The translation at 67c5-6 follows J. V. Luce (C.R. 1951, 66—7), Hackforth, and Verdenius, in taking the reference to be simply to the earlier discussion, and not to any ancient religious doctrine. For the alternative view, see Burnet, Bluck, and Loriaux.
The text at 68a4 is not quite certain, and there is much to be said for bracketing nai iwauiCiv Kai veoju with Verdenius. The language suggests an antithesis between iraiSiKa and
For the text of 69a6—c3 see Bluck, 154—6, J. V. Luce, C.Q. 1944, 60—4, and notes by Verdenius and Loriaux. The translation retains Kai tovtov ixev navTa and cbvov/deva re Kai mnpaoKd- jieva, and Kai in 69b6. With Burnet's text the reference to 'buying and selling all things for this' will be omitted. Burnet gives the meaning of 69b 1—3 as 'when accompanied by this [i.e. wisdom] our goodness really is goodness', jierd
Burnet and Loriaux hold that at 70b4 and 76c 12 fipourjotq is used in a popular sense, meaning 'intelligence' or 'wits'. But the word has been translated 'wisdom', here as elsewhere (see on 69a6— c3), for the sake of the coming argument. For if the (ppovrjoiq possessed by the soul in its previous existence were different from that which philosophers hope to attain in the afterlife (66e—67a, 68a—b), the Cyclical and Recollection Arguments would support that hope by mere equivocation.
Literally (70b6), 'tell a tale'. Cf.61e2. Socrates has earlier remarked that he is no tale-teller himself (61b). The ensuing proofs of immortality are not, of course, 'tales' like that of the afterlife in 107c-114c. But the argument from opposites that now follows contains a striking fusion of myth with logic, and the verb &WLixvQo\orfelv may possibly be used with this in mind (though it need mean no more than 'converse', as at Apology 39e5).
iieixvr}p.eQa (70c6) has been taken to mean 'we've recalled'. With this meaning, Socrates will be glancing back to his earlier references (63c5, 69c7) to religious teachings about the afterlife. The meaning may, however, simply be 'we recall' ('comes into my mind', Hackforth). afiinop-evat has been taken in apposition to the subject of eioiv, and eioiv as 'they do exist', rather than 'they are there'. See Loriaux.
Placing a semicolon at 70d2 after oboai and taking Kai, as often, with concluding force (Verdenius).
It seems preferable to place a full stop after frepov at 71b2 and to read yap with T. Thus Robin.
The translation at 73a7 takes evi in its ordinary sense of'one', and follows Verdenius in taking kirena to mean 'for example'. 73b 1—2 will then be an application of the questioning procedure
Socrates has mentioned in 73a7—9 and not a new way of proving his point, as the translation 'secondly' (Burnet, Hackforth) would require.
Reading Xeyco Se nva rpoirov rovSe, with Verdenius, at 73c5—6.
Taking abro both as object of e-niardiieda and with eoriv at 74b2. L.S.J. s.v. cfc give several examples of oc, though not of 6, introducing an indirect question. See note 26.
The translation follows Burnet's text at 74b8—9, reading rcjj fxeu .. .ro} 5', and preserves the ambiguity of the contrast. If the articles are masculine, they must be taken with (paiverai, in sense (a) discussed in the Notes—see on 74b7—c6 (p. 122). If they are neuter, they will be governed by taa, and will bear sense (b). For sense (c) one would expect, rather, rf? yev ... rfj 5'. R. P. Haynes (Phronesis 1964,20—1) suggests that rw could give this sense if taken as dative of the indefinite pronoun. But there seems no parallel for rep tiev ... Tq) Se being used in this way. Reading Tore iiev . .. fore 6' with TW, the meaning will be as in sense (d).
It seems necessary to read cbc eai> for the MSS. ewe av at 74cl3 to obtain the sense 'so long as', 'provided that'. See Hackforth, 193.
The translation 'what it is itself' follows Burnet's text at 74d6 and takes the use of eanv as incomplete. But the meaning may be 'that which is, itself'. See also notes 25 and 28, and on 75c7—d6 (p. 130). The text is very uncertain. But on any reading or interpretation it seems that eanv toov has to be understood as completing the &onep clause.
For the translation 'what equal is' at 75b 1—2 see on 75c7—d6 (p. 131). Taking loop as subject brings the grammar close to that suggested for 74b2—see note 21. The interpretation 'the equal which is' seems ruled out by the fact that tov is in a different case from hov. But the meaning might be 'that which is equal.'
Sri 'eanv, which Hackforth leaves untranslated at 75b6, must refer to the nature, not the existence, of the equal. Hence 'eanv should be taken as incomplete, and on as an interrogative 'what'. Cf.74b2, and note 21.
The translation follows Burnet and Hackforth in taking e« elae dvoioetv at 75b7 as equivalent to ineiae &va4>epovreq tvvofioew. But this is very awkward, and there is much to be said for supplying am evvcriioew after hvoioeiv, or deleting ort. .. 0avXorepa, with
NOTES ON THE TEXT AND TRANSLATION Archer-Hind, as a gloss.
Reading tovto, 6 'eon at 75d2 with BTW, and taking eon as incomplete. There seems no justification for Burnet's departure from the united MSS.' reading, since 8 eon may occur without abrd—cf. 92d9. But the original reading may have been tovto, to 6 'eon, the article marking the use of 8 'eon as a name, as at 92d9, but omitted by haplography. For the translation 'what it is' see on 75c7-d6 (p. 130), and notes 24—6.
