Russia A History

2. Muscovite Russia 1450–1598

NANCY SHIELDS KOLLMANN

Sixteenth-century Muscovy was a diverse ensemble of regions, ethnic groups, cultures, historical traditions, and geographic differences. To rule this expanding empire, Moscow’s sovereigns devised strategies of governance that were flexible, integrating, and minimalist; they used coercion rarely, but ruthlessly. The result was a loosely centralized political system rich in ambition, poor in resources, and resilient in the face of crisis.

RUSSIA’S sixteenth century, like that of the Mediterranean in Fernand Braudel’s eyes, was a ‘long sixteenth century’. The hundred and fifty years from 1450 to the death of Tsar Fedor Ivanovich in 1598 was a cohesive era shaped by the tension between the interventionist policies of a state desperate to control its people and the nagging realities of geography, limited resources, and cultural diversity.

It was long-term geographical, institutional, and cultural realities that shaped Muscovy’s drive to mobilize its human and natural resources. So we will try to see the realm as Moscow’s rulers saw it, again evoking Braudel with a focus on long-term sources of change (geography, climate, settlement patterns, trade routes, and other aspects of Braudel’s ‘la longue durée’) and middle-level ones (social and religious structures, ideational systems, etc.) in preference to individuals, wars, and events. But we need to start briefly with Braudel’s ‘histoire événementielle’ to define the constantly expanding territory with which we will be concerned.

‘Russia’ constituted the realm of the grand princes (after 1547, the tsars) of Moscow, the Daniilovich line of the Riurikid dynasty that traced its descent to the rulers of Kievan Rus. Moscow amassed regional power starting in the fourteenth century; by 1450, after a decisive dynastic war, it embarked on expansion that continued unabated into the nineteenth century. Although much has been made of Moscow’s relentless expansion, it was hardly unusual for the time. In Europe the Habsburgs and Jagiellonians were building empires, while England, France, and the Dutch were expanding overseas. They may have justified their expansion by the theory of mercantilism while Muscovy claimed to be restoring the ‘patrimony’ of Kievan Rus, but the motives—pursuit of resources, wealth, power—were the same.

Muscovy’s expansion easily equalled that of other sixteenth-century empires. Russia expanded along lucrative trade routes, towards the Baltic, along the Volga, and into fertile steppe or the fur-bearing north and Siberia. Despite pious claims, much of what Muscovy won had not been part of Kievan Rus and Muscovy’s expansionist zeal never turned to the Ukrainian heartland in the sixteenth century. Under Ivan III Moscow acquired, through marriage, inheritance, coercion, or conquest, contiguous territories that had once been sovereign principalities: Riazan, 1456–1521; Iaroslavl, 1463; Rostov, 1463, 1474; Tver, 1485. With the conquest in 1478 of the Baltic trading city of Novgorod came a rich hinterland stretching to the Urals. Since the conquest of Novgorod and of Pskov in 1510 under Vasilii III put Muscovy face to face with the grand duchy of Lithuania and Sweden, much of the sixteenth century was consumed with wars on the western border, including the draining and fruitless war for Livonia (1558–82). Under Ivan IV (‘the Terrible’) and Fedor Ivanovich Muscovy moved on several fronts, conquering Kazan in 1552 and Astrakhan at the Caspian Sea in 1556, thereby assuring Russian control of the Volga river route. The steppe on either side became the next target of expansion in the second half of the century. Simultaneously, from the 1580s Muscovy was asserting political control into western Siberia, seeking the treasure of furs.

The only significant diversion that Moscow’s rulers faced from these foreign policy goals was the era of the oprichnina (1564–72), a murky episode in which about half the tsardom (almost all the lucrative trading areas north and northwest of Moscow, stretching to the White Sea, plus several major towns in the centre) was designated as Ivan IVs personal realm. Parallel élites, armies, and bureaucracies were formed, with attendant confiscations of land and purges of individuals, clans, institutions, and regions deemed hostile to Ivan IV. The oprichnina might have been intended to consolidate central power, as some have argued, but more likely was the fruit of Ivan IVs own personal devils. Some, such as V. O. Kliuchevskii and S. B. Veselovskii, have argued that Ivan was insane or paranoid; Edward L. Keenan suggests that a debilitating spinal illness made Ivan create the oprichnina in an attempt to abdicate power, an argument made all the more persuasive by Ivan’s later year-long abdication (1574/5) and by his erratic behaviour (he married several times, throwing clan-based court politics into disarray; even after 1572 he patronized a parallel élite of low-born families called the court [dvor]). Certainly some explanation in the psychological realm is required, since evidence shows that the oprichnina had no positive social or political consequences, devastating much of the centre of the realm and disrupting social and institutional structures.

The Span of the Russian Empire

We will begin by surveying the regions that made up Russia in the sixteenth century. There were three large divisions: the north, the centre, and the frontier, primarily a steppe frontier but also including the western border with the grand duchy of Lithuania. The north stretched from the Gulf of Finland in the west to beyond the Urals in the east and from the White Sea south to about 60° L. The north is a land of taiga, a largely coniferous forest turning into tundra and permafrost as one goes north; in addition to the taiga’s acidic and leached soil, its marshiness and the brevity of the growing season (only three to four months, sufficient for only one crop) make it inhospitable to agriculture. This was an area of forest exploitation and trade.

The regions of the north from west to east included Karelia, centred around Lakes Onega and Ladoga and stretching north to the Kola peninsula; the Northern Dvina and Sukhona river basins (Pomore); the Mezen and Pechora river basins (home of the Komi-Zyriane); and the Perm and Viatka lands (key inland fur-trapping regions north-east of Moscow focused on the upper Viatka, Vychegda, and Kama rivers, also home to the Komi-Permians). The indigenous population here was Finno-Ugric speakers of the Uralic language family. Sparse Russian settlement hugged the rivers and shoreline, barely touching the far-eastern Viatka and Perm lands until late in the sixteenth century. Christianity came with Russian settlement but made few inroads among non-East Slavs throughout this time. In the tundra band lived nomadic reindeer herdsmen, fishermen, and hunters: the Finno-Ugric Lapps in Karelia and east of them the Nentsy (called in Russian Samoedy) who speak a Samoedic Uralic language. From the 1580s Muscovite expansion drove across the Urals, moving quickly up the Ob and Irtysh rivers and into the Enisei basin. Garrisons were founded at Tobolsk on the upper Irtysh river in 1587 and at Tomsk on the upper Ob in 1604. But Russian settlement in Siberia remained sparse indeed, save for the garrisons of musketeers and Cossacks mustered from local populace or imported from the north, supported in turn by grain requisitions from Viatka, Perm, and other parts of the north. These garrisons collected tribute from the native peoples: farthest to the north were the Nentsy (Samoedy) living east of the Ob; south of them lived the Ostiaki (the Khanty in Russian) and inland to the west between the Permians and the Ob river lived the Voguly (Mansy to the Russians), also Finno-Ugric speakers.

