ramped up the pace of his
Bitcoin purchases, so that
now he had over 10 percent
of his net wealth—tens of
millions
of
dollars—in
Bitcoin.
Pete
respected
numbers and bold, confident
moves like the one Wences
had made.
From the ski lodge, Pete
e-mailed one of his most
trusted lieutenants at Fortress,
Bill Tanona, and asked what
Bill knew about Bitcoin.
When he got back to San
Francisco he opened a Mt.
Gox account and quickly
built up his own $100,000
position in Bitcoin. At work,
he
started
talking
with
Tanona and a few other
colleagues
about
how
Fortress could get involved in
this new market.
CHAPTER 16
December 2012
For all the new mainstream
interest, the most successful
entrepreneur in the Bitcoin
world was still Ross Ulbricht,
the operator of the world’s
largest online drug bazaar.
Silk Road had continued
adding new members and
new products through 2012.
Some $1.2 million worth of
Bitcoin was changing hands
each month, spinning off
$92,000 in commissions for
Ross. By the end of 2012
there were seventy thousand
different
topics
on
Silk
Road’s forum, and there were
even resident security experts
who helped users ensure their
anonymity and a resident
doctor
who
answered
questions about drugs and
their health effects.
Initially,
Ross
had
enjoyed
the
success
by
traveling to Southeast Asia
and Costa Rica. But as the
year went on, the site
increasingly
required
all-
consuming work. Ross now
had several moderators and
administrators on staff who
helped
him
deal
with
customer support and mediate
disputed
transactions.
He
chose members whom he
trusted, even when he didn’t
know their identity.
In the fall of 2012 Ross
had
moved
in
with
a
childhood friend on a hilly
street
in
one
of
San
Francisco’s
residential
neighborhoods.
He
could
have afforded his own place,
but by now he was trying to
leave as few traces as he
could for the authorities to
pick up on. His work on Silk
Road was done at an Internet
café around the corner from
his friend’s house; at this café
he would log in remotely to
Silk Road’s servers, making it
that much harder for anyone
to find him.
Ross
was
becoming
acutely aware of just how
difficult it was to remain
anonymous even with the
best technologies. Over the
summer, a Silk Road user had
managed to follow a series of
transactions and find one of
Silk Road’s main Bitcoin
wallets,
which
contained
coins worth about $2 million.
This didn’t cover any losses,
but it was a reminder that
while Bitcoin did not require
users to provide an identity,
accounts
were
pseudonymous, attached to a
particular identity, rather than
anonymous.
In
Australia,
police traced transactions to
make the first arrests of Silk
Road vendors in that country.
None of this, though,
dented Ross’s boldness and
ambitions for the site—if
anything, he grew more
committed as time went on.
On the forums, under his
screen name Dread Pirate
Roberts, or DPR, he wrote
that he would keep this up to
his “last breath”:
Once you’ve seen
what’s possible, how
can you do otherwise?
How can you plug
yourself into the tax
eating, life sucking,
violent, sadistic, war
mongering,
oppressive machine
ever again? How can
you kneel when
you’ve felt the power
of your own legs?
As Dread Pirate Roberts,
Ross became a kind of folk
hero
for
his
members,
engaging with them on the
Philosophy, Economics, and
Law section of the forum and
later on DPR’s Book Club,
where he advocated for a
world in which “the human
spirit flourishes, unbridled,
wild and free!”
As time went on, though,
it was hard to avoid the
growing reminders of the
dangers of living in an
anonymous world with no
source
of
authority.
In
November 2012 a hacker
threatened to release an
enormous trove of data about
Silk Road users if Ross didn’t
pay a ransom. That was soon
followed by a denial-of-
service attack that eventually
forced the site down. The
only way Ross was able to
get the attack to stop was by
paying the attacker $25,000.
When the site came back
online,
Dread
Pirate
Roberts’s style and approach
had shifted, leading some
users to suspect that the site
had changed hands. Ross
explained
that
he
was
changing his writing style to
elude capture.
In November, Ross flew
to Dominica, an island in the
Caribbean known for being
an easy place to secure
“economic
citizenship”
(Roger Ver was also trying to
obtain citizenship from the
country). The small island
offered
a
passport
in
exchange for a $75,000
donation. The sum was no
problem for Ross and he
began
filling
out
the
application on his laptop,
listing his profession as “IT
consulting.” A new passport
would allow him to move that
much further out of the reach
of a government that he knew
was chasing him.
He was, though, getting
used to his new life. When he
chatted with a Silk Road
member, scout, who was
thinking about joining his
staff, Ross answered scout’s
concerns
about
getting
arrested by explaining why he
believed it would be hard to
ever get caught.
“put yourself in the shoes
of a prosecutor trying to build
a case against you,” he said in
a
chat
with
scout.
“Realistically, the only way
for them to prove anything
would be for them to watch
you log in and do your work.”
But Ross acknowledged
how much even the small
possibility weighed on him.
“the biggest con about
this work is not the risk of
going to jail or having your
life disrupted,” he wrote; “it’s
getting used to and living
with that possibility no matter
how remote.”
“and,” he added, “keeping
your work a secret.”
By now he had been
hardened enough that he
knew how to keep things to
himself. Even the friend he
was living with and the girl
he began dating didn’t know.
The only people with whom
he could be honest were the
users and administrators of
his site, who didn’t know his
identity, and it was becoming
increasingly hard to believe
that he could trust even them.
Silk Road forums were rife
with debate about which
users and vendors on the site
were likely to be undercover
cops. One of the most
vigorous debates sprang up
around a user named nob.
Toward the end of 2012, nob
put up a listing for a kilogram
of cocaine for $27,000 in
Bitcoins.
nob
had
done
almost no reviewed sales of
drugs on the site and many
other
users
were
very
suspicious.
“If this acct isn’t [law
enforcement], it’s some other
bullshit for sure,” a user
named
MC
Haberdasher
wrote on the forum. “I’d
rather wake up from a heroin
induced blackout sitting bitch
in a car full of fat chicks
listening to speed garage than
even attempt to order from
this guy.”
In this case, though, Ross
trusted nob, who had slowly
built a relationship with him
over the course of the
previous year. Ross decided
to help nob sell his kilogram
of cocaine, connecting him
with
one
of
the
site
administrators, chronicpain,
who had been the first
employee Ross hired back in
2011. The administrator was,
in real life, Curtis Green, a
forty-seven-year-old
poker
player and grandfather living
just outside Salt Lake City.
Green found a buyer for
nob’s cocaine and offered to
receive the package at his
home before sending it on to
the buyer. The package was
delivered to Green’s house on
January 17, 2013. Just as he
took it inside and was
opening the package to check
its contents, a SWAT team
swarmed in. As the agents
spread through the house,
they found a stack of black,
custom-made Bitcoin-mining
machines. The floor around
the computers, and in the rest
of the house, was littered with
hardened dog shit.
Even after Ross learned
about Green’s arrest—and his
release on bail—he did not
assume that it was nob who
had compromised the deal.
Ross
had
always
been
somewhat skeptical about
Green, believing that he was
doing it for the money rather
than the ideals. Ross asked
nob (who he still believed
was a powerful drug dealer) if
he could have Green “beat
up, then forced to send the
Bitcoins he stole back.”
nob
agreed
to
the
proposition. But a day later,
Ross changed his mind: “can
you change the order to
execute rather than torture?”
Ross explained to nob
that he was concerned that
Green
would
give
the
authorities information about
Silk Road users, potentially
jeopardizing the whole site
and its grand mission. He said
that he had “never killed a
man or had one killed before,
but it is the right move in this
case.”
The federal agents who
had Green in custody, and
who were the undercover
puppeteers behind the user
nob, obliged by staging
Green’s
death
(without
actually killing him), and e-
mailing bloody photos to
Ross. When the photos came
through, Ross responded that
he was “a little disturbed, but
I’m ok.”
“I’m new to this kind of
thing is all,” he said, before
quickly adding: “I don’t think
I’ve done the wrong thing.”
The purported murder of
Green was paid for with a
transfer of $80,000 to a
Capital One Bank account in
Washington, DC. The money
was
sent
through
an
anonymous
money-
transferring
service
in
Australia that hid the location
and identity of the sender.
But the agents were already
digging into the wealth of
information
on
Green’s
computers, seeking clues to
find their way to their real
quarry, Dread Pirate Roberts
himself.
CHAPTER 17
January 2013
Ross Ulbricht was not the
only Bitcoin entrepreneur
who had gotten himself into
something bigger than he
could have ever imagined. In
January
Charlie
Shrem’s
BitInstant was taking in over
$250,000
in
commissions
each
month
on
record
transaction volumes.
But the growth obscured
strains that were threatening
to tear Charlie’s company
apart. The fights with David
Azar that had started almost
as soon as BitInstant took
David’s
investment
had
grown worse and usually
ended in a shouting match or
a slammed-down phone. In
December, Charlie and Erik
Voorhees had looked to
David’s investment partners,
the Winklevoss twins, to help
foster a more productive
relationship.
The brothers had been
relatively
hands-off
after
putting in their $550,000. But
they had grown concerned
from afar. The e-mail chains
between Charlie and David
signaled that the twins were
not dealing with the cool,
calculating entrepreneurs of
their Harvard alumni circles.
They saw that Charlie’s
initially
attractive
energy
came with a distressing
inability to concentrate on
one task. Between constant
travel and media appearances,
Charlie
was
relishing,
perhaps
too
much,
the
elevated social status that
Bitcoin was giving him.
When
Charlie
did
talk
business, he often seemed
more intent on selling the
idea of Bitcoin than of his
own company.
There was another more
immediate problem that the
twins hadn’t bargained for.
Earlier in the year, Erik and a
friend he had brought into
BitInstant, Ira Miller, had
started
an
independent
company called Satoshi Ltd.
with a number of subsidiaries.
One was a technology called
Coinapult that BitInstant used
to send Bitcoins via e-mail.
Another, Paysius, allowed
merchants to accept virtual
currencies.
The Winklevoss twins
asked how Erik and Ira could
run those businesses at the
same time that they were
working
full-time
for
BitInstant.
Erik
and
Ira
proposed solving the issue by
merging Satoshi Ltd. with
BitInstant in exchange for a
higher
equity
stake
in
BitInstant—all that David and
the twins had to do was give
up 1.5 percent of their own
stake in the company.
Around the New Year,
Erik wrote up a lengthy
strategy document listing how
a merger could be handled,
allowing the company to go
after new markets like mobile
payments in Africa and poker
sites in need of payment
networks around the world.
The document reflected the
team’s big ambitions. Erik
and Ira didn’t want BitInstant
to be just a place to buy
Bitcoins. They wanted to
offer all the services that
banks did, in a new, cheaper,
and more democratic way.
But the Winklevoss twins
and
David
Azar
were
thinking in more immediate
and practical terms. Glancing
at the pages of long-term
strategy, they blanched at the
value that Erik and Ira
assigned to Satoshi Ltd.
The
twins
wrote
increasingly peeved e-mails
to Charlie, pushing him to
resolve the situation without
giving in to Erik and Ira. The
conversations between the
twins and Charlie began to
end with the same sort of
recriminations that had been
so common between Charlie
and David weeks earlier.
Charlie
and
his
team
appeared to the twins like
inexperienced entrepreneurs
who didn’t know how to put
business
interests
above
social
and
political
allegiances. The Winklevoss
twins, meanwhile, confirmed
the fears of the BitInstant
team
regarding
what
happened when people who
didn’t care about the big
principles underlying Bitcoin
tried to make money in the
space.
Charlie and Erik reached
out to Roger Ver, Charlie’s
first investor, hoping he
might be able to resolve
things from Tokyo. Their idea
was that Roger could buy out
the stake that the twins and
David had taken in BitInstant.
“My one hope was that
perhaps the Winklevii would
be far more helpful and
productive, but a long insult-
filled call between Cameron
and Charlie today proved that
my hope was naive,” Erik
wrote to Roger in early
January.
Charlie and Erik wrote a
lengthy, acerbic letter to the
twins,
pleading
for
a
resolution that would allow
both sides to go their separate
ways.
“If we’re all being honest,
then it’s clear we neither need
nor want your money, and
you neither need nor want to
be risking your money with a
team that you believe to be
childish
and
2/3rds
expendable,” the letter said.
“Let’s be gentlemen and
move on. If you are so
interested
in
building
a
Bitcoin business, and you are
so skillful at navigating these
waters, then I welcome you to
go and do it.”
The
twins
considered
selling to Roger. But they
also believed BitInstant was a
good idea that could work
under the right management.
In January BitInstant had its
best month ever, processing
almost
$5
million
in
transactions. The price of a
Bitcoin, meanwhile, had risen
from $13 at the beginning of
the month to around $18 at its
end. Some of this was due to
the twins themselves. They
had asked Charlie to continue
buying them coins with the
goal of owning 1 percent of
all the Bitcoins in the world,
or some $2 million worth at
the
time.
This
ambition
underscored
their
commitment to sticking it out
with Bitcoin.
The tension came to a
breaking point at the end of
January. Patrick Murck, the
general counsel at the Bitcoin
Foundation, flew in from
Seattle to see if he could help
Charlie and Erik make their
argument to the twins. In a
meeting in the BitInstant
conference room, Charlie,
Erik, and Patrick, sitting on
one side of the table, offered
to provide Maguire Ventures,
the entity put together by
David and the twins, with a
full refund for the money they
had put in. The twins
responded angrily that they
would accept no less than five
times what they had put in.
