Liberty: Incorporating "Four Essays on Liberty"

195-7. 238 'Final Retrospect' (IB), xxv, xxxi Floud, Jean Esther, xxviii Foreign Affairs (journal), 3, 55n Forster, Edward Morgan, 129, 306 Fosdick, Dorothy, 354 Four Essays on Liberty (IB): literature on, xxxi, 362; publishing history, ix-x, xiii, xv-xxv

Four Freedoms, The (TV series), xxvi Fourier, Francois Charles Marie, 87, 1 12 Fox, William Johnson, 223n France: anti-clerical governments, 84; trade unions in, 84; self-confidence in, i 87П; democracy m, 284 France, Anatole, 1 1 2 Franco, General Francisco, 148 Franklin, Benjamin, 2on fraternity: and liberty, 20 1

Frederick II (the Great), King of Prussia, 116, i76n

free will: and determinism, 5, 7, 1 i6n, i 24-5; and Stoics, 34; and differing values, 43-4; Mill on problem of, 250 freedom see liberty

Freedom and its Betrayal (IB), xi, ^re, 349n French Revolution: as historical landmark, 61; historical representation of, 142, 144; and desire for freedom, 208 Freud, Sigmund, 74, 78, 88, 130, 158, 242, 287

Friedrich, Carl Joachim, 356 'From Hope and Fear Set Free' (IB),

xx-xxi, xxiv, xxv, 361 Fromm, Erich, 34-5 Fry, Roger, 306 Furbank, Philip Nicholas, 363

Galileo Galilei, 287

Galipeau, Claude J., 363

Gambarara, Daniele, Stefano Gensini and

Amonino Pennisi, 363n Garden of Eden see paradise Gardiner, Patrick Lancaster, 4n, 270 Garrard, Graeme, 363 Gascoigne, Bamber, xxvi Genghis Khan, 20, 131, 143, 163 Germany: trade unions in, 84; anti-

liberalism in, 167; inner freedom in, 186; political theory in, 290, 294; nationalism,

347

Geyl, Pieter, 353 Gibbon, Edward, 1 18, 1 34 Gilgamesh, epic of, 105 Gladstone, William Ewart, 84 Gnosticism, 130, 158 Gobineau, Joseph Arthur, comte de, ioo God: existence of, 75 Godwin, William, 14, 129, 306 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 244, 321 Gomme, Arnold Wycombe, 34n Goodin, Robert Edward, and Philip Pettit, 357

Gorky, Maxim, 82n

government see authonty

Gowans, Christopher W., 3 59

Gracchi, the, 1 17

Grant, Robert, 316, 358

Gray, John Nicholas, x-xin, 3 59-60, 3 62,

363

Gray, Tim, 357

Great Britain: tolerance in, 90; see also England

Greece (ancient): and individual liberty, 32-4, 176, 186, 283-4; influence on

modern liberalism, 62; social life and individualism in, 287, 294-32^ gods in,

299, 303

Green, Thomas Hill, 4in, 53, i8on, i96,

³5^{6, 362} Griffin, James P., 359 Gross, Hyman, and Ross Harrison, 362n Grotius, Hugo, 62 Gutmann, Amy, 360

Hague Court, the, 6 1 Halevy, Elie, i38

Hampshire, Stuart Newton: xvi, xxi n, 4n, 16, i8n; and determinism, Ii6n; on Spinoza, 264 n; on self-prediction, 266-7; and self-determination, 271, 277; on IB's Jewish views, 361 happiness: as product of rational organisation, I i2; increase in, i 54; compulsion to, 183; Mill's belief in, 221-3, 225-7, 237; Bentham on, 225n, 226; as alternative to freedom, 342 Hardy, Henry Robert Dugdale, 364 Hare, Richard Mervyn, 26i Harris, Ian Colin, xxxi, 357 Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus, xvi, 4n, 278

Hausheer, Roger N., 3 59

Hayek, Friedrich August von, loin, 35 r

Hayward, Jack, Brian Barry and Archie

Brown, 356 Hayward, Max, xxin Hazlitt, William, ix Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: and Plekhanov, i9; and historiography, 20, 56n, 99, ioi, I i2-i3, i 56; and rationalism, 1 8 8; on understanding as freedom, i 89; and controlling domination, i 92; on obedience, I 96; on social conditioning, 2o6n; and harmony of values, 2 I 3, 289; argument for war, 235; and impediments to liberty, 256; and self-determination, 277, 338; reactions to, 288; on owl of Minerva, 31 i; and Kant, 3 i 2; influence and reputation, 32i; and moral goodness, 340; on economic corrosion, 343 Heine, Heinrich, i 67 Helen of Troy, 8

Helvetius, Claude Adrien: rationalism, 20; liberalism, 62; on freedom, I 69n; on slavery to passions, i 84; belief in finality, 234, 238 Heraclitus, 32: Herakles, 3 i 2

Herder, Johann Gottfried, 20, 95, ioo, 140П, I89, j6J

Herillus, 316

Herodotus, 33, 294, 299, 3 IO Herzen, Alexander Ivanovich, 5 m, 64, 228n

'Herzen and Bakunin on Individual

Liberty' (IB), xxv heteronomy, 179, 183-4, 185, i95-6, 202n Hilbert, David, 142 Himmler, Heinrich, 23 Hippias, 298

'Historical Inevitability' (IB), xxv, 352-3 history: causality in, 5, 27-9; E. H. Carr on impersonality of, i9-20, 26; and biography, 20; and judgement, 21-5, H5-20, 125-6, 129-35, 138, i4i, 145-53, I63-4; motives and intentions in, 26-7, 98, I 59-60; and factual integrity, 55-8, 118-19, 157, i62-3; bias and objectivity in, 56, 134, 136-7, I 39-40, 145-8, i50, I 52; and growth of institutions, 56, 98-9, 128; and conflicting forces, 61; and natural laws, 95-6, 104, 108-10, i26, 139-41; and individual human behaviour, 96-8, 125; 'march of' and mission in, ioi-io, 113-15, 119, 126-8; and progress, Ii2; responsibility and choice in, i2i-6, i28, I 57; impersonal factors in, 12 5; and human imperfection, I 33-6; as science, i 39-40; generalisations in, 141-2; structure and unification in, i 56-61, 290; moral categories and concepts in, 163-5; conflicts of ideas in, 168; Tolstoy on, 290 Hitler, Adolf: judgements on, 20, 22, Ii6, 131, i38, i44, 163; nationalism, loo; dogmatism, 345; genocides, 346 Hobbes, Thomas: on determinism, 9, 1 i6n; pessimistic view of life, 6o n; on seeking security, 73; on reality as knowable, 130; on free man, I70n; on desirability of controls, I 73; on sovereigns, 210; desire for security, 243; basic ideas, 289; Leviathan, 6on Holbach, Paul Heinrich Dietrich, Baron von, i09, 278; System of Nature, i i 6 Honderich, Edgar Dawn Ross (Ted), xxvi humanitarian liberalism: doctrine of, 59, 68, 79, 185, I99n, 236-7, 239; in ancient Greece, 287, 294-321 Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 227, 244, 318 Hume, David: on fact and value, 6n, 291; on determinism, 9, i i6n; doubts final solutions, 76; and self-determination, 261; beliefs and ideas, 3 12

Hus, John, 346

Huxley, Aldous, 44, 78, 143

hypnosis, I84n

Ibsen, Henrik, 89, 243 Idealist metaphysicians, 3 7 ideas: power of, 167-8 Ignatieff, Michael, 3 6o, 3 63 imperialism, 9 I

individual: definition and recognition of,

201-5; social behaviour, 236 individualism see humanitarian

individualism Isaiah Berlin Literary Trust, xxxi, 364 Isocrates, 3 I I

Jacobinism, 49, 73-4, I94 n, 208 James, William, 7-8, ii, i8i Jefferson, Thomas, I73 Jellinek, Georg, 33 Jesus Christ, 23 I, 249, 346 Johnson, Samuel, I I7n Jones, Arnold Hugh Martin, xxv Joseph II, Emperor of Austria, I76n Josephus, 308

justice: and determinism, 1 5; Mill on

importance of, 244 Justinian, 23n

Kannegiesser, Leonid, xxix Kant, Immanuel: on determinism, 7, 12, i6; maxims, 14; on men as natural objects, 18n; on laws of morality, 28; on Holy Will, 44; rationalism, 88; on 'crooked timber of humanity', 92, 216, 2 3 7; on freedom and obligation, I I 7n, I82n, 183-5, 202n; on real and ideal, I23n; on human autonomy, I62, 198-9, 277; on compulsion to happiness, 1 83; on human values, 184, 29I; individualism, I91, I98; on political liberty, I 94; and 'negative' liberty, I 99n; on paternalism, 203; Mill and, 245; and Hegel, 3 12; on human choice, 33 7; distinguishes realm of value and facts of nature, 35 0 n; Critique of Pure Reason, I67 Kateb, George, 360, 366 Katznelson, Ira, x, 363 Kaufman, Arnold Saul, 4on, 354 Kelly, Aileen M., JJin Kemp-Welch, Anthony, 82n Kennan, George: IB's letter to, xxix-xxx,

33^6-44^, J5² Kenny, Michael, 364

Kepler, Johannes, I62 Keynes, John Maynard, 306 Kierkegaard, S11ren, 6o, 67, 2 56 Kingsley, Charles, 247 Knapheis, Baillie, xvi knowledge: as liberating, I30— I, 190, 252, 255-9, 263-5 272-3, 277-8; in history, I32-6; and determinism, I39; sociology of, I 58; and predictability, 262; negative effects of, 274-6; advancement of, 277; Epicurus on, 304-5 Kocis, Robert Albert, 363 Koestler, Arthur, 344 Kolakowski, Leszek, 23cm Kraus, Oskar, and Roderick M. Chisholm, 35^Sn

Kropotkin, Prince Peter, 71 Kukuthas, Chandran, 357

Lactantius, 300 laissez-faire, 213, 327 La Mettrie, Julien Offray de, 96 Laplace, Pierre Simon, marquis de, 1 2, I 20 Larmore, Charles, 3 6o Laski, Harold Joseph, 344 Laslett, Peter, and others, 36n Lassalle, Ferdinand Johann Gottlieb, 228n Lassman, Peter, and Steve Buckler, 357 Lavoisier, Antoine Laurent, 287 law: as infraction of liberty, 4 in, I 7on, I95; and exercise of freedom, I74, 193-5, 198—9; obedience to, 183; natural, 2Io; restraints and curbs in, 215; in ancient Greece, 296, 299 League of Nations, 61, 84 Leff, Gordon, 27n