The single word e-niarquas (75d4) has to be translated 'pieces of knowledge', since 'knowledge' has no plural. Cf.75e4 and 76cl5.
Or perhaps, taking
Literally 'each thing, what it is itself (78d3-4), 'each of them, what it is' (d5), taking eon as incomplete. See on 75c7—d6 (p. 131) and notes 24-6. Cf. also 65dl3-el and note 7.
to ov (78d4) has been taken as referring back to avrri f? oboia (78dl) with Verdenius and Loriaux, and not closely with abrd maoTov 5 eonu - 'the being itself whatever it may be' (Hackforth).
It seems necessary to bracket nakcov either in 78dl0 or in 78el. The translation follows Burnet, bracketing f) naktiv in 78el. If koKcov is bracketed in 78dl0, the meaning will be: 'But what about the many things, such as men or horses or cloaks or anything else at all of that kind? Equal things or beautiful things or all things that bear the same name as those objects?'
TOiv ovTiov is used at 79a6 broadly to include the seen as well as the unseen world. See on 65c2—4.
The translation follows Verdenius' and Loriaux's account of 80c5—7. xapi&rcoc has been translated 'in beautiful condition', rather than 'in favourable condition (sc. to preservation)' (Hackforth). The eav clause need not be taken to specify favourable conditions. It is better translated 'even if', and understood to specify relatively unfavourable ones, the thought being that 'a healthy body decomposes more rapidly than an old and withered one' (Burnet). If so, Kai Travv fiaXa will not contrast sharply with femeuedxr avxydv xpouov, but will represent a rather weak case, in contrast with the stronger ones which follow, eu TOiavrij copa has been translated 'in the flower of youth', rather than 'at a fine season of the year' (Burnet, Bluck). Burnet says that if ojpa mearit 'flower of youth', toixwtq would be otiose, and that when mentioned in connection with death it means 'a ripe old age'. However, as Verdenius says, these objections neutralize each other, since roiadry may be added to avoid a misunderstanding of copa.
Reading ooofia at 82d3, as Verdenius suggests. Cf. Timaeus 88c3.
Hackforth (92, n.l) translates (82e5-83al): 'the way in which the prisoner would be most likely to cooperate in his own incarceration is through his desire', taking the cjc clause as subject of 'eoTtv. This is very awkward and takes paXiara out of order. Verdenius would take eipjfxov to mean 'imprisonment'. However, it cannot mean that at 82e3, and if it is taken in that way at 82e5 there will be an awkward shift of sense.
Bracketing nai
Omitting
The translation at 84a5—6 follows Burnet's text and Loriaux's explanation, eraw&o? is taken to mean 'in reverse' (to Penelope) rather than 'undoing her web' (Hackforth, Bluck). Penelope unpicked at night what she had woven during the day. The soul is thought of as reweaving at night, through sensual indulgence, the 'web' (rtw ... Iotov) that philosophy has unravelled during the day.
Hackforth translates 84c4 'were having a few words'. See, however, Lysis 211a and other passages cited by W. L. Lorimer, C.R. 1960, 7—8, supporting 'were talking in a low voice' (Burnet, Bluck).
Understanding the subject of Xex#i?wu (84dl) as ra \ex6evra from 84c5. This seems preferable to 'if you think it would be better that it should be stated' (Bluck).
The translation follows Burnet's text at 88a2, which involves taking 'you' here to refer to Cebes himself. He is voicing the argument of an imaginary objector, who is prepared to grant 'the speaker', i.e. the proponent of immortality, 'even more than what you say': even more, that is, than Cebes has himself conceded (87al—4)—that the soul's prenatal existence has been adequately proved. It is, however, difficult to take av to refer to Cebes himself, when the objection has been presented in oratio obliqua;
and it is awkward to understand raj Xeyom as meaning, without further explanation, the proponent of immortality. Some editors therefore bracket f} at 88a2: 'If one were to grant even more to someone who says what you (sc. Socrates) say'. On either reading, however, Cebes will be making the same concession to the same viewpoint. See Bluck, 157—9 for further difficulties. The passage may, as Hackforth suggests, be incapable of strict grammatical analysis.
Or perhaps (89b3—4) 'it was his way sometimes to play with my hair' (Bluck). If nafteiv means 'make fun of, Socrates may, as Robin suggests, be making fun of Phaedo for wearing his hair long, though he was past the age at which it was customary at Athens to do so.
\&)Kov r) yeXava (90a7) is usually translated 'white or black'. The words can, however, mean 'pale' and 'dark' (cf., e.gRepublic 474el—2), and this seems better suited to the notion of a range.
roof bvroiv (90d6) has been taken as if governed by the whole phrase ttj? aXrjtfere «aЈ emcm^T}*;. If it is governed only by rrj? aXrjfieta? (cf.99e6), the meaning will be 'deprived of the truth of the things that are and of knowledge'. For tlqp outoov see on 65c2—4.
Reading clvqwl at 9lb5 with Burnet, and translating 'ignorance' rather than 'folly' (Bluck). Socrates' ignorance will consist in his mistaken belief in the afterlife. With the reading 5iavota the meaning will be 'this opinion of mine will not persist'.
el kotos (92dl) has been translated 'likelihood' rather than 'analogy' (Burnet). Burnet cites Theaetetus 162e5 and Euthydemus 305el,but as Hackforth says, those passages tell strongly in favour of 'likelihood'.
