In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan

Chapter Thirteen

1. PBS Frontline, “The Return of the Taliban,” Written, produced, and reported by Martin Smith. Airdate: October 3, 2006.

2. See, for example, Murray Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguar (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1994); John Holland, Hidden Order (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1995); Kevin Dooley, “A Complex Adaptive Systems Model of Organization Change,” Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Science, vol. 1, no. 1, 1997, pp. 69–97.

3. Author interview with Commander Larry Legree, June 10, 2008.

4. Joby Warrick, “CIA Places Blame for Bhutto Assassination,” Washington Post, January 18, 2008, p. A1.

5. Author interview with U.S. intelligence officer, Bagram, Afghanistan, March 8, 2008.

6. On cooperation among insurgents, see Barnett R. Rubin, Afghanistan and the International Community: Implementing the Afghanistan Compact (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006); “Afghan Taliban Say No Talks Held with U.S., No Differences with Hekmatyar,” Karachi Islam, February 24, 2005, pp. 1, 6; “Pajhwok News Describes Video of Afghan Beheading by ‘Masked Arabs,’ Taliban,” Pajhwok Afghan News, October 9, 2005; “Spokesman Says Taliban ‘Fully Organized,’ Daily Ausaf (Islamabad), June 23, 2005, pp. 1, 6; “UK Source in Afghanistan Says al Qa’ida Attacks Boost Fear of Taliban Resurgence,” The Guardian, June 20, 2005; “Taliban Military Chief Threatens to Kill U.S. Captives, Views Recent Attacks, Al-Qa’ida,” Interview with Al Jazeera TV, July 18, 2005.

7. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005), pp. 11–12, 78–79.

8. On terrorism and learning, see Brian A. Jackson, Aptitude for Destruction, Vol. 1: Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups and Its Implications for Combating Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005); Jackson, Aptitude for Destruction, Vol. 2: Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups (Santa Monica, CA: RAND: 2005).

9. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, A Review of the Taliban and Fellow Travelers as a Movement: Concept Paper Updating PAG Joint Assessment of June 2006 (Kabul: United Nations, August 2007), p. 3.

10. United States Marine Corps, After Action Report on Operations in Afghanistan (Camp Lejeune, NC: United States Marine Corps, August 2004); Operation Enduring Freedom: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, December 2003); United Nations Department of Safety and Security, Half-Year Review of the Security Situation in Afghanistan (Kabul: United Nations, August 2007).

11. Amnesty International, Amnesty International Contacts Taliban Spokesperson, Urges Release of Hostages (New York: Amnesty International, August 2, 2007).

12. See, for example, Action Memo from Steven Casteel (Senior Adviser to the Iraq Ministry of Interior) to L. Paul Bremer (Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority), Ransom Payments for Hostages, April 21, 2004. According to the memo, the Japanese government paid $750,000 per hostage for the release of three Japanese hostages captured on April 8, 2004, near Fallujah, and the French government paid $600,000 for the release of journalist Alexandre Jordanov.

13. Letter from L. Paul Bremer (Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority) to Foreign Embassies in Iraq, Ransom Payments for Hostages, April 21, 2004.

14. See, for example, Ian Fisher, “Italy Paid Ransom for Journalist, It Confirms,” International Herald Tribune, March 22, 2007, p. 1; Peter Kiefer, “Italian Leader Faces New Attack on Prisoner Swap After Reported Death of Journalist’s Aide,” New York Times, April 10, 2007, p. A12; Massoud Ansari, “Taliban Funds Blitz on British Troops with Hostage Cash,” The Sunday Telegraph (London), October 14, 2007; Saeed Ali Achakzai, “Korea Pays Taliban $24m for Hostages,” The Sunday Mail (Australia), September 2, 2007, p. 46.

15. “Taliban Military Chief Threatens to Kill U.S. Captives.”

16. Lester Grau, ed., The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996); Grau, Artillery and Counterinsurgency: The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 1997); U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Operation Enduring Freedom: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, December 2003).

17. Statement of Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, Commander, Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, June 28, 2006; Memorandum from General Barry R. McCaffrey (ret.) to Colonel Mike Meese and Colonel Cindy Jebb, United States Military Academy, “Trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan,” June 2006, p. 4; Operation Enduring Freedom: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures; Opposing Militant Forces: Elections Scenario (Kabul: ISAF, 2005).

18. “The Rule of Allah,” Video by Al Qa’ida in Afghanistan, produced in 2006; “Taliban Execute Afghan Woman on Charges of Spying for U.S. Military,” Afghan Islamic Press, August 10, 2005; “Afghan Taliban Report Execution of Two People on Charges of Spying for U.S.,” Afghan Islamic Press, July 12, 2005.

19. Taliban Says Responsible for Pro-Karzai Cleric’s Killing, Warns Others,” The News (Islamabad), May 30, 2005; “Taliban Claim Responsibility for Killing Afghan Cleric,” Kabul Tolo Television, May 29, 2005. Also see the killings of other clerics, such as Mawlawi Muhammad Khan, Mawlawi Muhammad Gol, and Mawlawi Nur Ahmad in “Pro-Karzai’ Cleric Killed by Bomb in Mosque in Khost Province,” Pajhwok Afghan News, October 14, 2005; “Karzai Condemns Murder of Clerics,” Pajhwok Afghan News, October 18, 2005. Also see Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (London: Hurst & Company, 2007), p. 46.

20. “Taliban Threatens Teachers, Students in Southern Afghan Province,” Pajhwok Afghan News, January 3, 2006. Also see “Gunmen Set Fire to Schools in Ghazni, Kandahar Provinces,” Pajhwok Afghan News, December 24, 2005.

21. Afghan Islamic Press interview with Mofti Latifollah Hakimi, August 30, 2005.

22. Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000); William Maley, ed., Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban (New York: New York University Press, 2001).

