Every Man a Tiger: The Gulf War Air Campaign

Fighter pilots know something of what Arabs know, and what few of us like to admit — that none of us is in control of our lives, that we’re all in the hands of God.

In 1962, while he was stationed at Lakenheath, England, young Lieutenant Chuck Horner was in North Africa, at Wheelus, Libya, flying an F-100D Super Saber, training on the gunnery range that the Air Force had established in those days of friendship with the Libyan government of King Idris. The weather in Libya was better than anywhere in Europe; there were hundreds of miles of desert to spare for a gunnery range; and for recreation, the old walled town had a camel market, Roman ruins, decent Italian restaurants, and beaches nearby for relaxing on weekends. The officers’ club rocked every night, and the pilots had plenty of time to drink and lie, two of their most pleasurable activities. It was fighter pilot heaven.

One day at Wheelus, Horner was number three in a group of four, flying strafe patterns. Imagine four lines in a square pattern on the ground whose corners are — very roughly — a mile apart. At each of these corners is an F-100. The target is located in one corner of this box. The airplane on the corner turning to head toward the target is rolling in to shoot at the target. The airplane behind him at the corner diagonally across the box is turning base leg; he is getting ready to shoot next. The airplane behind him is flying toward the base leg turning point. And the airplane coming off the target has just completed his gunnery pass and is trying to visually acquire the other three aircraft so he can space on them for his next turn at the target. It’s extremely important to maintain that spacing. If the pilot puts the base leg too far out, then his dive angle is flat and he can pick up ricochets. If he gets it in too close, his dive angle’s too steep, and he’ll hit the ground while trying to pull up from his firing pass on the target.

That day there was a ghibly blowing — a sandstorm. Visibility was bad, less than a mile, which meant each pilot could see where he was in relation to the ground and could sometimes dimly spot the location of the aircraft ahead of him, but it was next to impossible to see the target itself or determine how the aircraft were spaced in relation to each other and the target. In other words, it was a day they shouldn’t have been on the range.

According to the procedure they normally followed, when a pilot made a turn, he’d call it over the radio—“turning in,” “turning off,” “turning downwind,” “turning base.” Most of these calls were for the information of the other pilots, to let everyone know where he was. But the “turning base” call was more serious. That call let the safety observer in the tower know he was about to approach the target. When the observer heard that, he would be watching the aircraft ahead of the caller making his firing pass, which meant he was also ready to hear the next pilot’s turning-in hot call. Then he would give the pilot, or deny him, clearance to fire. For instance, if another airplane was in the way, he would say, “Make a dry pass” or “You’re not cleared.” And then the pilot would break off his attack, fly through level, and resume the correct spacing.

At Wheelus was a nuclear target circle, next to the conventional bomb circle and strafe targets. This circle had a long run-in bulldozed in the desert that served as a guideline about where to fly when the fighters were in the strafe pattern. On the run-in line was a smaller bulldozed line, more like a short streak across it, that was located 13,000 feet out from the nuclear bomb bull’s-eye. This mark was exactly the right place to start the turn to base leg to set up a pass at the strafe target. Normally, pilots making the gunnery run would turn base over that same streak. On this day, though, the pilot (number two) ahead of Horner got lost. Instead of turning base over the bulldozed lines in the desert, he kept flying away from the target and the proper place to begin his base leg turn.

Horner, meanwhile, was waiting for him to call base, as he himself was closing in on the base turning point. Finally, the call came, “Turning base.” Meaning: Horner was looking for him on base to his left front, expecting him to be moving toward the final attack roll-in point. Of course, he wasn’t anywhere near there; he was in front of Horner, far from the base leg and the target.

As Horner searched the roll-in point ahead, he had to watch his airspeed. If he got too fast, he would overrun the man he thought was ahead of him; and if he got too slow he wouldn’t have the right airspeed (about 400 knots) for shooting his guns — the sight picture was based on airspeed and the angle of attack of the airplane. Still, he had no other choice; he slowed down, slowed down, slowed down… waiting for the other pilot to call “turn in.” Finally, Horner turned base — since the other guy had to be pretty close to his turn in by then — and hit the power, still waiting for number two to call his turn in to the target. A moment later, at last, number two called, “Turning in.” Horner scanned out toward the target, looking for him. He’s got to be shooting, he thought. He’s got to be shooting. By then, he’d reached the point where he himself had to turn in, still staring out left in the direction of the target. Out of the corner of his vision to his right, he saw something screaming toward him fast and close.

“Shit!” Horner cried out, instinctively pulling hard back on his stick; his F-100 went nose up and slowed — the way a hand does if held flat outside a car window with the wind slapping against it — and the other guy blasted through the space Horner’s aircraft was about to occupy. There was Horner, mushing ahead with his nose high, his plane acting like a water skier when the tow-boat slows down too much. But that didn’t last long, because the nose snapped through and the airplane flipped. Now he was staring at the ground, 3,500 feet below, his airplane in a stall.

Super Sabers were equipped with leading edge slats that worked by gravity; at slow airspeed they came out and gave the aircraft more lift. However, one of his slats had stuck — sand had clogged it — while the other one had deployed. As a result, one wing had a lot more lift than the other, which caused his aircraft to snap-roll and enter a fully stalled condition where there was insufficient airspeed to make the flight controls responsive. His aircraft had just become a metal anvil heading toward the earth. At normal flying speeds, the tail should have provided sufficient control to recover from the dive he had entered, but at his now-slow airspeed, the elevator surface in the tail was not effective.

He said to himself, Okay, pull up. The stick went all the way back to his lap. Nothing happened. The nose didn’t move. He glanced over to the airspeed indicator, and it read close to zero — fifty knots. For all life-supporting purposes, that was zero. He said to himself, Screw me. I’m out of here, and reached over to grab the ejection handles. But then pride took over.

You know, he told himself, if you eject from this airplane, you will never be able to drink with the guys in the bar again. You owe it to yourself to try and get it out. You always do.

When a pilot breaks a stall, he puts the stick all the way forward in order to pick up airspeed, and that way get some control surfaces working for him.

Horner did that, then tried to bring the nose up… and nothing happened.

Meanwhile, all he could see was ground screaming up at him, surrounding him, all about him. It was too late to punch out with the ejection seat. And nothing he had done was bringing the plane under control.

At that moment, he went through the death experience. I’m going to die, he said to himself. There is no way an airplane will recover from this shit. It’s not capable of doing it. I’m going to die out here in the shitty, nowhere desert, splattered like roadkill on the ground, and I’m not going to get out of this.

Two things happened then, both of them a normal consequence of the sudden onset of adrenaline pumping through one’s system as death nears:

First, outrage. He was filled with fury that his wife, Mary Jo, was pregnant with their first child and he would never see it. Second, time slowed. The fire pulse — the adrenaline — was pushing him to high speed. The data in his head was spinning through like mad. Even so, he was preternaturally calm. It was like one of those old science fiction stories, in which somebody takes a potion that speeds time up. An hour in speeded-up time is a second in the world’s time.

There he was, not far from the ground, certain he was about to die, feeling simultaneous outrage at dying and absolute peace and surrender, and time had slowed to a near stop. He had never felt so calm and serene in his life.

Somewhere in this timelessness, he somehow rose out of the top of his head and was suspended there, looking down at himself, sitting in the cockpit. As he stared down at himself, he thought, What can I do to get out of this? I don’t really want to die here.

Meanwhile, the airplane was sinking to the ground, at something like 150 to 200 miles an hour. He tried again to pull the nose up, but the nose rose only a little bit, an inch at a time. He was still going to hit the ground.

A memory came to him. He was sitting in the coffee bar back at the squadron in Nellis AFB in Nevada, where he’d spent three months in top-off training and nuclear certification before assignment to a fighter wing. As he sat with his cup of coffee, two instructor pilots were talking about a student in an F-100 who’d been turning base to final on a landing approach. At 300 feet above the ground, he’d let the nose of his aircraft get above the horizon, thus producing adverse yaw, and the plane had snapped over. By then, of course, the airplane had used up all its energy, which meant there was not enough airspeed to recover.

“What about the afterburner?” the instructor in the back cockpit had asked himself, and instinctively slammed the throttle into it, knowing that was their only chance to live.

The F-100 engine was not supposed to light in afterburner at slow speeds; and ordinarily it wouldn’t. Instead it would shoot about twenty feet of flame out the air intake in the front of the jet, and there’d be a violent explosion that would physically knock one’s feet off the floor. This was called a compressor stall, which — though it might seem odd — didn’t harm the engine. If a pilot happened to cause the engine to compressor-stall, he then pulled the throttle to clear the engine, then brought the throttle back up as he got more airspeed and more air going through the engine. Once he had these, he could try lighting the afterburner again.

Back at Nellis, when the instructor had thrown his throttle into afterburner, the engine shouldn’t have lit. It should have experienced a compressor stall. But it hadn’t. It had lit, and given him half again as much thrust. And that thrust had saved his life.

Remembering that, Horner said, “Let’s try the afterburner.” He moved the throttle up full, then pushed it outboard… and waited. He felt a shiver in the aircraft, and looked up. Above him were sand dunes to his right and to his left. But he was moving ahead; and he realized that he now had the airplane, the controls were responding; and the jet continued to respond as he made small inputs to level off above the ground. He was flying it carefully, carefully, carefully… If I screw this up one little bit, he told himself, then the aircraft is going to hit the ground.

The afterburner had lit after all, and the nose was actually coming up, though of course the tail was now probably inches above the ground. Behind him, the increased thrust hitting the sand looked like a Texas tornado. Slowly, the airplane staggered up out of the desert.

About that time, the tower officer, sensing trouble, put in a call: “Three, are you having a problem?”

“No,” Horner answered, “but I am returning to base.” And he flew home.

★ Later, the events of that day hit him hard. He put the maneuver under his mind’s microscope, and he realized that the numbers didn’t compute. There was no way he could have recovered that airplane. It was physically impossible. The physics of the maneuver were such that it just wouldn’t work.

If that’s the way things are, he asked himself, why did it happen? Why was I allowed to live?

The answer wasn’t long in coming. What he’d just experienced out there over the North African desert was a message from God. Horner didn’t make a big issue of it, but he was a deeply religious man. God was saying to him, “Mister Fighter Pilot, you aren’t in charge of your life. I have a purpose for you, even though you don’t know what it is yet. So get on with your life and see what happens. And just remember: I’m the one in charge here. Any questions?”

It was as though God literally, physically, had kept his airplane from hitting the ground… at least that’s how he saw it. He had no other explanation that fit the facts.

After that Chuck Horner had changed fundamentally. Here is how he describes it:

Every day of my life after that event has been a gift. I was killed in the desert in North Africa. I’m dead. From then on I had no ambition in terms of what course my life was going to take. That was up to God to decide. I’ d go do the best I could. I’ d enjoy whatever promotions, pay, money that came my way. Anything that came my way I’d enjoy and use, but I wouldn’t live for it. I never wanted to be a general, for instance. I was proud when I made general; I was pleased; I liked the money; and I like people saying, “Yes sir,” “No sir,” and “You’re really good-looking today,” and all that. I loved all the lies and all that shit. Don’t get me wrong. But the fact that I made general is no big deal. It’s what God wanted me to do, not what I wanted to do. So I gave up me.

Now Christians talk about rebirth. Some piss me off when they do. They go around holier than thou. “Well, I’ve got the word now, because I’ve been reborn in Jesus.” Well, fine, okay. But if you really have all that, you don’t need to tell me, I’ ll know.

In my case I know. I was reborn. Why? He wanted me to do something… What? I don’t know. He has never told me what He wanted me to do…

Whatever it was, I let go of my life and everything else in 1962. Sure, I fall into passion and lust and smallness. I’m still a human being. But when I really start getting upset about something, I just say, “Screw it, I’m dead, it doesn’t matter.”

That was the way it was twenty-eight years later, in August of 1990 when I was riding in an airplane going from Jeddah to Riyadh, temporarily in command of all U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, and I said to myself, “What in the hell am I going to do? If they come south, I’m responsible. Well, shit, I don’t know how to do that. I’ve never fought an invading army. We don’t have any forces. What am I going to do? How am I going to do all this?” And then I realized it was what the Arabs call inshallah: “It is not mine to do; it’s mine to do the best I can; it’s going to happen according to God’s will.”

INTO THE SKY

The Divine purpose is rarely easy to discern, but it is safe to say the obvious in Chuck Horner’s case: he was meant to be a fighter pilot. It might have come as a surprise, though, to anyone who had known him as a boy and young man, in Davenport, Iowa. They’d have had to look extremely close to see the few glimmers that showed before he fell into the Air Force ROTC during the course of slouching without much visible purpose through the University of Iowa.

When he’d gone away to college, he’d found classes a bore. He avoided most of them, and learned whatever he needed to keep a C average by picking the brains of anyone who actually attended. Otherwise, he worked at odd jobs, drank beer, sat around arguing with other students, and did his best to have a good time. Meanwhile, when the C average killed off what hopes he had of majoring in medicine, he needed to cast around for something to occupy his time after he graduated until he could figure out what he wanted to do with his life.

In those days, all male students at Iowa had to be enrolled in an ROTC program, and making the best of it, he’d opted for Air Force ROTC… they had fewer parades. As it turned out, he actually liked the experience, and even showed some leadership — he could drill the troops better than most, and he made marching fun for his guys by making it challenging rather than tedious. But the real pull of ROTC came to him almost out of the blue. He discovered flying.

Born on October 19, 1936, Chuck Horner was old enough for World War II to have made a strong impact on his young mind. The war had made aviation enthusiasts out of everyone, but for him it was more personal. His heroes were all pilots, especially his cousin, Bill Miles, the Jack Kennedy of the family — an all-state football player and straight-A student, tall and good-looking, with a winning smile, who always had time for little guys like Chuck. Everyone in the family looked up to Bill. When the war broke out, he’d joined the Army Air Corps and become a B-24 pilot.

One afternoon in 1944, when Chuck was eight years old, he came home from school to find his mother crying. Bill was dead, on a mission over Italy. A single 37mm antiaircraft artillery round had punched through the airplane’s skin beneath his seat and killed him instantly, the only casualty on the mission. The news devastated the whole family; and it left an eerie association in Chuck — death, heroism, and flying.

Later on, Chuck lost a second pilot hero.

Like Bill Miles, John Towner was a man young boys idolized. Handsome and self-assured, John had also been an all-state football player in high school; and he’d gone on to play football at the university. In 1952, when Chuck was a sophomore in high school, John had graduated; married the youngest of Chuck’s three older sisters, Pud[2]; entered the Air Force; and started fighter pilot training. Basic gunnery training was taught at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona. Shortly after Christmas of 1953, John was killed on the air-to-ground bombing range at Luke, when his F-84 aircraft failed to pull out of a dive-bomb pass. Once again, the family was devastated; and once again came the eerie association for Chuck of death, heroes, and flying.

It didn’t turn him against flying, however. He already had the gift possessed by every successful fighter pilot — the ability to put death in a box, and keep it separate.

It wasn’t until Air Force ROTC, however, that he really got hooked. It was in ROTC that he first spent serious time in the air — first in a single-engine Ryan Navion piloted by one of his ROTC instructors (who, to Horner’s delight, liked to push the normally staid executive aircraft into loops and rolls), and then in a little Aeronca Champion, in which he learned to fly solo. Flying captured him then — he was good at it. He was enthralled for life.

★ Chuck Horner had met Mary Jo Gitchell, two years his junior, when they’d both been in high school; and they’d continued dating, with some ups and downs, in college. Though they were not at all alike, he knew from the start that she was the right woman for him. He was shy; she loved to meet people. He hated to talk; she could spin words out of the simplest event into rich detail, bubbling over with enthusiasm.

By the time he left college, Chuck knew he wanted to make the Air Force his life, but he also knew that such a life involved hardships that could destroy even the most secure marriage. Before he left school, Horner discussed all this with her, and the two of them reached an agreement: she had to live with his airplanes; and she had to know that he cared for flying as much as he cared for her. She did not come second in his life — it was just that he wanted very badly to excel, and he didn’t want her to grow jealous of his mistress. She needed to know ahead of time the sacrifices that would be expected of both of them. (There is a joke about the wife of a fighter pilot who complains, “You love the Air Force more than you love me,” to which he replies, “Yes, but I love you more than the Army or the Navy.”)

For her part of the bargain she got control of the family money, which at $222.00 a month, plus $100.00 flight pay, was not much of a victory. On the other hand, she knew Chuck pretty well by then; and he wasn’t famous for a heavy supply of cash. When they’d started dating at the end of her freshman year in college, for instance, they’d had to tap her college money to pay for dinner at a pizza place on Sunday night. One time he’d bought her a birthday present, a small portable radio. When the check bounced, he’d had to borrow the money from her to make it good.

Their agreement about money still stands.

They were married on the twenty-second of December 1958, in the Congregational Church in Cresco, Iowa, Mary Jo’s hometown.

★ Horner was commissioned in the Air Force Reserve[3] on Friday, June 13, 1958, just before his graduation from the University of Iowa. In October, he attended Preflight Training at Lackland AFB, San Antonio, Texas. And in November, he was sent to Spence Field in Moultrie, Georgia, to enter primary flying training in the T-34 and T-28 aircraft.

At that time, USAF flight training consisted of about 120 hours in T-34s (two-seat prop planes still used today, with a turboprop engine, by the Navy), and T-28s (larger than T-34s, not unlike P-47s from World War II). This took about six months, and was followed by another six months in T-33 jets, after which the student pilots got their wings. Horner loved every minute.

The training was strenuous, and there were few active duty pilot places to fill — it was not unlike an entire college senior class showing up at NFL summer camp and vying for a position on the forty-man roster. At this time, the Air Force was capable of producing far more pilots than they needed. Their pilot factory had been constructed to satisfy the huge need for pilots during the Korean War, but now the Air Force was smaller and more stable, and thus the name of the game was to wash out anyone who showed a weakness. Instead of receiving additional instruction when he made a mistake, a student pilot entered a process designed to eliminate him from the program. He was gone, no second chances. That meant he never left blood in the water, or else the sharks would come to visit.

The overall washout rate from entry into preflight at Lackland to graduation from Basic Training was near 85 percent, with the vast majority coming from the aviation cadets, men who did not have a college degree. (Student officers tended to be older and more mature than the cadets; and they had additionally made it through college — itself a screening process — and had passed through the light-plane screening program.) Every day someone would be out-processing after being eliminated.

To make sure he was never in jeopardy, Horner studied as he had never studied in college. He actually practiced the next day’s flight maneuvers sitting at home in a chair, going over in his mind all the challenges he might run into the next day. The hard work paid off. He was soon headed to jet training at Laredo AFB and, if he made it, his wings.

The T-33 (T Bird) Horner would fly there was a two-seat training version of the F-80, one of the first jet fighters. F-80s had fought in Korea.

The T Bird was a good-looking aircraft, but old — most of them had been around for five or ten years; the T Bird’s technology was from the 1940s. It was fully acrobatic, very honest to fly, reasonably fast, and could stay airborne for two and a half hours at high altitude, but since it was straight-winged, it was subsonic. The worst thing about the T Bird was the seat. Though there was a seat cushion, you sat on a bailout oxygen bottle, which was like sitting on an iron bar. Flying a T Bird meant you had “a one-hour ass.” After you were in the jet that long, your tail hurt so bad you wanted to land.

In those days, the Air Force was still young and wild. Aircraft were underpowered and often poorly maintained, not nearly as safe as they are today. The leaders in the air were often veterans of World War II or Korea, where they had been rushed into combat with little training and a lot of attitude. Those who had survived were often indifferent to risk-taking that would make most people cringe. Low-level flying was low, often measured in a few feet above the ground, though as the old flyboy joke put it, the world’s record for low flying was tied, with fatal results. If it had been tough in Georgia, where they eliminated half the class, it was going to be hell in Texas.

Yet for Horner, life was blessed. He loved his work, flying came easily to him, and he excelled in the academic courses. He learned instruments by flying under a hood in the backseat of a T Bird; he learned transition — takeoff and landing and acrobatic maneuvers — and he learned flying formation. He knew now that he wanted to be a fighter pilot.

His flight commander, Captain Jack Becko (he looked a little like Jack Palance and was a terror in the sky), had been an F-86 pilot in Korea and was a joy to fly with. Captain Becko loved flying and acrobatics and formation. Too many pilots were timid — they got nervous in close formation or joining up after takeoff — but Horner, who loved it all as much as Becko did, was very aggressive, very wild on the controls. The flight commander adored that; he howled with glee when he flew an instruction ride with Horner, and Horner slammed the throttle around and made the jet go where it needed to be to stay in formation. And then, after they’d gone through all the required maneuvers, Captain Becko showed him how to shoot down another jet.

Some of the more conservative instructors — the ones with multi-engine time — were less enthusiastic, but since Horner always flew well and was always in position, they kept quiet.

At Laredo, a table, little larger than a card table, was the “office” where an instructor briefed his students. The flight room had about ten of them along the walls. On them were maps and diagrams under Plexiglas, so you could draw on them with a grease pencil, to show the path over the ground during an instrument approach, the procedures needed to compensate for wind drift, and the like. Each IP would have from one to three students in his table.

Horner grew so proficient that one day the instructor for his table, First Lieutenant Art Chase, asked him to fly lead for another, much less skilled, student. That way, Chase could get in the other student’s backseat and provide formation instruction.

When the other student lagged two ship lengths behind him, Horner saw a temptation it took him no time to give in to. He knew it was going to put him in deep trouble. It was not part of the training, it was not briefed, he was supposed to provide a stable platform for the other student to fly off of, and if he made a wrong move, they would collide and all three pilots would be killed. But what the hell, he thought, you’ve got to go for it sometimes.

He reefed back hard on the stick, kicked right rudder, rolled hard right, and slipped neatly in behind the other aircraft in a perfect guns tracking position. The instructor, in what had now become Horner’s target, never even saw him disappear. Worried they had overrun him and were about to collide, Chase started shouting on the radio. At about that time, Horner was calling guns tracking and feeling like the biggest, meanest tiger in South Texas.

That feeling lasted about as long as it took Art Chase to order him firmly back in the lead.

He knew then that he was in for — and deserved — one huge ass-chewing. He knew he had taken unfair advantage of his friendship with Chase. Yet none of that mattered. He had joy in his heart. By executing a difficult and dangerous dogfighting maneuver, he had proved to himself that he was a fighter pilot.

He has never regretted doing that roll over the top that flushed Art Chase and his table mate out in front for a guns tracking pass.

When they landed, there was indeed hell to pay; Chase wanted Chuck Horner’s hide, and he gave him the ultimate punishment, which was to be sent into the Flight Commander’s office, where you were made to wonder if you would escape with your life, let alone stay in the program. There, Jack Becko gave Horner one of the finest dressings-down ever delivered. Then, as Horner was leaving the room — scared but not defeated — Becko gave him a wink. “Chuck, you’re going to make one hell of a fighter pilot,” he said.

At that moment Chuck Horner walked on clouds. I’m going to be a fighter pilot!

The only problem was: nobody was getting fighter assignments.

With the draw-down after the Korean War, if you wanted to be a fighter pilot, you could get assigned to either Air Defense Command or Tactical Air Command. By Chuck Horner’s time, Air Defense Command was a dead-end job, flying obsolete planes. Since it was becoming obvious that ballistic missiles were about to replace the Soviet bomber threat, there wasn’t going to be much need for fighter interceptors to knock out the bombers. Over time, the Air Force has gone from a hundred squadrons of fighter interceptors to about six or eight today.

If you were sent to Tactical Air Command, however, you would check out in F-84s, F-86s, or perhaps F-100s, and spend six to eight months in gunnery school.[4] Since the Air Force had no need for fighter pilots, however, you would probably then go to bomber school for another six to eight months and graduate as a Strategic Air Command B-47 copilot, or, if you were one of the top students, you might be asked to remain in Air Training Command and become an instructor pilot. There you would spend three years building flight time and teaching, but a lot of that flying would be in the backseat of the T Bird, a fate Chuck Horner did not relish. After that, if you wanted to fly fighters, you would probably get assigned to gunnery school, and if you wanted to fly heavies, to bomber school, or to air transport school. There was in those days — and there is still — an informal screening system: people believed to be incapable of flying fighters were urged to fly, or were otherwise sent to, heavies.

Because Horner had graduated number one in his flight and was fighter-qualified, he was eligible either for instructor training or for one of the few gunnery school slots. The matter came to a head when the Group Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jack Watkins, offered him a teaching spot at Laredo. When the offer was made, however, he gulped, refused, and somehow found himself picked for one of the few F-100 gunnery school slots. He figured you better follow your destiny, even if it might take him to B-47s. The main thing was that fighter flying was in his blood. Even if he got sent on to B-47s, he knew that somehow in the future he would find a way to fly fighters.

★ One of the proudest moments in Chuck Horner’s life came on the day Mary Jo pinned a very tiny set of pilot wings on his uniform. The ceremony took place in Laredo, in a paint-peeling, run-down, non-air-conditioned base movie theater, straight out of World War II. He had never worked so hard for anything as he had for those wings.

It was also in Laredo that Horner was introduced to the tough side of military aviation, the missing-man formation flyby, to commemorate a pilot killed in an aircraft accident.

One day, he was sitting on the end of the runway in his T-33, awaiting takeoff clearance, when the aircraft ahead of him, as it was lifting off, rolled abruptly and flew into the ground. The ailerons — the movable surfaces on the aft part of the wing that enable a pilot either to keep his wings level or to roll the aircraft — were incorrectly rigged[5] so that both of them moved in the same direction. When the pilot made an input to level the wings, the aircraft rolled; the more he tried to level the wings, the more he kept rolling.

So there was Chuck Horner, a twenty-two-year-old kid with a fire-breathing jet strapped to him, staring at what just seconds before had been a silver jet, and was now billowing black smoke and orange flame. The rescue helicopter and fire trucks roared onto the scene, and the flames were quickly extinguished. Then the pilot’s remains were placed on the helicopter (there was no way anyone could survive that crash) and were just passing overhead on the way to the base hospital, with the charred legs of the pilot’s body dangling out the door, when the tower cleared Horner for takeoff. He swallowed hard, closed the canopy, pushed the throttle forward, released the brakes, and prayed.

In the thirty-six years in the Air Force that followed, he learned to do that again and again. Too many times, he and Mary Jo went to church services that ended outside the chapel with four pilot buddies roaring overhead in formation, and then the number three man pulling abruptly up to disappear from sight heavenward.

★ If flying in training command was dangerous, gunnery training was several notches worse. Chuck Horner took to it immediately.

On January 5, 1960, he reported to Williams AFB, Arizona, for gunnery training and check-out in the supersonic F-100.

The Super Saber, which had replaced the venerable F-86 Saber, was the first USAF aircraft capable of exceeding Mach 1 in level flight. It was a swept-wing, single-seat, afterburner-equipped, single-engine fighter, and its mission was day-fighter air-to-air combat, though subsequent models were also modified to carry both conventional and nuclear bombs. For armament, it had four internal 20mm rapid-fire cannons and carried heat-seeking air-to-air missiles. The gun sight was primitive by today’s standards, but sophisticated at the time. It was gyrostabilized, and a radar in the nose provided range to target for air-to-air gunnery. The F-100 was normally flown at 500 knots/hr and had reasonable range: with external drop tanks, it had about a 500-mile radius. For its day, it was reasonably maneuverable. Though older aircraft like the F-86 were more agile, the afterburner engine gave the F-100 an edge on acceleration and maintaining energy. Maintaining energy is a plus in air-to-air combat. When a pilot loses his energy all he can do is point the nose down and keep turning while the enemy figures out how to blow him away. F-100s were used in the Vietnam War, primarily in South Vietnam, for close air support, since by then the aircraft did not have the performance, speed, range, payload, and survivability to make it over North Vietnam. Those who flew it liked it: it was honest most of the time, and with it they got to do air-to-air as well as air-to-ground gunnery training.

The training of fighter pilots has always been dedicated to creating an individual capable of meeting an adversary in the sky who is flying an equally capable aircraft, and shooting him down. A pilot can’t hold back or be timid. There is no room for self-doubt. He must know his limitations, but he must always believe that the better man will survive, and that man is him. When Chuck Horner was in the program, its unofficial title was “Every Man a Tiger,” and the main emphasis, aside from flying and gunnery, was on the pilot’s attitude and self-confidence.

Chuck Horner has never been short of self-confidence.

Meanwhile, for a lieutenant student, the training was tough, the flying and instructions in the air demanding, and the debriefings brutal. Many nights Horner rolled into bed exhausted from pulling Gs in the air while trying to keep track of other fighters in a swirling dogfight over the desert. Yet often he fell asleep with the light still on, as Mary Jo stayed up to finish her homework. In the morning, she usually left for classes before he woke up.

★ A superior fighter pilot is made up of one part skill, one part attitude, one part aggression, and one part madness. You have to be more than a little insane to take on tasks that will likely kill a man unless he performs them perfectly and with luck. The good ones perform those tasks regularly and successfully… most of the time.

One day when Horner was going through gunnery school, he was involved in a one-on-one air-to-air simulated combat engagement with an instructor pilot, Major Country Robinson. Horner was in a single-seat F-10 °C, and Robinson was flying an F-100F with another student sandbagging — along for the ride — in the backseat.

When two fairly equal pilots in equal jets get into a fight starting from a neutral setup — meaning neither has an initial advantage in speed, altitude, or nose position — then one of two predictable outcomes will come about. Either one of the pilots will make a mistake, allowing the other to get behind his adversary and achieve a guns tracking position, and the game is over with a clear winner. Or each pilot will fly his jet to its maximum performance, conserve energy appropriately, and correctly maneuver on his own and in response to the maneuvers of his adversary. In this case, neither pilot will achieve a position to kill his adversary, and both aircraft will wind up in a nose-low death spiral. In ordinary practice combat, one of the pilots must call this off, usually when they pass some minimum altitude such as 10,000 feet above the ground.

On this day, young Second Lieutenant Horner was matched against the wily, experienced IP Robinson, meaning the IP expected to wait for a green mistake, kill him, and then put him through a tough debriefing, so he wouldn’t make the mistake again.

The problem was ego.

