Примечания
1
For detail see Harrison and Simonov, “Voenpriemka,” 233-35
2
Wintrobe, Political Economy of Dictatorship, 247-79.
3
Foa and Mounk, “Democratic Disconnect”; see also Foa et al, Global Satisfaction with Democracy; Drutman, Goldman, and Diamond, Democracy Maybe.
4
IPSOS, Broken-System Sentiment in 2021. The direction of causation is unclear. Acemoglu et al., “(Successful) Democracies Breed Their Own Support,” find that the failure to overcome economic and political crisis contributes to disillusionment with democratic institutions. Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch, “Populist Leaders and the Economy,” draw a line from disillusionment with democracy through the adoption of populist economic policies to poor economic and social outcomes. Combining these findings suggests a self-reinforcing, downward spiral.
5
The phrase coined in David Runciman, “The Trouble with Democracy,” The Guardian (London), 8 November 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/nov/08/trouble-with-democracy-david-runciman
6
For a brief account of terms applied to authoritarian systems in the political science literature, see Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, “A Note on Dictatorship,” in Substate Dictatorship, 311-16. A longer survey and treatment is by Frantz, Authoritarianism.
7
Svolik, Politics of Authoritarian Rule, 78-81.
8
“He [Stalin] must be assessed differently according to the time, the period; there were various Stalins. The postwar Stalin was one Stalin; the prewar Stalin was another, and Stalin between 1932 and the 1940s was yet another Stalin. Before 1932 he was entirely different. He changed. I saw at least five or six different Sta¬lins,” said Lazar Kaganovich, once Stalin’s deputy, looking back after many years. Cited in the editors’ introduction to Davies, Khlevniuk, and Rees, eds., Stalin- Kaganovich Correspondence,
9
The Bible, Job 41; Hobbes, Leviathan.
10
Acemoglu and Robinson, The Narrow Corridor
11
Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, book 3, 24-25.
12
Gunther, Inside Russia Today, 537
13
Some who wrote knowledgeably during the Cold War about what they could see of Soviet secrecy from the outside were journalists (Gunther, Inside Russia Today, 74-81; Smith, The Russians, 420-57); some were specialists (Bergson, “Reliability and Usability”; Hardt, statement in US Congress Joint Economic Commit¬tee, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China- Hutchings, Soviet Secrecy, Maggs, Nonmilitary Secrecy; Rosenfeldt, Knowledge and Power and Stalin’s Special Departments'). Among the contributors were also Russian insiders who made it to the West while the Cold War was still on (Vladimirov, “Glavlit”; Zhores Medvedev, Medvedev Papers and Soviet Science; Birman, Secret Incomes; Dunskaya, Security Practices at Soviet Research Facilities; Agursky and Adomeit, “The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex”)
14
Davies, “Making Economic Policy,” 63.
15
Fitzpatrick, “Closed City and Its Secret Archives,” 780.
16
Harrison, “Economic Information,” 99. A handwritten note on the MVD proposal reads: “Comrades Popov and Serov: consider and resolve. L. Beria.”
17
Among the first collections of this nature were Gregory (ed), Behind the Façade of Stalin’s Command Economy, and Gregory and Lazarev (eds), Economics of Forced Labor. The literature concerned, too voluminous to itemize here, has been surveyed by Gregory and Harrison, “Allocation under Dictatorship”; Kuromiya, “Stalin and His Era”; Ellman, “Political Economy of Stalinism”; Kragh, “The Soviet Enterprise”; and Markevich, “Economics and the Establishment of Stalinism.”
18
Secret archives: Khorkhordina, “Khraniteli sekretnykh dokumentov.” What was secret and what was not: Bone, “Soviet Controls on the Circulation of Information.” The censorship: Goriaeva, Politicheskaia tsenzura; Kurenkov, Zashchita voennoi i gosudarstvennoi tainy. Concealment: Siddiqi, “Soviet Secrecy” and “Atomized Urbanism”; Jenks, “Securitization and Secrecy.” Conspirativeness: Khlevniuk et al., eds, Stalinskoe Politbiuro; Kurenkov, Ot konspiratsiia к sekretnosti; Rosenfeldt, “Special” World. Government mail and telephone communications: Zakharova, “Trust in Bureaucracy and Technology.” Vetting personnel: Grybkaus kas, “The Soviet Dopusk System.”
19
Nikitchenko et al., Kontrrazvedyvatel’nyi slovar’ (classified “top secret”), 279. The Google Ngram Viewer at https://books.google.com/ngrams (accessed December 8, 2020), described by Michel et al., “Quantitative Analysis of Culture,” shows that “rezhim sekretnosti” (the regime of secrecy) was effectively unknown in the Russian-language Google Books corpus of 2019 until 1987. The only exception is a tiny, near-imperceptible spike in 1956
20
Churilov, “Pervyi sovetskii ‘kseroks.’”