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, I09, 23on, ²⁶I 343

Lenin, Vladimir Il'ich: and irrationalism, 68, 72-3; authoritarianism, 69, 7 I-3; Utopianism, 73; on reality as knowable, I30; achievements, I 59; dogmatism, 345 Leon, Xavier, 5 in Leontiev, Konstantin, 67, 338 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, 89, i i 2, 243 Lessnoff, Michael, 3 64 'Letter to George Kennan' (IB), xxix-xxx Letwin, Shirley Robin, 3 6.2 Lewis, Clarence Irving, 20П liberal individualism see humanitari^an liberalism

liberalism: in IB's philosophical outlook, x; beliefs, 59, 62, 6 j; and historicism, 6 5; and irrationalists, 67; and freedom, 175, 286

liberty (freedom): IB's views on, xxvi; 'positive' and 'negative', 4, 3o-i, 35, 37-43. 48-5°, 53. 169, 175. 177 n, 178-9, 181, 186-7, '99n, 204, 207-8, 273, 325-7, 351, 358 ; in ancient Greece, 32-4, 294-321; and activity, 34-5; and authority, 3 5-7, 39, 49-50; and individualism, 3 8, 6°, 201-3; and State intervention, 38-9, 173; and choice,

9, 53, 272; conditions for exercise of,

7, s°; and security, 46; from domination, 48; value of, so-2; frontiers of, 52-3; and self-realisation, 53; and sovereignty, 75, 208-12; and economic strength, 8°; as illusion, 11°, 131; and causal laws, 124-5; influenced by knowledge, 130-1, 190, 252, 255-9, 263-5, 272-8; and coercion, 168-71, 174-5, 179, 210, 274; Mill on, 171, 174-6, 186, 206, 208, 211, 215, 224-5, 235-6, 243, 246, 251; nature and varieties of, 171-3, i77n; and socio­economic conditions, 172; and law, 174, 193-5; political, 176, 283-6; and democracy, 177; and equality, I 8on; and frustration of goals and desires, 181-3,

1 86-7; and concept of self, 1 82; for others, 191—3; and reason, 192-4; and social recognition, 202-6; and conflict and harmony of values, 212-13; restraints and curbs on, 214-15, 285; and self-determination, 259-61, 269-71, 275; as human attribute, 270-1 'Liberty' (IB), xxv, xxvi Lilla, Mark, 363 Lincoln, Abraham, 13 Linnet, Catherine, x, xiv-xv, xxii Livingstone, Richard Winn, 218, 242-3 Lloyd George, David, 84 Locke, John: influence, 62, 73, and determinism, i i6n; on freedom, 171; optimism, i 73; on law and freedom, 1 93, 284; humanism, 243; and self- determination, 26i Louis XIV, King of France, 347 Lukacs, Georg, 23°n Lukes, Steven, 357, 358, ]6o Lycophron, 298

Macaulay, Thomas Babington, Baron, i г8,

134, 138, 218-19 MacCallum, Gerald Cushing, jr, 3611, 355 McCloskey, Henry John, 355 Macfarlane, Les!ie John, 32n, 52, 53n, 354 Machiavelli, Niccolo, 293

Mack, Arien, xin, 35 8n Mack, Eric, 359

Mackinnon, Donald Mackenzie, 353 MacLennan, Bud, xv McNair, Lisa, 363n Macpherson, Crawford Brough, 355 Maistre, Joseph de, 5 in, 73-4, 78, 350 Mandel'berg, Viktor Evseevich ( pseud.

Posadovsky), 69, 70n, 71 Manent, Pierre, and others, 359n Marcus Aurelius, Roman Emperor, 231 Margalit, Avishai, 355, 361 Margalit, Edna, 355 Marmontel, Jean Francois, 221 Marx, Karl: historicism, 20, 56n, 99, 101, 112-13, 132, 137n, 158, 325; and speaking for oppressed, 64; recoils from despotism, 7 i; and class, 72; elitism, 73; on 'superstructure', 73; influence, 77; and totalitarianism, 78; and oppressive institutions, 87; morality, 1 30; and new animism, 1 58n; on understanding as key to freedom, 189--90; and controlling domination, 192, 328; and harmony of values, 213, 289; as prophet, 218, 227, 242; view of Mill, 229n, 247; and unity of theory and practice, 23°n; Bakunin attacks, 25m; and impediments to liberty, 256; and self-determination, 271, 338; and moral goodness, 340; on economic corrosion, 343; Communist Manifesto (with Friedrich Engels), 3 14; A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 219 Marxism: and determinism, 10; historicism, 19, 26, 57, 99, I 58; and application of reason, 66-9; revolutionary principles, 70; on withering away of State, 166; on individual freedom, I7°n; attraction of, 205; and unity of theory and practice, 23°n; and historical determinism, 325; origins of, 3 jz Masaryk, Thomas, 62 Maurras, Charles, 73 Mazzini, Giuseppe, 24 5 Megone, Christopher, 355 Menander, 3 1 1 metaphors, 1 06 n methodology, I49n Meyer, Sheldon, xv Michelct, Jules, 57, 95, 134, 244 Middle Ages, 151, 244 Mill, Harriet see Taylor, Harriet Mill, James, 219-22, 227, 234, 238, 244,

247

Mill, John Stuart: IB writes on, xiii-xiv, 3; and determinism, 1 1; and significance of human lives, 24; and State intervention, 38--9, 174, 318; on value judgements, 43, 291; quotes Comte, 8 m; ideals, 84, 89, 227; rationalism, 88; influence, 89; on freedom, 171, 174--6, 186, 206, 208, 211, 215, 224-5, 235-6, 243, 251; optimism, 173; critics and opponents, 175, 246; and necessary constraint, 1 96; on private and social life, 201, 236-7; and deprivation of human rights, 204; on social recognition, 205; and liberalism, 207, 236; on government by the people, 208-9; on 'permanent interests of man', 2ion; advocates 'experiments in living', 21 5, 225 n; background and upbringing, 219-22, 247; character, 22o-2, 248; search for ends of life, 22o-i, 226, 23o-i; beliefs and values, 221-4, 226, 228-34, 236-8, 242-5, 247, 25о 1, 284, 312, j6/-z; on happiness, 221-3, 225--6, 237; lack of prophetic vision, 227-8, 242; encourages dissent and diversity,

235, 239-42, 244; marriage, 229, 240; on toleration, 229; empiricism, 232, 238; and individualism, 236-7, 239; on effects of democracy, 24o-i, 243, 25in; reputation and influence, 247-8, 2 50; values intellect and ideas, 247-8; attitude to religion, 249-50; on social impediments to liberty, 256; and self- determination, 261; On Liberty, 218-19,

246-7

Miller, David, 357, 361 Milton, John, 233 Momigliano, Arnaldo, 357 monism, 4, 216

Montaigne, Michel Eyquem, seigneur de, 62, 76

Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, baron de: opposes tyranny, 53; historical interpretations, 158; on political liberty, 193; belief m variety, 238, 290; humanism, 243 Moore, George Edward, 306 morality: judgements, 4, 21-5, 110, 118, 126, 1 36, 139; scientific explanations of, 129; and responsibility, 1 31; in history, 163-5; and human choice, 337 Morris, William, 245 Moses, 316

Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus: The Magic

Flute, zoo Muhammad the Prophet, 1 1 5

Muller, Herbert Joseph, 300n

Mussolini, Benito, i 64n

'My Intellectual Path' (IB), xxv, xxviii-xxix

Nagel, Ernest, 8, io n, 28, 30, 353 Nagel, Thomas, 4n, 358, 359 Namier, Lewis Bernstein, 121 Napoleon I (Bonaparte), Emperor of ^France, ^ 159, ¹⁶3, 197, 347 nationalism: compatibility with

internationalism, 65; fanaticism, 88; dangers of, 347; see also romantic nationalism natural sciences: and search for causes, i 7; as model for political theory, 67; and attaining truth, 75; Comte on, 95; history as, 95--6, 108-9, 126; neutrality of view in, 141-2; generalisations in, 143, i44n; and unification theories, 1 56; nature and methods of, 165; and determinism, 322 Nazism, 339 Neoplatonism, I 58 New Deal (USA), 84, 91 New York Review of Books, xxvin, xxviii,

Newman, John Henry, Cardinal, 247 Newton, Isaac, 108, 142, 287 Nicholls, David, 4m, 356 Nietzsche, Friedrich: and social struggle, 64; irrationalism, 66; elitism, 73; and cosmic force, 1 13; opposes Victorian claustrophobia, 243; defiance, 338 Nikias, 33, 300

'Notes on Prejudice' (IB), xxx, 352 Nowell-Smith, Patrick Horace, ii6n, 261

Oakeshott, Michael, 350 obedience, 75, 168, 183, 195-8, 327-8 'objective reason', 196 objectivity, 147-9 Occam, William, 175, 176n Oenamaus, 26on

'On the Pursuit of the Ideal' (IB), xxvi oppression, 192, 328 Ongen, 14m original sin, 128

'Originality of Machiavelli, The' (IB), xxvii

Orwell, George, 78

O'Sullivan, Noel, 3 56

Otancs, 33

Ouyang Kang, xxvii

Owen, Robert, 1 12

Oxford Companion to Philosophy (ed. Honderich), xxvi

Packe, Michael St John, 247П Paine, Thomas, I 73, 284, J21 Palmerston, Henry John Temple, 3rd

Viscount, 224 Panaetius, 3 16, 3 I 9

paradise (Garden of Eden): as original

human State, I 5 5-6, 1 92 Parekh, Bhikhu, 364 Pareto, Vilfredo, 73, 1 58, 242 Parkes, Joseph, 223n Parmenides, 3 1 5

Passmore, John Arthur, i 2, 27n, 353 Pasteur, Louis, 22, 138 paternalism, 47, 183, 203 'pedantrocratie, Ia', 2$ in Pelczynski, Zbigniew Andrzej, and John

Gray, 356 Pericles, 33, 30o-I, 3 10, 319 Peripatetics, 307 Perl, Jeffrey, xxvi-xvii Persaeus, 3 1 6 persecution, 231, 235 pessimism, I 54 Pettit, Philip, 357 Phaleas, 299 philanthropy, 87 Philip of Macedon, 310 Philo of Alexandria, 3 1 6 philosophes, 158, 198, 216, 323 Planck, Max, 287 Plant, Raymond, 357

Plato: pessimism, 78; and authoritarianism, 88; on Sophocles, 185; on harmony of values, 2 1 3; moral and political ideas,

