aisles,

grabbing as much food as

possible

before

the

hyperinflation

caused

the

goods to be repriced. A man

walked through the aisles all

day

doing

nothing

but

repricing the items on the

shelves to keep up with the

rapidly changing value of the

peso. When Wences and his

mother got to the register, he

and his sisters would run back

and grab more food if they

still had any money left.

Holding on to money was

equal to losing it.

These experiences gave

Wences insights into the

nature of money that most

people in the world learn only

from textbooks. In America,

the dollar seamlessly serves

the three functions of money:

providing

a

medium

of

exchange,

a

unit

for

measuring the cost of goods,

and an asset where value can

be stored. In Argentina, on

the other hand, while the peso

was used as a medium of

exchange—for

daily

purchases—no one used it as

a store of value. Keeping

savings in the peso was

equivalent to throwing away

money. So people exchanged

any pesos they wanted to save

for dollars, which kept their

value better than the peso.

Because the peso was so

volatile,

people

usually

remembered prices in dollars,

which

provided

a

more

reliable unit of measure over

time.

As Wences avidly pored

over all the available writing

about Bitcoin in the first

months after discovering it, it

seemed clear to him that for

people

in

places

like

Argentina,

Bitcoin

might

provide

a

much

more

efficient place to store money

than the dollar. In Argentina,

dollars had to be purchased

through

shady

money

changers, and were saved in

closets or under the mattress.

The promise of a virtual

currency that could be bought

and stored online, accessed

from anywhere, and secured

with a private key looked like

a significant improvement.

Wences

began

by

purchasing

a

growing

stockpile of Bitcoins from

Mt. Gox in early 2012 and

joined in the conversation on

the forums and chat channels.

When he wasn’t playing with

Bitcoin, he devoured several

books on the history of

money, most significantly

Debt: The First 5,000 Years, a cult favorite in the Occupy

Wall Street movement and in

certain transgressive corners

of Wall Street. The book, by

anthropologist

David

Graeber,

argued

that

historians and economists

have wrongly assumed that

money grew out of barter. In

fact, Graeber argued, and

Wences came to believe,

barter was never common and

money

was

actually

an

evolution of credit—a way of

tracking what people owed to

each other. People used to

just keep a mental tally of

what they owed each other,

but money provided a way to

expand the system more

broadly among people who

didn’t know each other.

As he read, Wences felt

that after twenty years of

working

on

financial

technology, he was finally

coming to understand money

for the first time. He saw that

Bitcoin’s lack of any apparent

intrinsic value didn’t matter

when looked at against the

history of money. The reason

gold itself had been used as

money was not that it was

valuable; it had become

valuable because it was used

as money. And it was used as

money because it did what all

good money did: it served as

a sort of physical ledger on

which society could keep

track of who was owed what.

Each

piece

of

gold

represented a slot on the

ledger of all outstanding gold,

which anyone could verify by

checking

the

mass

and

volume of the gold.

“We

don’t

use

gold

because it’s pretty—that was

a stupid assumption of mine

and many other people,”

Wences would tell anyone

who would listen during these

days when he was totally

immersed in the history. “No,

we use it in jewelry because

it’s very expensive. It’s not

expensive because we use it

in jewelry.”

“What is the value?” he

would ask. “It’s that it is the

ledger. You put the ledger on

your neck to show power and

wealth. It isn’t a ledger where

you have to trust a bank or

anyone else.”

Bitcoin, Wences came to

believe, was a purer version

of that sort of ledger—a

commonly verifiable place

where everyone could keep

track of who owned what.

Despite

his

fervor,

Wences initially had trouble

drumming up much interest

among his Silicon Valley

friends beyond a few fellow

South Americans, who had

grown up in places with

similarly

screwed-up

currencies. Mostly he just got

skeptical looks. For those

who had heard of it, the first

question was usually about

whether it was anything more

than a token for online drug

dealers. Some remembered

David Chaum’s DigiCash

back in the 1990s, but anyone

familiar with that experiment

knew that it had gone under.

The bigger question was why

something like this was

necessary in the first place.

Credit cards and $20 bills did

everything

that

most

of

Wences’s

friends

needed

when it came to spending

money. Why should they trust

a digital code that had

nothing backing it but the

computers of some libertarian

nerds?

After months of trying,

Wences

finally

made

a

breakthrough with one of his

best friends, and the one

whose opinion in this area

mattered

most:

David

Marcus, who had recently

become the president of

PayPal. Like Wences, Marcus

was a foreigner in the Valley.

He had grown up in France

and Switzerland, and had the

same

slender

stature,

unassuming presence, and

seemingly

effortless

sophistication as Wences. But

after spending a decade on

payment startups, Marcus

was used to hearing grand

claims about technologies

that would revolutionize the

way money moved around

the Internet. He also had

experienced the overbearing

regulatory scrutiny that falls

on any company that wants to

deal with money.

But in the fall of 2012

Marcus had a conversion

moment

when

the

Argentinian

government

ordered his company, PayPal,

to cut off direct payments

between Argentinians, a new

prong in the government’s

effort to slow the movement

of pesos into other currencies.

With Wences’s arguments

ringing in his head, Marcus

watched as the policy went

into effect and the price of

Bitcoin rose, suggesting to

Marcus

that

Argentinians

were seeking out Bitcoin as a

way around the government’s

restrictions. He quietly set up

an account with Mt. Gox and

began buying coins. In doing

so, Marcus became one of the

first

of

many

important

converts that Wences would

win to the Bitcoin cause.

WENCES RAN HIS digital-wallet

company with an old friend in

Argentina, Federico Murrone,

or Fede. Unlike Wences, who

had an aristocratic lineage,

Fede came from a working-

class family and looked like a

tough biker. The two had

connected as teenagers on

Wences’s

first

startup,

creating

Argentina’s

first

Internet provider, and they

had been close friends ever

since, with Fede providing

the programming smarts for

Wences’s ideas, always from

Argentina, where Fede stayed

to be close to his family.

Wences

traveled

to

Buenos Aires every few

months to check in with Fede

and his team of Argentinian

coders. Each time Wences

visited in 2012, the reminders

of what it was like to live in a

country with broken money

strengthened his belief in the

potential for Bitcoin.

Like other smart visitors

to the country, Wences went

to a black market money

changer whenever he needed

pesos to spend. Credit cards

and ATMs were available,

but they provided pesos at the

official government exchange

rate, which was about 35

percent lower than the rate

available on the street in

2012.

The

government

wanted to make changing

money

into

dollars

unattractive, with its official

exchange rate, because it was

afraid that its citizens would

sell off all their pesos for

dollars, driving the exchange

rate down even further and

devastating the economy. The

government

had

recently

started fining economists who

challenged

its

official

exchange rate. As 2012 went

on,

the

situation

grew

progressively worse, and this

is

what

had

led

the

government to crack down on

PayPal.

The inflation rate wasn’t

the only problem with the

local financial system. As in

many developing countries, it

was incredibly hard to open a

bank account and even harder

to get a credit card. Despite

having

grown

up

in

Argentina, Wences had never

had an Argentinian bank

account. People were left to

pay their bills in cash at the

drugstore, so they had to

carry around wads of 100-

peso bills. This too, seemed

like something that Bitcoin,

with its secure digital wallet,

could help address.

At the Lemon offices in

Buenos Aires, Wences and

Fede were supposed to be

working on their new startup,

but they would end up

spending hours playing with

Bitcoin and talking about

how they might harness its

potential. In late 2012 the two

men organized the first-ever

Bitcoin Meetup in Argentina

at a favorite whiskey bar. It

was sparsely attended, other

than by the friends that

Wences and Fede had already

sold on the technology. The

small

crowd

was

not

surprising given how hard it

was to get Bitcoins in

Argentina. It was incredibly

expensive and difficult to

transfer money from an

Argentinian bank to Mt. Gox

or another foreign Bitcoin

exchange.

And

no

Argentinian bank would work

with a domestic Bitcoin

company.

But there was a budding

conversation about Bitcoin on

an

Argentinian

website

dedicated to protecting online

freedom. When Wences was

in Argentina, he would offer

to sell some of his Bitcoins

after work at a bar near the

Lemon offices. Each time, a

different crew of people

would show up, but one older

gentleman kept coming back,

buying a little more each

time. He had a silent, sullen

countenance and didn’t seem

technologically sophisticated.

After the man made a

particularly large purchase

one day, Wences gently asked

him if he understood the risks

involved with Bitcoin.

“It seems to me like this

is a lot of money, and this is

very risky,” Wences told him

as politely as he could. “You

know you could lose it all?”

“How many times has

your family lost everything

keeping their money in the

peso?”

the

man

asked

Wences.

“Three,

maybe

four,

times,” Wences said.

“Yes. For me it’s been

more times than that,” the

man said.

The man admitted that he

had the option of putting his

money in dollars but that this

would require him to take a

distorted exchange rate and

then hide the bills in his

closet. And who knew when

the dollar might suffer the

same problems as the peso?

“There is no way you can

convince me to keep my

money in the peso,” he said.

BITCOIN HAD CAUGHT Wences

at a decisive moment in his

life—what

an

American

might call a midlife crisis. He

already had many successes

under his belt, as was evident

from his estate in the rolling

hills above Palo Alto, with

two homes, a swimming pool,

tennis courts, and views down

to the bay. In addition to the

tens of millions of dollars

Wences had earned from

selling past startups, he had

been surprised to discover

that he also had a knack for

picking winning investments

in his friends’ companies.

But he had recently been

hitting up against failure for

the first time. Lemon, his

current startup, had grown out

of the decline of his previous

startup, Bling Nation, and

many of Wences’s friends

wondered whether Lemon

was the result of the kind of

passion necessary to succeed

in Silicon Valley or was just

Wences’s attempt to prove

that the failure of Bling

Nation had been an anomaly.

There were already signs that

Lemon was not getting the

kind of pickup that Wences

had imagined. And, as with

all startups, it required more

time from its chief executive

than any one person had in a

day. This was Wences’s

twelfth startup, depending on

how you counted, and his

wife once again felt like a

single mother for their three

children. Wences and Belle

had

already

agreed

that

Lemon would be his last

startup.

These difficulties played

into larger insecurities that

Wences had managed to

sweep under the carpet until

now. For all the money his

past startups had made him,

none had quite achieved their

grand original goals. Back in

Argentina, he had hoped that

his first company, Patagon,

would provide a way to

extend financial services to

the hundreds of millions of

South Americans without a

basic bank. In the end,

though, he couldn’t get a

banking license, and the

online financial firm he

created was used mainly by

South

America’s

wealthy

elite.

For

Wences,

Bitcoin

seemed to address many of

the problems that he’d long

wanted to solve, providing a

financial account that could

be opened anywhere, by

anyone, without requiring

permission

from

any

authority. He also saw an

infant technology that he

believed he could help grow

to dimensions greater than

anything he had previously

achieved.

Wences’s wife, Belle, was

used to watching Wences

dive

headfirst

into

new

technological discoveries. His

easily incited passion and his

ability to convey it were part

of what made him such a

great startup salesman. He

could impart his excitement

with a rare skill. But usually

the initial ardor passed before

long. That was showing no

signs of happening with

Bitcoin. As 2012 went on,

Belle realized that this might

be different from his previous

endeavors.

Belle

herself

resented how much time

Bitcoin was taking out of

Wences’s

already

full

schedule. But even she was

becoming entranced by the

almost mythical nature of this

currency and its mysterious

founder. She soon started

swapping her own theories

with Wences on the identity

of Satoshi.

IN EARLY JANUARY, Wences

traveled with a group of some

of the West Coast’s most

wealthy and powerful men to

an isolated lodge in the

Canadian Rockies with its

own wine cellar, sauna, and

private staff. Their host was

Pete Briger, whom Wences

had met a few years earlier

through an organization for

young chief executives. Even

among the rich and powerful,

Briger

stood

out.

After

attending

Princeton

and

working at Goldman Sachs

for fifteen years, he had risen

to the top of the Fortress

Investment Group, a firm

overseeing

an

array

of

enormous private equity and

hedge funds.

Briger was a big gruff

man, who was known for his

bold bets on distressed debt—

the troubled bonds and loans

that everyone else was too

afraid to touch, and that gave

Briger and his firm arm-

twisting leverage over large

companies and occasionally

small

countries.

He

sometimes called himself a

“financial garbage collector”

and he looked the part. In

2009 Briger had been named

cochairman

of

Fortress,

which

then

controlled

investments worth around

$30 billion, including the

resort company that owned

the lodge where the men were

staying.

Wences was not an alpha

male like most of the other

guests. He liked to stay in

touch with his humble origins

in

Patagonia,

and

his

driveway was filled with

Subarus instead of Teslas or

sport cars. Rather than taking

luxury vacations, Wences

used his time off to go with

his wife to Burning Man, and

he had recently done a vision

quest—involving

days

without any creature comforts

—in the wilderness of the

Andes with one of his best

friends from his younger

years

in

Argentina.

But

Wences had a good-natured

self-confidence

and

a

willingness to listen that had

always allowed him to get

along easily with hard-driving

power players.

The morning after they

arrived at the Valemont

lodge, Wences, Briger, and

the rest of the men climbed

into a red-and-white Bell 212

helicopter sitting just outside

the lodge and lifted off

toward the high white peaks,

for a day of heli-skiing. In the

afternoon, the group returned

to the lodge and sat around in

the expansive common room,

an enormous fire crackling

away. This was not a crowd

to chat about kids and the

upcoming Super Bowl. The

men had dedicated their lives

to making money and Pete

pressed them to present their

best investment ideas.

“Pete, I told you, I’m

interested

in

Bitcoin,”

Wences said when his turn

came to talk. “It hasn’t

changed.”

Wences drew the group in

with an explanation of the

basic notion of a new kind of

network that could allow

people

to

move

money

anywhere

in

the

world,

instantaneously—something

that these financiers, who

were

frequently

moving

millions between banks in

different

countries,

could

surely appreciate.

“You can call someone in

Jakarta on Skype,” Wences

told them. “You can see them

and you can hear them and

there’s

a

synchronous

connection with a lot of

bandwidth. There’s a ton of

magic happening, which is

incredible. And you hang up

and you want to send them

one cent and that’s not

possible. That’s ridiculous. It

should be a lot easier to send

a cent than to see video and

audio.”

The

blockchain

technology

made

that

previously impossible task

possible. But it was much

more than that, Wences

emphasized. It was the next

step in the evolution of

money. He tried to explain

his recent discoveries about

the ledger as the foundation

of all money. With Bitcoins,

unlike

pesos

or

dollars,

everyone using them knew

exactly how many existed,

and they were not tied to one

country. Unlike gold, which

was universal but difficult to

acquire and hold, Bitcoins

could be bought, held, and

transferred by anyone with an

Internet connection, with the

click of a mouse.

“Bitcoin is the first time

in five thousand years that we

have something better than

gold,” he said. “And it’s not a

little

bit

better,

it’s

significantly better. It’s much

more scarce. More divisible,

more durable. It’s much more

transportable. It’s just simply

better.”