Since Novgorodian times the dominant social and political organization among East Slavs and the Finno-Ugric population in the taiga lands from Karelia to Perm was the commune (mir, volost), composed of what contemporary sources call the ‘black’ or taxed peasants who were subject to the tsar directly and not subordinate to landlords as well. (Among native peoples of the Urals and western Siberia, however, Russia did not impose communal organization.) Northern communes differed from the nineteenth-century Russian peasant commune where land and labour were collectively shared. These were fiscal entities, territorial groupings of Slavs or non-Slavs for purposes of local administration and taxation. Nor is the term ‘peasant’ particularly appropriate for this populace. Members of communes were not primarily farmers, even the East Slavs among them, but were fishers, bee-keepers, traders, hunters, trappers, and artisans.

Straddling the border between the north and the centre were the Novgorod and Pskov lands to the north-west and the Beloozero and Vologda area north of Moscow. The north-west, including Novgorod and its five contiguous ‘fifths’ (piatiny), and Pskov and its environs, remained a centre of Baltic trade in the sixteenth century, and also supported at least a subsistence level of agriculture and relatively dense population. The Beloozero and Vologda areas lay on active trade routes to the White Sea and were productive centres for fish, salt, and furs. In these various lands the Russian population outnumbered Finno-Ugric speakers by the end of the century. Novgorod and Pskov had long been centres of Christianity and the Beloozero and Vologda areas became, from the mid-fifteenth century, magnets of energetic monastic colonization. Monasteries such as the St Cyril and Ferapontov monasteries near Beloozero, the Spaso-Prilutskii in Vologda, and the Solovetskii Monastery on the White Sea—expanded by taking over settled peasant lands and in the course of the sixteenth century became major local political and economic powers.

Although part of the Muscovite realm from the late 1400s, the north and north-west remained distinct as regions. When Moscow adopted at mid-century a new tax unit for arable land (the large sokha), for example, these areas retained the smaller, Novgorodian unit of measure. Similarly, surviving coin hoards from the second half of the century show a distinct split in the circulation of coinage between a north-west arena and a Moscow central one. Finally, gentry in the north-west were called upon to serve only within that region.

The centre, or ‘Moscow region’ (Zamoskov’e) in contemporary sources, differed from the north and the southern borderlands by its relative ethnic homogeneity, the economic primacy of agriculture, and the social power of landlords. By the early sixteenth century, the centre stretched from Beloozero and Vologda in the north to the Oka river and Riazan lands in the south; its western bounds were the upper Volga Tver lands and its eastern ones lay just beyond the lower Oka and its confluence with the Volga at Nizhnii Novgorod. An extension of the European plain that begins at the Atlantic, the region has a mixed deciduous-coniferous forest. It shares with Europe a continental climate, but its northerly latitude and distance from warming ocean currents made for harsher conditions. The winters are long (five months of snow cover) and cold (January mean temperature is −10.3°C or 13.5°F) and the growing season commensurately short (four to five months); because the soil was not particularly fertile, save for a triangle of loess north-west of Vladimir, yields were at subsistence level. Animal husbandry was limited by the sparseness of yields and the length of the winter which made provisioning large herds prohibitive; as a result natural fertilizer was inadequate. The populace supplemented its diet with food from the forests (hunting, fishing, berries, nuts, mushrooms) and income from artisan work.

The social structure in the centre was more complex than in the north. Settlement here was almost uniformly East Slavic, the indigenous Finno-Ugric peoples having been assimilated by the sixteenth century. Most of the populace, whether urban or rural, was taxed. Peasants lived in small hamlets (one to four households) and practised cultivation systems ranging from primitive slash-burn to three-field rotations depending upon population density, length of settlement in a region, and other factors. In 1450 most peasants were still free of landlord control, living in communes and paying taxes only to the tsar, but by the end of the sixteenth century virtually all of these ‘black’ peasants had been distributed to private landholders. Like the black peasants, artisans and petty merchants in towns were formed into urban communes (posad), which also paid taxes (here assessed not on arable land but as an annual rent or obrok), sales tax, customs, and other duties.

The non-taxpaying landholding strata were either military or ecclesiastical. The clerical populace was divided into ‘black’ (monks, nuns, and hierarchs—all celibate) and ‘white’ clergy (married parish priests). Church landholding increased at a phenomenal rate after 1450; particularly in the turbulent 1560s–70s landholders donated land in large amounts to monasteries, despite repeated legislation prohibiting such gifts (1551, 1572, 1580, 1584). But the Church’s wealth was unevenly distributed: diocesan episcopates and a handful of major monasteries (for example, St Cyril-Beloozero, Simonov, Trinity-Sergius) had immense holdings by the end of the century, but one-fifth of the monasteries possessed no or fewer than five peasant households, and most parish churches possessed none at all.

Secular landholders were all obliged to serve the Moscow grand prince as a part of a cavalry army. A few select families lived in Moscow and enjoyed hereditary privileges to be boyars, that is, counsellors of the grand prince. The rest of the élite ranged from wealthy, large landholders to rank-and-file cavalrymen (called ‘boyar’s children’ [deti boiarskie]). The landholding élite was not a corporate estate with juridical protection, but it did enjoy freedom from taxation, an almost exclusive claim to landownership and high status.

Over the course of the sixteenth century other social groups developed, primarily in the centre. The tsar’s élite merchants (gosti) were first mentioned in the 1550s; by the 1590s two less prestigious associations of official merchants (the gostinnaia and sukonnaia hundreds) were recorded. Merchants managed the tsar’s monopolies (salt, fur, vodka, and the like) or served as tax farmers, customs collectors, and entrepreneurs. In return they enjoyed the right to hold service tenure and hereditary land and to use the tsar’s own courts instead of local governors’ courts. The highest ranks of the chancery secretaries (d’iaki) could also hold hereditary or service tenure lands and utilize the tsar’s courts. Most worked in Moscow, but a few were stationed in the provinces (in 1611 the relative numbers were 55 and 17). In the second half of the sixteenth century most secretaries came from the lesser cavalry ranks. Situated socially between the taxed and non-taxed populations were non-cavalry army units, and of course there were also people who did not fit in—those who refused to be caught in the webs of landlord’s control or urban taxation: vagrants (guliashchie liudi), minstrels (skomorokhi) so vilified by the Church, holy fools, unemployed sons of priests, defrocked clergy, isolated hermits—in sum, the flotsam characteristic of the social diversity of premodern societies.

Perhaps the most remarkable fact about the centre was its juridical diversity. Much of this land was exempt from the grand prince’s government and taxation, a situation that rulers not only tolerated but used to their advantage. Grand princes countenanced areas that were virtually sovereign islands of political independence—the old apanage (udel) principalities, granted to members of the ruling dynasty and other notables. Apanages enjoyed autonomy from the grand prince’s taxation and judiciary and maintained small armies and boyar élites of their own. They were enjoined only against conducting independent foreign policy. From 1450 to 1550 apanages proliferated with the dynasty: Ivan III and Vasilii III each had four brothers, and Ivan IV, one as well as two adult sons. Each received lands with an apanage capital in towns such as Dmitrov, Volok, Uglich, Vologda, Kaluga, and Staritsa.