23. Commander British Forces, Counterinsurgency in Helmand: Task Force Operational Design, January 2008.

24. Estimates of insurgents are notoriously difficult for two reasons. First, it is difficult to count the number of insurgents, since they hide in urban and rural areas to evade foreign and domestic intelligence and security forces. Second, the number of insurgents is often fluid. Some are full-time fighters but many are not. In addition, there is a significant logistics, financial, and political support network for insurgent groups, making it virtually impossible to reliably estimate the total number of guerrillas and their support base. These reasons make it more difficult to estimate the number of insurgents than to estimate the size of state military forces. On the Taliban numbers, the author interviewed U.S., European, and Afghan officials on numerous occasions throughout 2004, 2005, and 2006.

25. United Nations, A Review of the Taliban and Fellow Travelers as a Movement: Concept Paper Updating PAG Joint Assessment of June 2006 (Kabul: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, August 2007), p. 3.

26. Amrullah Saleh, Strategy of Insurgents and Terrorists in Afghanistan (Kabul: National Directorate of Security, 2006), p. 2.

27. Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection, translated by John King (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 13.

28. Al Jazeera interview with Mullah Dadullah, February 2006. Also see, for example, “Taliban Spokesman Condemns Afghan Parliament as ‘Illegitimate,’” Sherberghan Aina Television, December 19, 2005.

29. “Spokesman Rejects Afghan Government’s Amnesty Offer for Taliban Leader,” Afghan Islamic Press, May 9, 2005.

30. See, for example, “Al Jazeera Airs Hikmatyar Video,” Al Jazeera TV, May 4, 2006.

31. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, May 2007, recorded DVD response to Agence France Presse questions. Also see, for example, Sardar Ahmad, “Afghan Insurgency Here for a Long Time: Rebel Leader,” Agence France Presse, May 6, 2007.

32. Parts of the video clip were released in such Pakistan newspapers as Dawn. See, for example, “US Can’t Stay for Long in Afghanistan: Hekmatyar,” Dawn (Pakistan), February 22, 2007.

33. The video clip was released in 2003. See, for example, Aileen McCabe, “Attack Seen as ‘Payback’ for Drug Raid,” National Post (Canada), January 28, 2004, p. A2. Hekmatyar’s comments were regularly anti-American. In an address to U.S. President George W. Bush, he noted: “You must have realized that attacking Afghanistan and Iraq was a historic mistake. You do not have any other option but to take out your forces from Iraq and Afghanistan and give the Iraqis and Afghans the right to live their own way.” Zarar Khan, “Afghan Warlord Splits with Taliban, Hints at Talks with Karzai Government,” Associated Press, March 8, 2007.

34. Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, pp. 77–78.

35. Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 141–43.

36. Author interview with Ambassador Said Jawad, August 24, 2007.

37. United Nations, A Review of the Taliban and Fellow Travelers as a Movement: Concept Paper Updating PAG Joint Assessment of June 2006 (Kabul: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, August 2007), p. 4.

38. Author interview with Robert Grenier, November 6, 2007

39. See, for example, Zahab and Roy, Islamist Networks, p. 1.

40. The term salafi jihadist initially began to occur in the literature of the Islamic Armed Group in Algeria. See, for example, Alain Grignard, “La lit-térature politique du GIA, des origines à Djamal Zitoun—Esquisse d’une analyse,” in F. Dassetto, ed., Facettes de l’Islam belge (Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium: Academia-Bruylant, 2001).

41. Video clip of Abu Laith al-Libi, released in September 2007.

42. Zahab and Roy, Islamist Networks, p. 14

43. See, for example, Thomas H. Johnson, “The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night Letters),” Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 18, no. 3, September 2007, pp. 317–44.

44. “Taliban Military Chief Threatens to Kill U.S. Captives.”

45. Saleh, Strategy of Insurgents and Terrorists in Afghanistan, p. 8.

46. “Religious Scholars Call on Taliban to Abandon Violence,” Pajhwok News Agency, July 28, 2005.

47. “Taliban Claim Killing of Pro-Government Religious Scholars in Helmand,” Afghan Islamic Press, July 13, 2005.

48. The Asia Foundation, Voter Education Planning Survey: Afghanistan 2004 National Elections (Kabul: The Asia Foundation, 2004); pp. 107–8.

49. Author interview with Ambassador Ronald Neumann, September 7, 2007.

Chapter Fourteen

1. The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, DC, April 4, 1949.

2. Eric V. Larson, “U.S. Air Force Roles Reach Beyond Securing the Skies,” RAND Review, vol. 26, no. 2, Summer 2002.

3. Author interview with NATO military official, Kandahar, Afghanistan, September 16, 2007.

4. Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), p. 154.

5. Author interview with Daoud Yaqub, January 2, 2008.

6. UNDP, Rebuilding the Justice Sector of Afghanistan (Kabul: United Nations Development Program, January 2003), p. IA.

7. The Bonn Agreement (2001), article II, paragraph 2.

8. Author interviews with Carlos Batori, counselor and deputy head of mission, Italian Government, Kabul, June 22, 2004, and Colonel Gary Medvigy, Office of Military Cooperation—Afghanistan, June 24, 2004.

9. J. Alexander Thier, Reestablishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan (Stanford, CA: Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University, September 2004), p. 13.

10. Feith, War and Decision, pp. 153–55.

11. World Bank, Governance Matters 2007: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996–2006 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007).

12. Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2007 (Berlin, Germany: Transparency International, 2007).

13. World Bank, Governance Matters 2007.

14. Author interview with Daoud Yaqub, January 2, 2008.

15. Author interview with Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, October 27, 2007.

16. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1510, October 13, 2003, S/RES/1510. Resolution 1510 specifically authorized “expansion of the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force to allow it, as resources permit, to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment, and to provide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement.”

17. Hans-Jürgen Leersch, “Deutsche Soldaten werden im Norden Afghanistans patrouillieren,” Die Welt, October 16, 2003; Halima Kazem, “Germany Pushes to Extend Security Beyond Kabul,” Christian Science Monitor, October 7, 2003, p. 7.

18. Author interview with Lieutenant General David Barno, September 4, 2007; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO in Afghanistan: How Did This Operation Evolve? (Brussels: NATO, 2008).