They also said that the
technology being offered by
Erik’s company, Satoshi Ltd.,
was worth little. Erik and Ira
responded by walking out of
the room as the twins
“continued with emotional
insults and absurdities,” Erik
wrote in an e-mail after the
meeting.
The next day Erik and Ira
sent in their resignations and
moved into the offices of
Larry Lenihan and FirstMark
Capital; Lenihan had always
been more interested in
investing in Erik than in
Charlie.
Charlie, Roger, and Erik
were
in
constant
conversation, contemplating
whether Charlie should join
Erik, and if the whole group
should sue the Winklevoss
twins.
They
ultimately
decided not to sue—mindful
of the way the twins had
responded
when
Mark
Zuckerberg left them out of
Facebook.
Charlie
decided
he
couldn’t leave the company
he created, but when he went
to work the next day, he did
not
go
in
peace.
He
demanded
that
Maguire
Ventures deliver the final
installment of the investment
it had agreed to make the
previous fall:
“You guys are screwing
up my company, and Ira and
Erik left because of it. Give
me my money or I will wire it
all back to you today.”
Roger, who still had a 15
percent stake in the company,
continued pushing the twins
to sell their stake in the
company or let Roger sell his:
You guys obviously
don’t understand
Bitcoin, or BitInstant.
You are
destroying your equity
and mine, and I don’t
want to be any part of
it.
If you disagree,
then make me an offer
for my 15% of
BitInstant.
Name your price.
I will gladly sell it
to you for less than
the valuation you
bought in at.
There
was
some
confirmation
of
Roger’s
assessment a few days after
Erik left, when Charlie got a
letter from the latest bank to
decide that it would no longer
service BitInstant’s accounts.
It was unclear if BitInstant
would have anywhere to put
all the money customers were
sending it. As the value of
Bitcoin continued to shoot up,
the value of Charlie’s idea
seemed to be falling apart
before his eyes.
CHAPTER 18
February 2013
The desk where Wences
Casares worked on his digital
wallet, Lemon, was mounted
on a treadmill, in an office
overlooking
the
main
shopping street in Palo Alto.
His monitor was perched on a
short pile of books, hardcover
copies of Debt: The First
5,000 Years. When he spoke
about Bitcoin with visitors to
the office and invariably
began talking about the
history of money, he would
frequently give them a copy
of the book.
Wences shared the space
with Micky Malka, an old
Venezuelan
friend
and
business partner. Micky was a
big investor in Lemon and
chairman of the company’s
board. Wences was, for his
part, one of the largest
investors in Micky’s venture
capital firm, Ribbit Capital.
Micky’s recently opened
fund was technically focused
on financial services. But
after Wences got Micky
excited about Bitcoin, Micky
was trying to find virtual-
currency
investments.
Because there were so few
viable
Bitcoin
companies
around, Micky made the
somewhat
controversial
decision to use his investors’
money
to
buy
Bitcoins
themselves.
Both Micky and Wences
turned the office into a kind
of
virtual-currency
salon,
hosting a constant parade of
interested visitors. Among
them was Pete Briger, the
chairman
of
Fortress
Investment
Group,
who
dropped by soon after the
skiing trip, with his deputy
Bill
Tanona.
Wences
marveled at how quickly Pete
had managed to get others at
Fortress
excited
about
Bitcoin, but when he heard
Pete speak about it he
understood why. Pete, a
normally reserved man, got
fired up when talking about
the inefficient “oligopoly”
that the big banks had over
money movement and the
transaction fees that the
oligopoly forced everyone
else to pay. Wences was
getting more of a response
from Fortress—a Wall Street
giant managing nearly $60
billion—than he was from
Silicon Valley venture-capital
firms with just a few hundred
million dollars. Pete assigned
Tanona to the almost full-
time
job
of
exploring
potential Bitcoin investments,
and also drew in another top
Fortress
official,
Mike
Novogratz. All of them began
buying coins in quantities that
were small for them, but that
represented
significant
upward pressure within the
still
immature
Bitcoin
ecosystem.
The
purchases
being
made by Fortress—and by
Micky’s team at Ribbit—
were supplemented by those
being
made
by
the
Winklevoss twins, who were
still trying to buy up 1
percent of all the outstanding
Bitcoins.
Together,
these
purchases helped maintain the
sharp upward trajectory of
Bitcoin’s price, which rose 70
percent in February after the
50 percent jump in January.
On the evening of February
27 the price finally edged
above
the
long-standing
record of $32 that had been
set in the hysterical days
before the June 2011 crash at
Mt. Gox.
ON
THE
AFTERNOON
of
Sunday, March 3, Wences
boarded a Gulfstream two-
engine jet at a private airport
in San Jose favored by the
Silicon Valley elite.
Wences was headed to
one of the most exclusive,
and
secretive,
annual
gatherings of tech-industry
power players, held at the
Ritz-Carlton resort outside
Tucson, Arizona, and hosted
by the investment bank Allen
& Co. Only a few hundred
people were invited and it
was private enough that the
news media rarely even found
out it was happening.
Wences
flew
to
the
conference on eBay’s private
jet. eBay owned PayPal, the
company
headed
up
by
Wences’s good friend David
Marcus, and David was
among the twelve passengers
on the flight. He had been
quietly working to make sure
PayPal was ahead of the
curve on virtual currencies
and had pulled together a
group in-house to look at how
PayPal might harness the
Bitcoin technology. He had
also begun to talk about it
with his boss, John Donahoe,
the chief executive of eBay.
When
the
eBay
jet
touched
down
north
of
Tucson, the passengers were
quickly whisked away in
SUVs to the Dove Mountain
Resort, which sat in the
foothills of the mountains that
separate Tucson and Phoenix.
That
evening,
everyone
congregated for drinks on the
Tortelita Terrace and then
proceeded to dinner on an
immaculately
maintained
lawn overlooking the scrubby
mountains.
This was the most casual
dinner of the three-day event,
with unassigned seating and a
buffet to accommodate the
guests arriving at uneven
intervals. Wences took notice
as the big names showed their
faces:
Twitter’s
chief
executive,
Dick
Costolo;
LinkedIn’s
founder
Reid
Hoffman; Rupert Murdoch’s
son, James; and perhaps the
most recognizable venture
capitalist in Silicon Valley,
Marc
Andreessen,
an
enormous man with a shiny
bald head.
Wences found his way to
a table with another budding
Bitcoin nut, Chris Dixon, one
of the up-and-coming stars at
Andreessen’s
firm,
Andreessen Horowitz. The
men
quickly
began
comparing
ideas.
Dixon
explained that he had gotten
excited about the importance
of the blockchain protocol as
a new way of moving value
around the world, just as the
Internet
protocol
had
provided a decentralized way
to move information. Dixon
had been pushed to think
about this by the writings of
Fred Wilson, the New York
venture capitalist who had
backed Wences’s first big
company.
Wences
smiled
with
gratitude to find someone
who had seen the beauty of
the system without his help.
Wences, in turn, told Dixon
about
the
international
potential he saw for Bitcoin,
in countries like Argentina
where people lack a safe
place to keep their money.
Dixon hadn’t thought much
about that opportunity and
asked Wences to tell him
more.
They were interrupted by
Henry Blodget, a former Wall
Street analyst and founder of
the
news
site
Business
Insider, who asked what they
were talking about: he had
never
heard
of
Bitcoin.
Wences responded with his
favorite introductory line:
“It’s the best form of money
the world has ever seen.”
Blodget’s
famously
childlike curiosity provided a
great opening for Wences to
work through all of his finely
honed arguments.
After touching on the
history
of
money
and
Bitcoin’s advantages over
gold, Wences explained his
back-of-the-envelope
calculations of what Bitcoin
might be worth if people
began to realize its value as a
substitute for gold. All the
gold in the world was worth
around $7 trillion. If Bitcoin
became even half as popular,
that would put the value of
each Bitcoin at around half a
million
dollars—or
about
fourteen thousand times more
than its $34 value that day in
March.
The
conversation
continued as the sun went
down and the desert air grew
chilly.
The
little
crowd
around Wences’s table grew,
with Marcus and others
stopping by.
Wences saw the interest
build when he told one of his
newest
stories
from
Argentina. A friend of his
sister had recently wanted to
buy an upscale $1.5 million
apartment in Buenos Aires.
As with most Argentinian
real estate transactions, the
seller—distrustful of the peso
—wanted the payment in
dollars and in cash, no small
feat when the sum was $1.5
million. The bigger problem
was that the sister’s friend,
like
many
wealthy
Argentinians, kept his savings
in dollars in an American
bank account. To transfer the
money into an Argentinian
bank and then take it out in
cash would eat about 10
percent of the money in bank
and exchange fees—some
$150,000—and
would
involve
several
days
of
waiting. To get around this,
the sister’s friend purchased
$1.5
million
worth
of
Bitcoins from Mt. Gox. Once
the friend had the coins, he
took his Bitcoin wallet to the
signing for the apartment in
Buenos Aires and transferred
it over to the seller, with the
notary as witness. Afterward,
Wences’s sister sent him a
picture of the two old men
holding up their smartphones
and smiling.
To prove how easy this all
was, Wences asked Blodget
to take out his phone and
helped him create an empty
Bitcoin wallet. Once it was
up,
and
Wences
had
Blodget’s
new
Bitcoin
address, Wences used the
wallet on his own phone to
send Blodget $250,000, or
some 6,400 Bitcoins. The
money was then passed to the
phones
of
other
people
around the table once they
had set up wallets. Anyone
could have run off with
Wences’s $250,000, but that
wasn’t a risk with this
particular crowd. Instead, as
the money went around,
Wences saw the guests’
laughter
and
wide-eyed
amazement at what they were
watching.
The next two days were
filled with panels covering
topics
like
“eBay
and
Innovation” and “China: The
Road
Ahead.”
In
the
afternoon
there
were
scheduled activities: tennis,
horseback riding, and clay-
pigeon
shooting,
among
others. During the interludes
Wences
was
approached
constantly by people who had
heard the Sunday evening
conversation or heard about
it. LinkedIn founder Reid
Hoffman pulled Wences aside
to ask more, as did Michael
Ovitz, the former president of
Disney. During a hike on
Wednesday
afternoon,
Wences spent the entire time
explaining the concept to
Charlie Songhurst, the chief
of strategy at Microsoft. At
night, many of the same
people
approached
David
Marcus. As the president of
PayPal, he would have as
informed a view as anybody
on the viability of Bitcoin.
“What do you think of
this?” they asked him. “Is this
real?”
Marcus replied that he
already believed in the idea
enough to put his own money
into it. They shouldn’t invest
money they couldn’t afford to
lose, he said, but it was
certainly
worth
some
investment.
On Monday, the first full
day of the conference, the
price of Bitcoin jumped by
more than two dollars, to $36,
and on Tuesday it rose by
more than four dollars—its
sharpest rise in months—to
over $40. On Wednesday,
when everyone flew home,
Blodget put up a glowing
item on his heavily read
website, Business Insider,
mentioning
what
he’d
witnessed
(though
not
specifying where exactly he’d
been, or whom he’d talked
to):
I was at a technology
conference earlier this
week, and the most
popular topic of
casual conversation
was Bitcoin, the
electronic currency
invented and
unleashed a few years
ago.
One of the things
that’s most fascinating
about Bitcoin, I have
learned, is that it
entrances fanatical
conspiracy theorists,
clear-eyed
pragmatists, and
diehard skeptics alike.
Songhurst, the Microsoft
head of strategy, who had
learned about Bitcoin during
his hike with Wences, wrote
up a paper and circulated it
among some of the most
powerful investors in Silicon
Valley, channeling Wences’s
arguments:
We foresee a real
possibility that all
currencies go digital
and competition
eliminates all
currencies from non-
effective
governments. The
power of friction-free
transactions over the
internet will unleash
the typical forces of
consolidation and
globalization and we
will end up with six
digital currencies: US
Dollar, Euro, Yen,
Pound, Renminbi, and
Bitcoin.
The question then
becomes, is Bitcoin
viable if the
government digital
ledger systems are just
as good? We think
yes, for two reasons:
1. There will always be
transactions for which
“official money” is less
good than Bitcoin
2. If you live outside the
US, it is dangerous to
have all your money
controlled by a state
where you have no
rights.
In three days, Wences had
reached
more
powerful
people than Bitcoin had in its
previous
four
years
of
existence.
DESPITE
THE
SURGE
of
excitement,
the
interest
Wences was encountering
was still far from uniformly
positive. More than a few
people
in
Arizona
left
unconvinced
that
the
technology would work and
survive government scrutiny.
Much of this skepticism had
the
same
root
as
the
excitement, and that was
Silicon Valley’s defining, and
cautionary, experience with
financial technology: PayPal.
PayPal, of course, still
existed, owned by eBay and
run by Wences’s friend David
Marcus. But what made
people wary was not the
current incarnation of PayPal,
but instead the company’s
early days, when it had
ambitions to be something
much bigger.