I 5, 287-8, 296-7, 309, ji 1-12, J I 5-1 8,

2 1; on causation and moral responsibility, 260; and self- determination, 271; on social life, 294-7, 300, 309, 3 14; and Sophists, 298, 300; and Stoic doctrines, 310; and Moses,

3 I 6; and rationalism, 3 27; Apology, 296; Crito, 296; Gorgias, 299; Laws, 296; Politicus, 296; Republic, 295, 302n Platomsm, 306

Plekhanov, Georgy Valentinovich, 19, 70,

^I3⁰ .

pluralism: centrality to IB, x, xxvii, 356; and differing goals, i 5 i; and conflict of values and aims, 212-17, 358-60; Mill and, 233, 235, 238, 244 Plutarch, 309 Pohlenz, Max, 3 16, 31 8 'Political Ideas in the Romantic Age' (IB), 349 n 'Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century'

(IB), xx, 352 political theory: nature of, 168; changes in,

29o-2 Pollard, Sydney, ion

Popper, Karl Raimund, x, ioon, ioin, 265,

267, 287, jfi,jf3 Posadovsky ( pseud.) see Mandel'berg,

Viktor Evseevich Posidonius, 3 I, 276-7, 307, 316 positivism, 20, 80

power: control of, 54; and compromise,

64; see also authority Power of Ideas, The (IB), xxviii, 361 praise and blame: determinism and, 9-10, ij-i6, 122, 269, 324; effect of, 28; and historical inevitability, 115, 122, 146; and knowledge, i 3 1-2, 150; and self- determination, 263 Preen, Friedrich von, 2on prejudice, 345-7 Priam, King, 307 privacy, 176 Procrustes, 216 Prodicus, 298, J2I

progress: and human improvement, 62-4; concept of, 89; technological, 91; in ideas, 2 87-8 Proper Study of Mankind, The (IB), xxv,

xxvin, xxvii Protagoras, 298, 3 I 5 Protestantism, I 8 5 Proudhon, Pierre Joseph, 228n Proust, Marcel, 142 psychology: laws of, I 08-9 'Purpose Justifies the Ways, The' (IB),

xxiv, xxviii Pushkin, Alexander Sergeevich, 171 Putnam, Hilary, 357 Pythagoras, 3 20

quietism, 1 86n, 1 87n Quinton, Anthony Meredith, 357 Quixote, Don, 340

Racine, Jean, 142 Rainborow, Thomas, 202n Ranke, Leopold von, 57, 95, 138 rationalism: and political solutions, 62, 66-7, 74-5, 76, 191-3; and obstacles to self-realisation, 1 88; and natural laws, i 90; and behaviour, 2 53-4, 2 56, 264-5; in ancient Greece, 306; and exercise of freedom, 3 27; see also reason Rawls, John, 358

Raz, Joseph, 358

reason: and irrational influences, 6i; Marxist belief in, 66-9; and liberation, I 3o-i, 190; and unification theories, 1 56, 29o-i; and individualism, 185, 190, i 98-9; and coercion, 1 97; see also rationalism Reformation, 176 relativism, 1 52, i 55

religion: persecution of, 2 3 i; Mill's attitude

to, 249-50; in ancient Greece, 298-9, ³⁰³

Renaissance, Italian, 62, 112, 176, 290, 319 Renouvier, Charles Bernard, 1 1 representation (political), 3; see also

democracy responsibility: and determinism, 6, 28-9, Ji6n, 117, 121-2, 128, 131, 136, 163, 164, 323; and conscience, 48n; moral, 260, 3 3 8; and self-prediction, 266-7 revolutions: and individual responsibility,

163; causes and aims, 207 Rickman, Hans Peter, 28n rights: natural, 72, 210; and society, 191; as absolute, 211; and freedom, 285-6; unconsidered in ancient Greece, 3 I 9 Riley, Jonathan, 360, 366 Robert Waley Cohen Memorial Lecture

^(l959^ ^xii Roberts, Colin, xiii, xvin Robespierre, Maximilien, 92, 144, 167, 345 n

Robson, Ann Provost, John Mercel Robson and Bruce L. Kinzer, 362 romantic nationalism, 59-61, So 'Romantic Revolution, The' (IB), xxvii romanticism, 88; and history, I I 3; and

political theory, 294; IB's views on, 350 Rome (ancient), 102, 117-18, 176, 186,

3'2 3^J9 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 84 Roots of Romanticism, The (IB), xxvii, 350, 362

Ross, William David, 358 Rostovtzeff, Michael I., 321 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques: on human chains, 32, 5in; Heme on, 167; on ill will, 170; on obedience to laws, 183; influence on liberal humanism, 185; on true freedom, 185; individualism, 191, 198; on harmonious society, 1 94; on austerity of laws of liberty, 208; Constant opposes, 209; Mill and, 245; on barbarian innocence, 275; reactions to, 288; on human conduct, 350

Ruskin, John, 245, 247 Russell, Bertrand: on understanding, xxix, 288; and determinism, I 1 6n; on fundamental beliefs, 24 5; and self- determination, 261; revolutionary ideas, 287; knowledge of, 315 Russian Social Democratic Party, 2nd

Congress (1903), 69 Russian Thinkers (IB), xxv Ryan, Alan James, 354, 355, 362, 364

Sabine, George Holland., 3 1 8, pon, 32 i,

Saint-Simon, Claude-Henri, comte de: on human fulfilment, 71; prophesies materialist government, 8 5-6, 1 66; Utopianism, 1 I 2, 23 8; on obedience to general laws, 1 29; and finality, 227; Mill and, 242n, 248 Sainte-Beuve, Charles-Augustin, 20, 92n Sandel, Michael, 3 57 Santayana, George, xxx Savigny, Friedrich Karl von, 57 Sceptics (Greek sect), 3 I 5, 3 1 9 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von,

99, 158, 167, 219 Schlick, Moritz, 9, u6n, 261 Schoeck, Helmut, and James Wilhelm

Wiggins, 356 Schofield, Malcolm, 302n Schopenhauer, Arthur, 66, 1 23n, 154, i 87,

261, 271, 278 Schumpeter, Joseph Alois, 2i7n science see natural sciences self: and attainment of freedom, 1 84-5; see

also individual self-denial, 1 86

self-determination, 259-71, 275 self-fulfilment, 2 5 3-4 self-government, I 77 self-knowledge, 244 self-mistery, 178-82 self-prediction, 26 5-7 self-realisation, 187-9 I Sen, Amartya Kumar, 7n, 8-9, 15, J 53,

358a Seneca, 62

Sense of Reality, The (IB), xxvii Sextus Empiricus, 76, 307n Shackleton, Robert, 22 5 n Shaw, George Bernard, I 12 Sheldon, Olive, xiii Shelley, Percy Bysshe, 306 Shklar, Judith, jjj, 3j6a Siedentop, Larry, 363 Simhony, Avital, 356

Simon, Richard, xv

slavery, 179, i 84, 210-1 I, 273-4

Slavophils, 289

Smerdis, pseudo-, 33

Smith, Adam, 79, i 73

Smith, Geoffrey W., 355

social Darwinism, 37

social democracy, 68, 9I

socialism: beliefs, 59, 65; and irrationalists,

67; Mill and, 228П sociology: laws of, 108-9, 124, 159, 161-2 Socrates: disciples, 33, 3 i 2; accepts Athenian law, 49, 295; on virtue and knowledge, 2020; killed, 231, 295, 346; accused of corrupting young men, 296; Sophist opponents, 298; on learning not to mind, 3 o 5; Antisthenes and, 3 i 2; opposes Aristippus, 3 I 3; and unworthiness of political participation, 3I9

Sophists, 298-9, 310, 3 I 5 Sophocles, i 8 5, 3 I I Sorel, Georges, 67, 158 sovereignty: and liberty, 75, 208-I2 Soviet Union: and central plan, 82 Sparta, 207, 294, 296, 30o-I Spencer, Herbert, 20, 3 8, 234, 247 Spengler, Oswald, 99, 101, 130, 289 Spinoza, Benedictus de: on determinism, 9, I 3, 15, I 29, 278; influence, 62; rationalism, 88, I 88; on reality as knowable, 130; and controlling domination, 192; on children's obedience, 193; humanism, 243; on knowledge, 259; on self-determinism, 264, 271, 277; and positive freedom, 3 56; Ethics, 264 Spitz, David, xiiin, 43, 46, 354 Stalin, Josef Vissarionovich: historical statements on, 20, 148; regime, 55n; on creative artists as 'engineers of human soul', 82 n, 328; judgements on, 163; dogmatism, 345 Stallworthy, Jon, xi, xv-xvii, xix-xxii, xxiv State, the: intervention by, 3 8-9, 6 5, 76, 90, 171, 283-4, 318; growth in responsibilities, 80; withering away of, I 66, 342; authoritarianism, i 98; service to, 206; Mill on stultifying effects of, 245; social life in, 295; in ancient Greece, 300-3, 306, 3 I 8-19 Steinberg, Jonny, 363 Steiner, Hillel, j 56

Stendhal (pseudonym of Marie-Henri Beyle), 143

Stephen, James Fitzjames, 175, 246, 358 stereotypes (national), 346-7 Sterling, Edward, 248n Sterling, John, i74n, 205n, 244n, 248 Stirner, Max, 6o Stocker, Michael, 358 Stoics: and determinism, 5, 7, 16, 29, i 54; and security against conditioning, I 8n; and freedom, 31-2, 34, 186, 198; and acceptance, 154, 276; and harmony of theory and practice, 230n; on knowledge as liberating, 252-3, 256-7; on causation, 260; and self-determination, 261, 271; and rationality, 264, 306-7; on saving the soul, 303; doctrines and influence, 306-13, 316, 319-20; on pleasure as enemy, 313; oriental origins, 316; and suppression of desire, 326 Storrs Lectures (Yale University, i 962), xv,

xxvu Strauss, Leo, 356

suffering: caused by ignorance, i i i

superstition: philosophical, I 6-i 8

surrealism, 8 8

Sutcliffe, Peter H., xv

Swift, Adam, 366

Swift, Jonathan, 78

Swinburne, Algernon Charles, xxiv

Switzerland, 90

syndicalism, 68

Tacitus, 57

Taine, Hippolyte, 130, 134, 247 Talleyrand, Charles Maurice de, 92 Tallis, Raymond, 363 Talmon, Jacob Leib, j 5 r Tanner, Michael, 364 Tarn, William Woodthorpe, 309 Tawney, Richard Henry, 17 m, 215 Taylor, Charles, 355, 358, 359^, 3⁶3 Taylor, Harriet (later wife of J. S. Mill),