19. Map courtesy of NATO.

20. Author interview with Lieutenant General David Barno, September 4, 2007.

21. Anne Barnard and Neil Swidey, “U.S. Commander’s Background Considered a Strength in War with Iraq,” Boston Globe, March 27, 2003, p. A28.

22. Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez with Donald T. Phillips, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), p. 50.

23. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1623, September 13, 2005, S/RES/1623.

24. Eric Schmitt and David S. Cloud, “U.S. May Start Pulling Out of Afghanistan Next Spring,” New York Times, September 14, 2005, p. 3; Bradley Graham, “U.S. Considering Troop Reduction in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, September 14, 2005, p. A26.

25. See, for example, Eric Schmitt, “U.S. to Cut Force in Afghanistan,” New York Times, December 20, 2005, p. A19.

26. See, for example, Christopher Layne, “America as European Hegemon,” National Interest, no. 72, Summer 2003, pp. 17–29.

27. Elizabeth Pond, Friendly Fire: The Near-Death of the Transatlantic Alliance Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 56–62; Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, An Alliance at Risk: The United States and Europe Since September 11 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), p. 82.

28. Claire Trean, “La guerre contre l’Irak se fera sans le feu vert des Nations unies,” Le Monde, March 12, 2003; Luc de Barochez, “Alors que la date du prochain vote du Conseil de securité n’est pas encore fixée,” Le Figaro, March 11, 2003; “Paris rejetera une deuxième resolution au conseil de securité,” La Tribune, March 11, 2003, p. 4.

29. See, for example, the speech by Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier to the German Bundestag, Berlin, December 14, 2005: “Speech by Foreign Minister Steinmeier in the German Bundestag” (Berlin: Federal Foreign Office, December 2005). Also see Chancellor Angela Merkel’s objections to the U.S. prison at Guantánamo Bay in Jens Tartler and Olaf Gersemann, “Merkel fordert Ende von Guantánamo,” Financial Times Deutschland, January 9, 2006.

30. Henry A. Kissinger, “Role Reversal and Alliance Realities,” Washington Post, February 10, 2003, p. A21.

31. Patrick E. Tyler, “Threats and Responses: Old Friends,” New York Times, February 12, 2003, p. A1.

32. Ivo H. Daalder, “The End of Atlanticism,” Survival, vol. 45, no. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 147–48. Also see Samuel F. Wells, “The Transatlantic Illness,” Wilson Quarterly, vol. XXVII, no. 1, Winter 2003, pp. 40–46; James B. Steinberg, “An Elective Partnership: Salvaging Transatlantic Relations,” Survival, vol. 45, no. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 113–46; Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis Over Iraq (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), p. 2.

33. Eric Schmitt, “NATO Troops Will Relieve Americans in Fighting the Taliban,” New York Times, December 31, 2005, p. A3.

34. Jason Beattie, “5,000 British Troops to Root Out the Taliban,” The Evening Standard (London), September 13, 2005, p. 8.

35. Doug Saunders, “NATO Chief Defends Afghan Mission,” The Globe and Mail, March 7, 2006, p. A12.

36. Author interview with Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, October 27, 2007.

37. UK House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Thirteenth Report (London: HMSC, 2007), para. 46.

38. Author interview with NATO official, NATO ISAF Headquarters, Kabul, Afghanistan, September 15, 2007.

39. Judy Dempsey and David S. Cloud, “Europeans Balking at New Afghan Role,” International Herald Tribune, September 14, 2005, p. 1.

40. UK House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Thirteenth Report, para. 43.

41. German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo (Italy), Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2007 (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, 2007), p. 33.

42. Author interview with General Markus Kneip, September 6, 2006.

43. John D. Banusiewicz, “National Caveats’ Among Key Topics at NATO Meeting,” American Forces Press Service, February 9, 2005.

44. Author interview with Ambassador David Sproule, January 10, 2007.

45. Author interviews with senior German military officials in Mazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz, September 6–7, 2006; September 2007.

46. Memorandum from General Barry R. McCaffrey (ret.) to Colonel Mike Meese and Colonel Cindy Jebb, United States Military Academy, “Trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan,” June 2006, p. 4.

47. Quoted in Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), p. 111.

48. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Statement to the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2007.

49. Peter Spiegel, “Gates Says NATO Force Unable to Fight Guerrillas,” Los Angeles Times, January 16, 2008, p. A1.

50. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005), p. 77.

51. The clear, hold, and expand section draws extensively from Joseph D. Celeski, Operationalizing COIN, JSOU Report 05–2 (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2005).

52. Celeski, Operationalizing COIN.

53. Colonel Bruce Burda, Operation Enduring Freedom Lessons Learned (Hurlburt Field, FL: Air Force Special Operations Command, 2003).

54. Author interview with Western ambassador, Kabul, Afghanistan, September 13, 2007.

55. Author interviews with Canadian soldiers, Kandahar, Afghanistan, September 16–19, 2007. See also, for example, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, A Review of the Taliban and Fellow Travelers as a Movement: Concept Paper Updating PAG Joint Assessment of June 2006 (Kabul: United Nations, August 2007).

56. Author interview with senior NATO military official, Kandahar, Afghanistan, September 16, 2007.

57. Letter from Paddy Ashdown to Gordon Brown and David Miliband, December 2007.

58. Author interview with Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, October 27, 2007.

Chapter Fifteen

1. Rudyard Kipling, Verses, 1889–1896, vol. 11 (New York: Charles Scribner, 1899), p. 79.

2. “Enemy Assault on North OP in VIC BCP 213 Shkin,” U.S. After Action Report, September 22, 2005. I interviewed one of the U.S. officials present at Shkin that night (he wished to remain anonymous) on February 7 and February 11, 2007. I also interviewed nearly a dozen U.S. soldiers with similar reports along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in 2006, 2007, and 2008.

3. Author interview with senior officer, 82nd Airborne Division, March 7, 2008.

4. Quoted in Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan—The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2001), p. 20.

5. PBS Frontline, “The Return of the Taliban,” Written, Produced, and Reported by Martin Smith, Airdate: October 3, 2006.