L. Lorimer's proposal (C.R. 1938, 165-6) to read (92d2) 8 ok el
Placing a colon at the end of 92d9, and keeping the MSS. aurfj? with Burnet. 'Being' belongs to the soul, is 'of it' (aurrj
The difference, if any, at 93al4—b2 between iiaXhov and em nXeou, and between t^ttov and en' eXarrov is uncertain. Hackforth thinks there is no difference. Olympiodorus took the first member of each pair to refer to pitch and the second to intervals (see Burnet's note on 93al4). Verdenius plausibly takes em irXeov to mean 'extending over a greater part', i.e. covering a greater number of strings.
Verdenius says that the emep clause (93bl) should be taken with eni nXeov only, and expresses the fact that 'em irXeov (in the sense explained in note 51) is a rather theoretical case, since in practice all strings will have been tuned. But it is hard to understand how an attunement, as opposed to an instrument, could be tuned em rrXeov in this sense.
The translation follows Burnet's text at 93d4, but not his version of 93d2—3, 'this is just our admission'. The clause p.rjSev ... eivai (d3—4) has been taken as dependent upon to bptoX&yriiia: 'this is the admission that...' Hackforth (115-16, n.4) and others, finding contradiction between these lines and 93al4—b6, have bracketed apfioviac; in 93d4, taking apfxoviav in the same line as complement, and erepav ... erepae to refer to one soul as compared with another: 'one soul cannot be more or to a greater extent, or again less or to a smaller extent, an attunement than another'. With this reading, t-qp Se (93d6) and rj 5e (93d9) will refer to the soul and not to attunement, as they do in the translation adopted. However, there is no MS. support for the change, and it destroys what looks like a deliberate parallelism of language at 93d2 and 94d4. It also entails taking 93d6—7 in such a way as to anticipate the reasoning of 93d 12—e2.
Or perhaps (94b4—5) 'Is it a man's soul that controls every part of him?' (Hackforth).
(pQopa (95e9, 96b9) has been translated 'destruction', and oXedpos (e.g., 95d2) 'perishing'. The cognate verbs have been translated correspondingly throughout. There seems no significant difference between them, both being used as general terms for 'ceasing to exist'. At 106e aS idcpOopoq will be used as a variant for ai>co\e0po The ancient sense of cpvoeojc; ioTopla (96a8) is preserved, as Burnet says, in 'natural history', but this term is too narrow for the range of inquiries Socrates mentions. Or perhaps (96d5) 'and so the little child had become a big man' (Hackforth). But top opiupdv avdpoinov is naturally taken as one phrase. At 96e9 and throughout 97a—b 6uo has been translated as complement of yiyveodai. Up to 97a 1 this is clearly correct. From 97a4 onwards, however, it is uncertain whether Socrates is talking about 'the coming into being of two' (Hackforth) or about 'one' (or each of a pair of 'ones') 'becoming two' (Tredennick). See on 70c4—8 (p. 104) for the relation between a thing's coming to be F, and Fs coming to be. If 5i5o is a complement at 97b 1, what should be understood as subject of yiyveo6a.il What exactly has 'come to be two'? For this puzzle see on 96e6—97b7. The translation at 97b4, 'why it is that one comes to be', follows Burnet, Hackforth, and Bluck in taking ev as subject. It could be taken as complement by supplying 'things' as its subject—'how it is that things become one' (Tredennick), or by understanding yiyverai impersonally—'how there comes to be one'. See also 101b9—c5 and note 65. More literally (97dl), 'in any other way'. But the implication that a thing's existence is also to be thought of as a way of 'acting or being acted upon' seems unnatural. Literally (98e5), 'by the dog'. For this favourite Socratic oath see E. R. Dodds, ed. Gorgias 482b5. More literally (99b4—5): 'most people, groping, as it were, in the dark' (Bluck). The translation follows an explanation of these lines, cited by Verdenius, as an allusion to blind man's buff. The blindfold player, after catching one of the others, has to 'paw him over' (\&i?Xa^af) and try to guess his name correctly. It is with him that most people are being compared in their mistaken assignment of the term airia. The translation 'kneading-trough' follows the reading KapS&rtq? in Burnet's text at 99b8. In his note he prefers napSonuo, 'the lid of a kneading-trough'. This would fit Aristotle's account of the theory (De Caelo 294b 15). However, the kneading-trough itself, as a round, flat object, would illustrate the theory well enough. npooyeuofiivr) may be retained at 100d6, if it is supposed that it has been assimilated to the preceding substantives (Bluck). The alternatives are to accept Wyttenbach's npooayopevopevr) (defended by Burnet), to read npooyevopevov (Hackforth), or to omit the word altogether (Archer-Hind). With Wyttenbach's conjecture, the question left open will be what the relation between Forms and particulars should be called. With any other reading the sense will be as given in the translation. kvavTlos Xoyoq (101a6) has been translated 'contradiction'. It may mean simply 'an opposing statement', i.e. a denial that A is larger than B by a head. Or it may mean the paradox generated (101a6—b2) by saying that A is larger than B by a head. ev and 8vo are clearly complements of eoeoOcu at 101c6—7. 