They flew out to the area north of Williams AFB, where they were based, turned away from each other, flew apart until nearly out of visual range, and turned back in, passing each other. “Fights on” was called, and they started the dance of death. Major Robinson was good, and he didn’t make a mistake. Since his jet was a two-seater, it was a little heavier than Horner’s, which made a slight difference in Horner’s favor. At the same time, Horner had learned his lessons well up to this point and was holding his own. The result: no one was gaining clear advantage. They twisted, turned, and rolled, nose up to gain smaller turning radius, diving to gain speed for maneuvering, using afterburner but sparingly (if either used too much, he’d exhaust his fuel and have to declare bingo and head for home, which meant the other pilot won). Finally they were canopy to canopy, each in a steep dive; for neither aircraft had enough airspeed to bring its nose back up without accelerating, which would place that aircraft ahead of the other — and it would lose. They passed 30,000 feet, then 20,000. The altimeter needles looked like stopwatches, they were unwinding so fast, and meanwhile the airspeed was approaching the minimum that allowed control of the aircraft.

Suddenly, the two-seat F-100F snapped uncontrollably and entered a flat spin, an unfortunate tendency of the two-seat F-100 at low speed. At that point, by the rules, Major Robinson should have made a “knock it off ” call. In any event, he had to get on with the business of recovering his aircraft before passing 10,000 feet, or else begin to seriously consider ejecting from his fighter. But he was good. He was able to work the recovery and still keep the fight going. He was not going to lose… not to any damn second lieutenant student.

During all of this time, Horner was able to extend away from Robinson’s jet and achieve sufficient airspeed to regain enough nose authority to bring his gun sight to bear on the spinning, falling instructor pilot’s jet. But his own aircraft was in a full stall, falling toward the ground at about the same rate as Major Robinson’s. No matter: he was on the radio calling, “Guns tracking kill,” and he knew his gunnery film would show the F-100F slowly turning in front of him, nose, tail, nose, tail, nose, tail.

Got him!

He’d beaten his better… who was in the fascinating position of being about to die if he didn’t take instant action. Horner had half a second advantage over his instructor, in that he could wait that long before he had to recover his jet. He put that half-second to the only possible use: he kept the pip of his gun sight on the other jet and felt the rush.

Finally, neither of them could stand it any longer; they broke off the mock combat and turned to recovering their aircraft — with each regaining control only a few feet above the yucca, palo verde, and mesquite, fractions of seconds before taking things too far and crashing.

Clearly each of them had failed to exercise good judgment, each had violated the rules that guided training, and each should have figured out a way to achieve a simulated kill before approaching the extreme they reached. But neither did any of these. They were both so deeply involved in the fight that everything else was secondary. They were both training with the intensity combat requires, except in combat no one would be so foolish as to allow the enemy to tie him up in such a tight-turning battle. They fell into that trap because they were flying nearly equal jets, and fighting with the same level of proficiency. In the end, it was simply a contest of wills, and neither flinched until the very last second.

That ability to push on to the margin and not crash is what a fighter pilot seeks. Sadly, the ability to judge the ultimate “knock it off ” point escapes some pilots, and they die, or else they pad that point to allow for their own inadequacies, and find themselves constantly defeated.

Wise, old pilots look for an early, easy kill, relying on experience and knowledge; and they don’t play fair. They pick a weak one from the pack they’re fighting, go for a quick kill, and then blow through the fight. The young pilot fails to recognize the weak ones, so he moves in close and turns and burns. He is strong and quick, however, so he can get away with it. When a pilot’s old, he tires faster, and he avoids the pain of lots of sustained Gs. He can still pull them — but why, if he can succeed with less effort and more brains?

★ At the end of the training, Horner received his first operational assignment: he’d be flying F-100Ds with the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing, RAF Lakenheath, England. His faith had paid off. Suddenly the Air Force needed fighter pilots again. He and his entire class had dodged the fate so many previous gunnery school graduates had suffered, condemnation to B-47s. They were going to join the fighter community worldwide.

Before he left the States, there was a short stint at Nellis AFB in Nevada for top-off training. There, Horner checked out in the F-100D, got training dropping live bombs, did day and night air-to-air refueling off a KB-29 tanker, fired a live AIM-9B heat-seeking missile, and planned and flew realistic combat missions.

Since the F-100D had a better nuclear bombing system than the F-10 °C they had trained in at Williams before coming to Nellis, and since the primary mission of the 48th TFW was to sit on alert with a nuclear weapon targeted for the evil empire, there was a great deal of emphasis on delivering nuclear weapons (their secondary mission was conventional weapons delivery). The training for that involved flying a single ship in at low level — between 50 and 1,000 feet above the ground — while navigating and making turn points and accurate timing at 360 knots. A pilot would arrive at an initial point at a specified time, accelerate to 480 knots, and by means of very accurate visual navigation, he’d arrive at a precomputed offset point (upwind) from a target. From there, he’d start an afterburner Immelmann,[6] so that at a precomputed angle (just over ninety degrees — almost straight up), a gyro would release a 2,000-pound nuclear shape (in training, filled with concrete). After release, he’d bring the nose below the horizon on his back, roll wings level upright, and make a high-speed escape away from the blast of the nuclear weapon. Meanwhile, the bomb was climbing to 30,000 feet. There it would run out of speed, swap ends, and fall to the ground. The time of flight of the weapon gave him the time needed to escape the blast.

Since it was not easy to do all this accurately, an instructor pilot would usually orbit the target to document release time and to score the hit: you can see the dust fly when 2,000 pounds of concrete going warp nine hits the desert. The SAC generals called this method of delivery “over the shoulder,” but the pilots, who had no love for the nuclear tasking (if all you and your adversary are doing is deterring each other, you are both being stupid), had another name for it. They called it “Idiot Loops.”

SQUADRONS AND WINGS

For all the impressive technology of its multirole aircraft, equipment, and weapons, for all the freedom of the environment in which it operates, the U.S. Air Force is structurally only a few degrees away from feudal. It is an organization of knights and squires. The knights are those who are rated (to fly), while the squires are all the others — the vast majority of the force — who keep the planes in the air and the bases running. In the air, only the knights — the rated — fight the enemy. Though the majority of the rated are officers,[7] rated enlisted members include flight engineers, load masters, gunners, and parachute jumpers — PJs, rescue men. PJs were among those most decorated during the Vietnam War.

The elitism of the rated is a given. The knights of the sky, by virtue of their position, are offered automatic respect (which they can, of course, forfeit). In practical terms, that means that the enlisted troops like to see their officers behaving like heroes; it increases their own stature as the people who keep the heroes in the air. On the other hand, officers who don’t behave like proper knights of the sky get into big trouble: there are a million moving parts under the skin of an aircraft, and only the enlisted force knows what is working and what might get the pilot killed. Wise officers make sure their relationship with the enlisted force is respectful — both ways.

By contrast, the enlisted do most of the fighting and dying in traditional armies, and rank is all-important. In these organizations, nothing is left to chance, communication tends to be top-down, and command means telling a crowd of enlisted guys with loaded weapons who didn’t ask to be there in the first place to go forth and charge up the hill, when even the most dense among them can figure out that about half of them are going to get killed or wounded.

In the Air Force, the transaction is far different when an officer strolls out to his jet and chats for a moment with his crew chief — a person who selected the Air Force in order to grow his (or her) technical expertise. The officer asks, “How is the jet?” and the enlisted man (or woman) answers, “The jet’s ready to go. Good luck. Let me help you strap in. Go get one for me.” Much is implied in this exchange. The crew chief knows that the officer, who is about to go risk his life for his nation, for his unit, and even for him or her, has entrusted his very life with his crew chief ’s talent and ability to take responsibility. The officer will die if his chief has forgotten to connect a fuel line or rig an ejection seat properly.

The mutual dependence between the rated and the enlisted in the Air Force is profound.

★ When Horner arrived at Lakenheath in the 1960s, this is how a squadron and a wing were set up.

In flight, the basic fighting element consists of two ships, but most fighter flights are made up of two elements — four ships. Two elements are more than enough aircraft for the flight leader to keep track of and manage. In a flight of four, the most experienced pilot is usually the flight lead, number one, and he usually flies in front, with number two on one side and number three on the other; number four flies on number three’s wing opposite the flight leader. If you hold up your left hand, the middle finger is number one; the index finger is number two, a wingman; the ring finger is number three, the element lead; and the little finger is number four, another wingman.

The flight leader plans the mission, determines the goals to be achieved, briefs the flight, navigates, dictates the tactics, and in general works all the details.

The element lead, or deputy flight lead, backs him up and takes charge if for some reason the lead is unable to maintain the lead (if he loses his radio, crashes, aborts, or is shot down). He also keeps track of navigation, in case the leader gets lost; clears the sky behind numbers one and two aircraft; keeps track of his own wingman, to make sure he is doing his job; and thinks about what he would be doing better if he was the leader.

Number three and number one run the flight and make the decisions about how to attack, what formations to use, and whether or not to penetrate bad weather. It is their job to get the mission done and bring the wingmen home alive.

The wingmen, number two and number four, are the greenest flyers. They are expected to keep their mouths shut unless they are low on fuel, have an emergency, or see an enemy aircraft approaching the flight (especially from behind it) — but only after no one else has called it out.

Though watching over four aircraft is near the limit of any single leader’s abilities, air-to-ground missions will sometimes contain up to sixteen aircraft. This is usually not a problem, as long as nothing goes amiss in the preplanned mission. However, if an enemy fighter somehow works into the middle of a sixteen-ship flight, it will be a chaotic mess, with airplanes all over the place trying to kill the enemy, stay alive, and regain order.

In determining who is to be the flight leader, rank in itself is not an issue. However, since flight leaders are usually the experienced pilots, they are more often than not captains and majors, or — higher still — lieutenant colonels, such as the squadron commander and the ops officer. In Vietnam, however, when the Air Force frequently used nonfighter pilots, the flight leader was often a young lieutenant with sixty to ninety missions under his belt leading around majors and lieutenant colonels who had come from bombers and thus weren’t credible in fighters. (This was one of the many U.S. failures in Vietnam that resulted from the rotation policies: a pilot came home after 100 missions in the North or after a year in the South, and other pilots were rotated in for their chance at combat… whether or not they had been trained in fighters, or even — for that matter — in conventional war.)

All young jocks aspire to make leader. Most of the time, they do it by working their way up a complex training regime: first, check rides as element lead, then a few rides with an instructor on the wing as practice lead, and finally a flight-lead check ride. That system isn’t always possible, however. At Lakenheath, for example, there was no established flight-lead check-out program. Instead, the squadron flight commander, operations officer, standardization and evaluation pilot, instructor pilot, or the commander flew with a pilot a few times, looked at his check rides, then just published orders making him a flight leader.

★ There are four flights in each squadron, with about six pilots in each flight. The primary work force of the squadron are the line pilots — that is, the combat-ready pilots. Flight commanders are always line pilots, while instructor pilots, functional test pilots, and standardization and evaluation pilots may or may not be; the ops officer and squadron commander are overhead pilots. The command chain runs from line pilots through the flight commander, who is the line pilot’s first line supervisor, to the squadron commander (but the squadron operations officer has a great deal to say about each pilot’s life, and he usually becomes the next squadron commander) up to the wing director of operations, and finally to the wing commander.

Flight commanders shepherd the five pilots assigned to them. They work with the ops officer’s shop to schedule missions for their assigned pilots; they tell them when they are going on alert; what sorties they will fly and when, and when they will go on temporary duty (TDY) to places such as Wheelus or to Germany as a forward air controller (FAC);[8] and, most important, they write their pilots’ Officer Efficiency Reports (OER). That is to say, they chew their asses and pat them on the back.

The squadron commander runs the squadron; he tells everyone what to do based on what he is told at the wing staff meetings. The operations officer’s job is to make sure the operation goes smoothly. Thus, he watches over the squadron’s monthly schedule and makes sure it is workable. Then he makes sure that the flying schedule is going as planned; and he makes changes as pilots call in sick, aircraft break, the weather turns bad, or as someone needs a special, unanticipated training event. He also works with the other squadrons to coordinate missions and training. And finally, if the commander is flying or TDY, he backs him up by attending wing staff meetings and taking over other duties, as appropriate.

Other important members of the squadron staff:

Stan Eval (standardization and evaluation) pilots administer check rides and tests, inspect operations for compliance with regulations, and check on the personal equipment of the troops to make sure they are taking care of the pilots’ masks and G suits. From Stan Eval pilots, line pilots get an instrument check (capability to fly on instruments), tactical check (capability to fly a combat mission), and flight-lead check (capability to lead other pilots around the sky).

Instructor pilots fly with the new pilots until their initial check ride, and also with pilots scheduled for upgrade (such as someone who is about to become a flight leader).

Weapons and Tactics pilots, usually fighter weapons school graduates, watch over bomb scores to make sure the squadron is doing a good job or if it needs extra training in bomb-delivery techniques; they keep track of the weapons-delivery systems, to make sure maintenance is keeping the guns harmonized with the gun sights and the release racks working properly (the release racks have to give the bombs a precise shove when the bomb shackles are blown open); they conduct training classes at bomb commanders school; and they keep the tactics manuals up-to-date and available for the line pilots to study in their free time.

Trainers keep watch over individual training records and make sure the flight commanders are scheduling their people for needed training programs.

Intelligence, usually a lieutenant, is nonrated. He keeps track of enemy threats, conducts classroom training on such things as SAMs and enemy aircraft, and helps in mission planning.

★ A typical squadron schedule at Lakenheath would usually start with the maintenance troops coming in at 0300 to get the jets ready. At around 4:00 A.M., the first pilots scheduled to fly would open the squadron and make the coffee; they will be on duty after 8:00 P.M., for a typical day of over twelve hours. Supervisors start arriving at 0500.

The flying schedule begins with three four-ship flights taking off at 0600, 0615, and 0630, for an hour-and-a-half mission; followed by three more four-ships at 1100, 1115, and 1130; followed by two more four-ships at 1600 and 1630. The first eight sorties would go to an air-to-ground range for bomb deliveries. The other four aircraft would be configured without external fuel tanks and bomb racks and would engage in two-versus-two air-to-air training in airspace off the coast. All of those aircraft would be “turned” to the same mission in the midday “go,” and four of the bombers would drop off the schedule for the third “turn.” Some pilots fly twice; others only once.

If few jets break during the day, then the aircraft set aside for spares will not be required, which might allow an add-on sortie or two. On the other hand, if the jets give a lot of trouble, the maintenance troops might work until midnight.

Also on the schedule are the pilots who are on alert, attending ground school, in the simulator flying practice instrument and emergency procedures missions, at the altitude chamber for their annual chamber ride, or who are TDY to the weapons ranges, to Germany as forward air controllers, or back in the States for fighter weapons school.

The schedule is roughed out monthly with range times, takeoff times, and number of sorties. Names are filled in weekly and changed daily, with the next day’s schedule usually posted by 4:00 P.M., so each pilot can check it in time to go home and get some rest if he has to be back by 4:00 A.M. Starting in 1969 (and still in force, except during wartime), pilots were required to have twelve hours off before flying.

Also at work in the scheduling process is the law of supply and demand: if there is to be a workable schedule, a squadron needs so many flight leaders. For instance, if the daily schedule calls for four four-ship flights in the morning, four more in the afternoon, and three more later in the afternoon, that means a total of forty-four sorties (what they called “4 turn 4, turn 3”). Say a pilot can fly twice a day. Then about eleven four-ship flight leaders are needed, plus someone on the duty desk and in the tower. Since some of those forty-four sorties require an IP or check pilot, that means about fifteen flight leaders are actually needed.

There are about thirty pilots available in the squadron, plus a few overhead — the squadron operations officer (he may have an assistant) and the commander (who also has an adjutant, an intelligence officer, and a maintenance officer, who are not rated). However, four of the pilots are on alert; five are attending school in the United States, or are at Wheelus, Libya, for gunnery training, or are attending bomb commanders school; three are on leave; two are on Duties Not Include Flying (DNIF) with colds or sprained ankles from sports; two are processing out to return to the States; three are new pilots who just arrived and are looking for a house; and three more are in Germany on forward air controller duties. That means that twenty-two of the thirty pilots are not available. You can get some help from the five wing staff attached to the squadron for flying, but that still only makes thirteen pilots to fly, with fifteen flight leaders needed… That kind of math went on all the time.

★ The wing commander is the senior commander on the base and has about 3,500 people under him. In the past, the wing commander was a colonel (as were his deputy and his vice commander), but now he is a brigadier general. Immediately under the wing commander comes the vice wing commander (usually a steady old hand whose job is primarily to help a young up-and-comer who will probably get promoted to general), who fills in when the wing CO is flying, TDY, or otherwise off-base. Under the vice comes the DCO, or deputy commander for operations, who runs the three flying squadrons (and who usually moves up to wing commander); the DCM Maintenance, who is responsible for all the aircraft maintenance (a big job which can make or break the wing; the DCR Resources, who runs supply, finance, and the motor pool; and the base commander, who watches over civil engineers, services, security police, legal, public affairs, and personnel.

Above the base level (at the time Horner was in England) was a three-star numbered Air Force commander (in those days, most Air Force one-and two-stars worked in the Pentagon), then a four-star Air Force Command commander (commanding TAC, SAC, MAC, USAFE, or PACAF), then the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Secretary of Defense, and the President.

The Goldwater-Nichols Law of 1986 changed all of that, at least in terms of operational command, but that was twenty years into the future

LAKENHEATH

In October 1960, after three months at Nellis, Chuck and Mary Jo Horner left for England. Their C-118 transport landed at RAF Mildenhall, and they boarded a bus for Lakenheath just a few miles away.

RAF Lakenheath was in Suffolk, just north of Cambridge, and about two hours’ drive time northeast of London. Originally a World War II base, whose Quonset huts and brick tower looked like sets from Twelve O’Clock High, it had been closed after the war, but been reopened for B-47s, which for a time sat alert with nuclear weapons. There was a problem, though. A dip in the runway too often caused the big bombers to get airborne before they had enough speed to maintain flight. Most of the pilots would relax and let the aircraft settle back on the runway, but a few of them would struggle with the controls and try to fly. The aircraft would stall, fall off on a wing, and wind up a fireball.

A more accommodating airfield seemed like a good idea.

A replacement for the B-47s appeared in the late fifties, when Charles de Gaulle ordered U.S. fighters to leave France; and in 1960, the 48th Wing, then stationed at Chaumont Air Base east of Paris, pulled up stakes and moved to Lakenheath. In the process of the move, personnel who were close to the end of their overseas tours went home early. This in turn resulted in unusually large numbers of new people being assigned to the wing. This had a downside: Every week six or seven lieutenants with the bare minimum of flying time showed up at each of the wing’s three squadrons. Since Horner was in the first wave, he became a flight leader almost immediately. For a young pilot to become a flight lead is an honor and indicates rare confidence from the squadron leaders — or else it means there aren’t any experienced pilots in the squadron and you use what you have and hope for the best. In Horner’s case, it was the latter. The blind were leading the blind; and the accident rate proved it. In the first three months he was assigned to the wing, six aircraft and four pilots were lost (Horner didn’t actually contribute to any of these accidents, but he came close). Since the tour was for three years, that meant he stood an excellent chance of going home early in a pine box. On the other hand, young Chuck Horner was having a very good time, and learning a great deal about flying fighter aircraft.

Second Lieutenant Horner got quite a shock, however, when he first walked into the squadron. He had 100 hours of F-100 time, had never flown in really bad weather (a daily occurrence in England), and expected to be led around by the hand for six months or so to learn the ropes. The ops officers smiled, got him a local area check-out and a Stan Eval check ride to certify he could sit alert, then stamped him flight leader and hoped he made it.

When Horner arrived at Lakenheath, among the first people he met was his new squadron commander, Major Skinny Innis — one of the wildest members of a profession that tries to corner the market on wildness. Innis, like many others, had gone off to World War II before he finished college. During that war, pilots of his age group had operated almost without rules — the name of the game had been to get the job done. The downside was that a lot of them had died in accidents and not as a result of enemy fire. Innis had survived that war, and Korea, by means of brains, energy, flying talent, and luck.

In the two worlds that make up the military — field and headquarters — Skinny Innis was at the far extreme of the field orientation. One earned points there for being outrageous, and Skinny had acquired just about as many outrageous points as it was possible to accumulate. All he wanted to do was fight wars and have fun in the downtime. He was profane, inelegant, not only un- but antidiplomatic, and often wrongheaded; but he deeply loved his nation, flying, and the Air Force; he made it fun to serve with him; and he kept his pilots looking at the enemy instead of worrying about their own careers.

Skinny hated to be supervised. In practice that meant that he and the wing director of operations, Colonel Bruce Hinton (who was called “Balls” Hinton and had had several kills in Korea), often had fistfights when they had a difference of opinion. Since they had both served in World War II and Korea, lived with adjoining backyards, and were friends as well as antagonists, however, they tolerated each other’s wild behavior.

Even though Skinny hated authority, he was loyal to senior commanders, which meant he worked their problems and did the mission they laid out for his squadron. He ran the squadron the way he wanted to, however, which today would not be politically acceptable, and he specialized in making flamboyant statements.

At the officers’ club at Lakenheath, a large bell was mounted over the bar. When you walked in, you had to buy drinks for everyone at the bar if someone could ring the bell before you got your hat off. Skinny turned the game upside down. He bought bowler hats for all the 492d Squadron, declared them the Mad Hatters, and “ordered” them to wear their hats in the bar. If they didn’t, they had to buy the bar a round. (The bowler rule was in effect only when you wore a civilian jacket and tie; uniform was excepted.)

Then Skinny decided that wasn’t enough. His squadron also needed to be different from the other two squadrons at work, so he bought them glengarries, the traditional Scottish hats, to wear with their flight suits. When Bruce Hinton tried to stop this change in uniform (correctly judging it against the uniform rules), they had another fight, and Skinny won. Thus, for the three years Horner was at Lakenheath, everyone in Skinny’s squadron wore a glengarry, with his rank on it, with his flying suit.

There was a serious point behind the apparent silliness. Skinny’s goal was to create an elite unit, the 492d Tactical Fighter Squadron, within an elite unit, the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing. His methods probably went too far by today’s practices; but back then, in the shadow of World War II and Korea, commanders had a great deal of latitude. During Vietnam, Horner and the other pilots at the bases at Korat and Ta Khli in Thailand wore nonregulation Aussie hats for the same reason.

Horner’s initiation into the Skinny Innis leadership style came on the day of his first mission at Lakenheath.

That morning, he looked out the window at fog thick enough to cut with a knife. Believing that prudence was a wise course for junior officers, he reported to Major Innis in a military manner and calmly informed him that since he had never flown in actual weather, let alone the kind of fog they had outside, the major might consider finding someone else to take the mission. Major Innis looked up from the paper he was reading, glared at Horner, and snapped, “Get your ass in the air. You don’t think I’m going to fly in shit like this, do you?”

It was a case of learn or die, and he learned.

As it turned out, after Horner had been in the squadron a couple of months and proved he could hack it, Skinny let him know that he had gone to high school in Iowa with his cousin Bill Miles and had been one of his closest friends. They had both joined the Air Corps together, and gone on to get their wings.

Years later, in 1964, Innis — now a colonel — was in Saigon flying old, broken-down B-26s over South Vietnam. In those days, the U.S. government was pretending that Innis and the other Air Force people in the country were “advising” the VNAF, though, in fact, they were doing much of the fighting. Some of Skinny’s friends loved being there, because that was where the action was, and when Chuck Horner heard about that, he did what he could to get himself into the war.

When he wrote Innis to ask for his help, however, Skinny advised him to stay as far away from Vietnam as he could. Even then, Innis realized the war was destined to collapse into disaster.

★ The mission of the 48th TFW was primarily nuclear strike, backed up by conventional air-to-ground and air-to-air. That meant that the pilots primarily trained in the delivery of nuclear weapons and sat alert in the European version of the SIOP (the Single Integrated Operations Plan for conducting a one-day nuclear war), just as SAC pilots did in bombers back in the States. In order to qualify in nuclear weapons delivery, they had to drop a certain number of practice bombs every six months and certify on their target. They also had to describe to a board how the weapon worked, talk through their mission, and know command and control cold — that is, they had to know who could release them to go on the mission, what procedures had to be followed in order to arm the bomb, what kind of code words they could expect, and so on.

Each training period, pilots also flew a few air-to-air and air-to-ground conventional-weapons training sorties, but they were only required to be familiar in those events — they didn’t have to qualify by achieving a specific bomb score average.

★ This is how a typical nuclear delivery training sortie might go — a two-ship air-to-ground:

The lead and the wingman brief two hours before takeoff, check the weather and notices, suit up, and step to the jets about twenty minutes before start engine, which is twenty minutes before takeoff time (which is predicated on range time). After preflighting the jet and starting and checking out the systems, the two taxi to the arming area at the end of the runway. There the weapons troops take out the safety pins on the practice bomb dispenser and arm the guns by rotating a live round into the chamber and connecting the electrical plug that provides current to the bullet primer. From there the two taxi onto the runway and close the canopies. After a head nod, the brakes are released. After a second head nod, they light the afterburners and take off. A third head nod is the signal for gear up, followed by flaps up. They then turn out of traffic on the air traffic control frequency and fly a departure route, climbing to 1,000 feet on top (that is, in the clear on top of the overcast).

Since the lead planned a low level in France, they now head for the let-down point. In the meantime, the lead moves his wingman out to about 4,000 to 6,000 feet, meaning that the lead is not looking into the sun and he can clear his wingman’s six o’clock (his tail) without himself having to squint into the light. After he reaches the let-down point, he rocks his wings, which signals the wingman to join up on his wing. The wingman lines up the light on the lead’s wingtip with the star on the lead’s fuselage in order to maintain forward and aft reference, and down the two go into the weather.

The lead breaks out at 1,000 feet above the ground and kicks his wingman out by fluttering the rudder. The wingman then takes up a chase position off to one side and slightly high, about 500 feet aft of the lead’s jet. From there he can look through the lead to clear the air for other airplanes that might appear in his path. The lead’s job, meanwhile, is to fly the route and arrive at the range at the scheduled range time.

The navigation is not easy. The lead must maintain the planned speed and heading, while using a map to locate an identifiable point on the ground. If it comes into view at the precise time and the precise place that had been planned, then they are not lost. (They must not try it the other way. That is, they must not find a point on the ground and then try to find it on the map. Doing that means they are lost.)

At the Initial Point (IP) to the range, the lead switches the flight over to range frequency and calls the range officer for clearance. The wingman now splits off and makes a 360-degree turn, which will leave him about two minutes spacing on the lead’s aircraft for a nuclear over-the-shoulder delivery. Meanwhile, the lead arms his switches, gets clearance, pushes up to delivery speed, and heads toward the range.

What follows is a variation on what he practiced earlier at Nellis:

The bull’s-eye is a set of concentric circles on the ground: the outer circle is 2,000 feet in radius, the next is 1,000 feet, the next is 500, and the smallest is 100. The lead’s immediate task is to fly over a spot upwind from the bull’s-eye. For example, if he has a wind from the northeast at 20 knots and he is heading north on the run-in, he lines up his jet over the ground to the right of the bull’s-eye, waits until he is past the bull’s-eye at the prescribed offset point, lights the afterburner, and presses the pickle (the bomb-release button on top of the stick). At that point, he starts an Immelmann. At a preset angle, nose up (which primarily depends on the outside temperature and wind velocity at release point), the bomb is automatically released. Sometimes this is a twenty-five-pound practice bomb, but often it is a 2,000-pound bomb shaped like a nuclear weapon (when he releases one, his aircraft bounds like a kangaroo). The bomb then climbs to more than 30,000 feet above the ground, runs out of speed, and turns around and heads to earth. When it strikes the ground, a shotgun shell filled with white phosphorus puts out a large puff of smoke. This allows the range crew to score the hit by referencing it to the circles. Since the pilot is dropping a simulated nuclear weapon, a satisfactory score is well over 1,000 feet.

Meanwhile, at release he calls, “Off on top wet,” which means that a release light lit in his cockpit, and the bomb is in the air headed for the ground. He then rolls out so his wingman can start his run. As he comes off on top, they both enter the bombing and strafe pattern. After they expend all their bombs and bullets, they join up and start for home.

As they cross the Channel, the lead checks in with the British, so the cousins don’t scramble a fighter on them, and enter the holding pattern at Hopton beacon on the English coast (which served as the initial fix for airfields in East Anglia), until the expected approach clearance time, EAC.

When control informs him that he is cleared to penetrate, the lead switches to the Lakenheath GCA frequency and contacts the controller, who talks him down. He breaks out into the fog at 300 feet above the ground a half mile off the end of the runway, touches down, deploys his drag chute, and gingerly steps on the brakes as the jet slips and slides on the always wet runway. He turns off on the end and jettisons his drag chute. The armorers then disconnect the gun plugs and put safety pins in any remaining bombs. About this time, the wingman lands. The lead waits for him to get safetied, and then he taxis back to the ramp in front of the squadron, shuts down the jet, climbs out, and stops by maintenance debriefing. Then he goes back to the squadron and stows his gear.

After that, he and his wingman spend maybe half an hour debriefing the flight: what went right, what went wrong, why the bombs were good or bad.

No small part of the discipline of a fighter pilot derives from the debriefings after a mission.

Since these can be brutal, the lead makes very sure that in the mission he follows the game plan, and if he’s made a mistake during the mission, he had better be the first to admit it. If he doesn’t, or if he wasn’t aware that he had made a mistake, or if he tried to cover up his mistakes with self-serving excuses, he was probably dead meat in the debrief.

Debriefings in operational units often involve heated debate, for the stakes are incredibly high, and the participants have strong and differing opinions about what will survive and work in combat and what is just fanciful thinking. On the other hand, the debriefings in combat crew training units tend to be much more structured and much less heated. The students do not have the experience to know what is functional and dysfunctional, and the missions themselves are usually very structured. However, since every mission includes unexpected events, there is always room for differences of opinion.

The most respected pilots are the ones who can identify their own shortfalls and learn from them. And the best instructors are the ones who can tell them the root cause of their failures in the air and give them tools to avoid them — either new physical techniques or different thought processes.