Similar to dynastic apanages were the holdings of some high-ranking princely families, called ‘service princes’. The apanage rights of princes from the upper Oka basin—the Mosal’skie, Mezetskie, Belevskie, Novosil’skie and others—were extinguished in the early sixteenth century, but two such clans, the Vorotynskie and Odoevskie princes, retained autonomy until 1573. Similarly, descendants of the ruling dynasty of the grand duchy of Lithuania long kept their rights: the Bel’skie until 1571, the Mstislavskie until 1585. Descendants of the ruling lines of Suzdal, Rostov, and other principalities likewise kept some vestige of autonomous rights into the mid-sixteenth century. The grand princes also actively created islands of autonomies as a political strategy. In the mid-fifteenth century, for example, Vasilii II’s government created a quasi-independent Tatar principality at Kasimov, designed as a refuge for a dissident line of the Kazan ruling dynasty and their Tatar retinues and thus as a focal point of opposition to the khanate of Kazan. It was located on the Oka river below Riazan and endured until the mid-seventeenth century. In the mid-sixteenth century an analogous apanage for a line of the Nogai Horde was created at Romanov, which lasted until 1620. In the Urals the Stroganov family acquired quasi-autonomous authority over vast tracts of lands in return for its colonization and trade activities.

Even more expansively the state accorded landlords judicial and administrative authority over their peasants except for major crimes. Ecclesiastical lands were particularly separate. By age-old statutes and tradition, the Orthodox Church had jurisdiction over all the Muscovite Orthodox populace in crimes declared church-related (such as heresy, sacrilege, inheritance, divorce, and adultery); it also exercised virtually total jurisdiction over the people living on its lands. Similarly, Muscovite towns, particularly in the centre, epitomized the patchwork quilt of administration and status that Russian society amounted to in the sixteenth century. Side by side with the taxpaying urban posad in most towns were privileged properties called ‘white places’ (i.e. untaxed), which competed with the trade of the posad. They could be enclaves of musketeers, postal workers, the tsar’s artisans, Europeans, or Tatars; they could be urban courts of monasteries, great boyars, and large landholders. Such communities enjoyed preferential treatment in taxes, tolls, customs, and immunities from the tsar’s judiciary and administration.

It is important to recall, however, that the grand princes tolerated local autonomies as a quasi-bureaucratic convenience; they did not countenance political independence and they kept apanage princes and leading boyars and landholders on a tight rein. They often imposed surety bonds (poruchnye zapisi) on boyars or treaties on their kinsmen to guarantee their loyalty. The grand princes’ closest kin were particularly distrusted, a bitter legacy of the dynastic war of the mid-fifteenth century, when the principle of linear dynastic succession triumphed over collateral succession but at the cost of bitter internecine battles. In succeeding generations uncles and cousins who loomed as potential rivals were closely controlled, forbidden to marry, imprisoned, or even executed. Within ten years of Ivan III’s death in 1505 all collateral lines of the clan had died out, save the Staritsa line, which was finally extinguished in the oprichnina in 1569. The perils of this aggressive pruning of the family tree were exposed in 1598 when the dynasty itself died out, destabilizing the political system almost terminally.

As diverse and dynamic as the centre was, even more volatile was the frontier on the west and south. In some ways calling this area the ‘frontier’ to the exclusion of the others is inaccurate. The north and centre were also riddled with ‘frontiers’—between Slavs and non-Slavs, Orthodox and non-Christians, farmers and trappers, Muslims and ‘pagans’. All these social interfaces generated tensions, synergies, and cross-cultural fertilization. But in the west and the south the classic meaning of ‘frontier’ as outposts of defence and conquest applies. In climate, precipitation, soil quality, and other key measures of agrarian fertility, these lands were far superior to those north of them and thus were coveted. On the west the frontier began with the Novgorod and Pskov lands south of the Gulf of Finland and extended south to the Smolensk area and south again to the upper Oka river region. This relatively narrow north-south strip, located between the sixtieth and fiftieth latitudes, moved from taiga at the Novgorod end through deciduous-coniferous mixed forest, approaching steppe in the south. These lands flanked the grand duchy of Lithuania and were hotly contested throughout the century; between 1491 and 1595 Muscovy spent a total of fifty years at war on the western front. After the rout of the Livonian War (1558–82) and the Time of Troubles (1598–1613) Muscovy yielded lands from Karelia to beyond Smolensk to Sweden (Treaty of Stolbovo, 1617) and the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania (Treaty of Deulino, 1618).

On the western frontier, as in the centre, Moscow tolerated administrative and social diversity. For example, when Smolensk was annexed in 1514, Vasilii III affirmed by charter the landholding and judicial rights historically granted to the region by the grand dukes of Lithuania. Similarly as we have seen, princes from the upper Oka area retained autonomies as ‘service princes’ in Muscovy well into the sixteenth century.

On the south the frontier ran just south of the middle, west–east stretch of the Oka river, from around Tula across the Riazan lands to the border with the Kazan khanate in the east. Moving south from this forested zone one quickly encounters steppe (a prairie rich in grey and black soils), a line that moves roughly diagonally, south-west to north-east, from Kiev to Kazan. This south flank was exposed to raids and warfare: in the sixteenth century the Crimean Tatars made forty-three major attacks on the Muscovite lands, and the Kazan khanate forty. After Moscow conquered Kazan in 1552, the Nogai Horde of the lower Volga took its place as Moscow’s steppe adversary. Already in the 1530s Muscovy fortified a line south of the Oka and at mid-century it conquered Kazan and Astrakhan (1552, 1556). A generally east-west line of fortifications pushed steadily southward from the 1550s; Muscovy also constructed a network of fortresses to fortify the Kazan heartland and Kama basin. In the 1580s Muscovy began to subjugate the Bashkirs, a Tatar nomadic people, on a southern tributary of the Kama, constructing a fort at Ufa in 1586; most of the Bashkirs remained subjects of the Siberian khan until Muscovy’s final defeat of the khan in the late 1590s. A final stage of southern frontier fortification witnessed bold extensions of fortresses down the land and river routes used by the Nogais and Crimeans: Elets (1592), Belgorod, and Tsarev Borisov on the Donets river (1593, 1600).

The Kazan conquest added ethnically and religiously diverse lands to Russia: the élite was Tatar and Muslim, descended from the Golden Horde, but it presided over a variety of peoples who followed animistic cults. They included Finno-Ugric speakers (the Mari or Cheremisy and the Mordva) and Turkic speakers (the Chuvash, said to descend from the Volga Bulgars who had controlled the Volga before the Mongol invasion). The Chuvash and Mordva by and large inhabited the high, right bank of the Volga; the Tatars and Mari, the lowland left bank between the Volga and Kama rivers which had been the heartland of the Kazan khanate. Although fur-trapping, bee-keeping, and trade all engaged the populace, this was also an area of settled agriculture from the twelfth century: the land here was thinly forested or steppe, and the soil was the famous ‘blackearth’ topsoil, a thick layer rich in humus and nutrients.