21
Lewis, “Communications Output in the USSR,” 411-12.
22
On KGB phone tapping, see Harrison, One Day We Will Live without Fear, 195-200.
23
At times the Kremlin’s foreign exchange was so short that even a Republican KGB could be refused. On 18 March 1974, the chief of the Soviet Lithuania KGB wrote to Moscow on behalf of its information and analysis division requesting provision of a Xerox 720 photocopier. The refusal, dated 28 March, was based on “the extremely limited allocation of foreign currency.” Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/798, 26-27
24
Zakharova, “Trust in Bureaucracy and Technology,” 566-69. More generally, see Solnick, “Revolution, Reform and the Soviet Telephone System,” and Campbell, Soviet Telecommunications System
25
For the English translation see under “Seventeen Moments of Soviet History,” http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917-2/organs-of-the-press/organs-of-the-press -texts/decree-on-the-press/. Egorov and Sonin, “Political Economics of Nondemocracy,” maintain that propaganda and censorship are conceptually the same, in the sense that they both amount to the manipulation of information by truncating some true signal. Organizationally, however, propaganda and censorship place very different demands on state capacity, and this difference explains the emphasis of the present chapter.
26
Lenin, “Pis’mo G. Miasnikovu” (5 August 1921).
27
Kurenkov, Ot konspiratsii k sekretnosti, 169.
28
Kurenkov, Ot konspiratsii k sekretnosti, 170.
29
The centralization of the censorship is described by Goriaeva, Politich- eskaia tsenzura, 162-240. The relative liberalism of the 1920s allowed E. H. Carr to take the story of his multivolume History of Soviet Russia through the end of 1928. Beyond that point, Carr decided, the growing secrecy of Soviet politics and policy making became too great a barrier to the writing of history. Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, Book 1, 6, and Carr, “Russian Revolution and the West,” 27.
30
Bergson, “Reliability and Usability of Soviet Statistics,” 14.
31
Rigberg, “Tsarist Press Law”; “Efficacy of Tsarist Censorship Operations,” and “Tsarist Censorship Performance.” In 1906, for example, the scope of budgetary secrecy was debated in print as Russia moved toward constitutional rule. Avinov, “Sekretnye kredity v nashem gosudarstvennom biudzhete.” Avinov was a prominent Cadet (Constitutional Democrat). I thank Vasilii Zatsepin for this reference.
32
Rigberg, “Efficacy of Tsarist Censorship Operations,” 343.
33
Vladimirov, “Glavlit,” 41. The author, a Soviet science journalist, defected to the United Kingdom in 1966.
34
Various translations of konspiratsiia are possible. Rosenfeldt, “Special” World, 66, prefers the literal equivalent: conspiracy. This does not seem right: while the two words look the same, the Russian konspiratsiia suggests the essence of conspiracy rather than a particular plot, for which the Russian word would be zag- ovor. Katherine Verdery, Secrets and Truths, location 560, translates the Romanian conspirativitate as “conspirativity”; she identifies it with the compartmentalization of intelligence work. It is amusing to add that a book on KGB espionage in the United States (Haynes et al., Spies, chapter 4, under “Harold Glasser”) translates konspiratsiia as “tradecraft.” In its context, this makes perfect sense: conspirativeness was the tradecraft of spies. The distinctive feature of the Soviet Union is that conspirativeness was the tradecraft of every branch of government, including those concerned with, say, licensing motor vehicles, or fixing the price of admission to movie theaters. Finally, while Lih, “Lenin and Bolshevism,” 58, does not offer a translation, he emphasizes the original meaning of konspiratsiia, that of secure communication between the underground party and its agents in the mass movement
35
Kurenkov, Ot konspiratsii к sekretnosti, 24,46.
36
Voronov, “‘Arkhisekretno, shifrom!’”
37
Service, Last of the Tsars, 252-53. On Lenin’s efforts to avoid leaving written evidence of his involvement in various matters, see also 245-46.
38
Kurenkov, Ot konspiratsiia к sekretnosti, 102.
39
Kurenkov, Ot konspiratsiia к sekretnosti, 84.
40
Istochnik, “Praviashchaia partiia”; Khlevniuk et al., eds, Stalinskoe Politbi- uro v 30-e gody, 74-77; Kurenkov, Ot konspiratsiia к sekretnosti, 224-45.
41
Zakharova, “Trust in Bureaucracy and Technology.”
42
Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled, 425-27, recounts the establishment of the Cheka. Werth, “Soviet Union,” tells the history of the Soviet secret police up to the end of World War II.
43
Lezina, “Soviet State Security and the Regime of Secrecy,” 41; see also Rosenfeldt, “Special” World, 98-99.