★ Another typical mission out of Lakenheath was called a night MSQ. This was a single-ship mission in Germany. Ground radars with very accurate beams had been placed near the East German border, in order to direct a fighter in wartime to a point in space for bomb release of a nuclear weapon. The bomb would then fly a predictable route to the target.

On an MSQ mission, a pilot might take off single-ship near the end of the day and fly at 40,000 feet to a contact point on the East German border. At the contact point, he’d call in the blind; that is, he’d broadcast without receiving an answer. Meanwhile, in the upper-left-hand side of his instrument panel was a four-inch-round dial on which were a number of small symbols, windows, and icons. One arrow pointed to the left, another arrow to the right; one window said one minute, and another said thirty seconds; and at the top of the dial was a single red light. When that one lit, he knew the radar was locked on to his jet. Then he followed the instructions it was sending him, which were relayed through the arrows, windows, and icons on the dial. Most frequently, they sent you north along the western edge of the East German border. To be on the safe side, the pilot would also tune the low-frequency navigation set on the floor between his legs to a series of twenty-five-watt navigation beacons. These gave him a cross check to make sure he didn’t stray over the border.

Meanwhile, in the darkening sky, he would see the contrails of a Russian fighter shadowing him, hoping the pilot would stray over the border so he could try to shoot him down.

Soon, the one-minute light would come on, meaning that the pilot had sixty seconds to release. At the same time, he would be getting left or right arrows, while maintaining his altitude and airspeed at the prebriefed values. Then the thirty-second light would come on, and thirty seconds later, he’d hit his bomb button. This would cause his radio to emit a tone, which the radar site would score. (Both the pilot and the radar site were given a score.)

Afterward, he’d turn away to the west and either return to the contact point for another run or head for home, hoping to hit his bed by midnight, because he had to be at work at 4:00 A.M. for a six o’clock takeoff the next day.

★ Fighter pilots never get enough of air-to-air training — dogfights — yet, for some reason, probably having to do with the nuclear delivery mission, U.S. pilots in the late fifties and early sixties were given very little air combat training; and what they were allowed was rudimentary. As a result, they all went underground. They practiced against other NATO fighters that happened to be in the air at the same time they were.

So, for example, if a pilot was flying the nuclear delivery profile above, a Mirage fighter might well start a practice intercept run on him. When the pilot saw the Mirage, he tried to do what he would do in actual combat. He’d push the power up and turn into the attack. Then he and the Mirage pilot would conduct a series of maneuvers aimed at foiling the other while winding up at his six o’clock for a heat-seeking missile or gun attack. All of this was unbriefed and there were no rules. In fact, it was illegal. Worse, you were often in a dangerous configuration, carrying, say, four external fuel tanks and a practice nuke bomb, which made the fighter apt to go out of control.

Those who did well in this school learned how to fly their aircraft on the edge of the envelope and how to fight a broad range of aircraft and pilots.

Mirages, for instance, tended to be more maneuverable than Super Sabers, because the F-100s usually carried external fuel tanks, but Mirage pilots often entered the fight in afterburner with speed brakes out, thus negating the advantage of either function. As a result, it was pretty easy to get them to overshoot initially. After that, a pilot had to be careful at slow speed because the Mirages could out-turn him. The British Hawker Hunter was a sweet jet and tough to beat, but U.S. aircraft had afterburners and Hunters did not. While F-100s could not out-turn them, they could use the vertical dimension (that is, they could climb faster) to gain some advantage over a less skilled pilot. On the other hand, the Javelin (also British) was heavy and underpowered, so it didn’t take much to gain the advantage on it. The British Lightning had both superb turning ability and outstanding thrust, but didn’t carry much fuel. So if a pilot got jumped by a Lightning, he’d just stay defensive and fend off his passes with hard turns, nose low to maintain energy, until the fight wound up on the deck and the pilot’s turns now became level. Then he’d spend about ten pain-filled minutes looking over his own tail while the Lightning tried to get off a valid shot. Eventually, if he “survived,” he’d see the Lightning level his wings and turn for home, meaning that his meager gas supply was about gone. Then the pilot would light afterburner, fly after him, and place his nose on his tail just so he got the message.

Fighter pilot ecstasy.

★ Combat units are tested periodically to see if they can do their mission. The Super Bowl of tests for Horner’s wing was called an Operational Readiness Inspection, or ORI. Since for the 48th TFW the primary mission was to load their nuclear weapons and deliver them on the Soviet enemy situated throughout Eastern Europe, an ORI usually began when the wing received an alert message (plainly marked “Exercise Only”) that warned of an impending crisis. Soon inspectors flew into the base, and the commander was briefed on the nature and rules of the exercise. Usually the wing was expected to break out the nuclear weapons, deliver them to each combat-ready aircraft, and get them uploaded in a specified number of hours. If all that took too long, or if there were any unsafe practices, the exercise was stopped and the wing flunked. This often resulted in the appointment of a new wing commander, followed by a period of months to practice, and a retest.

Meanwhile, as the weapons were loaded, the pilots were briefed on the flying phase of the exercise. This usually meant they were given simulated targets in France or Germany. After the weapons were all successfully loaded, they were then downloaded and returned to the secure storage area. Once that was done, dummy bombs — concrete shapes — were uploaded; the exercise clock was restarted; sorties were launched in accordance with the tasking from the IG team (often the IG team threw in disruptive events, such as an enemy air attack on the airfield, to complicate matters); and the pilots had to figure out in the air how to fly their route and reach the bombing range on time to make their assigned Time over Target (TOT). As the pilots flew their routes, the IG had people in France or Germany on the ground at various checkpoints, noting if the pilots passed by there and the time. When the pilots reached their bombing range, they got a single pass to release their weapon, and this was scored by the IG team.

Much could go wrong: the jet could break (pilots often took off with a mechanical failure and sweated it out until they released their bombs and could declare an emergency); or the bomb might not release during the over-the-shoulder delivery. If there was weather, as there often was in Europe, crafty pilots would reset the switches while upside down in the overcast, near a stall, do a loop on instruments, and jettison the bomb while heading back toward the ground. The IG on the ground would see only this ton of concrete and steel scream out of the clouds into which the plane had just climbed, and score the hit.

Other missions were less demanding. Pilots would simply fly to a simulated target and do a dry pass. No practice bomb would be released, but the IG team would score the pilot’s time over target and whether he hit the proper offset point at the target.

ORIs were exhausting, and it was all too easy to fail. If a pilot didn’t get a high percentage of his weapons to release on the range on time with a given Circular Error Probability, for example, he died… or at least the wing commander died, and he usually took others along with him.

Horner was called to make what turned out to be his last flight at the “Heath” because of a surprise ORI. It was supposed to have been his last day in England, and he hadn’t expected to fly. Meanwhile, the Horner household goods were packed; Chuck and Mary Jo had moved into the officers’ club guest house in Brandon Forest, and they were waiting for transport out.

About noon, the housekeeper came looking for him with an urgent request to call the squadron. Major Nogrowski, the operations officer (they called him Nogo), was desperate. The wing was being given an Operational Readiness Inspection; they were short on pilots; and they needed Horner to fly one more mission. As luck — and planning — would have it, Chuck’s flying gear was stashed in his personal baggage. He’d gotten into that habit whenever he made a Permanent Change of Station move (PCS), so he’d be ready to start flying first thing at his new station.

“Okay,” he said, “no problem.” Then he kissed Mary Jo goodbye, caught a ride to the base, and checked into the 492d Fighter Squadron. Nogo briefed him at the duty desk. They needed to fly two more sorties to pass the ORI. Nogo had a new pilot he could send on one of them, but he’d run out of flight leaders.

“No problem.”

Horner changed into his gear and briefed the new wingman: easy mission takeoff, climb out, and cruise over to France. Let down through the weather, fly low to an abandoned air base in northern France, and conduct a simulated attack. The Inspector General team did not have observers at that target, so the attack would not be scored. The weather was clear, and there was a full moon for their return to England in the early evening. As usual in those days, the wingman was inexperienced, a green lieutenant; but all he had to do was stay in formation, follow Horner’s orders, and avoid the ground with his aircraft during the low-level navigation and target attack portions of the mission.

The first half of the mission proceeded without a hitch. But as they were climbing out from the target toward the setting sun, Horner’s wingman called him on the radio — an unusual event, since new guys were to maintain strict radio discipline and speak only when spoken to.

“Blue Leader, this is Blue Two. The bottom of your aircraft is dark. Request permission to join to close formation and take a look.” Horner rolled his eyes in exasperation and cleared him in as they leveled off en route home.

But the next call really got his attention. “Sir”—Horner had just made captain—“there is a bunch of fluid all over the bottom of your aircraft.” Horner scanned his cockpit gauges, and all was normal. The engine was running fine. Perhaps the setting sun, he thought, had caused a lighting condition that was playing tricks with the lieutenant’s vision.

The wingman’s next call, as they crossed the English Channel, was even more alarming. “Sir, you’re streaming so much fluid it’s making a vapor trail behind the aircraft.”

Horner rolled the aircraft to the left, looked over his left shoulder, and saw a trail of white mist arcing out from the tail of his jet. As he wondered what could cause this, the darkening cockpit lit up with red and yellow warning lights. Much of his hydraulic systems had quit. The system needed to operate the flight controls remained, but the second flight-control system and a third system that lowered the landing gear and powered the wheel brakes registered zero hydraulic pressure. The fluid Horner and his wingman had observed was the hydraulic fluid from these systems leaking overboard.

Okay, no sweat, he thought, I have good flight controls, at least enough to fly home and land, an emergency one-shot backup system—to lower the landing gear—and a backup electric motor-driven system, for braking action. This and the drag chute (a parachute packed in the back end of the F-100 that was deployed after touchdown to slow the aircraft down and save wear and tear on tires and brakes) should permit the aircraft to stop safely on the runway. Maintenance will have to tow the jet into the parking area, and I’ll have to declare an emergency with the tower, which means extra paperwork; but what the hell, the weather’s good—rare in England—and I’m in control.

When they arrived at Hopton Radio Beacon on the East Anglia coast, Horner called the Tower at Lakenheath. “Lakenheath tower, this is Blue One at Hopton, I have an emergency. One has lost his primary flight control and utility hydraulic systems, and am bingo fuel.” Meaning: he had only fuel enough to proceed to the field and land. He then informed them he would depart the fix (that is, from the radio beacon’s location on the English coast) and fly to the field, and asked for a weather update.

The supervisor of flying (SOF) called back with unwelcome news: a fog bank was moving in, the ground-controlled intercept radar (GCI) was not in operation, and he was fixing to close the field and go home. Because the weather was supposed to be good enough for a nonradar approach, they had shut the GCI down for periodic maintenance. Because it was England, the fog had just come up unexpectedly. He directed Horner to fly back to France and land at a suitable base; there were several possibilities.

Horner looked at the clear night sky, then at his sick jet’s flashing warning lights, and then at the fuel gauges, all seeming to read zero fuel left, and let the supervisor of flying know where he could go. “I can’t make it to France,” he went on. “I’m coming home, I have to land, and can you get the crash crew out?” He was thinking that the presence of the big fire truck with its yellow-suited firemen might come in handy in the event he couldn’t get his landing gear down, or if it collapsed on landing, or if he lost heading control after landing because he didn’t have nose wheel steering, or if his drag chute failed and he ran off the end of the runway and wound up in a fireball.

As the night sky grew dark and the moon started to slide above the horizon, he could make out wisps of white fog filling in the low spots in the English countryside.

As they let down into the night, he began to check in his mind all the things that could go wrong, then instructed the wingman how to react — that is, how to avoid getting caught up in the explosion of Blue Leader’s jet. Meanwhile, to his credit, the SOF stayed cool (it occurred to Horner about that time that the SOF could afford to be cool, seeing as how his ass wasn’t in a sick jet trying to get on the ground before the field became socked in). By then, Horner could make out the lights from villages and from cars on the roads shining up through the wisps of fog. He had flown into the field hundreds of times, in far worse weather, but always with the calm assuring voice of their British air traffic controllers guiding his actions as they observed his flight path toward the field. Tonight, he thought, they’re all drinking ale in some pub because the weather was supposed to be good and we were the last flight and the radar needed periodic routine maintenance.

In the end, Horner found the field, dropped down to the treetops in the dark, and — using dimly lit references — found the runway. He landed, his drag chutes worked, and he gently used the emergency brakes to bring his wounded jet to a stop on the runway. By then, the fog was so thick that the fire truck that came racing down the runway almost collided with his jet. He sat there, wet with sweat, hands shaking more from fatigue than anything else, and realized one more time there was a God who didn’t want to talk with Chuck just yet. Just a routine day in the life of a fighter pilot, cheating death and thinking he did it on his own, but knowing in his heart it was divine intervention that let him beat the odds.

Chuck went home and picked up Mary Jo and their year-old daughter Susan, and they boarded the transport home to the United States.

SEYMOUR JOHNSON

Horner’s next assignment (it was now 1963) was to the 335th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 4th Tactical Fighter Wing, at Seymour Johnson AFB, Goldsboro, North Carolina, where he would fly the famous, or infamous, F-105 Thunderchief. There his son, John Patrick Horner, would be born, and from there he would go off to combat for the first time.

The Thud, as it was called — at first by its detractors, and then by everyone else, after it proved to be the jet of choice if one was going to be shot at — was big and spacious: A man could stand up under its wing, and he needed a ladder to climb up into the cockpit. The cockpit was roomy, and the instruments were as modern as one could get, with tapes instead of dials, which made it a breeze to read while screaming down the chute during a dive-bomb pass. The Thud was also solid; since fuel was not stored in the wings, AAA could blow huge holes in them, and a pilot could still come home without a problem. And it was fast — nothing could touch it for top speed; it routinely exceeded twice the speed of sound, Mach 2, on test flights. What made it fast was a huge gas-sucking engine and very thin wings, so it flew faster in military power than most aircraft did in afterburner. Unfortunately, this capability was achieved at the cost of lift. The thin wings took forever to fly on takeoff. When a pilot had a full load of fuel and bombs, he used the entire runway. Even then, the Thud didn’t want to fly; but rather than set a land speed record, the pilot would pull the beast off the ground and stagger into the air, whacking off branches of small trees with his aircraft until he was able to start a climb.

This same reluctance manifested itself when he wanted to turn in air-to-air combat. The Thud would go fast, but it did not like to turn. Thus, the preferred tactic in a fight was just to enter it, pick a target, scream in for a shot, and then blow on through. A pilot didn’t have to look back, because no one was going to catch him.

Similar principles applied in bombing runs: just after a pilot released his bombs, he put both hands on the stick and pulled it back into his lap. He didn’t have to worry about over-geeing the aircraft, because the Thud was so solid, it didn’t seem to mind ten or twelve Gs. But if he didn’t immediately begin the recovery, he was sure to hit the ground.

Early F-105s had two seriously bad habits: they had a tendency to blow up in the air; and if the pilot wasn’t alert, they slammed into the ground.

They blew up because of a design problem. At times fuel got trapped between the hot section of the engine and the fuselage. After a while, a fire got going back there, which in time would melt through hydraulic lines (no flight controls then) or a fuel cell (a small fire instantly became a very big fire and the pilot was the marshmallow).

They hit the ground because of mistakes in Air Force tactics. In the erroneous belief that one would avoid enemy defenses that way, tactics in those days emphasized flying at low level; but the Thud, being slow to pull out on a dive-bomb pass, needed more air under it than those tactics wanted to give it.

Still, the pilots came to love flying the F-105, especially after the design and tactical flaws were fixed. It was an honest aircraft; a pilot loves a jet that obeys his commands, and a jet that makes it easier to put the bombs on target. And if he wanted to strafe a target, he had an M-61 Gatling gun. With that, much of the time, he could expect to put every round through the target, for a 100 percent score. Today, many of the attributes of the F-105—such as stability and accuracy — are found in the A-10. On the other hand, the A-10 turns, but it won’t go fast. All things being equal, fighter pilots will tell you, “speed is life.”

★ Horner had a good tour at Seymour Johnson. The 335th was a fine squadron, and there was a lot of excitement with firepower demonstrations and plans to attack Cuba — in those days there was well-justified fear that the Russians would install nuclear missiles on the island. On the other hand, the otherwise joyous squadron parties and deployments around the world were tempered by the F-105’s bad habits, blowing up in the air or slamming into the ground, either of which meant somebody had to erase a name off the pilot board, empty a locker, and return the pilot’s effects to his widow or parents.

That happened when Horner’s flight commander “bit it”—another one of those expressions people use when they don’t want to face the reality— when he flew into the water on the gunnery range off the coast of North Carolina. Parts of his body were recovered, and then came the ceremony of sitting with the grieving widow, taking care of the children, helping arrange for the funeral, and attending the memorial ceremony, with its missing-man flyby… By now, all this was a familiar routine for Chuck Horner, except this time it all hit him on the head with a powerful new insight.

At that funeral, I guess I was beginning to grow up; for I started to notice something about our warrior culture that I hadn’t really noticed before: the pain and agony of the widow.

Hey, fighter pilots are tough. When one of us died, we felt sad, got drunk, and made jokes, in an effort to laugh in the face of our own deaths. But without our knowing it, it was our wives who really suffered. Air Force wives are indoctrinated from the get-go, “Don’t make a big issue over a death. Don’t make a thing about the loss. Cover it over. Don’t get your own pilot husband upset. He needs to be alert and to concentrate when he’s flying his six-hundred-mile-an-hour jet.” And they do cover it over. Meanwhile, the wives, and not the warriors, know the real horror.

Among the American Plains Indians (so the story came to me), when a warrior died in battle, everyone was happy (dying in battle was about as noble an act as you could imagine)… everyone except the warrior’s widow. She tore her clothing, rubbed ashes in her hair, cut her arms with a knife, and wailed as though her soul had been torn out of her body. For the widow, it was more than losing her husband (Indian husbands not being famously loving, caring mates, anyway). Rather, with her husband dead, she no longer had standing as a human being in the tribe. Unless she remarried, she would cease to exist in the eyes of her former friends, and she would be left to fend for herself. When the tribe moved on to new hunting grounds, she’d fall behind, she’d have nothing to eat, and soon, she’d starve, or else weather or wolves would kill her. For the warrior’s widow, in other words, the death of a warrior husband was a sentence condemning her to a death that was lonely, slow, and shameful.

Our warrior society, I began to see, isn’t all that different. The husband would die. The widow would be comforted, food would be brought over, there’ d be tears and shared memories and that missing-man flyby that chilled all of our souls. But Monday would roll around, the pilots would go back to their jet aircraft mistresses, the wives would go back to raising kids and bonding with one another, and the movers would be pulling up to the widow’s house. She no longer qualified to live on the base; and her former pals, her inner circle, didn’t want their own husbands hanging around her, lest she snag a new husband. Worse, none of our warriors, husbands or wives, wanted her reminder of the death that lived seconds away whenever we strapped on our jet and took to the wild blue yonder.

It hit me then that, daily, our wives had to contend with the unspoken horror of all that. Not only did they dread our death, but just as real was the knowledge that their lives, as members of an extremely close interdependent society, also hung in the balance. And I came to appreciate the steel in their unspoken and unacknowledged courage — as opposed to our own drunken ribaldry, which we pretended was “guts”—in the ever-present face of death. The pilots were scared children who used booze, offensive behavior, and profane language to hold the awareness of their fragile mortality at arm’s length. But our women shared a gut-wrenching horror that someday the wing commander would show up at their front door to announce that they were now going to have to provide for and raise the children alone, that they were about to be turned out into the world to fend for themselves, and that their closest confidantes in the world would soon stare through them, lest they see what might be in store for themselves.

Service wives, especially fighter pilot wives, are the most underrated warriors in the world. Daily, they confront their own fears, staying home to change a dirty diaper and getting ready for the next move, while shoring up the inflated egos of their mates before they go off to chase around the sky. God bless and watch over them.

★ Death came personally to Chuck Horner during his time with the 4th TFW.

One of the 4th’s missions was to deploy to Turkey and sit alert with a nuke on their F-105s. They flew gunnery training over the Mediterranean, air-to-ground at Koyna range in Turkey, and low level all over Turkey. While Horner was in Turkey around Christmas of 1964, his parents, his sister, Mary Lou Kendall, her husband Bill, and their three children were killed in a car accident in Iowa (Christmas was not a lucky time for the Horner clan; John Towner had been killed during the Christmas season of 1953-54).

Those deaths were terrible, and so was Horner’s grief. Despite them, however, there was a fascinating side story that made, and still makes, the horror and grief a little more bearable.

When Chuck Horner came back to the States for the funeral, he was a nobody captain with a lot of pain, yet the USAF took care of him royally — actually, they treated him like a warrior. They arranged transport that brought him from Turkey to Des Moines before his sister from San Diego could get there. Colonel John Murphy, his wing commander, even had the TAC commander’s personal T-39 transport meet Horner at McGuire AFB when he got off the military air transport system aircraft that brought him from Germany.

All of this cost a great deal of money. Nowadays, the media might even have a field day with the story of misuse of government jets. But the cost of that government jet that flew Chuck Horner from McGuire to Des Moines got paid back many times over during the next few years. There are some things you have to do for warriors.

After the 4th TFW, Horner’s next move was into combat in Vietnam.

In April of 1965, Chuck Horner was on TDY at McCoy AFB in Orlando at a gunnery workup, preparing for a weapons meet called Red Rio. Because it was a major meet, he had done a lot of flying to prepare for it — pure gunnery missions three times a day, bombing and strafing — and he was at the peak of his performance. One night at the bar, the ops officer fingered him. “You’ve got orders,” he said. “Take a jet and get yourself back home to Seymour.”

“I better wait until morning,” Horner answered; he had a couple of drinks in him.

“No way,” the Ops said. “Get your ass in the jet and go.”

So Horner packed that night and flew home to Seymour Johnson, where he was met when he arrived. “You’ll be leaving in the morning on a secret mission,” he was told. “Pack for hot weather.” He went home and kissed Mary Jo hello; the next morning a staff car arrived, and he kissed her goodbye.

Also in the car was Major Roger Myhrum, a friend from the 4th TFW, Seymour Johnson, who had joined the wing at about the same time in 1963 that Horner had. Myhrum was older than Horner and was in another squadron, the 333d, but they both flew F-105s and got along well. Now they were traveling together on commercial airline tickets to San Francisco, destination classified; they didn’t have a clue about where they were going.

In San Francisco, a bus picked them up, along with some other pilots from McConnell AFB, Kansas, and took them to Travis AFB near Oakland. After the bus left them off, their destination began to grow clearer: Somebody handed them an empty bag and sent them down a line. They filled the bag with soldiers’ gear — rifle, pistol, mosquito netting, sleeping bag, poncho, helmet, mess kit, and web belt with canteen. In the military, they handed out that kind of gear when a man was about to go off to war, just in case he needed it. On the one hand, it was better to be safe than unprepared, but on the other hand, when a pilot gets handed a rifle and a poncho, he gets a bit edgy. It suggests that he’s about to go and live with the Army in the field, directing air strikes. Horner wanted to fly jets, not stomp around on the ground. Fortunately, they also gave him a.38 pistol, which was a weapon you carried when you flew jets in combat, so that was reassuring. Well, time would tell.

Horner and Myhrum were then loaded onto a commercial jet contracted to the military and headed west. They landed in Bangkok, where they were told they would be going upcountry in a couple of days on the Klong Courier — that was the call sign of the C-130 that took people and supplies clockwise from Bangkok around to all the Thai bases in the morning, and counterclockwise in the afternoon. They were going to a base called Korat, in central Thailand, about a hundred miles northeast of Bangkok, where two squadrons of F-105s were located.

Korat was one of four bases — the others were Ta Khli, Ubon, and Udorn — the Air Force was then operating in Thailand, though the bases remained under the control of the Thai Air Force. The Air Force had been at these bases on and off for several years, training Thais. Early in 1965, F-105s from Korat raided North Vietnamese munitions storage areas supplying the Vietcong in the South. Even though more raids soon followed, the U.S. presence at the air bases in Thailand was kept very quiet, partly to keep it a secret from the enemy and partly to avoid embarrassing the Thai government.

Two days later, while Horner and Myhrum were waiting at the Bangkok airfield for the Klong Courier, Horner ran into a pilot from Korat whom he knew named Dick Pearson. Along with another pilot from Korat, Pearson was passing through on his way to Washington, D.C., where they were being sent to answer hard questions about an embarrassing incident over North Vietnam.

Horner was eager to pick Pearson’s brain, for this was his first in-person conversation with anyone who had flown combat missions over North Vietnam. And it was here that he received the first of many lessons pointing out the gulf between reality and fantasy in the Vietnam War.

On April 6, during a strike at Vinh, in North Vietnam, two North Vietnamese MiG-17s had shot down two F-105s, numbers one and two in a flight of four.

The flight had been holding south of the target awaiting another flight to clear the area. As they waited, the flight leader let the formation get slow: The Thuds were loafing along at about 350 knots, and they were bomb-laden, and thus clumsy and vulnerable. To make matters worse, the two elements became separated by a couple of miles, though they were still in visual contact.

Dick Pearson, who had been number three in the flight, had looked up and watched in horror as the two MiGs slid in between the formations, and then each MiG blew an F-105 out of the air. He and his wingman immediately jettisoned their bombs and tanks and went after the MiGs, but they dove for the deck and escaped. Pearson and his wingman then returned to the scene of the shoot-down and started a RESCAP (Rescue CAP) — circling the area and looking for chutes or flares and listening for beepers.

What the commanders in Washington wanted to know was how a couple of ignorant Third World peasants flying two vintage MiGs could take out two supersonic, state-of-the-art American jets. The answer was no surprise to Horner, no more than to the two pilots who were about to get laid out on the carpet in Washington. However, it was not welcome information to the commanders in Washington: Fighter pilot training during previous years had concentrated on nuclear delivery, and now the pilots were fighting a conventional war. Such incidents were bound to happen.

The MiG story, of course, came as a shock to Horner, but then he simply passed the North Vietnamese success off to a flight leader mistake. In fact, he was right up to a point. The flight leader had let his formation get too slow; and he hadn’t made sure that everyone in the flight was alert to intruders. He had let himself fall into stateside gunnery range habits, where one tended to concentrate on spacing rather than combat alertness. On Horner’s first mission, he remembers that his own pull-off from the target was not all that aggressive. Aggression came fast, however, when he noticed the orange golf balls passing his canopy and all the black puffs with orange centers of smoke between him and the number one aircraft.

More important, however, Chuck Horner was as naive as other Americans when he deployed to war for the first time. He was a believer. He thought he and the other American pilots would eat the enemy alive, that American jets were unstoppable, that American tactics were superb, that America’s cause was just, and that American generals knew what they were doing. As for the actual leadership in Washington and the decisions they were making about the war in Vietnam, he didn’t have a clue. As it turned out, neither did they.

KORAT—1965

In March 1965, a series of air strikes against ninety-six targets in North Vietnam called ROLLING THUNDER began, and a platform was needed from which to base the attacks. For this purpose, Thailand proved ideal. It was close to both countries; the Thai Air Force had very fine airfields with 10,000-foot runways that they were under-using; Thailand was secure (there was no insurgency there); and finally, Americans could keep a low profile (no press was allowed), which meant that the American military presence could be concealed.

Before ROLLING THUNDER, some of the strikes had been launched out of the bases in Thailand, but those were short-notice deployments in and out of the bases, and no real infrastructure had been needed. The U.S. Air Force had simply used the runways and ramps, and the pilots slept in hotels, tents, or U.S. training compounds. But in March and April, when the attacks against North Vietnam (and Laos) began in earnest, two F-105 squadrons were sent to Korat (which grew to four squadrons by the time Horner returned to Korat in 1967), and a wing infrastructure was now needed to operate the bases in Thailand. Horner and Myhrum were to become part of this infrastructure.

At Korat, the wing staff was headed by Bill Richie, who had earlier flown across the Atlantic, using British equipment and F-84s, to prove air-to-air refueling for deployments. Horner and Myhrum were to serve as duty officers in the Wing Tactical Operations Center — that is, they were to be staff officers, who would help plan the missions. There were no plans for them to fly.

★ And so there they were, in April 1965, standing for the first time on the aircraft parking ramp at Korat Air Base, the Klong Courier now on the next leg of its circuit.

Though it had a first-class runway with a tower, in those days Korat was at best a sparse place. On a ramp in front of the tower, the Thai Air Force had its trainer aircraft parked, and nearby was a parking ramp for the two squadrons of F-105s. The buildings were wood frame with tin roofs. The housing was in the same type of wood buildings, with screening and open boards, so the air could circulate.

Soon after they landed, Horner and Myhrum were met by a friend from McConnell AFB in Kansas, Major Pete Van Huss. Van Huss was the ops officer of the McConnell squadron at Korat; the other squadron came from Kadena AFB in Okinawa. They all piled into a jeep and drove to where the hooches were located, which was about a mile off the flight line where the jets were parked. Van Huss dropped them off in a dusty stand of grass. They set their bags down and watched a flock of Thai carpenters set to work nailing and sawing.

The Thais put up a hooch frame, nailed screening all around it, put up boards along the sides at an angle — to keep the rain out and let the air in — put on a tin roof, hammered on the doors, and then went to the next open space and started on another hooch. Horner and Myhrum walked in, dropped their bags, and set up the cots that services had left for them. Then they unpacked and slipped into flight suits to go over to the officers’ club (a couple of hooches with a bar tacked together inside), run by hired Thais. Since they were the FNGs,[9] they kept their mouths shut, except to welcome old friends as they filed back in from flights or other duties. Since the fighter community is very closely knit, and Horner and Myhrum were experienced fighter pilots and had some reputation, it was easy for them to fit in.

They very quickly picked up a pretty good idea about what was going on at the base: who was there, the kinds of missions being flown — bombing targets in North Vietnam like ammo dumps and bridges — and what were the gripes and good deals. The bad news was that the pilots at Korat were not willing to let the new guys fly with them… at least not then. Horner and Myhrum were there as staff, and in those early days of ROLLING THUNDER, operational tempos were not active. There weren’t enough sorties to go around.