With Russian conquest the Tatar populace was forcibly removed from the city of Kazan and those dwellings and shops were awarded to artisans, peasants, and lesser military servitors imported from the centre. The lands surrounding Kazan were distributed as service landholdings; there were no free peasant communes here as in the north and little hereditary land (votchina) save that granted to the newly founded archbishopric of Kazan (1555) and new monasteries. Christianization remained a minor goal for the Muscovite state here. Local élites were left relatively untouched as long as they remained loyal to the tsar; they collected the tribute (iasak) and administered communities according to local traditions. Muscovite governors were instructed to govern fairly without coercion. Nevertheless Muscovy was challenged repeatedly by uprisings of Cheremisy, Tatars, and Mari in the 1550s and thereafter.

Culture and Mentality

So diverse a populace cannot be said to have possessed a single mentality. Certainly sources on this for the non-Christian subjects of the tsar are lacking. But since clichés abound about the Russian character even for the Muscovite period, it is worth assessing sixteenth-century Orthodox East Slavs’ attitudes towards the supernatural, community, and family, based on contemporary sources. (One should take with a grain of salt the reports of foreign travellers about popular culture since many were biased by Catholic and Protestant viewpoints, by a post-Reformation zeal for a more rational or more personal spirituality, or by a fascination with the ‘exotic’.)

Sixteenth-century Russians were nominally Orthodox Christian, but that statement is as misleading as saying that most Europeans before the Reformation were Catholic. Just as in pre-Reformation Europe, sixteenth-century Russian Orthodoxy combined Christian beliefs with practices drawn from the naturalist and animistic beliefs of the various Finno-Ugric peoples with whom the East Slavs came in contact. At the 1551 ‘Stoglav’ Church Council (called ‘Stoglav’ or ‘One Hundred chapters’ after the document it issued), the hierarchy identified a wide incidence of improper religious practices, but apparently lacked the resources to change them. Parish schools or seminaries were nonexistent, parish organization was weak, books, sermons, and learning were limited to ecclesiastical élites. The council had to content itself with establishing some mechanisms to supervise parish clergy but otherwise just exhort the faithful to avoid what it considered ‘pagan’ behaviour. By examining death rituals, marriage ceremonies, prayers, and a range of celebratory practices, one can discern a ‘popular culture’, that is, a range of beliefs and practices exhibited by the entire social range which was distinct from the prescriptions of the official Church. That culture featured a view of the world significantly different from the typical Christian one as Eve Levin points out. Rather than seeing the world as basically good, created by God and disrupted by the Devil, sixteenth-century Russians seem to have regarded it as a universe of powerful natural forces ‘neither good nor evil but wilful and arbitrary’. They identified these forces in Christian terms (the Devil) or terms drawn from Finno-Ugric beliefs (nezhit, a force of evil in nature; bears and foxes were equated with evil). They summoned supernatural forces to protect themselves, drawing both on Christian intercessors (Jesus, Mary, and others) and Finno-Ugric (appealing to the power of ritual sites like bathhouses or trees and herbs imbued with supernatural powers). These customs showed no social distinctions: even the tsar’s marriage ceremony shared folk customs associated with fertility; boyars are recorded consulting folk healers; wills with evocations of non-Christian attitudes stem from the landed class.

The Church in the sixteenth century railed against many of these practices, and had some success in asserting its presence and rituals at key moments such as death and marriage. It promoted a new vision of spirituality as well. Until the early 1500s, monasteries, monks, and an ascetic way of life had constituted the norm in church teaching about social and religious behaviour. But as monasteries became less exemplary with greater worldly success, the church hierarchy diversified the focus of spiritual life, offering saints’ cults, sermons, other moralistic writings and teachings, and more ritual experiences to appeal more broadly. As Paul Bushkovitch has noted, official spirituality in the sixteenth century emphasized the collective, public experience of the faith, not the more inner-directed, personal piety that developed among the élite in the next century.

Attitudes towards daily life in the élite can be gleaned from a handbook of household management (the Domostroi), which was most probably based on a foreign secular model, but edited in an Orthodox Christian vein in Muscovy in the mid-sixteenth century. The Domostroi depicts the family as the structuring principle of the community and of the polity; the grand prince is portrayed as the head of the realm construed as a ‘household’, just as the father is the head of an extended household of wife, children, servants, and other dependents. Both patriarchs rule justly but firmly; each demands obedience and responds with just and fair treatment. Women and children are to behave and obey; physical force is recommended to fathers to keep them in line. But women also have remarkably broad latitude and responsibility. Offsetting its otherwise more typical Muscovite misogynistic views of women is the Domostroi’s parallel depiction of them as capable household managers, empowered in the domestic realm. Theirs is the primary responsibility for leading the family to salvation by the example of virtue and piety; theirs is the responsibility of making the household economy and servants productive by skilful management. Christian values such as charity to the poor and just treatment of dependents are balanced by a keen attention to sexual probity all of which values worked towards social stability as much as piety. The Domostroi did not circulate widely in the sixteenth century, but to some extent it did reach the landed gentry.

One can hardly argue that Russians were particularly spiritual or ‘pagan’ in the sixteenth century. This was a typically eclectic premodern Christian community. And, significantly, the church’s de facto tolerance of syncretism, paralleled by the state’s toleration of religious diversity (the Orthodox Church was specifically enjoined against aggressive missionary work in newly conquered areas such as Kazan and Siberia), helped ensure that the sixteenth century passed with remarkably little societal tension over matters of belief, a stark and oft-noted contrast to the turbulent sixteenth century of Reformation in Europe.

Administrative and Economic Strategies of Autocracy

A similar flexibility characterized the administrative, political, and fiscal strategies of the state: rather than trying to fit a uniform policy to lands of dazzling differences, the state modified policies to fit local needs, while never losing sight of its fundamental goals. Muscovite rulers were obsessed with the same issues as their European counterparts: bureaucracy, taxation, and the army. The goal has often been called ‘absolutism’, but the term is applicable only if it is redefined. Recent scholarship shows that in England and France as well as in Muscovy, ‘absolute’ authority was achieved by tolerating and co-opting traditional institutions and élites, rather than by replacing them with rational bureaucratic institutions. What resulted was not homogenization, ‘centralization’, or ‘autocracy’, but resource mobilization.

Muscovy’s first concern in the sixteenth century was to expand its army. The army was primarily a cavalry, composed of a landed élite that served seasonally and provided its own equipment, horses, and training. Expansion was possible after Ivan III developed on a large scale the principle that servitors would be compensated with land given in conditional tenure (pomest’e). Until then hereditary landholding (votchina) had supported landowners and their retinues. The grand prince’s role in recompense was presumably limited to booty and largesse. The large-scale use of service landholding began in Novgorod: over 1,300 service estates were assigned to men transferred there from the centre, while Novgorodian deportees received lands in conditional tenure in the centre (Moscow, Vladimir, Murom, Nizhnii-Novgorod, Pereiaslavl-Zalesskii, Iurev-Polskoi, Rostov Velikii, Kostroma, and elsewhere). Recipients of service land were socially diverse: princes (mainly from Iaroslavl and Rostov), boyars and lesser non-princely families, and also clients (posluzhil’tsy) of such families (who constituted 20 per cent of service land recipients in Novgorod). Thus the service landholding system enriched and expanded the cavalry élite as a whole.