8vo has also been taken as complement of yeveaQai at lOlcl and 101c5. But 'reason for the coming into being of two' or 'reason for there coming to be two' also seem possible in these lines. Cf.97a—b and note 58. For ovaia (101 c3) see note 7. exeodat has been translated 'hang on to' at lOldl and 101d3. As usually interpreted, it undergoes an abrupt shift of sense from 'hold firmly on to' to 'take issue with'. P. M. Huby (Phronesis 1959, 14. n.l) has suggested reading oxovpevoi; em for exopemq in 101 dl—'riding upon the safety of the hypothesis'—comparing 85dl. But 'exopevoq has occurred at 100d9 in precisely the sense required at lOldl, whereas L.SJ. give no parallel for that required at 101d3. If the text is to be emended, therefore, alteration of the latter passage, such as Madvig's e0oiro, seems preferable. The meaning at 102d3 is uncertain. Socrates may be comparing his cumbersome style with that of a legal document (Archer-Hind), or with artificially balanced prose-writing (Burnet), or 'talking like a professor' (Bluck). gkgIvo (102e5) has been expanded in translation to 'the large in us'. Hackforth translates: 'the Form that is tall can never bring itself to be short: and similarly shortness, even the shortness in us, can never consent to be or become tall' (emphasis added). The words italicized give the impression that the Forms Large and Small as well as 'the large and small in us' are being referred to. Yet these lines can be concerned only with the latter, since the suggestion at 103al that opposites must either withdraw or perish could not apply to the Forms themselves. Much hinges on the grammar and text at 104dl—3. The translation takes on as subject of Kardoxy, on av Karaoxq as subject of avaynd^ei, a as object of awy/cafet, and abrov as referring to on. The alternative is to take on as object of KardaxQ, a as subject of apajKa^ei, and on av KaraoxQ as object of cwajKa^ei. abrou will then refer either to on (Hackforth) or to a (D. O'Brien, C.Q. 1967, 215-6). For the shift from plural to singular on the latter view cf.70e5, and see Burnet on 104d2. On the translation adopted avro is very hard to explain, and would be better emended to aura. If the original reading was aura, an attempt to correct it by a copyist who had misunderstood a... avajKa^ei could explain the readings avro in BT and abrols in W. avro may, however, be correct, and avrois due simply to dittography before ioxew. If so, O'Brien's or Hackforth's version of the sentence will be preferable. For the effect of these alternatives upon the argument see on 104c7—d4. The MSS.' reading amcb at 104d3, retained by Burnet, is very difficult on any interpretation. It seems best either to omit it, as in the translation, or, if evavriov must have a dative, to read rco with Robin or av rep with Bluck. No clear distinctions seem marked by Plato's usage of eЈ5oe, ISea, and nop fir}. At 104d9, as at 104b9, 104d2, 104d6, and 105dl3, tSea appears to be used as a variant for eЈ8o? as used at 104c7. Bluck (17, n.7) and Hackforth (150, n.l), both with reservations, suggest that etSoe on the one hand, and iSea and noptprj on the other, may be aligned with 'transcendent' and 'immanent' Forms respectively. But no safe inferences can, in fact, be drawn from the use of any one of these expressions. The translation follows Burnet's text at 104e8, retaining to 'evavriov. Hackforth and Verdenius would bracket it, as a misguided gloss upon auro. See, however, D. O'Brien, C.Q. 1967,216. The translation retains auro to em4>epov at 105a4, though it may be merely a correct gloss upon eKelvo. Tr\v evavrtdrriTa (a4—5), translated 'the quality opposed', seems a variant for f? 'evavria idea (104d9). emevai, though elsewhere rendered 'attack', has been translated 'enters' at 105a3—4, since in this context its subject seems not to be thought of as hostile to what it visits—cf. rjKew eiri at 105d3. The reference of the pronouns is very obscure. At 105a3, despite Burnet's note, e/cetvo has been taken as subject of be^aodai, and antecedent of o av 'em The translation follows Stephanus in deleting ev tu> at 105b9. This simplifies the Greek and brings it more closely into line with the examples in 105c3—6. Retaining ev tu>, the literal meaning is: 'What is it that, whatever thing it comes to be present in, in its body, that thing will be hot?' The interrogative ri is placed inside the subordinate clause, and deppov agrees with odopan, just as 7reptrroc at 105c5 agrees with the masculine apidpco. Thus the question asks for the specification of an x, such that (x, y) {(x is in body) D (Fy)}. If ■nepmov is read at 105c5 with the first hand in T, it would have to agree with ri at 105c3, and deppov would agree with ri at 105b9. This would invite the specification of an x, such that (x, y) {(x is in y) D (Fx)}. D. O'Brien (C.Q. 1967, 224) rightly rejects this: what is being sought here is a reason for something's being F, not a reason that is itself F. Moreover, the verb voor\oei (105c3) would be far less naturally predicated of a fever than of a body. a8ia At 107b9 the exact referent of tovto auto is uncertain. Is the meaning 'if you make sure that you have followed up the argument as far as is humanly possible' (Burnet), or 'if you secure the hypotheses and the deductions from them' (Archer-Hind)? Perhaps Socrates means that an adequate analysis of the hypotheses would necessarily secure their truth. If so, the two alternatives would, in practice, come to the same