Plutarch's Lives: Volume I

Life of Fabius Maximus

I. Such a man did Perikles show himself to be in his most memorable acts, as far as they are extant.

Let us now turn our attention to Fabius.

The first of the family is said to descend from one of the nymphs, according to some writers, according to others from an Italian lady who became the mother of Fabius by Hercules near the river Tiber. From him descended the family of the Fabii, one of the largest and most renowned in Rome. Some say that the men of this race were the first to use pitfalls in hunting, and were anciently named Fodii in consequence; for up to the present day ditches are called fossae, and to dig is called fodere in Latin: and thus in time the two sounds became confused, and they obtained the name of Fabii. The family produced many distinguished men, the greatest of whom was Rullus, who was for that reason named Maximus by the Romans. From him Fabius Maximus, of whom I am now writing, was fourth in descent. His own personal nickname was Verrucosus, because he had a little wart growing on his upper lip. The name of Ovicula, signifying sheep, was also given him while yet a child, because of his slow and gentle disposition. He was quiet and silent, very cautious in taking part in children's games, and learned his lessons slowly and with difficulty, which, combined with his easy obliging ways with his comrades, made those who did not know him think that he was dull and stupid. Few there were who could discern, hidden in the depths of his soul, his glorious and lion–like character. Soon, however, as time went on, and he began to take part in public affairs, he proved that his apparent want of energy was really due to serenity of intellect, that he was cautious because he weighed matters well beforehand, and that while he was never eager or easily moved, yet he was always steady and trustworthy. Observing the immense extent of the empire, and the numerous wars in which it was engaged, he exercised his body in warlike exercises, regarding it as his natural means of defence, while he also studied oratory as the means by which to influence the people, in a style suited to his own life and character. In his speeches there were no flowery passages, no empty graces of style, but there was a plain common sense peculiar to himself, and a depth of sententious maxims which is said to have resembled Thucydides. One of his speeches is extant, a funeral oration which he made in public over his son who died after he had been consul.

II. He was consul five times, and in his first consulship obtained a triumph over the Ligurians. They were defeated by him and driven with great loss to take refuge in the Alps, and thus were prevented from ravaging the neighbouring parts of Italy as they had been wont to do. When Hannibal invaded Italy, won his first battle at the Trebia, and marched through Etruria, laying everything waste as he went, the Romans were terribly disheartened and cast down, and terrible prodigies took place, some of the usual kind, that is, by lightning, and others of an entirely new and strange character. It was said that shields of their own accord became drenched with blood: that at Antium standing corn bled when it was cut by the reapers; that red–hot stones fell from heaven, and that the sky above Falerii was seen to open and tablets to fall, on one of which was written the words "Mars is shaking his arms."

None of these omens had any effect upon Caius Flaminius, the consul, for, besides his naturally spirited and ambitious nature, he was excited by the successes which he had previously won, contrary to all reasonable probability. Once, against the express command of the Senate, and in spite of the opposition of his colleague, he engaged with the Gauls and won a victory over them. Fabius also was but little disturbed by the omens, because of their strange and unintelligible character, though many were alarmed at them. Knowing how few the enemy were in numbers, and their great want of money and supplies, he advised the Romans not to offer battle to a man who had at his disposal an army trained by many previous encounters to a rare pitch of perfection, but rather to send reinforcements to their allies, keep a tight hand over their subject cities, and allow Hannibal's brilliant little force to die away like a lamp which flares up brightly with but little oil to sustain it.

III. This reasoning had no effect upon Flaminius, who said that he would not endure to see an enemy marching upon Rome, and would not, like Camillus of old, fight in the streets of Rome herself. He ordered the military tribunes to put the army in motion, and himself leaped upon his horse's back. The horse for no visible reason shied in violent terror, and Flaminius was thrown headlong to the ground. He did not, however, alter his determination, but marched to meet Hannibal, and drew up his forces for battle near the lake Thrasymenus, in Etruria. When the armies met, an earthquake took place which destroyed cities, changed the courses of rivers, and cast down the crests of precipices; but in spite of its violence, no one of the combatants perceived it. Flaminius himself, after many feats of strength and courage, fell dead, and around him lay the bravest Romans. The rest fled, and the slaughter was so great that fifteen thousand were killed, and as many more taken prisoners. Hannibal generously desired to bury the body of Flaminius with military honours, to show his esteem for the consul's bravery; but it could not be found among the slain, and no one knew how it disappeared.

The defeat at the Trebia had not been clearly explained either by the general who wrote the despatch, or by the messenger who carried it, as they falsely represented it to have been a drawn battle; but as soon as the praetor Pomponius heard the news of this second misfortune, he assembled the people in the Forum, and said, without any roundabout apologies whatever, "Romans, we have lost a great battle, the army is destroyed, and the consul Flaminius has fallen. Now, therefore, take counsel for your own safety." These words produced the same impression on the people that a gust of wind does upon the sea. No one could calmly reflect after such a sudden downfall of their hopes. All, however, agreed that the State required one irresponsible ruler, which the Romans call a dictatorship, and a man who would fulfil this office with fearless energy. Such a man, they felt, was Fabius Maximus, who was sufficiently qualified for the office by his abilities and the respect which his countrymen bore him, and was moreover at that time of life when the strength of the body is fully capable of carrying out the ideas of the mind, but when courage is somewhat tempered by discretion.