Muscovy found still other ways to expand the army. It recruited infantry militias from the peasants and townspeople by assessing a fixed number of recruits per unit of arable land or households in urban communes. In the north this system persisted through the sixteenth century for purposes of local defence; in areas where ‘black’ peasants were transferred to landlord control, landlords then recruited men according to a calculus issued in 1556—one man per every 100 chetverti of land. Richard Hellie estimates the resultant forces at 25,000 to 50,000 by the end of the century. But these forces were untrained and unspecialized. More valuable to the state were new formations of troops. Responding to the European ‘military revolution’, Russia began to develop regiments of artillery and musketeers (called collectively by the seventeenth century sluzhilye liudi po priboru or ‘contract’ servitors). In the mid-sixteenth century their numbers are estimated to have been around 30,000, thus outnumbering the cavalry servitors (approximately 21,000). By the end of the century there were about 30,000 cavalrymen, some 20,000 musketeers alone, significant numbers of artillery (3,500), as well as frontier Cossack and non-Russian troops (Bashkirs, Tatars).

Contract servitors were most probably recruited from the peasantry or impoverished landed élite; they did not enjoy the high social status or landholding privileges of the cavalry élite. They were garrisoned in towns throughout the realm, but especially on the southern frontier. They stood as a middle social stratum between the taxpaying artisans of the posad and the landed gentry. They supported themselves from trade and farming their own plots; they paid no state tax (the obrok levied on posad people), but did pay tax on their sales.

These military innovations had tremendous impact on Muscovite social structure over the course of the sixteenth century, but differentially so. In the north, not including the Novgorod and Pskov areas, the land would not support nor did local needs require the service landholding system and a landed cavalry élite. Garrisons manned by locally mustered Cossack, musketeers, and militia met the need for border defence. Conversely, the southern steppe frontier had a preponderance of contract servitors living in commune-type regiments. This area had relatively little hereditary landholding (secular or ecclesiastical), few enserfed peasants, few large landholders. What service landholding estates there were were small, farmed by poor cavalrymen with few peasants, making a lower cavalry class distinct from their relatively better-off counterparts in the centre. Social boundaries were fluid on the frontier. Here one finds such anomalies as musketeers holding service landholdings and cavalrymen serving as infantry and holding no land in conditional tenure; here all servitors, even gentry, were obligated to farm state properties and to provide grain reserves.

But in the centre and north-west the service landholding system had a great impact on social relations. By the end of the century service landholding dominated here, although in the centre a significant minority of land remained hereditary. Hereditary tenure was preferred because in theory service landholdings could not be transferred. But since many service tenure holders also held hereditary land, and since service holdings from the very beginning were treated de facto as transferable and hereditable, and since hereditary landholders were also obliged to serve Moscow, hereditary owners (votchinniki) and service tenure holders (pomeshchiki) did not constitute separate social forces, as has traditionally been thought. The landholding élite constituted a consolidated élite, with divisions in power, wealth, and status based on regional association and family heritage, but not according to the type of landholding.

Muscovite grand princes used the system of service landholding to create stronger regional élites by resettlement. From the early sixteenth century they moved new settlers from the centre to areas previously conquered: Novgorod (1478), Viazma (1494), Toropets (1499), Pskov (1510), and Smolensk (1514). Later they continued to make grants of land in conditional tenure to populate newly conquered areas or to bolster frontier economies shattered by war. In the 1570s, for example, petty landholders from the Novgorod environs were moved to the western border (Velikie Luki, Toropets, Dorogobuzh, Smolensk, Viazma), while others were moved to recently captured territories in Livonia. When Russians were driven out of Livonia, they were resettled on the Novgorod frontier. These relocations severed original regional attachments but created new ones elsewhere, forging new regional élites and perhaps a more integrated centre.

Other policies also worked to create regional ‘corporations’ and a central élite. Laws from Ivan III’s time forbade landholders in almost all regions, for example, to sell land to non-locals;parallel injunctions kept land within princely clans. Up until the mid-century Muscovy mustered the bulk of the army by region or princely clans; by the end of the sixteenth century it had developed a more differentiated system of regional gentry ‘corporations’ arranged around towns (goroda). At the social apex was the ‘sovereign’s court’ (gosudarev dvor) with about 3,000 men at mid-century and set apart by privileges and largesse. In land, for example, by the end of the century the highest ranks received 3.5 times more service tenure land than the lowest. They also received largesse from the grand prince: after the victory of Kazan, Ivan IV is said to have distributed 48,000 roubles’ worth of precious objects to his men in three days of feasting. The sovereign’s court also had access to the Kremlin and the person of the ruler, attending daily and at ceremonial occasions and accompanying him on pilgrimages.

The grand princes also forged the metropolitan élite by bolstering the principle of clan. Access to boyar rank was hereditary within clans. Traditionally the number of clans with such access was small: from the 1300s to 1462 it stayed around ten. But with the influx of new servitor families, rulers added new clans to integrate and stabilize the élite. From 1462 to 1533, the number of boyar clans rose from around fifteen to twenty-four, and after the turbulence of Ivan IV’s minority (1533–47) it nearly doubled to forty-six. Rulers used their own marriages to establish the political pecking order among the boyars: with his marriage in 1547 to a daughter of a leading faction (the Romanov clan), for example, Ivan IV resolved the struggles during the period of his minority. In 1555 he went a step further towards reconciliation in the élite by marrying off his distant cousin to a member of the boyar clan, the Bel’skie princes, who had been on the ‘losing’ side in the minority.

Rulers made clan the organizing principle of the sovereign’s court below the boyar level as well. In the system of precedence (mestnichestvo) they offered protection to injured honour for servitors who alleged that their military assignments were beneath their clan’s dignity, measured by genealogy and military service. To that end extensive official records of service and genealogies of the élite were compiled from Ivan III’s time (razriadnye and rodoslovnye knigi).

The Moscow-based sovereign’s court became increasingly high born in the aftermath of the oprichnina and Ivan IVs death when the many low-born families that Ivan IV had patronized in the dvor were relegated to provincial service, while the highborn families who had served in the oprichnina or the regular government (zemshchina) remained in Moscow. Socially, the impact of sixteenth-century policy was not to destroy a ‘feudal’ élite or raise up ‘new men’, as has been often held, but rather to consolidate the landed military élite in the centre into Moscow-based and regional ‘corporations’, divided by status, wealth, and duties.