thing. Reading ookov (108a5), a more general word than dvotCov, which it includes in its meaning (Verdenius). Or perhaps (108a7—bl) 'after its long period of passionate excitement concerning the body and the visible region' (Bluck). See 68c9 for this sense of enTTofiadcu, rrepL The allusion may, however, be to 81c9—dl, in which case the phrase should be taken as in the translation. Or perhaps (108d2—3> 'but not these things of which he (sc. the theorist alluded to in 108c8) convinces you'. See J. S. Morrison,Phronesis 1959, 105, n.2. The force of Kara (lllc5), and the relationship of the 237 hollows to the regions now to be described, are unclear. Hackforth translates: 'but all round about it there are many places where it is hollowed out'. Bluck: 'and in the earth, in the cavities all over its surface, are many regions'. Retaining 8ia (112c3), and interpreting roi? kclt' eKelva ra peipara with Hackforth, despite the awkwardness of roZ? governed by eiapel. Verdenius suggests 'it flows into the regions which are reached along those streams'. Burnet's text could be translated: 'it flows into the regions of the land along those streams'. But tok remains difficult. Omitting f\v at 113cl with BTW. Retaining ajq itopevoopevoq orav r? eipappevr) Kakq at 115a2— 3. Verdenius explains avrdq at 118a3 as simply marking the fact that the subject of ijirreTo and eineu is not the same as that of \pvxovro and -nrtyvmo in the previous sentence. There is thus no need to suppose, with Burnet, that others had touched Socrates by the executioner's direction, or, with Hackforth, to accept Forster's emendation. cwOk. SELECT AND ADDITIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES TRANSLATIONS H. Tredennick, The Last Days of Socrates, Harmondsworth, 1954. W. D. Woodhead, Plato, SocraticDialogues, London, 1953. EDITIONS, COMMENTARIES ETC. R. D. Archer-Hind, The Phaedo of Plato, (2nd ed.), London, 1894, New York, 1973. R. S. Bluck, Plato's Phaedo, London, 1955. J. Burnet, Plato's Phaedo, Oxford ,1911. W. D. Geddes, The Phaedo of Plato, London, 1863. R. Hackforth,Plato's Phaedo, Cambridge, 1955. R. Loriaux, Le Phedon dePlaton (57a-84b), Namur, 1969. L. Robin, Platon, Phedon, Paris, 1926.
W. J. Verdenius, Notes on Plato's Phaedo, in Mnemosyne 1958, 133-243. Williamson, The Phaedo of Plato, London, 1915. OTHER BOOKS M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, London, 1963, i. 303-24, ii. 141-4, 156-71, 295-303, 310-19, 529-31, 539-48. R. Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic, Oxford, 1953, Chs. 7, 9. T. M. Robinson, Plato's Psychology, Toronto, 1970, Ch. 2. W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, Oxford, 1951, Ch. 3. A. E. Taylor, Plato, the Man and his Work, London, 1929, Ch. 8. ARTICLES J. L. Ackrill, 'Anamnesis in the Phaedo: Remarks on 73c—75c', Exegesis and Argument, 177—95. R. S. Bluck, 'bmdeoeu; in the Phaedo and Platonic Dialectic', Phronesis 1957,21-31. , 'Plato's Form of Equal', Phronesis 1959, 5-11. E. L. Burge, 'The Ideas as Aitiai in the Phaedo', Phronesis 1971, J. Gosling, 'Similarity in Phaedo 73 seq.', Phronesis 1965, 151—61. H. B. Gottschalk, 'Soul as Harmonia', Phronesis \91\, 179-98. R. P. Haynes, 'The form equality as a set of equals: Phaedo 74b-c', Phronesis 1964, 17-26. W. F. Hicken, 'Phaedo 93all-94b3\ Classical Quarterly 1954, 16-22. D. Keyt, 'The Fallacies in Phaedo 102a-107b', Phronesis 1963, 167-72. K. W. Mills, 'Plato's Phaedo 74b7-c6', Phronesis 1957, 128-47, 1958,40-58. D. O'Brien, 'The Last Argument of Plato's Phaedo', Qassical Quarterly 1967, 198-231,1968,95-106. G. E. L. Owen, 'A Proof in the nepi t§ euc', Journal of Hellenic Studies, 1957, Part I, 103-11. P. Plass, 'Socrates' Method of Hypothesis in the Phaedo', Phronesis 1960, 103-14. J. M. Rist, 'Equals and Intermediates in Plato', Phronesis 1964, 27-37. D. S. Scarrow, 'Phaedo 106a—106e', Philosophical Review 1961, 245-53. J. Schiller, 'Phaedo 104-5: Is the Soul a FormV, Phronesis 1967, 50-8. C. C. W. Taylor, 'Forms as Causes in the Phaedo', Mind 1969,45-59. Vlastos, 'Reasons and Causes in the Phaedo', Philosophical Review 1969,291-325. C. J. F. Williams, 'On Dying',Philosophy 1969,217-30. ADDITIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1983 J. Barnes, Critical Notice on D. Gallop, ed. Phaedo, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1978,397-419. J. T. Bedu-Addo, 'The Role of the Hypothetical Method in the Phaedo', Phronesis 1979,111-32. J. Brentlinger, 'Incomplete Predicates and the Two-World Theory of the Phaedo', Phronesis 1972,61-79. N. Castaneda, 'Plato's Phaedo Theory of Relations', Journal of Philosophical Logic 1972,467-480. M. J. Cresswell, 'Plato's Theory of Causality. Phaedo 95-106', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1971,244-49. K. Dorter,Plato'sPhaedo, Toronto, 1982. D. Frede, "The Final Proof of the Immortality of the Soul in Plato's Phaedo 102 A-107 A', Phronesis 1978, 27-41. D. Gallop, 'Relations in tht Phaedo', Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy 1976, Supp. Vol. II 149-63. , 'Plato's "Cyclical Argument" Recycled', Phronesis 1982, 207-22. J. C. B. Gosling,Plato, London 1973, Ch. 10. C. H. Kahn, 'Some Philosophical Uses of "to be" in Plato', Phronesis 1981,105-34. R. J. Ketchum, 'Knowledge and Recollection in the Phaedo. An Interpretation of 74a-75b' J.H.P 1979, 243-53. C. Kirwan, 'Plato and Relativity', Phronesis 1974,112-29.