6. On U.S. aid to Pakistan, see C. Christine Fair and Peter Chalk, Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Security Assistance (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006); Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet, “When $10 Billion Is Not Enough: Rethinking U.S. Strategy toward Pakistan,” Washington Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 2, Spring 2007, pp. 7–19.

7. David E. Sanger and David Rohde, “U.S. Pays Pakistan to Fight Terror, but Patrols Ebb,” New York Times, May 20, 2007, p. 1. There were a number of additional New York Times investigative pieces on the Coalition support funds. See, for example, David Rohde, Carlotta Gall, Eric Schmitt, and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Officials See Waste in Pakistan Aid,” New York Times, December 24, 2007, p. A1.

8. Author interview with Dov Zakheim, January 30, 2008.

9. On the capture of these al Qa’ida figures, see Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Free Press, 2006), pp. 222–63.

10. See, for example, Intikhab Amir, “Waziristan: No Man’s Land?” The Herald (Pakistan), vol. 37, no. 4, April 2006, pp. 74–79; Amir, “Whose Writ Is It Anyway?” The Herald (Pakistan), vol. 37, no. 4, April 2006, pp. 80–82; Iqbal Khattak, “40 Militants Killed in North Waziristan,” Daily Times (Pakistan), September 30, 2005.

11. On Operation Anaconda, see, for example, U.S. Air Force, Office of Lessons Learned (AF/XOL), Operation Anaconda: An Air Power Perspective (Washington, DC: Headquarters United States Air Force AF/XOL, February 2005); Paul L. Hastert, “Operation Anaconda: Perception Meets Reality in the Hills of Afghanistan,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 28, no. 1, January—February 2005, pp. 11—20; Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: Berkley Books, 2005).

12. Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, pp. 269–70.

13. Ismail Khan and Alamgir Bhittani, “42 Uzbeks among 58 Dead: Fierce Clashes in S. Waziristan,” Dawn (Pakistan), March 21, 2007.

14. Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl W. Ford, Jr. to Secretary of State Colin Powell, “Pakistan—Poll Shows Strong and Growing Public Support for Taleban,” November 7, 2001. Released by the National Security Archive.

15. Author interview with Richard Armitage, October 17, 2007.

16. Author interview with Robert Grenier, November 6, 2007.

17. Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qa’ida (New York: Crown Publishers, 2005), p. 241.

18. Letter from Lieutenant General James B. Vaught (U.S. Army Retired) to Secretary Rumsfeld, October 28, 2003.

19. Author interview with Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, October 27, 2007.

20. Author interview with Robert Grenier, November 6, 2007.

21. General Barry R. McCaffrey USA (ret.), After Action Report, February 26, 2007.

22. The rest of this section relies on extensive author interviews with American, European, Canadian, Afghan, and Pakistani government officials between 2003 and 2008. The interviews—which took place throughout Afghanistan and in Washington, London, Brussels, The Hague, and Ottawa—were conducted with military, political, and intelligence officials.

23. Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 240.

24. “Outgoing U.S. Envoy Enthusiastic about Afghanistan’s Future,” Sherberghan Aina Television, June 18, 2005. Ambassador Khalilzad’s comments were supported by President Karzai’s office in “Afghan Spokesman Calls on Pakistan to Curb Taliban Activities,” Kabul Tolo Television, June 21, 2005.

25. Author interview with senior adviser to Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, Kabul, Afghanistan, June 24, 2004.

26. International Security Assistance Force, Nationwide Research and Survey on Illegal State Opposing Armed Groups (ISOAGS): Qualitative and Quantitative Surveys (Kabul: International Security Assistance Force, 2006).

27. Author interviews with three U.S. soldiers from 7th Group Special Forces, Washington, DC, May 10, 2007.

28. Author interviews with senior U.S. officials, U.S. Embassy, Kabul.

29. David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 57.

30. Barnett R. Rubin, Afghanistan and the International Community: Implementing the Afghanistan Compact (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006), p. 24.

31. Author interviews with three U.S. soldiers from 7th Group Special Forces, Washington, DC, May 10, 2007.

32. European Union and UNAMA, Discussion of Taliban and Insurgency (Kabul: European Union and UNAMA, April 30, 2007), p. 4.

33. Pakistani officials frequently denied this assertion. As one Pakistani senator noted in testimony before Pakistan’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “Pakistan has arrested over 500 Taliban this year from Quetta and 400 of them have been handed over to Afghans.” Pakistan Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations, Report 13 (Islamabad: Pakistan Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 2007), p. 38.

34. Amir, “Waziristan: No Man’s Land?” p. 78.

35. Author interview with White House official, Washington, DC, June 20, 2007.

36. M. Ilyas Khan, “Profile of Nek Mohammad,” Dawn (Pakistan), June 19, 2004.

37. Locals denied the existence of the last clause and argued that they did not agree to register all foreigners with the government.

38. Iqbal Khattak, “I Did Not Surrender to the Military, Said Nek Mohammad,” The Friday Times (Pakistan), April 30-May 6, 2004.

39. Ismail Khan and Dilawar Khan Wazir, “Night Raid Kills Nek, Four Other Militants,” Dawn (Pakistan), June 19, 2004.

40. See, for example, Peace Pact North Waziristan, September 5, 2006. This agreement was negotiated by a political agent from North Waziristan representing Governor N.W.F.P. Federal Government, and tribal representatives from North Waziristan, Local Mujahideen N.W.F.P., Atmanzai Tribe.

41. Pakistan Ministry of Interior, The Talibanisation Problem (Islamabad: Ministry of Interior, 2007). The document was subsequently leaked to the press. See, for example, Ismail Khan, “Talibanisation Imperils Security, NSC Warned: Immediate Action Urged,” Dawn (Pakistan), June 22, 2007.

42. U.S. Department of State, Afghanistan, Autumn 2006: A Campaign at a Crossroads (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, 2006), pp. 2–3. Unclassified document.

43. Amir, “Whose Writ Is It Anyway?” pp. 80–82.

44. Transcript of Martin Smith interview with General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan, June 8, 2006. I received a copy of the transcript from Frontline.