228n, 229, 238, 240, 248 Taylor, Helen, 249 technocrats, 2 1 6, 242n teleology, 105, 107-9, 1 18 Tennyson, Alfred, 1st Baron, 62 theocrats, 2 I 6

theology: and attaining truth, 75 Theophrastes, 3 20

theory and practice: unity of, 230 n Thomas, William, 362 Thompson, Dennis Frank, 362 thought: as human attribute, 292-3 Thrasymachus, 298-300 Three Critics of the Enlightenment (IB), xm, 350

'Three Turning-Points in the History of

Political Thought' (IB), xxvii Thucydides, 57, 148, 294, 3Oo-i, 311 Times Higher Educational Supplement, ix Times Literary Supplement, 30П, 343 Tkachev, Petr Nikitich, 71 Tocqueville, Alexis de: and State

intervention, 3 8; and social struggle, 64; rationalism, 88; on freedom, 171, 211-19; death, 2 19; prophecies, 227; Mill admires, 228; belief in variety, 238; on American democracy, 24I toleration, 9c, 92, 218-19, 229, 24c Tolstoy, Count Lev Nikolaevich, 72, I 29,

3 135^ ²9^c totalitarianism, 78, 83, 286, 3 51 Toynbee, Arnold Joseph, 99, 105, 158, 289 trade unionism, 68, 84 Treitschke, Heinrich von, I i 8 Trotsky, Leon, 55, 134 truth: theology and, 75; in political theory,

29o-2; and deliberate deception, 339 Tuell, Anne Kimball, 248n Turgenev, Ivan Sergeevich: Dnevnik lishnego cheloveka ('Diary of a superfluous man'), 343n; Fath""s and Children, 86 Turgot, Anne Jacques Robert, baron de

l'Aulne, 1 53 'Two Concepts of Liberty' (IB), x, xii, xvin, xxv, xxxi, 30, 50n, 352, 354, З⁵⁶, 357, 3J8, 36o-i tyranny, 53-4, 208--9, 2 I 4

Ulam, Adam, xiv

understanding: and historical process, i 53-4; as key to freedom, i 89--90, 26 5; of basic ideas, 288; see also knowledge United Nations, 84 United States of America: and State responsibilities, 80; political issues in, 8 3-4; materialism, 88; self-confidence in, i87n; democracy in, 241, 284 Uritsky, Moise Solomonovich, xxix, 333-5, 35¹

Utilitarianism: on moulding human material, 184; on morality, 198, 342; Mill's attitude to, 221-2, 226-7, 239,

245, 25c; Bentham advocates, 224; belief in simple truths, 235, 25c; refuted by human achievers, 3 3 8 Utopianism, I 12, I 5 3, 166

Vaihinger, Hans, i23n value judgements: and determinism, 4, 8-9, 13, 21-5, 28, 116-19, 136-7; Mill on, 43; varieties of, 44-6 values: harmonisation of, 212-14, 2 16-17, 2.9²

Vico, Giambattista, 95, i4on

Vico and Herder (IB), x

Villey, Michel: Legons d'histoire de Ia

philosophie du droit, i76n Voltaire, Fran,;ois Marie Arouet de: rationalism, 2.c; historical sense, 57; influence, 89; and toleration, 1 17; on liberty, 284

Waelder, Robert, 3in

Walzer, Michael, 358, 360, 361

Warner, Stuart D., 358П

Weber, Max, 2.c, 48n, i58n

Wells, Herbert George, 20, I 12, 143, 242n

West, David, 356

White, Morton, 13 n, 14-15, 29-30, 353 Wilberforce, William, 247 Wilbur, George B., and Warner

Muensterberger, 3in Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen, 3 58, 3 59,

364

Wilson, Woodrow, 62, 84

Wollheim, Richard, 3on, 354, 359, 361, 362

Woolf, Virginia, 3c6

Wordsworth, William, 221

World Spirit, 98

Xenophon, 3 1 3n, 318

Zeitgeist, 130

Zelinsky, Kornely L., 82n

Zeller, Eduard, 3 16

Zeno, 130, 302, 306-10, 312, 316-17,

3¹9^-2.^c Zionism, 360 Zola, Emile, 143

¹ Quoted without a reference in German, in the article on Fichte in Entsiklo- pedicheskii slovar' (St Petersburg, 189^1907), vol. 36, p. 50, col. 2, and in Xavier Leon, Fichte et son temps (Paris, 1922-7), vol. 1, p. 47; untraced in Fichte, and possibly not correctly attributed to him. Ed.

¹ I do not, of course, attribute this view either to Hegel or to Marx, whose doctrines are both more complex and far more plausible; only to the terribles simplificateurs among their followers.

III

And yet to a casual observer of the politics and the thought of the twentieth century it might at first seem that every idea and movement typical of our time is best understood as a natural development of tendencies already prominent in the nineteenth century. In the case of the growth of international institutions, for instance, this seems a truism. What are the Hague Court, the old League of Nations and its modern successor, the numerous pre­war and post-war international agencies and conventions for political, economic, social and humanitarian purposes - what are they, if not the direct descendants of that liberal internationalism -

¹ 'Locksley Hall' ( 1 842), line 128.

. .. those vast impersonal forces . . . T. S. Eliot¹

I

Writing some ten years ago² in his place of refuge during the German occupation of northern Italy, Bernard Berenson set down his thoughts on what he called the 'Accidental View of History': they 'led me', he declared, 'far from the doctrine, lapped up in my youth, about the inevitability of events and the Moloch still devouring us today, "historical inevitability". I believe less and less in these more than doubtful and certainly dangerous dogmas, which tend to make us accept whatever happens as irresistible and foolhardy to oppose.'³ The famous critic's words are particularly timely at a moment when there is, at any rate among philosophers of history, if not among historians, a tendency to return to the ancient view that all that is, is ('objectively viewed') best; that to explain is ('in the last resort') to justify; or that to know all is to forgive all; ringing fallacies (charitably described as half-truths) which have led to special pleading and, indeed, obfuscation of the issue on a heroic scale.

This is the theme on which I should like to speak; but before doing so I must express my gratitude for the honour done me by the invitation to deliver this, the first of the Auguste Comte Memorial Lectures. For, indeed, Comte is worthy of commemoration and praise. He was in his own day a very celebrated thinker, and if his works are today seldom mentioned, at any rate in this country, that is partly due to the fact that he has

Notes towards the Definition of Culture (London, 1948), p- 88.

² This was written in 1953.

3 Bernard Berenson, Rumour and Reflection: 1941:1944 (London, 1952), p. 116 (entry dated 11 January 1943).

¹ I do not wish here to enter into the question of what such procedures are, for example, what is meant by speaking of history as a science - whether the methods of historical discovery are inductive, or 'deductive-hypothetical', or analogical, or to what degree they are or should be similar to the methods of the natural sciences, and to which of these methods, and in which of the natural sciences; for there plainly exists a greater variety of methods and procedures than is usually provided for in textbooks on logic or scientific method. It may be that the methods of historical research are, in at least some respects, unique, and some of them are more unlike than like those of the natural sciences; while others resemble given scientific techniques, particularly when they approach such ancillary enquiries as archaeology or palaeography or physical anthropology. Or again they may depend upon the kind of historical research pursued - and may not be the same in demography as in history, in political history as in the history of art, in the history of technology as in the history of religion. The 'logic' of various human studies has been insufficiently examined, and convincing accounts of its varieties with an adequate range of concrete examples drawn from actual practice are much to be desired.

¹ We are further told that we belong to such wholes and are 'organically' one with them, whether we know it or not; and that we have such significance as we do only to the degree to which we are sensitive to, and identify ourselves with, these unanalysable, imponderable, scarcely explicable relationships; for it is only in so far as we belong to an entity greater than ourselves, and are thereby carriers of 'its' values, instruments of 'its' purposes, living 'its' life, suffering and dying for 'its' richer self-realisation, that we are, or are worth, anything at all. This familiar line of thought should be distinguished from the no less familiar but less ethically charged supposition that men's outlooks and behaviour are largely conditioned by the habits of other past and present members of their society; that the hold of prejudice and tradition is very strong; that there may be inherited characteristics both mental and physical; and that any effort to influence human beings and to judge their conduct must take such non-rational factors into account. For whereas the former view is metaphysical and normative (what Karl Popper calls 'essentia- list'), the latter is empirical and descriptive; and while the former is largely found as an element in the kind of ethical or political anti-individualism held by romantic nationalists, Hegelians and other transcendentalists, the latter is a sociological and psychological hypothesis which doubtless carries its own ethical and political implications, but rests its claim on observation of empirical facts, and can be confirmed or refuted or rendered less or more plausible by it. In their

I

To coerce a man is to deprive him of freedom - freedom from what? Almost every moralist in human history has praised free­dom. Like happiness and goodness, like nature and reality, it is a term whose meaning is so porous that there is little interpretation that it seems able to resist. I do not propose to discuss either the history of this protean word or the more than two hundred senses of it recorded by historians of ideas. I propose to examine no more than two of these senses - but they are central ones, with a great

3 'A free man', said Hobbes, 'is he that ... is not hindered to do what he has a will to.' Leviathan, chapter 21: p. 146 in Richard Tuck's edition (Cambridge, 1991). Law is always a fetter, even if it protects you from being bound in chains that are heavier than those of the law, say some more repressive law or custom, or arbitrary despotism or chaos. Bentham says much the same.

III

The retreat to the inner citadel

I am the possessor of reason and will; I conceive ends and I desire to pursue them; but if I am prevented from attaining them I no longer feel master of the situation. I may be prevented by the laws

² Kant's psychology, and that of the Stoics and Christians too, assumed that some element in man - the 'inner fastness of his mind' - could be made secure against conditioning. The development of the techniques of hypnosis, 'brain­washing', subliminal suggestion and the like has made this a priori assumption, at least as an empirical hypothesis, less plausible.

¹ It is worth remarking that those who demanded - and fought for - liberty for the individual or for the nation in France during this period of German quietism did not fall into this attitude. Might this not be precisely because, despite the despotism of the French monarchy and the arrogance and arbitrary behaviour of privileged groups in the French State, France was a proud and powerful nation, where the reality of political power was not beyond the grasp of men of talent, so that withdrawal from battle into some untroubled heaven above it, whence it could be surveyed dispassionately by the self-sufficient philosopher, was not the only way out? The same holds for England in the nineteenth century and well after it, and for the United States today.