IV. As soon as the people had passed their decree, Fabius was appointed dictator,^[19] and appointed Marcus Minucius his master of the horse. First, however, he begged of the Senate to allow him the use of a horse during his campaigns. There was an ancient law forbidding this practice, either because the main strength of the army was thought to lie in the columns of infantry, and for that reason the dictator ought to remain always with them, or else because, while in all other respects the dictator's power is equal to that of a king, it was thought well that in this one point he should have to ask leave of the people. Next, however, Fabius, wishing at once to show the greatness and splendour of his office, and so make the citizens more ready to obey him, appeared in public with all his twenty–four lictors at once; and when the surviving consul met him, he sent an officer to bid him dismiss his lictors, lay aside his insignia of office, and come before him as a mere private citizen. After this he began in the best possible way, that is, by a religious ceremony, and assured the people that it was in consequence of the impiety and carelessness of their late general, not by any fault of the army, that they had been defeated. Thus he encouraged them not to fear their enemies, but to respect the gods and render them propitious, not that he implanted any superstitious observances among them, but he confirmed their valour by piety, and took away from them all fear of the enemy by the hopes which he held out to them of divine protection. At this time many of the holy and mysterious books, which contain secrets of great value to the State, were inspected. These are called the Sibylline books. One of the sentences preserved in these was said to have an evident bearing on contemporary events; what it was can only be guessed at by what was done. The dictator appeared before the people and publicly vowed to the gods a ver sacrum, that is, all the young which the next spring should produce, from the goats, the sheep, and the kine on every mountain, and plain, and river, and pasture within the bounds of Italy. All these he swore that he would sacrifice, and moreover that he would exhibit musical and dramatic shows, and expend upon them the sum of three hundred and thirty–three sestertia, and three hundred and thirty–three denarii, and one–third of a denarius. The sum total of this in our Greek money is eighty–three thousand five hundred and eighty–three drachmas and two obols. What the particular virtue of this exact number may be it is hard to determine, unless it be on account of the value of the number three, which is by nature perfect, and the first of odd numbers, the first also of plurals, and containing within itself all the elements of the qualities of number.

V. Fabius, by teaching the people to rest their hopes on religion, made them view the future with a more cheerful heart. For his own part, he trusted entirely to himself to win the victory, believing that Heaven grants men success according to the valour and conduct which they display. He marched against Hannibal, not with any design of fighting him, but of wearing out his army by long delays, until he could, by his superior numbers and resources, deal with him easily. With this object in view he always took care to secure himself from Hannibal's cavalry, by occupying the mountains overhanging the Carthaginian camp, where he remained quiet as long as the enemy did, but when they moved he used to accompany them, showing himself at intervals upon the heights at such a distance as not to be forced to fight against his will, and yet, from the very slowness of his movements, making the enemy fear that at every moment he was about to attack. By these dilatory manoeuvres he incurred general contempt, and was looked upon with disgust by his own soldiers, while the enemy, with the exception of one man, thought him utterly without warlike enterprise. That man was Hannibal himself. He alone perceived Fabius's true generalship and thorough comprehension of the war, and saw that either he must by some means be brought to fight a battle, or else the Carthaginians were lost, if they could not make use of their superiority in arms, but were to be worn away and reduced in number and resources, in which they were already deficient. He put in force every conceivable military stratagem and device, like a skilful wrestler when he tries to lay hold of his antagonist, and kept attacking Fabius, skirmishing round him, and drawing him from place to place, in his endeavours to make him quit his policy of caution. But Fabius was convinced that he was right, and steadily declined battle. His master of the horse, Minucius, who longed for action, gave him much trouble. This man made unseemly boasts, and harangued the army, filling it with wild excitement and self–confidence. The soldiers in derision used to call Fabius Hannibal's lacquey, because he followed him wherever he went, and thought Minucius a really great general, and worthy of the name of Roman. Minucius, encouraged in his arrogant vauntings, began to ridicule the habit of encamping on the mountain–tops, saying that the dictator always took care to provide them with good seats from which to behold the spectacle of the burning and plundering of Italy, and used to ask the friends of Fabius whether he took his army up so near the sky because he had ceased to take any interest in what went on on the earth below, or whether it was in order to conceal it from the enemy among the clouds and mists. When Fabius was informed of these insults by his friends, who begged him to wipe away this disgrace by risking a battle, he answered, "If I did so, I should be more cowardly than I am now thought to be, in abandoning the policy which I have determined on because of men's slanders and sneers. It is no shame to fear for one's country, but to regard the opinions and spiteful criticisms of the people would be unworthy of the high office which I hold, and would show me the slave of those whom I ought to govern and restrain when they would fain do wrong."

VI. After this, Hannibal made a blunder. Wishing to move his army further from that of Fabius, and to gain an open part of the country where he could obtain forage, he ordered his guides one night after supper to lead the way at once to Casinatum. They, misunderstanding him because of his foreign pronunciation, led his forces to the borders of Campania, near the city of Casilinum, through the midst of which flows the river Lothronus, which the Romans call Vulturnus. This country is full of mountains, except one valley that runs towards the sea–coast, where the river at the end of its course overflows into extensive marshes, with deep beds of sand. The beach itself is rough and impracticable for shipping.

When Hannibal was marching down this valley, Fabius, by his superior knowledge of the country, came up with him, placed four thousand men to guard the narrow outlet, established the main body in a safe position in the mountains, and with the light–armed troops fell upon and harassed the rear of Hannibal's army, throwing it all into disorder, and killing about eight hundred men. Upon this, Hannibal determined to retrace his steps. Perceiving the mistake which he had made, and the danger he was in, he crucified his guides, but still could not tell how to force his way out through the Roman army which was in possession of the mountain passes. While all were terrified and disheartened, believing themselves to be beset on all sides by dangers from which there was no escape, Hannibal decided on extricating himself by stratagem. Taking about two thousand captured oxen, he ordered his soldiers to bind a torch or faggot of dry wood to their horns, and at night at a given signal to set them on fire, and drive the animals towards the narrow outlet near the enemy's camp. While this was being done, he got the remainder of the troops under arms and led them slowly forward. The cattle, while the flame was moderate, and burned only the wood, walked steadily forward towards the mountain side, astonishing the shepherds on the mountain, who thought that it must be an army, marching in one great column, carrying torches. But when their horns were burned to the quick, causing them considerable pain, the beasts, now scorched by the fire from one another as they shook their heads, set off in wild career over the mountains, with their foreheads and tails blazing, setting fire to a great part of the wood through which they passed. The Romans watching the pass were terribly scared at the sight; for the flames looked like torches carried by men running, and they fell into great confusion and alarm, thinking that they were surrounded, and about to be attacked on all sides by the enemy. They dared not remain at their post, but abandoned the pass, and made for the main body. At that moment Hannibal's light troops took possession of the heights commanding the outlet, and the main army marched safely through, loaded with plunder.