Pete had a habit of taking

long, anxiety-inducing pauses

before

responding

to

anything,

and

his

first

questions for Wences were

distinctly skeptical. But his

subsequent

questions

suggested that something was

clicking. Pete’s job as an

investor

in

distressed

companies made him good at

spotting broken systems, and

the more he thought about it,

the more broken the current

methods of moving money

around the world seemed to

him.

Something else caught

Pete’s attention. Wences had

put his wallet where his

mouth was. Throughout 2012

Wences had methodically

ramped up the pace of his

Bitcoin purchases, so that

now he had over 10 percent

of his net wealth—tens of

millions

of

dollars—in

Bitcoin.

Pete

respected

numbers and bold, confident

moves like the one Wences

had made.

From the ski lodge, Pete

e-mailed one of his most

trusted lieutenants at Fortress,

Bill Tanona, and asked what

Bill knew about Bitcoin.

When he got back to San

Francisco he opened a Mt.

Gox account and quickly

built up his own $100,000

position in Bitcoin. At work,

he

started

talking

with

Tanona and a few other

colleagues

about

how

Fortress could get involved in

this new market.

CHAPTER 16

December 2012

For all the new mainstream

interest, the most successful

entrepreneur in the Bitcoin

world was still Ross Ulbricht,

the operator of the world’s

largest online drug bazaar.

Silk Road had continued

adding new members and

new products through 2012.

Some $1.2 million worth of

Bitcoin was changing hands

each month, spinning off

$92,000 in commissions for

Ross. By the end of 2012

there were seventy thousand

different

topics

on

Silk

Road’s forum, and there were

even resident security experts

who helped users ensure their

anonymity and a resident

doctor

who

answered

questions about drugs and

their health effects.

Initially,

Ross

had

enjoyed

the

success

by

traveling to Southeast Asia

and Costa Rica. But as the

year went on, the site

increasingly

required

all-

consuming work. Ross now

had several moderators and

administrators on staff who

helped

him

deal

with

customer support and mediate

disputed

transactions.

He

chose members whom he

trusted, even when he didn’t

know their identity.

In the fall of 2012 Ross

had

moved

in

with

a

childhood friend on a hilly

street

in

one

of

San

Francisco’s

residential

neighborhoods.

He

could

have afforded his own place,

but by now he was trying to

leave as few traces as he

could for the authorities to

pick up on. His work on Silk

Road was done at an Internet

café around the corner from

his friend’s house; at this café

he would log in remotely to

Silk Road’s servers, making it

that much harder for anyone

to find him.

Ross

was

becoming

acutely aware of just how

difficult it was to remain

anonymous even with the

best technologies. Over the

summer, a Silk Road user had

managed to follow a series of

transactions and find one of

Silk Road’s main Bitcoin

wallets,

which

contained

coins worth about $2 million.

This didn’t cover any losses,

but it was a reminder that

while Bitcoin did not require

users to provide an identity,

accounts

were

pseudonymous, attached to a

particular identity, rather than

anonymous.

In

Australia,

police traced transactions to

make the first arrests of Silk

Road vendors in that country.

None of this, though,

dented Ross’s boldness and

ambitions for the site—if

anything, he grew more

committed as time went on.

On the forums, under his

screen name Dread Pirate

Roberts, or DPR, he wrote

that he would keep this up to

his “last breath”:

Once you’ve seen

what’s possible, how

can you do otherwise?

How can you plug

yourself into the tax

eating, life sucking,

violent, sadistic, war

mongering,

oppressive machine

ever again? How can

you kneel when

you’ve felt the power

of your own legs?

As Dread Pirate Roberts,

Ross became a kind of folk

hero

for

his

members,

engaging with them on the

Philosophy, Economics, and

Law section of the forum and

later on DPR’s Book Club,

where he advocated for a

world in which “the human

spirit flourishes, unbridled,

wild and free!”

As time went on, though,

it was hard to avoid the

growing reminders of the

dangers of living in an

anonymous world with no

source

of

authority.

In

November 2012 a hacker

threatened to release an

enormous trove of data about

Silk Road users if Ross didn’t

pay a ransom. That was soon

followed by a denial-of-

service attack that eventually

forced the site down. The

only way Ross was able to

get the attack to stop was by

paying the attacker $25,000.

When the site came back

online,

Dread

Pirate

Roberts’s style and approach

had shifted, leading some

users to suspect that the site

had changed hands. Ross

explained

that

he

was

changing his writing style to

elude capture.

In November, Ross flew

to Dominica, an island in the

Caribbean known for being

an easy place to secure

“economic

citizenship”

(Roger Ver was also trying to

obtain citizenship from the

country). The small island

offered

a

passport

in

exchange for a $75,000

donation. The sum was no

problem for Ross and he

began

filling

out

the

application on his laptop,

listing his profession as “IT

consulting.” A new passport

would allow him to move that

much further out of the reach

of a government that he knew

was chasing him.

He was, though, getting

used to his new life. When he

chatted with a Silk Road

member, scout, who was

thinking about joining his

staff, Ross answered scout’s

concerns

about

getting

arrested by explaining why he

believed it would be hard to

ever get caught.

“put yourself in the shoes

of a prosecutor trying to build

a case against you,” he said in

a

chat

with

scout.

“Realistically, the only way

for them to prove anything

would be for them to watch

you log in and do your work.”

But Ross acknowledged

how much even the small

possibility weighed on him.

“the biggest con about

this work is not the risk of

going to jail or having your

life disrupted,” he wrote; “it’s

getting used to and living

with that possibility no matter

how remote.”

“and,” he added, “keeping

your work a secret.”

By now he had been

hardened enough that he

knew how to keep things to

himself. Even the friend he

was living with and the girl

he began dating didn’t know.

The only people with whom

he could be honest were the

users and administrators of

his site, who didn’t know his

identity, and it was becoming

increasingly hard to believe

that he could trust even them.

Silk Road forums were rife

with debate about which

users and vendors on the site

were likely to be undercover

cops. One of the most

vigorous debates sprang up

around a user named nob.

Toward the end of 2012, nob

put up a listing for a kilogram

of cocaine for $27,000 in

Bitcoins.

nob

had

done

almost no reviewed sales of

drugs on the site and many

other

users

were

very

suspicious.

“If this acct isn’t [law

enforcement], it’s some other

bullshit for sure,” a user

named

MC

Haberdasher

wrote on the forum. “I’d

rather wake up from a heroin

induced blackout sitting bitch

in a car full of fat chicks

listening to speed garage than

even attempt to order from

this guy.”

In this case, though, Ross

trusted nob, who had slowly

built a relationship with him

over the course of the

previous year. Ross decided

to help nob sell his kilogram

of cocaine, connecting him

with

one

of

the

site

administrators, chronicpain,

who had been the first

employee Ross hired back in

2011. The administrator was,

in real life, Curtis Green, a

forty-seven-year-old

poker

player and grandfather living

just outside Salt Lake City.

Green found a buyer for

nob’s cocaine and offered to

receive the package at his

home before sending it on to

the buyer. The package was

delivered to Green’s house on

January 17, 2013. Just as he

took it inside and was

opening the package to check

its contents, a SWAT team

swarmed in. As the agents

spread through the house,

they found a stack of black,

custom-made Bitcoin-mining

machines. The floor around

the computers, and in the rest

of the house, was littered with

hardened dog shit.

Even after Ross learned

about Green’s arrest—and his

release on bail—he did not

assume that it was nob who

had compromised the deal.

Ross

had

always

been

somewhat skeptical about

Green, believing that he was

doing it for the money rather

than the ideals. Ross asked

nob (who he still believed

was a powerful drug dealer) if

he could have Green “beat

up, then forced to send the

Bitcoins he stole back.”

nob

agreed

to

the

proposition. But a day later,

Ross changed his mind: “can

you change the order to

execute rather than torture?”

Ross explained to nob

that he was concerned that

Green

would

give

the

authorities information about

Silk Road users, potentially

jeopardizing the whole site

and its grand mission. He said

that he had “never killed a

man or had one killed before,

but it is the right move in this

case.”

The federal agents who

had Green in custody, and

who were the undercover

puppeteers behind the user

nob, obliged by staging

Green’s

death

(without

actually killing him), and e-

mailing bloody photos to

Ross. When the photos came

through, Ross responded that

he was “a little disturbed, but

I’m ok.”

“I’m new to this kind of

thing is all,” he said, before

quickly adding: “I don’t think

I’ve done the wrong thing.”

The purported murder of

Green was paid for with a

transfer of $80,000 to a

Capital One Bank account in

Washington, DC. The money

was

sent

through

an

anonymous

money-

transferring

service

in

Australia that hid the location

and identity of the sender.

But the agents were already

digging into the wealth of

information

on

Green’s

computers, seeking clues to

find their way to their real

quarry, Dread Pirate Roberts

himself.

CHAPTER 17

January 2013

Ross Ulbricht was not the

only Bitcoin entrepreneur

who had gotten himself into

something bigger than he

could have ever imagined. In

January

Charlie

Shrem’s

BitInstant was taking in over

$250,000

in

commissions

each

month

on

record

transaction volumes.

But the growth obscured

strains that were threatening

to tear Charlie’s company

apart. The fights with David

Azar that had started almost

as soon as BitInstant took

David’s

investment

had

grown worse and usually

ended in a shouting match or

a slammed-down phone. In

December, Charlie and Erik

Voorhees had looked to

David’s investment partners,

the Winklevoss twins, to help

foster a more productive

relationship.

The brothers had been

relatively

hands-off

after

putting in their $550,000. But

they had grown concerned

from afar. The e-mail chains

between Charlie and David

signaled that the twins were

not dealing with the cool,

calculating entrepreneurs of

their Harvard alumni circles.

They saw that Charlie’s

initially

attractive

energy

came with a distressing

inability to concentrate on

one task. Between constant

travel and media appearances,

Charlie

was

relishing,

perhaps

too

much,

the

elevated social status that

Bitcoin was giving him.

When

Charlie

did

talk

business, he often seemed

more intent on selling the

idea of Bitcoin than of his

own company.

There was another more

immediate problem that the

twins hadn’t bargained for.

Earlier in the year, Erik and a

friend he had brought into

BitInstant, Ira Miller, had

started

an

independent

company called Satoshi Ltd.

with a number of subsidiaries.

One was a technology called

Coinapult that BitInstant used

to send Bitcoins via e-mail.

Another, Paysius, allowed

merchants to accept virtual

currencies.

The Winklevoss twins

asked how Erik and Ira could

run those businesses at the

same time that they were

working

full-time

for

BitInstant.

Erik

and

Ira

proposed solving the issue by

merging Satoshi Ltd. with

BitInstant in exchange for a

higher

equity

stake

in

BitInstant—all that David and

the twins had to do was give

up 1.5 percent of their own

stake in the company.

Around the New Year,

Erik wrote up a lengthy

strategy document listing how

a merger could be handled,

allowing the company to go

after new markets like mobile

payments in Africa and poker

sites in need of payment

networks around the world.

The document reflected the

team’s big ambitions. Erik

and Ira didn’t want BitInstant

to be just a place to buy

Bitcoins. They wanted to

offer all the services that

banks did, in a new, cheaper,

and more democratic way.

But the Winklevoss twins

and

David

Azar

were

thinking in more immediate

and practical terms. Glancing

at the pages of long-term

strategy, they blanched at the

value that Erik and Ira

assigned to Satoshi Ltd.

The

twins

wrote

increasingly peeved e-mails

to Charlie, pushing him to

resolve the situation without

giving in to Erik and Ira. The

conversations between the

twins and Charlie began to

end with the same sort of

recriminations that had been

so common between Charlie

and David weeks earlier.

Charlie

and

his

team

appeared to the twins like

inexperienced entrepreneurs

who didn’t know how to put

business

interests

above

social

and

political

allegiances. The Winklevoss

twins, meanwhile, confirmed

the fears of the BitInstant

team

regarding

what

happened when people who

didn’t care about the big

principles underlying Bitcoin

tried to make money in the

space.

Charlie and Erik reached

out to Roger Ver, Charlie’s

first investor, hoping he

might be able to resolve

things from Tokyo. Their idea

was that Roger could buy out

the stake that the twins and

David had taken in BitInstant.

“My one hope was that

perhaps the Winklevii would

be far more helpful and

productive, but a long insult-

filled call between Cameron

and Charlie today proved that

my hope was naive,” Erik

wrote to Roger in early

January.

Charlie and Erik wrote a

lengthy, acerbic letter to the

twins,

pleading

for

a

resolution that would allow

both sides to go their separate

ways.

“If we’re all being honest,

then it’s clear we neither need

nor want your money, and

you neither need nor want to

be risking your money with a

team that you believe to be

childish

and

2/3rds

expendable,” the letter said.

“Let’s be gentlemen and

move on. If you are so

interested

in

building

a

Bitcoin business, and you are

so skillful at navigating these

waters, then I welcome you to

go and do it.”

The

twins

considered

selling to Roger. But they

also believed BitInstant was a

good idea that could work

under the right management.

In January BitInstant had its

best month ever, processing

almost

$5

million

in

transactions. The price of a

Bitcoin, meanwhile, had risen

from $13 at the beginning of

the month to around $18 at its

end. Some of this was due to

the twins themselves. They

had asked Charlie to continue

buying them coins with the

goal of owning 1 percent of

all the Bitcoins in the world,

or some $2 million worth at

the

time.

This

ambition

underscored

their

commitment to sticking it out

with Bitcoin.

The tension came to a

breaking point at the end of

January. Patrick Murck, the

general counsel at the Bitcoin

Foundation, flew in from

Seattle to see if he could help

Charlie and Erik make their

argument to the twins. In a

meeting in the BitInstant

conference room, Charlie,

Erik, and Patrick, sitting on

one side of the table, offered

to provide Maguire Ventures,

the entity put together by

David and the twins, with a

full refund for the money they

had put in. The twins

responded angrily that they

would accept no less than five

times what they had put in.

They also said that the

technology being offered by

Erik’s company, Satoshi Ltd.,

was worth little. Erik and Ira

responded by walking out of

the room as the twins

“continued with emotional

insults and absurdities,” Erik

wrote in an e-mail after the

meeting.

The next day Erik and Ira

sent in their resignations and

moved into the offices of

Larry Lenihan and FirstMark

Capital; Lenihan had always

been more interested in

investing in Erik than in

Charlie.

Charlie, Roger, and Erik

were

in

constant

conversation, contemplating

whether Charlie should join

Erik, and if the whole group

should sue the Winklevoss

twins.

They

ultimately

decided not to sue—mindful

of the way the twins had

responded

when

Mark

Zuckerberg left them out of

Facebook.

Charlie

decided

he

couldn’t leave the company

he created, but when he went

to work the next day, he did

not

go

in

peace.

He

demanded

that

Maguire

Ventures deliver the final

installment of the investment

it had agreed to make the

previous fall:

“You guys are screwing

up my company, and Ira and

Erik left because of it. Give

me my money or I will wire it

all back to you today.”

Roger, who still had a 15

percent stake in the company,

continued pushing the twins

to sell their stake in the

company or let Roger sell his:

You guys obviously

don’t understand

Bitcoin, or BitInstant.

You are

destroying your equity

and mine, and I don’t

want to be any part of

it.

If you disagree,

then make me an offer

for my 15% of

BitInstant.