44
Simonov, “‘Strengthen the Defence of the Land of the Soviets’,” 1360. Also, Cooper, introduction to Cooper, Dexter, and Harrison, “The Numbered Factories and Other Establishments.”
45
Nove, Economic History of the USSR, 331-77; Hanson, Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy, 48-97.
46
Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer; Hardy, Gulag after Stalin.
47
A decree issued in December 1938, in the wake of the Great Terror, required prosecutors seeking the arrest of party members to obtain the prior approval of the provincial party committee. At the time it was assumed that prior approval would not be unreasonably withheld. By the post-Stalin period, depending on both circumstances and personalities, the effect could be to extend a degree of protection to the party member accused of an offence by giving priority to party investigation over the decision to prosecute. Cohn, High Title of a Communist, 51-53.
48
Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 81.
49
Hornsby, Protest, Reform, and Repression, 130-31.
50
Hardy and Skorobogatov, “‘We Can’t Shoot Everyone’.”
51
For the change in public discussion of economic matters, see Hanson, Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy, 67-69
52
Bittner, Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw, 40-74.
53
Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, 165-170, and Substate Dictatorship, 5-11.
54
Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Substate Dictatorship, 47-49,73-77.
55
“The overwhelming majority of the 680,000 people deported to special settlements from 1946 to 1952 were from the newly occupied or reoccupied western regions.... To the extent that there were expulsions of‘internal’ groups ..., these were relatively limited and targeted in nature.” Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, 173П. See further Chapter 5.
56
Adamec, “Courts of Honor.” A postwar court of honor is featured in Chapter 4.
57
Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, 167.
58
Tikhonov, “End of the Gulag”; Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, 123-331
59
Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, 133-42.
60
These themes are shared by various recent histories of the Thaw: Bittner, Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw; Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer; Hardy, Gulag after Stalin; Hornsby, Protest, Reform, and Repression; Jones, ed., Dilemmas of De-Stalinization; Jones, Myth, Memory, Trauma.
61
For the distinction see Frantz, Authoritarianism, 107. The title of Hardy and Skorobogatov, “‘We Can’t Shoot Everyone’,” captures the spirit of the transition: in 1962, Leonid Brezhnev wrote that “we can’t shoot everyone,” but that sense of restraint would not have occurred to anyone in 1937.
62
Starting points can be found in Krementsov, Stalinist Science, and Jenks, “Securitization and Secrecy.”
63
Sam Lebovic, “The Surprisingly Short History of American Secrecy,” July 5, 2016, American Historical Association, https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/summer-2016/the-surprisingly-short-history-of-american-secrecy.
64
Executive Order no. 10290,27 September 1951, Federation of American Scientists website under “Selected Executive Orders on National Security,” https:// fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/. In this chapter, further references to executive orders are given in the text by the name of the president followed by the number of the order and the year of its publication, the text of the order being available at the same address on the Federation of American Scientists website unless otherwise mentioned. See also helpful discussion by Aftergood, “Secrecy and Accountability in U.S. Intelligence”; Elsea, “Protection of Classified Information”; Moynihan Commission, Report; Quist, Security Classification of Information, vol. 1.
65
Nikitchenko et al., eds, Kontrrazvedyvatel’nyi slovar’, 75,292,323-24.
66
Also called “top-top secret” by Agursky and Adomeit, “Soviet Military- Industrial Complex,” 28.
67
Hoover/LYA K-1/10/405, 24-26 and 27-28 (memos to USSR KGB investigation department chief Volkov A. F., both signed by Lithuania KGB investigation department chief Kismanis E., 6 November 1973 and 1 March 1974, respectively)
68
As discussed by Steven Aftergood in “Trump Jr: Declassify Everything!,” FAS Secrecy Blog, December 6, 2020, https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2020/12/declassify-everything/.
69
See also Quist, Security Classification of Information, vol. 1, 72. Once the Cold War came to an end, the Clinton rules (EO no. 12958,1995) for the first time required the opening of all classified documentation after twenty-five years unless specifically exempted, but exemptions were many and broad. The Obama rules (EO no. 13526, 2009) added: “No information may remain classified indefinitely.” Time limits on classification have had practical consequences. These rules were still in force in the winter of 2020. Personnel shortages arising from the COVID- 19 pandemic of that year left officials of many US agencies scrambling to complete their review of documents coming up for otherwise automatic declassification, as discussed by Steven Aftergood in “2020 Declassification Deadline Remains in Force,” FAS Secrecy Blog, December 6,2020, https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2o2o/12/ declass-deadline-2020/.
70
Described by Haynes and Klehr, Venona; Haynes et al., Spies.
71
Executive Order 9835 is available from the Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/executive-orders/9835/executive-order-9835. See also Eisenhower’s EO no. 10450 (1953).
72
Rigby, “Staffing USSR Incorporated”; Harris, “Stalin as General Secretary.”