PayPal had been founded
back in 1998 by Peter Thiel
and Max Levchin, among
others. Thiel was an avid
libertarian, who had wanted
to
use
Levchin’s
cryptographic expertise to
fulfill
the
Cypherpunks’
dream of sending money
through encrypted channels,
between private individuals
and in particular between
mobile
devices
like
the
PalmPilots of that time. In
early staff meetings, Thiel
gave speeches that could
almost have come from the
Cypherpunk mailing list.
“PayPal will give citizens
worldwide
more
direct
control over their currencies
than they ever had before,” he
said.
PayPal grew quickly, but
in 2001, as the company
readied for an initial public
offering, it hit roadblock after
roadblock from lawmakers
concerned
about
the
possibilities
for
money
laundering and other illegal
activities.
New
York
Attorney
General
Elliot
Spitzer said PayPal was
breaking
the
law
by
facilitating
payments
for
gambling companies, and the
Department
of
Justice
decided PayPal was violating
the USA Patriot Act. The new
limits
and
restrictions
imposed took it further and
further from its ambitious
original goals. Thiel and
Levchin left PayPal soon
afterward.
This had scared much of
Silicon Valley away from
tinkering with finance, which
was seen as largely resistant
to new technology because of
all the regulations. But the
PayPal
experience
also
explained why there was a
hunger for the idea of a
virtual currency. There was a
lingering memory of this
unfulfilled dream of Silicon
Valley. While the Internet
had freed information and
communication
from
the
postal
service
and
the
publishing
industry,
the
Internet had essentially never
disrupted money, and dollars
remained bound by the old
networks run by the credit
card companies and the
banks.
In the month before the
Arizona conference, Thiel
himself had been poking
around in the virtual-currency
space once again, looking for
projects that might take
advantage of the blockchain,
without getting too bound up
in a currency that could piss
off
government
officials.
Chris
Dixon,
Wences’s
conversation partner at that
Arizona dinner, had also been
agitating to get his firm,
Andreessen Horowitz, to look
at cryptocurrency startups and
had been finding a receptive
ear
in
his
boss,
Marc
Andreessen.
They had both found their
way to the new company
being
created
by
Jed
McCaleb,
the
original
founder of Mt. Gox. Jed’s
new company, named Ripple,
was a cryptographic network
that could be used to send any
currency, not just Bitcoins.
That made it less threatening
to governments and banks
and more attractive to people
like Andreessen and Thiel,
who both offered small seed
investments.
But both of these key
Silicon Valley figures were
also getting more comfortable
with
Bitcoin
itself.
The
investment firm that Thiel
had helped create with some
of his PayPal riches, the
Founders Fund, began talking
with an engineer at Facebook
who had founded an e-mail
list
for
Silicon
Valley
insiders, dedicated to Bitcoin,
about joining the firm to look
for
virtual
currency
investments.
The growing openness to
Bitcoin was helped along by
Silicon Valley’s ballooning
sense of self-importance in
early 2013. With the Nasdaq
composite
stock
index
soaring, shares of Google at
an all-time high, and startups
selling for mind-boggling
sums, many in the tech
industry believed that they
were going to be able to
revolutionize and improve
every element of modern life.
Investors and entrepreneurs
were cooking up ever more
ambitious schemes involving
virtual reality, drones, and
artificial
intelligence,
alongside
more
quotidian
projects, like remaking public
transportation and the hotel
industry.
The
PayPal
founders were among the
most ambitious, with Thiel
advocating
for
floating
structures where people could
live outside the jurisdiction of
any
national
government.
Elon Musk, an early PayPal
employee and founder of
SpaceX, was aiming for the
colonization of Mars. If there
was ever a time that Silicon
Valley believed it could
revive
the
long-deferred
dream of reinventing money,
this was it. A virtual currency
that rose above national
borders fitted right in with an
industry
that
saw
itself
destined to change the face of
everyday life.
CHAPTER 19
March 2013
At the same time that
Bitcoin’s
reputation
was
getting a makeover in Silicon
Valley,
the
physical
infrastructure of the Bitcoin
network was also undergoing
an extensive transformation.
For much of the previous
year
and
a
half,
the
computing
power
underpinning the network had
grown steadily, but slowly.
Over the course of 2012 the
amount of computing power
on the Bitcoin network barely
doubled.
What’s
more,
everyone was still relying on
basically the same technology
—graphic processing units, or
GPUs—that
had
been
introduced back in 2010 by
Laszlo Hanecz, the buyer of
the Bitcoin pizzas. By the end
of 2012 there was the
equivalent of about 11,000
GPUs working away on the
network.
But even back in 2010 it
had been clear that if Bitcoin
became more popular there
was a logical next step that
would eclipse GPUs. An
application-specific
integrated unit, or ASIC, is a
chip
that
is
built
to
specifically accomplish just
one task—an even more
specialized computing unit
than a GPU. If someone
could build an ASIC designed
specifically to solve the
Bitcoin hash function, it
would probably be able to
crunch the numbers hundreds
of time faster than a GPU and
thus likely to win hundreds of
times more Bitcoins.
But
designing
and
fabricating a new ASIC chip
could cost millions of dollars,
and take several months,
requiring contracts with one
of the five specialized chip
foundries
that
produced
virtually all the chips in the
world. For most of 2011 and
2012 Bitcoins simply were
not worth enough to justify
this investment.
But as Bitcoin’s price had
continued to rise in the
second half of 2012, a couple
of enterprising engineers had
thrown caution to the wind
and begun racing to create the
first ASIC chip dedicated to
mining Bitcoins. The first
entrant in the race was a
company in Kansas City that
went by the name Butterfly
Labs. In June 2012 the
founders announced that they
would
deliver
specialized
mining computers installed
with custom chips in October
2012 and quickly sold $5
million of the machines on
preorder.
A few months later, when
Butterfly announced that the
release of its machines would
be delayed, a young Chinese
immigrant in New York, Yifu
Guo, announced that he had
created a company, Avalon,
with a group of engineers in
China, which was building its
own Bitcoin-dedicated ASIC
chips.
Yifu, a shaggy-looking
twenty-three-year-old,
promised that each device
would be able to do 66 billion
hashes per second, compared
with the 2 billion that a GPU
card could do. What’s more,
his chips required a lot less
energy—and
thus
lower
electricity costs—to do the
work. The price for each
machine? A cool $1,299.
The process of putting the
machines together, first in
Beijing and then in Shanghai,
and then shipping them to
customers in the United
States, proved to be more
complicated than Yifu and his
team anticipated. But on
January 30, 2013, Jeff Garzik,
the Bitcoin developer in
North Carolina, posted on the
forum pictures of the bulging
boxes that DHL had just
delivered and the gleaming
silver box inside, built to do
nothing
but
mint
new
Bitcoins. Within hours, new
Bitcoins were showing up in
Jeff’s wallet, and within nine
days the machine had earned
back what Jeff had paid for it.
The machine was eating up so
much energy that it was
heating up the room that it
occupied.
Over the next month and
a half, as the rest of Avalon’s
first batch of three hundred
mining computers reached
customers, the effect was
evident on the charts that
tracked the power of the
entire Bitcoin network. It had
taken all of 2012 for the
power on the network to
double,
but
that
power
doubled again in just one
month after Yifu’s machines
were shipped. At the same
time,
the
network
automatically adjusted the
difficulty of the problem the
miners needed to solve, to
ensure the ten-minute gap
between
new
blocks
of
Bitcoins. For people who had
built up fleets of GPUs
making a profit quickly
became a lot harder. *
A few other companies
were making big promises
about their own, specialized
mining chips that they were
working on. But the most
aggressive project—and the
one that revealed the most
about the untapped potential
that many saw in Bitcoin
mining—was top secret and
open to only a small elite.
The
company
21e6—
shorthand for 21 million, the
number of Bitcoins to be
released—was
created
by
Balaji Srinivasan, a Silicon
Valley prodigy who had
founded a successful genetics
testing company from his
Stanford dorm room. In the
spring of 2013, Balaji was
quietly assembling a team of
top engineers to build a
Bitcoin mining chip that
would go beyond anything
that had been contemplated
before—rolled out in data
centers built exclusively for
the 21e6 machines. If the
chips worked as promised
they would mint money for
investors. This was a simple
enough proposition, and the
price of Bitcoin was rising
fast enough that it attracted
interest
from
venture
capitalists who were still
queasy about tying their firms
to Bitcoin. Both of the
founders
of
Andreessen
Horowitz, Marc Andreessen
and Ben Horowitz, signed up
to put some of their own
personal money into Balaji’s
project, as did several of the
original founders of PayPal,
including Peter Thiel and
David Sacks. Soon enough,
Balaji was closing in on a $5
million fund-raising round.
The Bitcoin arms race had
begun.
THE TYPE OF chip was not the
only thing about Bitcoin
mining that had changed
since late 2010. Over the
course of 2011 and 2012,
more and more users were
joining collectives that pooled
their mining power. These
mining pools allowed lots of
people to combine their
resources, with each person
getting a proportional fraction
of the total winnings, thus
increasing the chances that
everyone
would
get
something every day.
The
pools,
though,
generated concern about the
creeping
centralization
of
control in the network. It took
the agreement of 5 percent of
the computing power on the
network to make changes to
the
blockchain
and
the
Bitcoin protocol, making it
hard for one person to dictate
what happened. But with
mining pools, the person
running the pool generally
had voting power for the
entire pool—all the other
computers were just worker
bees. As a couple of pools
harnessed
significant
computing
power,
some
people
worried
that
the
operators of those pools could
conspire
to
change
or
undermine
the
rules
of
Bitcoin.
But an incident in March
2013—the network’s most
significant
technological
failure
to
date—was
a
reminder
of
how
the
incentives built into the
Bitcoin network could still
work as Satoshi had hoped.
Gavin Andresen, now the
chief scientist of the Bitcoin
Foundation, was in his den in
Massachusetts after dinner,
when he saw some online
chatter about disagreement
between computers or nodes
on the network over what
block the nodes were trying
to
mine—was
it
the
225,430th block since the
network began back in 2009,
or the 225,431st?
Gavin quickly realized
that this was what had long
been known as the biggest
potential
danger
to
the
Bitcoin network: a “hard
fork,” a term coined to
describe a situation where
one group of computers on
the network went off in one
direction,
agreeing
about
which node had mined each
block, while another group of
computers on the network
moved in another direction,
agreeing on a different set of
winners for each block. This
was disastrous because it
meant
that
there
was
disagreement
about
who
owned which Bitcoins. So
far, there had been a split
only on the last few blocks—
not the whole blockchain
history—but if it wasn’t
fixed, there would essentially
be two conflicting Bitcoin
networks, which would be
likely to result in no one
trusting either of them, or
Bitcoin itself.
“this seems bad,” a user
on the chat channel wrote a
few minutes after the problem
first appeared.
“‘seems’ is putting it
lightly,” another shot back.
“We have a full fork,”
one of the most respected
developers,
a
Belgian
programmer named Pieter
Wuille, pronounced a few
beats later.
The price of Bitcoin
dropped from $49 back to
$45 in a half hour, erasing all
the previous week’s gains.
Mark Karpeles joined the
discussion a half hour later,
and
quickly
stopped
processing all transactions at
Mt. Gox; a few minutes after
that, Erik Voorhees said his
gambling
company,
SatoshiDice, was doing the
same.
By the time Gavin entered
the conversation, it was clear
that the problem was not the
result
of
one
node
overpowering the network or
of any sort of malice. Instead,
computers
that
had
downloaded a recent update
to the Bitcoin software were
accepting
blocks—and
awarding new Bitcoins to
miners—that
were
not
considered legitimate by the
old
software
and
the
computers still running it.
Generally, if a block was
accepted by a majority of
nodes, it would be accepted
by everyone, but the old
software, version 0.7, had a
rule that specifically did not
allow a type of block that the
new software, version 0.8, did
allow.
The solution to this was
clear:
everyone
on
the
network had to agree to move
en masse to one of the two
versions
and
adopt
the
blockchain accepted by that
software. But there were no
rules for deciding which
version to pick—and once a
version was chosen, no one
knew how long it would take
for all the nodes to get on
board.
After racing through the
possibilities, Gavin concluded
that the most fundamental
rule of Bitcoin was the
democratic principle that the
blockchain with the most
support was the official one.
In this case, the version
created by the new software,
0.8, had a lot more computing
power behind it. That was, in
no small part, because the
most sophisticated miners,
especially the large pool
operators, had been among
the first to update their
software. Gavin thought that
if they had the most power,
everyone else needed to
update to join them. In
addition to having more
power, the miners on the new
software had newly generated
coins that they would be
unlikely to want to give up.
Gavin
quickly
faced
resistance
from
almost
everyone else involved in the
conversation;
most
participants believed that only
the large miners would be
responsive enough to change
their software to fix the
problem.
Somewhat
surprisingly, the operators of
the biggest mining pools
quickly agreed that they
would revert to the old
software, version 0.7. The
operator of the prominent
pool BTC Guild said that just
switching his pool alone
would get a majority of the
computing power back on the
earlier software. Doing this
would
mean
losing
the
Bitcoins that had been mined
since version 0.8 came out.
But the losses would be much
greater if the entire Bitcoin
network lost the confidence
of users.
“There is no way the 0.8
chain can continue in this
situation,” the operator of
BTC Guild, who went by the
screen name Eleuthria, said.