R. Loriaux, Le Phedon dePlaton (84b-118a), Namur, 1975. M. Matthen, 'Plato's Treatment of Relational Statements in the Phaedo', Phronesis 1982,90-100. A. Nehamas, 'Predication and Forms of Opposites in the Phaedo', Review of Metaphysics 1973,461 —91. 8, 'Plato on the Imperfection of the Sensible World', American
Philosophical Quarterly 1975,105-17. M. D. Reeve, 'Socrates' Reply to Cebes in Plato's Phaedo', Phronesis 1975,199-208. K. M. W. Shipton, 'A Good Second-Best. Phaedo 99b ff:, Phronesis 1979,33-53. C. Stough, 'Forms and Explanation in the Phaedo',Phronesis 1976, 1-30. M. V. Wedin, 'aura rd Јaa and the Argument at Phaedo 74b7—c5', Phronesis 1977,191-205. L. G. Westerink, The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo, Amsterdam, 1976-1977, Vols. I and II. F. C. White, 'Particulars in Phaedo 95e-107a', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1976, Supp. Vol. II, 129-47. , 'The Compresence of Opposites in Phaedo 102', Classical Quarterly 1977,303-11. , Phaedo Republic V on Essences', J.H.P 1978,142-56. N. P. White, Plato on Knowledge and Reality, Indianapolis 1976, ch. 3.
WORKS AND PERIODICALS CITED BY ABBREVIATION
A.C.P.A. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, i, H. Cherniss, Baltimore, 1944.
A.D. Aristotle on Dialectic: the Topics, ed. G. E. L. Owen, Oxford, 1963.
A. G.P. Archiv fur Geschich te der Philosophie.
A.J.P. American Journal of Philology.
A.P.A. American Philosophical Association, Proceedings and Addresses.
C.P. Classical Philology.
C.Q. Classical Quarterly.
C.R. Classical Review.
DK Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, eds. H. Diels and W. Kranz, Berlin, 1951-4. E.A. Exegesis and Argument, eds. E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. Rorty, Assen, 1974. E.A.G.P. Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, eds. J. P. Anton and G. L. Kustas, Albany, 1971.
E.F.P. L'Etre et la Forme selon Platon, R. Loriaux, Bruges, 1955.
E.P.D. An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, I. M. Crombie, 2 vols., London, 1963.
G.I. The Greeks and the Irrational, E. R. Dodds, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951. P. The Greek Particles, J. D. Denniston, Oxford, 1954. G.M. A History of Greek Mathematics, T. L. Heath, 2 vols., Oxford, 1921. S. C.P. Harvard Studies in Classical Philology. A.C.P. 7th Inter-American Congress of Philosophy, Proceedings, 2 vols., Quebec, 1967.
I.P.R. The Interpretation of Plato's Republic, N. R. Murphy, Oxford, 1951.
J.H.P. Journal of the History of Philosophy. L.S.J. H. G. Liddell and R. Scott's Greek Lexicon, revised edition by H. Stuart-Jones, Oxford, 1968.
N.E.P.A. New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. R. Bambrough, London, 1965.
O.E.D. The Oxford English Dictionary. P.A.M. Plato's Analytical Method, K. Sayre, Chicago and London, 1969.
P.E.D. Plato's Earlier Dialectic, R. Robinson, Oxford, 1953.
P.M. W. Plato, the Man and his Work, A. E. Taylor, London, 1929. P.P. Plato's Psychology, T. M. Robinson, Toronto, 1970. P.P.L. Philosophical Papers and Letters, G. W. Leibniz, ed. L. E. Loemker, 2 vols., Chicago, 1956.
P.P.M. Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics, A. Wedberg, Stockholm, 1955.
P.P.R. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
P. Q. Philosophical Quarterly.
P.R. Philosophical Review.
P.T.I. Plato's Theory of Ideas, W. D. Ross, Oxford, 1951.
R.M. Review of Metaphysics.
S.H.G.N. Studies in Honour of Gilbert Norwood, ed. M. E. White, Toronto, 1952.