That was to change a few weeks later as the flying tempo increased and some of the pilots got shot down. The resulting shortage meant that nobody could go on R & R unless Myhrum and Horner took up the slack in the flying schedule. But for the first couple of weeks it was very frustrating.

★ When Horner arrived at Korat, the squadron from McConnell and the squadron from Kadena operated as independent units; the one from Kansas was owned by TAC, while the one from Okinawa was owned by PACAF (officially, Southeast Asia came under PACAF, which made the squadron from Kadena more equal, in an Orwellian sense, than the squadron from McConnell). The two had a common command post and shared a mess hall, where the food was just about inedible. Horner, Myhrum, and a few others (most of them nonrated — to take care of supply, motor pool, maintenance control, intelligence, civil engineering, and the like) had been brought in to set up a wing structure not only for Korat but also for Ubon, Udorn, and Takhli. However, that quickly proved impossible, for there were not enough people to handle it, nor were there sufficient communications. Consequently, provisional wing structures were set up at each field.

From the start, there was rivalry between the two squadrons. Both TAC and PACAF wanted their squadrons to get their noses in the war. On the face of it, Kadena, from PACAF, had first dibs, since it was PACAF’s theater of operation. However, things weren’t quite that simple. Because Kadena and Yokota (in Japan) had nuclear alert duties, PACAF needed augmentation, which meant that TAC deployed a squadron. That didn’t mean that the TAC squadron was welcome, since PACAF didn’t want to share the glory of fighting the North Vietnamese with a TAC squadron any more than TAC wanted to share the glory with a PACAF squadron. It was all very adolescent, and in the end, it all proved moot. There turned out to be plenty of war to go around.

The competition between the commands was obvious, even at base level. Though the pilots and maintenance crews were all perfectly friendly, the deployed commanders were often reluctant to help one another out; each was trying to hog the war for himself. For example, Kadena squadrons, unlike TAC squadrons, normally didn’t deploy to other bases, and so didn’t have available the extensive war reserve spares kits that the others did — metal boxes on wheels that contained what a squadron needed for the first thirty days until a supply line to the depot could be put in place. You’d think it would be easy for a mechanic from Kadena to get a part from the TAC deployed spares kit. Think again.

The rivalry was also evident in the makeup of the provisional staff. PACAF made sure that Kadena people filled all the important positions, no matter what their qualifications were. Another bone in the TAC people’s craw was the rotation policies: the PACAF people rotated in and out on short notice, while the TAC people were there for as long as 120 days.

Leaving aside the command nonsense, life for the pilots in the spring of 1965 was relatively easy. They flew at most once a day, and planning the next day’s mission might take a couple of hours. After that, their time was their own. As for the missions themselves, most of them were far from difficult: They’d fly in a two-ship team along a stretch of highway in south or central North Vietnam until they saw something worth shooting or bombing. If they hit bingo fuel before they found anything, they’d drop their bombs on a bridge. In those days there were very few big missions, such as the multi-flight attacks on a fixed target deep inside North Vietnam that later became more the norm; but there were a few (which typically did not go well). Wartime flying was in fact very much like peacetime flying… except that people were trying to kill you.

★ Meanwhile, Horner and Myhrum took up their jobs as duty officers in the one-room Wing Tactical Operations Center (though it had a divider that split it into something like two rooms). For security, it was surrounded with a barbed-wire fence. The security was necessary because that was where the Frag — the term for Fragmentary Order, now called the Air Tasking Order — was received from Saigon. The Frag order was a computer listing of all the data associated with the next day’s air operations. It told pilots who would fly where, when, and drop what ordnance on what target, what tanker would be used and what off-load (that is, how many pounds of fuel each pilot would get from the tankers). It would also contain the call signs of the MiG CAP[10] and other information.

Each pilot, if he was any good, and certainly the lead pilot, would go through the pages of the Frag the way he might go through a telephone book and find his unit — say, the 388th Tac Ftr Wing (Provisional). There, listed by call sign, were all the sorties the 388th was expected to fly the next day. After the call sign was further information: for example, Teak, 4 F-105s, Vinh Oil refinery BE12356778. This last was the bomb encyclopedia number, or BE number. This told pilots where to look up information about each target (which in fact intelligence had already done for them, since they also got the Frag). The pilots would then go to intelligence, and be provided with whatever information intelligence had available: this might be printouts of microfiche film of the target, drawings or maps, or only a verbal description. The pilots would certainly get latitude and longitude coordinates and probably DMIPs (Desired Mean Impact Point) and weapons-effects data: e.g., for 90 percent destruction, use this number of weapons of this type.

If intelligence had a photo of the target, the pilots would study it, so they could recognize it and know exactly where they should put their bombs, then they might divide up who targeted what. The flight would also plan the mission so that the debris from one aircraft’s bombs would not obscure the target for those behind him. Usually first bombs were dropped downwind of the other aim point(s).

Maps and pictures were additionally used by the pilots to “go from big to little.” Let’s say they were hitting a power station, a small target that might be hidden by trees. First they would plan their ingress route, based on weather, enemy defenses, terrain, etc. Then they’d look for large visual reference points — a bend in the river, a rail line, a bridge. Once they had one or more of these, they’d start looking for other reference points, so they could walk their eyes onto the target. Thus, after the bend in the river comes a large triangular rice paddy, and then on the east corner of the paddy there is a small canal that runs north and south, with a patch of jungle just south, and then the power station is two football fields’ distance to the south of that on the east bank of the canal.

Many of the targets Horner’s people were tasked to hit required this type of planning: they were so insignificant that they couldn’t see them until just before they released their bombs at about 4,000 feet above the ground; and so they flew to where they knew the target was located, and when it appeared they had barely enough time to adjust their flight path. If they were good, it appeared under their pippers (the red dot in the gun sight) at the right altitude, airspeed, and dive angle for their bombs to hit the target. On the other hand, if they had a good target — such as a railyard full of boxcars — then advance planning didn’t matter, since they could find the target from fifty miles away, and when they rolled in there was so much target that their pippers would be on something worth bombing regardless of their dive angle, airspeed, and altitude of release.

The Frag would also provide tanker information — that is, it told the pilot his air refueling contact time and which tanker track he’d be flying to — e.g., “Shell 30 at Orange anchor.” And finally, the Frag would provide a Time on or over Target, which was the time the bombs were scheduled to hit the target (all the other aircraft involved in a mission — MiG CAP, RESCAP, radar surveillance aircraft, and later Wild Weasels and support jamming — planned their efforts based on a pilot making his TOT).

Working the Frag was harder for the flight leader than for the other pilots. First of all, he had to ask himself how long it would take to reach the target from the tanker drop-off point. He would then call the tanker unit and tell them where and when he wanted to be dropped off. Then he would figure out how long it would take to fly to the tanker and refuel, and that would tell him what his takeoff time would be. He would then give this to the wing ops center, who would pass the word over to maintenance and also “deconflict” his flight from the other flights taking off around that time, in order to avoid midair collisions.

Meanwhile, he would need to look up other information: Who was pulling RESCAP that day? What was the call sign and frequency? Were there special instructions (such as: Avoid Phuc Yen airfield by ten miles… so as not to really disturb the enemy)? What were the flight call signs and targets being struck in the same time frame (so he’d know who was in the air when he was, where they were, and doing what)? And what were the code words for the day (such as for recall)? The better the flight leader, the more capable he was in reading the Frag, extracting all the relevant information, and then briefing the flight in such a way that a precise image of the coming reality was created and everyone could fly the mission in his mind before he set out. In that way, when he flew the mission he had already reduced the confusion and fog of war to the minimum.

★ Horner’s and Myhrum’s job was to break out the Frag order, and outline those items that applied to their base: missions, call signs, times for takeoff, refueling, and Time over Target. They would receive the Frag around 2200 at night (it would usually arrive on a T-39 executive jet that flew over from Saigon), with first takeoffs at 0600 in the morning.

In the beginning, the Frag was a nightmare to decode because the Frag team in Saigon would send the entire thing, which was a huge, complex document. Later the planners in Saigon separated out the information that didn’t change (such as tanker tracks, radar control unit information, frequencies, and so forth) into a separate Frag that was kept in operations, and the daily Frag contained only information that was new.

Once they’d broken out the Frag, Horner and Myhrum would give the details to intelligence, so they could dig out target materials, and to maintenance, so they could load the jets with munitions and get them ready to fly.

Once these arrived, the two of them passed the info over to the squadron duty officers, who would wake up the flight leaders so they could plan the missions.

It didn’t take them long to get into the groove of life at Korat.

During the day it was fiercely hot, but in the late afternoon or early evening, a thunderstorm would pass through and the air would cool off. That made sleeping at night very comfortable, and there was the squawking of the geckos — small, very loud lizards — to lull you to sleep. The roads were dirt, and red clay dust was everywhere. When it rained, they got muddy with red clay mud; but everything dried when the sun came out. They had common showers, where the maids also did the laundry and washed the sheets and clothing during the morning. And most had outdoor toilets.

For a swimming pool, they used a twenty-man life raft filled with rainwater. In the heat of the day, the pool water was cool and welcome. If you were flying and were sent on the early mission, you could find a place in the pool when you landed. But if you were flying a later mission, you had to wait until someone left the pool before you could sit in it.

★ After enduring a week of the confusion and frustration that goes with being in the military, Myhrum and Horner informed the two fighter squadrons at Korat that while they had been sent over to serve as staff officers and help plan missions, they still wanted to fly.

No one heard them. They kept getting the runaround: “Well, not today, but maybe tomorrow.”

Fed up, finally, Myhrum gave a call to a friend at Ta Khli. “Sure,” he told him, “we’re looking for pilots. Come on over.” Without telling anyone in authority, the two men packed their flight gear, arranged for someone to cover them in the command post for a couple of days, and went out to board the Klong Courier. But as they approached the ramp door of the C-130, Major Pete Van Huss of the McConnell squadron ran out to intercept them. “You can fly with us after all,” he said. “You don’t need to go to Ta Khli.” So they started flying. (Later, when the McConnell squadron rotated back to the States, they were handed off to the new squadron, who needed their experience.)

Chuck Horner’s first combat mission came in May 1965, when he flew as number two in a flight of four F-105s, each loaded with eight 750-pound general-purpose bombs. They’d been sent to destroy a gasoline storage area and pumping station at Vinh, North Vietnam, which was a hundred miles south of Hanoi. More eager than nervous, he accomplished what had become “the routine” of preparation, briefing, preflight, taxi, takeoff, aerial refueling, and formation flying to the target… “routine,” because as the duty officer breaking out the Frag, he had already helped plan many sorties and he had also planned and executed practice missions for years.

It was early morning as they refueled over the Thai rice paddies, neat brown and green squares waiting to be planted or harvested… a stark contrast with Laos, which they crossed next. Laos was mostly mountainous jungle, wild and beautiful. Everywhere was a dark green canopy of trees, and here and there were small mountain ridges and karst — limestone mesas whose sides consisted of sheer cliffs thrusting sometimes a thousand feet up from the jungle floor, their tops a dark green cap of jungle. Next they flew across the high, narrow, north-south-running mountain range that separated Laos from North Vietnam. Beyond lay North Vietnam itself, a narrow strip of peaceful, beautifully green land, with the mountains on the west, the sea on the east, and a scattering of islands along the coast. Near the coast were numberless rice paddies, and near the mountains were low foothills, usually covered with jungle. Several rivers flowed from the mountains and snaked to the east and the ocean. In the morning, the land was calm, with fog in the low spots. During the day, rain clouds built up, especially over the mountains, and produced much lightning and heavy rain until well into the evening. As the pilot approached the coast, he saw more roads, and more towns and villages. These tended to be a cross between Oriental and French. Most buildings were wooden, with tin roofs, and raised on stilts off the ground. More solid structures, however, were occasionally left over from the French, usually large, made of white concrete, with red tile roofs.

According to the usual practice, they crossed North Vietnam at its narrowest around the finger-shaped lakes between Vinh and the South Vietnamese border (hence the name Finger Lakes), then flew out to sea and proceeded north until they returned inland to hit a target.

As they roared in from over the South China Sea, they could see the target from fifty miles, huge white petroleum storage tanks and a large pumping station to the west on the north bank of the river that ran out of the city toward the sea. They came in from the east at 15,000 feet above the ground. The air was crystal clear, and the sun was behind them. The leader rolled over to his right and pointed his Thud at the storage tanks.

Horner waited fifteen seconds and followed him down, offsetting to the west so he wouldn’t get hit by enemy ground fire shot at the leader. It was absolutely calm as Horner watched the lead’s bombs set off two of the storage tanks in a violent orange and black maelstrom. He eased his aircraft’s nose to the right, checked his dive angle, airspeed, and altitude; and when his gun sight crept up on the huge pumping station, he depressed the bomb-release button on top of the control stick, then reefed back on the stick to keep from hitting the ground, and watched over his right shoulder as his bombs struck dead center on the mass of pipes and buildings that had once been a petroleum-pumping station.

With his head twisted completely around over his right shoulder and the nose of his jet now pointed toward the sky, he somehow saw red fireballs stream past on the left side of his canopy. Someone is trying to kill me, he thought abstractedly — the way we might think, It’s raining out. Meanwhile, he racked his jet toward the sea and tried to see the lead, who was just fifteen seconds ahead. Then he realized that he couldn’t see the leader because both of their jets were surrounded by greasy black smoke with orange centers making whoomp whoomp noises that rocked his jet. At that point, he put his jet into maximum afterburner, to get as much speed as possible, and started to dance around in the sky, to kill any tracking solutions the gunners might be working out.

It’s just like the World War II and Korea veterans said it was, he thought, as he flew out over the sea. And instantly he was a veteran.

Later, AAA too became part of the routine. If he looked down at the ground, he could see the red flame from the barrels of the AAA as they shot up at him. He could tell when the big guns were shooting at him because of the black greasy puffs. The 57mm guns were arranged in a circle and would fire in salvo, so what he saw was a circle of fire. And then if he looked to the other side of the formation and above the flight, he could see the black smoke of projectiles exploding. The smaller-caliber weapons featured tracers that snaked up from the ground and then curved behind the flight. In reality, the tracers didn’t curve; they appeared to because of the movement of his aircraft. Orange tracers were the sign of 37mm guns. The projectiles from these weapons exploded in gray-white smoke… All in all, fascinating to look at.

After the excitement and skill of an attack and evading AAA, the trip home was easy — a thoughtful time. When a man is filled with adrenaline, he thinks fast, but on the way home he has time for meditating about what he has just done.

As he flew back to Korat that day — no longer a virgin — Horner realized that war is not the glamorous heady adventure described in song and story. He wondered what those gunners on the ground thought of him. He was pleased that they’d missed him, and glad that he’d frustrated them, but he took little joy that he and his companions had wrecked so much of their homeland and probably killed some of their countrymen.

As Horner accumulated missions — killing more people and destroying more property — he began to accumulate an abhorrence of war. For him, this abhorrence was a complex emotion:

He always felt the pain of the people he was attacking… but not enough for him to stop what he was doing. He hated the stupidity and immorality of war… but he loved being shot at and missed. He loved taking part in the struggle, the excitement, the high. He was afraid of being killed… yet unafraid (like most good fighter pilots, keeping his fears in a box). When he would sit in the arming area waiting for his flight to go, a little voice would whisper in his ear, “You are not coming back from this mission.” Yet he would shrug it off and fly. Once he was on the mission, he was so busy that he didn’t have time to be afraid. Afterward, sometimes, his hands would shake — probably, he claims, from fatigue as much as anything else.

“I love combat,” he says. “I hate war. I don’t understand it, but that’s the way it is.”

During the next two months, Horner flew forty-one combat missions.

Most often the F-105s would fly in pairs into North Vietnam, conducting road reconnaissance — looking for trucks — with a fixed alternative target such as a bridge. They dropped a variety of munitions, most often 750-pound bombs; but they also carried antitank rockets and were sometimes Fragged to hit a bridge with them. These would punch small holes in the bridge floor, and repairs could be made in hours. The best missions were against stored petroleum, freight cars in rail yards, and big bridges. The worst were what they called “Whiplash Bango Alert,” during which they’d sit on the ground in their Thuds and wait for orders to scramble in order to provide CAS for clandestine operations in Laos. When they finally scrambled, it was usually at the end of their vulnerability period — during the two hours from 1000 to 1200, they were “vulnerable” to a scramble; the jet was cocked, they had to wear G suits, and they sat around close to the jets so they could get airborne quickly — and the target was usually suspected troops in the jungle. Meaning: they bombed the jungle.

★ All the pilots soon came to realize that they were not fighting the war in the most efficient manner.

For the most part, the planning aim was to make it difficult for North Vietnam to help the Vietcong with logistical support, which was a reasonable goal. Within that aim, however, so many restrictions were placed on the pilots that very little of that aim was actually achievable. Robert McNamara’s strategy was one called Graduated Pressure, and its aim was to persuade the North Vietnamese to give up rather than going all out to defeat them. As a result, the pilots were saddled with politically selected targets, rules of engagement, buffer zones, target exclusions, and all sorts of other counterproductive arrangements. Unlike the Army, the Air Force wasn’t caught up in measuring success by counting bodies; however, the Air Force measures of merit, such as numbers of sorties flown, hardly made better sense. Any sortie might well have been useless, due to the lack of decent targeting or munitions; yet it was seen by headquarters as just as important as a sortie against a good target. Finally, the planning aim was to avoid gaining control of the air (for the sake of Graduated Pressure), and there was no serious thought given to destroying the enemy’s capacity to make war and his will to fight.

When Horner first went to Korat, most pilots counted all of these oddities as a sign of the fits and starts and inexperience that go with fighting a new war. Still, it was hard to overlook the inefficiencies, and not to ask why their efforts appeared to be so fragmentary, and without the conviction needed to win a war. It all seemed like such a limp way to hit the North Vietnamese. If you’re going to hit them, then hit them.

In time the pilots came to realize that it wasn’t just an efficiency problem; it was a stupidity problem. And then in time they came to realize that it was more than that, it was a matter of lies and betrayals. That realization — for Chuck Horner, anyhow — was not to come until later, but in the spring and summer of 1965, he could not fail to register oddities such as the following:

Early on, when they were short of munitions, he and other pilots would be sent over North Vietnam with a single bomb and their gun, their mission supposedly being to intimidate the North Vietnamese. Meanwhile, splendid targets, such as piers full of supplies and warehouses, were off-limits. Likewise, the airfields north of Hanoi were off-limits (allowing the MiGs a safe haven from which to launch attacks on our own aircraft). The enemy was allowed the use of his own government buildings, even as he was blowing up South Vietnamese government buildings in Saigon. And he was given buffer zones along the China border, in order for us to avoid “frightening” the Chinese. The enemy used this protected space wisely.

Orders like these flowed out of the bizarre rules of engagement. When the Frag came in at night with the targets the pilots were scheduled to hit, included would be a long list of ROEs, primarily telling them what they could not do. They could not hit any target of opportunity. In the beginning, they could not engage enemy forces unless fired upon (this changed). Areas such as Hanoi and Haiphong were off-limits. They could not attack SAM sites. And they could not attack airfields, even if a MiG was taking off to intercept them.

Pilots are realists and craftsmen. They want to get the job done, and to do it well. It didn’t take them long to see that even their best efforts would not get the job done well.

What they didn’t know was that, besides the policy of Graduated Pressure, the President and his Secretary of Defense wanted to maintain absolute control of the war for political reasons. On the one hand, they wanted to look strong in the United States and perhaps slap the North Vietnamese around enough to persuade them to give in. On the other hand, they didn’t want the conflict to grow into a full-fledged war that would endanger the success of the President’s domestic efforts, such as the Great Society.

In addition, the Secretary of Defense arrogantly believed in his own intellectual and moral superiority over his immediate military subordinates, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Chiefs passively accepted it. They were constitutionally responsible not only to the President but to the Congress, to tell the truth as they saw it, but they didn’t. They knew the Johnson-McNamara policy would not work, and they were silent.

Meanwhile, in the skies over Southeast Asia, the frustration over the rules of engagement increased. The pilots sensed that they were constructed by men who did not have a feel for what was going on in the cockpits over the North. Their sense of fighter-bomber tactics and of the vulnerabilities of the F-105 was dim to nonexistent. Much worse, they had not the slightest vision of what they wanted done, and therefore they could not pass it on to the pilots.

If a pilot who is laying his life on the line is told to do a half-baked job, to perform less than credibly, even though he might die doing it, then you will soon have a problem maintaining military discipline and loyalty up the chain. The ROE orders made pilots perform tasks that were not credible… and so in time the orders were disobeyed and the pilots lied about it. In this way began the erosion of discipline and respect for authority that followed from the Vietnam experience.

★ Route Packages (so called because the mission was to interdict the supply of support to the Vietcong in South Vietnam) caused the pilots a somewhat different — though related — problem. The Route Packages themselves were simple enough. They offered a reasonable, though arbitrary, way to lay out North Vietnam into geographical areas.

The country was divided into seven zones, starting at the DMZ (the line separating the two parts of Vietnam) and looking north. Thus, from south to north, the Route Packages went RP I to RP IV. The part of the country that was mostly west of the Red River was called RP V, while the rest — including Hanoi and Haiphong — was VI. Phuc Yen and Hanoi were in VI A, the western part of VI, while Haiphong was in VI B, the eastern part of VI.

In practical terms, defenses in RP I and II were relatively light. In III and IV, defenses were heavier but still moderate (but with one or two real hot spots, such as the Than Hoa Bridge, which resulted in more shoot-downs than any other single target). MiGs flew out of V, which was bad, but it also contained a lot of jungle where there were no SAMs or guns, which was good. VI was the worst, with the Red River Valley, MiG bases at Phuc Yen and Dong Ha, Hanoi and Haiphong, and the northeast railroad.

The reason for Route Packages was to allow the U.S. Navy and the USAF to operate over North Vietnam without coordinating with each other. Each service could operate over its own designated zones, and in that way, each service could keep control of its own aircraft without having to place them under the control of a single air commander. Thus, the USAF got RPs I, II, V (V was farthest from the sea), and VI A, while the Navy got RPs III, IV, and VI B (VI B and IV were near the sea). In other words, the Navy got the midsection and the USAF got the top and bottom.

There were both benefits and drawbacks to Route Packages. The chief benefit was that the Navy and the Air Force kept out of each other’s way and they could plan their operations apart from each other, so there was never a coordination problem. In those days, it was also likely that U.S. forces did not have the command and control that would have allowed Navy and Air Force aircraft to operate with each other in the same airspace. It was likely, too, that Air Force and Navy planes would have been intercepting one another and perhaps even taking shots at one another. The chief drawback, of course, was that U.S. forces were not mutually supportive, which meant that the enemy could easily take advantage of the split in U.S. forces, and contend with two weaker divided air efforts rather than one unified and coordinated force.

It also gave pilots another reason to act contrary to what they saw as stupid, wrong, and lacking in credibility.

For example, when the weather was bad in an Air Force Route Package, Air Force pilots were not allowed to hit an alternative target in the Navy’s Route Packages.

Let’s say that Horner was flying in RP VI A, going after a bridge on the northwest rail line to China, and the weather turned bad — thunderstorms. Logic would say he ought to fly over to the northeast rail line to China and drop on a bridge over there; but since that was in RP VI B, he was expected to weather-abort the mission and bring his bombs home.

Did he do that? No.

What he did was fly to wherever there looked to be a suitable target, drop on it, and then report 100 percent of ordnance in the original target area. He would not report any BDA (Battle Damage Assessment), since he knew that the original target had not been hit, while there was a smoking hole a hundred miles away that they could not correlate with any Frag, so they did not report it, even if photos showed it.

Meanwhile, Chuck Horner came to understand that both he and the enemy ultimately worked for people whose interests did not include either of them; they did not really care if he or they died. Their agenda involved some geopolitical goal, while his was to stay alive.

★ None of these realizations came in a flash. For Horner, some didn’t hit him until after he returned to the United States. If, however, there was a Road to Damascus moment for Chuck Horner, it had to be on the July day in 1965 when the Thuds from Korat and Ta Khli made history. On that July 24, sixteen F-105s were sent to destroy a radar-guided SA-2 surface-to-air missile site located at the junction of the Red and Black Rivers in North Vietnam. This was the first-ever attack on a SAM site, and it turned into a ghastly fiasco.

Before that date, the Air Force and civilian authorities responsible for determining the course of the war had further determined that U.S. aircraft should not attack the SA-2 sites then being set up in North Vietnam. In that way, they reasoned, the United States wouldn’t annoy the North Vietnamese enough to provoke them into using the SAMs… “Annoy the North Vietnamese?” Chuck Horner observes. “Why would the North Vietnamese go to all the trouble of setting the SA-2s up if not to shoot at U.S. aircraft? And keep in mind that U.S. aircraft were already bombing their country, so they had plenty of reason to be annoyed. What we should have done is sink the boats bringing the SAMs from the USSR. We should have bombed the trains that brought them from China. If we missed them there, we should have bombed them the first time we saw them being taken out of the craft. And failing that, we should have bombed the very first sites they set up. Instead we put the sites off-limits in the ‘hopes’ that the North Vietnamese would not use this weapon against us, if we did not shoot at them. How dumb can you get?”

One day in July, the North Vietnamese shot down an RF-4C, an unarmed reconnaissance version of the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom jet, with a SAM-2. In other words, the North Vietnamese had missed the subtle reasoning that would have had them install SAMs without actually using them, and now the United States had to teach them a lesson.

On the night of July 23, a warning order went out to Korat and Ta Khli to stand by, a retaliation mission against the North Vietnamese SA-2 site was being planned; Frag to follow. At 11:00 P.M. the Frag arrived. It called for low-level tactics to defeat the SAMs, without thought of the many AAA guns that were defending the sites. To fool the North Vietnamese, the Thuds from Korat would let down in Laos just across the border, fly east down a deep valley in northern Laos that the Communist Pathet Lao used as their stronghold — without thought that the Pathet Lao might see them, or perhaps choose to take some target practice themselves — then turn north at the Black River and hit the target in the delta at the Black and Red Rivers junction. The Thuds from Ta Khli, meanwhile, would let down to the north and fly east until hitting the Red River, then come south — without thought to the midair-collision potential resulting from Korat flying up from the south and Ta Khli coming down from the north. They also Fragged the munitions. Since it was a low-level attack, the F-105s were given napalm and CBU-2s. These last were new munitions — tiny bomblets containing ball bearings carried in tubes under the wing. When you reached the target, you blew the ends of the tubes and the bomblets dropped out and fell to earth. When they exploded, the ball bearings inside were like bullets, scattering in all directions, punching holes in whatever they struck. (The bomblets also had the bad habit of colliding in midair behind the wing, detonating, and punching holes in the dispensing fighter aircraft, setting it on fire or destroying its fuel cells and hydraulic flight control lines.)

In all fairness to those who planned the mission, no one had experience against SAMs (other than the U-2 pilots who’d been shot down by SAMs over Russia and Cuba). There was, in fact, a general feeling that it was hopeless to fly against SAMs; they never missed. Finally, planning for the first-ever raid against SAMs was heady stuff — it was hard to step back and just look at the best way to do it — and so anybody in Saigon or Washington who had an opportunity to add a tweak to the plan did.

Was there a better way? In fact, yes. Higher command could have called down to the Wing and said, “If you can kill those SAM sites at such and such a location, please do so, and let me know what you learn.” In other words, the Wing might well have had a more practical way to accomplish higher command’s goal than higher command did. But that was not likely under the centralized system then in place.

Meanwhile, Horner and Myhrum, who were on duty handling the Frags, noted that the Dash-One pilot’s handbook contained restrictions on using napalm. Specifically, the maximum speed for release of these weapons was 375 knots indicated airspeed. Not smart, they thought, to go in against AAA that slow. They passed that thought on to Saigon, and Saigon agreed. Another message came back at 2:00 A.M. that morning, saying, “OK, load up iron bombs and have at it.” By that time, the munitions troops had already loaded the jets with napalm.

“Hey, wait a minute.” Horner and Myhrum came running up. “Change in plans. Drop the napalm and CBUs and load up bombs.”

“Okay, can do.”

Then, around 5:00 A.M. the general in Saigon must have arrived at headquarters, because a new message quickly came in: “Load the napalm and the CBUs and go as ordered.” So they went back to the hapless maintenance troops: “Hey, guys, there’s been a change. Reload the napalm and CBUs. Sorry.” It’s because such things happen that maintenance troops have a low opinion of operations.

While all this was going on, the pilots who were about to fly the mission were doing what they could to sleep; but sleep wasn’t likely, because this mission was a major operation. When the sun rose, the pilots assembled; and Horner and Myhrum delivered the mission data for the first-ever attack on a surface-to-air radar-guided-missile site, then prepared to grab breakfast and hit their beds.

As it happened, maintenance had a pair of extra aircraft loaded, in case someone aborted a primary jet. “Would you and Roger give those jets a hot preflight and start them up?” they asked. “If someone has to abort their primary aircraft, they can run over to yours, jump in, and take off on the mission.”

“No problem,” they answered.

“And would you please taxi them out to the arming area,” they added, “in the event that one of the primary jets breaks out there?”

“Sure, no sweat,” they answered. But because they had been up all night and they were tired, Horner was also thinking, Let’s get the show on the road so I can get some breakfast and sleep.

Then the takeoff time was moved up, forcing Horner and Myhrum to go to the jets early (somebody brought them sandwiches from the club, but the meat was cold liver, which Horner hates, and he went hungry), climb in the jet, start check-in, and then taxi to the landing area. All went well there, until Horner and Myhrum, who were sitting off to the side, heard two pilots in the first flight abort their takeoffs. Next the flight leader called to order them to take off and join him as numbers three and four. Okay, no sweat, Horner thought, I can fly wing anywhere. All I have to do is put the light on the star[11] and stay in formation, refuel, and drop some napalm on whatever the flight leader puts in front of me. His flight plan will determine mine, since I am in formation with him.

That was overhopeful.

After they refueled, but before they let down in Laos, numbers one and two decided they had to go home with aircraft problems. That left Roger Myhrum — who hadn’t been briefed — to lead the whole show from Korat. On his wing was Chuck Horner. Other than what he could remember from the night before when he broke out the Frag, Horner was just as much in the dark about the mission as his friend. Not to worry, he thought. We’ve faked it before, and anyway we know the area like the back of our hands from previous missions.