One reason that the grand princes assiduously cultivated regional solidarities is that they came to use such communities for local administration. Traditionally, Muscovy had ruled through governors (namestniki) in the larger centres and local officials (volosteli) in smaller communities who collected taxes and administered the lands and, in return, received kormlenie (‘feeding’, i.e. material support) from the local populace. Starting in Ivan III’s time, however, the state began to create specialized officers to collect specific taxes and duties—for example, officials to collect taxes for urban fortifications. In the late 1530s the state gave authority over local law and order to ‘brigandage elders’, who were elected by local communities; in the mid-1550s it gave tax-collection authority to boards of taxpayers—peasants or townsmen—elected by their communes. In the centre governors were in effect abolished. The result was not only better local government and higher revenues but also the strengthening of community solidarities in many parts of the realm. In the centre and northwest, landlords became a pillar of the tsar’s administration. They ran the brigandage system and oversaw tax-collection by peasant communes. In the north communal organization was the beneficiary; communes took on all these roles in the absence of gentry to do brigandage work. The work of overseeing was provided by chancery offices in Moscow. The oprichnina and other economic and political dislocations of the 1560s-80s, however, dealt a harsh blow to gentry and to peasant communes in the centre and north-west, and going into the seventeenth century the principle of local representation in governance, except in the north, was severely compromised. A system of governors returned, but the social solidarity of regional gentry communities endured into the seventeenth century.

Many places in the realm, however, stayed outside these administrative reforms and their attendant social impact. As we saw in the Smolensk lands, for example, the indigenous élite retained privileges and social structures of the grand duchy of Lithuania. In non-East Slav areas—western Siberia, the middle Volga, the tundra reaches of the Lapps and Nentsy—the Russians maintained a traditional tribute system (iasak), paid in furs, other goods, and some services and collected by local élites and communities. Where local forces were lacking, Moscow sent specially appointed officials (danshchiki) to collect the annual payment and otherwise left the status quo untouched. (The iasak was phased out as the basis of taxation in Siberia only between 1822 and 1917.) Similarly in major cities on strategic borders (Novgorod, Pskov, Kazan, Astrakhan, Tomsk) governors exercised overall authority, since there was little social basis here for local fiscal or criminal administration. At the same time numerous servitor units stationed here, such as Cossacks, Streltsy (musketeers), and ‘privileged hetman’ (belomestnye atamany), enjoyed autonomies and communal landholdings as regimental units and ran their own affairs collectively.

Not surprisingly, Muscovy did not constitute a uniform legal community. Many legal codes served these various communities. Ecclesiastical law codes came to the Rus lands from Byzantium. The most significant compendium, known as the ‘Rudder’ (kormchaia kniga), was a collection of Byzantine secular and ecclesiastical codes. For day-to-day affairs communes and landlords apparently used the Russkaia pravda, a compendium of customary law from the Kievan era that still circulated in Muscovite lands (a new redaction was even compiled in the early seventeenth century). The grand princes and boyar council promulgated three law codes (1497, 1550, 1589) as procedural handbooks for judges. The 1589 edition was suited to the social structure and economic patterns of the north; contemporary sources also refer to separate law codes in use for the Perm lands (zyrianskii sudebnik).

Such administrative eclecticism strengthened the state, creating quasi-bureaucratic organs that freed grand princes to concentrate on those few issues they considered their own: supreme judicial authority, foreign policy, the army and defence, and above all the mobilization and exploitation of resources. It was a minimalist state, run by the ruler, his counsellors, and a household-based bureaucracy reminiscent of the Carolingian court. Until the mid-sixteenth century the work of the fisc, foreign policy, and the mustering of troops constituted the provenance of two general offices, the treasury, and the court (in the sense of household, not judiciary). By the 1560s, the term prikaz (chancery) was used to denote the many new offices that were being established to meet new needs (the Brigandange, Slavery, and Streltsy Chanceries, for example) or to separate out specific functions (Military Service, Service Land, Foreign Affairs, Postal System Chanceries). By the end of the century there were approximately twenty-four chanceries, a system that was efficient but eclectic and irrational by modern, Weberian standards. No single principle governed the organization and jurisdiction of chanceries. Some had responsibility for a particular social group (the military élite, foreigners); others exercised one function over the entire realm (Fortifications, Slavery, Criminal Chanceries), or had total authority over a particular territory (the Kazan Chancery). Initially led by secretaries, from the time of Boris Godunov boyars ran more and more chanceries, presaging the transformation of the military élite into the ‘noble official’ class that has been chronicled for the seventeenth century.

No less important to the sixteenth-century state than the expansion of the army was the mobilization of wealth. That impelled a new fiscal strategy in 1551—elimination of the tax immunities traditionally enjoyed by lay and ecclesiastical landholders. But the government was inconsistent, issuing new immunities in times of political turbulence (1530s-40s, 1560s-70s, 1590s). At mid-century the state commuted taxes from payment in kind and services to cash, changed the tax assessment unit in the centre, raised existing taxes (especially for the postal system), and introduced new ones. The tribute-bearing peoples of Siberia and the middle Volga also filled Moscow’s coffers, as did a tax on any furs brought to market from Siberia by Russian traders. Income from the tsar’s monopolies such as salt and alcohol production (analogous to medieval European kings’ monopolies or regalia) was also significant and the state aggressively patronized entrepreneurs, whether Russian (the Stroganovs) or foreign (the English Muscovy company received a charter of trade privileges c .1555). Trade through the White Sea with the British and Dutch grew to great proportions in the second half of the century.

But the government’s drive to mobilize eventually blew up in its face. Taxes rose precipitously in the sixteenth century, exceeding the parallel inflationary rise of the century. It has been calculated that taxes rose 55 per cent from 1536 to 1545, another 286 per cent (with commutations to cash) from 1552 to 1556, another 60 per cent in the 1560s, and another 41 per cent in the 1570s before they began a steady decrease in the face of economic distress. At the same time in the 1560s and 1570s the north-west and centre experienced great disruptions from the oprichnina, Livonian War, and natural disasters that included plague, crop failure, and famine. Petty landlords responded by squeezing their peasants for more income, while larger landholders lured peasants to their lands with loans and tax breaks. They also began to consolidate their holdings into demesnes and to extract labour services, two to three days per week by the end of the century on much secular land. Trying to shelter the landed élite, the state ended taxation on landlord’s demesne in the 1580s, shifting the tax burden all the more to peasants. In response the average peasant plot decreased: at the beginning of the century many peasant holdings were the equivalent of a man-sus (in Russian, vyt, that is, the unit of land considered sufficient to support a peasant family). But from the 1570s most holdings ranged between just one-half to one-eighth of a vyt.

All this spelled disaster for peasants and petty gentry, especially in the northwest and centre. Thousands fled to new landlords in the centre or to the relative freedom of the Volga and Kama basins, the Dvina lands, or the southern border. Depopulation was acute: in the mid-1580s only 17 per cent of the land in the Moscow environs was being cultivated, while in the northwest 83 per cent of settlements were deserted. Towns suffered disproportionately: while the populations of urban communes had risen in the first half of the century, posad populations fell by 61 per cent in the 1550s-80s, and then another 45 per cent from the 1580s to the 1610s. In Novgorod in 1582, for example, a census recorded only 122 urban households as occupied and over 1,300 abandoned for such reasons as death of the family (in 76 per cent of the cases) and impoverishment (18 per cent). The economic situation stabilized in the late 1580s, but Russia was plunged again into turmoil by the turn of the century: not only foreign invasion, but crop failure and pestilence accompanied the end of the dynasty in 1598.