45. In one public statement, for example, the Taliban argued that “the situation is augmenting and the Taliban in Waziristan are capturing hearts and minds. We see the tribes who were struggling for tens of years accepting arbitration by Taliban scholars.” Taliban Statement on Waziristan, April 13, 2006.

46. Author interviews with Pakistan government officials, Washington, DC, January 2006.

47. Lieutenant General David W. Barno, Testimony Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, February 15, 2007, p. 21.

48. Ibid.

49. Author interview with senior Indian intelligence official, April 4, 2007.

50. David C. Mulford, U.S. Ambassador to India, Afghanistan Has Made a Remarkable Transition (New Delhi: U.S. Department of State, February 2006); Amin Tarzi, “Afghanistan: Kabul’s India Ties Worry Pakistan,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 16, 2006.

51. Border Roads Organisation, Vision, Mission, Role (Delhi: Border Roads Organisation, 2006).

52. Feroz Hassan Khan, “The Durand Line: Tribal Politics and Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations,” Paper Presented at a Conference on Tribalism, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 2006, p. 20. As one Pakistan Senate panel concluded, India was more successful at winning Afghan hearts and minds than Pakistan. Pakistan Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Pakistan—Afghanistan Relations, Report 13, p. 9.

53. Author interview with Sayed Fazlullah Wahidi, May 20, 2008.

54. See, for example, Aly Zaman, “India’s Increased Involvement in Afghanistan and Central Asia: Implications for Pakistan,” Islamabad Policy Research Journal, vol. 3, no. 2, Summer 2003; Aimal Khan, “Historic Hostility,” The Herald (Pakistan), vol. 37, no. 4, April 2006, pp. 83–85; Khan, “The Durand Line: Tribal Politics and Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations,” p. 20.

55. Feroz Hassan Khan, “Rough Neighbors: Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Strategic Insights, vol. II, issue 1, January 2003, p. 6.

56. Author interview with Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin, August 27, 2008.

57. Abd Allah Mustawfi, Shahr-i zindigani-yi man ya tarikh-i ijtima‘i va idari-yi dawreh-yi qajariyeh [The Town of My Life or the History of Society and Administration of the Qajar Era] (Tehran: Kitabfurushi-yi Zavvab, 1964).

58. Author interview with General Dan McNeill, May 25, 2008. See, for example, John Ward Anderson, “Arms Seized in Afghanistan Sent From Iran, NATO Says,” Washington Post, September 21, 2007, p. A12; Tom Coghlan, “Iran ‘Arming Taliban with Anti-Armour Roadside Bombs,’” Daily Telegraph (London), October 4, 2007, p. 1; Robin Wright, “Iranian Arms Destined for Taliban Seized in Afghanistan, Officials Say,” Washington Post, September 16, 2007, p. A19.

59. Author interviews with NATO officials: Washington, DC, June 4, 2007; Kabul, Afghanistan, September 15, 2007; Kandahar, Afghanistan, September 17, 2007.

60. Author interview with Ambassador Said Jawad, August 24, 2007.

61. Author interviews with NATO officials: Washington, DC, June 4, 2007; Kabul, Afghanistan, September 15, 2007; Kandahar, Afghanistan, September 17, 2007.

62. Author interview with Afghan Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta, July 2006; author interview with Dr. Zalmai Rassoul, November 23, 2005.

63. Memorandum of Conversation, From L. Paul Bremer III, June 22, 2003 Meeting with Kofi Annan, Amman, Jordan.

64. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Iranian Support to the Afghan Resistance,” excerpt from unidentified study, n.d.; Defense Intelligence Agency, “Iranian Support to the Afghan Resistance,” 11 July 1985. Released by the National Security Archive.

65. Thom Shanker, “Iran May Know of Weapons for Taliban, Gates Contends,” New York Times, June 14, 2007, p. 12.

66. Bill Gertz, “China Arming Terrorists,” Washington Times, June 15, 2007, p. 5.

67. Author interviews with NATO officials, Kandahar, Afghanistan, September 17, 2007.

68. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), p. 66.

69. European Union and UNAMA, Discussion of Taliban and Insurgency, p. 5.

70. On Saudi Arabia’s historical role in Afghanistan, see National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), pp. 371–74.

71. Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Frontiers: The Romanes Lecture 1907 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), p. 7.

72. U.S. State Department, Afghanistan, Autumn 2006, p. 17. Unclassified document.

73. Eric Schmitt, Mark Mazzetti, and Carlotta Gall, “U.S. Hopes to Arm Pakistani Tribes Against Al Qa’ida,” New York Times, November 19, 2007, p. A1.

74. Author interview with White House official, Washington, DC, June 20, 2007.

75. Author interview with Western ambassador, Kabul, Afghanistan, September 13, 2007; author interview with Western ambassador, Kabul, Afghanistan, January 10, 2007.

Chapter Sixteen

1. National Intelligence Council, The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, July 2007), p. 1.

2. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 2008), pp. 5–6.

3. Author interview with FBI counterterrorism official, July 1, 2008.

4. House of Commons, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, HC 1087 (London: The Stationery Office, 2006), p. 21.

5. Bruce Hoffman, “Challenges for the U.S. Special Operations Command Posed by the Global Terrorist Threat: Al Qa’ida on the Run or on the March?” Written Testimony Submitted to the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, February 14, 2007.

6. On the plot’s connection to al Qa’ida, see United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2006, p. 269.

7. Author interview with Bruce Riedel, Washington, DC, June 5, 2008.

8. Seth G. Jones and Martin Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, forthcoming).

9. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), p. 60; Daniel Benjamin and Steve Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002), pp. 132, 242.

10. “Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques,” Al Islah (London), September 2, 1996.

11. “Text of World Islamic Front’s Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), February 23, 1998.

12. House of Commons, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, p. 29.

13. See, for example, Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam (New York: Random House, 2003), p. xi.

14. On the establishment of a Caliphate, see, for example, Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass, translated and published by the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, May 23, 2006.

15. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, translated by Laura Mansfield (Old Tappan, NJ: TLG Publications, 2002), p. 132.