S.P.M. Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed. R. E. Allen, London, 1965. V.B.A.G. The Verb 'Be'in Ancient Greek, C. H. Kahn, Foundations of Language, Supplementary Series, vol. 16, Dordrecht, 1973. The figures in bold 1 account (logos), 76b, 78d, 115,132-3, 138-9,146-7 (see also arguments, definitions, theories). Alcibiades I, 88. II, 210. anamnesis, 113-14 (see also recollection). Anaxagoras, 72c, 97c-98c, 174-6,221. antinomies, 90c, 155 (see also contradiction-mongers) . Apology, 74-5,228 (n. 15). arguments (logdi), 89b-91c, 146-7, 153-5 (see also account, definitions, theories). Aristotle, 84,148-9, 158,183,191, 200, 210-11, 234 (n. 62). attunement, 85e-86d, 92a-95a, 147-50, 156-67,233 (n.51-3), beauty, lOOb-e, 181-3,230 (n. 33). becoming, 104 (see also coming to be), being, 92-4,135,138-9,145,157,162, 227 (n. 7), 230 (n. 34), 232 (n. 50). birth, being born, 70c-73a, 75b-77d, 88a, 95c-d, 104-7,109-12,114, 171 (see also coming to be), body, 64c-67d, 79b-84b, 86c-e, 87d-88b, 91d, 94b-e, 95c-d, 98c-99a, 105b-d, 115c-e, 86-90, 111, 133, 140-3,147-53,155-6,166-7, 200, 207,209,211-15, 221-2, 227 (n. 10), 230 (n. 35), 231 (n. 36), 237 (n. 75, 79). bravery, 68c-d, 99-100. causality, 95e- 101c, 150,167,169-70, 172-3, 177,179,183-4,208, 21113 (see also explanation, reasons), chance, 58a, 75. change, see variation. Charmides, 99. coming to be, 70d-72d, 95e-101c, 10412,170-4,234 (n. 58), 235(n. 65) (see also birth), comparatives, 70e-71a, 96d-e, lOOe-lOlb, 102b-103c, 108-9,184-6,192-4, 197. fpe refer to the text contradiction-mongers, lOle, 155,189, 191-2 (see also antinomies). Cratylus, 83, 89,97,115,119,141,14: 176,197. Crito, 74, 83-4. death, dying, 64a-c, 67c-68b, 70c-72d, 77b-e, 80c-81a, 84b, 86c-d, 87a- 88d, 91d, 95c-d, 105d-106e, 74-i 86-7,106-14,136-7,146,150-3, 155-6,171,215-6,218,221-2, (n. 4). definitions (logoi), 132-3, 138-9, 146-7, 178-80 (see also account, arguments, theories). Descartes, 144,169. destruction, dispersal, 70a, 77b-78c, 841 95e-96c, 106d-e, 137,170-1, 233 (n. 55), 237 (n. 76) (see also perishing), dialectic, 95,139,190-1. dreams, 60e-61b, 78. dualism, 94-5,143-4 (see also body, mir soul). Eleatics, 173. Empedocles, 140. epiphenomenalism, 148. equality, 74a-75d, 116-31,229 (n. 22, 24-6), 230 (n. 33). Euclid, 123, 210. Euthydemus, 153,155, 183,192,216, 232 (n. 48). existence, 105-6,219-21,234 (n. 59) (see also being), explanation, 169-77,183-4, 211-13, 220-1 (see also causality, reasons) Forms, 65d-e, 74a-77a, 78c-80b, 92d-e, lOOb-lOlc, 102b-106e, 91-8,116-35,138-46,154, 157,172, 174,176-9,181-4, 187-216,218-22, 226 (n. 5-6), (n. 7-8), 229 (n. 21,24-6), 230 (n. 28, 31-2, 34), 232 (n. 50), 235 (n. 63, 66, 69, 70), 236 (n. 72, 74). Frege, 173. God, gods, 58b-c, 61a-b, 62b-63c, 80d-8Ia, 85a-b, 106d, 75, 78, 84-5,141,143,219-21. good, the Good, 97c-99d, 99,103, 175-7,191. goodness, 69a-c, 82b, 93c-94a, 114c, 95-6,98-9,102,161, 222-3, (n. 13) (see also virtue). Gorgias, 76-8, 80, 83, 86,99, 104, 182,223,224, 228(n. 12), (n. 60). hedonism, 99 (see also pleasure). Heracleitus, 110. Hippias 1,173,206, 211. Hume, 84-5. Huxley, T.H., 148. hypothesis, 92d, 93c, 94b, lOOa-b, lOld, 107b, 157, 166,179-81, 187-91,222,237 (n. 77). immortality, 73a, 88b, 95c-d, 105e- 106e, 107c, 114d, 87-90,97, 103, 112-15,136-7, 151-3, 155-6,168-9, 215-22 (see also death, perishing), incomposites, 78c, 137-8,147, 161, 200,230 (n. 30). intelligence, 97c-99c, 174-7, 221,228 (n. 14) (see also mind, soul). justice, 69b-c, 82b, 95-6, 99,102, 223, 226 (n. 5) (see also virtue). know, 74b, 76b-c, 116-17,119-20, (n. 21) (see also knowledge), knowledge, 66d-67b, 73c-76d, 94, 115,117-18,120-1, 131-4, 140,146, 230 (n. 29), 232 (n. 46). Laches, 80,99. largeness, 70e-71a, 96d-e, lOOe-lOlb, 102b-103c, 108-9,130,172, 184-7,192-8, 234 (n. 57), (n. 69). Laws, 