When they let down in the valley in Laos, the Pathet Lao must have been caught unaware, because they scarcely shot at them. Soon they hit the river and turned north.

Suddenly the radio came alive: “Buick Leader is down in the river!”… “I’m hit and on fire!”… “Two, where are you?” All these messages came with automobile call signs, meaning Ta Khli was early in their attack. They were coming south down the river and getting shot at and hit.

Since it was not pleasant to have the enemy shooting at you at slow speeds, the Thuds from Korat pushed it up. Horner noticed Myhrum was doing a nice 550 knots and accelerating. Good man, he thought. Hope the generals don’t find out we’re exceeding the 375-knot limit on the napalm. He looked up then and saw Bobby Tastett’s Thud rise up out of an area of dust and flames, with the whole underside of his jet on fire. He kept staring as Tastett’s jet sank back into the dust and exploded against the ground.[12] Horner’s next glance was over to the side, where he noticed the gun barrels of the AAA all lined up and shooting down the valley. They were flying so low the North Vietnamese couldn’t depress their barrels enough to hit them. That meant the projectiles burst overhead, and most of the hits were on the topside of their jets. They were so low that some of them came back with leaves stuck in underside doors and panels.

In a moment, Horner saw what looked like a SAM site, then dropped his munitions about the same time Myhrum did. Later they both admitted they weren’t sure what they actually dropped them on, but since Saigon didn’t want to hear that, they reported that 100 percent of the munitions were in the target area, and that made Saigon happy. Turning left and crossing the Red River, he heard Frank Tullo call to report he was punching out (ejecting). He was later recovered.

Then it was finished. When the guns stopped shooting at them, they checked each other over. Myhrum had a hung can of napalm, so they slowed down while he jettisoned it, then headed south across Laos back to Thailand.

En route, they listened in on the ops officer talking on the radio with a friend of Horner’s, Bill Barthelmous. Bill had holes in his jet behind the canopy and asked the ops officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jack Farr, to check him over for fire, leaking fluid, or anything else. Sure enough, fluid was leaking. Suddenly Barthelmous’ flight controls locked up from loss of hydraulic fluid, and he pitched up, smashing into Farr’s jet, killing him. Barthelmous jumped out, but his chute streamered, and he was later found dead in a rice paddy with multiple broken bones and water in his lungs.

In the attack, Korat lost, in all, four jets and three pilots, one of whom turned up several years later as a POW, while Ta Khli lost two jets and two pilots. Bill Barthelmous and Jack Farr died; Bob Tastett and others checked into the Hanoi Hilton; and only Frank Tullo came back to fly north again from the hell of that day.

Afterward, poststrike reconnaissance film showed an untouched SAM site. But it turned out not really to matter that they missed it, since the site was fake. Its SA-2 Guideline missiles had been built out of telephone poles, with a dummy radar in the middle. They’d fallen for a very skillfully handled trap — a clever sting. That night, all the surviving pilots got roaring drunk and made a lot of noise celebrating being alive. In their hearts, though, they felt terrible, because they hadn’t got the job done.

The next day, the PACAF Commander, General Hunter Harris, paid a visit in his 707. As the door opened, the local SAC base commander was standing there, dressed up in his blue uniform, waiting at the bottom of the stairs; the honor guard, with chrome helmets, was lined up on either side of the red carpet. Instead of General Hunter Harris standing in the door, however, there was Frank Tullo, his flight suit covered with blood, mud, and vomit. He had cut his head when he ejected, then he’d crawled around in the jungle mud trying to avoid detection by the North Vietnamese. After a few hours of this, Air America had picked him up and flown him to a forward site in Laos, where he got drunk on local Mekong whiskey, got sick, and vomited all over himself as he slept. When the pilots saw him, they all cheered, much to the annoyance of the SAC base commander, realizing as they did that General Harris had a sense of humor and knew what was important (even if he couldn’t do anything about what they were being asked to do).[13]

★ The July 24 attack on the radar SAM site proved to be such a catastrophe that it served as an exemplary lesson in tactics and survival. The tactics were wrong on two counts: First, since it was thought that SAMs were 100 percent effective, it was concluded that aircraft had to underfly them. Second, from the Strategic Air Command commanders who were planning and running operations in Vietnam came bomber stream tactics — that is, large numbers of jets flying in trail over the target.

Both tactics derived from various historical and peacetime experiences — the bomber stream from World War II, and flying low level from lack of experience fighting against radar-guided SAMs.

Over Germany and Japan, the massed bomber formations would follow the same route into the target, the idea being to keep the wings level from Initial Point (IP) to target in order to get accurate bombing from level flight. The problem was that it gave the defense easy targets — ducks in a row.

In principle, flying low to defeat SAMs was far from unreasonable. The SA-2 radars the Air Force faced in Vietnam were limited to seeing targets at about 1,000+ feet above the ground, while the early-warning radars that fed them target information were limited to much higher altitudes. From that perspective, it made sense to come in low and fast. Unfortunately, the commanders failed to recognize that at low level, the guns were a much greater threat than a SAM. In point of fact — and experience was to bear this out — SAMs were not 100 percent effective. Even when they are flying within a SAM’s range, and a missile is locked onto them, pilots have a chance. They can always acquire the SAM visually and outfly it, even if they don’t have the Radar Warning Receivers, ECM pods, chaff, or flares that pilots now have.

Both tactics came out of the doctrine of centralized control — control from Washington and control from the Strategic Air Command. Washington has already been discussed. SAC’s attachment to control derived from their approach to their primary mission, the Single Integrated Operations Plan. No deviation from the SIOP was allowed. Its timetable allowed no variation. Every sortie was fixed. Every warhead was to be exactly placed.

The same minds that made a religion out of the SIOP refused to change low-level and bomber-stream tactics in Vietnam, even after these tactics had proved to be deadly.

★ The attack on the SA-2 site was a life-changing experience for Chuck Horner. His reaction to it, in fact, had a direct bearing on the success of the air war against Saddam Hussein in 1991. Here he is in his own words:

After we got back to Korat, we were treated like heroes and acted like fools. That night, as those of us who came home made ourselves gloriously drunk and loud, there burned a bitterness in me against the stupid generals who sent us in at low level, trying to sneak up on an enemy whom we had trained to be the world’s best air defense experts.

Our generals were bad news. But later my bitterness grew to include the administration in Washington (the people who were ultimately responsible for the madness in Vietnam). They just did not know what they wanted to do or what they wanted military power to achieve. As a result, they came up with strategies almost on a day-by-day basis. Meaning: we had no real strategy in the air war over North Vietnam. Sometimes it looked as though we were trying to punish North Vietnam into coming to peace talks. Sometimes it looked as though we were trying to force North Vietnam to stop supplying the Vietcong. Sometimes it looked as though we were flying sorties just to impress the White House that we were flying sorties. It was like the game of crack the whip. A little jiggle in Washington resulted in a huge snapping of the end of the whip out in Southeast Asia.

That doesn’t mean we didn’t cause the North Vietnamese a lot of problems. We sure tried. However, in the overall analysis, I am also sure that we gave the North Vietnamese a lot of comfort. They had to have been greatly encouraged about the way we fought the war, about the way we parceled out airpower and didn’t achieve dominance, about the way we ignored our own doctrine and failed to gain control of the air. As a result, we filled their POW camps with our pilots and littered their countryside with downed aircraft. We taught our enemy to endure air attacks, we taught our enemy how to best defend against the world’s greatest air power, and we taught our enemy how to defeat us in the end.

In my heart, meanwhile, I knew that I would never again be a part of anything so insane and foolish. The name of the game is to get the mission done. That takes a combination of the fighter headquarters and the unit level leadership. It takes a team, not the teacher-student or parent-child relationship that we had with our SAC leaders. I vowed that if I ever got in charge, if I ever became the omnipresent “ higher headquarters they,” I would not let such madness reign.

In time my bitterness changed to hatred of them — the omnipresent them — everybody above my wing, all the Fighter Headquarters from Saigon on up (and later, too, the real culprits, primarily the President and the Secretary of Defense). I didn’t hate them because they were dumb, I didn’t hate them because they had spilled our blood for nothing, I hated them because of their arrogance… because they had convinced themselves that they actually knew what they were doing and that we were too minor to understand the “Big Picture.” I hated my own generals, because they covered up their own gutless inability to stand up to the political masters in Washington and say, “Enough. This is bullshit. Either we fight or we go home.” I hated them because they asked me to take other people’s lives in a manner that dishonored both of us, me the killer and them the victim.

If you are going to kill someone, you better have a good reason for it. And if you have a good reason, then you better not play around with the killing. We didn’t seem to have the good reason, and we were playing around with the killing. Shame on all of us. If I had to be a killer, I wanted to know why I was killing; and the facts didn’t match the rhetoric coming out of Washington.

The rhetoric was that we were there to save South Vietnam for democracy and to keep the other Southeast Asia nations from falling into Communist slavery. Okay, I will buy that. But the way we fought was so inefficient that you wondered if the rhetoric was just a front we were putting up. Then there was the political situation in South Vietnam itself. It was bothersome that we were supposed to be defending a political realm that was so unstable and corrupt. You couldn’t trust the elected government, and the elections we called for were rigged from the start. So in Vietnam there was hypocrisy. Next came the strong assurances from the President that he would fight the war to win and then he did nothing of the kind. Worst of all for me was coming home from the war in 1965, visiting my wife’s hometown, Cresco, Iowa, and talking to the local Rotary luncheon. On the one hand, I was being told that we are out there on the frontier of freedom defending these people’s interests, even eventually their freedom. On the other hand, these people had no idea what was going on in the war. They were supportive. But how much comfort can someone who is killing other humans take when the folks back home don’t know what you are doing or why you are doing it?

What should we have done?

For starters, we should have actually taken control of the air. We should have taken down the MiG threat by attacking their airfields. We should have rooted out the air defense systems by attacking sector operations centers — even if they were in prohibited areas like Hanoi or Haiphong. We should have bombed any gun that shot at us on a priority basis. And we should have attacked the SAM storage areas.

How did I resolve these contradictions and confusions?

I returned to the United States in August of 1965, after maybe four months in the war, initially surprised that I wasn’t kept in battle until the war was won. After all, isn’t that how we do things in America? In 1965, I cared about winning. By 1967, I still wanted to win, but when I had a chance to go back to Korat as a Wild Weasel, I’d concluded that since the President didn’t really give a damn, and since the American people didn’t understand what we were doing, then why should I worry about it? Since I knew the ropes by then, and that this would probably be the only war I’ d ever be in, my goal was to get back to the war, do the best I could, and enjoy the thrill of combat, even though the war itself was a stupid, aimless, evil thing. My only disturbing thought then was the almost certain knowledge that as a Wild Weasel I ran an excellent chance of not coming home. But then, you never take counsel of your own fears.

To put it another way, I lied. Most of us did; and the folks above us wanted us to lie. I stripped myself of integrity. We lied about what we were doing in North Vietnam. We lied about what targets we hit: Say my Fragged target was a ford across a river. If I saw a better target — say, boxcars on a rail siding — I would miss my Fragged target and somehow my bombs would hit the boxcars. We lied about where we flew. For instance, I always tried to fly in the no-fly buffer zones on the Chinese border, because the North Vietnamese didn’t have any guns on the ground there. They also knew about our buffer zones and figured we would follow orders.

When I went into North Vietnam, there was nobody from Washington up there, so I did what I felt was in the best interests of winning the war. If our leaders had no interest in winning, whatever that was, well, I did; and I was going to try to win, even if they didn’t want to or were unwilling to really try. I loved the fighting. If they didn’t care about the truth, then I would lie. If they didn’t care about the killing and dying, then neither would I.

In war, of course, shit happens more often than at most other times. You are faced with the ever-present reality that you are out there killing other people, and that is very bothersome, especially if you really believe the stuff they taught you in church. You are stuck with a contradiction: “Thou shall not kill.” But you are killing. The only way to resolve the contradiction is to try to do it as humanely as possible. That comes from knowing why you are at war, and then to fight it in such a way that it is over as quickly as possible and everyone can go home and live in peace… or at least until the next war.

So you do your best to hit the enemy where it hurts. For example, the North Vietnamese airfields were off-limits. Now, you tell me — you are a pilot over North Vietnam near Hanoi with your head on a swivel, with Red Crown screaming out MiG warnings and beepers going off as Air Force pilots are bailing out of their jets, and there is an enemy airfield sitting there off to the right of Thud Ridge waiting for you to drop some bombs on it, and the Big Bosses send your bosses messages saying, “Do not bomb that airfield”—and you think, You’ve got to be shitting me, and you wonder how to get close enough to miss your Fragged target in order to lay some ordnance on the airfield with a slightly long bomb.

What good did any of that do? I learned something. I learned that you cannot trust America. And I tell my Arab friends that as I point out to them that the once-upon-a-time capital of the last nation to put complete faith in American military might is now called Ho Chi Minh City.

NELLIS AFB—1965–1967

When Horner returned to the United States in August 1965, he and Roger Myhrum went back to Seymour Johnson, where they worked in the command post doing odd jobs and waiting for orders. The boredom of all this was enlivened one day in October, when a parade was held at Seymour Johnson, during the course of which Horner and Myhrum each received an Air Medal for attacking the fake SA-2 SAM site that fateful day in July. Horner was surprised; he hadn’t expected it. And he was proud: nobody else in his wing who’d entered the Air Force since the end of the Korean war over a decade earlier had one of those blue and yellow ribbons on his chest.[14]

For the next two years Horner volunteered every chance he could to return to the war, but was told by the TAC personnel assignments people that he was too valuable for that; his combat experience was needed to train the rapidly growing pipeline feeding replacement aircrews into the war. This meant a move to Nellis AFB as an instructor in the F-105 school, where they trained new and old pilots to fly the Thud in combat.

During the time Horner was an instructor at Nellis, nearly all the experienced F-105 pilots had been or were being cycled through the war. By late 1966, that pool had been used up; those in it had either completed their tours (the normal tour for an F-105 pilot being 100 sorties, about four months) or had been shot down and killed or captured (the F-105 had the dubious honor of leading the pack in this category). This meant that the turnover rate in the F-105 (which flew only over North Vietnam or Laos) was at best four months. And this meant TAC had a tremendous training load in order to qualify replacement pilots. Since the pipeline could not feed the vacancies, the Air Force impressed non-fighter pilots, trained them in quickie courses, and shipped them off to war and near-certain death or capture. The term “There ain’t no way” became common in the F-105 community about this time. It meant: “There’s no way to make it to 100 sorties in the F-105, because you are going to get shot down before you reach 100.”

Here is how the training at Nellis went:

An instructor was in a squadron with normally fifteen other instructors. Every six months he’d get a long-course class — second lieutenants just out of flying training with shiny new wings and shiny new attitudes, willing to learn. Every three months he’d get a short-course class — pilots who came from staff jobs or from flying other aircraft.

To both long and short, he’d teach classroom instruction on the systems in the F-105, as well as taking off and landing, flying in formation, and air-to-air and air-to-ground gunnery, weapons, and tactics. Even though these students were being sent off to Vietnam when they graduated, there was still considerable inertia in the Air Force, so he also taught nuclear weapons deliveries. But whenever he was teaching his students what they would actually use in war — bombing techniques, lookout procedures for MiGs and SAMs, and so on — he always made sure they got the message that this would be a test question administered in the sky over North Vietnam.

Predictably, Horner was best with pilots who were aggressive and quick to learn. If they were slow learners or incompetent, then he had no patience with them, and they suffered his verbal abuse. The long-course people, the real fighter pilots, were usually a joy to check out — a clean sheet of paper for what he could give them. All he had to do was tell them the function of the various switches and the unique aspects of the Thud.

However, the pilots who’d been flying heavies — the cannon fodder schooled in other ways of operating who were being packaged and sent off to war — resisted change and were difficult to teach. Though he could coax them through, and for the most part could make them safe in the Thuds, their minds did not move at the pace flying fighters required. They lacked good situational awareness. Most of them got by using checklists and rote procedures, but some — because they were behind the jet all the time — were dangerous. These he taught survival skills, such as: “Don’t worry about hitting the target with your bombs. Worry about hitting the target with your airplane. Someday you’ll get through all this and return to your C-118, where you are happiest.”

Just as the conduct of the war in Vietnam was riddled with insanities, so also was the training for it: thus, instructors weren’t allowed to wash anyone out of the program. While many pilots did not meet standards, they were graduated and sent off to war. However, in the case of those few who would clearly die if sent off to war in a Thud, instructors did their best to figure out ways to keep them from going.

Horner had a young heavy pilot who was so far behind the aircraft it was a sure thing that even if the enemy didn’t get him, he would kill himself. One day, Horner learned that the young pilot had had a growth removed from his forearm. That was the excuse he needed. He had him sent to the squadron flight surgeon for an examination, and there it was “discovered” that this pilot’s forearm was too weak to pull back on the stick of an F-105 and that he should be returned to transports. And so it came about… even though anyone who knows aircraft knows that pulling on the wheel of a transport requires a lot more strength than the hydraulically boosted controls of a modern fighter. Sometimes the only way to beat insanity is by canceling it out with another insanity.

★ All of this pointed up the deep flaws in the assignment of pilots into combat.

First, all military personnel sent to fight the war had to operate under an arcane accounting system that governed how long they would be exposed to combat. To CPAs and bean counters this made sense. To warriors this was madness. But it was the bean counters who were running the personnel system, and the personnel system was establishing the policy that drove the strategy.

Second, all pilots were to have an equal chance to gain combat experience, and no pilot was expected to spend more than one year in theater or 100 combat missions over North Vietnam. The constant injection into the F-4, F-100, and F-105 units of bomber and tanker pilots who were not experienced fighter pilots, but who were given a quickie checkout in fighter jets and sent to war, at least hurt and at times crippled the war effort. Often these people wound up in charge by virtue of their rank and tried to lead when they didn’t know what they were doing. Some proved out, but most just muddled around until they finished their 100 missions or were shot down.[15]

This policy was obviously wrong on several counts, starting with the assumption that all pilots were of equal ability when it came to fighting. It further encouraged unusual tensions and risk avoidance, as pilots tried to stay alive for their 100 missions or their year rather than concentrate on the job of defeating the enemy. (Pilots with 90 missions would really get edgy.) Thus, it removed the primary incentive of a pilot for doing his combat duties to the best of his abilities, the goal of winning.

At Korat, one of the pilots was shot down after about 88 missions. He survived, came back to the base, and wanted to finish his tour flying with the Wild Weasels.

The job of the Wild Weasels was to locate and destroy SAM sites; and it was the job of the number one and three pilots in a Weasel flight of four aircraft to do that. The number two and four pilots were not Weasels; and they flew ordinary F-105Ds with bombs. Their job was to stick close and look out for MiGs while the other two were teasing the sites. If the one and three cornered a SAM site, two and four would drop regular bombs or CBUs on it.

This pilot figured that flying with the Weasels would be a soft touch, since the one and three often left their wingmen on the ridge in comparative safety, while they ventured out on the Red River valley floor to find the SAMs. They could maneuver a lot more aggressively if they didn’t have to take care of a wingman.

As luck would have it, though, on his first mission with the Weasels, this pilot had sixteen SA-2 missiles shot at him. They all missed, but when he returned to base he couldn’t even get drunk. His hands shook so much, he couldn’t hold a glass.

To his credit, he finished his 100 missions, but he became a dip bomber and was never again effective.

A dip bomber was a pilot who went in at 15,000 feet, rolled in over the target, and at 14,000 feet dropped his bombs so they were sure to hit somewhere on the surface of the earth. He then immediately started a climb until he could rejoin the rest of the flight, who’d gone down to much lower altitudes to try to hit the target, even though it meant getting shot at. There were a number of dip bombers at Korat. Some, like this one, evoked sympathy; some were the object of scorn.

It’s not hard to understand why pilots who’d been shot down became dip bombers. For a pilot the cockpit is an air-conditioned and familiar womb, but when he is about to go down and he blows the canopy, he’s jerked out of the womb into the real world of wind blast, noise, and if he’s flying at high speed, pain. The uncertainty as he floats down in his parachute quickly follows: Will I get rescued? Will I get injured when I hit the ground? Will I get captured by civilians and beaten to death with hoes and stones? Will I be captured by the army and spend the rest of my life getting tortured in jail? When your plane gets hit, you’re scared. Chuck Horner’s plane was never hit, but he has no doubt about how he would have reacted if it had been.

Why did the Air Force fall into this particular trap?

Partly for old-style ticket-punching reasons — to give every officer a chance for quality combat time in order to justify promotions. Worse, in Horner’s view, the Air Force felt that since the war offered an opportunity to renew the combat experience of the force, they wanted to offer that experience to as many pilots as possible. Since it really didn’t matter how good any of these pilots were, they could afford to send in the second team. In other words, playing the entire bench was more important than winning the game.

As far as Horner was concerned, the generals who led the Air Force should have resigned rather than put up with any of this.[16] Instead, they should have found the best pilots, put them in fighters, and sent them off to war with the warning: “Don’t come home until you’ve won.” They’d have figured out how to win. If they’d extended that policy all up and down the military line — as was done during Desert Storm — they’d have had a solid chance of victory.

The Israelis have devised a system that allows an air force to put its best pilots into the best planes. It wouldn’t be at all difficult for the USAF to implement such a system. The Israeli Air Force has a ladder — a list naming the pilots: top of the ladder is the best and the bottom is the worst. The best pilots go to the best squadrons. There is also a ladder of squadrons: the best squadrons fly the top fighters, U.S.-made F-15s and F-16s. The next-best squadrons fly Mirages or F-4s, which are older fighters and cannot compete with the F-15s and F-16s. From time to time, the top of the ladder in the F-4 squadron will get orders to fly the F-16, and the bottom of the F-16 ladder will get orders to fly the F-4. Below the F-4s or Mirages are other, lesser aircraft, all the way down to multi-engine and helicopters. Conceivably, an F-15 pilot who loses his nerve or concentration could free-fall all the way down to being a chopper pilot.

American personnel types don’t like to hear about such a system, because it starts with the premise that some pilots are better than others, while the bureaucrats try to keep their own job simple by assuming that all pilots are round pegs for round holes, plug-and-play as the laws of supply and demand dictate.

WEASELING

Until the introduction into the war of the Wild Weasels and Electronic Counter Measures Pods (ECMs confused SAM radars), enemy SAMs had an easy time against U.S. jets. There was virtually no defense against them. The free ride ended in 1966, when the first combat Wild Weasel, a two-seat modified F-100F fighter, located an SA-2 site and killed it with rockets and cannon. This was the first confirmed kill of a SAM site. It meant the enemy manning them were no longer safe. When they went to work at their SAM site, they stood a chance of dying, just the same as the pilots they were shooting at.

Weaseling was fairly straightforward. A pilot teased and tempted the enemy enough to provoke him to try to kill the Weasel, and then the pilot dodged the bullets while he closed on the enemy’s camouflaged position and stuck a knife in his heart. (The camouflage — nets over the radar and missiles — was quite effective, especially when a pilot was going 600 knots in a jet and trying to see all around him at once, looking for MiGs and missiles from other sites and tracking gunfire.) For Weaseling to be successful, the Weasel pilots had to have much better information than the strike aircraft about where the SAM radar was looking and the status of the SAM operator’s attack on his target. Then, when SAMs were launched, the Weasels had to be able to see the best ways to maneuver in order to avoid being tracked or hit by them. In short, Weasel pilots needed better detection gear and better training than other strike pilots.

After a few months of Weasel attacks, the SAM radar operators were forced to limit their time on the air to just a few brief seconds, or else they would be located and killed. The combined effects of the Wild Weasels and the self-protection ECM Pods on the bombing aircraft meant that the SAM became a manageable threat. Now thousands of SAM missiles had to be fired before the enemy was able to knock one U.S. aircraft down. The growing in-effectiveness of the SAMs meant that attacking fighters could operate at medium altitude, out of the range of most of the AAA guns. The Weasels, by helping to solve the SAM problem, helped to solve the visually-aided-guns problem.

This success came at a price. Too many Wild Weasel aircraft and their crews were lost; the job was hazardous to your health.[17]

The inspiration for the Weasels came in 1965, shortly after the failed attempt to bomb the SAM site at the junction of the Black and Red rivers. After that failure, the Pentagon realized (to their credit) that it was time to take a hard look at electronic combat. The result was an acquisition process called QRP, for Quick Reaction Process, whereby the Pentagon sent queries out to industry about what could be done.

One suggestion was to mount electronic jamming pods under the wings of U.S. aircraft. The electronics in the pods put noise jamming on the SAM radarscopes, so the operators could not lock onto the target aircraft.

These pods led to a whole new way of flying bombing attacks. Instead of flying in at low level, where a pilot would be vulnerable to AAA, he’d come in at 15,000 or 20,000 feet in what was called a pod formation. When the North Vietnamese tried to make out what their radars were picking up, all they could see was a blob — not an individual aircraft they could lock onto and attack. The Air Force liked this idea and implemented it. Before long, the pods began to have a good effect over the skies of Vietnam.

A second response, meanwhile, came from a small company in California, Applied Technology Incorporated. ATI suggested a radar signal receiver mounted on an aircraft that would allow the aircraft to locate SAM radars on the ground, then tell the pilot the radar’s status — searching for a target, locking onto a potential target, preparing to fire, or just having fired a missile at a target — and it could tell the pilot if he was the target.

The Air Force also liked this idea, and ATI produced prototype black boxes for testing. Then they found a few experienced fighter pilots from TAC, such as Gary Willard and Al Lamb, and bomber EWOs (electronic weapons officers — the people who operate the black boxes) from SAC, such as Jack Donovan. (Most bomber EWOs had never been near a fighter, but they were schooled both in the ways of SAMs and of the black boxes that helped bombers penetrate Russian SAM defenses.) These people flew the black boxes in two-seat F-100s at Eglin AFB, Florida, and proved that they could find radars whenever they were turned on, no matter how much they were camouflaged.

The next step came in 1966, when black box-equipped F-100s were deployed to Southeast Asia and sent into North Vietnam. Al Lamb and Jack Donovan, flying one of these F-100s, killed the first SA-2 site (with rockets and strafing; later Weasels used a mix of Shrike radar-homing missiles, 20mm cannon, cluster bombs, general-purpose bombs, and sometimes, high-velocity rockets). Unfortunately, the F-100s were slow and vulnerable when flying in the heavy defenses over North Vietnam and took too many losses. As a result, this initial cadre of Wild Weasels returned to Nellis, and ATI built even newer black boxes for F-105s, which greatly improved their radar detection system. Since F-105s had a crude heads-up display, ATI could install antennas on the nose of the aircraft, and a red dot was projected on the pilot’s gun sight that showed the location of the SAM radar on the ground. F-105s also carried more munitions, and they were faster and more survivable than the first F-100 Weasels.

★ At Nellis, meanwhile, Horner volunteered for a variety of test programs designed to introduce into the war the AT-37 Dragonfly (a T-37 jet trainer modified into an air-to-ground aircraft for counterinsurgency warfare; it was sold to several Third World nations) and F-5 Tiger Jet (a T-38 aircraft modified to act as a supersonic fighter; it was easy to fly and maintain, low in cost, and could be used by nations with small air forces; thousands of these aircraft are still flying today throughout the world). But he was turned down, just as he’d been turned down repeatedly for well over a year whenever he’d asked to return to Southeast Asia. He remained at Nellis.

One morning he was at Mobile Control, a small glass house between the runways, where one watched students in the traffic pattern, making sure they don’t crash or land gear up. As it happened, Al Lamb, a captain like Horner, was also assigned to Mobile Control that morning. While he was there, he talked about his recent experience in Southeast Asia flying F-100 Wild Weasels, the new secret outfit designed to find and kill SAM sites. They were just starting up, he explained, and needed experienced pilots who were also volunteers. “I want in,” Horner told him.

About an hour later, Lamb finished his tour in Mobile and left. Soon after he himself was relieved from Mobile that morning, Horner got a call from Gary Willard, a lieutenant colonel, who was commander of the new Weasel school. “Al told me you’re a volunteer,” he said to Horner.

“That’s true,” Horner answered, and by 11:00 A.M. that day he had orders to report to the Weasel squadron for extra training. The Air Force forgot the cold eye they had previously cast on his attempts to return to combat. They placed great importance on the Weasel program.

★ Horner entered Wild Weasel training together with his good friends, Billy Sparks and Jim Hartney (White Fang), whose father, a major, had been Eddie Rickenbacker’s ops officer in World War I.[18] He also went through the training with a cool, somber electronics warfare officer named Dino Regalli, who had been an EWO on spy missions flown out of the Middle East to eavesdrop on the Russians.

The training itself emphasized the obvious, that Weaseling is like making love to a porcupine: you approach them and do your thing very carefully.

Practically, it consisted of a great deal of classified classroom instruction on SAM radars, SAM operations and limitations, and tactics for approaching a SAM site, as well as in-flight training. The ATI black box that allowed Weasels to see where they were in the enemy radar-tracking radar beams was called the ER-142. The Weasels also had a set of antennas that allowed them to see where the radar was located on the ground, even if it was hidden from visual view. Using these electronics, they were trained in the modes and tactics of the SA-2 radar. They were also trained to use the Shrike radar homing missile and to outmaneuver the SA-2 Guideline missiles.

★ In the spring of 1967, Horner, now a Wild Weasel, returned to Korat, Thailand.

Between 1965 and 1967, the base had expanded, and the facilities were much improved. There was now a large, new, air-conditioned officers’ club with a swimming pool and all sorts of other amenities. (The 1965 club was being used to store soft drinks for the new BX.) There was also a two-story hospital and an air-conditioned church. The hooches were now two-man air-conditioned rooms in four-room suites. Each suite had a flush toilet and shower and a sitting area complete with refrigerator and chairs. Quite a change from the shacks where they lived and slept in 1965, and the rubber raft pool.

As a Wild Weasel, Horner flew both Wild Weasel missions and night radar bombing missions, a total of seventy in addition to the forty-one he’d flown in 1965.