Having no other way to support its cavalry, and unwilling to transform this privileged estate into less prestigious contract servitors, the state endeavoured to secure peasant labour for landlords. In 1580 it forbade some peasants to change landlords and in 1592–3 made the ban universal, capping a legislative process that had commenced with restrictions on the peasant’s right to move in the law codes of 1497 and 1550. These ‘forbidden years’ were perceived as temporary but, with the exception of 1601–2, endured thereafter. This incremental enserfment affected most directly the peasants of landlords in the centre, northwest, and steppe frontier, but it also had an impact in the north and Siberia. Cadastres compiled throughout the realm in the 1580s and 1590s served as the basis for registering peasants in communes; they were then forbidden to leave, whether or not they were subject to landlords as well.

Sixteenth-century peasants faced with economic disaster and enserfment had two options. One was to flee to the frontier. Despite decrees beginning in the 1590s that steadily extended the statute of limitations on the recovery of runaway peasants, peasants with the means still had an opportunity to move. For most, however, the older option in hard times—debt slavery—was far more viable. Increasingly in the sixteenth century individuals sold themselves into a limited ‘service-contract’ (kabal’noe) slavery. Slavery offered them not only a loan but also refuge of a lord and freedom from the taxes and services due the state. Understandably, over the course of the sixteenth century, the government sought to regulate hereditary slavery and manumission, to forbid servitors to assume this status (1550), and to limit its duration (1586, 1597).

Mechanisms of Social Integration

The grand princes’ primary goals in the sixteenth century may have been expanding their territory and extracting resources from it, but to do so they needed a minimal degree of social cohesion in the realm as a whole to ensure stability. Their major strategy in this regard, as we have suggested, was to tolerate diversity. Even in contemporaneous Europe, where national realms were small and often ethnically cohesive and where dynasties worked assiduously to create a national unity, the reality was that stability was based not on the ruler’s coercive power but on social traditions of deference to authority and loyalty to community and region. All the more so for Muscovite rulers. They had limited tools of integration and used them judiciously. As in other states, however, they relied on coercion and meted out harsh punishment to disloyal servitors, tax cheats, and rebellious subjects. They were particularly inclined to declare boyars to be in ‘disgrace’ (opala) for brief periods (often a few days) to chasten them and keep them in line. Frequently they tempered the punishments with last-minute reprieves, bestowing their benevolent ‘mercy’ and ‘favour’. They also made abundant use of such harsh punishments as confiscation of property demotion in rank, exile, imprisonment, and execution whenever their authority was challenged. But given the limits of central power in an early modern state, Muscovite tsars relied upon rewards, symbols, and ideas to inculcate loyalty and to disseminate an image of a unified realm. And they put most of their energies into appealing to the élite since its loyalty was crucial to the state’s goals.

Active techniques of integration that touched all society seem to have focused on the Orthodox population. The non-Orthodox (called ‘tribute’ people) generally were neither integrated into the élite (except for the highest clans among them) nor addressed by many of the less tangible institutions of integration. The Church was one of few institutions whose rituals and symbolism reached across the realm; conveniently its teachings legitimated the secular government as appointed by God. The Church and state recognized local holy men as saints on the national or local levels and thus worked to integrate disparate parts of the realm into a putative Orthodox community. Rulers used ritual moments, such as pilgrimages and processions, to demonstrate the ruler’s power, piety, and relationship to his men and people; such moments were often accompanied by the distribution of alms, the founding of new monasteries and chapels, and other overtures to the local community. Ivan IV participated almost incessantly in annual pilgrimages that traversed the centre of the realm; rulers’ ceremonial entrances into conquered cities (see examples in chronicles sub anno 1478, 1552, and 1562) show the tsar both as humble penitent and powerful leader.

Rulers also used architecture as a symbolic statement. Ivan III reconstructed the Kremlin churches into a magnificent ensemble (including a family cathedral, the metropolitan’s see, and a mortuary cathedral) that demonstrated not only his power and strength but, by incorporating architectural motifs from Novgorod and Pskov, the breadth of his conquests. Significantly, the centre-piece of the ensemble was the Dormition (Uspenskii) Cathedral, copied specifically from the metropolitan’s see in Vladimir, not the Kiev example. Throughout the sixteenth century, this church was replicated—at the Trinity-Sergius Monastery, in Pereiaslavl-Zalesskii, Rostov, Vologda, Kazan, and elsewhere—stamping the landscape with a specifically Muscovite cultural idiom. Grand princes also left symbols of their authority in new churches and monasteries built to commemorate military victories (Sviazhsk, 1551; Kazan, 1552; the Church of the Intercession on the Moat or ‘St Basil’s’ in Moscow, 1555–61; Narva, 1558; Velikie Luki, 1562) or to spread their patronage (Mozhaisk, 1563; Pereiaslavl, 1564).

The state also extended protection to all society for ‘injured honour’ (beschest’e) , implicitly defining the state as a community unified by honour. Honour was defined as loyalty to the tsar, to the Church, to one’s social rank, to family and clan. Specifically excluded from the community of honour were ‘thieves, criminals, arsonists, and notorious evil men’, while even minstrels, bastards, and slaves were included (1589 law code). The state also appealed to all its inhabitants with a vision of community by according all subjects, even non-Orthodox, the right to petition the ruler. Individuals used formulae that accentuated their personal dependence on him: they referred to themselves with self-deprecating, although stylized, labels and beseeched the ruler for ‘favour’, be it a grant of land, release from service, or the resolution of litigation. Around 1550 a ‘Petitions Chancery’ was founded to encourage individuals to bring their grievances directly to the ruler.

Petitions, like the Domostroi, suggest symbolically that the ruler and his people were united in a patriarchal, personal family, that the realm constituted a single, homogeneous community. It has been noted that early seventeenth-century texts portray the tsardom as a ‘God-dependent’ community in which all, high and lowly, are personally dependent on the ruler and all equally share a responsibility to serve him loyally and offer him virtuous counsel when he errs. Sixteenth-century chronicle sources also strike these themes of consensus, unanimity, and patrimonial dependence, emphasizing the personal affection between grand princes and their boyars, or criticizing boyars for not giving the ruler counsel or for seeking ‘personal power’ (samovlastie). It is impossible to say how well these ideas were internalized by various strata of the population, but they were consistently and clearly articulated in the sources.

The central focus for building a cohesive state was the court, which sought to project a coherent public image of the realm and its relationship to the élite. Genealogies of the Daniilovich family traced its descent to the Vladimir-Suzdal principality (twelfth and thirteenth centuries), while panegyrics and hagiography created a pantheon of Muscovite heroes, most notably Grand Prince Dmitrii Donskoi (1359–89). The court also patronized cults of the ‘Moscow miracle-workers’, three fourteenth- and fifteenth-century metropolitans (Peter, Alexis, Iona) closely associated with the ruling dynasty. All these texts identified Moscow accurately with its fourteenth-century roots.