Name your price.

I will gladly sell it

to you for less than

the valuation you

bought in at.

There

was

some

confirmation

of

Roger’s

assessment a few days after

Erik left, when Charlie got a

letter from the latest bank to

decide that it would no longer

service BitInstant’s accounts.

It was unclear if BitInstant

would have anywhere to put

all the money customers were

sending it. As the value of

Bitcoin continued to shoot up,

the value of Charlie’s idea

seemed to be falling apart

before his eyes.

CHAPTER 18

February 2013

The desk where Wences

Casares worked on his digital

wallet, Lemon, was mounted

on a treadmill, in an office

overlooking

the

main

shopping street in Palo Alto.

His monitor was perched on a

short pile of books, hardcover

copies of Debt: The First

5,000 Years. When he spoke

about Bitcoin with visitors to

the office and invariably

began talking about the

history of money, he would

frequently give them a copy

of the book.

Wences shared the space

with Micky Malka, an old

Venezuelan

friend

and

business partner. Micky was a

big investor in Lemon and

chairman of the company’s

board. Wences was, for his

part, one of the largest

investors in Micky’s venture

capital firm, Ribbit Capital.

Micky’s recently opened

fund was technically focused

on financial services. But

after Wences got Micky

excited about Bitcoin, Micky

was trying to find virtual-

currency

investments.

Because there were so few

viable

Bitcoin

companies

around, Micky made the

somewhat

controversial

decision to use his investors’

money

to

buy

Bitcoins

themselves.

Both Micky and Wences

turned the office into a kind

of

virtual-currency

salon,

hosting a constant parade of

interested visitors. Among

them was Pete Briger, the

chairman

of

Fortress

Investment

Group,

who

dropped by soon after the

skiing trip, with his deputy

Bill

Tanona.

Wences

marveled at how quickly Pete

had managed to get others at

Fortress

excited

about

Bitcoin, but when he heard

Pete speak about it he

understood why. Pete, a

normally reserved man, got

fired up when talking about

the inefficient “oligopoly”

that the big banks had over

money movement and the

transaction fees that the

oligopoly forced everyone

else to pay. Wences was

getting more of a response

from Fortress—a Wall Street

giant managing nearly $60

billion—than he was from

Silicon Valley venture-capital

firms with just a few hundred

million dollars. Pete assigned

Tanona to the almost full-

time

job

of

exploring

potential Bitcoin investments,

and also drew in another top

Fortress

official,

Mike

Novogratz. All of them began

buying coins in quantities that

were small for them, but that

represented

significant

upward pressure within the

still

immature

Bitcoin

ecosystem.

The

purchases

being

made by Fortress—and by

Micky’s team at Ribbit—

were supplemented by those

being

made

by

the

Winklevoss twins, who were

still trying to buy up 1

percent of all the outstanding

Bitcoins.

Together,

these

purchases helped maintain the

sharp upward trajectory of

Bitcoin’s price, which rose 70

percent in February after the

50 percent jump in January.

On the evening of February

27 the price finally edged

above

the

long-standing

record of $32 that had been

set in the hysterical days

before the June 2011 crash at

Mt. Gox.

ON

THE

AFTERNOON

of

Sunday, March 3, Wences

boarded a Gulfstream two-

engine jet at a private airport

in San Jose favored by the

Silicon Valley elite.

Wences was headed to

one of the most exclusive,

and

secretive,

annual

gatherings of tech-industry

power players, held at the

Ritz-Carlton resort outside

Tucson, Arizona, and hosted

by the investment bank Allen

& Co. Only a few hundred

people were invited and it

was private enough that the

news media rarely even found

out it was happening.

Wences

flew

to

the

conference on eBay’s private

jet. eBay owned PayPal, the

company

headed

up

by

Wences’s good friend David

Marcus, and David was

among the twelve passengers

on the flight. He had been

quietly working to make sure

PayPal was ahead of the

curve on virtual currencies

and had pulled together a

group in-house to look at how

PayPal might harness the

Bitcoin technology. He had

also begun to talk about it

with his boss, John Donahoe,

the chief executive of eBay.

When

the

eBay

jet

touched

down

north

of

Tucson, the passengers were

quickly whisked away in

SUVs to the Dove Mountain

Resort, which sat in the

foothills of the mountains that

separate Tucson and Phoenix.

That

evening,

everyone

congregated for drinks on the

Tortelita Terrace and then

proceeded to dinner on an

immaculately

maintained

lawn overlooking the scrubby

mountains.

This was the most casual

dinner of the three-day event,

with unassigned seating and a

buffet to accommodate the

guests arriving at uneven

intervals. Wences took notice

as the big names showed their

faces:

Twitter’s

chief

executive,

Dick

Costolo;

LinkedIn’s

founder

Reid

Hoffman; Rupert Murdoch’s

son, James; and perhaps the

most recognizable venture

capitalist in Silicon Valley,

Marc

Andreessen,

an

enormous man with a shiny

bald head.

Wences found his way to

a table with another budding

Bitcoin nut, Chris Dixon, one

of the up-and-coming stars at

Andreessen’s

firm,

Andreessen Horowitz. The

men

quickly

began

comparing

ideas.

Dixon

explained that he had gotten

excited about the importance

of the blockchain protocol as

a new way of moving value

around the world, just as the

Internet

protocol

had

provided a decentralized way

to move information. Dixon

had been pushed to think

about this by the writings of

Fred Wilson, the New York

venture capitalist who had

backed Wences’s first big

company.

Wences

smiled

with

gratitude to find someone

who had seen the beauty of

the system without his help.

Wences, in turn, told Dixon

about

the

international

potential he saw for Bitcoin,

in countries like Argentina

where people lack a safe

place to keep their money.

Dixon hadn’t thought much

about that opportunity and

asked Wences to tell him

more.

They were interrupted by

Henry Blodget, a former Wall

Street analyst and founder of

the

news

site

Business

Insider, who asked what they

were talking about: he had

never

heard

of

Bitcoin.

Wences responded with his

favorite introductory line:

“It’s the best form of money

the world has ever seen.”

Blodget’s

famously

childlike curiosity provided a

great opening for Wences to

work through all of his finely

honed arguments.

After touching on the

history

of

money

and

Bitcoin’s advantages over

gold, Wences explained his

back-of-the-envelope

calculations of what Bitcoin

might be worth if people

began to realize its value as a

substitute for gold. All the

gold in the world was worth

around $7 trillion. If Bitcoin

became even half as popular,

that would put the value of

each Bitcoin at around half a

million

dollars—or

about

fourteen thousand times more

than its $34 value that day in

March.

The

conversation

continued as the sun went

down and the desert air grew

chilly.

The

little

crowd

around Wences’s table grew,

with Marcus and others

stopping by.

Wences saw the interest

build when he told one of his

newest

stories

from

Argentina. A friend of his

sister had recently wanted to

buy an upscale $1.5 million

apartment in Buenos Aires.

As with most Argentinian

real estate transactions, the

seller—distrustful of the peso

—wanted the payment in

dollars and in cash, no small

feat when the sum was $1.5

million. The bigger problem

was that the sister’s friend,

like

many

wealthy

Argentinians, kept his savings

in dollars in an American

bank account. To transfer the

money into an Argentinian

bank and then take it out in

cash would eat about 10

percent of the money in bank

and exchange fees—some

$150,000—and

would

involve

several

days

of

waiting. To get around this,

the sister’s friend purchased

$1.5

million

worth

of

Bitcoins from Mt. Gox. Once

the friend had the coins, he

took his Bitcoin wallet to the

signing for the apartment in

Buenos Aires and transferred

it over to the seller, with the

notary as witness. Afterward,

Wences’s sister sent him a

picture of the two old men

holding up their smartphones

and smiling.

To prove how easy this all

was, Wences asked Blodget

to take out his phone and

helped him create an empty

Bitcoin wallet. Once it was

up,

and

Wences

had

Blodget’s

new

Bitcoin

address, Wences used the

wallet on his own phone to

send Blodget $250,000, or

some 6,400 Bitcoins. The

money was then passed to the

phones

of

other

people

around the table once they

had set up wallets. Anyone

could have run off with

Wences’s $250,000, but that

wasn’t a risk with this

particular crowd. Instead, as

the money went around,

Wences saw the guests’

laughter

and

wide-eyed

amazement at what they were

watching.

The next two days were

filled with panels covering

topics

like

“eBay

and

Innovation” and “China: The

Road

Ahead.”

In

the

afternoon

there

were

scheduled activities: tennis,

horseback riding, and clay-

pigeon

shooting,

among

others. During the interludes

Wences

was

approached

constantly by people who had

heard the Sunday evening

conversation or heard about

it. LinkedIn founder Reid

Hoffman pulled Wences aside

to ask more, as did Michael

Ovitz, the former president of

Disney. During a hike on

Wednesday

afternoon,

Wences spent the entire time

explaining the concept to

Charlie Songhurst, the chief

of strategy at Microsoft. At

night, many of the same

people

approached

David

Marcus. As the president of

PayPal, he would have as

informed a view as anybody

on the viability of Bitcoin.

“What do you think of

this?” they asked him. “Is this

real?”

Marcus replied that he

already believed in the idea

enough to put his own money

into it. They shouldn’t invest

money they couldn’t afford to

lose, he said, but it was

certainly

worth

some

investment.

On Monday, the first full

day of the conference, the

price of Bitcoin jumped by

more than two dollars, to $36,

and on Tuesday it rose by

more than four dollars—its

sharpest rise in months—to

over $40. On Wednesday,

when everyone flew home,

Blodget put up a glowing

item on his heavily read

website, Business Insider,

mentioning

what

he’d

witnessed

(though

not

specifying where exactly he’d

been, or whom he’d talked

to):

I was at a technology

conference earlier this

week, and the most

popular topic of

casual conversation

was Bitcoin, the

electronic currency

invented and

unleashed a few years

ago.

One of the things

that’s most fascinating

about Bitcoin, I have

learned, is that it

entrances fanatical

conspiracy theorists,

clear-eyed

pragmatists, and

diehard skeptics alike.

Songhurst, the Microsoft

head of strategy, who had

learned about Bitcoin during

his hike with Wences, wrote

up a paper and circulated it

among some of the most

powerful investors in Silicon

Valley, channeling Wences’s

arguments:

We foresee a real

possibility that all

currencies go digital

and competition

eliminates all

currencies from non-

effective

governments. The

power of friction-free

transactions over the

internet will unleash

the typical forces of

consolidation and

globalization and we

will end up with six

digital currencies: US

Dollar, Euro, Yen,

Pound, Renminbi, and

Bitcoin.

The question then

becomes, is Bitcoin

viable if the

government digital

ledger systems are just

as good? We think

yes, for two reasons:

1. There will always be

transactions for which

“official money” is less

good than Bitcoin

2. If you live outside the

US, it is dangerous to

have all your money

controlled by a state

where you have no

rights.

In three days, Wences had

reached

more

powerful

people than Bitcoin had in its

previous

four

years

of

existence.

DESPITE

THE

SURGE

of

excitement,

the

interest

Wences was encountering

was still far from uniformly

positive. More than a few

people

in

Arizona

left

unconvinced

that

the

technology would work and

survive government scrutiny.

Much of this skepticism had

the

same

root

as

the

excitement, and that was

Silicon Valley’s defining, and

cautionary, experience with

financial technology: PayPal.

PayPal, of course, still

existed, owned by eBay and

run by Wences’s friend David

Marcus. But what made

people wary was not the

current incarnation of PayPal,

but instead the company’s

early days, when it had

ambitions to be something

much bigger.

PayPal had been founded

back in 1998 by Peter Thiel

and Max Levchin, among

others. Thiel was an avid

libertarian, who had wanted

to

use

Levchin’s

cryptographic expertise to

fulfill

the

Cypherpunks’

dream of sending money

through encrypted channels,

between private individuals

and in particular between

mobile

devices

like

the

PalmPilots of that time. In

early staff meetings, Thiel

gave speeches that could

almost have come from the

Cypherpunk mailing list.

“PayPal will give citizens

worldwide

more

direct

control over their currencies

than they ever had before,” he

said.

PayPal grew quickly, but

in 2001, as the company

readied for an initial public

offering, it hit roadblock after

roadblock from lawmakers

concerned

about

the

possibilities

for

money

laundering and other illegal

activities.

New

York

Attorney

General

Elliot

Spitzer said PayPal was

breaking

the

law

by

facilitating

payments

for

gambling companies, and the

Department

of

Justice

decided PayPal was violating

the USA Patriot Act. The new

limits

and

restrictions

imposed took it further and

further from its ambitious

original goals. Thiel and

Levchin left PayPal soon

afterward.

This had scared much of

Silicon Valley away from

tinkering with finance, which

was seen as largely resistant

to new technology because of

all the regulations. But the

PayPal

experience

also

explained why there was a

hunger for the idea of a

virtual currency. There was a

lingering memory of this

unfulfilled dream of Silicon

Valley. While the Internet

had freed information and

communication

from

the

postal

service

and

the

publishing

industry,

the

Internet had essentially never

disrupted money, and dollars

remained bound by the old

networks run by the credit

card companies and the

banks.

In the month before the

Arizona conference, Thiel

himself had been poking

around in the virtual-currency

space once again, looking for

projects that might take

advantage of the blockchain,

without getting too bound up

in a currency that could piss

off

government

officials.

Chris

Dixon,

Wences’s

conversation partner at that

Arizona dinner, had also been

agitating to get his firm,

Andreessen Horowitz, to look

at cryptocurrency startups and

had been finding a receptive

ear

in

his

boss,

Marc

Andreessen.

They had both found their

way to the new company

being

created

by

Jed

McCaleb,

the

original

founder of Mt. Gox. Jed’s

new company, named Ripple,

was a cryptographic network

that could be used to send any

currency, not just Bitcoins.

That made it less threatening

to governments and banks

and more attractive to people

like Andreessen and Thiel,

who both offered small seed

investments.

But both of these key

Silicon Valley figures were

also getting more comfortable

with

Bitcoin

itself.

The

investment firm that Thiel

had helped create with some

of his PayPal riches, the

Founders Fund, began talking

with an engineer at Facebook

who had founded an e-mail

list

for

Silicon

Valley

insiders, dedicated to Bitcoin,

about joining the firm to look

for

virtual

currency

investments.

The growing openness to

Bitcoin was helped along by

Silicon Valley’s ballooning

sense of self-importance in

early 2013. With the Nasdaq

composite

stock

index

soaring, shares of Google at

an all-time high, and startups

selling for mind-boggling

sums, many in the tech

industry believed that they

were going to be able to

revolutionize and improve

every element of modern life.

Investors and entrepreneurs

were cooking up ever more

ambitious schemes involving

virtual reality, drones, and

artificial

intelligence,

alongside

more

quotidian

projects, like remaking public

transportation and the hotel

industry.

The

PayPal

founders were among the

most ambitious, with Thiel

advocating

for

floating

structures where people could

live outside the jurisdiction of

any

national

government.

Elon Musk, an early PayPal

employee and founder of

SpaceX, was aiming for the

colonization of Mars. If there

was ever a time that Silicon

Valley believed it could

revive

the

long-deferred

dream of reinventing money,

this was it. A virtual currency

that rose above national

borders fitted right in with an

industry

that

saw

itself

destined to change the face of

everyday life.