VII. It happened that while it was yet night Fabius perceived the trick; for some of the oxen in their flight had fallen into the hands of the Romans; but, fearing to fall into an ambuscade in the darkness, he kept his men quiet under arms. When day broke he pursued and attacked the rearguard, which led to many confused skirmishes in the rough ground, and produced great confusion, till Hannibal sent back his practised Spanish mountaineers from the head of his column. These men, being light and active, attacked the heavily–armed Roman infantry and beat off Fabius' attack with very considerable loss. Now Fabius's unpopularity reached its highest pitch, and he was regarded with scorn and contempt. He had, they said, determined to refrain from a pitched battle, meaning to overcome Hannibal by superior generalship, and he had been defeated in that too. And Hannibal himself, wishing to increase the dislike which the Romans felt for him, though he burned and ravaged every other part of Italy, forbade his men to touch Fabius's own estates, and even placed a guard to see that no damage was done to them. This was reported at Rome, greatly to his discredit; and the tribunes of the people brought all kinds of false accusations against him in public harangues, instigated chiefly by Metilius, who was not Fabius's personal enemy, but being a relative of Minucius, the Master of the Horse, thought that he was pressing the interests of the latter by giving currency to all these scandalous reports about Fabius. He was also disliked by the Senate because of the terms which he had arranged with Hannibal about the exchange of prisoners. The two commanders agreed that the prisoners should be exchanged man for man, and that if either party had more than the other, he should redeem for two hundred and fifty drachmas per man. When, then, this exchange took place, two hundred and forty Romans were found remaining in Hannibal's hands. The Senate determined not to send these men's ransom, and blamed Fabius for having acted improperly and against the interests of the State in taking back men whose cowardice had made them fall into the hands of the enemy. Fabius, on hearing this, was not moved at the discontent of the citizens, but having no money, as he could not bear to deceive Hannibal and give up his countrymen, sent his son to Rome with orders to sell part of his estate, and bring him the money at once to the camp. The young man soon sold the land, and quickly returned. Fabius now sent the ransom to Hannibal and recovered the prisoners, many of whom afterwards offered to repay him; but he would take nothing, and forgave their debt to them all.

VIII. After this the priests recalled him to Rome to perform certain sacrifices. He now transferred the command to Minucius, and not merely ordered him as dictator not to fight or entangle himself with the enemy, but even gave him much advice and besought him not to do so, all of which Minucius set at nought, and at once attacked the enemy. Once he observed that Hannibal had sent the greater part of his army out to forage for provisions, and, attacking the remaining troops, he drove them into their intrenched camp, slew many, and terrified the rest, who feared that he might carry the camp by assault. When Hannibal's forces collected again, Minucius effected his retreat with safety, having excited both himself and the army with his success, and filled them with a spirit of reckless daring. Soon an inflated report of the action reached Rome. Fabius, when he heard of it, said that with Minucius he feared success more than failure; but the populace were delighted, and joyfully collected in the Forum, where Metilius the tribune ascended the rostra, and made a speech glorifying Minucius, and accusing Fabius not merely of remissness or cowardice, but of actual treachery, accusing also the other leading men of the city of having brought on the war from the very beginning in order to destroy the constitution; and he also charged them with having placed the city in the hands of one man as dictator, who by his dilatory proceedings would give Hannibal time to establish himself firmly and to obtain reinforcements from Africa to enable him to conquer Italy.

IX. When Fabius addressed the people, he did not deign to make any defence against the accusations of the tribune, but said that he should accomplish his sacrifices and sacred duties as quickly as possible, in order to return to the army and punish Minucius for having fought a battle against his orders. At this a great clamour was raised by the people, who feared for their favourite Minucius, for a dictator has power to imprison any man, and even to put him to death; and they thought that Fabius, a mild–tempered man now at last stirred up to wrath, would be harsh and inexorable. All refrained from speaking, but Metilius, having nothing to fear because of the privileges of his office of tribune (for that is the only office which does not lose its prerogatives on the election of a dictator, but remains untouched though all the rest are annulled), made a violent appeal to the people, begging them not to give up Minucius, nor allow him to be treated as Manlius Torquatus treated his son, who had him beheaded, although he had fought most bravely and gained a crown of laurel for his victory. He asked them to remove Fabius from his dictatorship, and to bestow it upon one who was able and willing to save the country. Excited as they were by these words, they yet did not venture upon removing Fabius from his post, in spite of their feeling against him, but they decreed that Minucius should conduct the war, having equal powers with the dictator, a thing never before done in Rome, but which occurred shortly afterwards, after the disaster at Cannae, when Marcus Junius was dictator in the camp, and, as many members of the Senate had perished in the battle, they chose another dictator, Fabius Buteo. However, he, after enrolling the new senators, on the same day dismissed his lictors, got rid of the crowd which escorted him, and mixed with the people in the Forum, transacting some business of his own as a private man.