16. Osama bin Laden, “Message to the Peoples of Europe,” released in November 2007.

17. Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 49.

18. Zawahiri’s reference to the Afghan jihad in this context was the Soviet War in the 1980s. He argued that it provided a critical opportunity for training Arabs against the forthcoming war with the United States. Zawahiri, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, p. 38.

19. This section adopts the framework laid out by Bruce Hoffman. See, for example, Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 285–89; Hoffman, “Challenges for the U.S. Special Operations Command Posed by the Global Terrorist Threat.”

20. Indeed, six months after September 11, 2001, al Qa’ida had lost sixteen of twenty-five key leaders on the Pentagon’s “Most Wanted” list. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qa’ida: Global Network of Terror (New York: Berkley Books, 2002), p. 303.

21. “Pakistan: Villagers Start Rebuilding Seminary Destroyed in Bajaur Airstrike,” The News (Pakistan), November 18, 2006.

22. Hoffman, “Challenges for the U.S. Special Operations Command Posed by the Global Terrorist Threat” Jason Burke, Al-Qa’ida: The True Story of Radical Islam (London: Penguin, 2004); Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: Touchstone, 2001); Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Knopf, 2006).

23. Greg Miller, “Influx of Al Qa’ida, Money into Pakistan Is Seen,” Los Angeles Times, May 20, 2007.

24. United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2006 (Washington, DC: United States Department of State), p. 269; Hoffman, “Challenges for the U.S. Special Operations Command Posed by the Global Terrorist Threat.”

25. House of Commons, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, pp. 24–27; Hoffman, “Challenges for the U.S. Special Operations Command Posed by the Global Terrorist Threat.”

26. New York Police Department, Threat Analysis: JFK Airport/Pipeline Plot (New York: New York Police Department, June 2, 2007).

27. Juzgado Central de Instrucción Numero 5, Audiencia Nacional, Sumario (Proc. Ordinario) 21/2006 L, Madrid, 23 Octubre 2007.

28. The Information Center for the Support of the Iraqi People, Iraqi Jihad, Hopes and Risks: Analysis of the Reality and Visions for the Future, and Actual Steps in the Path of the Blessed Jihad (The Information Center for the Support of the Iraqi People, December 2003).

29. Lorenzo Vidino, “The Hofstad Group: The New Face of Terrorist Networks in Europe,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 30, no. 7, pp. 579–92; Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst, From Dawa to Jihad: The Various Threats from Radical Islam to the Democratic Legal Order (The Hague: Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst, December 2004).

30. U.S. Department of Defense, Background and Activities of Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2007). Also see U.S. Department of State, Wanted Poster for Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi (Washington, DC: Rewards for Justice Program, U.S. Department of State, 2006).

31. Dipesh Gadher, “Al-Qa’ida ‘Planning Big British Attack,’” Sunday Times (London), April 22, 2007.

32. On Wadi al-Aqiq, see, for example, Wright, The Looming Tower, pp. 166, 192.

33. See, for example, “Bin Laden’s Treasurer Appointed New Afghan Qa’ida Leader,” Daily Times (Pakistan), May 30, 2007.

34. General Michael V. Hayden, The Current Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2006), p. 2.

35. Raffi Khatchadourian, “Azzam the American: The Making of an Al Qa’ida Homegrown,” The New Yorker, January 22, 2007.

36. Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, The Current Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2006), p. 6.

37. Alex Alexiev, “Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad’s Stealthy Legions,” Middle East Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 1, Winter 2005. On zakat and jihad, also see Marc Sage-man, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennyslvania Press, 2004).

38. See, for example, Alfred B. Prados and Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004); The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 55.

39. General Michael V. Hayden, The Current Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2006), p. 2.

40. United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 15 November 2007 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities Addressed to the President of the Security Council, November 29, 2007, S/2007/677, p. 8.

41. United States of America. v. Hassan Abujihaad, a/k/ a Paul R. Hall, Abu-Jihaad, United States District Court, District of Connecticut, No. 3:07-CR-57, Exhibit 2, Federal Bureau of Investigation FD-302 of William “Jamaal” Chrisman. Interview conducted December 2, 2006.

42. Statement from Mullah Omar, Leader of the Taliban, released December 17, 2007.

43. United States of America v. Babar Ahmad, United States District Court, District of Connecticut, No. 3:04-CR-301-MRK, Indictment, Filed October 6, 2004.

44. United States of America v. Syed Talha Ahsan, United States District Court, District of Connecticut, No. 3:06-CR-194-JCH, Indictment. Also see United States of America. v. Hassan Abujihaad, a/k/a Paul R. Hall, Abu-Jihaad, United States District Court, District of Connecticut, No. 3:07-CR-57, Indictment.

45. Author interviews with European, Afghan, and Pakistani government officials, Kabul, Afghanistan 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007. Also see Ali Jalali, “The Future of Afghanistan,” Parameters, vol. 36, no. 1, Spring 2006, p. 8.

46. Author interviews with U.S. government officials in Shkin, Afghanistan, April 2006. Al Jazeera interview with Mullah Dadullah, July 2005. Also see such press accounts as Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Unholy Allies,” Newsweek, September 26, 2005, pp. 40–42.

47. In what appeared to be a forced confession, Saeed Allah Khan stated: “I worked as a spy for the Americans along with four other people. The group received $45,000 and my share is $7,000.” Hekmat Karzai, Afghanistan and the Globalisation of Terrorist Tactics (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, January 2006), p. 2.

48. Author interview with U.S. government officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, December 2005.

49. On the rationale for suicide bombers, see Al Jazeera interview with Mullah Dadullah, February 2006.

50. Zawahiri, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, p. 200.

51. C. Christine Fair et al., Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan, 2001–2007 (Kabul: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, September 2007), p. 10.