CHAPTER 19

March 2013

At the same time that

Bitcoin’s

reputation

was

getting a makeover in Silicon

Valley,

the

physical

infrastructure of the Bitcoin

network was also undergoing

an extensive transformation.

For much of the previous

year

and

a

half,

the

computing

power

underpinning the network had

grown steadily, but slowly.

Over the course of 2012 the

amount of computing power

on the Bitcoin network barely

doubled.

What’s

more,

everyone was still relying on

basically the same technology

—graphic processing units, or

GPUs—that

had

been

introduced back in 2010 by

Laszlo Hanecz, the buyer of

the Bitcoin pizzas. By the end

of 2012 there was the

equivalent of about 11,000

GPUs working away on the

network.

But even back in 2010 it

had been clear that if Bitcoin

became more popular there

was a logical next step that

would eclipse GPUs. An

application-specific

integrated unit, or ASIC, is a

chip

that

is

built

to

specifically accomplish just

one task—an even more

specialized computing unit

than a GPU. If someone

could build an ASIC designed

specifically to solve the

Bitcoin hash function, it

would probably be able to

crunch the numbers hundreds

of time faster than a GPU and

thus likely to win hundreds of

times more Bitcoins.

But

designing

and

fabricating a new ASIC chip

could cost millions of dollars,

and take several months,

requiring contracts with one

of the five specialized chip

foundries

that

produced

virtually all the chips in the

world. For most of 2011 and

2012 Bitcoins simply were

not worth enough to justify

this investment.

But as Bitcoin’s price had

continued to rise in the

second half of 2012, a couple

of enterprising engineers had

thrown caution to the wind

and begun racing to create the

first ASIC chip dedicated to

mining Bitcoins. The first

entrant in the race was a

company in Kansas City that

went by the name Butterfly

Labs. In June 2012 the

founders announced that they

would

deliver

specialized

mining computers installed

with custom chips in October

2012 and quickly sold $5

million of the machines on

preorder.

A few months later, when

Butterfly announced that the

release of its machines would

be delayed, a young Chinese

immigrant in New York, Yifu

Guo, announced that he had

created a company, Avalon,

with a group of engineers in

China, which was building its

own Bitcoin-dedicated ASIC

chips.

Yifu, a shaggy-looking

twenty-three-year-old,

promised that each device

would be able to do 66 billion

hashes per second, compared

with the 2 billion that a GPU

card could do. What’s more,

his chips required a lot less

energy—and

thus

lower

electricity costs—to do the

work. The price for each

machine? A cool $1,299.

The process of putting the

machines together, first in

Beijing and then in Shanghai,

and then shipping them to

customers in the United

States, proved to be more

complicated than Yifu and his

team anticipated. But on

January 30, 2013, Jeff Garzik,

the Bitcoin developer in

North Carolina, posted on the

forum pictures of the bulging

boxes that DHL had just

delivered and the gleaming

silver box inside, built to do

nothing

but

mint

new

Bitcoins. Within hours, new

Bitcoins were showing up in

Jeff’s wallet, and within nine

days the machine had earned

back what Jeff had paid for it.

The machine was eating up so

much energy that it was

heating up the room that it

occupied.

Over the next month and

a half, as the rest of Avalon’s

first batch of three hundred

mining computers reached

customers, the effect was

evident on the charts that

tracked the power of the

entire Bitcoin network. It had

taken all of 2012 for the

power on the network to

double,

but

that

power

doubled again in just one

month after Yifu’s machines

were shipped. At the same

time,

the

network

automatically adjusted the

difficulty of the problem the

miners needed to solve, to

ensure the ten-minute gap

between

new

blocks

of

Bitcoins. For people who had

built up fleets of GPUs

making a profit quickly

became a lot harder. *

A few other companies

were making big promises

about their own, specialized

mining chips that they were

working on. But the most

aggressive project—and the

one that revealed the most

about the untapped potential

that many saw in Bitcoin

mining—was top secret and

open to only a small elite.

The

company

21e6—

shorthand for 21 million, the

number of Bitcoins to be

released—was

created

by

Balaji Srinivasan, a Silicon

Valley prodigy who had

founded a successful genetics

testing company from his

Stanford dorm room. In the

spring of 2013, Balaji was

quietly assembling a team of

top engineers to build a

Bitcoin mining chip that

would go beyond anything

that had been contemplated

before—rolled out in data

centers built exclusively for

the 21e6 machines. If the

chips worked as promised

they would mint money for

investors. This was a simple

enough proposition, and the

price of Bitcoin was rising

fast enough that it attracted

interest

from

venture

capitalists who were still

queasy about tying their firms

to Bitcoin. Both of the

founders

of

Andreessen

Horowitz, Marc Andreessen

and Ben Horowitz, signed up

to put some of their own

personal money into Balaji’s

project, as did several of the

original founders of PayPal,

including Peter Thiel and

David Sacks. Soon enough,

Balaji was closing in on a $5

million fund-raising round.

The Bitcoin arms race had

begun.

THE TYPE OF chip was not the

only thing about Bitcoin

mining that had changed

since late 2010. Over the

course of 2011 and 2012,

more and more users were

joining collectives that pooled

their mining power. These

mining pools allowed lots of

people to combine their

resources, with each person

getting a proportional fraction

of the total winnings, thus

increasing the chances that

everyone

would

get

something every day.

The

pools,

though,

generated concern about the

creeping

centralization

of

control in the network. It took

the agreement of 5 percent of

the computing power on the

network to make changes to

the

blockchain

and

the

Bitcoin protocol, making it

hard for one person to dictate

what happened. But with

mining pools, the person

running the pool generally

had voting power for the

entire pool—all the other

computers were just worker

bees. As a couple of pools

harnessed

significant

computing

power,

some

people

worried

that

the

operators of those pools could

conspire

to

change

or

undermine

the

rules

of

Bitcoin.

But an incident in March

2013—the network’s most

significant

technological

failure

to

date—was

a

reminder

of

how

the

incentives built into the

Bitcoin network could still

work as Satoshi had hoped.

Gavin Andresen, now the

chief scientist of the Bitcoin

Foundation, was in his den in

Massachusetts after dinner,

when he saw some online

chatter about disagreement

between computers or nodes

on the network over what

block the nodes were trying

to

mine—was

it

the

225,430th block since the

network began back in 2009,

or the 225,431st?

Gavin quickly realized

that this was what had long

been known as the biggest

potential

danger

to

the

Bitcoin network: a “hard

fork,” a term coined to

describe a situation where

one group of computers on

the network went off in one

direction,

agreeing

about

which node had mined each

block, while another group of

computers on the network

moved in another direction,

agreeing on a different set of

winners for each block. This

was disastrous because it

meant

that

there

was

disagreement

about

who

owned which Bitcoins. So

far, there had been a split

only on the last few blocks—

not the whole blockchain

history—but if it wasn’t

fixed, there would essentially

be two conflicting Bitcoin

networks, which would be

likely to result in no one

trusting either of them, or

Bitcoin itself.

“this seems bad,” a user

on the chat channel wrote a

few minutes after the problem

first appeared.

“‘seems’ is putting it

lightly,” another shot back.

“We have a full fork,”

one of the most respected

developers,

a

Belgian

programmer named Pieter

Wuille, pronounced a few

beats later.

The price of Bitcoin

dropped from $49 back to

$45 in a half hour, erasing all

the previous week’s gains.

Mark Karpeles joined the

discussion a half hour later,

and

quickly

stopped

processing all transactions at

Mt. Gox; a few minutes after

that, Erik Voorhees said his

gambling

company,

SatoshiDice, was doing the

same.

By the time Gavin entered

the conversation, it was clear

that the problem was not the

result

of

one

node

overpowering the network or

of any sort of malice. Instead,

computers

that

had

downloaded a recent update

to the Bitcoin software were

accepting

blocks—and

awarding new Bitcoins to

miners—that

were

not

considered legitimate by the

old

software

and

the

computers still running it.

Generally, if a block was

accepted by a majority of

nodes, it would be accepted

by everyone, but the old

software, version 0.7, had a

rule that specifically did not

allow a type of block that the

new software, version 0.8, did

allow.

The solution to this was

clear:

everyone

on

the

network had to agree to move

en masse to one of the two

versions

and

adopt

the

blockchain accepted by that

software. But there were no

rules for deciding which

version to pick—and once a

version was chosen, no one

knew how long it would take

for all the nodes to get on

board.

After racing through the

possibilities, Gavin concluded

that the most fundamental

rule of Bitcoin was the

democratic principle that the

blockchain with the most

support was the official one.

In this case, the version

created by the new software,

0.8, had a lot more computing

power behind it. That was, in

no small part, because the

most sophisticated miners,

especially the large pool

operators, had been among

the first to update their

software. Gavin thought that

if they had the most power,

everyone else needed to

update to join them. In

addition to having more

power, the miners on the new

software had newly generated

coins that they would be

unlikely to want to give up.

Gavin

quickly

faced

resistance

from

almost

everyone else involved in the

conversation;

most

participants believed that only

the large miners would be

responsive enough to change

their software to fix the

problem.

Somewhat

surprisingly, the operators of

the biggest mining pools

quickly agreed that they

would revert to the old

software, version 0.7. The

operator of the prominent

pool BTC Guild said that just

switching his pool alone

would get a majority of the

computing power back on the

earlier software. Doing this

would

mean

losing

the

Bitcoins that had been mined

since version 0.8 came out.

But the losses would be much

greater if the entire Bitcoin

network lost the confidence

of users.

“There is no way the 0.8

chain can continue in this

situation,” the operator of

BTC Guild, who went by the

screen name Eleuthria, said.

The developers on the

chat channel thanked him,

recognizing that he was

sacrificing for the greater

good. When he finally had

everything moved about an

hour later, Eleuthria took

stock of his own costs.

“It could’ve been worse if

I hadn’t been able to start

moving back to 0.7 quickly.”

But, he wrote, “this fork cost

me 150–200 BTC”—over

$5,000.

For the broader Bitcoin

ecosystem, the price had

fallen to $37, some 20

percent, within a few hours,

and some online reports

struck an ominous note.

“This is a dark day for

Bitcoin. Implications for the

exchange rate will likely be

huge,” a site called The

Bitcoin Trader announced.

The incident had indeed

revealed

the

sort

of

unanticipated problems that

frequently

occur

in

decentralized

networks,

which rely on lots of different

members,

with

all

their

vagaries,

acting

independently.

But almost as soon as

Eleuthria had fully switched

his servers over to version 0.7

the price began recovering,

and within hours people were

talking about how the event

had actually demonstrated

some of Bitcoin’s greatest

strengths. The network had

not had to rely on some

central authority to wake up

to the problem and come up

with a solution. Everyone

online had been able to

respond in real time, as was

supposed to happen with

open source software, and the

users had settled on a

response after a debate that

tapped the knowledge of all

of them—even when it meant

going

against

the

recommendation of the lead

developer,

Gavin.

Meanwhile, the incentives

that Satoshi Nakamoto had

built into the network had

again worked as intended,

encouraging people to look

out for the common good

over short-term personal gain.

A WEEK LATER, Gavin was

back at his desk in the den not

long after dinner, when an

unexpected

announcement

popped up. It came from the

Financial

Crimes

Enforcement

Network,

or

FinCen, the division of the

Treasury

Department

responsible for monitoring

money

laundering

and

enforcing the Bank Secrecy

Act. In opaque bureaucratic

terms, the release stated its

intent

to

“clarify

the

applicability

of

the

regulations implementing the

Bank Secrecy Act (‘BSA’) to

persons creating, obtaining,

distributing,

exchanging,

accepting,

or

transmitting

virtual currencies.”

Reading

behind

the

legalese, Gavin could see that

this was the United States

government’s first statement

on the legality of Bitcoin.

“oh

wow,”

Gavin

Andresen wrote on the chat

channel before passing along

a link to the announcement

for everyone else.

Everyone had feared that

at some point the authorities

would step in and declare

virtual currencies illegal. As

Gavin and others furiously

scanned

the

lengthy

document, the doomsayers

were quick to give their read.

“this kills the Bitcoin,”

one user on IRC responded to

Gavin.

But as Gavin and others

read on, they saw that it was

not, in fact, all bad. Yes, the

document noted that anyone

selling virtual currency for

“real

currency

or

its

equivalent” would now be

considered

a

money

transmitter—a category of

business subject to lots of

stringent federal rules. But

the release also made clear

that many parts of the virtual-

currency universe—including

miners—were not subject to

these

regulations.

More

important, Jeff Garzik, the

programmer

in

North

Carolina, noted, the basic

implication of the message

cleared up the biggest single

cloud: “this solidifies Bitcoin

status as legal to possess and

use for normal people.”

Indeed,

Gavin

said:

“More

legal/regulatory

certainty is definitely a good

thing . . . even if we might not

like the regulations.”

Over the next few days,

Bitcoin companies all raced

to understand the specifics of

the

FinCen

guidance.

Exchanges clearly needed to

register

as

money

transmitters, but what about

companies like BitInstant that

just worked with exchanges?

And did exchanges also need

to

register

as

money

transmitters with each state,

as companies like Western

Union had to do?

In New York, Charlie got

an e-mail from one of

BitInstant’s lawyers: “I don’t

think this is good for the

community.”

But

for

the

broader

Bitcoin universe, the basic

message of the guidance was

encouraging:

the

United

States government was not

planning to come in and shut

down the virtual currency.

The next day the price of

Bitcoin surged from $52 to

$59, and by Thursday it was

above $70.

The

financial

crisis

sweeping Europe added yet

another boost to the price.

The

banks

on

the

Mediterranean

island

of

Cyprus were on the verge of

collapsing

in

mid-March

when European authorities

put together a bailout plan.

The hitch was that all savings

in Cyprus’s banks were to be

docked by 10 percent. The

government, in other words,

was confiscating money from

private

bank

accounts.

BusinessWeek ran a story that

conveyed

the

seeming

promise of Bitcoin: “BITCOIN

MAY

BE

THE

GLOBAL

ECONOMY’S

LAST

SAFE

HAVEN,”

the

magazine’s

headline said. Russians who

kept their money in Cyprus’s

banks were rumored to be

buying up Bitcoin, which no

government could confiscate.

The

prices

certainly

suggested that someone with

lots of money was buying. In

California, Wences Casares

knew that no small part of the

new demand was coming

from the millionaires whom

he had gotten excited about

Bitcoin earlier in the month

and who were now getting

their accounts opened and

buying significant quantities

of the virtual currency. They

helped push the price to over

$90 in the last week of

March. At that price, the

value of all existing coins,

what was referred to as the

market capitalization, was

nearing $1 billion.

On March 27 the forums

and the news site Reddit lit

up with calculations of what

value, for a single coin,

would

take

the

market

capitalization over $1 billion,

and the number settled on

was $91.26. This calculation

was largely theoretical: most

of the outstanding coins had

been purchased for pennies or

a few dollars in the early

years, and if everyone tried to

sell for $91, the price would

plummet. But it marked a

psychological line in the sand

that was, if nothing else, fun

to talk about. That day,

Cameron Winklevoss, who

had taken responsibility for

the twins’ buying and selling

of Bitcoins, was watching the

price closely, first from the

twins’ office and then from

home. After midnight, as he

was preparing to go to bed, he

saw the price approach the

magical border of a billion.