X. Now the people, by placing Minucius on the same footing with the dictator, thought to humble Fabius, but they formed a very false estimate of his character. He did not reckon their ignorance to be his misfortune, but as Diogenes the philosopher, when some one said "They are deriding you," answered "But I am not derided," thinking that those alone are derided who are affected and disturbed by it, so Fabius quietly and unconcernedly endured all that was done, hereby affording an example of the truth of that philosophic maxim that a good and honest man can suffer no disgrace. Yet he grieved over the folly of the people on public grounds, because they had given a man of reckless ambition an opportunity for indulging his desire for battle; and, fearing that Minucius would be altogether beside himself with pride and vain glory, and would soon do some irreparable mischief, he left Rome unperceived by any one. On reaching the camp, he found Minucius no longer endurable, but insolent and overbearing, and demanding to have the sole command every other day. To this Fabius would not agree, but divided his forces with him, thinking it better to command a part than partly to command the whole of the army. He took the first and fourth legion, and left the second and third to Minucius, dividing the auxiliary troops equally with him.

As Minucius gave himself great airs, and was gratified at the thought that the greatest officer in the State had been humbled and brought low by his means, Fabius reminded him that if he judged aright, he would regard Hannibal, not Fabius, as his enemy; but that if he persisted in his rivalry with his colleagues, he must beware lest he, the honoured victor, should appear more careless of the safety and success of his countrymen, than he who had been overcome and ill–treated by them.

XI. Minucius thought all this to be merely the expression of the old man's jealousy. He took his allotted troops, and encamped apart from him. Hannibal was not ignorant of what was passing, and watched all their movements narrowly.

There was a hill between the two armies, which it was not difficult to take, which when taken would afford an army a safe position, and one well supplied with necessaries. The plain by which it was surrounded appeared to be perfectly smooth, but was nevertheless intersected with ditches and other hollow depressions. On this account Hannibal would not take the hill, although he could easily have done so, but preferred to leave it untouched, in order to draw the enemy into fighting for its possession. But as soon as he saw Fabius separated from Minucius, he placed during the night some troops in the depressions and hollows which we have mentioned, and at daybreak sent a few men to take the hill, in order to draw Minucius into fighting for it, in which he succeeded. Minucius first sent out his light troops, then his cavalry, and finally, seeing that Hannibal was reinforcing the troops on the hill, he came down with his entire force. He fought stoutly, and held his own against the soldiers on the hill, who shot their missiles at him; when Hannibal, seeing him thoroughly deceived, and offering an unprotected flank to the troops in the ambush, gave them the signal to charge. Upon this they attacked the Romans from all sides, rushing upon them with loud shouts, cutting off the rearmost men, and throwing the whole army into confusion and panic. Minucius himself lost heart and kept glancing first at one and then at another of his officers, none of whom ventured to stand their ground, but betook themselves in a confused mass to running away, a proceeding which brought them no safety, for the Numidian horsemen, as the day was now theirs, scoured the plain, encompassing the fugitives, and cut off all stragglers.

XII. Fabius had carefully watched the Romans, and saw in what danger they were. Conscious, it would seem, of what was going to happen, he had kept his troops under arms, and gained his information of what was going on, not from the reports of scouts, but from his own eyesight, from a convenient height outside of his camp. As soon as he saw the army surrounded and panic–stricken, and heard the cries of the Romans, who no longer fought, but were overcome by terror, and betaking themselves to flight, he smote his thigh and with a deep sigh, said to his friends, "By Hercules, now Minucius has ruined himself, quicker than I expected, and yet slower than his manoeuvres warranted." Having given orders to carry out the standards as quickly as possible, and for the whole army to follow, he said aloud, "My men, hurry on your march: think of Marcus Minucius; he is a brave man and loves his country. If he has made any mistake in his haste to drive out the enemy, we will blame him for that at another time." The appearance of Fabius scared and drove back the Numidians, who were slaughtering the fugitives in the plain; next he bore against those who were attacking the Roman rear, slaying all he met, though most of them, before they were cut off and treated as they had treated the Romans, betook themselves to flight. Hannibal seeing that the fortune of the battle was changed, and how Fabius himself, with a strength beyond his years, was forcing his way through the thickest battle up the hill to reach Minucius, withdrew his troops, and, sounding a retreat, led them back into his entrenched camp, affording a most seasonable relief to the Romans. It is said that Hannibal as he retired, spoke jokingly about Fabius to his friends in the words, "Did I not often warn you that the dark cloud which has so long brooded on the mountain tops, would at last break upon us with blasts of hail and storm?"

XIII. After the battle Fabius collected the spoils of such of the enemy as were slain, and drew off his forces without letting fall a single boastful or offensive expression about his colleague. But Minucius assembled his own troops, and thus addressed them, "My fellow–soldiers, it is beyond human skill to make no mistakes in matters of importance, but it is the part of a man of courage and sense to use his mistakes as warnings for the future. I myself confess that I have little fault to find with Fortune, and great reason to thank her; for in the space of one day I have learned what I never knew in all my previous life: that is, that I am not able to command others, but myself require a commander, and I have no ambition to conquer a man by whom it is more glorious to be defeated. The dictator is your leader in everything except in this, that I will lead you to express your thankfulness to him, by being the first to offer myself to him as an example of obedience and willingness to carry out his orders." After these words he ordered the eagles to be raised aloft and all the soldiers to follow them to the camp of Fabius. On entering it, he proceeded to the General's tent, to the surprise and wonderment of all. When Fabius was come out, he placed his standards in the ground before him, and himself addressed him as father in a loud voice, while his soldiers greeted those of Fabius by the name of their Patrons, which is the name by which freed men address those who have set them free. Silence being enforced, Minucius said: "Dictator, you have won two victories to–day, for you have conquered Hannibal by your bravery, and your colleague by your kindness and your generalship. By the one you have saved our lives, and by the other you have taught us our duty, for we have been disgracefully defeated by Hannibal, but beneficially and honourably by you. I call you my excellent father, having no more honourable appellation to bestow, since I owe a greater debt of gratitude to you than to him who begot me. To him I merely owe my single life, but to you I owe not only that but the lives of all my men." After these words he embraced Fabius, and the soldiers followed his example, embracing and kissing one another, so that the camp was full of joy and of most blessed tears.