The skies over Hanoi and Haiphong, meanwhile, and the surrounding Red River Delta, had become the most heavily defended real estate on earth. In the delta lowlands and the hills that ringed them had been placed more than 7,000 antiaircraft guns and as many as 180 well-camouflaged SAM launchers. By 1967, MiGs were also active, and doing surprisingly well against U.S. aircraft. At the start of the war, Air Force pilots had shot down four MiGs for every one of their own that was lost. Now the ratio was one to two. The Weasels and the ECM pods were badly needed.

A typical Weasel mission over Hanoi or Haiphong usually went something like this:

After takeoff, a pilot would proceed to the tanker in Thailand or over the Sea of China. After refueling, the package would form up. The Weasels would lead, followed by ingress MiG CAP F-4s, followed by twelve to sixteen bomb-laden F-105s, followed a little later (so they’d have fuel when the strikers were leaving the target area) by additional Wild Weasels and MiG CAP.

As he neared Little Thud Ridge, northeast of Hanoi, or Thud Ridge, running northwest of Hanoi parallel to the Red River, his MiG CAP would start down the ridge looking for any MiGs that might scramble, while the Weasels would fan out over the flats looking for SAM sites. (Pilots called it Dr. Pepper when a pilot was out on the flats with a SAM site at ten o’clock, two o’clock, and four o’clock locked onto him at the same time.) The Weasel’s job was to play chicken with the SAM operators, to “encourage” them to turn off their radars. So he often turned into the site and flew toward it. When the radar operator saw him coming at him, he had two choices: he could fire a SAM at him from the ring of missiles that he operated, or he could shut down his radar, which was in the middle of the ring. If he fired, the booster on the Guideline missile kicked up a lot of dust and clearly marked his site, so all the pilot had to do was to dodge the missile(s) he fired, and turn in and kill him. But more than likely he shut down and waited for help from a nearby site. When that site came up on the pilot’s electronics, he turned on him, and the dance went through another round. After a few minutes of this, the strike package had already gotten in and out and were back over the ridge. At that point, the egress Weasel flight would fly in to cover the pilot’s exit back up to the ridge and the MiG CAP F-4s would wait around in case any MiGs showed up.

Throughout all this, there might be a Weasel or striker shot down, and this added to all the confusion of radar signals going off in the pilot’s headset, of radio calls from his flight members about SAMs coming at him, of calls from the strikers trying to get their act together, of calls from the supporting command and control shouting out MiG warnings, of the constant junk chatter from the F-4s, and finally, of the ominous sound on guard channel of the beepers that are automatically activated when a pilot’s parachute is opened.

When he crossed the coastline or the Red River (there were few guns or SAMs west of the river), he was flooded with relief. He knew then that he was alive for at least one more day.

★ Though not everyone bought the ECM concept, the ECM pods were also proving their worth. The people at Ta Khli Base, for example, were suspicious of them and were still flying low-level tactics, even after two years of deadly lessons to the contrary. (For a time, Ta Khli was bereft of Wild Weasels, all of them from that base having been shot down; the Weasels from Korat had to take over some of their work until more could be sent from the States.)

However, the wing commander at Korat, Brigadier General Bill Chairasell, decided that losses at low level were too high and ordered his pilots to try out the new pods and fly the required four-ship pod formation. Each aircraft had to fly so many feet from each other and so many feet above or below his leader, so the four ships filled a box of airspace about 4,000 feet across by 1,000 feet long and 1,500 feet deep. Though using the pods and flying in this formation left the North Vietnamese radar operators unable to discern individual aircraft on their radarscopes, and gave them insufficient accuracy in their systems to hit anything with the missiles they shot, that didn’t stop them from trying. They sent up their missiles into the blobs on their screens. They came close, but they didn’t hit. And this meant some jittery moments for the pilots up there, cruising along at 15,000 to 20,000 feet above the ground in their rigid formation, feeling naked to the SAMs, sweating it out if their pods would really work or not, only finding out when the missile would fly harmlessly by. Not only did flying the pod formation require extreme discipline, but flying it was a pure act of faith; yet it worked. Soon, because of Bill Chairasell’s leadership and the use of pod formation and the Weasels, losses at Korat took a nosedive, and “There ain’t no way” became “There is a way.”

Did all of this make a real difference? In some ways, yes. Flying became safer for U.S. pilots. They had better targets — steel mills, bridges in Hanoi, SAM storage areas, and other targets in Hanoi and Haiphong. Later they had a few precision, laser-guided bombs, which also helped. Later still, Richard Nixon’s Linebacker II campaign late in 1972 sent B-52s over Hanoi, and mined Haiphong Harbor. The B-52s put terror into the North Vietnamese as no previous U.S. effort had done, and gave notice to the Russians and Chinese that nothing in North Vietnam was immune to U.S. bombing.

But did any of this make a real difference? Obviously no.

LAST RITES

The war in Vietnam had many unexpected consequences, and many of them were surprisingly positive. Here, in his words, is how the war ended for Chuck Horner:

In 1974, I traveled to Saigon and Australia, by then a lieutenant colonel in the Pentagon. While there, I had studied the 1973 Middle East war in detail. Based on this experience and my experience in Vietnam, I had put together a briefing (containing lots of Israeli gunnery film) on air-to-air combat for presentation to Congress. This briefing led to an invitation to a fighter symposium in Australia. As a courtesy, I visited the Vietnam squadrons flying the F-5 to provide them an update.

Not much was going on in Vietnam in those days. The Vietcong, of course, had been wiped out during the Tet Offensive, and we had pretty much pulled out, though there were USAF units in Thailand that could defeat any major action. So the North Vietnamese just sat tight, concentrated on diplomacy, and waited for the United States to lose interest in the South Vietnamese.

While I was in Saigon, the VNAF officers I was meeting knew we had pulled out for good and they were on their own. Therefore, having taken lessons from us for the past several years, they were putting their faith in hardware: if they had more, they would be OK. So they spent their time with me begging for matériel, radars, aircraft, bombs, transport, etc. By then I was aware that they weren’t going to get most of what they were asking for. I also knew that the Congress had had enough of the war and that the next two squadrons of F-5Es scheduled to go to Vietnam were not going to be delivered. The Pentagon had already started action to use them in building an upgraded Aggressor squadrons force at Nellis.

One day, I was scheduled to drive out in an embassy car with a driver to Bien Hoa Airfield to brief the squadron there (the same briefing I’ d given the other VNAF squadrons), and a VNAF lieutenant colonel, Le Ba Hung, was assigned to escort me. Before I left for the air base, the escort officer called to ask if he could ride up in my car. I said sure, but was mildly surprised. Vietnamese officers normally didn’t grab a ride with an American. They liked to take their own cars. So by asking to ride with me, this Hung guy was giving up a little “ face.” He would have had more face if he had shown up at the squadron in his own car. Well, I went over to the VNAF side of the base. When he got in the car, he was wearing a flight suit, which was another surprise. “I’ve already heard your briefing,” he told me. “So I’m going to get in a mission while you brief the squadron.”

At once I liked this guy, which inspired me to ask him why he had decided to ride with me. He answered flat out that he’d had trouble finding gas for his jeep; and besides, any extra gas he could get, he used in his Ford Mustang convertible, which he used to haul around his French girlfriend. Now I really resonated with this guy. We were the same age, and he had been flying fighters since 1960. He had been shot down and Americans had rescued him. And when he was going through pilot training, he’d had an American girlfriend, but didn’t feel he could get married due to the nature of his job. Now he was the F-5E Tiger II project officer on the VNAF Air Staff.

At that point he asked me point blank, “Are we going to get those other two squadrons of F-5E aircraft?”

“Do you want the truth?” I answered. He nodded, so I said, “No.”

He looked down in disappointment, then asked me what I thought about that. As far as I could tell, I told him, the VNAF would not have to fight the MiGs. What his country needed, if North Vietnam invaded, was gas and artillery ammo. And he agreed… and surprised me again.

After I briefed the squadron, and he flew a combat sortie, we rode home together. In the car, he turned to me and asked what I thought of the squadron pilots. “They look awfully young and inexperienced,” I told him uncomfortably. I was sure he didn’t want to hear this. “Their appearance and their questions and comments don’t give me a lot of confidence. If I were you, I’ d be worried.”

Then he looked me right in the eye and said, “Nixon’s policy of Vietnamization won’t work. My squadrons can’t fight their way out of a wet paper bag. And no matter how much equipment you give us, no matter how many drunken alcoholic civilian technicians you send over to do the maintenance on the equipment you give us, we are going to lose the forthcoming war with North Vietnam.” Once that had a chance to sink in, he went on: “Go back to the United States and tell your bosses what you’ve seen. Tell them that we desperately need your airpower until we’ve had time to grow a competent military force.”

I promised I would do that. And I did.

When I got back to the Pentagon, I wrote a trip report that included what I had observed. It said, among other things, that the policy of Vietnamization was a sham and wasn’t working, and that we needed to somehow stay engaged in Vietnam. If nothing more, we had to at least threaten to use our airpower if North Vietnam invaded the south. That paper made it two levels above me before it came back down with orders to destroy it and never bring up the subject again.

Even to the end we refused to recognize the facts or tell the truth about Vietnam.

After Saigon fell, I asked the intelligence guys to find Hung. They located him a few days later in a hospital at Wake Island, suffering from exhaustion. I wrote him a letter, but didn’t have any further contact with him until later. During the last few days of the war, he’d flown day and night, winding up in charge of the VNAF when all the generals left the country. Finally, after his last F-5 mission, he taxied into Tan Son Nut, and there was no one left to park his aircraft. Just about then, the North Vietnamese soldiers were coming over the wall, but Nguyen Cao Ky, the flamboyant fighter pilot who headed the South Vietnamese Air Force (and was for a time prime minister), came by and picked him up in a helicopter. For a few hours they tried to rally the country; but when mortars started falling on the Joint General Staff compound, they climbed aboard Ky’s Huey and flew to a carrier. There Hung collapsed.

Later, I tracked him to the United States Indiantown Gap Refugee Center and drove up to see him, which delighted him. He introduced me to Chan, his oldest sister, his mother, and Chan’s four children, one of whom had been born on Guam and was therefore an American citizen. Chan’s husband, Coung, a lieutenant colonel in the Army, had been ordered to stay behind to surrender the Army while his generals booked with the refugees who came out on the C-141s. But Hung had been able to use his Air Force contacts to get Chan and the children out. He’d called Colonel Marty Mahrt, an old F-105 buddy of mine, and Marty had arranged for Chan, the mother, and the three children to be evacuated on the next flight.

Then Hung went over to Chan’s house and explained that she had to go, which was not what she wanted to hear. When Chan started crying and wailing, Hung took out his 9mm handgun and calmly told her that she had two choices. Either she, his mother, and the children would get on the airplane, or he would shoot them all and then kill himself. But he was not going to let them fall into the enemy hands. Chan knew Hung, and knew he meant it. So she packed a few things and they left for the airport.

En route, artillery fire sent them down in a ditch. But after it let up, they were able to make it to the airport, Hung and Marty were able to put them on a C-141, and Hung went back to trying to repel the invasion. To this day his Mustang convertible is probably parked in front of the squadron.

When I met them at Indiantown, I knew that they needed an American sponsor. (In order to leave the refugee center and settle in the United States, you either had to have a large amount of money showing you could support yourself, or else you needed an American sponsor, who could help you get settled — usually by giving you a job.) So when I asked Hung who was going to do that, he told me that he himself didn’t need any help, since he had lived in the United States while attending various schools over the years and could easily find work and take care of himself. But it was going to be a problem for Chan and the others, because families who sponsored refugees wanted a family with a man in it who could earn money and help pay the expenses. “Okay, no problem,” I told him. “We’re on our way to Iowa for a vacation; but if no one comes forth in the meantime, they can come live with us.”

And so on our way back, we picked up Ba, the grandmother; Chan; Bich, a thirteen-year-old daughter who was a year older than my oldest daughter; Lingh and Que, nine- and eleven-year-old sons (my son, John, was ten); and Ain, the baby daughter, less than a year old. They lived with us for a year, and it was a wonderful experience. Every meal we ate rice with chopsticks. Mary Jo and Chan were like sisters. Ba took care of Ain and Nancy. The three boys roomed together and got along. Susan and Bich roomed together and acted like teenage sisters: they fought most of the time.

Hung, meanwhile, became the head manager at the Naval Academy Dining Room until the local mob ran him out of town because he tried to make them stop exploiting the Vietnamese who had replaced the Filipinos in the dining room. After Chan left us, she held good jobs and raised her family. Her oldest boy graduated from the Naval Academy with a degree in nuclear engineering. All the others excelled in school and are working citizens; Ain, the youngest, graduated from college and never received a grade below A in her life.

In November 1990, Chan’s husband Coung was released from Vietnam. I was in Riyadh when I got the news and was overjoyed. Over the years after the evacuation of Saigon, he had been in reeducation centers and had endured a great deal. Ba also died about that time; but her wish to be buried in the soil of Vietnam was never realized. Hung was married in Salem, Oregon, in 1979 to a wonderful and beautiful woman named Quin (who doesn’t take any sass from him). His sons are named Viet and Nam, so he will never forget the country he once served so proudly.

Following Vietnam, the Air Force was in bad shape, but it was by no means only Vietnam that had caused it. The problems were systemic in nature; they were the consequences of the way the Air Force had been run for many years.

Ever since the heating up of the Cold War, it had been the nuclear mission, and those who were in charge of it, the SAC commanders, who had been running the Air Force. In doing so, the SAC commanders gave every other Air Force mission at best only partial attention. How could dropping a bomb on a bridge compare with destroying the Soviet Union? The SIOP became supreme, and, as Chuck Horner had discovered, other methods of training were either downplayed or forbidden.

Bomber generals like predictability, order, and control, and in World War II, the best guarantee of bombing success had involved sending one’s bombers over the target in a specific line at a specific altitude. When the bomber generals became the SAC generals in the decades that followed, they ran the Air Force the way they already knew and already thought best — with order, centralized control, and intense micromanagement from above.

The authority of the SAC was further enhanced when Robert McNamara became the Secretary of Defense, and instituted the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) used by the Pentagon to build the annual budget submission for Defense. PPBS made the USAF Nuclear Forces — SAC and Air Defense Command — into what were called the Major Force Program 1, MFP-1. Since MFP-1 programs supported the most important part of America’s military strategy, they were to receive more DOD attention, and money, than other programs. Meanwhile, TAC and Conventional Forces were MFP- 2—second class.

The SAC generals took the ball and ran with it. Their methods, their procedures, became the only ones allowable, and they refused to tolerate any deviations. They did their best to standardize everything for which they had responsibility, and manuals and directions became the order of the day.

For instance, Walter Sweeney, a SAC general who commanded TAC in the early sixties, devised a system for rating the wings using what was called “Management Computation System” (MCS). Each wing’s activities were given a monthly score. These included not only measures of combat capability such as bomb scores and aircraft-in-commission rates, but also on-time payment of officers’ club bills, the number of lawns that needed cutting in the base housing area, the number of DUIs (driving under the influence) ticketed to a wing, and the number of contributions to the Air Force Aid Society. From all this a composite score was computed. The wing with the top score was presumably the best wing in the Air Force, while the one with the lowest was the worst. If a wing had a bad record paying its club bills, that counted as much as anything else, and the wing commander would certainly be criticized, and might even lose his job.

It’s no surprise that a system that measured uncut grass alongside bombing skill had no credibility with the troops. No surprise, either, was the result: the troops lied.

Take the case of a range officer at the bombing range at Poinsett, five miles south of Shaw AFB, at Sumter, South Carolina. An F-100 flight from Myrtle Beach was going to be on the range. The flight leader would give the range officer a call to tell him the kind of scores his squadron needed for their MCS points; and the range officer made sure that they got them. Consequently, if a pilot threw a bomb way off target, the score actually reported by the airmen became a no-spot (the smoke charge didn’t function when the bomb struck the ground, so the airmen scoring the bombs couldn’t tell where it hit). In short, there was no failure, and no loss of MCS points.

Another Sweeney game was to call from his office directly down to a squadron. Whoever picked up the phone was put to a test. Procedures that pilots were supposed to commit to memory were printed in the pilots’ handbook in boldface letters, and the hapless man on the phone was asked to parrot the boldface for a given emergency in his type of aircraft. Sweeney, naturally, had the book open before him; and if the pilot on the other end of the phone missed a word, he got a vicious chewing-out. And Sweeney wanted it all exactly as written; it had to be “Throttle — Off,” not “Throttle — Shut Down,” even though they meant the same. The result, first, was that the boldface procedures were soon pasted to the wall over every telephone in every squadron in TAC. Second, when Sweeny asked for the pilot’s name, he got an alias. Some of the names were very creative — Captain John Black, for instance, would become Captain George Suckfinger — yet the SAC general never caught on.

To the pilots, standardization and authority were important, but not this kind of mentality, and so the best of them fought back. They saw a vast gulf between the jobs they were being told to do and the jobs they felt needed to be done, and it seemed to them they had three options: they could crack under the strain, do a half-baked job, or fight by deceiving — lie and do the real job as much as they could swing it. Thus, integrity meant lying — not a good place to be, and the strains showed.

They showed in many ways — problems with drugs, alcohol, race, and sex. Too many crashed, too many were lost. They showed in smaller but equally telling ways, too: too many aircraft inoperable because there weren’t enough parts, too many hangar floors filthy, too many NCOs in their offices instead of with their troops, too many troops without clean toilets or clean washrooms.

It wasn’t until 1978 that a general named Bill Creech took command of the TAC, saw what needed doing, and did it, but that was several years in the future. In the meantime, men like Chuck Horner started laying the groundwork for reform.

When Chuck Horner returned from Vietnam in August 1967, he was primarily an operations man: he flew fighter planes, that’s what he did. Now, while continuing his strong operational inclination, he found himself on a steep learning path. He needed to understand how to work the bureaucracy, needed the right kind of mentoring, needed to be shown how to get things done off the field as well as on. It was very lucky for him that his first major job offer after Vietnam put him in the heart of tactics development at Nellis AFB in Nevada.

NELLIS AFB

Nellis has long been, as it calls itself, the “Home of the Fighter Pilot.” Because of the large-scale ranges and the free and open airspace, much of the USAF’s fighter equipment and tactics development has been carried out there, and after Vietnam began to make its presence felt, and money was freed up to develop the new conventional systems needed to fight that war, it was a very busy place.

In the 1960s, two major functions were based at Nellis: a fighter wing that performed F-105 (and later F-111) qualification training; and the Fighter Weapons School (FWS), where top fighter pilots received (and still receive) advanced training in fighter pilot instruction — at first in the F-100 and F-105, and later in the F-4.

Fighter pilots with a great deal of experience (usually 1,000-plus hours) and credibility were selected both for their flying skills and their ability to instruct, and sent to the FWS for a six-month intensive training course — in effect, a doctoral degree in Fighter Operations. The academics were fiercely difficult, and there was nearly endless flying in which every move was graded in a laboratory environment on the ranges. Beyond that, FWS students learned how to be superb platform instructors, as well as how to work with maintenance to ensure that the bombing systems were working correctly and the munitions being maintained properly.

After leaving the FWS, graduates were called patch wearers: instead of their flying squadron patch, they wore on their right shoulder the FWS patch — gray with yellow circles and a bomb impacting this bull’s-eye. After finishing the course, receiving their patch, and returning to their home base, patch wearers became the promoters of fighter excellence in their squadron or wings.

Graduates additionally received an “S” prefix on their Air Force Specialty code. Thus, AFSC A1115E signified the following: “S” meant FWS grad; “1115” meant pilot; and “E” meant F-105. When personnel people noticed the S on an AFSC, they knew this pilot needed to be handled specially, not only because of his special training, but also because of the Air Force’s huge investment in him. For that reason, patch wearers were more likely to be assigned the good flying jobs.

★ In August 1967, Chuck Horner returned to Nellis to an assignment in the Combat Crew Training wing. This was not an appealing career move, since the wing was then converting from F-105s to F-111s, which was much more of a bomber than a fighter. After some finagling of dubious legality that kept him technically AWOL for six months but let him avoid his official assignment, he found himself flying as an instructor at the Fighter Weapons School, where a friend, Gary Willard, was the commander. There Horner went to work teaching Wild Weaseling and Electronic Combat for pilots and electronic warfare officers. He also took on special projects, such as testing a new radar bombing system for the F-105 and new Wild Weasel black boxes. Meanwhile, after six months of less than official status, a friend in personnel took care of the paperwork that made Horner legal again.

In March 1968, Major Paul Kunichica asked Horner to join the team at the new Fighter Weapons Center at Nellis. Though the FWS had been set up to teach graduate-level fighter aviation, it soon found itself managing test projects, writing doctrine, and conducting advanced studies, all of which detracted from the quality of its principal mission, and so the center was created to take care of all those noneducation functions, all the projects and functions that needed the expertise resident at Nellis. Instructors from the FWS populated the center, and though they still flew with the FWS, they now spent most of their time working on new bombs or writing requirement documents to guide the development of new aircraft.

Horner and Kunichica, a Japanese-American from Hawaii, had flown with each other a number of times and were friends. Kunichica worked for Colonel Dick Bond, who in turn worked for Brigadier General (soon to be Major General) Zack Taylor. Bond was very smart, below the zone (promoted to rank early), and liked cocky young men who enjoyed staying late at the office, while Taylor, a soft-spoken but tough-as-nails Virginia gentleman who’d been an ace in World War II, was the father of the Fighter Weapons Center, and a man of conspicuous integrity.

After he moved up to the Center, Horner still flew with the squadron and taught, but he spent most of his time on projects such as a study of F-111 bombing accuracy, and on concepts that defined the capabilities needed in the fighter aircraft destined to replace the F-105 and F-4. Out of these concepts came the FX and AX, which eventually turned into the F-15 and the tank-killing A-10.

More important personally, Horner began to understand what mentoring meant in the military, as the newly promoted Major General Taylor took him under his wing. “Bond and Taylor challenged me,” Horner says now. Bond threw Horner into some of the General’s pet projects, which meant that Horner and the General often found themselves on their hands and knees on the floor of the General’s office, building charts that the General could use to brief his four-star boss, General Spike Momyer, at the time the TAC commander.

In young Captain Horner (promoted to major in 1969), Taylor saw a man who would see the problems through to a solution. Horner fought problems the way a dog worries a rag. He plunged into them and let fly. He loved making order out of chaos. When the smoke cleared, the floor would be covered with debris, but there’d also be the glimmers of a solution here and there, which Horner would gather up and present to his boss. During this process, he and Taylor would argue the concepts, push them and pull them, and in so doing Taylor often elevated Horner’s sight picture, got him to aim better at the real target, propelled him toward working the right problem… often to stop thinking small. Taylor showed him how to think big.

This was Horner’s first time really working the bureaucracy — an experience not too very different from combat, he quickly realized: a lot of men were gunning for him — not because he was arrogant, but because he wasn’t afraid to stick his neck out and do the work at a pace they could not generate.

The largest question facing the Fighter Weapons Center had to do with its continued existence. After the Vietnam surge in weapons development ended, the various Tactical Centers had to be reorganized, and those that were no longer really useful or viable, eliminated. Besides Nellis, Shaw AFB had the Reconnaissance Center, Pope AFB the Airlift Center, Eglin AFB the Air Warfare Center, and Hurlburt AFB the Special Operations Center. Taylor involved Horner in a study to look at what they needed to do at Nellis. When it was done, Taylor took the briefing to Langley and his new boss, General Momyer, and even suggested that the F-100 test aircraft at Nellis could be retired, which would save much-needed funds. Momyer then ordered that all the Centers be studied, to determine if there could be additional assets cut or even if the Center was still needed. Taylor picked Horner to be the representative from Nellis on that study, as he had worked up the formulas that allowed Taylor to make the cuts there. Before Horner left, Taylor gave him some very simple but important advice. “Don’t defend Nellis,” he told him. “Do what is best for the nation and the Air Force.” It was a magnificently empowering directive, for there was no hidden agenda. At the end of the day, Nellis’s Fighter Center and Eglin’s Air Warfare Center remained, but all the other Centers were shut down.

LANGLEY

When it was time for Horner to move on, General Taylor continued to take care of him — most importantly, by passing him on to Major General Gus Henry, the TAC planner, when Horner was assigned to Headquarters Tactical Air Command at Langley AFB, Hampton, Virginia. For the two years from 1970 to 1972, Horner was a staff officer, called the Action Officer (AO), in the office of the Deputy Chief of Plans in Plans in Studies and Analysis, under General Henry. There were five AOs, and for the most part they put together studies that aimed at answering questions such as how many fighter wings were needed, how best to use laser-guided bombs, and what the relative cost was of a sea-based attack sortie versus a land-based sortie (answer: ten times more expensive if you flew the sortie off a carrier).

At Langley, Horner learned the elementary lessons of what it takes to be a staff officer. It was a demanding job, filled with intrigues and battles, within both the TAC staff and the Air Force, and beyond, within the Army, Navy, and Marines. Horner’s agenda was to push “tactical” as opposed to “strategic” aviation. Instead of funneling the bulk of the Air Force’s efforts and budget into the nuclear war mission, he wanted to put the best equipment, training, doctrine, and tactics at the disposal of the people who might fight the actual wars.

The staffs themselves were war zones. At the TAC staff, the enemy was sometimes Strategic Command Headquarters, sometimes the Army, which was always trying to take control of the Air Force, sometimes another Deputy Chief of Staff who wanted his influence and power to grow at someone else’s expense. Sometimes it was the “doctrine” of the other services.

Military doctrine is a conceptual statement, or even a philosophy, of how a service looks at its mission and intends to accomplish it. The essentials of Air Force doctrine can be stated simply: The first requirement of modern war is to gain and maintain control of the air. Airpower provides flexibility, range, and firepower. It can be adapted to a multitude of strategies, from attacking the enemy’s capacity to sustain war to attacking the enemy’s military forces directly.

The doctrines of the other services tended to be much more codified and specific, which presented problems for Horner. The other services’ staff officers were better trained in their own doctrine than he was in the Air Force’s, which was more intuitive, so when he had an argument with the Army or Marines, they threw their doctrine at him from the rule book, while he had to make his points more with logic and enthusiasm. Landmen are lawyers; airmen are evangelists. Landmen think about defeating the enemy army; airmen think about defeating the enemy. Navy men fall in between: they look beyond defeating the enemy navy, but only think about defeating the enemy from the sea.

It soon became apparent that all the services advocated doctrines that optimized their own role in battle, but downplayed the overall role of joint operations. Fortunately, there were men in each branch, Chuck Horner among them, who felt differently. They were sickened both by interstaff and interservice parochial arguing, and the compulsion to defend service prerogatives and programs. They simply wanted to get the job done.

All through his career, Horner would run into people who had gone through the same catharsis, and when he did, they tended to get along, because of shared unspoken beliefs. They didn’t lie to one another. If they thought someone had a dumb idea, they called him on it without attacking him as an individual, but if they thought he was being less than honest, they attacked him without remorse. They came to know whom they could trust, and it had nothing to do with the color of a uniform or with rank.

From the TAC staff at Langley, Horner moved on to the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, where he trained in planning for joint and combined air, land, and sea combat. During this period he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel below the zone, in 1972. He then spent four months at the College of William and Mary, where he earned an MBA. And then it was on to the Pentagon, the Five-Faced Labyrinth, for a three-year tour.

THE FIVE-FACED LABYRINTH

As it turned out, Horner arrived at the Pentagon at just the right time. It was a heady period. The war was still ongoing, there was money in the defense budget, and the Air Force had started to acknowledge its shortcomings in training and equipment.

Once there, Horner joined a small basement office of unconstrained thinkers and freewheeling activists, which went under the name of Weapons and Tactics, TAC Division of DCS Operations, under the leadership of Colonel Bill Kirk, a slow-talking, rumpled-uniform warrior who was an old friend of Horner’s from Nellis.[19]

Their job was to make sure new equipment fit real-world tactics, and that the doctrine being written upstairs made sense to the operators who would have to follow it in combat. They produced studies and papers; briefed Congress about war in general and specific emerging programs such as the E-3 AWACS and new air-to-air missiles; pushed electronic-warfare systems and the laser-guided bomb programs; and when Israel fought the ’73 war, they sent people over to study the tactics, and mistakes, and how the various USAF and Soviet systems had been used.

Most of all, they pushed to improve air-to-air training.

Dick Pearson’s trip to Washington to explain how a pair of F-105s had been shot down by MiG-17s had had some effect on air-to-air training, but it was pretty tame. The problem was that F-105s fought like F-105s. One F-105 turned, accelerated, and climbed pretty much like another. As a consequence, pilots learned to estimate range against a big fighter, and learned to turn with another Thud, but they knew very little about exploiting the advantages of their fighter against an enemy aircraft of another type — like, say, a MiG- 21. The Air Force needed dissimilar training.

The problem that put dissimilar training on the front burner was the exchange ratios in Vietnam — the number of U.S. aircraft lost compared with the number of enemy shot down. In Vietnam, exchange ratios were horrendously bad. In Korea, they had been something like six to one in favor of the United States. In Vietnam, owing to the limitations in the way the war was fought, they were often less than one to one — in other words, the North Vietnamese shot down more U.S. pilots than U.S. pilots shot down North Vietnamese. By 1972, when Horner was assigned to the Pentagon, more than 1,000 U.S. aircraft had been lost to MiGs, SAMs, and AAA. Very clearly, something serious had to change.

Thanks to the Fighter Mafia, it did.

THE FIGHTER MAFIA

In the late fifties and early sixties, a few Air Force, Navy, and Marine officers came to the conclusion that the dominance of strategic nuclear thinking was sucking the life out of real airpower, and gathered in an informal fraternity of fighter pilots and other like-minded types, which came to be called the Fighter Mafia. Some were veterans of Korea, and membership was not confined to fighter pilots or weapons systems officers. It was attitude that mattered — if a man could think outside the narrow SAC box. Early on, they began to make their presence felt, and they grew in influence as the Vietnam War progressed, and as people started to realize how ineffective U.S. training and weapons were for fighting a conventional war. They peaked in the early seventies, when Chuck Horner arrived at the Pentagon.