As the number crept closer

and closer, he placed a small

order on Mt. Gox that would

be executed only if the seller

agreed to a price above

$91.26.

The

order

was

quickly filled and he watched

the value of a Bitcoin on Mt.

Gox—determined by the last

order—jump

to

$91.27.

Twitter and Reddit went wild.

The next morning, Cameron

gleefully reported to Tyler

that it was their money that

was responsible for sending

the value of all Bitcoin over

$1 billion for the first time.

CHAPTER 20

March 2013

The surging price of Bitcoin

helped bring out of the

woodwork some of the early

Bitcoiners who had dropped

from view.

In

February,

Martti

Malmi posted an entry on his

company’s

website

describing his early days in

Bitcoin. A month later, Hal

Finney recounted his own

story on the Bitcoin forum.

By this time, his ALS had

progressed to the point where

he was essentially paralyzed,

relying on tube feeding and a

respirator. He spent most of

his time in the same living

room where he’d first worked

on Bitcoin four years earlier,

his old computers stacked up

on the desks around him. But

Hal could still communicate

and type using a computer

that

tracked

his

eye

movement, and he diligently

worked on a few coding

projects

and

regularly

checked in on Bitcoin to see

how his pet project was

doing. As he watched the

price go up, he asked his son

to burn the private keys to his

Bitcoin wallets onto a DVD,

and put the DVD in a safe-

deposit box at a bank. Some

of his coins, though, he had

his son sell, in order to pay

for all the medical care he

needed to stay at home.

“I’m

pretty

lucky

overall,” Hal wrote. “Even

with the ALS, my life is very

satisfying.

But

my

life

expectancy is limited. Those

discussions about inheriting

your Bitcoins are of more

than academic interest. My

Bitcoins are stored in our safe

deposit box, and my son and

daughter are tech savvy. I

think they’re safe enough.

I’m comfortable with my

legacy.”

THIS SHOULD HAVE been the

best of times for the existing

Bitcoin businesses, and in

certain ways it was. In March

alone, sixty thousand new

accounts were opened on Mt.

Gox, and the monthly trading

commissions rose above $1

million for the first time ever,

more than triple what they

had been a month earlier.

But even after all their

earlier struggles, the staffers

at Mt. Gox were not ready for

this surge in business. Mark

Karpeles now had a staff of

eighteen, and a deputy with

real

business

experience,

whom he put in charge of all

the company’s dealings with

the outside world. But Mark

gave this deputy no power

over the company’s actual

operations and kept firm

control of Mt. Gox’s essential

accounts.

Mark

also

continued to struggle with

prioritizing

his

responsibilities. He was two

years into running the world’s

largest Bitcoin exchange, but

he had still not attended a

single Bitcoin event abroad—

a fact that he blamed on the

sickness of his cat, Tibanne,

who needed daily shots that

Mark believed only he could

administer.

Meanwhile, in late 2012

Mark had agreed to hand over

his American customers to

Peter

Vessenes

and

his

company CoinLab, which had

an American bank account.

But when it came time to

hand over the customer files

in March, Mark flinched,

worried about some of the

terms in the contract he had

already signed. This left

Mark’s customers relying on

Mt. Gox’s Japanese bank,

which put strict limits on the

number of wires the company

could send out each day.

Even the simple task of

opening an account with Mt.

Gox required a three-week

wait

for

approval

from

Mark’s team.

For BitInstant and other

companies that had to work

with Mt. Gox, the reason

behind the problems seemed

simple: sheer incompetence.

Charlie Shrem’s BitInstant

was now the main driver of

trading volume to Mt. Gox,

but

when

there

were

problems Charlie’s e-mails to

Mark Karpeles would go

unanswered for days or even

weeks.

Wences

Casares

had

never fully trusted Mt. Gox

and had been looking for a

better place to store his coins.

When he put them into his

own digital wallet, he realized

that all his private keys—the

signature that allowed his

coins to be spent—were

sitting on his computer or

phone, waiting for the first

hacker who got access to his

computer. Someone who had

the private key for one of

Wences’s Bitcoin addresses

could,

essentially,

impersonate Wences. Wences

decided to work on a system

with his Argentinian friend

Fede Murrone to store their

private keys out of the reach

of hackers. They started by

putting all their private keys

on

a

laptop,

with

no

connection to the Internet,

thus cutting off access for

potential

hackers.

After

David Marcus, Pete Briger,

and Micky Malka put their

private keys on the same

offline laptop, the men paid

for a safe-deposit box in a

bank to store the computer

more securely. In case the

computer gave out, they also

put a USB drive with all the

private keys in the safe-

deposit box.

CHARLIE HAD KEPT BitInstant

ahead of the regulatory curve.

Back

in

2012

he

had

registered the company with

FinCen

as

a

money

transmitter. In March, though,

the company was still trying

to bounce back from the

departure of Erik Voorhees

and his friend Ira Miller, who

had moved to Panama to

develop their own company

after the falling-out with the

Winklevoss twins.

The new team Charlie

brought

on

immediately

spotted significant flaws in

the way the company was

being

run.

For

starters,

Charlie was the only one with

access to the company’s bank

accounts. Many day-to-day

operations required Charlie to

manually intervene. The new

lead developer called for the

entire site to be taken down

and rebuilt. But there wasn’t

time as new customers were

pouring money into the site.

The new staff members were

jammed into every corner of

the small offices Charlie and

Erik had moved into the

previous summer.

On top of the internal

problems, Charlie was also

having trouble finding a

reliable bank account, even as

a

registered

money

transmitter. Since the end of

2012, Charlie had opened

accounts

with

KeyBank,

PNC,

Wells

Fargo,

and

JPMorgan Chase—and all of

them had been shut down. It

became apparent to others in

the company that Charlie had

not been entirely up-front

with the banks about the

nature of his business. Charlie

had generally opened the

accounts without explaining

that

BitInstant

customers

would be depositing and

withdrawing money on a

daily basis. When the banks

saw

the

thousands

of

transactions every day—a

strain on their compliance

officers—they decided the

BitInstant business wasn’t

worth it.

This pointed to a broader

issue with Charlie that was

frustrating the Winklevoss

twins and was clearly an

outgrowth of his childhood

desire for acceptance. Charlie

loved telling people what

they wanted to hear. He

would always give the twins

optimistic

predictions

for

projects and would fail to

alert them to impending

problems

until

the

last

moment, in the hope that the

problems would go away.

This optimistic approach was

great for a salesman, and

Charlie had been a great

salesman. But it was not such

a great habit for a manager,

who needed to find a way to

deal with problems, not

ignore them.

Given the issues at Mt.

Gox and BitInstant—the two

longtime giants of the Bitcoin

world—investors

and

entrepreneurs

in

Silicon

Valley were looking for

alternatives. As an alternative

to Mt. Gox, people saw some

promise in Bitstamp, an

exchange that had been

founded by a Slovenian

college student and a family

friend back in 2011 and that

had been growing slowly ever

since. Wences and Micky

sent one of Micky’s deputies

to Slovenia to scope out the

operations. The youngsters

running Bitstamp looked like

an Eastern European boy

band, with their long hair and

penchant for Adidas track

suits.

But

their

evident

competence—particularly

when they were compared

with Mt. Gox—generated so

much confidence that Wences

and Micky began moving

their trading to Bitstamp. Mt.

Gox still had 80 percent of all

Bitcoin

trading,

but

Bitstamp’s

market

share

began to creep up.

For those looking to buy

smaller quantities of Bitcoin

—BitInstant’s

specialty—

people found their way to

Coinbase, a San Francisco–

based startup that had been

opened by a veteran of

Airbnb and a former trader at

Goldman

Sachs

at

the

beginning of 2013. The

company had managed to

interest several investors and

had

maintained

a

bank

account with Silicon Valley

Bank.

But

even

with

Coinbase executives at the

bank made it clear that the

Bitcoin business was testing

their patience. In order to stay

on

top

of

anti–money

laundering laws, the bank had

to

review

every

single

transaction, and these reviews

cost the bank more money

than Coinbase was bringing

in. The bank imposed more

restrictions on Coinbase than

on other customers because

Bitcoin inherently made it

easier to launder money. A

terrorist could potentially put

dollars into Coinbase, buy

Bitcoins, and then use the

blockchain to send those

Bitcoins to terrorist cells

overseas. Because there is no

identifying

information

attached to Bitcoin addresses,

the terrorist cell could receive

money

without

anyone

noticing.

That

is

very

different from a traditional

bank, in which every account

is tied to a specific person or

organization. Coinbase had to

repeatedly convince Silicon

Valley Bank that it knew

where the Bitcoins leaving

Coinbase were going. Even

with all these steps, on

several

days

in

March

Coinbase hit up against

transaction limits set by

Silicon Valley Bank and had

to shut down until the next

day.

At the end of the month,

an item was posted on

SVBitcoin, an invite-only e-

mail list for the Silicon

Valley Bitcoin community:

“The Time Has Come for the

Bitcoin Community to Own a

U.S.

Based

Federally

Chartered Bank.”

The author, an investor

named David Johnston, wrote

that

the

skepticism

of

traditional

banks

toward

virtual currencies was the

biggest

roadblock

facing

Bitcoin’s growth. If people

couldn’t send dollars from

their bank to BitInstant or

Coinbase, the surging interest

in virtual currencies would be

snuffed out.

The

community

was

hitting

a

roadblock

that

almost

every

movement

striving to disrupt the status

quo eventually reaches. The

big ideals of Bitcoin had

carried it a long way and

were sound in theory, but

eventually the community

required some cooperation

from the existing authorities

—people needed the old

banks to agree to move their

money into the Bitcoin realm.

This was like an anarchist

commune that ran up against

the unwillingness of local

officials

to

continue

delivering

water

and

electricity. Such collisions

with the recalcitrant real

world are frequently where

utopian schemes run into

trouble.

Johnston estimated that

purchasing a licensed bank

that

could

specialize

in

Bitcoin

companies

would

require something like a $10

million investment up front.

He offered to put up $1

million himself—thanks to

the big rise in his own Bitcoin

holdings—and he sought out

ten more investors to join

him. Charlie quickly wrote

back saying it was a great

idea. Wences responded next,

offering to help fund the

venture.

But there wasn’t time for

any big changes. On April 1,

2013, the price of a Bitcoin

crossed the $100 threshold, a

670 percent increase since the

beginning of the year.

The price moves were

now feeding on themselves,

as speculators chased the

climbing ticker, fueled by

news articles from all the new

acolytes,

many

of

them

tutored by Wences. Jeremy

Liew, a venture capitalist at

the firm Lightspeed Capital,

which

had

money

in

Wences’s

current

startup,

wrote

an

article

in

TechCrunch explaining that:

“As a VC, my interest in the

Bitcoin ecosystem is not

ideological but mercenary. I

see

the

opportunity

for

Bitcoin to disrupt multi-

billion-dollar markets, but in

doing so also create new big

markets.”

Within the companies

handling all the money,

however, the gaskets popping

and wood warping were once

again audible. Charlie didn’t

have enough money at Mt.

Gox to fill all the orders

coming in. On April 5, with

the price moving above $140,

he asked the Winklevosses

for a short-term loan of

$500,000 so that he could

increase his reserves.

“I really wanna make

4pm wire cutoff so I can

make sure we have enough

money for the weekend in our

accounts!”

Charlie

wrote

feverishly.

When they quickly sent

over the funds, he wrote

back: “Thanks guys, you are

amazing.”

Charlie was also running

into issues at Mt. Gox, where

he purchased many of the

coins

that

he

sold

to

BitInstant customers. With

orders pouring in, Mt. Gox

was so backed up it was

taking half an hour for trades

to

go

through.

This

exacerbated the price swings

as people who thought they

were buying at $160 weren’t

getting their coins until the

price was at $175.

To compound matters,

Mark Karpeles chose this

moment to move ahead with

big changes in some obscure

but important codes that

customers used to transfer

money around, and did not

fully brief customers—even

big ones like BitInstant—on

how

to

cope

with

the

changes. This set off a set of

increasingly panicked e-mails

between Tokyo and New

York.

“You have been throwing

us around like you always

do,” Charlie wrote to Mark

on April 9. “Beating around

the bush and not being up

front with us.”

When Mark responded

without answering Charlie’s

basic question about some

necessary coding language,

Charlie exploded: “IF WE

CANNOT

ACCEPT

MTGOX

ORDERS WE ARE VIRTUALLY

SHUTTING DOWN.”

“Someone help us!!!!”

Charlie wrote on the morning

of April 10.

That same day, the mania

peaked when the price for

Bitcoins on Mt. Gox surged

to $260. In the first ten days

of the month, the exchange

had attracted 75,000 new

accounts. On April 10 the

number of trades coming in

was three times higher than it

had been just a day earlier.

For a trade, the lag between

being entered and being

executed was more than an

hour. As people sat waiting

for their orders to go through,

they saw the price shoot up

and panicked, not wanting to

pay $300 when they had

intended to pay $200. Orders

were canceled and people

began to sell, hoping to lock

in the profits they had

realized over the past months.

The effect was predictable.

While Charlie was asleep in

New York the price began

crashing, and by the time

Charlie showed up at the

office, the price was down to

$200. By lunchtime it was

closer to $100.

The BitInstant engineers

congregated

with

their

laptops on the small black

sofa and chairs in Charlie’s

office. Charlie had a bottle of

rum on his desk and, in a

spirit of good fun, was taking

occasional swigs as everyone

tried to figure out just what

was going wrong. Even the

wireless network in the office

was failing because of the

number of people in the

building trying to help. When

Yifu Guo, the creator of the

Avalon mining chips, stopped

by the office, Charlie was in a

state of giddy panic, both

scared and amused.

“I’m flipping out. I’m

yelling at everyone. Yifu, I’m

drinking the rum from the

bottle,” he said with a laugh.

“I don’t know why you

guys are all freaking out,”

Yifu said, chuckling himself.

“I’m not worried. The price is

fine. It’s time to buy.”

Things calmed down for a

few

hours

after

Mark

Karpeles assured his users

that the problems were due to

the volume of trade, not to

hackers. But hours after he

wrote

that,

the

hackers

showed up and staged fierce

denial-of-service

attacks,

forcing Mark to shut down

the site altogether in the

middle of the day.

CHAPTER 21

April 11, 2013

The day after Mt. Gox shut

down under the strain of

heavy trading, the members

of the corporate board of

Lemon, Wences Casares’s

digital wallet, showed up at

the company’s Palo Alto

offices

for

a

lunchtime

meeting. The price of Bitcoin

sat more than 50 percent

lower than where it had been

twenty-four hours earlier. But

the sudden downturn had

done

nothing

to

dim

Wences’s faith in Bitcoin’s

future.

Instead,

it

had

increased his conviction that

the companies dominating the

Bitcoin universe, like Mt.

Gox, needed to be replaced,

and that he needed to do more

than just be a cheerleader for

Bitcoin among the Silicon

Valley elite.