XIV. After this, Fabius laid down his office, and consuls were again elected. Those who were first elected followed the defensive policy of Fabius, avoiding pitched battles with Hannibal, but reinforcing the allies and preventing defections. But when Terentius Varro was made consul, a man of low birth, but notorious for his rash temper and his popularity with the people, he made no secret, in his inexperience and self–confidence, of his intention of risking everything on one cast. He was always reiterating in his public speeches that under such generals as Fabius the war made no progress, whereas he would conquer the enemy the first day he saw him. By means of these boastful speeches he enrolled as soldiers such a multitude as the Romans had never before had at their disposal in any war, for there collected for the battle eighty–eight thousand men. This caused great disquietude to Fabius and other sensible Romans, who feared that if so many of the youth of Rome were cut off, the city would never recover from the blow. They addressed themselves therefore to the other consul, Paulus Aemilius, a man of great experience in war, but disagreeable to the people and afraid of them because he had once been fined by them. Fabius encouraged him to attempt to hold the other consul's rashness in check, pointing out that he would have to fight for his country's safety with Terentius Varro no less than with Hannibal. Varro, he said, will hasten to engage because he does not know his own strength, and Hannibal will do so because he knows his own weakness. "I myself, Paulus," said he, "am more to be believed than Varro as to the condition of Hannibal's affairs, and I am sure that if no battle takes place with him for a year, he will either perish in this country or be compelled to quit it; because even now, when he seems to be victorious and carrying all before him, not one of his enemies have come over to his side, while scarcely a third of the force which he brought from home is now surviving." It is said that Paulus answered as follows: "For my own part, Fabius, it is better for me to fall by the spears of the enemy than be again condemned by the votes of my own countrymen; but if public affairs are indeed in this critical situation, I will endeavour rather to approve myself a good general to you than to all those who are urging me to the opposite course." With this determination Paulus began the campaign.

XV. Varro induced his colleague to adopt the system of each consul holding the chief command on alternate days. He proceeded to encamp near Hannibal on the banks of the river Aufidus, close to the village of Cannae. At daybreak he showed the signal of battle (a red tunic displayed over the General's tent), so that the Carthaginians were at first disheartened at the daring of the consul and the great number of his troops, more than twice that of their own army. Hannibal ordered his soldiers to get under arms, and himself rode with a few others to a rising ground, from which he viewed the enemy, who were already forming their ranks. When one Gisco, a man of his own rank, said to him that the numbers of the enemy were wonderful, Hannibal with a serious air replied, "Another circumstance much more wonderful than this has escaped your notice, Gisco." When Gisco asked what it might be, Hannibal answered, "It is, that among all those men before you there is not one named Gisco." At this unexpected answer they all began to laugh, and as they came down the hill they kept telling this joke to all whom they met, so that the laugh became universal, and Hannibal's staff was quite overpowered with merriment. The Carthaginian soldiers seeing this took courage, thinking that their General must be in a position to despise his enemy if he could thus laugh and jest in the presence of danger.

XVI. In the battle Hannibal employed several stratagems: first, in securing the advantage of position, by getting the wind at his back, for it blew a hurricane, raising a harsh dust from the sandy plains, which rose over the Carthaginians and blew in the faces of the Romans, throwing them into confusion. Secondly, in his disposition of his forces he showed great skill. The best troops were placed on the wings, and the centre, which was composed of the worst, was made to project far beyond the rest of the line. The troops on each wing were told that when the Romans had driven in this part of the line and were so become partly enclosed, that each wing must turn inwards, and attack them in the flank and rear and endeavour to surround them. This was the cause of the greatest slaughter; for when the centre gave way, and made room for the pursuing Romans, Hannibal's line assumed a crescent form, and the commanders of the select battalions charging from the right and left of the Romans attacked them in flank, destroying every man except such as escaped being surrounded. It is related that a similar disaster befel the Roman cavalry. The horse of Paulus was wounded, and threw its rider, upon which man after man of his staff dismounted and came to help the consul on foot. The cavalry, seeing this, took it for a general order to dismount, and at once attacked the enemy on foot. Hannibal, seeing this, said, "I am better pleased at this than if he had handed them over to me bound hand and foot." This anecdote is found in those writers who have described the incidents of the battle in detail. Of the consuls, Varro escaped with a few followers to Venusia. Paulus, in the whirling eddies of the rout, covered with darts which still stuck in his wounds, and overwhelmed with sorrow at the defeat, sat down on a stone to await his death at the hands of the enemy. The blood with which his face and head were covered made it hard for any one to recognise him; but even his own friends and servants passed him by, taking no heed of him. Only Cornelius Lentulus, a young patrician, saw and recognised him. Dismounting from his horse and leading it up to him he begged him to take it and preserve his life, at a time when the State especially needed a wise ruler. But he refused, and forced the youth, in spite of his tears, to remount his horse. He then took him by the hand, saying, "Lentulus, tell Fabius Maximus, and bear witness yourself, that Paulus Aemilius followed his instructions to the last, and departed from nothing of what was agreed upon between us; but he was vanquished first by Varro, and secondly by Hannibal." Having given Lentulus these instructions he sent him away, and flinging himself on to the enemy's swords perished. In that battle it is reckoned that fifty thousand Romans fell, and four thousand were taken prisoners, besides not less than ten thousand who were taken after the battle in the camps of the two consuls.