The developers on the
chat channel thanked him,
recognizing that he was
sacrificing for the greater
good. When he finally had
everything moved about an
hour later, Eleuthria took
stock of his own costs.
“It could’ve been worse if
I hadn’t been able to start
moving back to 0.7 quickly.”
But, he wrote, “this fork cost
me 150–200 BTC”—over
$5,000.
For the broader Bitcoin
ecosystem, the price had
fallen to $37, some 20
percent, within a few hours,
and some online reports
struck an ominous note.
“This is a dark day for
Bitcoin. Implications for the
exchange rate will likely be
huge,” a site called The
Bitcoin Trader announced.
The incident had indeed
revealed
the
sort
of
unanticipated problems that
frequently
occur
in
decentralized
networks,
which rely on lots of different
members,
with
all
their
vagaries,
acting
independently.
But almost as soon as
Eleuthria had fully switched
his servers over to version 0.7
the price began recovering,
and within hours people were
talking about how the event
had actually demonstrated
some of Bitcoin’s greatest
strengths. The network had
not had to rely on some
central authority to wake up
to the problem and come up
with a solution. Everyone
online had been able to
respond in real time, as was
supposed to happen with
open source software, and the
users had settled on a
response after a debate that
tapped the knowledge of all
of them—even when it meant
going
against
the
recommendation of the lead
developer,
Gavin.
Meanwhile, the incentives
that Satoshi Nakamoto had
built into the network had
again worked as intended,
encouraging people to look
out for the common good
over short-term personal gain.
A WEEK LATER, Gavin was
back at his desk in the den not
long after dinner, when an
unexpected
announcement
popped up. It came from the
Financial
Crimes
Enforcement
Network,
or
FinCen, the division of the
Treasury
Department
responsible for monitoring
money
laundering
and
enforcing the Bank Secrecy
Act. In opaque bureaucratic
terms, the release stated its
intent
to
“clarify
the
applicability
of
the
regulations implementing the
Bank Secrecy Act (‘BSA’) to
persons creating, obtaining,
distributing,
exchanging,
accepting,
or
transmitting
virtual currencies.”
Reading
behind
the
legalese, Gavin could see that
this was the United States
government’s first statement
on the legality of Bitcoin.
“oh
wow,”
Gavin
Andresen wrote on the chat
channel before passing along
a link to the announcement
for everyone else.
Everyone had feared that
at some point the authorities
would step in and declare
virtual currencies illegal. As
Gavin and others furiously
scanned
the
lengthy
document, the doomsayers
were quick to give their read.
“this kills the Bitcoin,”
one user on IRC responded to
Gavin.
But as Gavin and others
read on, they saw that it was
not, in fact, all bad. Yes, the
document noted that anyone
selling virtual currency for
“real
currency
or
its
equivalent” would now be
considered
a
money
transmitter—a category of
business subject to lots of
stringent federal rules. But
the release also made clear
that many parts of the virtual-
currency universe—including
miners—were not subject to
these
regulations.
More
important, Jeff Garzik, the
programmer
in
North
Carolina, noted, the basic
implication of the message
cleared up the biggest single
cloud: “this solidifies Bitcoin
status as legal to possess and
use for normal people.”
Indeed,
Gavin
said:
“More
legal/regulatory
certainty is definitely a good
thing . . . even if we might not
like the regulations.”
Over the next few days,
Bitcoin companies all raced
to understand the specifics of
the
FinCen
guidance.
Exchanges clearly needed to
register
as
money
transmitters, but what about
companies like BitInstant that
just worked with exchanges?
And did exchanges also need
to
register
as
money
transmitters with each state,
as companies like Western
Union had to do?
In New York, Charlie got
an e-mail from one of
BitInstant’s lawyers: “I don’t
think this is good for the
community.”
But
for
the
broader
Bitcoin universe, the basic
message of the guidance was
encouraging:
the
United
States government was not
planning to come in and shut
down the virtual currency.
The next day the price of
Bitcoin surged from $52 to
$59, and by Thursday it was
above $70.
The
financial
crisis
sweeping Europe added yet
another boost to the price.
The
banks
on
the
Mediterranean
island
of
Cyprus were on the verge of
collapsing
in
mid-March
when European authorities
put together a bailout plan.
The hitch was that all savings
in Cyprus’s banks were to be
docked by 10 percent. The
government, in other words,
was confiscating money from
private
bank
accounts.
BusinessWeek ran a story that
conveyed
the
seeming
promise of Bitcoin: “BITCOIN
MAY
BE
THE
GLOBAL
ECONOMY’S
LAST
SAFE
HAVEN,”
the
magazine’s
headline said. Russians who
kept their money in Cyprus’s
banks were rumored to be
buying up Bitcoin, which no
government could confiscate.
The
prices
certainly
suggested that someone with
lots of money was buying. In
California, Wences Casares
knew that no small part of the
new demand was coming
from the millionaires whom
he had gotten excited about
Bitcoin earlier in the month
and who were now getting
their accounts opened and
buying significant quantities
of the virtual currency. They
helped push the price to over
$90 in the last week of
March. At that price, the
value of all existing coins,
what was referred to as the
market capitalization, was
nearing $1 billion.
On March 27 the forums
and the news site Reddit lit
up with calculations of what
value, for a single coin,
would
take
the
market
capitalization over $1 billion,
and the number settled on
was $91.26. This calculation
was largely theoretical: most
of the outstanding coins had
been purchased for pennies or
a few dollars in the early
years, and if everyone tried to
sell for $91, the price would
plummet. But it marked a
psychological line in the sand
that was, if nothing else, fun
to talk about. That day,
Cameron Winklevoss, who
had taken responsibility for
the twins’ buying and selling
of Bitcoins, was watching the
price closely, first from the
twins’ office and then from
home. After midnight, as he
was preparing to go to bed, he
saw the price approach the
magical border of a billion.
As the number crept closer
and closer, he placed a small
order on Mt. Gox that would
be executed only if the seller
agreed to a price above
$91.26.
The
order
was
quickly filled and he watched
the value of a Bitcoin on Mt.
Gox—determined by the last
order—jump
to
$91.27.
Twitter and Reddit went wild.
The next morning, Cameron
gleefully reported to Tyler
that it was their money that
was responsible for sending
the value of all Bitcoin over
$1 billion for the first time.
CHAPTER 20
March 2013
The surging price of Bitcoin
helped bring out of the
woodwork some of the early
Bitcoiners who had dropped
from view.
In
February,
Martti
Malmi posted an entry on his
company’s
website
describing his early days in
Bitcoin. A month later, Hal
Finney recounted his own
story on the Bitcoin forum.
By this time, his ALS had
progressed to the point where
he was essentially paralyzed,
relying on tube feeding and a
respirator. He spent most of
his time in the same living
room where he’d first worked
on Bitcoin four years earlier,
his old computers stacked up
on the desks around him. But
Hal could still communicate
and type using a computer
that
tracked
his
eye
movement, and he diligently
worked on a few coding
projects
and
regularly
checked in on Bitcoin to see
how his pet project was
doing. As he watched the
price go up, he asked his son
to burn the private keys to his
Bitcoin wallets onto a DVD,
and put the DVD in a safe-
deposit box at a bank. Some
of his coins, though, he had
his son sell, in order to pay
for all the medical care he
needed to stay at home.
“I’m
pretty
lucky
overall,” Hal wrote. “Even
with the ALS, my life is very
satisfying.
But
my
life
expectancy is limited. Those
discussions about inheriting
your Bitcoins are of more
than academic interest. My
Bitcoins are stored in our safe
deposit box, and my son and
daughter are tech savvy. I
think they’re safe enough.
I’m comfortable with my
legacy.”
THIS SHOULD HAVE been the
best of times for the existing
Bitcoin businesses, and in
certain ways it was. In March
alone, sixty thousand new
accounts were opened on Mt.
Gox, and the monthly trading
commissions rose above $1
million for the first time ever,
more than triple what they
had been a month earlier.
But even after all their
earlier struggles, the staffers
at Mt. Gox were not ready for
this surge in business. Mark
Karpeles now had a staff of
eighteen, and a deputy with
real
business
experience,
whom he put in charge of all
the company’s dealings with
the outside world. But Mark
gave this deputy no power
over the company’s actual
operations and kept firm
control of Mt. Gox’s essential
accounts.
Mark
also
continued to struggle with
prioritizing
his
responsibilities. He was two
years into running the world’s
largest Bitcoin exchange, but
he had still not attended a
single Bitcoin event abroad—
a fact that he blamed on the
sickness of his cat, Tibanne,
who needed daily shots that
Mark believed only he could
administer.
Meanwhile, in late 2012
Mark had agreed to hand over
his American customers to
Peter
Vessenes
and
his
company CoinLab, which had
an American bank account.
But when it came time to
hand over the customer files
in March, Mark flinched,
worried about some of the
terms in the contract he had
already signed. This left
Mark’s customers relying on
Mt. Gox’s Japanese bank,
which put strict limits on the
number of wires the company
could send out each day.
Even the simple task of
opening an account with Mt.
Gox required a three-week
wait
for
approval
from
Mark’s team.
For BitInstant and other
companies that had to work
with Mt. Gox, the reason
behind the problems seemed
simple: sheer incompetence.
Charlie Shrem’s BitInstant
was now the main driver of
trading volume to Mt. Gox,
but
when
there
were
problems Charlie’s e-mails to
Mark Karpeles would go
unanswered for days or even
weeks.
Wences
Casares
had
never fully trusted Mt. Gox
and had been looking for a
better place to store his coins.
When he put them into his
own digital wallet, he realized
that all his private keys—the
signature that allowed his
coins to be spent—were
sitting on his computer or
phone, waiting for the first
hacker who got access to his
computer. Someone who had
the private key for one of
Wences’s Bitcoin addresses
could,
essentially,
impersonate Wences. Wences
decided to work on a system
with his Argentinian friend
Fede Murrone to store their
private keys out of the reach
of hackers. They started by
putting all their private keys
on
a
laptop,
with
no
connection to the Internet,
thus cutting off access for
potential
hackers.
After
David Marcus, Pete Briger,
and Micky Malka put their
private keys on the same
offline laptop, the men paid
for a safe-deposit box in a
bank to store the computer
more securely. In case the
computer gave out, they also
put a USB drive with all the
private keys in the safe-
deposit box.
CHARLIE HAD KEPT BitInstant
ahead of the regulatory curve.
Back
in
2012
he
had
registered the company with
FinCen
as
a
money
transmitter. In March, though,
the company was still trying
to bounce back from the
departure of Erik Voorhees
and his friend Ira Miller, who
had moved to Panama to
develop their own company
after the falling-out with the
Winklevoss twins.
The new team Charlie
brought
on
immediately
spotted significant flaws in
the way the company was
being
run.
For
starters,
Charlie was the only one with
access to the company’s bank
accounts. Many day-to-day
operations required Charlie to
manually intervene. The new
lead developer called for the
entire site to be taken down
and rebuilt. But there wasn’t
time as new customers were
pouring money into the site.
The new staff members were
jammed into every corner of
the small offices Charlie and
Erik had moved into the
previous summer.
On top of the internal
problems, Charlie was also
having trouble finding a
reliable bank account, even as
a
registered
money
transmitter. Since the end of
2012, Charlie had opened
accounts
with
KeyBank,
PNC,
Wells
Fargo,
and
JPMorgan Chase—and all of
them had been shut down. It
became apparent to others in
the company that Charlie had
not been entirely up-front
with the banks about the
nature of his business. Charlie
had generally opened the
accounts without explaining
that
BitInstant
customers
would be depositing and
withdrawing money on a
daily basis. When the banks
saw
the
thousands
of
transactions every day—a
strain on their compliance
officers—they decided the
BitInstant business wasn’t
worth it.
This pointed to a broader
issue with Charlie that was
frustrating the Winklevoss
twins and was clearly an
outgrowth of his childhood
desire for acceptance. Charlie
loved telling people what
they wanted to hear. He
would always give the twins
optimistic
predictions
for
projects and would fail to
alert them to impending
problems
until
the
last
moment, in the hope that the
problems would go away.
This optimistic approach was
great for a salesman, and
Charlie had been a great
salesman. But it was not such
a great habit for a manager,
who needed to find a way to
deal with problems, not
ignore them.
Given the issues at Mt.
Gox and BitInstant—the two
longtime giants of the Bitcoin
world—investors
and
entrepreneurs
in
Silicon
Valley were looking for
alternatives. As an alternative
to Mt. Gox, people saw some
promise in Bitstamp, an
exchange that had been
founded by a Slovenian
college student and a family
friend back in 2011 and that
had been growing slowly ever
since. Wences and Micky
sent one of Micky’s deputies
to Slovenia to scope out the
operations. The youngsters
running Bitstamp looked like
an Eastern European boy
band, with their long hair and
penchant for Adidas track
suits.
But
their
evident
competence—particularly
when they were compared
with Mt. Gox—generated so
much confidence that Wences
and Micky began moving
their trading to Bitstamp. Mt.
Gox still had 80 percent of all
Bitcoin
trading,
but
Bitstamp’s
market
share
began to creep up.