Lemon provided a way

for customers to keep all their

credit cards and coupons in

digital

form

on

their

smartphones.

Wences

proposed to his board that

they add a pocket for Bitcoins

that would be a safe, reliable

way to keep virtual currencies

and potentially even to buy

them. To get started, Wences

suggested that Lemon could

use

$1

million

of

its

remaining money to buy

Bitcoins that could serve as

an initial pool for customer

purchases. This was actually

a great time to buy coins,

Wences argued, because the

price was down after the

latest price crash.

Wences expected to see

his board members light up—

particularly Micky Malka, the

chairman of Lemon’s board

and one of the first people

Wences had gotten excited

about Bitcoin back in 2012.

Instead, Micky furrowed his

brow. Is this really what

Lemon set out to do? Micky

asked Wences. Lemon had

finally started catching on as

a digital wallet. Wouldn’t

opening it up to virtual

currencies engender all sorts

of unknown legal risks?

The other board members

quietly listened to Wences’s

explanation of why this was

worth doing. They all knew it

was dangerous in Silicon

Valley

to

alienate

an

entrepreneur like Wences—

there was no easier way to

ensure that a company failed.

But they didn’t jump to his

defense either.

After the meeting was

adjourned, the board member

who had looked the least

skeptical,

Eric

O’Brien,

pulled Wences aside and

asked him: “How strongly do

you believe in this—what are

you personally doing?”

Wences

didn’t

mince

words: “I am personally

allocating a percentage of my

net worth to this that is

borderline

irresponsible

because I believe in it so

much.”

Regardless of what the

Lemon board wanted to do,

Wences said, “I would advise

you to invest as much money

as you can stomach losing.”

He told O’Brien to buy

coins at Mt. Gox, but to move

the coins off Mt. Gox as soon

as the order went through.

“It is either going to be

worth zero or worth five

thousand times what it is

today.”

IN THE DAYS that followed,

Mt.

Gox

reopened

for

business

and

the

price

stabilized around $100. But

many believed that the recent

price crash proved the flaws

in the whole concept. Felix

Salmon, a financial columnist

at Reuters, wrote a widely

circulated article pointing out

that the volatile price of

Bitcoin

made

it

nearly

impossible to use for its most

basic purpose, as currency. If

consumers

didn’t

know

whether a Bitcoin would be

worth $10 or $100 tomorrow

they would be unlikely to

spend

their

coins

and

merchants would similarly be

unlikely to accept them. Even

this

critic,

though,

saw

something elegant in the

network underlying Bitcoin.

“For the time being,

Bitcoin is in many ways the

best and cleanest payments

mechanism the world has

ever seen,” Salmon wrote.

“So if we’re ever going to

create something better, we’re

going to have to learn from

what Bitcoin does right—as

well as what it does wrong.”

The day after the crash,

the Winklevoss twins finally

went public in the New York

Times

with

their

now

significant stake in Bitcoin—

worth some $10 million. The

interest was not restricted to

the United States. A few

weeks after the crash, a

national television station in

China broadcast a half-hour

segment

on

the

new

enthusiasts in that country,

and

several

local

entrepreneurs began setting

up exchanges to buy Bitcoins

using yuan.

Despite

the

crash,

everyone with a Bitcoin idea

found that there was now no

shortage of eager investors in

Silicon Valley. In May, Pete

Thiel’s

Founders

Fund

announced that it was putting

$2 million into BitPay, the

payment processing company

that allowed merchants to

accept Bitcoin and end up

with dollars in their bank—

taking advantage of the

Bitcoin network’s quick and

cheap transactions.

But the company that was

attracting the most attention

was Coinbase, founded by the

veterans

of

Airbnb

and

Goldman

Sachs.

The

twentysomething cofounders

had clean-cut looks and soft-

spoken ways that naturally

engendered

confidence.

Investors liked that the pair

avoided the ideological talk

of overthrowing the Fed and

instead sold their company as

a safe and easy place for

consumers to buy and hold

coins that wouldn’t be subject

to endless delays and scrutiny

from the authorities. They

also had real professional

experience at well-known

companies, something that

had been in short supply in

the Bitcoin world up to this

point.

After consultations with

Wences, Micky decided to

team up with the New York

venture capitalist Fred Wilson

to put $5 million into

Coinbase. It was the largest

publicized investment in a

Bitcoin company to date, by a

wide margin, and the first

time an established venture

capitalist like Wilson had put

serious money into the space.

The rest of Silicon Valley

took notice.

CHARLIE,

MEANTIME,

WAS

taking

advantage

of

BitInstant’s status as the only

serious Bitcoin company in

New York—the media capital

of the world—to become a

sort of public spokesman for

Bitcoin in the press. He

regularly invited reporters to

a bar that he had invested in

at the beginning of the year,

EVR, the sort of dark,

swanky Manhattan club that

made its clientele line up in

high heels on the sidewalk.

The round leather booth in

the back corner was Charlie’s

standing nighttime office,

with some top-shelf liquor on

the table for guests.

Those who knew Charlie

back

in

Brooklyn

were

amazed at his transformation

from

a

short,

awkward

teenager into a confident

impresario

who

bragged

about the ring that he wore,

engraved with the private key

to one of his Bitcoin wallets.

But as always with Charlie, it

was all somewhat less than it

appeared. He still lived in his

teenage bedroom in the

basement of his parents’

house in Brooklyn. He left

people with the impression

that EVR was his bar, despite

the fact that he had put in

only about $15,000 and

owned less than 1 percent of

it.

Meanwhile,

Charlie’s

company was racing furiously

to keep up with all the new

competitors,

especially

Coinbase, and Charlie was

often missing when he was

needed most, hanging out at

the bar or talking with

reporters.

At

one

point,

Cameron Winklevoss asked

Charlie: “Do you want to be

the proprietor of a bar or the

CEO of a Bitcoin company?

You can’t have it both ways.”

Cameron,

the

more

involved of the two twins,

constantly pressed Charlie on

why things weren’t getting

done faster. When Coinbase’s

$5 million investment was

announced, Cameron warned

Charlie that Coinbase could

steal BitInstant’s thunder.

“Just

deliver

the

deliverables and stop fucking

around,” Cameron told him.

Charlie meekly submitted.

“OK, I will push the team and

myself harder.”

IN TOKYO, MARK Karpeles

was also learning that Mt.

Gox’s first-mover advantage

was not impregnable.

On May 2, Mark was

sued in a Seattle court by

CoinLab, the company run by

Peter Vessenes that had been

scheduled

to

assume

responsibility for Mt. Gox’s

business in the United States

earlier in the year. CoinLab

accused Mt. Gox of breaching

its contract by not handing

over the customers. Troubles

deepened a week later when

the money in Mt. Gox’s two

American bank accounts—

some $5 million—was seized

by

federal

agents,

who

accused Mt. Gox of violating

federal

money-transmitting

laws. It wasn’t apparent at the

time, but these moves were

part of the net tightening

around Silk Road, as law

enforcement

agents

in

Baltimore narrowed in on

their prey. Prosecutors had

secretly

filed

a

sealed

indictment on May 1 against

Dread Pirate Roberts for

narcotics trafficking and were

prepared

to

arrest

the

mastermind as soon as they

figured out who he was.

Given all this turbulence,

it was remarkable that anyone

continued using Mt. Gox at

all. In the world of trading,

though, the most valuable

thing an exchange can offer is

liquidity or, more simply,

people buying and selling. An

exchange

with

the

best

technology in the world isn’t

worth

anything

if

no

customers are there offering

to buy and sell. Mt. Gox still

had liquidity because it had

attracted so many customers

from its days as just about the

only exchange around, and

some customers would move

only if others did as well.

But a chasm was opening

up

between

the

early

Bitcoiners and the new, more

practical

community

of

entrepreneurs, engineers, and

investors. When some of the

developers working on the

underlying Bitcoin code set

up a Bitcoin press center, it

immediately led to fights

about who was presentable

enough to be listed as a

contact

for

journalists,

especially when Roger Ver

was taken off the list. Erik

Voorhees lashed out at those

trying to smooth Bitcoin’s

sharper edges.

“It is embarrassing to see

Bitcoin reduced to sniveling

permission-seekers,

too

cowardly to speak about the

real issues and the real

reasons why this technology

is so important,” Erik wrote.

“Bitcoin is a movement, and

those trying to distill it into

nothing more than a cute new

technology

are

kidding

themselves and doing a

terrible disservice to this

community.”

EVERYONE SEEMED READY for

a truce from the bickering as

the

Bitcoin

Foundation’s

first-ever

conference

approached in late May. The

foundation had booked the

main convention center in the

capital of Silicon Valley, San

Jose.

On the morning of the

conference’s first day, Friday,

May 17, the Valley news site

TechCrunch went live with a

story

that

officially

announced the investment the

Winklevoss twins had made

in BitInstant, which had

remained a secret even after

they went public with their

holdings of Bitcoin. The

investment was put at $1.5

million. Even this article was

the cause for a small tiff with

Charlie, who had accidentally

tipped off another reporter

first.

“Your communication is

piss poor and gums up the

entire

operation,”

Tyler

Winklevoss wrote.

But the tension quickly

passed and Charlie and the

twins showed up at the

convention center to find that

they were heroes of sorts to

the

assembling

Bitcoin

masses.

Many

of

the

conference

attendees

had

been aficionados for years,

waiting for the world to see

the beauty of their pet project.

Now these tall, statuesque

celebrity twins were standing

up for their cause. On Friday

night, the twins delivered the

keynote speech together, clad

in sneakers and button-down

shirts with rolled-up sleeves.

They opened with a quote

from Gandhi, and proceeded

to cite Dr. Seuss and the

Bitcoin pizzas purchased by

Laszlo Hanecz. The next

morning, when the general

exhibition

opened,

one

vendor was selling shirts with

the smiling face of Charlie

Shrem, in the style of Barack

Obama’s

famous

“Hope”

poster.

The adulation distracted

Charlie from the business

opportunities

at

the

conference. He got around to

scribbling

down

some

thoughts for his Saturday

afternoon speech only an

hour

beforehand,

while

standing around the booth.

The talk was unsurprisingly

disjointed, but Charlie still

possessed his old infectious

enthusiasm, which had the

crowd cheering and clapping.

That

night,

the

whole

BitInstant team went out for a

boozy dinner with shots of

Fireball whiskey, followed by

a night out at a club.

While Charlie and other

Bitcoin

old-timers

were

reveling, a more quiet and

sophisticated

conversation

was going on around the

edges. In a back room of the

convention

center,

Gavin

Andresen gathered with the

four other developers who

were maintaining the basic

Bitcoin

software

that

computers on the network

were running. This was the

first time the so-called core

developers had met in person,

and far from the crowds they

talked about the serious work

of keeping the basic Bitcoin

protocol safe from hackers

and forks.

The moneyed set that had

recently converted to Bitcoin

was also buzzing around the

conference. Wences didn’t

speak at the conference but he

had

lots

of

private

conversations

with

the

investors and entrepreneurs

whom he had introduced to

the

technology,

including

PayPal’s David Marcus, who

had turned his name badge

around so that no one would

know who he was. After

browsing in the exhibition

hall, Marcus told Wences that

he had been appalled by the

naïveté

and

lack

of

sophistication of the existing

companies. When asked how

they were dealing with anti–

money laundering laws, none

of the young entrepreneurs

gave

a

knowledgeable

answer. It was so bad that

Marcus told Wences he was

contemplating

quitting

PayPal and starting his own

Bitcoin

exchange—

something he later decided

against.

For these Silicon Valley

power brokers, there was an

absurdity to the old-school

Bitcoiners who crowed to

each other about being the

leaders of a new global

movement and getting rich in

the process. The convention

center happened to be hosting

the Big Wow! ComicFest at

the same time as the Bitcoin

conference,

and

it

was

sometimes hard to tell who

among the long-haired nerds

were there for the comics and

who for the virtual currency.

CHAPTER 22

June 2013

The gap that had been

revealed

at

the

Bitcoin

Foundation’s

conference—

between the apparent promise

of Bitcoin’s underlying idea

and the weakness of the

current

companies—only

emboldened the big-money

people

going

into

the

summer.

Pete Briger at Fortress,

the private equity and hedge

fund giant, invited in an old

classmate from Princeton and

colleague from his days at

Goldman

Sachs,

Dan

Morehead, to help Fortress

look full-time at a range of

virtual-currency

opportunities.

A

tall,

statuesque man, who had

been on both the rowing and

the

football

teams

at

Princeton, Dan looked like a

member of the ruling class,

and he had recently been

running his own hedge fund,

Pantera. After getting the

invitation from Briger, Dan

took up a desk at Fortress’s

offices in a skyscraper near

the

Embarcadero

in

downtown San Francisco. He

soon

hired

the

first

professional traders to buy

Bitcoins for a fund he hoped

to set up, which would make

Bitcoin more easily available

to big investors. In New

York, Barry Silbert was

working

on

something

similar. To get everyone in

his company involved and

excited, Barry gave each of

his seventy-five employees

two Bitcoins—each worth

around $100 at the time—

with the mandate to spend

one of them and save the

other.

But as these professionals

got more deeply involved it

quickly became clear to them

that for all the excitement

around Bitcoin in Silicon

Valley, almost no one had

been paying attention to

equally

important

constituencies in Washington,

DC, and on Wall Street, now

the

most

significant

roadblocks to the growth of

this technology.

In

late

May

federal

prosecutors

arrested

the

operators of Liberty Reserve,

another online currency that

Mt. Gox and BitInstant had

used early on as a method for

funding accounts. Liberty

Reserve was a very different

beast from Bitcoin. It was run

by a centralized company,

which designed the currency

to make it easier for criminals

to move money undetected.

But the shadow of Liberty

Reserve naturally fell on

Bitcoin and statements from

regulators suggested they did

not necessarily see a big

difference.

At the end of May the top

financial

regulator

in

California sent the Bitcoin

Foundation a cease-and-desist

letter accusing the foundation

of operating as an unlicensed

money

transmitter.

The

accusation was somewhat

absurd—the foundation was

not a business of any sort—

but it highlighted just how

little the foundation had done

to cultivate relationships with

the relevant regulators.

Given

the

regulatory

uncertainty,

it

was

unsurprising

that

bankers

were

not

eager

to

get

involved

with

the

new

industry. In 2012 and 2013

several big banks had faced

$1 billion fines for not being

vigilant enough in tracking

money laundering. In the

early

summer

of

2013

JPMorgan Chase, the nation’s

biggest bank, was shutting

down

accounts

for

any

companies that came with an

elevated

risk

of

money

laundering, including check-

cashing

businesses

and

companies that did remittance

payments to Mexico.

Finding banks willing to

open accounts for Bitcoin

companies had always been a

problem for entrepreneurs

like Charlie Shrem. But even

the new, more powerful

backers of Bitcoin were

discovering that they couldn’t

find banks willing to work

with them. Fortress’s Pete

Briger set up a meeting with

top executives he knew at one

of the nation’s largest banks,

Wells

Fargo,

about

potentially teaming up to

create a more secure and

reliable Bitcoin exchange, but

Wells Fargo quickly declined

any partnership. It had been

only a few months since

Wells Fargo had had to deal

with federal agents seizing

Mt. Gox’s Wells Fargo bank

accounts.