¹ Or, as some modern theorists maintain, because I have, or could have, invented them for myself, since the rules are man-made.

¹ ibid., p. 578. ² ibid., p. 576.

¹ ibid., pp^ 578, 580.

1 Chapter 7: vol. I, p. 259, in Collected Works of ]ohn Stuart Mill, ed. J. M. Robson and others (Toronto/London, 1963-91). Subsequent references to Mill's writings are followed by a reference to this edition by volume and page in the form CW i 259, except that references to On Liberty are given by chapter and a page reference to vol. I 8 of this edition, thus: L 4/2 8 1.

I

Everyone knows the story of John Stuart Mill's extraordinary education. His father, James Mill, was the last of the great raisonneurs of the eighteenth century, and remained completely

Bentham used this phrase frequently: for examples see his 'Legislator of the

¹ Democracy m America, part 2 (1840), book 4, chapter 6, 'What Sort of Despotism Democratic Nations Have to Fear': vol. 2, p. 3 19, in the edition by Phillips Bradley of the translation by Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen (New York, 1945).

¹ Aereopagtta (1644): vol. 2, p. 561, in Complete Prose Works of John Milton (New Haven and London, 1953-82); Milton's spelling has been modernised in the quotation.

¹ L 2/250. The concluding phrase is quoted from 'a cotemporary [sic] author' identified neither by Mill nor by the editor of CW xviii, J. M. Robson.

¹ L 3/274-5, 269 ('In this age ... ' ). ² L 2/240 note. ³ L 4/287.

¹ Diary, 26 March 1854: CW xxvii 664.

⁵ L 4/286.

¹ Principles of Political Economy, book 2, chapter 1: CW ii 209.

³ Letter to his wife Harriet, 15 January 1855 (Mill's emphasis): CW xiv 294.

• L 2/242. ⁷ L 2/229. ' L 4/282.

i

Does knowledge always liberate? The view of the classical Greek philosophers, shared by much, though perhaps not all, Christian theology, is that it does. 'And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.'¹ Ancient Stoics and most modern rationalists are at one with Christian teaching on this issue. According to this view freedom is the unimpeded fulfilment of my true nature - unimpeded by obstacles whether external or internal. In the case of the passage from which I have quoted, the freedom in question (I follow Festugiere's interpretation on this point) is freedom from sin, that is, from false beliefs about God, nature and myself, which obstruct my understanding. The freedom is that of self-realisation or self-direction - the realisation by the individual's own activity of the true purposes of his nature (however such purposes or such natures are denied), which is frustrated by his misconceptions about the world and man's place in it. If to this I add the corollary that I am rational - that is, that I can understand or know (or at least form a correct belief about) why I do what I do, that is, distinguish between acting (which entails making choices, forming intentions, pursuing goals) and merely behaving (that is, being acted upon by causes the operations of which may be unknown to me or unlikely to be affected by my wishes or attitudes) - then it will follow that knowledge of the relevant facts - about the external world, other persons and my own nature - will remove impediments to my policies that are due to ignorance and delusion.

Philosophers (and theologians, dramatists, poets) have differed widely about the character of man's nature and its ends; what kind and degree of control of the external world is needed in order to achieve fulfilment, complete or partial, of this nature and its ends; whether such a general nature or objective ends exist at all; and

1 Gospel according to St John, chapter 8, verse 32.

¹ Stuart Hampshire, 'Spinoza and the Idea of Freedom', Proceedings of the British Academy 46 (i960), 195-215.

II

I do not, of course, wish to deny that when we say that a man is free - or freer than he was before - we may be using the word to denote moral freedom, or independence, or self-determination. This concept, as has often been pointed out, is far from clear: the central terms - willing, intention, action, and the related notions - conscience, remorse, guilt, inner versus outer compulsion, and so on - stand in need of analysis, which itself entails a moral psychology that remains unprovided; and in the meanwhile the notion of moral independence - of what is, or should be, independent of what, and how this independence is achieved -

¹ op. cit. (p. 266 above, note i), p. 92.

¹ See p. 2 55 above.

II

The great moments are those when one world dies and another succeeds it. This is marked by a change in the central model. Great moments of transformation occurred, for example, when the cyclical laws of the Greeks were succeeded by the ascending straight line, the historical teleology, of the Jews and Christians; or when teleology, in its turn, was overthrown by the causal- mathematical model of the seventeenth century; or when a priori constructions yielded to methods of empirical discovery and verification. There are those who, like Condorcet or Hegel, Buckle or Marx, Spengler or Toynbee, claim to be able to perceive a single pattern of development in this succession of human perspectives. I do not wish to maintain that such ambitious efforts to reduce the vast variety of conscious human experience to one enormous dominant pattern are necessarily doomed to failure; I confine myself to saying merely that the three great crises which I shall discuss are not satisfactorily explained by the hypotheses of any of

² Politics i}}7a27; compare also Ntcomachean Ethics i i8oa24-9 and Meta­physics I075ai9.

з Hippolytus 421-2; Ion 672-5; Phoenissae 390-3; Temenidae fr. 737 Nauck.

⁵ Herbert J. Muller, Freedom in the Ancient World (London, 1962), p. 168.

⁶ Aristotle, Politics 1 3ioa3 3; Euripides, fr. 8 8 3 Nauck.

¹ Fr. 551 Usener: literally 'Escape notice having lived.'

Bion fr. i6a Kindstrand.

See under Epicurus fr. 551 Usener (p. 327, lines 9-10).

Epicurus fr. 6. 71 Arrighetti.

ibid. fr. 247.

¹ Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, op. cit. (p. 85 above, note 1), vol. 4, pp. 479, 493; cf. eid., Collected Works (London, 1975- ), vol. 2, pp. 502, 519.

1 Lloyd-Jones-Parsons, Supplementum Hellenisticum, frr. 351, 352. 4-5.

I Jeremiah 3 i: 29-34; Ezekiel i 8: 20, 14: i 2-20, 33: 1-20; Psalms 40, 50, 51.

¹ Francis Macdonald Cornford, Before and After Socrates (Cambridge, 1932), p. i°9.

George H. Sabine, A History of Political Thought, 4th ed. (Fort Worth etc., ^Г973Х p. 13¹

ibid.

² M. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World (Oxford, 1941), p. 1095-

1 Reprinted above, pp. 166-217.

i

The story of which I am going to tell is about the murder of Uritsky, Minister of Justice of Soviet Russia in the year i919.

Already in the year i 9 i 8 the people in Russia, and its capital Petrograd especially, were very depressed by the Bolsheviks, who terrorised the people to the utmost. One of the most noble families in Petrograd was the family of the Ivanovs. It consisted of Andrew Ivanov, an old man aged sixty-four, his son Peter, a handsome and brave young man, and an old servant named Vasily. Although very depressed, they had a cosy little home in which peace and friendships reigned undisturbed, until a sudden shock came about to destroy their well-earned happiness.

It was a bright cold winter morning. The sun appeared as a little red disc on the clear sky. All nature seemed to be enjoying itself, lapped by the bright rays of the sun. A sudden knock at the door was heard and the next moment an officer and two soldiers entered the Ivanovs' little hall.

'Is Andrew Ivanov living here?' asked the officer curtly.

'I am Andrew Ivanov, and am at your service,' answered the old man quietly.

'Take him away,' ordered the officer, signing to his soldiers. 'This man is guilty before the law for hiding some diamonds in his house. Search the house instantly and if you find any precious stones you will give them to me.'¹

Peter, who looked at the scene with bewilderment and anger, suddenly dealt the officer a blow that sent him on to the floor, while himself, quick as a lightning, jumped out of the window and soon was out of sight. The soldiers followed the example of their commander, who rose from the ground and went for Peter. But the blow over his head made him fall over the first stone that lay in his

¹ Once when the Berlins' flat in Petrograd was searched the maid successfully hid the family jewels in the snow on the balcony.

New College, Oxford 13 February 1951

Dear George,

I have ill rewarded your wonderful letter by leaving it so long unanswered. I received it towards the end of term here when I was genuinely worn out by teaching and examining, and scarcely capable of taking anything in, but even then it moved me profoundly. I took it off with me to Italy and read it and re-read it, and kept putting off the day on which I would write an answer worthy of it, but no such day ever came. I began many letters but each seemed trivial, and what the Russians call 'suetlivo'i - full of hurrying sentences, scattered and moving in all directions at once, inappropriate either to the theme or to your words about it; but I cannot bear (if only because of the feelings which your letter excited in me) to say nothing merely because I am not sure how much I have to say. So you must forgive me if what I write is chaotic, not merely in form but in substance, and does little justice to your thesis. I shall simply go on and hope for the best, and beg you to pardon me if I am wasting your time.

I must begin by saying that you have put in words something which I believe not only to be the centre of the subject but something which, perhaps because of a certain reluctance to face the fundamental moral issue on which everything turns, I failed to say; but once forced to face it, I realise both that it is craven to sail round it as I have done, and moreover that it is, in fact, what I myself believe, and deeply believe, to be true; and more than this: that upon one's attitude to this issue which you have put very

¹ 'In a fussy or bustling manner.' (All notes to this letter are editorial.)

¹ Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, book 5, chapter 4: vol. 1, p. 287, in the Penguin Classics edition, trans. David Magarshack (Harmondsworth, 1958): 'too high a price has been placed on harmony. We cannot afford to pay so much for admission. And therefore I hasten to return my ticket of admission.'

II

Another source of avoidable conflict is stereotypes. Tribes hate neighbouring tribes by whom they feel threatened, then ration­alize their fears by representing them as wicked or inferior, or absurd or despicable in some way. Yet these stereotypes alter sometimes quite rapidly: Take the i 9^th century alone: In, say, 1 840 the French are thought of as swashbuckling, gallant, immoral, militarized, men with curly moustachios, dangerous to women, likely to invade England in revenge for Waterloo; the Germans are beer drinking, rather ludicrous provincials, musical, full of misty metaphysics, harmless but somewhat absurd. By i 87 i the Germans are Uhlans storming through France incited by the terrible Bismarck - terrifying Prussian militarists filled with national pride etc. France is a poor, crushed, civilized land, in need of protection from all good men, lest its art literature are crushed underheel by the terrible invaders.

The Russians in the 1 9^th century are crushed serfs, + darkly

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¹ For assessments of Berlin's writings on Russia, see Aileen Kelly, Toward Another Shore (New Haven and London, 1998: Yale University Press), introduc­tion and chapter 1, and her 'A Revolutionary Without Fanaticism', in Mark Lilla, Ronald Dworkin and Robert B. Silvers (eds), The Legacy of Isaiah Berlin (New York, 2001: New York Review Books), 3-30.