For those looking to buy
smaller quantities of Bitcoin
—BitInstant’s
specialty—
people found their way to
Coinbase, a San Francisco–
based startup that had been
opened by a veteran of
Airbnb and a former trader at
Goldman
Sachs
at
the
beginning of 2013. The
company had managed to
interest several investors and
had
maintained
a
bank
account with Silicon Valley
Bank.
But
even
with
Coinbase executives at the
bank made it clear that the
Bitcoin business was testing
their patience. In order to stay
on
top
of
anti–money
laundering laws, the bank had
to
review
every
single
transaction, and these reviews
cost the bank more money
than Coinbase was bringing
in. The bank imposed more
restrictions on Coinbase than
on other customers because
Bitcoin inherently made it
easier to launder money. A
terrorist could potentially put
dollars into Coinbase, buy
Bitcoins, and then use the
blockchain to send those
Bitcoins to terrorist cells
overseas. Because there is no
identifying
information
attached to Bitcoin addresses,
the terrorist cell could receive
money
without
anyone
noticing.
That
is
very
different from a traditional
bank, in which every account
is tied to a specific person or
organization. Coinbase had to
repeatedly convince Silicon
Valley Bank that it knew
where the Bitcoins leaving
Coinbase were going. Even
with all these steps, on
several
days
in
March
Coinbase hit up against
transaction limits set by
Silicon Valley Bank and had
to shut down until the next
day.
At the end of the month,
an item was posted on
SVBitcoin, an invite-only e-
mail list for the Silicon
Valley Bitcoin community:
“The Time Has Come for the
Bitcoin Community to Own a
U.S.
Based
Federally
Chartered Bank.”
The author, an investor
named David Johnston, wrote
that
the
skepticism
of
traditional
banks
toward
virtual currencies was the
biggest
roadblock
facing
Bitcoin’s growth. If people
couldn’t send dollars from
their bank to BitInstant or
Coinbase, the surging interest
in virtual currencies would be
snuffed out.
The
community
was
hitting
a
roadblock
that
almost
every
movement
striving to disrupt the status
quo eventually reaches. The
big ideals of Bitcoin had
carried it a long way and
were sound in theory, but
eventually the community
required some cooperation
from the existing authorities
—people needed the old
banks to agree to move their
money into the Bitcoin realm.
This was like an anarchist
commune that ran up against
the unwillingness of local
officials
to
continue
delivering
water
and
electricity. Such collisions
with the recalcitrant real
world are frequently where
utopian schemes run into
trouble.
Johnston estimated that
purchasing a licensed bank
that
could
specialize
in
Bitcoin
companies
would
require something like a $10
million investment up front.
He offered to put up $1
million himself—thanks to
the big rise in his own Bitcoin
holdings—and he sought out
ten more investors to join
him. Charlie quickly wrote
back saying it was a great
idea. Wences responded next,
offering to help fund the
venture.
But there wasn’t time for
any big changes. On April 1,
2013, the price of a Bitcoin
crossed the $100 threshold, a
670 percent increase since the
beginning of the year.
The price moves were
now feeding on themselves,
as speculators chased the
climbing ticker, fueled by
news articles from all the new
acolytes,
many
of
them
tutored by Wences. Jeremy
Liew, a venture capitalist at
the firm Lightspeed Capital,
which
had
money
in
Wences’s
current
startup,
wrote
an
article
in
TechCrunch explaining that:
“As a VC, my interest in the
Bitcoin ecosystem is not
ideological but mercenary. I
see
the
opportunity
for
Bitcoin to disrupt multi-
billion-dollar markets, but in
doing so also create new big
markets.”
Within the companies
handling all the money,
however, the gaskets popping
and wood warping were once
again audible. Charlie didn’t
have enough money at Mt.
Gox to fill all the orders
coming in. On April 5, with
the price moving above $140,
he asked the Winklevosses
for a short-term loan of
$500,000 so that he could
increase his reserves.
“I really wanna make
4pm wire cutoff so I can
make sure we have enough
money for the weekend in our
accounts!”
Charlie
wrote
feverishly.
When they quickly sent
over the funds, he wrote
back: “Thanks guys, you are
amazing.”
Charlie was also running
into issues at Mt. Gox, where
he purchased many of the
coins
that
he
sold
to
BitInstant customers. With
orders pouring in, Mt. Gox
was so backed up it was
taking half an hour for trades
to
go
through.
This
exacerbated the price swings
as people who thought they
were buying at $160 weren’t
getting their coins until the
price was at $175.
To compound matters,
Mark Karpeles chose this
moment to move ahead with
big changes in some obscure
but important codes that
customers used to transfer
money around, and did not
fully brief customers—even
big ones like BitInstant—on
how
to
cope
with
the
changes. This set off a set of
increasingly panicked e-mails
between Tokyo and New
York.
“You have been throwing
us around like you always
do,” Charlie wrote to Mark
on April 9. “Beating around
the bush and not being up
front with us.”
When Mark responded
without answering Charlie’s
basic question about some
necessary coding language,
Charlie exploded: “IF WE
CANNOT
ACCEPT
MTGOX
ORDERS WE ARE VIRTUALLY
SHUTTING DOWN.”
“Someone help us!!!!”
Charlie wrote on the morning
of April 10.
That same day, the mania
peaked when the price for
Bitcoins on Mt. Gox surged
to $260. In the first ten days
of the month, the exchange
had attracted 75,000 new
accounts. On April 10 the
number of trades coming in
was three times higher than it
had been just a day earlier.
For a trade, the lag between
being entered and being
executed was more than an
hour. As people sat waiting
for their orders to go through,
they saw the price shoot up
and panicked, not wanting to
pay $300 when they had
intended to pay $200. Orders
were canceled and people
began to sell, hoping to lock
in the profits they had
realized over the past months.
The effect was predictable.
While Charlie was asleep in
New York the price began
crashing, and by the time
Charlie showed up at the
office, the price was down to
$200. By lunchtime it was
closer to $100.
The BitInstant engineers
congregated
with
their
laptops on the small black
sofa and chairs in Charlie’s
office. Charlie had a bottle of
rum on his desk and, in a
spirit of good fun, was taking
occasional swigs as everyone
tried to figure out just what
was going wrong. Even the
wireless network in the office
was failing because of the
number of people in the
building trying to help. When
Yifu Guo, the creator of the
Avalon mining chips, stopped
by the office, Charlie was in a
state of giddy panic, both
scared and amused.
“I’m flipping out. I’m
yelling at everyone. Yifu, I’m
drinking the rum from the
bottle,” he said with a laugh.
“I don’t know why you
guys are all freaking out,”
Yifu said, chuckling himself.
“I’m not worried. The price is
fine. It’s time to buy.”
Things calmed down for a
few
hours
after
Mark
Karpeles assured his users
that the problems were due to
the volume of trade, not to
hackers. But hours after he
wrote
that,
the
hackers
showed up and staged fierce
denial-of-service
attacks,
forcing Mark to shut down
the site altogether in the
middle of the day.
CHAPTER 21
April 11, 2013
The day after Mt. Gox shut
down under the strain of
heavy trading, the members
of the corporate board of
Lemon, Wences Casares’s
digital wallet, showed up at
the company’s Palo Alto
offices
for
a
lunchtime
meeting. The price of Bitcoin
sat more than 50 percent
lower than where it had been
twenty-four hours earlier. But
the sudden downturn had
done
nothing
to
dim
Wences’s faith in Bitcoin’s
future.
Instead,
it
had
increased his conviction that
the companies dominating the
Bitcoin universe, like Mt.
Gox, needed to be replaced,
and that he needed to do more
than just be a cheerleader for
Bitcoin among the Silicon
Valley elite.
Lemon provided a way
for customers to keep all their
credit cards and coupons in
digital
form
on
their
smartphones.
Wences
proposed to his board that
they add a pocket for Bitcoins
that would be a safe, reliable
way to keep virtual currencies
and potentially even to buy
them. To get started, Wences
suggested that Lemon could
use
$1
million
of
its
remaining money to buy
Bitcoins that could serve as
an initial pool for customer
purchases. This was actually
a great time to buy coins,
Wences argued, because the
price was down after the
latest price crash.
Wences expected to see
his board members light up—
particularly Micky Malka, the
chairman of Lemon’s board
and one of the first people
Wences had gotten excited
about Bitcoin back in 2012.
Instead, Micky furrowed his
brow. Is this really what
Lemon set out to do? Micky
asked Wences. Lemon had
finally started catching on as
a digital wallet. Wouldn’t
opening it up to virtual
currencies engender all sorts
of unknown legal risks?
The other board members
quietly listened to Wences’s
explanation of why this was
worth doing. They all knew it
was dangerous in Silicon
Valley
to
alienate
an
entrepreneur like Wences—
there was no easier way to
ensure that a company failed.
But they didn’t jump to his
defense either.
After the meeting was
adjourned, the board member
who had looked the least
skeptical,
Eric
O’Brien,
pulled Wences aside and
asked him: “How strongly do
you believe in this—what are
you personally doing?”
Wences
didn’t
mince
words: “I am personally
allocating a percentage of my
net worth to this that is
borderline
irresponsible
because I believe in it so
much.”
Regardless of what the
Lemon board wanted to do,
Wences said, “I would advise
you to invest as much money
as you can stomach losing.”
He told O’Brien to buy
coins at Mt. Gox, but to move
the coins off Mt. Gox as soon
as the order went through.
“It is either going to be
worth zero or worth five
thousand times what it is
today.”
IN THE DAYS that followed,
Mt.
Gox
reopened
for
business
and
the
price
stabilized around $100. But
many believed that the recent
price crash proved the flaws
in the whole concept. Felix
Salmon, a financial columnist
at Reuters, wrote a widely
circulated article pointing out
that the volatile price of
Bitcoin
made
it
nearly
impossible to use for its most
basic purpose, as currency. If
consumers
didn’t
know
whether a Bitcoin would be
worth $10 or $100 tomorrow
they would be unlikely to
spend
their
coins
and
merchants would similarly be
unlikely to accept them. Even
this
critic,
though,
saw
something elegant in the
network underlying Bitcoin.
“For the time being,
Bitcoin is in many ways the
best and cleanest payments
mechanism the world has
ever seen,” Salmon wrote.
“So if we’re ever going to
create something better, we’re
going to have to learn from
what Bitcoin does right—as
well as what it does wrong.”
The day after the crash,
the Winklevoss twins finally
went public in the New York
Times
with
their
now
significant stake in Bitcoin—
worth some $10 million. The
interest was not restricted to
the United States. A few
weeks after the crash, a
national television station in
China broadcast a half-hour
segment
on
the
new
enthusiasts in that country,
and
several
local
entrepreneurs began setting
up exchanges to buy Bitcoins
using yuan.
Despite
the
crash,
everyone with a Bitcoin idea
found that there was now no
shortage of eager investors in
Silicon Valley. In May, Pete
Thiel’s
Founders
Fund
announced that it was putting
$2 million into BitPay, the
payment processing company
that allowed merchants to
accept Bitcoin and end up
with dollars in their bank—
taking advantage of the
Bitcoin network’s quick and
cheap transactions.
But the company that was
attracting the most attention
was Coinbase, founded by the
veterans
of
Airbnb
and
Goldman
Sachs.
The
twentysomething cofounders
had clean-cut looks and soft-
spoken ways that naturally
engendered
confidence.
Investors liked that the pair
avoided the ideological talk
of overthrowing the Fed and
instead sold their company as
a safe and easy place for
consumers to buy and hold
coins that wouldn’t be subject
to endless delays and scrutiny
from the authorities. They
also had real professional
experience at well-known
companies, something that
had been in short supply in
the Bitcoin world up to this
point.
After consultations with
Wences, Micky decided to
team up with the New York
venture capitalist Fred Wilson
to put $5 million into
Coinbase. It was the largest
publicized investment in a
Bitcoin company to date, by a
wide margin, and the first
time an established venture
capitalist like Wilson had put
serious money into the space.
The rest of Silicon Valley
took notice.
CHARLIE,
MEANTIME,
WAS
taking
advantage
of
BitInstant’s status as the only
serious Bitcoin company in
New York—the media capital
of the world—to become a
sort of public spokesman for
Bitcoin in the press. He
regularly invited reporters to
a bar that he had invested in
at the beginning of the year,
EVR, the sort of dark,
swanky Manhattan club that
made its clientele line up in
high heels on the sidewalk.
The round leather booth in
the back corner was Charlie’s
standing nighttime office,
with some top-shelf liquor on
the table for guests.
Those who knew Charlie
back
in
Brooklyn
were
amazed at his transformation
from
a
short,
awkward
teenager into a confident
impresario
who
bragged
about the ring that he wore,
engraved with the private key
to one of his Bitcoin wallets.
But as always with Charlie, it
was all somewhat less than it
appeared. He still lived in his
teenage bedroom in the
basement of his parents’
house in Brooklyn. He left
people with the impression
that EVR was his bar, despite
the fact that he had put in
only about $15,000 and
owned less than 1 percent of
it.
Meanwhile,
Charlie’s
company was racing furiously
to keep up with all the new
competitors,
especially
Coinbase, and Charlie was
often missing when he was
needed most, hanging out at
the bar or talking with
reporters.
At
one
point,
Cameron Winklevoss asked
Charlie: “Do you want to be
the proprietor of a bar or the
CEO of a Bitcoin company?
You can’t have it both ways.”