In all the discouraging

dealings with bankers and

government

officials,

Bitcoiners were facing basic

questions about why it was

worthwhile for anyone to put

any

energy

into

this

technology. Almost five years

after Satoshi Nakamoto had

published his paper, the

virtual currency was worth

real money and had attracted

talented people, but although

some

small

companies

accepted

Bitcoin

through

BitPay, the virtual currency

was still used almost entirely

for speculation, gambling,

and drug dealing.

Economists

who

had

taken note of Bitcoin also

pointed out that the virtual

currency actually had built-in

incentives

discouraging

people from using it. The cap

on the number of Bitcoins

that could ever be created—

21 million—meant that the

currency was expected to

become more valuable over

time. This situation, which is

known

as

deflation,

encouraged people to hold on

to their Bitcoins rather than

spend them.

The notion of Bitcoiners

around the world sitting on

their private keys and waiting

to become rich begged the

question of the intrinsic value

of these digital files. What

were all these locked-up

virtual coins really worth if

no one was doing anything

with

them?

What

was

backing up all the value the

coins seemed to have on

paper?

Bitcoin fans argued that

the United States dollar was

not backed up by anything

real either—dollars were just

pieces of paper. But this

argument ignored the fact that

the United States government

promised to always take

dollars for tax bills, which

was a real value no matter

how much people disliked

paying taxes.

Practically no one was

promising to take Bitcoin for

anything. The primary value

the coins had at this point was

the expectation that they

would be worth more in the

future,

allowing

current

holders to cash out for more

than they paid. To some

cynics, that description made

Bitcoin sound suspiciously

like a less savory sort of

financial invention: a Ponzi

scheme.

FROM THE OUTSIDE, it would

have been easy to conclude

that Charlie and BitInstant

were somehow dodging all

these problems. Charlie was

shopping for new, larger real

estate for his company and

eventually settled on a well-

appointed suite in an office

tower. Charlie had finally

managed to move out of his

parents’

basement

in

Brooklyn. He was motivated

to do this, in no small part,

because he was afraid to tell

his

parents

about

his

girlfriend, Courtney, who was

a waitress at his favorite bar,

EVR. Courtney was some ten

years his senior and, more

important,

not

Jewish—

something that did not fly in

the

Syrian

Jewish

community.

Charlie

and

Courtney took a room in a big

communal apartment above

EVR, where there were

always alcohol bottles and

bongs on offer. Charlie was

often spotted at EVR with

Courtney on his arm.

But

within

BitInstant,

Charlie’s hard-partying ways

seemed to many like an

escape from the challenges he

was facing with his company.

The Winklevoss twins had

been pushing Charlie to raise

more money to pay for

BitInstant’s expansion. And

Charlie had no trouble getting

meetings with investors, who

were all impressed at the

sheer number of dollars

already

running

through

BitInstant. But as Charlie’s

team tried to get the investors

the paperwork they needed, it

quickly became clear how

unequipped BitInstant was for

the big time. When the

BitInstant

chief

financial

officer, who was just two

years out of college, tried to

put together the financial

statements he realized that

there were large holes in the

company’s

books,

with

unexplained expenses in all

directions.

Charlie

had

made

remarkable progress for a

twenty-three-year-old

entrepreneur with almost no

prior experience. He had built

a complicated business from

nothing and people entrusted

him with millions of dollars.

But Charlie was clearly, and

unsurprisingly, lacking skills

as a manager. In many

startups this is something that

investors might notice, and

help fix, by finding an

experienced manager to come

in and steer the ship. As it

turned out, though, Charlie’s

investors didn’t have much

more

experience

working

with startups than he did. The

twins’ early experience with

Mark Zuckerberg had been

limited and, since setting out

to become tech investors the

previous

year,

they

had

worked with only a few

young

companies.

With

Charlie,

the

twins

had

initially adopted a hands-off

attitude,

despite

all

the

bickering. But as problems

became more evident, they

talked with Charlie’s chief

programmer about replacing

Charlie

as

CEO.

When

Charlie learned about the

potential palace coup he was

furious and began showing up

for work less and less.

In

mid-June,

the

Winklevosses asked an angel

investor they knew, Chris

Morton,

to

diagnose

BitInstant’s problems. What

they got back was a long list

of basic things the company

was missing, among them:

“There is no accounting

system.

“The equity agreements

are a mess or nonexistent.

“The company mission is

not clear.”

But Morton’s harshest

words were reserved for

Charlie:

He cannot focus. He

seems to be busy with

superfluous meetings

(press, investors,

partners, speaking

engagements) and

personal commitments

(bar, rental property).

Even when those

meetings are in

progress, he does

other things on his

computer. He makes

commitments and

does not follow

through. He

confirmed a meeting

with the accountant

and then did not show.

The Winklevoss twins

talked with Morton about

coming in to help turn around

the company, but he had little

interest.

The twins were realizing

that BitInstant might be a lost

cause

and

they

began

working toward a life in

Bitcoin without Charlie. At

the Manhattan offices of

Winklevoss Capital, where

the brothers had matching

glass-walled offices on either

side

of

a

glass-walled

conference room, the twins

started putting together the

paperwork for what they

envisioned as the first-ever

Bitcoin

exchange-traded

fund, or ETF, which would

hold Bitcoins and move with

the value of the coins, but

trade

on

a

real

stock

exchange, much like the

hugely popular gold ETF.

The

twins

planned

to

assemble a team that would

buy

and

sell

Bitcoins,

allowing ordinary investors to

purchase the ETF through

their Charles Schwab or

E*Trade brokerage account.

IN LATE JUNE, Charlie finally

managed

a

long-planned

relaunch of BitInstant, in

partnership with a money-

transmitting business that was

regulated in most states. But

when the site went live and

BitInstant began doing more

thorough

checks

of

its

customers, Charlie’s staffers

realized that many of their

customers had been doing

business with them under

fake identities. When the

Manhattan district attorney

sent a disconcerting request

to Charlie asking him to come

in

for

a

meeting,

it

precipitated an emergency

conference call with a team of

lawyers on July 4.

“The problem is that the

site is a patchwork of

bandages,” one of the lawyers

told Charlie and his team.

“When we go into that

meeting, they’re going to go

straight to the site and review

it in detail. They can’t see a

patchwork of quick fixes.”

The

lawyers

were

unrelenting, and the answers

from Charlie made them

nervous:

no,

BitInstant’s

compliance officer had no

previous

experience

in

compliance,

and

no,

BitInstant had not filed any

suspicious-activity

reports

with regulators despite having

lots of transactions flagged as

potentially

fraudulent

by

partners. The call concluded

with a long list of things that

needed

to

be

handled

immediately.

“You are very exposed on

all fronts,” the lawyer told

Charlie and his team.

Charlie tried to show how

serious

he

was

about

complying with all the rules,

but the old problems were

quickly joined by new ones.

A

couple

of

customers

disputing transactions filed a

lawsuit, for which they were

seeking class-action status.

When the twins read Charlie

the riot act, he responded

with total contrition.

“Things ARE changing

dramatically to fix problems

on all fronts and put us in a

position for growth as quickly

as possible,” he told them.

“I’ve made a lot of mistakes,

the ones that you guys called

me out on as well as others

that I’m seeing now and

taking steps to fix.”

But there wouldn’t be

time for that. Charlie was in

the new BitInstant offices,

which he had moved the

company into less than two

weeks earlier, when he got a

letter from his lawyers telling

him that because of the

number of legal questions,

they could not represent him

in his upcoming meeting with

the district attorney unless he

shut down the site and

resolved all the problems.

Charlie

reached

the

Winklevoss twins while they

were in the car on the way to

their family beach house.

They laid the blame entirely

at his feet and demanded the

return of the $500,000 loan

they had made back in April

when business was booming.

On Friday, July 12, at 9

p.m.,

Charlie

took

the

BitInstant site down, for what

he thought would be only a

temporary hiatus.

THE MALODOROUS HAZE now

hovering over Bitcoin was

making everyone question

what it was doing.

Erik Voorhees, one of the

most fearless proponents of

Bitcoin’s radical possibilities,

announced a few days after

Charlie shut down BitInstant

that he was selling the

gambling site, SatoshiDice,

which he’d bought in 2012

and turned into one of the

most popular Bitcoin sites on

the Web.

The

sale

involved

reimbursing all the people

who had bought shares in

Erik’s company in 2012, but

they had only 13 percent of

the site. This young man who

had been unemployed two

years earlier was now a

millionaire living in Panama.

But the reason he was selling

SatoshiDice was not the

money. In e-mail exchanges

with other entrepreneurs he

explained that his legal costs

were piling up and that it was

too much of a headache to be

under such scrutiny.

“Bitcoin businesses are

literally at the edge of law,

not because they are doing

anything wrong, but because

Bitcoin enables new activities

and

behaviors

and

recategorizes money in such a

way as to enable it to

transcend current statutes.

This is both exciting, and

scary, because we’re breaking

amazing ground and we’ll

inevitably be in the crosshairs

for doing so,” he said.

About a week after he

sold the company and paid

back his shareholders, he got

an e-mail from the Securities

and Exchange Commission

letting him know that it

believed that he had broken

the

law

by

selling

unregistered securities. The e-

mail caused a terrible feeling

in the pit of Erik’s stomach

that didn’t abate for days.

Not long after that, nearly

every major company in the

Bitcoin space got a subpoena

from

the

top

financial

regulator in New York, a

young bulldog of a prosecutor

named Benjamin Lawsky,

who asked for a trove of

documentation

about

consumer protections and

anti–money

laundering

programs. A few days later

the US Senate’s Committee

on Homeland Security and

Governmental Affairs sent a

letter to the major financial

regulators

and

law

enforcement agencies asking

about the “threats and risks

related to virtual currency.”

Neither of these requests

suggested that lawmakers

regarded this new technology

with much warmth.

NO ONE, THOUGH, was feeling

more heat than Ross Ulbricht,

aka Dread Pirate Roberts.

Ross’s site was more

successful than ever. In the

middle of 2013, Silk Road

was approaching its one-

millionth registered account.

In the first two months of the

summer, Silk Road users

exchanged over a million

messages with each other and

the commissions collected by

the site were often over

$10,000 a day.

But since the spring Ross

had

been

dealing

with

continuing and varied attacks

unlike

anything

he

had

experienced before. A hacker

had managed to take the site

down for days at a time and

stopped only after Ross

agreed to pay $100,000 up

front and $50,000 every week

thereafter—payments

that

ultimately

amounted

to

$350,000.

These weren’t the only

unanticipated costs. When a

user named FriendlyChemist

threatened to release details

about thousands of Silk Road

customers, Ross reached out

to a distributor, who he

believed was a member of

Hell’s Angels, and asked

what it would cost to do away

with FriendlyChemist. This

time around, there was none

of the hemming and hawing

that had accompanied Curtis

Green’s

supposed

death.

When

the

assassin,

redandwhite, came back with

a price of $150,000, Ross

politely haggled with him.

“Don’t want to be a pain

here, but the price seems

high,” Ross wrote, pointing to

the $80,000 that had been

paid

for

the

previous

execution.

A few days after a price

was

agreed

upon,

redandwhite sent evidence

that the deed had been done

(though no evidence was later

found of an actual murder).

Messages quickly followed

with a request for a hit on

another scammer—and three

of his associates—who had

robbed Silk Road users. This

deed was paid for with 3,000

Bitcoins, or roughly $500,000

(but, again, no evidence was

found of any actual murders).

This

was

not

the

softhearted young man of

early 2012 who had trouble

telling white lies. Now his

diary was filled not with

ruminations

on

his

weaknesses, but instead with

brief, cold lists of his

problems and solutions. His

entry

for

the

day

FriendlyChemist

was

presumably killed, read:

got word that

blackmailer was

excuted

created file upload

script

started to fix problem

with bond refunds

over 3 months old

Even his family members,

who had no idea what he was

up to, noticed a change

during this time. Ross’s mom

would say that her son,

during this period, was “rebel

Ross,” not the lovable young

man she had known in recent

years.

Ross’s transition from an

affable youngster obsessed

with oneness to a minor

tycoon whose diary entries

reflected a willingness to kill

looked, from many angles,

like a predictable outcome of

the community that Ross had

created and the role that Ross

had assumed within that

community. In a world in

which there are no agreed-

upon

authorities,

it

was

natural that individuals might

take it upon themselves to

determine what is right and

wrong—and to act on those

determinations on their own.

It was easy to imagine that

Ross, cut off from any real

contact

with

the

other

members of the community,

except for Internet chats,

began to see people as

abstractions with no real life

force—like characters in a

video game. In this sort of

world, the idea of killing

these people could lose its

visceral repugnance.

As the year went on, Ross

receded further from his

ordinary life. He moved out

of his friend’s apartment in

June and went even deeper

underground, renting a place

a few miles away in a

residential neighborhood of

San Francisco that he paid for

in cash. He told his new

roommates that his name was

Josh. On his laptop, he kept a

document

called

“emergency” that included

the steps he would take if he

needed to run:

encrypt and backup

important files on

laptop to memory

stick.

destroy laptop hard

drive and hide/dispose

destroy phone and

hide/dispose

hide memory stick

get new laptop

go to end of train

find place to live on

craigslist for cash

create new identity

(name, backstory)

The New York office of

the FBI was, by this point,

working in cooperation with

the Marco Polo task force that

had been set up a year and a

half earlier in Baltimore to

crack down on Silk Road.

The teams were making

almost monthly arrests of

other vendors and buyers on

Silk Road, and many of these

arrests

were

publicized.

When a competing black

market drug site, which had

opened in the spring, shut

down, Dread Pirate Roberts

told his followers that he had

often thought about doing the

same:

Without going into

details, the stress of

being DPR is

sometimes

overwhelming. What

keeps me going is the

understanding that

what we are doing

here is more important

than my insignificant

little life. I believe

what we are doing

will have rippling

effects for generations

to come and could be

part of a monumental

shift in how human

beings organize and

relate to one another.

I have gone

through the mental

exercise of spending a

lifetime in prison and

of dying for this

cause. I have let the

fear pass through me

and with clarity

commit myself fully

to the mission and

values outlined in the

Silk Road charter.

Ross,

by

this

point,

understood just how hard it

was going to be to continue

evading detection. He became

aware, at several points in

2013, that despite his best

efforts,

his

system

did

occasionally leak a real IP

address,

providing

information, however briefly,

on where his servers were

located. Each time, he would

delete the information and

move his databases to new

servers, hoping that no one

had noticed the mistake. Ross

assigned Variety Jones, his

old mentor, who now went by

the screen name cimon, to

serve

as

the

site’s

counterintelligence

expert

against law enforcement. But

as Ross guessed, there were,

indeed,

federal

agents

dedicating their days to

spotting any sign of a real IP

address associated with Silk

Road, and they were homing

in on a set of servers in

Iceland that they believed

were the right ones.

Before the authorities got

anything on those servers,

though,

agents

on

the

Canadian border intercepted a

package with nine forged

drivers’ licenses. Each license

had a different name and

address, but the pictures on

all of them were the same

wavy-haired young man. The

package was addressed to a

house in San Francisco.