79,84-5. learning, 113 (see also knowledge, Recollection). Leibniz, 176. life, living, alive, 70c-72d, 77c-d, 84b, 87d-e, 96b, 105c-d, 106d, 107c, 89-90,105-13,141, 171,208-9,211-16,218-21, 223. like, likeness, 118-19,126,178 (see also similarity). Lucretius, 148. Lysis, 231 (n.41). materialism, 103-4, 137, 143^, 146. mathematics, 95,97, 115,123,169, 200,210-11 (see also numbers), mechanism, 109,169,175, 212. Meno, 102, 113,115,120,133. mind, 89,93 (see also body, intelligence, soul), misology, 89d-91b, 153-4. names, words, 71b, 99b, 102b-103b, 96-7,110,123,139,157, 192,197,223, 234 (n. 61). natural science, 96a-c, 169-77,223, (n. 56). nature, 141,192,197, 230 (n. 30). numbers, 96e-97b, lOlb-c, 103e-105c, 106a-c, 172-4,182, 187, 199203, 205-12,218,234 (n. 58), (n. 65). Olympiodorus, 158,233 (n. 51). Ontological Argument, 217. opinion, 94,146. opposites, 70e-72d, 102e-103c, 76-8, 104,107-10, 139, 174-5, 186-7, 193-4,196-7,199, 201-3, 207-9, (n. 71,74). pain, 59a, 60b-c, 65c, 69a, 83b-84a, 75-8, 89, 145 (see also pleasure), paradigms, 96,125,127-9 (see also Forms). Parmenides, 97,123,128, 182-3, 189, 194,195,197,198,201. participation, lOOc-d, 101c, 102b, 128, 182-4 (see also Forms), perception, see sense-perception, perishing, imperishability, 70a, 86b-d, 87b-88b, 9 Id, 95c-d, 96a ff, 102e-103a, 103d, 104b-c, 105e- 106e, 151-3, 155-6, 170-1, 195-6,198,201, 216-22 (see also destruction). Phaedrus, 89,103,113,138, 144,206. Philebus, 76,89,99,103,176. Philolaus, 6Id, 78-9,148. Philoponus, 158,160-1. philosophy, philosophers, S9a, 61c- 62e, 63e-69e, 82c-84b, 91a-c, lOle, 114c, 98-103,146-7, 155,190, 227 (n. 10), 228 (n. 12), 231 (n. 40). pleasure, 59a, 60b-c, 64d, 65 c, 68e-69b, 81b, 83b-84a, 75-8, 89,99, 101-3,145. predication, 92, 96,125,127-9,131, 182,192-4. Protagoras, 91,99-100,102. purity, purification, 58b, 65e-67b, 69c, 80d-81d, 82c-d, 83d-e, llOe, 113d, 114c, 75. Pythagoreans, 74-5,144,148. reality, 81b, 83b-d, 95,98,144-5 (see also being, truth), reasons (aitiai), 95e-101c, 169-70, 172-7,179-90,209-13,215, 220-1,234 (n. 61), 237 (n. 75) (see also causality, explanation). Recollection, being reminded, 72e-77a, 91e-92d, 113-20,126, 130, 6,156. reincarnation, 70e-72d, 77a-d, 81d-82b, 88a-b,95c-d, 113a, 105-7, 111, 4,144,151-2,168,223-4. relations, relatives, 122-3,128,139, 175,184-5,192-4,198. Republic, 76-8, 80,85,89-91,94-7, 99,103-4,112,119,122,133, 138-9,141,144-7,149,154-5, 161,166-7,177-8,182,187, 191,197, 209, 223-4, 232 (n. 45). Ryle, 97,155. sense-perception, 65b-66a, 73c-76e, 79a-c, 81b-d, 83a-c, 99d-e, 91-2,125-6,129, 140-1,144, 171,177,199-200, 226 (n. 6), 227 (n. 9). similarity, 74a-76a, 79b-80b, 118-19, 126,132,140,142. smallness, see largeness. Sophist, 92,107. soul, 86-91,140, 231 (n. 40), 232 (n. 50), 233 (n. 54) (see also body, intelligence, mind), as intellect, 64c-67e, 79b-84b, 8890,133-4,144,171. as life-principle, 87d-e, 105c-d, 89-90, 200,211-16. goodness and badness in, 93b-94b, 161,163-5. parts of, 89,138,141,161,167. rival accounts of, 148-9,151-2, 167. standards, see paradigms. Strato, 217. suicide, 61c-62c, 78-85. Symposium, 98,107,123,147,151, 223. teleology, 174-7,191 (see also explanation, reasons), temperance, 68c-69b, 82b, 99,101-2. Theaetetus, 89,171,195,197,232 (n. 48) theories (logoi), 99e-100a, 146-7, 154,178-9 (see also account, arguments, definitions). Timaeus, 76, 89,144,175-7,198, 221. truth, 89d-91c, 92,95,98, 154-5, 227 (n. 8) (see also being, reality). universal, 96-7,125,127-8,197-8 (see also Forms). variation, 78c-79e, 90,137-41,144. virtue, 99,102-3,144, 224 (see also goodness). "what F is', 94,123,130-1,139,157, 227 (n. 7), 229 (n. 21, 24-6), 230 (n. 28, 31), 233 (n. 50). wisdom, 68a-b, 69b-c, 79d, 98, 102-3, 228 (n. 12-14). Wittgenstein, 138.
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