52. Hekmat Karzai, Afghanistan and the Logic of Suicide Terrorism (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, March 2006); “Taliban Claim Responsibility for Suicide Bomb Attack in Afghan Kandahar Province,” Afghan Islamic Press, October 9, 2005; “Pajhwok News Describes Video of Afghan Beheading by ‘Masked Arabs,’ Taliban,” Kabul Pajhwok Afghan News, October 9, 2005; “Canadian Soldier Dies in Suicide Attack in Kandahar,” Afghan Islamic Press, March 3, 2006; “Taliban Claim Attack on Police in Jalalabad, Nangarhar Province,” Kabul National TV, January 7, 2006.

53. See, for example, Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005); Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Christoph Reuter, My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Hoffman, Inside Terrorism.

54. Hekmat Karzai and Seth G. Jones, “How to Curb Rising Suicide Terrorism in Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, July 18, 2006.

55. In its public rhetoric, the Taliban tended to identify the suicide bombers as Afghans, since it suggested there was a significant indigenous component of the insurgency.

56. Fair et al., Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan, p. 28.

Chapter Seventeen

1. Author interview with Commander Larry Legree, June 10, 2008.

2. Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2008: A Survey of the Afghan People (Kabul and San Francisco: Asia Foundation, 2008).

3. Author interview with Colonel Martin Schweitzer, March 7, 2008.

4. Colin Soloway, “I Yelled at Them to Stop,” Newsweek, October 7, 2002; Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), pp. 141–42.

5. Author interview with Colonel Martin Schweitzer, March 7, 2008.

6. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, translated by Daniel Lee (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), p. 6.

7. Author interview with Commander Larry Legree, March 8, 2008; author interview with Colonel Martin Schweitzer, March 7, 2008.

8. Author interview with Colonel Martin Schweitzer, March 7, 2008.

9. British Government, Afghanistan: Countering the Insurgency RC(E) vs. RC (S) Comparative Approaches, May 12, 2008.

10. The quote is from Bruce Hoffman and Seth G. Jones, “Cell Phones in the Hindu Kush,” The National Interest, No. 96, July/August 2008.

11. International Security Assistance Force, ISAF Campaign Plan (Kabul: ISAF, November 2008).

12. Trinquier, Modern Warfare, p. 6.

13. Prior to the establishment of the first Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells and U.S. Army Civil Affairs Teams—Afghanistan supported humanitarian assistance, relief, and reconstruction efforts throughout Afghanistan. These began in 2002.

14. Robert Borders, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: A Model for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development,” Journal of Development and Social Transformation, vol. 1, November 2004, pp. 5–12; Michael J. McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?” Parameters, vol. 35, no. 4, Winter 2005–06, pp. 32–46.

15. Author interview with Commander Larry Legree, June 10, 2008.

16. McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan,” p. 40.

17. Trent Scott and John Agoglia, “Getting the Basics Right: A Discussion on Tactical Actions for Strategic Impact in Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal, November 2008; author interview with John Agoglia, November 13, 2008.

18. Author interview with Michelle Parker, August 15, 2007.

19. Author interviews with NATO officials involved in the meetings, Kabul, Afghanistan, May 2008.

20. Author interview with senior NATO intelligence official, November 13, 2008.

21. J. Alexander Thier and Azita Ranjbar, Killing Friends, Making Enemies: The Impact and Avoidance of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, July 2008); Human Rights Watch, “Troops in Contact”: Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan (New York: Human Rights Watch, September 2008).

22. Trista Talton and Robert Burns, “Probe: Spec Ops Marines Used Excessive Force,” Marine Corps Times, April 13, 2007. Also see Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Investigation: Use of Indiscriminate and Excessive Force against Civilians by U.S. Forces Following a VBIED Attack in Nangarhar Province on 4 March 2007 (Kabul: Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, 2007).

23. Josh White, “69 Afghans’ Families Get a U.S. Apology,” Washington Post, May 9, 2007, p. A12.

24. Memorandum from Brigadier General Michael W. Callan to Acting Commander, United States Central Command, Subject: Executive Summary of AR 15-6 Investigation into new information relative to civilian casualties from engagement by U.S. and Afghan Forces on 21–22 AUG 2008 in Azizabad, Shindand District, Herat Province, Afghanistan, October 1, 2008.

25. Statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, Kai Eide, on Civilian Casualties Caused by Military Operations in Shindand District of Herat Province, August 26, 2008.

26. Jon Boone, “Kabul Accuses Allies of Civilian Deaths,” Financial Times, August 22, 2008.

27. Office of the President, President Karzai Condemns Shindand Incident (Kabul: Office of the President, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, August 23, 2008).

28. Author interview with senior U.S. State Department official, October 2, 2008.

29. Memorandum from Brigadier General Michael W. Callan to Acting Commander, United States Central Command, Subject: Executive Summary of AR 15–6 Investigation into new information relative to civilian casualties from engagement by U.S. and Afghan Forces on 21–22 AUG 2008 in Azizabad, Shindand District, Herat Province, Afghanistan, October 1, 2008.

30. Memorandum from the Rendon Group to J5 CENTCOM Strategic Effects, Polling Results—Afghanistan Omnibus May 2007, June 15, 2007.

31. Charney Associates, Afghanistan: Public Opinion Trends and Strategic Implications (New York: Charney Associates, 2008), slide 20.

32. Author interview with senior NATO intelligence official, November 13, 2008.

33. United Nations Department of Safety and Security, Security Incidents in Afghanistan, July 2008

34. NATO ISAF, Afghan National Security Forces Update (Kabul: NATO ISAF, July 24, 2008), slide 5. Between January 2007 and July 2008, there were 333 Coalition soldiers killed (20 percent), 1,015 Afghan police killed (59 percent), and 369 Afghan soldiers killed (21 percent).

35. Memorandum from Investigating Officer to Commander, Combined Joint Task Force—101, Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, Subject AR 15–6 Investigation Findings and Recommendations—Vehicle Patrol Base (VPB) Wanat Complex Attack and Casualties, 13 July 2008, 13 August 2008.

36. The NATO after-action report was leaked to Canada’s Globe and Mail newspaper. See Graeme Smith, “Taliban Making the Grade in Guerrilla War,” The Globe and Mail, August 20, 2008.