XVII. After this immense success, Hannibal was urged by his friends to follow up his victory and enter Rome with the fugitives, promising that five days thereafter he should sup in the Capitol. It is not easy to say what reasons could have deterred him from doing so, and it seems rather as if some divinity prevented his march, and inspired him with the dilatory and timid policy which he followed. It is said that the Carthaginian, Barca, said to him, "You know how to win a victory, but do not know how to use one." Yet so great a change was effected by this victory that he, who before it had not possessed a single city, market, or harbour in Italy, and had to obtain his provisions with the utmost difficulty by plunder, having no regular base of operations, but merely wandering about with his army as though carrying on brigandage on a large scale, now saw nearly the whole of Italy at his feet. Some of the largest and most powerful States came over to him of their own accord, and he attacked and took Capua, the most important city next to Rome itself.

It would appear that the saying of Euripides, that "adversity tries our friends," applies also to good generals. That which before this battle was called Fabius's cowardice and remissness, was now regarded as more than human sagacity, and a foresight so wonderful as to be beyond belief. Rome at once centred her last hopes upon Fabius, taking refuge in his wisdom as men take sanctuary at an altar, believing his discretion to be the chief cause of her surviving this present crisis, even as in the old Gaulish troubles. For though he had been so cautious and backward at a time when there seemed to be no imminent danger, yet now when every one was giving way to useless grief and lamentation, he alone walked through the streets at a calm pace, with a composed countenance and kindly voice, stopped all womanish wailings and assemblies in public to lament their losses, persuaded the Senate to meet, and gave fresh courage to the magistrates, being really himself the moving spirit and strength of the State, which looked to him alone to command it.

XVIII. He placed guards at the gates to prevent the mob from quitting the city, and regulated the period of mourning, bidding every man mourn for thirty days in his own house, after which all signs of mourning were to be put away. As the feast of Ceres fell during those days, it was thought better to omit both the sacrifices and the processions than to have them marred by the consciousness of their misfortune, which would be painfully evident in the small number of worshippers and their downcast looks. However, everything that the soothsayers commanded to appease the anger of the gods and to expiate prodigies was carried out. Fabius Pictor, a relative of the great Fabius, was sent to Delphi, and of two of the Vestal virgins who were found to have been seduced, one was buried alive, as is the usual custom, while the other died by her own hand. Especially admirable was the spirit and the calm composure of the city when the consul Varro returned after his flight. He came humbled to the dust, as a man would who had been the cause of a terrible disaster, but at the gate the Senate and all the people went out to greet him. The chief men and the magistrates, amongst whom was Fabius, having obtained silence, spoke in praise of him "because he had not despaired of the State after such a calamity, but had come back to undertake the conduct of affairs and do what he could for his countrymen as one who thought they might yet be saved."

XIX. When they learned that Hannibal after the battle had turned away from Rome to other parts of Italy, the Romans again took courage and sent out armies and generals. Of those the most remarkable were Fabius Maximus and Claudius Marcellus, both equally admirable, but from an entirely different point of view. Marcellus, as has been related in his Life, was a man of activity and high spirit, rejoicing in a hand–to–hand fight, and just like the lordly warriors of Homer. With a truly venturesome audacity, he in his first battles outdid in boldness even the bold Hannibal himself; while Fabius, on the other hand, was convinced that his former reasoning was true, and believed that without any one fighting or even meddling with Hannibal, his army would wear itself out and consume away, just as the body of an athlete when overstrained and exerted soon loses its fine condition. For this reason Poseidonius calls Fabius the shield, and Marcellus the sword of Rome, because the steadiness of Fabius, combined with the warlike ardour of Marcellus, proved the saving of the state. Hannibal, frequently meeting Marcellus, who was like a raging torrent, had his forces shaken and weakened; while Fabius, like a deep quiet river kept constantly undermining them and wasting them away unperceived. Hannibal was at length reduced to such extremities that he was weary of fighting Marcellus, and feared Fabius even though he did not fight: for these were the persons whom he generally had to deal with, as praetors, consuls, or pro–consuls, for each of them was five times consul. He drew Marcellus, when consul for the fifth time, into an ambuscade; but although he tried every art and stratagem upon Fabius he could effect nothing, except once, when he very nearly succeeded in ruining him. He forged letters from the leading citizens of Metapontum, and then sent them to Fabius. These letters were to the effect that the city would surrender if he appeared before it, and that the conspirators were only waiting for his approach. Fabius was so much moved by these letters as to take a part of his army and commence a night march thither; but meeting with unfavourable omens on the way he turned back, and soon afterwards learned that the letters were a stratagem of Hannibal's, who was waiting for him under the city walls. This escape one may attribute to the favour of Heaven.