In the sixteenth century this vision became more universalist and less accurate. Genealogical tales of the Muscovite grand princes began to extend the family line through Kiev to ancient Rome in a typically Renaissance quest for a classical heritage. By the mid-century even more grandiose visions were constructed, with their roots firmly in the Orthodox past. Metropolitan Makarii’s mid-century compilations of hagiography chronicles, and didactic texts presented Muscovy as a holy kingdom, part of universal Christianity, linked through Kiev Rus to Byzantine Christianity and ultimately to God’s creation of the earth. Icons such as ‘Blessed is the Heavenly Host’ (popularly known as the ‘Church Militant’), new court ceremonies such as Epiphany and Palm Sunday processions, and fresco cycles that filled the interiors of the Kremlin churches and palaces after the fires of 1547, all elaborated a ‘Wisdom Theology’ that immersed the reader or viewer in a biblical world. This vision was decidedly apocalyptic, lending great drama to the symbolic message and perhaps dispensing tension or exaltation among the viewers.

One should be quite clear about what Muscovite ideology was not saying in the sixteenth century. Moscow was not, for example, styling itself the ‘Third Rome’, heir to Rome and Byzantium and natural leader of the world. The ‘Moscow, the Third Rome’ text was a minor theme encountered in only a few ecclesiastical texts; it was originally used only to exhort the tsars to be just and humble, not to justify overweening power. It was most warmly embraced in the seventeenth century, and then by the schismatic Old Believers, at the same time that it was being discredited by the official Church. Nor did Muscovite ideology primarily exalt the tsar as next to God in power and as separate and above the common man. Although this viewpoint, associated with the Byzantine philosopher Agapetus, makes its appearance in mid-sixteenth-century texts, it was usually balanced with Agapetus’ injunction to rulers to govern justly and with mercy. Nor did Muscovy see itself as a secular or pluralistic kingdom. There is no trace in sixteenth-century Muscovy of the keen debates over the natio that flourished in sixteenth-century England, France, Poland, and seventeenth-century Ukraine. Russia was outside that world of discourse; it defined itself in religious, not secular terms, as a family and community, not a state.

Much of this imagery directly appealed to the élite by making use of allegorical military themes. Moscow’s boyars and élite, although illiterate, could absorb a consistent vision of the state and their place in it by gazing at the frescos, battle standards, and icons that decorated the churches and chambers where they attended the tsar. Allegorically these depicted the state as the Lord’s heavenly army, a remarkably apt and probably compelling image for a state whose élite was defined by military service.

The image of the state as a Godly community of virtuous warriors and dependents of the tsar was acted out in collective meetings that first appeared in the mid-sixteenth century. Councils of the Land (zemskie sobory) were summoned at the initiative of the ruler; he set the agenda which usually concerned the issue of war and peace, but occasionally succession and taxation. Those present generally came from non-taxed social strata. The Councils were not parliamentary assemblies; they possessed neither legal definition, nor legislative initiative, nor decision-making power, nor consistent and representative composition. They seem to have fulfilled other functions than legislation; indeed, in the wake of the abolition of regional governors, they served as means of communication of state policy to the countryside to mobilize support for its military and fiscal policy. They also played an important symbolic role by physically creating a community of tsar and people in ritual fashion that may have worked cathartically as Emile Durkheim described rituals working to energize the community, to build bonds, and to resolve tensions. Clearly these were the challenges that stood before Muscovite rulers in the sixteenth century as they sought to bolster stability in constantly growing and vastly diverse lands.

The Autocratic Project

They were not alone in facing such challenges. Religious, linguistic, cultural, and regional diversity was typical of premodern states across the European plain. French kings, for example, ruled over several language communities and had to contend with a basic division in legal relations between pays d’etat (where estates negotiated laws and finances with the kings) and pays selection (where the king’s officers had direct authority). French towns and rural communities used many different legal codes and fiscal systems; corporate groups—estates, guilds, municipalities, professions—enjoyed privileged status. Rulers tried to make diversity work for them, tolerating differences, co-opting élites, maintaining established customs and regional associations as a means to consolidate their own power in the long run.

At first glance Muscovy would seem to have been less successful at these ‘absolutizing’ goals than England or France in the sixteenth century. With the débâcles of the oprichnina, the Livonian Wars, exorbitant taxation, and peasant flight, Muscovy ended the sixteenth century impoverished and politically vulnerable. But if judged over the longer term, Muscovy had achieved a surprising degree of success. The course charted by Ivan III and Vasilii III endured. Ivan IV did not transform political relationships or institutions, nor create a new élite. Many boyar families who dominated politics from Ivan III’s time survived the oprichnina and remained part of the élite into the next century; the new families that Ivan IV patronized by and large fell to provincial gentry status by the end of the century. Resource mobilization, development of a bureaucracy, military reform, and the consolidation of the élite survived the traumas of the 1560s-1580s, as did the march towards enserfment.

At this point it might be appropriate to reflect on the historical significance of Ivan IV ‘the Terrible’, whose enigmatic personality and actions have often been the main concern of narratives of Russia in the sixteenth century. His importance has been exaggerated in part because the oprichnina has long been considered Muscovy’s equivalent to the great clashes of monarchy and nobility or Church and state that made sixteenth-century European politics so turbulent. In other words, Ivan was writ large for historiographical imperatives. But, as already suggested, the oprichnina had no discernible political programme and no lasting results. Ivan’s significance has also been inflated because of the writings attributed to him, primarily a series of letters addressed to the émigré boyar, Prince A. M. Kurbskii, that articulated a claim to unlimited patrimonial power. But Edward L. Keenan has raised serious questions about the authenticity of Ivan’s and Kurbskii’s letters on the basis of manuscript history, content analysis, and linguistic style. Although most scholars have not accepted Keenan’s arguments, many recognize as apocryphal some later pieces of the correspondence and some related texts; the debate and manuscript research on the question endures. Keenan’s challenge sparked a fresh round of enquiry into the political and cultural world Ivan inhabited: was he literate, classically educated, and ahead of his time in political philosophy, or was he—like grand princes, tsars, and boyars before and after him to the mid-seventeenth century—cut from the same cloth as the Muscovite warrior élite, illiterate and little educated, but fiercely loyal to the ethos of Orthodox patrimonial authority? In any case, quandaries over Ivan’s personality and motives pale in the face of Braudel’s ‘longue durée’: Ivan IV did not divert, although he did disrupt, the Daniilovich project. His government, like that of his father and grandfather, made its main task the expansion of the tsardom, the consolidation of the élite, and the integration of a large and disparate realm. Perhaps the best indicator that the Muscovite rulers had managed to increase cohesion in their realm by the end of the sixteenth century was the fact that disparate forces—service tenure landholders from the centre, Cossacks of the steppe frontier, communes of the north—mobilized in the Time of Troubles to rescue the state from foreign invasion. Moscow’s rulers had at least consolidated an élite sufficiently cohesive to hold the state together. This achievement, done at the high human cost of enserfment, was possible because of the skilful use of coercion and co-option, but especially because of the state’s minimalism. However autocratically they styled themselves, Moscow’s rulers could exert their authority in only very narrow arenas. Sixteenth-century Russia is customarily called an ‘autocracy’, taking up the appellation (samoderzhets) that Boris Godunov introduced into the tsar’s title. But if this was an autocracy, it was a pragmatically limited one.