37. Author interviews with U.S. intelligence officers, Bagram, Afghanistan, March 8, 2008.

38. U.S. Department of State, “Pakistan: Refocusing Security Assistance,” January 2008.

39. State Bank of Pakistan, Monetary Police Statement, July—December 2008 (Islamabad: State Bank of Pakistan, 2008).

40. Author interview with senior State Department official, September 30, 2008.

41. Dexter Filkins, “The Long Road to Chaos in Pakistan,” New York Times, September 27, 2008.

42. Dexter Filkins, “Right at the Edge,” New York Times Magazine, September 5, 2008.

43. Author interview with senior NATO official, September 29, 2008.

44. Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, August 1, 2008, p. A1.

45. Author interview with senior White House official, September 25, 2008.

46. Iftikhar A. Khan, “Kayani Warns US to Keep its Troops Out,” Dawn (Pakistan), September 11, 2008.

47. Combined Joint Task Force-101, CJTF-101 Assessment (Bagram: CJTF-101, 2008), slide 7.

Chapter Eighteen

1. Zehr-Ed-Dn Muhammed Bbur, Memoirs of Zehr-Ed-Dn Muhammed Bbur: Emperor of Hindustan, vol. 2, translated by John Leyden and William Erskine (London: Oxford University Press, 1921), p. 19.

2. Author interview with Lieutenant Colonel Simon Heatherington, Commander, Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, Kandahar, January 16, 2007.

3. Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), pp. 101, 149.

4. Francesc Vendrell, EUSR Vendrell’s Valedictory Report (Kabul: European Union, 2008).

5. Olivier Roy. Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 10.

6. U.S. Embassy Kabul to Department of State, Cable 4745, August 2, 1971, “Audience with King Zahir.” Released by the National Security Archive.

7. Thomas Schweich, “Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?” New York Times Magazine, July 27, 2008.

8. See, for example, United States Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, FM 3–24 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), pp. 1–13.

9. On the role of tribes, see Shahmahmood Miakhel, “The Importance of Tribal Structures and Pakhtunwali in Afghanistan: Their Role in Security and Governance,” in Arpita Basu Roy, ed., Challenges and Dilemmas of State-Building in in Afghanistan: Report of a Study Trip to Kabul (Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2008), pp. 97–110; David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 39–114.

10. Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2008: A Survey of the Afghan People (Kabul and San Francisco: Asia Foundation, 2008).

11. Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan—The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2001), p. 64.

12. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), p. 186.

13. Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland in Two Volumes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

14. Author interview with Ambassador Ronald Neumann, September 7, 2007.

Afterword

1. Author interview with U.S. Army soldier, September 17, 2009.

2. Author interview with White House official, November 2009.

3. Memorandum from Stanley A. McChrystal to the Honorable Robert M. Gates, Subject: COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, Reference: Secretary of Defense Memorandum 26 June 2009, August 30, 2009, p. 1-1.

4. Steven Simon, “Can the Right War Be Won? Defining American Interests in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 88, no. 4, July/August 2009, p. 134. Also see, for example, Rory Stewart, “How to Save Afghanistan,” Time, July 17, 2008.

5. Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, “Afghanistan: How Much is Enough?” Survival, vol. 51, no. 5, October–November 2009, pp. 47–68.

6. John J. Mearsheimer, “Hollow Victory,” Foreign Policy, November 2, 2009.

7. Letter from Matthew Hoh to Ambassador Nancy J. Powell, September 10, 2009.

8. Author interview with U.S. army soldier, November 5, 2009.

9. Memorandum from Investigating Officer to Commander, Combined Joint Task Force—101, Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, Subject: AR 15-6 Investigation Findings and Recommendations—Vehicle Patrol Base (VPB) Wanat Complex Attack and Casualties, 13 July 2008, August 13, 2008.

10. “Haqqani Says No Use of Negotiations; Vows to Defeat ‘Crusaders’ in Afghanistan,” in the 30th issue of Al-Samud monthly magazine, December 2008. The magazine was published on the Hanin Net Web site at www.hanein.info/vb.

11. Author interviews with British, Pakistani, and Afghan government officials, April and May 2009.

12. Author interviews with NATO government officials, September 2009.

13. Author interview with U.S. intelligence official, November 2009.

14. GEO TV (Pakistan) interview of Shaykh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (aka Shaykh Saeed), June 21, 2008.

15. See, for example, Stephen Biddle, “Is it Worth It?” American Interest, July–August 2009, vol. 4, no. 6.

16. Steve Coll, “The Case for Humility in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, October 16, 2009.

17. Author interview with Taliban commander, April 2009.

18. Hanin Net Web site, www.hanein.info/vb, December 2008.

19. Taliban (Afghanistan) press release, “Code of Conduct,” Voice of Jihad, August 6, 2009. The author received a copy of the press release from a Taliban contact.

20. Taliban (Afghanistan) press release, Voice of Jihad, April 29, 2009. The author received a copy of the press release from a Taliban contact.

21. La’iha, May 9, 2009. The La’iha, or code of conduct, is the Taliban’s comprehensive set of rules and regulations governing Taliban activity in Afghanistan.

22. Author interviews with Paktia tribal leaders, October 2009.

23. Memorandum from Stanley A. McChrystal to the Honorable Robert M. Gates, Subject: COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, Reference: Secretary of Defense Memorandum 26 June 2009, August 30, 2009, p. 1-1.

24. Author interview with senior U.S. military official, October 2009.

25. See, for example, Faisal Aziz, “Fear Grows of U.S. Strikes in Pakistan’s Baluchistan,” Reuters, October 12, 2009.

26. Author interview with Afghanistan cabinet minister, November 2009.

27. See, for example, James Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003).

28. See, for example, Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); M. Nazif Shahrani and Robert L. Canfield, eds., Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1984); David B. Edwards, Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

29. Author interview with Kandahar tribal leader, October 2009.

30. Author interview with senior U.S. State Department official, June 2009.

31. Mohammad Ehsan Zia, “Thoughts on a National Police Force,” November 2009. The author received a copy of the piece from the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.

32. Author interview with Minister of Interior Mohammad Hanif Atmar, September 2009.