Cameron,
the
more
involved of the two twins,
constantly pressed Charlie on
why things weren’t getting
done faster. When Coinbase’s
$5 million investment was
announced, Cameron warned
Charlie that Coinbase could
steal BitInstant’s thunder.
“Just
deliver
the
deliverables and stop fucking
around,” Cameron told him.
Charlie meekly submitted.
“OK, I will push the team and
myself harder.”
IN TOKYO, MARK Karpeles
was also learning that Mt.
Gox’s first-mover advantage
was not impregnable.
On May 2, Mark was
sued in a Seattle court by
CoinLab, the company run by
Peter Vessenes that had been
scheduled
to
assume
responsibility for Mt. Gox’s
business in the United States
earlier in the year. CoinLab
accused Mt. Gox of breaching
its contract by not handing
over the customers. Troubles
deepened a week later when
the money in Mt. Gox’s two
American bank accounts—
some $5 million—was seized
by
federal
agents,
who
accused Mt. Gox of violating
federal
money-transmitting
laws. It wasn’t apparent at the
time, but these moves were
part of the net tightening
around Silk Road, as law
enforcement
agents
in
Baltimore narrowed in on
their prey. Prosecutors had
secretly
filed
a
sealed
indictment on May 1 against
Dread Pirate Roberts for
narcotics trafficking and were
prepared
to
arrest
the
mastermind as soon as they
figured out who he was.
Given all this turbulence,
it was remarkable that anyone
continued using Mt. Gox at
all. In the world of trading,
though, the most valuable
thing an exchange can offer is
liquidity or, more simply,
people buying and selling. An
exchange
with
the
best
technology in the world isn’t
worth
anything
if
no
customers are there offering
to buy and sell. Mt. Gox still
had liquidity because it had
attracted so many customers
from its days as just about the
only exchange around, and
some customers would move
only if others did as well.
But a chasm was opening
up
between
the
early
Bitcoiners and the new, more
practical
community
of
entrepreneurs, engineers, and
investors. When some of the
developers working on the
underlying Bitcoin code set
up a Bitcoin press center, it
immediately led to fights
about who was presentable
enough to be listed as a
contact
for
journalists,
especially when Roger Ver
was taken off the list. Erik
Voorhees lashed out at those
trying to smooth Bitcoin’s
sharper edges.
“It is embarrassing to see
Bitcoin reduced to sniveling
permission-seekers,
too
cowardly to speak about the
real issues and the real
reasons why this technology
is so important,” Erik wrote.
“Bitcoin is a movement, and
those trying to distill it into
nothing more than a cute new
technology
are
kidding
themselves and doing a
terrible disservice to this
community.”
EVERYONE SEEMED READY for
a truce from the bickering as
the
Bitcoin
Foundation’s
first-ever
conference
approached in late May. The
foundation had booked the
main convention center in the
capital of Silicon Valley, San
Jose.
On the morning of the
conference’s first day, Friday,
May 17, the Valley news site
TechCrunch went live with a
story
that
officially
announced the investment the
Winklevoss twins had made
in BitInstant, which had
remained a secret even after
they went public with their
holdings of Bitcoin. The
investment was put at $1.5
million. Even this article was
the cause for a small tiff with
Charlie, who had accidentally
tipped off another reporter
first.
“Your communication is
piss poor and gums up the
entire
operation,”
Tyler
Winklevoss wrote.
But the tension quickly
passed and Charlie and the
twins showed up at the
convention center to find that
they were heroes of sorts to
the
assembling
Bitcoin
masses.
Many
of
the
conference
attendees
had
been aficionados for years,
waiting for the world to see
the beauty of their pet project.
Now these tall, statuesque
celebrity twins were standing
up for their cause. On Friday
night, the twins delivered the
keynote speech together, clad
in sneakers and button-down
shirts with rolled-up sleeves.
They opened with a quote
from Gandhi, and proceeded
to cite Dr. Seuss and the
Bitcoin pizzas purchased by
Laszlo Hanecz. The next
morning, when the general
exhibition
opened,
one
vendor was selling shirts with
the smiling face of Charlie
Shrem, in the style of Barack
Obama’s
famous
“Hope”
poster.
The adulation distracted
Charlie from the business
opportunities
at
the
conference. He got around to
scribbling
down
some
thoughts for his Saturday
afternoon speech only an
hour
beforehand,
while
standing around the booth.
The talk was unsurprisingly
disjointed, but Charlie still
possessed his old infectious
enthusiasm, which had the
crowd cheering and clapping.
That
night,
the
whole
BitInstant team went out for a
boozy dinner with shots of
Fireball whiskey, followed by
a night out at a club.
While Charlie and other
Bitcoin
old-timers
were
reveling, a more quiet and
sophisticated
conversation
was going on around the
edges. In a back room of the
convention
center,
Gavin
Andresen gathered with the
four other developers who
were maintaining the basic
Bitcoin
software
that
computers on the network
were running. This was the
first time the so-called core
developers had met in person,
and far from the crowds they
talked about the serious work
of keeping the basic Bitcoin
protocol safe from hackers
and forks.
The moneyed set that had
recently converted to Bitcoin
was also buzzing around the
conference. Wences didn’t
speak at the conference but he
had
lots
of
private
conversations
with
the
investors and entrepreneurs
whom he had introduced to
the
technology,
including
PayPal’s David Marcus, who
had turned his name badge
around so that no one would
know who he was. After
browsing in the exhibition
hall, Marcus told Wences that
he had been appalled by the
naïveté
and
lack
of
sophistication of the existing
companies. When asked how
they were dealing with anti–
money laundering laws, none
of the young entrepreneurs
gave
a
knowledgeable
answer. It was so bad that
Marcus told Wences he was
contemplating
quitting
PayPal and starting his own
Bitcoin
exchange—
something he later decided
against.
For these Silicon Valley
power brokers, there was an
absurdity to the old-school
Bitcoiners who crowed to
each other about being the
leaders of a new global
movement and getting rich in
the process. The convention
center happened to be hosting
the Big Wow! ComicFest at
the same time as the Bitcoin
conference,
and
it
was
sometimes hard to tell who
among the long-haired nerds
were there for the comics and
who for the virtual currency.
CHAPTER 22
June 2013
The gap that had been
revealed
at
the
Bitcoin
Foundation’s
conference—
between the apparent promise
of Bitcoin’s underlying idea
and the weakness of the
current
companies—only
emboldened the big-money
people
going
into
the
summer.
Pete Briger at Fortress,
the private equity and hedge
fund giant, invited in an old
classmate from Princeton and
colleague from his days at
Goldman
Sachs,
Dan
Morehead, to help Fortress
look full-time at a range of
virtual-currency
opportunities.
A
tall,
statuesque man, who had
been on both the rowing and
the
football
teams
at
Princeton, Dan looked like a
member of the ruling class,
and he had recently been
running his own hedge fund,
Pantera. After getting the
invitation from Briger, Dan
took up a desk at Fortress’s
offices in a skyscraper near
the
Embarcadero
in
downtown San Francisco. He
soon
hired
the
first
professional traders to buy
Bitcoins for a fund he hoped
to set up, which would make
Bitcoin more easily available
to big investors. In New
York, Barry Silbert was
working
on
something
similar. To get everyone in
his company involved and
excited, Barry gave each of
his seventy-five employees
two Bitcoins—each worth
around $100 at the time—
with the mandate to spend
one of them and save the
other.
But as these professionals
got more deeply involved it
quickly became clear to them
that for all the excitement
around Bitcoin in Silicon
Valley, almost no one had
been paying attention to
equally
important
constituencies in Washington,
DC, and on Wall Street, now
the
most
significant
roadblocks to the growth of
this technology.
In
late
May
federal
prosecutors
arrested
the
operators of Liberty Reserve,
another online currency that
Mt. Gox and BitInstant had
used early on as a method for
funding accounts. Liberty
Reserve was a very different
beast from Bitcoin. It was run
by a centralized company,
which designed the currency
to make it easier for criminals
to move money undetected.
But the shadow of Liberty
Reserve naturally fell on
Bitcoin and statements from
regulators suggested they did
not necessarily see a big
difference.
At the end of May the top
financial
regulator
in
California sent the Bitcoin
Foundation a cease-and-desist
letter accusing the foundation
of operating as an unlicensed
money
transmitter.
The
accusation was somewhat
absurd—the foundation was
not a business of any sort—
but it highlighted just how
little the foundation had done
to cultivate relationships with
the relevant regulators.
Given
the
regulatory
uncertainty,
it
was
unsurprising
that
bankers
were
not
eager
to
get
involved
with
the
new
industry. In 2012 and 2013
several big banks had faced
$1 billion fines for not being
vigilant enough in tracking
money laundering. In the
early
summer
of
2013
JPMorgan Chase, the nation’s
biggest bank, was shutting
down
accounts
for
any
companies that came with an
elevated
risk
of
money
laundering, including check-
cashing
businesses
and
companies that did remittance
payments to Mexico.
Finding banks willing to
open accounts for Bitcoin
companies had always been a
problem for entrepreneurs
like Charlie Shrem. But even
the new, more powerful
backers of Bitcoin were
discovering that they couldn’t
find banks willing to work
with them. Fortress’s Pete
Briger set up a meeting with
top executives he knew at one
of the nation’s largest banks,
Wells
Fargo,
about
potentially teaming up to
create a more secure and
reliable Bitcoin exchange, but
Wells Fargo quickly declined
any partnership. It had been
only a few months since
Wells Fargo had had to deal
with federal agents seizing
Mt. Gox’s Wells Fargo bank
accounts.
In all the discouraging
dealings with bankers and
government
officials,
Bitcoiners were facing basic
questions about why it was
worthwhile for anyone to put
any
energy
into
this
technology. Almost five years
after Satoshi Nakamoto had
published his paper, the
virtual currency was worth
real money and had attracted
talented people, but although
some
small
companies
accepted
Bitcoin
through
BitPay, the virtual currency
was still used almost entirely
for speculation, gambling,
and drug dealing.
Economists
who
had
taken note of Bitcoin also
pointed out that the virtual
currency actually had built-in
incentives
discouraging
people from using it. The cap
on the number of Bitcoins
that could ever be created—
21 million—meant that the
currency was expected to
become more valuable over
time. This situation, which is
known
as
deflation,
encouraged people to hold on
to their Bitcoins rather than
spend them.
The notion of Bitcoiners
around the world sitting on
their private keys and waiting
to become rich begged the
question of the intrinsic value
of these digital files. What
were all these locked-up
virtual coins really worth if
no one was doing anything
with
them?
What
was
backing up all the value the
coins seemed to have on
paper?
Bitcoin fans argued that
the United States dollar was
not backed up by anything
real either—dollars were just
pieces of paper. But this
argument ignored the fact that
the United States government
promised to always take
dollars for tax bills, which
was a real value no matter
how much people disliked
paying taxes.
Practically no one was
promising to take Bitcoin for
anything. The primary value
the coins had at this point was
the expectation that they
would be worth more in the
future,
allowing
current
holders to cash out for more
than they paid. To some
cynics, that description made
Bitcoin sound suspiciously
like a less savory sort of
financial invention: a Ponzi
scheme.
FROM THE OUTSIDE, it would
have been easy to conclude
that Charlie and BitInstant
were somehow dodging all
these problems. Charlie was
shopping for new, larger real
estate for his company and
eventually settled on a well-
appointed suite in an office
tower. Charlie had finally
managed to move out of his
parents’
basement
in
Brooklyn. He was motivated
to do this, in no small part,
because he was afraid to tell
his
parents
about
his
girlfriend, Courtney, who was
a waitress at his favorite bar,
EVR. Courtney was some ten
years his senior and, more
important,
not
Jewish—
something that did not fly in
the
Syrian
Jewish
community.
Charlie
and
Courtney took a room in a big
communal apartment above
EVR, where there were
always alcohol bottles and
bongs on offer. Charlie was
often spotted at EVR with
Courtney on his arm.
But
within
BitInstant,
Charlie’s hard-partying ways
seemed to many like an
escape from the challenges he
was facing with his company.
The Winklevoss twins had
been pushing Charlie to raise
more money to pay for
BitInstant’s expansion. And
Charlie had no trouble getting
meetings with investors, who
were all impressed at the
sheer number of dollars
already
running
through
BitInstant. But as Charlie’s
team tried to get the investors
the paperwork they needed, it
quickly became clear how
unequipped BitInstant was for
the big time. When the
BitInstant
chief
financial
officer, who was just two
years out of college, tried to
put together the financial
statements he realized that
there were large holes in the
company’s
books,
with
unexplained expenses in all
directions.
Charlie
had
made
remarkable progress for a
twenty-three-year-old
entrepreneur with almost no
prior experience. He had built
a complicated business from
nothing and people entrusted
him with millions of dollars.
But Charlie was clearly, and
unsurprisingly, lacking skills
as a manager. In many
startups this is something that
investors might notice, and
help fix, by finding an
experienced manager to come
in and steer the ship. As it
turned out, though, Charlie’s
investors didn’t have much
more
experience
working
with startups than he did. The
twins’ early experience with
Mark Zuckerberg had been
limited and, since setting out
to become tech investors the
previous
year,
they
had
worked with only a few
young
companies.