Inside the Pentagon, the bureaucratic path from a bright, shiny new idea to its implementation in an actual working program involved coordination throughout the staff. People like Horner and his colleagues in Bill Kirk’s office would have to walk the idea through various duchies in the Labyrinth to obtain signatures of approval — approvals that many of the dukes were loath to give, since every good new idea meant the death of some preexisting idea. Much of the staff felt threatened by anything new. It was a zero-sum situation: you get budget money for your idea; I lose money for mine. As a result, it was important to have people you could turn to. If you knew a fighter pilot in the office in which you needed to get your package coordinated, you would work out with him how to push your idea through the office without running into known problem officers or potential problem officers — those too inept to make a decision, and who would therefore sit on your package.

This was the Mafia. They helped each other and schemed about ways to move the Air Force, and they grew very skilled. Their main value was as critics and as conceptual thinkers about warfare. They proclaimed early, for instance, the importance of timely action versus executing a preordained, changeless plan, such as the SIOP. They realized that any plan might be out of date when the time came to act on it, owing to enemy actions or changes in the environment. They also made conceptual inputs to aircraft design. The F-16 can trace its roots back to original Mafia work, because it was they who argued for lower-cost, small, and agile fighters.

They were not always right. For instance, the small jet they envisioned would not even have a radar. In those days, radars were big and complex, which meant building big and complex aircraft. This in turn drove up the cost, since every pound of radar on a jet required six additional pounds of structure, which meant larger engines to carry the added weight, which meant fuel to give the larger engines an effective range, which meant more structure to hold the fuel, and so on. In order to escape this spiral, they maintained, stop it at the beginning: don’t put radar in the nose of the jet.

In fact, this kind of solution was foolish, because radar is simply too valuable not to have in combat. During the Gulf War, for example, the overwhelming number of air-to-air kills were achieved using a radar-guided missile. The better solution was to make radars smaller, which is what happened. Over time, advances in radar and missile technology have allowed the F-16, with its small and relatively low cost, to evolve into the premier fighter aircraft in the world.

The Fighter Mafia began to lose its punch as more and more conventional force people began to populate the leadership positions in the Air Force, and as mainstream Air Force thinking began to concentrate on air superiority and conventional bomb dropping. Later, when Bill Creech arrived on the scene, the old, original Fighter Mafia (by this time aging, pre-Vietnam rebels) tried to maintain their separateness and their control by continuing to rebel, but now there was nothing to rebel against, and Creech simply put them in their place.

During Chuck Horner’s tour in the Pentagon, however, the Fighter Mafia was a godsend[20]—and he felt their influence immediately in the push for Aggressor Training.

AGGRESSOR TRAINING

Horner made his first appearance at the Pentagon on a Wednesday morning, and the first thing his new boss, Bill Kirk, asked him was what he thought about starting up an Aggressors program — that is, a force that could visit the wings all over the world and give them realistic air-to-air training. The idea was that they’d buy MiG-21s from a Third World nation who’d been equipped by the Soviets, train a few really good fighter pilots in Soviet tactics, then study how to use our fighter force to its best advantage.

Horner was enthusiastic, and elaborated on why it needed to be done. When he’d finished, Kirk smiled and handed him a message from General Momyer to General Jack Ryan, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and a SAC man, who had passed the note down the chain of command to Kirk. Momyer’s note to Ryan said, “I’ll be up to see you on Friday to talk about starting Aggressor training,” and in passing the note to Kirk, General Ryan had implied: “You better have something good for me.”

Kirk asked Horner to prepare a paper that outlined options for Ryan to use on Friday, and Horner immediately found an empty desk in the basement and started developing his thoughts about dissimilar air combat training. The paper discussed the kinds of aircraft needed to emulate the most likely enemy (the MiG-21); the organization of a Soviet-style Aggressor force, schooled in Soviet tactics and doctrine; and three optional force structure packages. After some rewriting at Kirk’s direction, Kirk then called in a Mafia person from Forces Branch, who costed out Horner’s options and helped him work out where to find the equipment and personnel to build this force. Together, they put together a package that recommended taking a small number of excess pilots, training them in T-38s (later F-5s), and assigning them to Nellis to form an initial Aggressor squadron. They further identified the source of money for the squadron and the types of training they would accomplish. The Aggressors, like the Navy’s Top Gun School in Miramar, California, would do air-to-air training, but they wouldn’t do it only at one base, but would visit each fighter wing and give training over a two-week period.

By late that same Wednesday night, Horner had a package and a staff summary sheet ready to do battle for coordination. The next day, he took on the Pentagon. Horner and Jim Mirehouse, a Mafia lieutenant colonel who had flown Weasels with Horner, steered a tortuous course though the bosses and got the package coordinated through the variously reluctant offices. For instance, when the head of Air Force Programs, a lieutenant general, refused to sign off on the coordination, they waited until he went to lunch, so his deputy, a major general who despised him, could sign off on the package. There were other similar but lesser battles.

By 11:00 P.M. on Thursday, Horner had the package coordinated and delivered to the Chief of Staff ’s office; and the next morning, Momyer paid his visit. Afterward, the package was ready for pickup at the chief ’s front office. Attached to it was a two-inch-square piece of paper that said simply, “Do it. R.”

The Air Force Chief of Staff had given the go-ahead for the Aggressors, despite his SAC prejudices. Later, when Horner appeared before General Hill so the general could program the aircraft into Nellis and authorize the money to man and operate the squadron, Hill flew into a towering rage. And yet, for all his shouts, he could not ignore that two-inch-square slip of paper that said, “Do it. R.”

And so the Aggressors were born. It was a hugely successful program — as evidenced, for example, by the exchange ratios in Desert Storm.

RED FLAG

Red Flag came next. A vast scale-simulated combat exercise, based at Nellis and “fought” against Aggressors, it was primarily the creation of Moody Suter, a captain when he was at Nellis, and a major at the Pentagon. Suter, cocksure, irreverent, and boundlessly creative, had the face of a hunting hound, an overactive, not always orderly mind, and a brash confidence that never endeared him to the Air Force brass. Though all of his ideas were brilliant, many were too radical to be implemented. Either way, he worked and worried his ideas until they came to fruition… or else so enraged the senior leadership in the Air Force that he had to go into hiding until things calmed down.[21]

While Horner was still at Nellis, General Taylor had instigated a major study that envisaged an enormous training area using the combined Hill AFB and Nellis ranges. This area would include the airspace over the government land comprising half of the state of Utah and Nevada — enough room for a great many aircraft to maneuver with no interference from civilian airliners; enough room, also, to practice air refueling. The area would be open to supersonic flight and unrestricted military operations, from the ground up. It would have extensive radar coverage, including AWACS, so that pilots could debrief what went on during the simulated combat exercises. Live bombs would be dropped and missiles would be fired. There would be simulated SAM and AAA in the ground in the target areas. And the Aggressors who were not on the road giving training would be used to create an enemy air force.

After Horner left Nellis, Suter continued to work this program hard, developing the concept in operational details beyond the original engineering study. Later, in 1972, when Suter came to the Pentagon, Bill Kirk had him assigned to his office, and Suter brought this concept with him.

In October 1973, a new commander came to TAC, another SAC general named Bob Dixon, who was known as the Tidewater Alligator for his habit of tearing flesh from colonels and generals under his command (and from anyone else, for that matter; he was famous for indiscriminate hatred). Dixon had been in the Pentagon for years and was savvy about how to play the game there, and he was not about to let wild visionaries from Nellis sell him a pig with wings.

Before Suter and the others on the team wanted to take on Dixon, they built briefings aimed at selling the concept to the air staff. These came out of some telling creative analysis: At Korat and Ta Khli, the practice had been to give new pilots ten missions in the less dangerous southern parts of North Vietnam (in Route Packages I and II), where there were only a few SAMs and no MiGs. After gaining experience in those ten missions, they were ready to go “downtown”—to Route Package V, VI A, or VI B, which was Hanoi and its adjacent areas. When building the new Red Flag briefing team, the team used this experience to build a graph that showed loss rates and numbers of missions flown. What this graph said, in effect, was that the first ten missions a pilot flew were his most dangerous, and that if he could survive this without getting shot down, then his chance of survival significantly increased. “Why not give him the first ten combat missions over the Nellis-Hill ranges,” the briefing went on to say, “where he can survive his mistakes and learn from his errors before the bullets and SAMs are real?”

Red Flag was taking shape conceptually. Meanwhile, however, it was running into bureaucratic problems. Though the Fighter Mafia had tried to push the idea up the chain at TAC, the support of colonels and generals leery of Dixon’s temper was conspicuously absent.

It was time to pitch the concept to General Dixon. The job was to show him how this could be his idea.

At that point Moody Suter devised a scheme, which offered itself when the team received word that the Army’s chief scientist was interested in battle lab training and emulation of combat to test Army systems. In other words, he was thinking about a land-warfare equivalent of what was becoming the Red Flag concept. (In time, the Army made this happen, with great success, at Fort Irwin in California.) Suter then slipped word to the scientist that the Air Force had been working on the exact concept he had in mind, and was busy developing a realistic training environment in the Nellis complex that would also be used for operational testing. Naturally, the scientist was very interested in learning more about the specifics of the Air Force program, and so he asked for a formal briefing. In point of fact, at that time they had no program, just a bare-bones concept that needed meat and structure. What they needed were slides, the chief props of a military briefing.

In due course, some graphics people who were also in the basement of the Pentagon began working with Suter and Horner to produce slides for the Army briefing. On the title slide, the head of the graphics section sketched a plain red flag, then used the logo on the subsequent slides. The “Red Flag” stuck, and so the program was named.

Now came the payoff to Suter’s scheme: since Bill Kirk’s team was going outside the Air Force to brief the Army, and since Nellis was owned by TAC (i.e., General Dixon), it was their duty to let General Dixon know what they were doing. This message implied much more than was stated: With the Army’s “interest” in the proposed Red Flag program at Nellis came the implicit threat that the Army would want to start using Nellis for their own battle lab, which could then grow to the Army owning the base.

The result — and the whole point of the scheme — was that Dixon asked to hear the briefing.

Suter put on his armor and took him on. Ferocious, but no fool, Dixon clearly saw the merits of Red Flag. After the briefing, he told Suter simply, “I’ve got it.” Red Flag was airborne.

In its early days, Red Flag had predictable problems — too many crashes, for instance. In time, however, everyone learned, the training setup grew more realistic, and the young pilots realized they couldn’t take chances in combat. The safety record improved. It wasn’t long before the Red Flag loss rate was lower than that of the normal home station training.

Over the years, range instrumentation also improved, and the Air Force started to look at the integration of tactics and new equipment. They discovered how to configure a strike package of bombers, fighter-bombers, escorting fighters, rescue forces, Wild Weasels, and command and control, which included AWACS, Rivet Joint (an EC-135 aircraft that collected signals intelligence—“sigint”), and Compass Call (an EC-130 aircraft that not only collected sigint, but also jammed enemy signals between aircraft, their ground controllers, and their ground radar network).

In time, Red Flag also began to involve integrated flying operations with Navy and Marine aircraft and with foreign air forces — French, British, Korean, Saudi, Israeli, and German. Air Guard and Reserves also flew in Red Flag, so that in the future, whenever a task force of USAF and non-USAF fliers were brought together (whether in Desert Shield or some Bright STAR exercise), they had no problem immediately integrating operations. Common terms and equipment were used, as were common rules and tactics.

Desert Shield and Desert Storm went so easily in great part because everyone had been there before. They had flown their first ten combat sorties together and had already been indoctrinated as a team. It paid off, not so much in terms of tactics development or even individual aircrew training, but because the people had worked together and understood one another.

★ It was while he was Assistant Deputy Commander for Operations to the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing at Seymour Johnson in North Carolina from 1976 to 1979 that Horner participated in his first Red Flag. Fresh from the Pentagon and a year at the National War College at Seymour Johnson, he worked for the DO, Colonel Harvey Kimsey, who worked for the wing commander, Colonel Bob Russ. It was a prime assignment, since it meant he was back flying, in F-4Es (then used in an air-to-air combat role). His job was to do whatever the DO didn’t want to do. Since Kimsey was primarily interested in flying jets and didn’t like paperwork, that left a great deal of work for his assistant, a situation that did not at all bother Horner, who was happy doing most of the jobs DOs do — looking after intelligence, tactics, standards/ evaluation, plans, scheduling, and shops. The wing had three squadrons of twenty-four aircraft and thirty pilots, commanded by lieutenant colonels. Horner planned exercises and monitored flying, both by watching the schedule and by flying with each of the squadrons.

For his first Red Flag, Horner commanded two squadrons from his home base. General Hartinger,[22] Ninth Air Force Commander, also assigned him another job: he was to be the man responsible (officially: the Ninth Air Force Senior Representative). In other words, if there was an accident at Red Flag, then he expected Horner to explain it. As a result, while Horner commanded only the primary unit, the two squadrons from Seymour Johnson, he was responsible to the Ninth Air Force commander for everything that went on; and if anything went wrong, God help his career. Since the threat of hanging tends to focus one’s attention, he made sure he sat in on the briefings and planning, spoke up if he sensed someone was going to do something stupid, and sent people home who didn’t play by the rules. The result: everything went smoothly.

In time, Horner flew in more than his share of Red Flags, and he learned there many things. For instance, his long-held opinion about the absurdity of low-level penetration of enemy defenses was reinforced at first hand at a Red Flag in January 1977. His squadrons were playing the role of red air (enemy air) in F-4Es, while blue air F-111s were trying to sneak in on the deck. These particular F-4Es were equipped with TISEO, a TV telescope mounted on the left wing root that could be slaved to the radar. That way, on their radar screen, pilots could see a TV picture of the target they were locked into, which allowed visual ID of the target while it was still beyond eyeball range. Using TISEO, pilots could tell the type of aircraft they were facing at sufficient distance to launch an AIM-7 medium-range missile in a head-to-head engagement, closing at a total speed of 1,000 to 1,300 knots. The 111s themselves, with their distinctive, ungainly look, were easy to spot; and because they were flying close off the ground, visual acquisition was a snap. Then, for Horner’s red team, it became just a matter of gaining sufficient smash (airspeed) to convert on them and film them with gun cameras. “It wasn’t unlike shooting strafe at a banner,” Horner remembers, “except in this case the target was moving at six hundred knots over the ground at fifty or a hundred feet. Just stay above the target and you won’t hit the ground.”

Pilots learned other basic lessons at Red Flags, as well: how to evaluate their situation in the confusion of combat (even as some people were talking too much on the radio, and others were talking too little); the necessity of looking after their wingmen and of herding a flight into the target and then into the return without soaking up fatal shots (even if they were only on video recorders); the necessity of using simple conservative tactics, so all can cope when the plan does not unfold as expected; the necessity of keeping situational awareness, even as hundreds of aircraft are swirling every which way at supersonic speeds; and the difficulty of finding the target and bombing accurately when a pilot’s radar warning receiver is screaming in his ear that he is going to die in a few seconds unless he does something (most likely what he is already doing).

Though Red Flags did not totally replicate combat, they definitely caused pressures that resulted in the same adrenaline flow and the same cotton-mouthed feeling.

THE GCC SYSTEM

Finally, the GCC — Graduated Combat Capability — system, like Aggressor Training and Red Flag, was another way to train the way they planned to fight. To make this a reality on a day-to-day basis, standards were devised and an accounting system established: for a base to be combat-ready, so many sorties of a certain type had to be flown each quarter. For example, in an F-15 air-to-air wing, each pilot needed to fly X number of one-versus-one maneuvering, and Y number of multi-ship two-versus-two (or more) tactics missions. If a pilot then aimed for a higher level of readiness, he needed additional and more demanding missions.

The accounting system kept track of aircrew training activity and quality, in order to define the combat readiness of the force. More experienced pilots were given lower requirements. Thus there were A-, B-, C-, and D-level pilots, based on their total fighter time, and time in the current aircraft (a fighter pilot with 1,500 hours total time, of which 300 hours was in his current jet, might be an A-level pilot, whereas a new pilot with 800 hours of fighter time might need 750 in the current jet to reach A level). The pilots then operated at three levels of combat readiness — basic, advanced, and ultimate. A pilot at the ultimate level was so experienced, and was flying at such a high rate, that he was certified combat-ready in any mission the jet was capable of performing.

THE BILL CREECH REVOLUTION

All of this new training was wonderfully effective, but it still didn’t address the root, systemic causes of the Air Force’s problems with morale and discipline. The men could fly better, but the legacy of Vietnam had taken its toll on military institutions, and the old leaders followed styles of command — fear and intimidation — that had been in vogue during World War II and Korea but were useless today.

These problems were compounded, once again, by SAC’s dominion over the Air Force. To a SAC general, all bombers and bomber crews were interchangeable. Fighter generals played the team according to the strengths and weaknesses of the individual pilots and their individual jets, but there weren’t enough fighter generals to make an impact on the culture at TAC. As a result, midlevel TAC leadership of Chuck Horner’s age group had for the most part either died in the war or left the service to avoid that fate.

Pilots, in particular, were leaving the Air Force in droves. The reasons were clear: they had joined the Air Force to serve their nation flying jet aircraft. Instead, they would come to work at 5:00 A.M. to brief for a 7:00 A.M. takeoff, wait until 9:00 A.M. until three of the four scheduled aircraft were reported by maintenance to be actually ready to fly, and finally mount up on these three planes, only to find after they started them up that one of them was in fact not capable of safe flight. Meanwhile, since the two planes that got airborne did not have working fire-control radars, the crews burned holes in the sky in a valiant effort to fly out the wing’s assigned number of hours.

The situation grew worse daily, and so, monthly and yearly, the flying-hour program was revised downward, in the hope of discovering the minimum level of flying operations that was supportable. It wasn’t anybody’s fault. There was no money for spare parts; maintenance mechanics were not trained, owing to the hemorrhaging caused by the lack of experienced personnel; readiness reports were shaded to look good, so higher headquarters felt justified in reporting to their boss in Washington that the Air Force was ready to carry out its wartime mission.

Experienced pilots were sick of the false reporting, the meaningless ground jobs (designed to keep them busy when there were no aircraft to fly), and the seemingly endless tragedies, as young, inexperienced, and noncurrent pilots died in needless aircraft accidents.

The drug problem was endemic in the nation, so it was no surprise that it affected the military, too. But it was one thing to be high on drugs at a party, and another to be high while guarding nuclear weapons or maintaining jets.

A case in point:

In 1977, while Horner was at Seymour Johnson, home of not only a TAC wing but a Strategic Air Command bomber wing, special agents from the Air Force’s Office of Special Investigations discovered a drug problem on the base. One night after a change of the guard mount assigned to protect the weapons-storage area, the security policemen turned in their weapons and left the building, intending to go home or back to the barracks. Instead they entered a waiting phalanx of lawyers and OSI agents, who proceeded to read Miranda rights to 151 of a total of 225 policemen. They then charged all 151 with use or possession of illegal drugs (in this case, marijuana).

Another night a year later, at Luke AFB, where Horner was wing commander, OSI agents boarded the van used on the wing’s flight line to transport mechanics out to the various F-15 fighter aircraft that needed maintenance. They arrested not only the van’s driver for dealing in illegal drugs, but seven technicians who just happened to be taking a “hit” before going to work in the vitals of a $30 million jet.

There was a race problem, too, but race was not as serious an issue in the Air Force as it was in the nation as a whole. Racial polarization in the Air Force setting was in reality a reflection of the alienation of the young from the officers and NCOs. A unit that had pride and discipline did not tolerate racial polarization, because they were a team. Unfortunately, there were all too few teams.

Chuck Horner takes up the story:

The lack of retention of trained mechanics and aircrews, the drugs, and the apparent lack of defense funding were the excuses. But the real reason we were on our ass was much simpler: we had lost the vision of who we were, what was important, and how to lead and how to follow, how to treat our people both with love and discipline and a sense of mission. In short, we had lost pride in ourselves. Pride is not arrogance. As Dizzy Dean said, “If you done it, it ain’t bragging.” Our “ done it” was simply being ready to go to war, and in war to win.

Well, we weren’t able to honestly claim we’ d “ done it.” The result was we were living a lie and had lost our pride. Do not scoff at pride. For a military person, pride is vital. How else do you think we get people to work long days and weekends, leave their families at a moment’s notice, endure living in tents and eating packaged food that no grocery store could sell, and do all that with minimum pay and the expectation that they might have to lay down their very lives? Military units live on pride, pride born of confidence in themselves and the man or woman on their left and right. Sure, they take pride in serving the nation, and they get goose bumps when they see its flag. But what really counts is pride in doing their job well, pride in their subordinates and leaders, and pride that their lives are spent serving a cause higher than themselves. After Vietnam, we tore pride down instead of building it. We lied about our readiness, we shortcut our maintenance, we chased our tails trying to fly more when in fact we flew less, our aircraft were dirty and broken and they looked broken, we dumped our people in housing that wasn’t habitable, our pay was frozen (in an effort to halt inflation), and our troops worked in temporary buildings left over from World War II that would have embarrassed any Third World slum. Discipline along with pride had fallen by the wayside, so the good ones walked and the feeble ones turned to drugs. We had become a Communist nation within the very organization that was to protect our nation from the threat of communism.

★ Then, in 1978, General W. L. “Bill” Creech was appointed commander of TAC.

A onetime leader of the Skyblazers and Thunderbird acrobatic teams, Bill Creech was a consummately skilled and precise fighter pilot. After a tour as Director of Operations at the Nellis Fighter Weapons School, he’d served as the senior assistant to General Sweeney, the bomber pilot who then commanded TAC, and the author of those infamous impromptu phone calls. Though he never said an unkind word about General Sweeney, Creech took care never to emulate him. Above all, Bill Creech was a practical philosopher and psychologist. In analyzing problems, his philosophical side looked well beyond the obvious in a search for root causes; he then doggedly worked for ways to prevent things from going wrong again. As a psychologist, he was a student of human nature, seeking to understand why people made mistakes — not in order to rebuke them, but to find ways to change the environment that led to the failures.

He was eccentric, fastidious about his personal appearance, tireless in his search for excellence, and as demanding of himself as he was of others.

How did he begin to address the problems of the Air Force?

The essential Air Force vision has always remained the same: the application of force — quickly, precisely, violently, massively. Aircraft in the air doing whatever it takes to gain control of the air, putting weapons precisely on their targets, flying as safely as possible. Success in each of these areas can be measured. The data can be very precise. How many aircraft do you have flying (and not, for example, in the hangars being repaired)? How many hours are the pilots in the air learning their skills? How well are they learning those skills? How many bombs are on target? How many planes crashed per given period of time?

By any serious measure, the Air Force was not answering those questions satisfactorily, but why? What was preventing good, highly motivated people from doing the work that they passionately wanted to do?

The answer, Creech decided, was centralization, the top-down management structures so beloved of Robert McNamara and the SAC generals. Creech hated centralization, because it robbed the individual of ownership of his job, deprived him of responsibility, and destroyed his initiative. The people in the Air Force, he liked to say, had turned into Russian workers: “We pretend to work and they pretend to pay us.” For him, centralization was a fantasy based on the dream of a totally efficient institution, but it wrecked against the hard rocks of actual, everyday human personality and behavior. People simply didn’t operate the way centralization expected and predicted they would.[23]

Every organization is made up of building blocks, and if the organization is running smoothly, these building blocks mesh smoothly together. The way centralization does it is to organize them from the top down, and functionally — that is, by functional specialty, and by the job done within that function. For instance, specialists are gathered together in centralized locations and sent to work on jobs as needed: electricians work together with other electricians, hydraulics specialists work with other hydraulics specialists, all parts are located in a centralized supply area, and so on.

Under this system, all jets and all the people who work on them are alike and interchangeable. The whole mass is rated, and individual success or failure is obscured. The basic rationale for this is “economies of scale”: efficiency, cost savings, elimination of duplication.

When Bill Creech arrived at TAC Command, however, he found no hard data supporting any of these claims — in fact, quite the opposite. When all the electricians worked from a centralized shop, and were dispatched in trucks to service an entire wing’s flight line (three squadrons of twenty-four aircraft apiece, a total of seventy-two fighters), there was a lot of travel, coordination, and paperwork involved. There were no economies of scale. With a centralized storage area, it took an average of three and a half hours from the time a part was ordered from the storage area to the time it was delivered to its customer. By then the technician who ordered it would have either moved on to another job, cooled his heels and drunk several cups of coffee with his buddies, perhaps lost interest in the job, or even conceivably forgotten the nature of the problem he was originally fixing. Out of the 4,000 TAC aircraft, 234 a day, on average, were what were called “hangar queens,” those grounded for more than three weeks for supply or maintenance problems. Of those aircraft that broke in some way during a normal flight, only one out of five were flyable again on the day they broke. And overall mission-capable rates were at 50 percent or less. (By way of comparison, in the stress and high tempo of Desert Storm, mission-capable rates were at over 95 percent.)

The “functional fiefdoms” (as Creech called them) of electricians, supply, weapons specialists, and so on, were oriented, he discovered, not toward satisfying the needs of the primary product (the aircraft) and of the various subsidiary products and functions connected with keeping the aircraft in the air, but toward satisfying the needs of the organization. Also, because of the vertical orientation of these fiefdoms, they did not work easily or comfortably together with the other fiefdoms — they didn’t mesh well with each other, as Creech put it.

What did Creech do to change TAC?

First he started an education campaign, and used hard data to persuade those who believed in centralized systems that they had failed. Meanwhile, he set up trial units as models of decentralization, and then he compared the two. Once the hard data had proved the superiority of decentralized systems, he began to put those systems in place throughout TAC.

He reshaped the basic building blocks from vertical to horizontal, and broke up the “functional fiefdoms.” Flight line maintenance, for example, was organized and integrated into product-oriented squadron teams (and smaller), in which electricians, aircraft mechanics, and hydraulics specialists all worked together. Members of one specialty were given elementary training in other specialties, so they could help their colleagues out, when needed, and would also have a better sense of the whole problem. Now, instead of a centrally administered central supply complex, all supplies directly related to aircraft supply were moved to the flight line, together with “dedicated” supply specialists who were devoted only to their flight line customer. Small computers that kept track of inventories also helped.

The squadron teams each set their own goals and devised their own schedules. Each made its own decisions, all of them aimed at the final product — planes in the air.

Finally, each fighter aircraft now had a “dedicated crew chief,” whose name was painted on the side of the aircraft. That aircraft was now “his” or “hers.” They “owned” it. It was up to them to be responsible for decisions — including mistakes — rather than waiting for orders from headquarters. While they would surely help one another out if needed, and the various technical specialists within the squadron teams were available to help, their performance was judged on how their jet or flight or squadron unit performed. At the same time, they were given what they needed, including more training, to make their jet perform well.

In time, Creech’s decentralizing led to real ownership and empowerment, real teamwork, clear-cut accountability (poor performance was now easy to track), and a system in which people were able to operate as humans and not as functions in some machine.

Problems began to be solved by the people closest to them, to be cut off at the source. The problem solvers were freed both to do it right and also to make mistakes. Mistakes will be made — the key is to try to prevent them from recurring, and the best way is to make sure they are self-correcting.

More practically, he attacked the root causes of TAC’s lack of readiness: He closed sick units so there would be enough trained people and parts to make the better units healthy. He kicked the senior NCOs out of their air-conditioned offices, where they had migrated under the centralized style of management, and placed them out on the flight lines, where they were truly in charge. He expected combat flying proficiency from his colonels and generals, so confidence in combat leadership began to be restored among the warriors. He ruthlessly rooted out and destroyed procedures and processes designed to maintain control for its own sake. He dictated goals and standards, then built visible and understandable scorecards that rated what actually mattered (such as sorties flown or aircraft in commission). As he slowly moved to decentralized leadership, he raised the goals and standards ever higher, as each day the men and women who worked for him proved they could exceed even his expectations.

He also made sure these changes were built on a foundation of absolute truth. Lying, shading of the truth, and making excuses were completely unacceptable. To make that point clear throughout TAC, Creech made a number of highly visible “public executions.”

Here is one example:

Before Creech, the great game among commanders was to tell higher headquarters they could accomplish what was asked of them, when in fact they knew they could not, either because they didn’t have the training or the resources, or because the mission was impossible. In fact, any commander who told the truth was likely to be fired. Under these conditions, the best promised as little as they could get away with, and through their own individual efforts made their units perform adequately; and in that way they didn’t have to shade the truth overly much. On the other hand, the worst commanders simply lied and juggled the books. Some commanders spoke up and told it like it actually was. If they were very intelligent and savvy, they were actually listened to, and some changes were made. Others, not so savvy, were fired for not being team players in what Chuck Horner calls “the grand hoax.”

In the F-4D, for instance, there was a computer-based bomb-release system, called the Dive Toss System, that supposedly allowed the aircrews to drop bombs from high altitude and thus to stay out of most visually aimed ground fire. The problem was that the Dive Toss System didn’t work.

Nevertheless, the training rules called for F-4D aircrews with this system to achieve bomb scores of a certain average — say, CEP (Circular Error Probable) of fifty feet. The aircrew would fly the aircraft out to a bombing range and drop a bomb using the Dive Toss System, the range crew would then score their bomb impacts, and that data would be amassed at the wing and reported to TAC. Unless a certain percentage of the crews achieved the desired CEP or higher, the wing was not judged combat-ready. Yet, achieving a satisfactory CEP was usually a gamble, either because crew training was often inadequate, or worse, because the bomb-release computer in the Dive Toss System was more often than not malfunctioning. That left the aircrews faced with a no-win situation: since the system was incapable of giving them a fifty-foot average CEP, everyone up to the wing commander had to lie, or else the wing commander would be fired (though sometimes the wing commander would fire the squadron commanders and the chief of maintenance instead).

That meant that a crew would roll in on the target and call the pass: “Two’s in for a Dive Toss”; but they would set their switches for a manual release, get the proper sight picture for the dive angle, airspeed, and wind condition, then release the bomb and make an abrupt pull-up so their friend on the ground scoring the bombs would see a Dive Toss, and not a manual dive, maneuver. Often they would drop a bomb with an even smaller CEP, which made the wing look very, very good. The commander would duly be promoted. The only thing that suffered was integrity. The crews called the event Dive Cheat.