When agents knocked on the

door, they recognized the

young man from the photos

on the forged IDs. He quickly

presented his real driver’s

license, from Texas, with his

real name, Ross Ulbricht. He

declined to answer any other

questions about where the

IDs had come from, but told

the agents in an offhand way

that anyone could buy faked

documents from a site called

Silk Road.

The agents left without

taking Ross with them. He

had gotten lucky. While he

was one of the suspects that

the New York and Baltimore

agents were looking at, they

had not disseminated his

name widely, and the border

patrol officers had no idea

who he was. After this close

call,

Ross

changed

apartments, but he did not

take the opportunity to cut

and run. Instead, he stayed in

San Francisco, watching his

commissions from Silk Road

pour in as the digital noose

tightened around his neck.

PART THREE

CHAPTER 23

August 2013

The Bitcoin Foundation had

set out to help improve the

network’s public standing,

but most of the people

involved in the foundation’s

creation had now become

unhappy examples of the

technology’s

problems.

Charlie Shrem had shut down

his site and was being sued.

Peter Vessenes was locked in

a legal battle with his fellow

founding

board

member,

Mark Karpeles, and Peter’s

other ventures were going

just as poorly. A company he

had set up to produce Bitcoin

mining machines had not yet

turned out a single coin and

his investors were breathing

down his neck.

There was, though, one

unlikely person left to carry

on the original mission of

providing the technology with

a more friendly public face:

the Seattle lawyer Patrick

Murck. For most of 2012 and

2013 Patrick had worked for

existing Bitcoin companies

and volunteered as general

counsel of the foundation.

But since the beginning of the

summer

he

had

been

employed by the foundation

full-time and was turning

himself into a respectable

public spokesman.

At each point along the

way, Bitcoin’s survival had

required the strengths of a

different

subset

of

its

believers. In the summer of

2013 it had become clear that

if Bitcoin was going to reach

a larger audience it would

need to learn how to play nice

with the existing system. As

it turned out, Patrick, a pudgy

young father with a warm

fuzzy beard, was uniquely

positioned to do just that. In

contrast to Bitcoin’s early

salesmen, like Roger Ver,

who was still trying to

renounce

his

citizenship,

Patrick was a patriot who had

grown up in Washington, DC,

with a mother who worked at

the National Labor Relations

Board. This upbringing had

made him believe in the

importance

of

fighting

injustice in the world and

gave him a healthy respect for

the role that government

could play in the process,

which helped explain the

volunteer work he had done

for the Obama campaign in

2008.

When it came to Bitcoin,

Patrick firmly believed, like

many in the tech world, that

Bitcoin could foment big

changes. An open source

financial network looked to

Patrick like just what was

needed to shake up the

privileged elite who ran and

disproportionately benefited

from the existing financial

system. The Bitcoin network

seemed to make it at least a

little bit harder for Wall

Street to collect tolls at every

step

of

every

financial

transaction. But Patrick did

not think that for this to

happen it would be necessary

for Bitcoin to overthrow the

existing governments and

central banks. In fact, he

thought

there

was

a

significant

place

for

regulations when a third

party, like Mt. Gox or

BitInstant,

was

holding

someone’s virtual currency.

Patrick had quietly begun

his work at the beginning of

the summer, when he spoke

at

a

conference

in

Washington that represented

essentially the first time a

Bitcoiner had sat on the same

stage with lawmakers. At that

point, there had been obvious

tension. Patrick had ended up

in a sharp exchange with a

man from the Department of

Justice who had compared

Bitcoin

users

to

child

pornographers.

Afterward,

though,

Patrick struck up a friendly

conversation with the woman

in charge of FinCen, the

branch

of

the

Treasury

Department that had put out

the first rules on virtual

currencies in March 2013.

Patrick had been somewhat

peeved that FinCen and its

leader,

Jennifer

Shasky

Calvery, had not had any

conversation with the Bitcoin

community before issuing

those rules. At the June

conference, though, Shasky

Calvery made it clear that she

was

interested

in

the

technology and open to a

dialogue about the rules.

Over the course of the

summer Patrick made almost

weekly trips from Seattle to

Washington to meet with

Shasky Calvery and other

regulators, to help them

understand Bitcoin. Patrick

quickly learned that staffers

in the office of Senator

Thomas Carper, of Delaware,

were studying Bitcoin and

looking at the possibility of

holding a hearing. Patrick

was able to put them in touch

with the most presentable

players in the Bitcoin world.

In his meetings Patrick

did not fight the obvious

reality that Bitcoin was not

yet doing any of the great

things that he and others were

talking about. But he was

able to cogently explain his

vision of how the blockchain

technology could make it

easier for poor immigrants to

transfer money back home

and allow people with no

access to a bank account or

credit card to take part in the

Internet economy.

In addition to his legal

mind, Patrick had a genial,

unthreatening approach that

made him able to get along

with just about anyone. He

liked

having

his

conversations over a whiskey

or beer in a bar, and his

everyman sensibility tended

to soften people up. The good

relationship

Patrick

developed

with

Shasky

Calvery, among other people,

led to a private meeting in

August, when Patrick and a

few other people affiliated

with the Bitcoin Foundation

got to present Bitcoin’s best

face to a roomful of law

enforcement

agents

and

government officials. It was

not entirely friendly, but the

attendees

seemed

to

understand that the Bitcoin

technology was useful for

more than just purchasing

drugs and laundering money

—so this meeting was already

a long way from Patrick’s

first

encounters

in

Washington at the beginning

of the summer.

Many Bitcoin companies

were

making

their

own

efforts to get in sync with the

authorities. Coinbase, the San

Francisco–based

company

that had raised $5 million

from Micky Malka’s Ribbit

Capital and other investors,

was developing extensive

measures to vet clients and

ensure that the service was

not used toward illegal ends.

The

Slovenian

Bitcoin

exchange, Bitstamp, which

passed Mt. Gox over the

summer to become the largest

Bitcoin exchange in the

world, now required all its

customers to go through a

rigorous identity verification

process. The two young men

who

had

founded

the

exchange were rewarded with

visits to their Slovenian city,

Kranj, by Dan Morehead and

Pete Briger from Fortress

Capital, who wanted to invest

in the exchange.

THIS WAS ALL a long way

from the original Cypherpunk

vision of a new digital money

that was outside the reach of

governments

and

banks.

Satoshi Nakamoto’s aim in

creating the decentralized

Bitcoin

ledger—the

blockchain—was to allow

users to control their own

money so that no third party,

not even the government,

would be able to access or

monitor it. But people were

still

opting

for

the

convenience of centralized

services like Coinbase and

Bitstamp to hold their coins.

The great benefit of this

business model was that the

companies, rather than their

customers, dealt with the

headache of storing and

securing the money. When

early Bitcoin users lost the

private keys to their Bitcoin

addresses,

the

coins

associated

with

those

addresses were lost forever.

With a Coinbase wallet, on

the other hand, if a customer

lost the password, it was like

losing the password to a

normal

website—the

company could recover it.

What’s

more,

Coinbase

customers didn’t have to

download

the

somewhat

complicated Bitcoin software

and the whole blockchain,

with its history of all Bitcoin

transactions. This helped turn

Coinbase into the go-to

company

for

Americans

looking to acquire Bitcoins

and

helped

expand

the

audience for the technology.

There was, though, a

small but vocal community of

dissidents, many of them

early Bitcoin users, who were

eager to go back to the

original vision that Satoshi

had laid out. Few were as

outspoken as Roger Ver, the

Tokyo-based libertarian who

had, in earlier years, lost

money that he had entrusted

to Bitcoin businesses like

Bitcoinica and MyBitcoin.

Roger was still a fervent

believer in the initial vision

he had of Bitcoin as a game-

changing

technology

for

governments

around

the

world, just as his favorite

martial art, jujitsu, offered a

relatively simple way to

neutralize even the strongest

opponent. Roger had recently

begun comparing Bitcoin to

the honey badger, the weasel-

like equatorial mammal that

has a reputation for being

able to overpower and even

castrate the most ferocious

predator. During the summer

of 2013, with graphic design

assistance

from

Erik

Voorhees, Roger had put up a

new billboard in Silicon

Valley with a picture of the

indomitable animal and the

caption: “Bitcoin: The honey

badger of money.”

But Roger had grown

increasingly firm in his belief

that

centralized

Bitcoin

businesses

like

Coinbase

defeated the essential purpose

of Bitcoin by putting the

personal information of every

user in the files of a single

company that was vulnerable

to government subpoenas. In

the summer of 2013, aiming

to foster an alternative, Roger

channeled the energy that he

had earlier put into Charlie

Shrem and BitInstant into

another one of the startups he

had invested in back in 2012.

Blockchain.info had been

created by a reclusive young

man named Ben Reeves who

lived in the English city of

York and ran his site alone

until the middle of 2013.

Reeves had created what

looked

like

a

rather

unspectacular product: an

online wallet that, like other

wallets, offered a way to

access Bitcoins from any

computer

or

smartphone

without

downloading

the

entire

blockchain.

But

Reeves’s wallet was different

in a crucial way. Rather than

holding

its

customers’

Bitcoins,

Blockchain.info

kept only a small file for each

customer with the private

keys

of

that

customer,

encrypted in a way that made

it impossible for the company

to see the keys themselves.

Because Blockchain.info held

an encrypted file with the

keys, they were not on the

computer

of

the

user,

vulnerable to hackers. But

when a customer logged into

a Blockchain. info wallet, the

log-in process decrypted the

file so that the keys were

temporarily on the customer’s

computer and could be used

to access coins that the

customer

had

on

the

blockchain. The customer’s

data—how much money he

or she had and the transaction

history—was

viewable

through

Blockchain.info’s

online template. But the

company itself never saw the

data. Because Blockchain.

info did not hold money or a

transaction history for its

customers, it couldn’t be

subpoenaed

to

give

up

customer records. Nor could

the

company

steal

its

customers’ coins.

The site had attracted lots

of interest from people who

opened

350,000

free

Blockchain.info wallets by

the middle of 2013. But the

business model was not a

recipe for big profits. Because

blockchain.info didn’t hold

customer funds it was hard to

deduct fees for its services. It

also

didn’t

allow

its

customers to buy Bitcoin

online—a lucrative business

that would have put the

company

in

charge

of

customers’

money.

Blockchain.info users had to

acquire their coins elsewhere

and send them to their

Blockchain.info wallet.

This was a business

opportunity uniquely suited to

Roger Ver, who had never

been concerned, primarily,

with making money from his

Bitcoin

investments.

He

wanted to see Bitcoin live up

to its revolutionary potential.

As a result, when Reeves

offered to turn a loan that

Roger

had

made

to

Blockchain.info

into

a

majority

stake

in

the

company (so that Reeves

could avoid a tax headache),

Roger

jumped

at

the

opportunity.

In

London

for

a

conference

that

summer,

Roger paid for Reeves to

come down so they could

meet in person for the first

time. Reeves showed up, but

Roger had trouble getting

more than a few words out of

the shy young man. After

Roger went out to speak at

the conference, he came back

to his hotel room and found

that Reeves had abruptly left

and gone home to York.

This didn’t discourage

Roger. He thought Reeves’s

code spoke for itself and he

began looking for a chief

executive for the company, a

person who could deal with

the outside world so that

Reeves didn’t have to. When

Erik Voorhees put Roger in

touch with an old college

fraternity brother, Nic Cary,

Roger flew Nic to Tokyo. On

their first night, they went to

Roger’s

favorite

establishment,

the

Robot

Restaurant, where women in

blinking bikinis rode around

on large robotic animals.

Roger and Nic spent the next

few days immersed in deep

conversations—some of them

during drives around Tokyo

in Roger’s Lamborghini—

about

how

to

expand

Blockchain.info’s offering of

a wallet that could be used

free by anyone, anywhere in

the world, outside the reach

of regulators. Nic explained

his vision for making the

website more user friendly

and expanding the number of

languages.

Roger promptly hired Nic

to move to York and work

with Reeves in a three-story

house that Roger rented for

what he hoped would soon be

a much larger team. As Roger

began to build out the

company he determined that

this would be a real Bitcoin

company, with no bank

accounts and all salaries paid

in Bitcoins.

TO MANY REGULATORS and

investors, the only plausible

reason that someone would

want an untraceable Bitcoin

wallet, like Blockchain.info,

was to enable online drug

purchases or other nefarious

activity. Why else would you

want to keep your records

from government officials?

But one place where

Blockchain.info, and Bitcoin

more broadly, was gaining

popularity in the summer of

2013 put a slightly different

slant on the potential uses for

Bitcoin services that couldn’t

easily be monitored by the

government.

At a Bitcoin Meetup in

July 2013, two hundred or so

people packed into one of the

historic old buildings that fill

downtown Buenos Aires, the

capital of Argentina. At a

time

when

Bitcoin’s

popularity was faltering in the

United States, the turnout in

Argentina was many times

greater than the thirty or so

people who had attended the

most recent meetups in New

York and Silicon Valley.

Many of the attendees in

Buenos Aires had come

looking for an easy way to

buy Bitcoins and those who

purchased coins from other

attendees,

generally

with

cash, were usually set up with

a Blockchain.info wallet to

receive their coins.

This was a long way from

the first Bitcoin meetup in

Argentina, which had been

organized by Wences Casares

back in 2012 and had

attracted only a handful of

people. Since then, Wences

had given the credentials for

the meetup group to one of

his old friends who lived in

Buenos Aires. Each of the

meetups that his friend,

Diego,

organized

had

attracted more people, with a

big jump in July. The

increasing interest was not

hard to understand in the

Argentinian context. Over the

first half of 2013, the

Argentinian peso had been

plummeting in value against

other currencies. While the

government tried to deny the

rampant inflation, grocery

prices surged and everyone

tried to dump pesos. The

government’s

increasingly

desperate attempts to keep

money in the country—by

imposing a tax on foreign

credit card transactions, for

instance—only

made

the

problem

worse.

Keeping

savings

in

pesos

was

equivalent to throwing the

money

away,

but

the

government made it hard to

get money out of the peso

through

official

channels.

This made a currency like

Bitcoin and a wallet like

Blockchain.info, which the

government could not access,

very attractive.

In late June, one of the

nation’s largest newspapers,

La Nación, had put a story

about dinero digital at the top

of the front page of the

Sunday issue. La Nación was

associated with the ruling

left-wing party, and the

article didn’t talk much about

the

country’s

financial

problems. But the people

quoted in the article made it

clear

why

they

were

interested.

“You don’t have to be

battling

all

of

the

government’s problems, you

aren’t going to buy bread

with it, but it’ll save you if

you have a stash of stable

currency

that

tends

to

appreciate in value,” twenty-

two-year-old Emmanuel Ortiz

told the newspaper.

Bitcoin, with its famous

volatility, did fall in value

against the peso in May and

June

2013,

when

the

problems at Mt. Gox created

widespread pessimism. But

by the end of the summer,

Bitcoin had risen in value

against the peso every other

month of the year, and in

September it was up 860

percent against the dollar

since the beginning of the

year while the peso was down

some 25 percent against the

dollar.

The

excitement

was

building in Argentina despite

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