XX. In the case of revolts and insurrections among the subject cities and allies, Fabius thought it best to restrain them and discountenance their proceedings in a gentle manner, not treating every suspected person with harshness, or inquiring too strictly into every case of suspected disloyalty. It is said that a Marsian soldier, one of the chief men of the allies for bravery and nobility of birth, was discovered by Fabius to be engaged in organizing a revolt. Fabius showed no sign of anger, but admitted that he had not been treated with the distinction he deserved, and said that in the present instance he should blame his officers for distributing rewards more by favour than by merit; but that in future he should be vexed with him if he did not apply directly to himself when he had any request to make. Saying this, he presented him with a war horse and other marks of honour, so that thenceforth the man always served him with the utmost zeal and fidelity. He thought it a shame that trainers of horses and dogs should be able to tame the savage spirit of those animals by careful attention and education rather than by whips and clogs, and yet that a commander of men should not rely chiefly on mild and conciliatory measures, but treat them more harshly than gardeners treat the wild fig–trees, wild pears, and wild olives, which they by careful cultivation turn into trees bearing good fruit. His captains informed him that a certain soldier, a Lucanian by birth, was irregular and often absent from his duty. He made inquiries as to what his general conduct was. All agreed that it would be difficult to find a better soldier, and related some of his exploits. Fabius at length discovered that the cause of his absence was that he was in love with a certain girl, and that he continually ran the risk of making long journeys from the camp to meet her. Without the knowledge of the soldier, he sent and apprehended this girl, whom he concealed in his own tent. Then he invited the Lucanian to a private interview, and addressed him as follows:—"You have been observed frequently to pass the night outside of the camp, contrary to the ancient practice and discipline of the Roman army: but also, you have been observed to be a brave man. Your crime is atoned for by your valiant deeds, but for the future I shall commit you to the custody of another person." Then, to the astonishment of the soldier, he led the girl forward, joined their hands, and said: "This lady pledges her word that you will remain in the camp with us. You must prove by your conduct that it was not from any unworthy motive, for which she was the pretext, but solely through love for her that you used to desert your post." This is the story which is related about him.

XXI. Fabius obtained possession of Tarentum by treachery in the following manner. In his army was a young man of Tarentum whose sister was devotedly attached to him. Her lover was a Bruttian, and one of the officers of Hannibal's garrison there. This gave the Tarentine hopes of effecting his purpose, and with the consent of Fabius he went into the city, being commonly supposed to have run away to see his sister. For the first few days the Bruttian remained in his quarters, as she wished her amour with him not to be known to her brother. He then, however, said: "There was a rumour in the army that you were intimate with one of the chiefs of the garrison. Who is he? for if he is as they say, a man of courage and distinction—war, which throws everything into confusion, will care little what countryman he may be. Nothing is disgraceful which we cannot avoid; but it is a blessing, at a time when justice has no power, that we should yield to a not disagreeable necessity." Upon this the lady sent for her Bruttian admirer and introduced him to her brother. He, by encouraging the stranger in his passion, and assuring him that he would induce his sister to look favourably on it, had no difficulty in inducing the man, who was a mercenary soldier, to break his faith in expectation of the great rewards which he was promised by Fabius. This is the account given of the transaction by most writers, though some say that the lady by whose means the Bruttian was seduced from his allegiance was not a Tarentine, but a Bruttian by race, who was on intimate terms with Fabius; and that as soon as she discovered that a fellow–countryman and acquaintance of hers was in command of the Bruttian garrison, told Fabius of it, and by interviews which she had with the officer outside the walls gradually won him over to the Roman interests.

XXII. While these negotiations were in progress, Fabius, wishing to contrive something to draw Hannibal away, sent orders to the troops at Rhegium to ravage the Bruttian country and take Caulonia by storm. The troops at Rhegium were a body of eight thousand men, mostly deserters: and the most worthless of those disgraced soldiers whom Marcellus brought from Sicily, so that their loss would not cause any sorrow or harm to Rome; while he hoped that by throwing them out as a bait to Hannibal he might draw him away from Tarentum, as indeed he did. Hannibal at once started with his army to attack them, and meanwhile, on the sixth day after Fabius arrived before Tarentum, the young man having previously concerted measures with the Bruttian and his sister, came to him by night and told him that all was ready; knowing accurately and having well inspected the place where the Bruttian would be ready to open the gate and let in the besiegers. Fabius would not depend entirely upon the chance of treachery; but though he himself went quietly to the appointed place, the rest of the army attacked the town both by sea and land, with great clamour and disturbance, until, when most of the Tarentines had run to repel the assault, the Bruttian gave the word to Fabius, and, mounting his scaling ladders, he took the place. On this occasion Fabius seems to have acted unworthily of his reputation, for he ordered the chief Bruttian officers to be put to the sword, that it might not be said that he gained the place by treachery. However, he did not obtain this glory, and gained a reputation for faithlessness and cruelty. Many of the Tarentines were put to death, thirty thousand were sold for slaves, and the city was sacked by the soldiers. Three thousand talents were brought into the public treasury.

While everything else was being carried off, it is said that the clerk who was taking the inventory asked Fabius what his pleasure was with regard to the gods, meaning the statues and pictures. Fabius replied, "Let us leave the Tarentines their angry gods." However, he took the statue of Hercules from Tarentum and placed it in the Capitol, and near to it he placed a brazen statue of himself on horseback, acting in this respect much worse than Marcellus, or rather proving that Marcellus was a man of extraordinary mildness and generosity of temper, as is shown in his Life.

XXIII. Hannibal is said to have been hastening to relieve Tarentum, and to have been within five miles of it when it was taken. He said aloud: "So then, the Romans also have a Hannibal; we have lost Tarentum just as we gained it." Moreover in private he acknowledged to his friends that he had long seen that it was very difficult, and now thought it impossible for them to conquer Italy under existing circumstances.

Fabius enjoyed a second triumph for this success, which was more glorious than his first. He had contended with Hannibal and easily baffled all his attempts just as a good wrestler disengages himself with ease from the clutches of an antagonist whose strength is beginning to fail him; for Hannibal's army was no longer what it had been, being partly corrupted by luxury and plunder, and partly also worn out by unremitting toils and battles.

One Marcus Livius had been in command of Tarentum when Hannibal obtained possession of it. In spite of this, he held the citadel, from which he could not be dislodged, until Tarentum was recaptured by the Romans. This man was vexed at the honours paid to Fabius, and once, in a transport of envy and vain glory, he said before the Senate that he, not Fabius, was the real author of the recapture of the town. Fabius with a smile answered: "Very true; for if you had not lost the place, I could never have recaptured it."