With
Charlie,
the
twins
had
initially adopted a hands-off
attitude,
despite
all
the
bickering. But as problems
became more evident, they
talked with Charlie’s chief
programmer about replacing
Charlie
as
CEO.
When
Charlie learned about the
potential palace coup he was
furious and began showing up
for work less and less.
In
mid-June,
the
Winklevosses asked an angel
investor they knew, Chris
Morton,
to
diagnose
BitInstant’s problems. What
they got back was a long list
of basic things the company
was missing, among them:
“There is no accounting
system.
“The equity agreements
are a mess or nonexistent.
“The company mission is
not clear.”
But Morton’s harshest
words were reserved for
Charlie:
He cannot focus. He
seems to be busy with
superfluous meetings
(press, investors,
partners, speaking
engagements) and
personal commitments
(bar, rental property).
Even when those
meetings are in
progress, he does
other things on his
computer. He makes
commitments and
does not follow
through. He
confirmed a meeting
with the accountant
and then did not show.
The Winklevoss twins
talked with Morton about
coming in to help turn around
the company, but he had little
interest.
The twins were realizing
that BitInstant might be a lost
cause
and
they
began
working toward a life in
Bitcoin without Charlie. At
the Manhattan offices of
Winklevoss Capital, where
the brothers had matching
glass-walled offices on either
side
of
a
glass-walled
conference room, the twins
started putting together the
paperwork for what they
envisioned as the first-ever
Bitcoin
exchange-traded
fund, or ETF, which would
hold Bitcoins and move with
the value of the coins, but
trade
on
a
real
stock
exchange, much like the
hugely popular gold ETF.
The
twins
planned
to
assemble a team that would
buy
and
sell
Bitcoins,
allowing ordinary investors to
purchase the ETF through
their Charles Schwab or
E*Trade brokerage account.
IN LATE JUNE, Charlie finally
managed
a
long-planned
relaunch of BitInstant, in
partnership with a money-
transmitting business that was
regulated in most states. But
when the site went live and
BitInstant began doing more
thorough
checks
of
its
customers, Charlie’s staffers
realized that many of their
customers had been doing
business with them under
fake identities. When the
Manhattan district attorney
sent a disconcerting request
to Charlie asking him to come
in
for
a
meeting,
it
precipitated an emergency
conference call with a team of
lawyers on July 4.
“The problem is that the
site is a patchwork of
bandages,” one of the lawyers
told Charlie and his team.
“When we go into that
meeting, they’re going to go
straight to the site and review
it in detail. They can’t see a
patchwork of quick fixes.”
The
lawyers
were
unrelenting, and the answers
from Charlie made them
nervous:
no,
BitInstant’s
compliance officer had no
previous
experience
in
compliance,
and
no,
BitInstant had not filed any
suspicious-activity
reports
with regulators despite having
lots of transactions flagged as
potentially
fraudulent
by
partners. The call concluded
with a long list of things that
needed
to
be
handled
immediately.
“You are very exposed on
all fronts,” the lawyer told
Charlie and his team.
Charlie tried to show how
serious
he
was
about
complying with all the rules,
but the old problems were
quickly joined by new ones.
A
couple
of
customers
disputing transactions filed a
lawsuit, for which they were
seeking class-action status.
When the twins read Charlie
the riot act, he responded
with total contrition.
“Things ARE changing
dramatically to fix problems
on all fronts and put us in a
position for growth as quickly
as possible,” he told them.
“I’ve made a lot of mistakes,
the ones that you guys called
me out on as well as others
that I’m seeing now and
taking steps to fix.”
But there wouldn’t be
time for that. Charlie was in
the new BitInstant offices,
which he had moved the
company into less than two
weeks earlier, when he got a
letter from his lawyers telling
him that because of the
number of legal questions,
they could not represent him
in his upcoming meeting with
the district attorney unless he
shut down the site and
resolved all the problems.
Charlie
reached
the
Winklevoss twins while they
were in the car on the way to
their family beach house.
They laid the blame entirely
at his feet and demanded the
return of the $500,000 loan
they had made back in April
when business was booming.
On Friday, July 12, at 9
p.m.,
Charlie
took
the
BitInstant site down, for what
he thought would be only a
temporary hiatus.
THE MALODOROUS HAZE now
hovering over Bitcoin was
making everyone question
what it was doing.
Erik Voorhees, one of the
most fearless proponents of
Bitcoin’s radical possibilities,
announced a few days after
Charlie shut down BitInstant
that he was selling the
gambling site, SatoshiDice,
which he’d bought in 2012
and turned into one of the
most popular Bitcoin sites on
the Web.
The
sale
involved
reimbursing all the people
who had bought shares in
Erik’s company in 2012, but
they had only 13 percent of
the site. This young man who
had been unemployed two
years earlier was now a
millionaire living in Panama.
But the reason he was selling
SatoshiDice was not the
money. In e-mail exchanges
with other entrepreneurs he
explained that his legal costs
were piling up and that it was
too much of a headache to be
under such scrutiny.
“Bitcoin businesses are
literally at the edge of law,
not because they are doing
anything wrong, but because
Bitcoin enables new activities
and
behaviors
and
recategorizes money in such a
way as to enable it to
transcend current statutes.
This is both exciting, and
scary, because we’re breaking
amazing ground and we’ll
inevitably be in the crosshairs
for doing so,” he said.
About a week after he
sold the company and paid
back his shareholders, he got
an e-mail from the Securities
and Exchange Commission
letting him know that it
believed that he had broken
the
law
by
selling
unregistered securities. The e-
mail caused a terrible feeling
in the pit of Erik’s stomach
that didn’t abate for days.
Not long after that, nearly
every major company in the
Bitcoin space got a subpoena
from
the
top
financial
regulator in New York, a
young bulldog of a prosecutor
named Benjamin Lawsky,
who asked for a trove of
documentation
about
consumer protections and
anti–money
laundering
programs. A few days later
the US Senate’s Committee
on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs sent a
letter to the major financial
regulators
and
law
enforcement agencies asking
about the “threats and risks
related to virtual currency.”
Neither of these requests
suggested that lawmakers
regarded this new technology
with much warmth.
NO ONE, THOUGH, was feeling
more heat than Ross Ulbricht,
aka Dread Pirate Roberts.
Ross’s site was more
successful than ever. In the
middle of 2013, Silk Road
was approaching its one-
millionth registered account.
In the first two months of the
summer, Silk Road users
exchanged over a million
messages with each other and
the commissions collected by
the site were often over
$10,000 a day.
But since the spring Ross
had
been
dealing
with
continuing and varied attacks
unlike
anything
he
had
experienced before. A hacker
had managed to take the site
down for days at a time and
stopped only after Ross
agreed to pay $100,000 up
front and $50,000 every week
thereafter—payments
that
ultimately
amounted
to
$350,000.
These weren’t the only
unanticipated costs. When a
user named FriendlyChemist
threatened to release details
about thousands of Silk Road
customers, Ross reached out
to a distributor, who he
believed was a member of
Hell’s Angels, and asked
what it would cost to do away
with FriendlyChemist. This
time around, there was none
of the hemming and hawing
that had accompanied Curtis
Green’s
supposed
death.
When
the
assassin,
redandwhite, came back with
a price of $150,000, Ross
politely haggled with him.
“Don’t want to be a pain
here, but the price seems
high,” Ross wrote, pointing to
the $80,000 that had been
paid
for
the
previous
execution.
A few days after a price
was
agreed
upon,
redandwhite sent evidence
that the deed had been done
(though no evidence was later
found of an actual murder).
Messages quickly followed
with a request for a hit on
another scammer—and three
of his associates—who had
robbed Silk Road users. This
deed was paid for with 3,000
Bitcoins, or roughly $500,000
(but, again, no evidence was
found of any actual murders).
This
was
not
the
softhearted young man of
early 2012 who had trouble
telling white lies. Now his
diary was filled not with
ruminations
on
his
weaknesses, but instead with
brief, cold lists of his
problems and solutions. His
entry
for
the
day
FriendlyChemist
was
presumably killed, read:
got word that
blackmailer was
excuted
created file upload
script
started to fix problem
with bond refunds
over 3 months old
Even his family members,
who had no idea what he was
up to, noticed a change
during this time. Ross’s mom
would say that her son,
during this period, was “rebel
Ross,” not the lovable young
man she had known in recent
years.
Ross’s transition from an
affable youngster obsessed
with oneness to a minor
tycoon whose diary entries
reflected a willingness to kill
looked, from many angles,
like a predictable outcome of
the community that Ross had
created and the role that Ross
had assumed within that
community. In a world in
which there are no agreed-
upon
authorities,
it
was
natural that individuals might
take it upon themselves to
determine what is right and
wrong—and to act on those
determinations on their own.
It was easy to imagine that
Ross, cut off from any real
contact
with
the
other
members of the community,
except for Internet chats,
began to see people as
abstractions with no real life
force—like characters in a
video game. In this sort of
world, the idea of killing
these people could lose its
visceral repugnance.
As the year went on, Ross
receded further from his
ordinary life. He moved out
of his friend’s apartment in
June and went even deeper
underground, renting a place
a few miles away in a
residential neighborhood of
San Francisco that he paid for
in cash. He told his new
roommates that his name was
Josh. On his laptop, he kept a
document
called
“emergency” that included
the steps he would take if he
needed to run:
encrypt and backup
important files on
laptop to memory
stick.
destroy laptop hard
drive and hide/dispose
destroy phone and
hide/dispose
hide memory stick
get new laptop
go to end of train
find place to live on
craigslist for cash
create new identity
(name, backstory)
The New York office of
the FBI was, by this point,
working in cooperation with
the Marco Polo task force that
had been set up a year and a
half earlier in Baltimore to
crack down on Silk Road.
The teams were making
almost monthly arrests of
other vendors and buyers on
Silk Road, and many of these
arrests
were
publicized.
When a competing black
market drug site, which had
opened in the spring, shut
down, Dread Pirate Roberts
told his followers that he had
often thought about doing the
same:
Without going into
details, the stress of
being DPR is
sometimes
overwhelming. What
keeps me going is the
understanding that
what we are doing
here is more important
than my insignificant
little life. I believe
what we are doing
will have rippling
effects for generations
to come and could be
part of a monumental
shift in how human
beings organize and
relate to one another.
I have gone
through the mental
exercise of spending a
lifetime in prison and
of dying for this
cause. I have let the
fear pass through me
and with clarity
commit myself fully
to the mission and
values outlined in the
Silk Road charter.
Ross,
by
this
point,
understood just how hard it
was going to be to continue
evading detection. He became
aware, at several points in
2013, that despite his best
efforts,
his
system
did
occasionally leak a real IP
address,
providing
information, however briefly,
on where his servers were
located. Each time, he would
delete the information and
move his databases to new
servers, hoping that no one
had noticed the mistake. Ross
assigned Variety Jones, his
old mentor, who now went by
the screen name cimon, to
serve
as
the
site’s
counterintelligence
expert
against law enforcement. But
as Ross guessed, there were,
indeed,
federal
agents
dedicating their days to
spotting any sign of a real IP
address associated with Silk
Road, and they were homing
in on a set of servers in
Iceland that they believed
were the right ones.
Before the authorities got
anything on those servers,
though,
agents
on
the
Canadian border intercepted a
package with nine forged
drivers’ licenses. Each license
had a different name and
address, but the pictures on
all of them were the same
wavy-haired young man. The
package was addressed to a
house in San Francisco.
When agents knocked on the
door, they recognized the
young man from the photos
on the forged IDs. He quickly
presented his real driver’s
license, from Texas, with his
real name, Ross Ulbricht. He
declined to answer any other
questions about where the
IDs had come from, but told
the agents in an offhand way
that anyone could buy faked
documents from a site called
Silk Road.
The agents left without
taking Ross with them. He
had gotten lucky. While he
was one of the suspects that
the New York and Baltimore
agents were looking at, they
had not disseminated his
name widely, and the border
patrol officers had no idea
who he was. After this close
call,
Ross
changed
apartments, but he did not
take the opportunity to cut
and run. Instead, he stayed in
San Francisco, watching his
commissions from Silk Road
pour in as the digital noose
tightened around his neck.
PART THREE
CHAPTER 23
August 2013
The Bitcoin Foundation had
set out to help improve the
network’s public standing,
but most of the people
involved in the foundation’s
creation had now become
unhappy examples of the
technology’s
problems.
Charlie Shrem had shut down
his site and was being sued.
Peter Vessenes was locked in
a legal battle with his fellow
founding
board
member,
Mark Karpeles, and Peter’s
other ventures were going
just as poorly. A company he
had set up to produce Bitcoin
mining machines had not yet
turned out a single coin and
his investors were breathing
down his neck.
There was, though, one
unlikely person left to carry
on the original mission of
providing the technology with
a more friendly public face:
the Seattle lawyer Patrick
Murck. For most of 2012 and
2013 Patrick had worked for
existing Bitcoin companies
and volunteered as general
counsel of the foundation.
But since the beginning of the
summer
he
had
been
employed by the foundation
full-time and was turning
himself into a respectable
public spokesman.