³ London, 1945: Routledge; Princeton, 1950: Princeton University Press.

⁴ London, 1952: Seeker and Warburg; published in the USA as The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy (Boston, 1952: Beacon Press).

² American Political Science Review 57 No 4 (1963), 841-54.

3 Oxford and Cambridge, Mass., 1994: Blackwell.

⁵ Political Studies 19 (1971), 81-6.

⁶ ibid. 29 (1991), 303-20.

⁷ ibid. 41 (1993), 284-96.

¹⁰ Oxford, 1999: Clarendon Press/The British Academy.

¹¹ Princeton, 1961: Van Nostrand, 137-57. It was reprinted in his The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism, ed. Thomas L. Pangle (Chicago and London, 1989: University of Chicago Press).

i London Review of Books, 5-18 November 1981, 6-7 (with Berlin's response in the same number, 7-8, and correspondence, 3-16 June 1982, 5).

' Rantan 17 (1997), 83-95.

⁴ In The Legacy of Isaiah Berlin, 3 1-42.

⁸ In The Idea of Freedom, I 5 3-74^

¹ New Left Review No 50 Quly-August 1968), 3-57, esp. 25-8.

² In his A Zone of Engagement (London and New York, 1992: Verso), 23^50.

3 Encounter 43 No 4 (October 1974), 67-72.

⁴ Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999), 345-62.

5 Oxford, 1982: Martin Robertson; Baltimore, Md, 1982: Johns Hopkins University Press, chapter 2.

6 London, 1990: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; New York, 1990: Random House, esp. 274-9.

' London, 1999: HarperCollins; Chicago, 1999: University of Chicago Press, ²⁰9^-3²-

^eSpectator, 15 November 1997, 16-17.

' In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (London and New York, 1998: Routledge), vol. 1, 750-3.

¹⁰ In his English Pasts (Oxford and New York, 1999: Oxford University Press), ¹95^-209.

" Oxford and Malden, Mass., 1999: Blackwell, chapter 8.

¹² Political Studies 48 (2000), 1026-39.

¹³ Cambridge and New York, 1980-2001: Cambridge University Press, vol. 3, 646-50.

'4 This list was updated (again) in the most recent printing (Princeton, 2001: Princeton University Press).

'5 Australian Financial Review, 30 June 2000, 4-5; also available on the website.

[1] In this view I differ, in company with others, from John Gray, author of the

[2] The manner of the book's creation would surely have been roundly censured in a Research Assessment Exercise.

[3] 'They' must have been Maurice Bowra, who had introduced me to the work of the Russian poet Alexander Blok (i88o-i92i), and Max Hayward, with whom I was then translating the title-poem of what would become Alexander Blok, The Twelve and Other Poems, trans. Jon Stallworthy and Peter France (London, 1970). j .s.

[4] This appears as note I to p. I 8 below. Hampshire comments when he sends in the note: 'the alien footnote is a new literary genre' (deployed again in the previous note). Not to be outdone, I have made use of another rare genre - the alien interpolation - by asking Jon Stallworthy to add the preceding passage on his memory of his definitive meeting with Berlin.

[5] There are, however, some necessary alterations of detail, especially in quotations and references, and readers who are concerned with accuracy at this level should use this revised edition in preference to, or alongside, the original edition. In particular, some quotations were attributed by Berlin, usually following inaccurate accounts by earlier writers, to the wrong author.

^г Excluding The Proper Study of Mankind, which is an anthology drawn from earlier collections.

[7] This piece was published in the New York Review of Books in 1988, and is also included in The Crooked Timber of Humanity (1990) and The Proper Study of Mankind.

[8] I have normalised the somewhat wayward spelling, punctuation and layout of the original manuscript, but otherwise, apart from a few insignificant adjustments to ease the reader's passage, have followed what the young Berlin wrote exactly. These changes were not made when the story was first published, in 1998 (see p. xxxii below); I have made them now because they seemed appropriate in this more disproportionately grown-up company.

[9] e.g. on pp. 245-6, 288 below.

[10] History of Western Philosophy (New York, 1945; London, 1946), p. 226.

[11] See pp. 246, 288 below. Berlin also uses 'inner citadel' in a rather different sense, as on pp. 1 8 1 -2, 306 below.

[12] New York Review of Books, 18 October 2001, 12. The editors made a few

[13] 'Real beings are sacrificed to an abstraction; individual people are offered up in a holocaust to people as a collectivity.' De I'esprit de conquhe et de I'usurpation dans leur rapports avec la civilisation europeenne, part 1, chapter 13, 'De l'uniformite': p. 169 in Benjamin Constant, Ecrits politiques, ed. Marcel Gauchet ([Paris], 1997).

[14] What kind of incompatibility this is - logical, conceptual, psychological or of some other kind - is a question to which I do not volunteer an answer. The relations of factual beliefs to moral attitudes (or beliefs) - both the logic and psychology of this - seem to me to need further philosophical investigation. The thesis that no relevant logical relationship exists, e.g. the division between fact and value often attributed to Hume, seems to me to be unplausible, and to point to a problem, not to its solution.

[15] See A. K. Sen, 'Determinism and Historical Predictions', Enquiry (Delhi) 2 (1959), 99-1 15- Also Gordon Leff in The Tyranny of Concepts: A Critique of Marxism (London, 1961), pp. 146-9.

[16] 'Elender Behelf', in the Critique of Practical Reason: Kant's gesammelte Schriften (Berlin, 1900- ), vol. 5, p. 96, line 15.

[17] 'History, the Individual, and Inevitability', Philosophical Review 68 (1959),

93^-Ю2.

[18] Hampshire replies: 'The injunction not to treat men as merely objects defines the moral point of view precisely because, being studied from the scientific point of view, men can be so treated. Isaiah Berlin disagrees with me (and with Kant) in regarding the question "Are men only natural objects?" as an empirical issue, while I hold that since no one can treat himself as merely a natural object no one ought to treat another as merely a natural object.'

[19] ibid., p. 71 (76); cf. p. 163 below. ² ibid., p. 38-49 (44-55).

[20] 'The things themselves speaking.' The phrase appears to originate in Justinian's Digest at i. 2. 2. 1 1. 2.

[20] A view attributed to me by Christopher Dawson in his review of Historical Inevitability, Harvard Law Review 70 (1956-7), 584-8, at 587.

My evident failure to state my view sufficiently clearly is brought home to me by the fact that the opposite of this position - a crude and absurd anti- rationalism - is attributed to me by Gordon Leff, loc. cit. (p. 7 above, note i), by J. A. Passmore, loc. cit. (p. 12 above, note i), by Christopher Dawson, op. cit. (see previous note), and by half a dozen Marxist writers: some of these in evident good faith.

[22] Though not in all situations: see my article 'From Hope and Fear Set Free' [reprinted below].

^г I state this explicitly on pp. 120, 122, 124-6, 134-5.

^ See H. P. Rickman, 'The Horizons of History', Hibbert Journal 56 (October 1957 to July 1958), January 1958, 167-76, at 169-70.

[23] The generous and acute anonymous reviewer [Richard Wollheim] of my lecture in the Times Literary Supplement ('A Hundred Years After', 20 February 1959, 89-90) was the first writer to point out this error; he also made other penetrating and suggestive criticisms by which I have greatly profited.

[24] Oxford, 1958: Clarendon Press. See p. xxxii above.

[25] Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 2. 61. 'Nihil agis, dolor! quamvis sis molestus, numquam te esse confitebor malum.'

[26] There is an illuminating discussion of this topic by Robert Waelder in 'Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Psychological Comments on a Problem of Power': this essay appears in George B. Wilbur and Warner Muensterberger (eds), Psychoanalysis and Culture: Essays in Honour of Geza Rosheim (New York, !9P; repr. 1967), pp. 185-95. He speaks of the remoulding of the superego into 'internalising' external pressures, and draws an illuminating distinction between authoritarianism, which entails obedience to authority without acceptance of its orders and claims, and totalitarianism, which entails in addition inner conformity to the system imposed by the dictator; hence totalitarian insistence on education and indoctrination as opposed to mere outward obedience, a sinister process with

[27] A. W. Gomme and others have provided a good deal of evidence for the hypothesis that they did.

[28] In his inaugural lecture to the University of Sheffield in 1966, Freedom as Politics (Sheffield, 1966), reprinted in his Political Theory and Practice (London, [1972]).

[29] It has been suggested that liberty is always a triadic relation; one can only seek to be free from x to do or be y; hence 'all liberty' is at once negative and positive or, better still, neither. See G. C. MacCallum, jr, 'Negative and Positive Freedom', Philosophical Review 76 (1967), 312-34, repr. in Peter Laslett, W. G. Runciman and Quentin Skinner (eds), Philosophy, Politics and Society, Fourth Series (Oxford, 1972). This seems to me an error. A man struggling against his chains or a people against enslavement need not consciously aim at any definite further state. A man need not know how he will use his freedom; he just wants to remove the yoke. So do classes and nations.

[30] See Coleridge Biographia Literaria (1817), chapter 12, theses 6-7, and chapter 1 3, antepenultimate paragraph.

[31] Not that such open violence has been lacking in our own country, practised at times under the noble banner of the suppression of arbitrary rule and the enemies of liberty and the emancipation of hitherto enslaved populations and classes. I agree with a great deal of what has been said on this subject by A. S. Kaufman ('Professor Berlin on "Negative Freedom"', Mind 71 (1962), 241-3). Some of his points may be found in an earlier attack by Marshall Cohen ('Berlin and the Liberal Tradition', Philosophical Quarterly 10 (i960), 216-27). Some of Kaufman's objections have, I hope, been answered already. There is one point, however, on which I must take further issue with him. He appears to regard constraint or obstruction not brought about by human means as being forms of deprivation of social or political freedom. I do not think that this is compatible with what is normally meant by political freedom - the only sense of freedom with which I am concerned. Kaufman speaks (op. cit., p. 241) of 'obstructions to the human will, which have nothing to do with a community's pattern of power relations' as obstacles to (political or social) liberty. Unless, however, such obstructions do, in the end, spring from power relations, they do not seem to be relevant to the existence of social or political liberty. I cannot see how one can speak of 'basic human rights' (to use Kaufman's phrase) as violated by what he calls 'non-human . . . interference'. If I stumble and fall, and so find my freedom of movement frustrated, I cannot, surely, be said to have suffered any loss of basic human rights. Failure to discriminate between human and non-human obstacles to freedom seems to me to mark the beginning of the great confusion of types _of

[32] The classical - and still, it seems to me, the best - exposition of this state of mind is to be found in Max Weber's distinction between the ethics of conscience and the ethics of responsibility in 'Politics as a Vocation': see Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays m Sociology, trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York, 1946), pp. 77-128.