Meanwhile, the generals thought they had a superior combat capability in the Dive Toss System, a system that just got better and better the more it was used because as the crews dropped more and more manual bombs, they grew more and more accurate.

One day, one of the F-4D captains suffered an attack of conscience and sent an anonymous letter to Creech that described the Dive Cheat situation. As a result, Creech sent the TAC Director of Operations, Major General Larry Welch, to investigate.

When Welch arrived, everyone in the wing except the wing commander told the truth. However, the wing commander claimed he knew nothing about what was really going on, even though he was current in the jet, and knew how he was getting his own bomb scores and certainly how everyone else was getting theirs. Not only that, he tried to throw the blame on others. He might possibly have survived what followed if he’d at least said something like: “Yes, sir, General Creech, my guys cheated, and I cheated, but that is what you wanted us to do, and we hate you and ourselves for doing it.” But he didn’t. In consequence, Creech had him fired in view of all corners of TAC. Afterward, everyone got the message that there was a new way of doing business that depended on telling the truth, that bad news was acceptable if you had done your best and still failed, and that lying or shading the truth to look good were far worse than failing.

★ All of this restored pride. But that wasn’t enough. Creech also insisted on raising standards of appearance. Pity the poor commander whose base was not clean and painted. If he had to, he went downtown and bought his own tools and paint. He paid attention to color — no Easter eggs, but earth tones pleasing to the eye, yet businesslike. He paid attention to military dress. Combat uniforms were fine, but they better be properly worn, neat, and clean (unless soiled from hard work). It wasn’t just looks that a commander watched out for. He paid attention to his people, he moved among them and listened to them, learning from all ranks as they figured out how to do their jobs more efficiently and quickly. He paid attention to families, too (family support centers and child-care facilities, for instance), so that people could concentrate on their work. Most of all, he paid attention to discipline. Discipline is fundamental to the good order needed to succeed in combat, and fundamental to pride. Hard tests were given in the air, on the flight line, and in all the multitude of areas that are required to carry out wartime missions. There were no excuses: If you failed, it was because you needed training, and you got it. If you needed resources, they were found. If you were overextended, you were given time to grow. But if you lacked the necessary desire, leadership, or integrity to be in the new military, you were given the opportunity to succeed in civilian life.

RESULTS

Here are some of the before-and-after performance data of the Creech reforms at TAC:

• The on-average three and a half hours from the order of a part to its delivery shrank to eight minutes.

• Pilot training sorties were doubled, increasing pilot skills and readiness.

• The number of aircraft grounded for maintenance was reduced by 73 percent.

• Hangar queens were reduced from an average of 234 per day to only eight per day.

• Fighters that landed with problems were now fixed much more quickly. The rate of those repaired on the same day was improved by 270 percent. Where before one out of five were flyable again on the same day, now it was four out of five.

• The ability to generate sorties in combat more than doubled.

All of this was accomplished with ever more technically sophisticated aircraft, thus burying two myths: (1) that U.S. aircraft were too sophisticated, and (2) that technically sophisticated aircraft couldn’t be kept in the air.

Chuck Horner takes up the story again:

What Creech did, what we did, was learn how to be an air force all over again. We learned first how to maintain aircraft and generate sorties, so our aircrews got enough quality training to be ready for combat. The average flying hours per month for our crews more than doubled, from less than ten to more than twenty. Pilots could now hit their targets, as bombing accuracy rose. And they could survive, as their aerial fighting skills were honed to levels previously considered unattainable. The equipment worked, because it was maintained with pride. Each crew chief was given ownership of his own jet, and his name was painted on the side along with the pilot’s. It was his jet and he was responsible for its performance. If his jet wasn’t ready to fly on time and in perfect condition, everyone knew who was responsible. So the crew chief would not accept excuses from the supply sergeant. If he couldn’t get a part, he found a friend whose jet was down for scheduled maintenance and asked to borrow the part he needed. And he didn’t have to ask the colonel’s permission. The transaction was between the two owners of the jets (decentralization at work).

The base also had pride, as the hospital waiting rooms were neat and clean, and the dining hall was decorated tastefully, with plants and clean walls and floors. Our people were being treated the way they deserved, and they knew it and responded.

What you saw in Desert Storm was the legacy of Bill Creech. When F-16 squadrons of usually twenty-four aircraft flew over a hundred sorties in a single day, that was because his liberation of maintenance crews from idiotic rules created an environment where individual initiative counted. Each crew chief and his assistants brought to the Gulf pride of ownership of their own aircraft. Add the awareness that we were in a war for a worthy cause, and there was no stopping us. We had pride, productivity, purpose, and a sense of professional dedication.

Decentralization was the key. Each man and woman knew what was expected, and each in turn busted his or her ass not only to do their job, but to exceed our highest expectations. Bill Creech had shown us what we were capable of achieving, he had created an environment where failure was not even a factor, and he had given us back the pride we ourselves had given away in the turmoil of Vietnam. There is no doubt the technology you saw on the television screens during Desert Storm was impressive, but to understand the victory, you have to understand the people who operated the bases, maintained the jets, and flew them into combat. You have to know the far-reaching fire Bill Creech lit in each and every one of us in the military services.

TRAINING IN LEADERSHIP

When the Creech Revolution began, Chuck Horner was a colonel. In those days, both his flying skills and his bureaucratic maneuvering skills were well developed; now it was as a leader, as a senior officer, that he had to grow and develop. The service academies, he likes to point out, educate and train top-flight lieutenants, but you learn — or fail to learn — how to be a general when you are a colonel. Only as a colonel do you have the responsibilities, the hard choices, the opportunities for success or failure, that can show you how to lead as a general.

In this stage of his life, Horner had help from a variety of officers senior to him — both good and bad — including, of course, Bill Creech himself.

His first wing commander at Seymour Johnson in 1976 was a good one, Colonel Bob Russ. Russ was hard to please, yet he wasn’t reluctant to reward outstanding performance, while letting those who fell short know they’d done so. And his efforts didn’t stop there; he devoted much of his time to training subordinates in what they needed to know to do their jobs, and ultimately to replace him. Though he was tough, he looked at each problem nonjudgmentally—“How did we get into this particular situation, how do we get out of it, and how do we prevent it from happening again?”—rather than looking for somebody to take the blame. When he could, he anticipated problems and fixed them before they occurred. Finally, because he let them bite off as much responsibility as they could swallow, people worked hard for him.

By contrast, at one point Horner was the vice commander to a brainy but thickheaded wing commander who treated his subordinates with contempt and built his career on the bodies of those he’d stabbed in the back, thus negating his very genuine intellectual gifts. Horner studied this man very carefully, and learned from him that most valuable lesson: how not to act. He did his best to handle people just the reverse of the way his boss did, and in doing so, he learned the even more important lesson: you’ve got to be yourself. If you are the commander, people don’t care if you are tough, or mean, or kind, or gentle, but if you are tough one day and kind the next, they are miserable. If they don’t know who you are going to be on any given day, then they don’t know how to act.

Much of the rest of Chuck Horner’s education in leadership came painfully… because it’s painful to have your shortcomings pointed out, especially if you are a fighter pilot with a large ego. Beyond that, if you truly care about the consequences of your acts, then you feel miserable when you make a mistake. “Good people don’t need to be screamed at,” Horner observes now. “They feel far worse about their shortcomings than you can ever make them feel. On the other hand, the bad person doesn’t care or understand, so screaming doesn’t work there, either. And if you are wrong, the good subordinate will reject your leadership in the future. So you just point out the error, to make sure they’ve gotten it, then discuss how to prevent it in the future, to rebuild their self-confidence. And then, if they are worth training, you send them on their way to sin no more.”

On one occasion, while he was at the 4th TFW, Horner led another aircraft from Seymour Johnson to Hill AFB in Utah to conduct low-level flying training. In North Carolina, fighter pilots were restricted to flying no lower than 500 feet above the ground, but since no one lived in the deserts south of the Great Salt Lake, they could drop down to fifty feet.

When they reached Hill, Horner’s wingman flew with another flight leader who was already deployed there, and Horner flew with the other flight leader’s wingman, who was qualified to fly at fifty feet. Their two-ship element took off first, and they proceeded along the low-level route, practicing formation flying and lookout at 480 to 540 knots and altitudes as low as the fifty-feet minimum. When they reached a mountain range southwest of Salt Lake City, they ran into weather, with clouds obscuring the mountain peaks, initiated a weather abort, climbed up through a hole in the clouds, and called the other element to let them know about the problem. “We’ll meet you on the gunnery range en route home,” they said as they signed off.

When the second two-ship element arrived in the mountains, the flight leader turned away from the wingman and started to climb. Unfortunately, he didn’t climb rapidly enough, and the wingman, who was trying to keep the leader in sight, failed to maintain situational awareness and scraped a ridgeline in his flight path. The aircraft skipped off the ridge and barely impacted the ground, but hit hard enough to cause the aircraft to explode.

Later, Horner and members of a ground crew search party found the bodies and debris in a canyon about two miles away.

After the missing-man flyby, Lieutenant General Hartinger, the commander at Ninth Air Force, let Horner know that it was his negligence that had caused the accident. He had failed in his responsibility as the leader, and so had “murdered” the two crew members.

He was already feeling sorry for himself, loathing himself for his failure and for his part in the deaths. Hartinger’s condemnation made it worse. “I’m working as hard as I can,” he told himself. “And now this. This dumbass flight leader doesn’t take care of his wingman. And, shit, that kills my career.” But the self-pity only lasted until he realized that what “The Grr” had pasted on him was exactly right — an insight that was reinforced by Bill Kirk, who was the DO at Ninth Air Force at the time. Kirk gave it to him straight, and Horner had to agree, that he had flat-out failed, and that he could either give up, or pull himself up, admit his mistakes, and start over.

I was responsible for these deaths, for a variety of reasons, but mainly because I was the senior officer present. It’s not the flight leader’s fault. It’s mine. I should have ordered the second element to abort the flight and climb when they were in the clear and not assume they’d know what to do when they hit the weather. I was at fault; I should not have made the mistake of passive leadership.

If you want responsibility, if you want the tough jobs, then you better be ready to stand up and take the criticism and all the anguish when things go wrong. If you can’t take the blame — even for mistakes that are beyond your control — then you are not in a responsible job, no matter what the job title says. The big jobs involve risk of great personal criticism. The jobs worth having are the ones with the biggest downside, and if you don’t admit your own mistakes, you are not worthy of the trust given to you.

I couldn’t guarantee that I would never again fail. No one can. But I knew that to seek credit for a job well done while ducking the pain and disgrace of failure is not leadership. No more. I would not wear a hair shirt; that’s not my way. But whenever someone under my command was hurt or killed, it was my fault and no excuses would be offered. The only atonement I could make was to do my best to make sure we all learned why the accident occurred and to prevent it from happening again. The only way to give value to the sacrifice of a life either in combat or in peacetime training, the only way to salvage some good out of such a terrible loss, was to do everything in my power to see that it was never repeated.

I started to become a “hard” man about some things — especially about things that could get people hurt. I never minded risks to myself, but I sure minded unnecessary risks to anyone who came under my command. Others under my command died over the years, but I blamed myself first and then searched for ways to keep the same thing from happening again.

I was learning to lead.

★ His next assignment was at Luke AFB (in Glendale, Arizona, near Phoenix), in 1979, where he was Colonel Pete Kemp’s vice commander at the 58th Fighter Wing.

Horner met Bill Creech for the first time at Luke, and the two men quickly discovered that they were both from Iowa — there are not too many Iowans in the Air Force. Other than that, it’s hard for Horner to say why he caught Creech’s notice. In fact, it’s hard to imagine two more different personalities. Creech is precise, careful, vain. Horner is wild, outrageous, and sloppy. But notice him Creech did.

Chuck Horner takes up the thought:

I have no idea what Creech liked about me. We were certainly never what I would call friends, or even had very much in common, other than a love for flying and the Air Force (Creech loved the joy of being a fighter pilot). So I avoided him as much as possible, and in the beginning, I even fought what he was trying to do. But when I realized he was actually showing us how to succeed and that is exactly what we wanted to do, I became one of his biggest advocates.

For his part, he was often very hard on me (which was good for me), and he was a giant pain in the ass (because he kept after details). Yet he gave me prime but challenging jobs, then made sure I worked my ass off. And in those jobs we did work hard to improve things — to have better-looking jets, cleaner facilities, and to take control of our own lives rather than ask for help without doing anything to make things better on our own hook. As the same time, I never tried to suck up to him and tried to be honest and admit mistakes to him I did not need to reveal. Though I think he liked that, I didn’t actually do it to impress him. That is just my way.

In the end, I think he judged me on the scorecard of our accomplishments, based on his awareness of what my NCOs thought of how I was doing. But I will never know.

★ By the time Horner and Creech met, Creech was starting to make his presence felt. One of Creech’s notable qualities was his ability to know virtually everything going on in his command. He was simply a powerful listener (“You’ve got to get your ear down at the other end of the pipe,” he liked to say); he was always on the phone, or taking trusted sergeants and officers aside to get the straight story. His network of such people was vast. Thus, he was well informed about the situation at the 58th Fighter Wing when Colonel Chuck Horner first arrived there.

The immediate challenge at the 58th was that the wing was so large, encompassing F-104s, F-4s, F-15s, and F-5s, that it had to be split in two. Horner was to be the commander of one of these new wings, which he assumed would be the one containing F-4s and F-104s. Meanwhile, he assumed that the existing wing commander, Pete Kemp, who was current in the F-15, would get the far more modern F-15/F-5 wing.

Since the F-4s and F-104s were far older than the F-5s and F15s and needed better maintenance leadership, Horner worked hard to find the best possible people for those aircraft. He wanted the best for his wing.

But then on the day before the split occurred, Pete Kemp was told he was leaving for another job, and that Horner would command the F-15/F-5 wing (now called the 405th Fighter Wing). After watching Horner make all the right moves for the F-4s and F-104s, Creech had moved him on to the challenge of making himself proficient in the more up-to-date aircraft.

★ In 1980, Horner was sent again to Nellis AFB, but now as the wing commander of the 474th TFW. In those days, the wing was equipped with long-out-of-date F-4Ds, but in a few months it was scheduled to receive the newest F-16As. That meant that, once again, Creech was offering Horner a large challenge, as well as the chance to make himself proficient in still another up-to-date, top-of-the-line fighter. He was to become one of the handful of pilots proficient in both air-to-air and air-to-ground in the two finest fighter aircraft in the U.S. inventory.

Meanwhile, the 474th offered many additional challenges. Not only were they switching over to the F-16s, but they were also taking on the very demanding Rapid Reactor commitment, because they were pledged to NATO. They had to be ready to deploy hours quicker than any other wing in the Air Force; then they had to be certified in all the mission areas required for a wing stationed in Germany; and at the same time they had to maintain all the other worldwide capabilities of any other wing. The wing successfully handled the commitment, as well as the F-16 changeover, and then six months after taking on their first aircraft and pilots, they won the TAC F-16 gunnery title, while taking an Operational Readiness Inspection and a Nuclear Assurity Inspection. “The results that followed these huge efforts were because of the entire wing effort and were not just a Chuck Horner thing,” Horner is quick to add. “I just had the privilege of being there at the time.”

In fact, Horner was taking command — a process as natural to him as flying.

I like a big challenge. That’s what motivates me. I like to be faced with a task that no one else can do — or at least do as well as I can in my own mind. On the other hand, I don’t care a hoot about small tasks, tasks that strike me as mundane or trivial (even though I also understand that the mundane may be as important as anything else; Jonas Salk must have conducted millions of mundane tests and observations to create his vaccine for polio). So I would much rather be given command of a wing in transition than a wing where things are going smoothly, and my challenge would be to make it better (without having a lot of room to make that happen). For instance, I was always happier to command a wing that was transitioning out of an old, difficult-to-maintain aircraft, like the F-4D, into a modern aircraft.

What turns my key is fear of failure in the face of a great challenge. And what causes me to go into the idle mode is to be given something to do that really doesn’t need much doing.

None of this means that I have any illusion that I am the reason the big job will get done. That’s not my function: I am a cheerleader, a mender of faint souls; I’m the one who listens to contending views of the path, the method for the use of resources or the organization of effort, and then decides which way to go.

★ These facts were not lost on Bill Creech. In the Air Force, commands are doled out very selectively, and most higher officers get only one of them in their entire life. But Creech kept moving Horner: two wings, two air divisions, and an air defense weapons center — all command billets. Then, after two years on staff, he spent five and a half years commanding regular forces, and spent the last few years of his career as a unified commander.

As a commander, you only get things done through other people. You lead people, you manage things. And if you can’t lead, you command. You order people to do what you want. Sometimes I had to order people; sometimes I just didn’t have time to go through all the niceties that leadership demands and had to lay a little leather on somebody. But leadership is best.

When you lead, you have to create an environment where the leader is the chief server. That is to say, he is the one who makes it possible for everyone else to do their jobs. He provides the backup and the support. I saw command as an inverted pyramid. I was the lowest guy in the food chain and the airman was the highest guy in the food chain, and it was my job to make sure I was working for all those people as much as possible.

The environment you create as commander will also have other characteristics. For one thing, it has to suit your personality (so you don’t go crazy); within it, you have to lay down realistic guidelines and goals (so people won’t fall off the face of the earth and will know where they’re going); yet it has to allow those under your command the freedom to do their best and most creative work. And then you have to trust yourself and everyone else to let all that happen.

★ For Horner, the leadership environment he liked to create tended to approach the edge of chaos… but a focused chaos. A “chaotic” style goes with the fighter-pilot ethos, partly because fighting in air-to-air battles is by definition chaotic; partly because a fighter pilot’s quickness of mind thrives in situations where inputs are many and varied and come lightning-fast; and partly because fighter pilots are themselves notably chaotic.

Wherever I went, if I didn’t find chaos, I made it. Or else I did outrageous things. Why? Because I was goddamned if I was going to let anybody control my life. And that was an outward sign of letting people know that this is an individual. It’s a revenge against the uniformity of the military service.

★ Yet Horner brought chaos down to earth and made use of it.

If you impose control to bring about order, then you will snuff initiative. My job was to exploit professionals and to get them to produce their best. I had to focus them, while letting them be themselves. Sometimes this generated friction, conflicts, or even explosions. So be it. A little friction is the price you pay for getting everyone to feel free to act and to use their initiative and talents; and this was especially true of the highly spirited people I was usually lucky enough to command.

On the other hand, some kinds of friction can be nonproductive. So it’s very important to create the kind of environment where people can dislike each other yet remain civil. You need an atmosphere where they can debate and where you can get the best arguments from them; yet you have to make sure they don’t come to blows or fall into some kind of irrational rage. Sometimes my subordinates would gang up on me. And sometimes I’ d arrange situations that would make that happen. When I saw people getting too diverted by personal differences, I would turn myself into the enemy — not by doing anything hostile, but normally by humor with a sting in it… I had no plan here; it was just instinctive, situational; it was a gut thing.

I’ve learned to support my guts. I’ve learned to trust myself. Not that I always get it right. But you have to make decisions based on uncertainty. You have to make decisions when the evidence is not clear. The black-and-white decisions are easy to make; they’re nobrainers. If what to do or where to go is so clear-cut that anybody can recognize what to do, then you don’t need a leader to make a decision. The hard decisions are the ones where the results are fuzzy, and where there’s no convincing rationale to tell you that one way is right and the other is wrong. What I learned is to go with my instincts, even when other people had equally valid arguments on the other side of the issue.

★ By the time he commanded the 47th TFW, Horner had come a long way toward internalizing and bringing to life these principles. He knew that he could create an environment where the NCOs and officers were permitted to tell the truth and give their unbiased opinion — and that his respect for them and trust in their judgment and integrity in those areas where they were experienced would lead them to make every effort to succeed and bring the unit along with them.

★ Horner’s handling of his NCOs and officers was one of the most crucial aspects of his leadership.

Noncommissioned officers — sergeants — are the heart and soul of the Air Force. They run its day-to-day operations, and they are fiercely independent.

The NCO’s job is to manage the enlisted force, lead and train the young airmen, and enforce discipline. Within that frame, they don’t think a great deal about officers, except insofar as an officer can cause the NCO problems while he attempts to do his job. They love a good commander who gives them meaningful work to do, and they despise a commander who undermines the performance they are trying to enforce among the enlisted members of the wing. If a commander loses their respect, they’ll dismiss him as useless and wait out his time in office in the hopes that a good commander will come along.

Pity the poor officer who loses their trust. They can kill an outfit’s productivity and capacity just by doing little or nothing. They do not have to work against the commander, they only have to do the job as told… and the commander will not fly his sorties, pass his inspections, or win his war. On the other hand, the simple act of listening to their advice and their views pays huge dividends in gaining their respect and loyalty.

Another way to win their support is to fire the right NCO. It goes without saying that not all NCOs are good and productive. The NCOs know who is getting the job done and who is coasting, but they will never tell on a fellow NCO to an officer. Fortunately, good NCO leadership is easy to detect. The best NCO leader is usually so busy getting the job done that the commander can’t even find him unless he scours the flight line or back shops. There he will find clues: a clean wheel and tire shop; a hangar floor so scrubbed you can eat dinner off it; an office filled with pride, military courtesy, and helpful airmen; a motor pool where the vehicles are in good operating condition and neatly parked in straight rows.

The NCO who tells you how to run the wing, or finds a thousand faults with the way his boss is doing the job, is likely to be one with weak leadership skills and a bad attitude, and he or she needs to go before it infects the rest of the organization. That is why it is important that a new wing commander fire the right NCO. If he targets the NCO who is not carrying his weight, and is an embarrassment to the other NCOs, that wing commander has it made; the NCO force will make sure he is a success. If the hapless new wing commander fires the NCO he should recognize as one of the unsung heroes, then the other NCOs will at best perform cautiously. Why should they try extra hard if their boss is too stupid to know the difference?

So when a commander sees a unit that’s gone bad, he has to fire or reassign the leadership of the unit, firmly and without hysterics. It is the hardest thing to do in command, for he can never be certain that he has accurately identified the person truly responsible.

By way of illustration, Chuck Horner tells this story:

When I took command of the 47th wing at Nellis, I made some immediate changes that upset a few people. For starters, I sent NCOs who had been sitting in air-conditioned offices out on the flight line, with instructions given in private, “You’re going to do it right, or you’re going to retire.” Young airmen who’d been playing loose with how they wore their uniform, got their hair cut, or shined their shoes also came in for close scrutiny from the new wing commander; and if they needed to be sharpened, I stuck them verbally in the sharpener — to include also their NCO supervisors (in the event they had forgotten what we were all about).

For a while, the wing went silent, while everyone decided if I was a good or bad commander. If I was to get their trust or loyalty, I had to earn it.

The first breakthrough came one day when one of the best NCOs in the unit pulled me aside and told me to keep it up. I asked what that meant, and he told me that I must be doing good, because of what he saw when he stopped for a beer in the Tiger Inn, the bar just outside the back gate at Nellis. While any of the NCOs might stop there for a beer en route home, it was a pretty wild place. The folks who usually hung out there were the malcontents and young men looking to get thrown in jail or out of the Air Force. So this good NCO told me that I must be doing it right because the walls of the bathroom cubicles were filled with graffiti about how much of a shit Colonel Horner was. “Colonel,” my confidante said, “at least you are pissing off the right people.”

To this day I am certain that I made mistakes. However, the wings I commanded all had measurably higher output, aircraft in commission rates, more sorties flown, and better inspection results, to name a few, so I must have been right more times than I was wrong. I know in my heart that at each base I had the NCO corps solidly behind me, making up for my lack of experience and providing the leadership I was not able to provide.

What I had was a deep desire to make the unit better. I walked the flight line day and night. When I saw something that needed to be fixed, I made sure the person I gave the job to had the resources to get the job done. I used to lobby at the headquarters for construction supplies. I challenged my own maintenance people to fix their own work spaces so they were neat and clean. You’d be amazed how it makes people more productive if they have a shiny floor to work on in the hangar. The light is better under the aircraft, and people don’t get oily when they have to go down on the floor. Same for dining halls, same for clubs, dorms, offices, every aspect of the work and housing area. You start at the flight line so everyone knows what is most important in the Air Force: getting the aircraft and pilots ready to go to war. But then you also pay attention to the toilets, so the troops have a decent place to relieve themselves. Ditto for the dorms; they have to be clean too, and we had a program to fix up the dorm rooms so they were not dingy, moldy, and overcrowded, with rusty showers, broken blinds, and missing fixtures and light covers. I expected very high performance standards from the troops, but only because that is what they wanted from themselves.

I made sure I was their servant, and I made sure my officers felt the same way. It was a no-harm, no-foul environment. I listened to the NCOs, but was never afraid of them or unwilling to say, “Thank you very much for your view, I will take it under consideration. In the interim, get your ass out there and lead,” and they did. All of us were working so hard to get the job done that we didn’t worry about who was in charge. In reality, they were in charge, since they were the only ones who could bring about success.

Officers are different from NCOs in a lot of ways. First of all, they stand out more, so it’s easier to see how they are performing, and then there are several classes of officers:

To start with, there are the young ones whom you’re grooming, the lieutenants and the captains with a future in the Air Force. So you’ll want them to be energetic. You want them to make mistakes, but you want to keep close supervision on them.

Then there are the career officers who rose up from NCO and who went to officers’ training school. Though they might be smart and talented, their careers have time limits. They’ll almost certainly never be promoted to command ranks, just because they don’t have enough time. Even so, they’re proud of being officers. It’s a big deal for them, because they’ve done it on their own (nobody in their family ever went to college or had anything like a professional career). So if you treat them honorably and with great respect and encouragement, they’ll give you fine, steady work. When they do screw up (or anyone else, for that matter), you chew their ass (I tried never to let a screwup go unpunished; letting them go creates apprehension and leaves things hanging out of balance).

Then you have the fast movers. You’re hard as hell on them, because if they’re worth a damn, they can withstand your withering blasts and profit from them. If they’re not worth a damn, if they bullshit their way, you need to destroy them. You need to push them so hard that they fail, and fail totally. You want to get them the hell out of there, and they want to get the hell out of there and go someplace where they can suck up to somebody and get ahead.

★ By the time Chuck Horner was given his first command, the Horner family had grown to five: Susan had been born at RAF Mildenhall, in Suffolk, England; John at Seymour Johnson; and Nancy Jo came while Horner was serving in Washington. While the Air Force does not officially admit it, wives (and now spouses) are an integral part of their society. This is not a formal thing. Each wife is expected to find her own niche, and yet, even though the commanders’ wives are not in charge, the younger ones tend to look to them for leadership. Life in the unit is much easier when the commander’s spouse promotes harmony among the nonmilitary side of the community.

Over the years that Chuck was growing as an Air Force officer, Mary Jo grew as an Air Force wife. During that time they’d frequently run into wives of senior officers who tried to wear their husbands’ rank. That didn’t work. Back when they came into the Air Force, there was still a stiff and formal relationship based on rank. Wives were expected to conform in such ways as wearing hats and gloves to the teas at the officers’ club or to some senior wife’s house when she was hosting a coffee. That pretty much died out during the sixties.

Mary Jo had a different approach. As they moved around from base to base to base, everyone liked her, because she was spontaneously enthusiastic and genuinely liked other people. She was strong enough not to put up with any guff from her commander — and later senior commander — husband, yet she was and remains a loving wife and capable mother. People came to bare their troubles to her, because they knew they wouldn’t get the conventional response from her or a moralizing lecture. Often at night she would share their pain with Chuck — a husband got passed over for promotion, or Chuck had fired him, or the couple was facing a long separation because of a remote assignment. In a very real sense, they were in the job together, and each had a role to play.

Chuck Horner learned never to discount the role of the spouse in the military community. “You know immediately,” he says, “when you have a dysfunctional spouse at work, especially if she is the wife of the commander. Common sense says you don’t make a big deal of it, but you can’t help but be aware. Sure, you always try to pick the best person for the job — man, woman, married, unmarried, working spouse, whatever. Still, if you are choosing between two equal men to make a subordinate commander, and one has a wife who promotes harmony, and one has a wife who (for whatever reason) is constantly causing trouble, you may select the former, just because you have too much to do already and don’t need any headaches caused by strife in the distaff side of the house.”

GENERAL HORNER

Over the next years Horner commanded at four different bases, two air divisions, the Air Defense Weapons Center, and finally Ninth Air Force.

After commanding the 474th, he was promoted to brigadier general, and from 1981 to ’83 he was a division commander over two wings at Holloman AFB in Alamogordo, New Mexico.

From Holloman, he moved to Tyndall AFB in Panama City, in the Florida Panhandle. There he commanded the Southeast Air Defense Regional Air Division. As division commander of the southeast region, he had responsibility for U.S. air defense from New Jersey to Texas. Active-duty and Air National Guard fighter squadrons under his command sat alert at bases along the coast from Houston to Cape May, while radar sites every two hundred miles or so were collocated with FAA radars and were netted to provide an air picture at the command headquarters in a large building in Tyndall.

Three months after starting the job at Tyndall, he was moved over to command of the Air Defense Weapons Center (also at Tyndall), a more interesting and important job. It involved transitioning the wing from F-106s to F-15s, operating the radar controllers school, operating the Gulf air-to-air missile testing ranges, conducting Red Flag-type air defense exercises, called Copper Flag, and operating a large fleet of T-33s for air targets and F-100/F-4 drones for shoot-down aerial targets.

Bill Creech retired during Horner’s tour in that command, to be replaced by General Jerry O’Malley. Soon after he took over, however, O’Malley and his wife were killed in a plane crash, and Bob Russ became the new TAC commander.

Then, as a major general, Horner replaced Tony McPeak as the TAC Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans at Langley (where he had worked at TAC as a major). He was responsible for the beddown of the forces and for preparing input on such matters as the budget, manpower, doctrine, war plans, studies and analysis, and joint matters. He also worked closely with the Army at nearby Fort Monroe, where their doctrine effort was centered.

From there he moved to command of Ninth Air Force and CENTAF, where one bright day in August he was ordered out of the sky and to Shaw AFB, ready to begin the biggest challenge of his life…