At each point along the
way, Bitcoin’s survival had
required the strengths of a
different
subset
of
its
believers. In the summer of
2013 it had become clear that
if Bitcoin was going to reach
a larger audience it would
need to learn how to play nice
with the existing system. As
it turned out, Patrick, a pudgy
young father with a warm
fuzzy beard, was uniquely
positioned to do just that. In
contrast to Bitcoin’s early
salesmen, like Roger Ver,
who was still trying to
renounce
his
citizenship,
Patrick was a patriot who had
grown up in Washington, DC,
with a mother who worked at
the National Labor Relations
Board. This upbringing had
made him believe in the
importance
of
fighting
injustice in the world and
gave him a healthy respect for
the role that government
could play in the process,
which helped explain the
volunteer work he had done
for the Obama campaign in
2008.
When it came to Bitcoin,
Patrick firmly believed, like
many in the tech world, that
Bitcoin could foment big
changes. An open source
financial network looked to
Patrick like just what was
needed to shake up the
privileged elite who ran and
disproportionately benefited
from the existing financial
system. The Bitcoin network
seemed to make it at least a
little bit harder for Wall
Street to collect tolls at every
step
of
every
financial
transaction. But Patrick did
not think that for this to
happen it would be necessary
for Bitcoin to overthrow the
existing governments and
central banks. In fact, he
thought
there
was
a
significant
place
for
regulations when a third
party, like Mt. Gox or
BitInstant,
was
holding
someone’s virtual currency.
Patrick had quietly begun
his work at the beginning of
the summer, when he spoke
at
a
conference
in
Washington that represented
essentially the first time a
Bitcoiner had sat on the same
stage with lawmakers. At that
point, there had been obvious
tension. Patrick had ended up
in a sharp exchange with a
man from the Department of
Justice who had compared
Bitcoin
users
to
child
pornographers.
Afterward,
though,
Patrick struck up a friendly
conversation with the woman
in charge of FinCen, the
branch
of
the
Treasury
Department that had put out
the first rules on virtual
currencies in March 2013.
Patrick had been somewhat
peeved that FinCen and its
leader,
Jennifer
Shasky
Calvery, had not had any
conversation with the Bitcoin
community before issuing
those rules. At the June
conference, though, Shasky
Calvery made it clear that she
was
interested
in
the
technology and open to a
dialogue about the rules.
Over the course of the
summer Patrick made almost
weekly trips from Seattle to
Washington to meet with
Shasky Calvery and other
regulators, to help them
understand Bitcoin. Patrick
quickly learned that staffers
in the office of Senator
Thomas Carper, of Delaware,
were studying Bitcoin and
looking at the possibility of
holding a hearing. Patrick
was able to put them in touch
with the most presentable
players in the Bitcoin world.
In his meetings Patrick
did not fight the obvious
reality that Bitcoin was not
yet doing any of the great
things that he and others were
talking about. But he was
able to cogently explain his
vision of how the blockchain
technology could make it
easier for poor immigrants to
transfer money back home
and allow people with no
access to a bank account or
credit card to take part in the
Internet economy.
In addition to his legal
mind, Patrick had a genial,
unthreatening approach that
made him able to get along
with just about anyone. He
liked
having
his
conversations over a whiskey
or beer in a bar, and his
everyman sensibility tended
to soften people up. The good
relationship
Patrick
developed
with
Shasky
Calvery, among other people,
led to a private meeting in
August, when Patrick and a
few other people affiliated
with the Bitcoin Foundation
got to present Bitcoin’s best
face to a roomful of law
enforcement
agents
and
government officials. It was
not entirely friendly, but the
attendees
seemed
to
understand that the Bitcoin
technology was useful for
more than just purchasing
drugs and laundering money
—so this meeting was already
a long way from Patrick’s
first
encounters
in
Washington at the beginning
of the summer.
Many Bitcoin companies
were
making
their
own
efforts to get in sync with the
authorities. Coinbase, the San
Francisco–based
company
that had raised $5 million
from Micky Malka’s Ribbit
Capital and other investors,
was developing extensive
measures to vet clients and
ensure that the service was
not used toward illegal ends.
The
Slovenian
Bitcoin
exchange, Bitstamp, which
passed Mt. Gox over the
summer to become the largest
Bitcoin exchange in the
world, now required all its
customers to go through a
rigorous identity verification
process. The two young men
who
had
founded
the
exchange were rewarded with
visits to their Slovenian city,
Kranj, by Dan Morehead and
Pete Briger from Fortress
Capital, who wanted to invest
in the exchange.
THIS WAS ALL a long way
from the original Cypherpunk
vision of a new digital money
that was outside the reach of
governments
and
banks.
Satoshi Nakamoto’s aim in
creating the decentralized
Bitcoin
ledger—the
blockchain—was to allow
users to control their own
money so that no third party,
not even the government,
would be able to access or
monitor it. But people were
still
opting
for
the
convenience of centralized
services like Coinbase and
Bitstamp to hold their coins.
The great benefit of this
business model was that the
companies, rather than their
customers, dealt with the
headache of storing and
securing the money. When
early Bitcoin users lost the
private keys to their Bitcoin
addresses,
the
coins
associated
with
those
addresses were lost forever.
With a Coinbase wallet, on
the other hand, if a customer
lost the password, it was like
losing the password to a
normal
website—the
company could recover it.
What’s
more,
Coinbase
customers didn’t have to
download
the
somewhat
complicated Bitcoin software
and the whole blockchain,
with its history of all Bitcoin
transactions. This helped turn
Coinbase into the go-to
company
for
Americans
looking to acquire Bitcoins
and
helped
expand
the
audience for the technology.
There was, though, a
small but vocal community of
dissidents, many of them
early Bitcoin users, who were
eager to go back to the
original vision that Satoshi
had laid out. Few were as
outspoken as Roger Ver, the
Tokyo-based libertarian who
had, in earlier years, lost
money that he had entrusted
to Bitcoin businesses like
Bitcoinica and MyBitcoin.
Roger was still a fervent
believer in the initial vision
he had of Bitcoin as a game-
changing
technology
for
governments
around
the
world, just as his favorite
martial art, jujitsu, offered a
relatively simple way to
neutralize even the strongest
opponent. Roger had recently
begun comparing Bitcoin to
the honey badger, the weasel-
like equatorial mammal that
has a reputation for being
able to overpower and even
castrate the most ferocious
predator. During the summer
of 2013, with graphic design
assistance
from
Erik
Voorhees, Roger had put up a
new billboard in Silicon
Valley with a picture of the
indomitable animal and the
caption: “Bitcoin: The honey
badger of money.”
But Roger had grown
increasingly firm in his belief
that
centralized
Bitcoin
businesses
like
Coinbase
defeated the essential purpose
of Bitcoin by putting the
personal information of every
user in the files of a single
company that was vulnerable
to government subpoenas. In
the summer of 2013, aiming
to foster an alternative, Roger
channeled the energy that he
had earlier put into Charlie
Shrem and BitInstant into
another one of the startups he
had invested in back in 2012.
Blockchain.info had been
created by a reclusive young
man named Ben Reeves who
lived in the English city of
York and ran his site alone
until the middle of 2013.
Reeves had created what
looked
like
a
rather
unspectacular product: an
online wallet that, like other
wallets, offered a way to
access Bitcoins from any
computer
or
smartphone
without
downloading
the
entire
blockchain.
But
Reeves’s wallet was different
in a crucial way. Rather than
holding
its
customers’
Bitcoins,
Blockchain.info
kept only a small file for each
customer with the private
keys
of
that
customer,
encrypted in a way that made
it impossible for the company
to see the keys themselves.
Because Blockchain.info held
an encrypted file with the
keys, they were not on the
computer
of
the
user,
vulnerable to hackers. But
when a customer logged into
a Blockchain. info wallet, the
log-in process decrypted the
file so that the keys were
temporarily on the customer’s
computer and could be used
to access coins that the
customer
had
on
the
blockchain. The customer’s
data—how much money he
or she had and the transaction
history—was
viewable
through
Blockchain.info’s
online template. But the
company itself never saw the
data. Because Blockchain.
info did not hold money or a
transaction history for its
customers, it couldn’t be
subpoenaed
to
give
up
customer records. Nor could
the
company
steal
its
customers’ coins.
The site had attracted lots
of interest from people who
opened
350,000
free
Blockchain.info wallets by
the middle of 2013. But the
business model was not a
recipe for big profits. Because
blockchain.info didn’t hold
customer funds it was hard to
deduct fees for its services. It
also
didn’t
allow
its
customers to buy Bitcoin
online—a lucrative business
that would have put the
company
in
charge
of
customers’
money.
Blockchain.info users had to
acquire their coins elsewhere
and send them to their
Blockchain.info wallet.
This was a business
opportunity uniquely suited to
Roger Ver, who had never
been concerned, primarily,
with making money from his
Bitcoin
investments.
He
wanted to see Bitcoin live up
to its revolutionary potential.
As a result, when Reeves
offered to turn a loan that
Roger
had
made
to
Blockchain.info
into
a
majority
stake
in
the
company (so that Reeves
could avoid a tax headache),
Roger
jumped
at
the
opportunity.
In
London
for
a
conference
that
summer,
Roger paid for Reeves to
come down so they could
meet in person for the first
time. Reeves showed up, but
Roger had trouble getting
more than a few words out of
the shy young man. After
Roger went out to speak at
the conference, he came back
to his hotel room and found
that Reeves had abruptly left
and gone home to York.
This didn’t discourage
Roger. He thought Reeves’s
code spoke for itself and he
began looking for a chief
executive for the company, a
person who could deal with
the outside world so that
Reeves didn’t have to. When
Erik Voorhees put Roger in
touch with an old college
fraternity brother, Nic Cary,
Roger flew Nic to Tokyo. On
their first night, they went to
Roger’s
favorite
establishment,
the
Robot
Restaurant, where women in
blinking bikinis rode around
on large robotic animals.
Roger and Nic spent the next
few days immersed in deep
conversations—some of them
during drives around Tokyo
in Roger’s Lamborghini—
about
how
to
expand
Blockchain.info’s offering of
a wallet that could be used
free by anyone, anywhere in
the world, outside the reach
of regulators. Nic explained
his vision for making the
website more user friendly
and expanding the number of
languages.
Roger promptly hired Nic
to move to York and work
with Reeves in a three-story
house that Roger rented for
what he hoped would soon be
a much larger team. As Roger
began to build out the
company he determined that
this would be a real Bitcoin
company, with no bank
accounts and all salaries paid
in Bitcoins.
TO MANY REGULATORS and
investors, the only plausible
reason that someone would
want an untraceable Bitcoin
wallet, like Blockchain.info,
was to enable online drug
purchases or other nefarious
activity. Why else would you
want to keep your records
from government officials?
But one place where
Blockchain.info, and Bitcoin
more broadly, was gaining
popularity in the summer of
2013 put a slightly different
slant on the potential uses for
Bitcoin services that couldn’t
easily be monitored by the
government.
At a Bitcoin Meetup in
July 2013, two hundred or so
people packed into one of the
historic old buildings that fill
downtown Buenos Aires, the
capital of Argentina. At a
time
when
Bitcoin’s
popularity was faltering in the
United States, the turnout in
Argentina was many times
greater than the thirty or so
people who had attended the
most recent meetups in New
York and Silicon Valley.
Many of the attendees in
Buenos Aires had come
looking for an easy way to
buy Bitcoins and those who
purchased coins from other
attendees,
generally
with
cash, were usually set up with
a Blockchain.info wallet to
receive their coins.
This was a long way from
the first Bitcoin meetup in
Argentina, which had been
organized by Wences Casares
back in 2012 and had
attracted only a handful of
people. Since then, Wences
had given the credentials for
the meetup group to one of
his old friends who lived in
Buenos Aires. Each of the
meetups that his friend,
Diego,
organized
had
attracted more people, with a
big jump in July. The
increasing interest was not
hard to understand in the
Argentinian context. Over the
first half of 2013, the
Argentinian peso had been
plummeting in value against
other currencies. While the
government tried to deny the
rampant inflation, grocery
prices surged and everyone
tried to dump pesos. The
government’s
increasingly
desperate attempts to keep
money in the country—by
imposing a tax on foreign
credit card transactions, for
instance—only
made
the
problem
worse.
Keeping
savings
in
pesos
was
equivalent to throwing the
money
away,
but
the
government made it hard to
get money out of the peso
through
official
channels.
This made a currency like
Bitcoin and a wallet like
Blockchain.info, which the
government could not access,
very attractive.
In late June, one of the
nation’s largest newspapers,
La Nación, had put a story
about dinero digital at the top
of the front page of the
Sunday issue. La Nación was
associated with the ruling
left-wing party, and the
article didn’t talk much about
the
country’s
financial
problems. But the people
quoted in the article made it
clear
why
they
were
interested.
“You don’t have to be
battling
all
of
the
government’s problems, you
aren’t going to buy bread
with it, but it’ll save you if
you have a stash of stable
currency
that
tends
to
appreciate in value,” twenty-
two-year-old Emmanuel Ortiz
told the newspaper.
Bitcoin, with its famous
volatility, did fall in value
against the peso in May and
June
2013,
when
the
problems at Mt. Gox created
widespread pessimism. But
by the end of the summer,
Bitcoin had risen in value
against the peso every other
month of the year, and in
September it was up 860
percent against the dollar
since the beginning of the
year while the peso was down
some 25 percent against the
dollar.
The
excitement
was
building in Argentina despite