[33] A reference to the American Declaration of Independence, which includes among men's 'unalienable rights' 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness'. Ed.

i Emile Faguet once paraphrased Joseph de Maistre by observing that, when Rousseau asked why it was that men who were born free were nevertheless everywhere in chains, this was like asking why it was that sheep, who were born carnivorous, nevertheless everywhere nibbled grass. Emile Faguet, Politiques et moralistes du dix-neuvieme siecle, 1st series (Paris, 1899), p. 41 [cf. Maistre: 'What does [Rousseau] mean? . .. This mad pronouncement, Man is born free, is the ^opposite of the truth', Oeuvres completes de ]. de Maistre (Lyon/Paris, 1884-7), ^voL. ²,p. 338].

^Similarly the Russian radical Alexander Herzen observed that we classify ^creatures by zoological types, according to the characteristics and habits that are m°^st frequently found to be conjoined. Thus, one of the defining attributes of fish i^{s their} liability to live in water; hence, despite the existence of flying fish, we do ^{not sa}y of fish in general that their nature or essence - the 'true' end for which ^they were created - is to fly, since most fish fail to achieve this and do not display ^{the sl}ightest tendency in this direction. Yet in the case of men, and men alone, _we ^say that the nature of man is to seek freedom, even though only very few _men i_n ^{the l}ong life of our race have in fact pursued it, while the vast majority at most

[35] 'As it really was.'

[36] According to some, for historically or metaphysically inevitable reasons or causes which, however, soon or late, will lose their potency.

[37] Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (i 6 5 i), part 1, chapter i 3.

[38] Hence, perhaps, the very different quality of the tone and substance of social protest, however legitimate, in the West in our time, as compared to that of Asian or African critics who speak for societies where large sections of the population are still crushed or submerged.

[39] The history and the logic of the transformation of liberalism in th_e

[40] See Plan des travaux scientifiques necessaires pour reorganiser Ia societe (1822): p. 53 in Auguste Comte, Appendice general du systeme de politique positive (Paris, 185 4), published as part of vol. 4 of Systeme de politique positive (Paris, i 8 5 1 -4). [Mill quotes this passage in Auguste Comte and Positivism: vol. io, pp. 301-2, in Collected Works ofjohn Stuart Mill, ed. J. M. Robson and others (Toronto/London, 1963-91).]

[41] op. cit. (p. 7 above, note 2), vol. 8, p. 23, line 22.

[42] 'Above all, gentlemen, no zeal whatsoever.' This maxim of Talleyrand's appears in various forms. The earliest I have found is 'N'ayez pas de zele' ('Don't be zealous'), in C.-A. Sainte-Beuve, 'Madame de Stall' (1835): vol. 2, p. 1104, in Sainte-Beuve, Oeuvres, ed. Maxime Leroy ([Paris], 1949-51). The version in the text appears in Philarete Chasles, Voyages d'un critique a travers la vie et les livres (1865-8), vol. 2, Italie et Espagne, p. 204. In this latter version 'point' is often replaced by 'pas trop' ('not too much'), as on p. 304 below, but I have found no nineteenth-century authority for this wording. Ed.

[43] Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel (London, 1 726), sermon 7, p. 136 [§ 16].

[44] Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progres de I'esprit humam, ed. O. H. Prior and Yvon Belaval (Paris, 1970), p. 228.

[45] What can and what cannot be done by particular agents in specific circumstances is an empirical question, properly settled, like all such questions, by an appeal to experience. If all acts were causally determined by antecedent conditions which were themselves similarly determined, and so on ad infinitum, such investigations would rest on an illusion. As rational beings we should, in that case, make an effort to disillusion ourselves - to cast off the spell of appearances; but we should surely fail. The delusion, if it is one, belongs to the order of what Kant called 'empirically real' and 'transcendentally ideal'. To try to place ourselves outside the categories which govern our empirical ('real') experience is what he regarded as an unintelligible plan of action. This thesis is surely valid, and can be stated without the paraphernalia of the Kantian system.

[46] This desperate effort to remain at once within and without the engulfing dream, to say the unsayable, is irresistible to German metaphysicians of a certain type: e.g. Schopenhauer and Vaihinger.

[47] E. M. Forster, Howards End (London, 1910), chapter 22, pp. 183-4-

[48] See, for example, the impressive and influential writings of E. H. Carr on the history of our time.

[49] I do not, of course, mean to imply that the great Western moralists, e.g. the philosophers of the medieval Church (and in particular Thomas Aquinas) or those of the Enlightenment, denied moral responsibility; nor that Tolstoy was not agonised by problems raised by it. My thesis is that their determinism committed these thinkers to a dilemma which some among them did not face, and none escaped.

[50] Held, unless I have gravely misunderstood his writings, by Herbert Butter- field.

[51] As opposed to making profitable use of other disciplines, e.g. sociology or economics or psychology.

[52] That history is in this sense different from physical description is a truth discovered long ago by Vico, and most imaginatively and vividly presented by Herder and his followers, and, despite the exaggerations and extravagances to which it led some nineteenth-century philosophers of history, still remains the greatest contribution of the romantic movement to our knowledge. What was then shown, albeit often in a very misleading and confused fashion, was that to

[53] Such 'stability' is a matter of degree. All our categories are, in theory, subject to change. The physical categories - e.g. the three dimensions and infinite extent of ordinary perceptual space, the irreversibility of temporal processes, the multiplicity and countability of material objects - are perhaps the most fixed. Yet even a shift in these most general characteristics is in principle conceivable. After these come orders and relations of sensible qualities - colours, shapes, tastes etc.; then the uniformities on which the sciences are based - these can be quite easily thought away in fairy tales or scientific romances. The categories of value are more fluid than these; and within them tastes fluctuate more than rules of etiquette, and these more than moral standards. Within each category some concepts seem more liable to change than others. When such differences of degree become so marked as to constitute what are called differences of kind, we tend to speak of the wider and more stable distinctions as 'objective', of the narrower and less stable as the opposite. Nevertheless there is no sharp break, no frontier. The concepts form a continuous series from the 'permanent' standards to fleeting momentary reactions, from 'objective' truths and rules to 'subjective' attitudes, and they criss-cross each other in many dimensions, sometimes at unexpected angles, to perceive, discriminate and describe which can be a mark of genius.

[54] Criteria of what is a fact or what constitutes empirical evidence are seldom in grave dispute within a given culture or profession.

[55] I need hardly add that responsibility (if I may still venture to use this term) for this cannot be placed at the door of the great thinkers who founded modern sociology - Marx, Durkheim, Weber - nor of the rational and scrupulous

[56] And a collection of isolated insights and apergus, like the dubious 'All power either corrupts or intoxicates', or 'Man is a political animal', or 'Der Mensch ist was er ifit' ('Man is what he eats').

[57] The Marxist conception of social laws is, of course, the best-known version of this theory, but it forms a large element in some Christian and utilitarian, and all socialist, doctrines.

[58] Emile, book 2: vol. 4, p. po, in Oeuvres completes, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and others (Paris, 195 9-95 ).

[59] R. H. Tawney, Equality (1931), 3rd ed. (London, 1938), chapter 5, section 2, 'Equality and Liberty', p. ²⁰⁸ (not . in previous editions).

[60] J. S. Mill, On Liberty, chapter i: vol. i 8, p. 226, in op. cit. (p. 81 above, note 1).

[61] ibid., p. 224. 3 ibid., chapter 3, p. 268.

ibid., pp. 265-6. The last two phrases are from John Sterling's essay on Simonides: vol I, p. 190, in his Essays and Tales, ed. Julius Charles Hare (London,

I 848).

[64] ibid., chapter 4, p. 277.

[65] This is but another illustration of the natural tendency of all but a very few thinkers to believe that all the things they hold good must be intimately connected, or at least compatible, with one another. The history of thought, like the history of nations, is strewn with examples of inconsistent, or at least disparate, elements artificially yoked together in a despotic system, or held together by the danger of some common enemy. In due course the danger passes, and conflicts between the allies arise, which often disrupt the system, sometimes t_o th_e great benefit of mankind.

[66] See the valuable discussion of this in Michel Villey, Lefons d'histoire de la philosophie du droit (Paris, 1957), chapter 14, which traces the embryo of the notion of subjective rights to Occam (see p. 272).

[67] Christian (and Jewish or Muslim) belief in the absolute authority of divine or natural laws, or in the equality of all men in the sight of God, is very different from belief in freedom to live as one prefers.

[68] Indeed, it is arguable that in the Prussia of Frederick the Great or in the Austria of Joseph II men of imagination, originality and creative genius, and, indeed, minorities of all kinds, were less persecuted and felt the pressure, both of institutions and custom, less heavy upon them than in many an earlier or later democracy.

[69] Social Contract, book 1, chapter 8: vol. 3, p. 365 in Oeuvres completes (op. cit., p. 170 above, note 2).

[70] op. cit. (p. 7 above, note 2), vol. 8, p. 290, line 27, and p. 291, line 3^

[71] 'Proletarian coercion, in all its forms, from executions to forced labour, is, paradoxical as it may sound, the method of moulding communist humanity out of the human material of the capitalist period.' These lines by the Bolshevik leader Nikolay Bukharin, especially the term 'human material', vividly convey this attitude. Nikolay Bukharin, Ekonomikaperekhodnogoperioda ['Economics in the Transitional Period'] (Moscow, 1920), chapter 10, p. 146.

[72] op. cit. (p. 170 above, note 2), p. 309.

[73] It is not perhaps far-fetched to assume that the quietism of the Eastern sages was, similarly, a response to the despotism of the great autocracies, and flourished at periods when individuals were apt to be humiliated, or at any rate ignored or ruthlessly managed, by those possessed of the instruments of physical coercion.

[74] op. cit. (p. 194 above, note 3), ibid.: 'every law is contrary to liberty'.

[75] Johann Gottlieb Fichte's siimmtliche Werke, ed. I. H. Fichte (Berlin, 1845-6), ^v°L 7^, p. 57⁶.

[76] ibid., p. 574.

[77] 'To compel men to adopt the right form of government, to impose Right on them by force, is not only the right, but the sacred duty of every man who has both the insight and the power to do so.' ibid., vol. 4, p. 436.