XXIV. The Romans, among many other marks of respect for Fabius, elected his son consul. When he had entered on this office and was making some arrangements for the conduct of the war, his father, either because of his age and infirmities or else intending to try his son, mounted on horseback and rode towards him through the crowd of bystanders. The young man seeing him at a distance would not endure this slight, but sent a lictor to bid his father dismount and come on foot, if he wanted anything of the consul. Those present were vexed at this order, and looked on Fabius in silence, as if they thought that he was unworthily treated, considering his great reputation: but he himself instantly alighted, ran to his son, and embracing him, said: "You both think and act rightly, my son; for you know whom you command, and how great an office you hold. Thus it was that we and our ancestors made Rome great, by thinking less of our parents and of our children than of the glory of our country." It is even said to be true that the great grandfather of Fabius, although he had been consul five times, had finished several campaigns with splendid triumphs, and was one of the most illustrious men in Rome, yet acted as lieutenant to his son when consul in the field, and that in the subsequent triumph the son drove into Rome in a chariot and four, while he with the other officers followed him on horseback, glorying in the fact that although he was his son's master, and although he was and was accounted the first citizen in Rome, yet he submitted himself to the laws and the chief magistrate. Nor did he deserve admiration for this alone.

Fabius had the misfortune to lose his son, and this he bore with fortitude, as became a man of sense and an excellent parent. He himself pronounced the funeral oration which is always spoken by some relative on the deaths of illustrious men, and afterwards he wrote a copy of his speech and distributed it to his friends.

XXV. Cornelius Scipio meanwhile had been sent to Spain, where he had defeated the Carthaginians in many battles and driven them out of the country, and had also overcome many tribes, taken many cities, and done glorious deeds for Rome. On his return he was received with great honour and respect, and, feeling that the people expected some extraordinary exploit from him, he decided that it was too tame a proceeding to fight Hannibal in Italy, and determined to pour troops into Africa, attack Carthage, and transfer the theatre of war from Italy to that country. He bent all his energies to persuade the people to approve of this project, but was violently opposed by Fabius, who spread great alarm through the city, pointing out that it was being exposed to great danger by a reckless young man, and endeavouring by every means in his power to prevent the Romans from adopting Scipio's plan. He carried his point with the Senate, but the people believed that he was envious of Scipio's prosperity and desired to check him, because he feared that if he did gain some signal success, and either put an end to the war altogether or remove it from Italy, he himself might be thought a feeble and dilatory general for not having finished the war in so many campaigns.

It appears that at first Fabius opposed him on grounds of prudence and caution, really fearing the dangers of his project, but that the contest gradually became a personal one, and he was moved by feelings of jealousy to hinder the rise of Scipio; for he tried to induce Crassus, Scipio's colleague, not to give up the province of Africa to Scipio, but if the expedition were determined on, to go thither himself, and he prevented his being supplied with funds for the campaign. Scipio being thus compelled to raise funds himself, obtained them from the cities in Etruria which were devoted to his interests. Crassus likewise was not inclined to quarrel with him, and was also obliged to remain in Italy by his office of Pontifex Maximus.

XXVI. Fabius now tried another method to oppose Scipio. He dissuaded the youth of the city from taking service with him by continually vociferating in all public meetings that Scipio not only was himself running away from Hannibal, but also was about to take all the remaining forces of Italy out of the country with him, deluding the young men with vain hopes, and so persuading them to leave their parents and wives, and their city too, while a victorious and invincible enemy was at its very gates. By these representations he alarmed the Romans, who decreed that Scipio should only use the troops in Sicily, and three hundred of the best men of his Spanish army. In this transaction Fabius seems to have acted according to the dictates of his own cautious disposition.

However, when Scipio crossed over into Africa, news came to Rome at once of great and glorious exploits performed and great battles won. As substantial proof of these there came many trophies of war, and the king of Numidia as a captive. Two camps were burned and destroyed, with great slaughter of men, and loss of horses and war material in the flames. Embassies also were sent to Hannibal from Carthage, begging him in piteous terms to abandon his fruitless hopes in Italy and come home to help them, while in Rome the name of Scipio was in every man's mouth because of his successes. At this period Fabius proposed that a successor to Scipio should be sent out, without having any reason to allege for it except the old proverb that it is dangerous to entrust such important operations to the luck of one man, because it is hard for the same man always to be lucky. This proposal of his offended most of his countrymen, who thought him a peevish and malignant old man, or else that he was timid and spiritless from old age, and excessively terrified at Hannibal; for, even when Hannibal quitted Italy and withdrew his forces, Fabius would not permit the joy of his countrymen to be unmixed with alarm, as he informed them that now the fortunes of Rome were in a more critical situation than ever, because Hannibal would be much more to be dreaded in Africa under the walls of Carthage itself, where he would lead an army, yet reeking with the blood of many Roman dictators, consuls and generals, to attack Scipio. By these words the city was again filled with terror, and although the war had been removed to Africa yet its alarms seemed to have come nearer to Rome.

XXVII. However Scipio, after no long time, defeated Hannibal in a pitched battle and crushed the pride of Carthage under foot. He gave the Romans the enjoyment of a success beyond their hopes, and truly

"Restored the city, shaken by the storm."

Fabius Maximus did not survive till the end of the war, nor did he live to hear of Hannibal's defeat, or see the glorious and lasting prosperity of his country, for about the time when Hannibal left Italy he fell sick and died.

The Thebans, we are told, buried Epameinondas at the public expense, because he died so poor that they say nothing was found in his house except an iron spit. Fabius was not honoured by the Romans with a funeral at the public expense, yet every citizen contributed the smallest Roman coin towards the expenses, not that he needed the money, but because they buried him as the father of the people, so that in his death he received the honourable respect which he had deserved in his life.