' loc. cit. (p. 8 I above, note i).

[79] Kant came nearest to asserting the 'negative' ideal of liberty when (in one of his political treatises) he declared that 'The greatest problem of the human race, to the solution of which it is compelled by nature, is the establishment of a civil society universally administering right according to law. It is only in a society which possesses the greatest liberty ... - and also the most exact determination and guarantee of the limits of [the] liberty [of each individual] in order that it may co-exist with the liberty of others - that the highest purpose of nature, which is the development of all her capacities, can be attained in the case of mankind.' 'Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltburgerlicher Absicht' (1784), in op. cit. (p. 7 above, note 2), vol. 8, p. 22, line 6. Apart from the teleological implications, this formulation does not at first appear very different from orthodox liberalism. The crucial point, however, is how to determine the criterion for the 'exact determination and guarantee of the limits' of individual liberty. Most modern liberals, at their most consistent, want a situation in which as many individuals as possible can realise as many of their ends as possible, without assessment of the value of these ends as such, save in so far as they may frustrate the purposes of others. They wish the frontiers between individuals or groups of men to be drawn solely with a view to preventing collisions between human purposes, all of which must be considered to be equally ultimate, uncriticisable ends in themselves. Kant, and the rationalists of his type, do not regard all ends as of equal value. For them the limits of liberty are determined by applying the rules of 'reason', which is much more than the mere generality of rules as such, and is a faculty that creates or reveals a purpose identical in, and for, all men. In the name of reason anything

[80] Thomas Rainborow, speaking at Putney in 1647: p. 301 in The Clarke Papers: Selections from the Papers of William Clarke, ed. C. H. Firth, vol. 1 ([London], 189 i ).

[81] This has an obvious affinity with Kant's doctrine of human freedom; but it is a socialised and empirical version of it, and therefore almost its opposite. Kant's free man needs no public recognition for his inner freedom. If he is treated as a means to some external purpose, that is a wrong action on the part of his exploiters, but his own 'noumenal' status is untouched, and he is fully free, and fully a man, however he may be treated. The need spoken of here is bound up wholly with the relation that I have with others; I am nothing if I am unrecognised. I cannot ignore the attitude of others with Byronic disdain, fully conscious of my own intrinsic worth and vocation, or escape into my inner life, for I am in my own eyes as others see me. I identify myself with the point of view of my milieu: I feel myself to be somebody or nobody in terms of my position and function in the social whole; this is the most 'heteronomous' condition imaginable.

[82] loc. cit. (p. 1 8 3 above, note 2).

[83] Following Sterling: loc. cit. (p. 174 above, note 4), at p. 266.

[84] This argument should be distinguished from the traditional approach of some of the disciples of Burke or Hegel, who say that, since I am made what I am by society or history, to escape from them is impossible and to attempt it irrational. No doubt I cannot leap out of my skin, or breathe outside my proper element; it is a mere tautology to say that I am what I am, and cannot want to be liberated from my essential characteristics, some of which are social. But it does not follow that all my attributes are intrinsic and inalienable, and that I cannot

[85] I_n Great Britain such legal power is, of course, constitutionally vested in the

[86] loc. cit. (p. 174 above, note 4). ' loc. cit. (p. 225 below, note 2).

[87] loc. cit. (p. 92 above, note 1).

[88] Sir Richard Livingstone, Tolerance m Theory and in Practice, First Robert Waley Cohen Memorial Lecture [1954] (London, 1954), p. 8.

[89] This was written in 1959.

[90] This passage occurs in a review of two pamphlets on the Carlile prosecutions in Westminster Review 2 (July-October 1824) No 3 (July), 1-27, at 26. Since Alexander Bain - see John Stuart Mill: A Criticism (London, 1882), p. 33 - confidently ascribes this article to Mill, even though it does not appear in Mill's own list of his work, Berlin too, not unnaturally, took it as Mill's. The review is also reprinted in Prefaces to Liberty: Selected Writings of John Stuart Mill, ed. Bernard Wishy (Boston, 1959; repr. Lanham, Md, etc., 1983), where the quoted passage appears on p. 99. However, a letter from Joseph Parkes to John Bowring (then co-editor of the Review) of 1 March 1824 (HM 30805, The Huntington Library, San Marino, CA) suggests that the review may in fact be by William Johnson Fox (1768-1864), though Parkes refers to 'Persecution papers'. But even if the words are not Mill's, the sentiments are certainly Millian. Ed.

[91] '[I]t is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong.' From the Preface to Bentham's A Fragment of Government (1776): p. 393 in A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment of Government, ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart (London, 1977). Cf. 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation', from Bentham's commonplace book (1781-5): see vol. 10, p. 142, in op. cit. (p. 194 above, note 3). Bentham later dropped the reference to the greatest number. The career of this idea before Bentham, and in Bentham's hands, is complex, but distilled with great clarity by Robert Shackleton in 'The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number: The History of Bentham's Phrase', Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 90 (1972), 1461-82. Ed.

[92] L 4/281; cf. L 3/261, where Mill speaks of 'experiments of living'.

[93] 'Bentham': CW x 99-100.

[94] ibid. no. ² ibid. i i i.

World': Writings on Codification, Law, and Education, ed. Philip Schofield and Jonathan Harris (Oxford: 1998), pp. 46, 282 (note). Ed.

[96] As he does in 'Bentham': CW x 1 10.

[97] L 3/268.

' He did not seem to look on socialism, which under the influence of Harriet Taylor he advocated in Principles of Political Economy and later, as a danger to individual liberty in the way in which democracy, for example, might be so. This is not the place to examine the very peculiar relationship of Mill's socialist to his individualist convictions. Despite his socialist professions, none of the socialist leaders of his time - neither Louis Blanc nor Proudhon nor Lassalle nor Herzen

[99] L 2/231. 2 ibid.

[100] loc. cit. (p. 225 above, note 2).

[101] L 2/254. 'L 2/257. 'L 4/285.

[102] loc. cit. (p. 92 above, note i). ² L 3/265, 271 ('maim')- ³ L 3/270.

[103] L 1/222. ² L 1/226. ³L 3/271-2. ⁴ L 3/272.

[104] L 3/263.

' loc. cit. (p. 228 above, note 1 ).

[106] Which in any case he regarded as inevitable and also, perhaps, to a vision

wider than his own time-bound one, ultimately more just and more generous.

[108] loc. cit. (p. xxx above, note 1).

[109] Michael St John Packe, The Life of John Stuart Mill (London, 1954), p. 504.

[110] 'Bentham': CW x 94^ He goes on: 'Almost all rich veins of original and striking speculation have been opened by systematic half-thinkers.'

[111] See p. 274 below.

[112] loc. cit. (p. 31 above, note 1).

[113] Stuart Hampshire and H. L. A. Hart, 'Decision, Intention and Certainty', Mind 67 (1958), 1-12.

[114] loc. cit. (p. xxx above, note 1 ).

[115] De I'esprit des lois, book 24, chapter 1 8: see also p. 20 above, note 2.

[116] Only the first crisis is treated here: see p. xxvii above.

[117] Apology 24b-c. 2 jac-j ic, esp. 5 ia. ¹ Republic 5 5 7bj.

[118] 666e. '

[119] Diels-Kranz, 6th ed., 87 B 44, B 2. 24-34 (ii 3 5 3).

[120] 3. 8o. 6. ^г Politics 1317b2.

[121] 2. 37­

^г 7. 69 (Nikias 'reminded them of their fatherland with all its great freedom and the uncommanded liberty of lifestyle for all').

' Against Leptines, 20. 106.

[124] Two Cheers for Democracy (London, 1951), 'What I Believe', p. 78.

[125] Epicurus fr. 6. 45 Arrighetti.

[126] SVF i 262. The Greek word for 'pasture' also means 'law'.

[127] Socrates' formulation of Aristippus' position. Xenophon, Memorabilia 2. 1. 12.

1 Diogenes Laertius 2. 75.

[128] Diogenes Laertius 6. 93.

[129] SVF iii 329. 2 svf iii 697. Cf. Zeno, SVF i 271.

³ Diogenes Laertius 7. 4.

[130] ibid., pp^ I 3 i-2.

[131] Reprinted above, pp. 94-165.

[132] See p. 82 above, note r.

[133] 'Uncle's Dream', a novella published in 1859.

[134] 'World-historical.'

[135] Conjectural restoration of word omitted by typist.

[136] This letter has been transcribed (with some additional paragraph breaks) from a carbon typescript which does not bear a signature. I have not been able to trace the top copy.

[137] Berlin may be referring to the passage where Robespierre writes that 'en scellant notre ouvrage de notre sang, nous puissons voir au moins briller l'aurore de la felicite universelle' ('by sealing our work with blood, we may see at least the bright dawn of universal happiness'). Rapport sur les prinopes de morale politique qui doivent guider la Convention nationale dans l'admmistration interieure de la Republique [Paris, 1794], p. 4-

[138] London, 1944: Routledge; Chicago, 1944: University of Chicago Press.

[139] p- 345 above. ² 85. з 88. ⁴ 92. '93­⁶ 'The New Scepticism', Times Literary Supplement, 9 June 1950, 357. ⁷ 337-

[140] Philosophical Review 61 (1952), 451-74•

' See pp. xxx, 246, 288 above.

[142] First published in French in 1980; translated by Stanley Hoffman in Shklar's Redeeming American Political Thought, ed. Stanley Hoffman and Dennis F. Thompson (Chicago and London, 1998: University of Chicago Press), i 10-26.

' American Political Science Review 56 No 1 ( 1962), I 14-28, at I 14 note 8.

[144] ibid., 297-8.

' London, 1984: Athlone Press; New York, 1984: St Martin's Press.

[146] Journal of Political Ideologies 2 (1997), 281-96.

[147] In Isaiah Berlin: A Celebration, reprinted in Taylor's Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1995: Harvard University Press), chapter 5.

[148] In D. Gambarara, S. Gensini and A. Pennisi (eds), Language Philosophies and the Language Sciences (Munster, 1996: Nodus), 165-79.

[149] In Lisa McNair and others (eds), Papers from the Parasession on Theory and Data in Linguistics (Chicago, 1996: Chicago Linguistic Society), i-i 1.

' History of European Ideas 22 (1996), 369-83.

[151] In Liberalism and Pluralism, 1079-1 I or.

'i London, 1997: Macmillan; New York, 1997: St Martin's Press.

'' Lewiston and Lampeter, 1989: Mellen Press.

i| Oxford and New York, 1994: Clarendon Press.