73
Grybkauskas, “Soviet Dopusk System.”
74
Siddiqi, “Soviet Secrecy.”
75
Corruption: Heinzen, The Art of the Bribe. Cheating: Harrison, “Forging Success.”
76
For example, Egorov and Sonin. “The Political Economics of Nondemocracy.”
77
Rubanov, “Poteri ot zasekrechivaniia informatsii.” Rubanov attributed the estimate to Boris Raizberg, a missile engineer who became an economist.
78
Lih, Bread and Authority in Russia, 269
79
Harrison, “Foundations of the Soviet Command Economy.”
80
The term “police state” had its origins in the mid-nineteenth-century development of Prussia’s bureaucracy, but it became widely used only in the 1950s when observers grappled with the similarities and differences of “totalitarian” rule in Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia. Again, see Google’s Ngram Viewer at https:// books.google.com/ngrams
81
For other purposes, the goals of communist rule might be formulated otherwise. Many economists have sought to analyze the Soviet economy on the basis that the goal of communist rule was to promote civilian development goals such as industrial modernization or productivity growth. An up-to-date example of that tradition, well received and widely cited, is Allen, Farm to Factory. By contrast Kontorovich, Reluctant Cold Warriors, argues that Soviet economic policies and institutions are better understood as promoting military power. For discussion see Harrison, “Foundations of the Soviet Command Economy,” 375-76
82
Marx, Capital, vol. 1, 713-15; Lenin, “Rech’ pered agitatorami,” 327. On 5 February 1918 Lenin spoke to party activists about to fan out to the countryside to campaign for food confiscations: “The old Bolshevik was right,” Lenin said, “when he explained Bolshevism to the Cossack. When the Cossack asked if it was true that the Bolsheviks are looters, the old man replied: Yes, we loot the looters.” “We loot the looters” is a widespread but loose translation of “My grabim nagrablen- noe,” literally, “We loot what was looted.” See also Millar, “Note on Primitive Accumulation.”
83
Lenin, “Groziashchaia katastrofa,” 198. See also Harrison, “Communism and Economic Modernization.”
84
On privacy, Posner, Economics of Justice, 271.
85
Hanson and Sigman, “Leviathan’s Latent Dimensions.”
86
Johnson and Koyama, “States and Economic Growth,” 2.
87
Besley and Persson, Pillars of Prosperity, 6.
88
Dincecco, State Capacity and Economic Development, 2.
89
Dincecco and Katz, “State Capacity and Long-Run Economic Performance”; Besley and Persson, Pillars of Prosperity, 103-68.
90
Aspects of state capacity as complements: Besley and Persson, Pillars of prosperity, 6-10.
91
Finan, Olken, and Pande, “Personnel Economics of the State”; Xu Guo, “Costs of Patronage.”
92
An exception is Skocpol and Finegold, “State Capacity and Economic Intervention.”
93
For historical discussion see Crowfoot and Harrison, “USSR Council of Ministers under Late Stalinism”; Pannell, “Growth, Stagnation, and Transition”; Gregory, Terror by Quota, 81-106; Markevich and Zhuravskaya, “M-form Hierarchy with Poorly-Diversified Divisions.”
94
Markevich, “How Much Control Is Enough?”
95
Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State,” refers to these adjustments as policy changes of first, second, and third order respectively.
96
North, Wallis, and Weingast, Violence and Social Orders, 3-6. On the consequences of political failure, see Fouquet and Broadberry, “Seven Centuries of European Economic Growth”; Broadberry and Wallis, “Growing, Shrinking, and Long Run Economic Performance”; Broadberry and Gardner, “Economic Growth in sub-Saharan Africa.”
97
Acemoglu and Robinson call the domain of coevolution the “narrow corridor”; they call the competitive coevolution of state and society the “Red Queen” effect, and they call the result “Shackled Leviathan.” Acemoglu and Robinson, Narrow Corridor, 33-73.
98
Acemoglu et al., “Perils of High-Powered Incentives”; Acemoglu and Robinson, Narrow Corridor, 354.
99
Besley and Persson, Pillars of Prosperity; Dincecco, State Capacity and Economic Development; and Acemoglu and Robinson, Narrow Corridor. Surprising resilience and fragility in peace and war: communist rule has collapsed in Europe but persists in China, Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba. Communist rule collapsed in the Soviet Union in 1991, at a time of international relaxation, but not in 1941 with the Kremlin in sight of an invading army. Exceptionally, experiences under communism are discussed by the authors of State Capacity Building in Contemporary China, edited by Naito and Macikenaite.
100
Besley and Persson, Pillars of Prosperity, 2-5; Dincecco, State Capacity and Economic Development, 2-6.
101
Bryan Caplan, ‘“State Capacity’ Is Sleight of Hand,” 5 June 2018, https:// www.econlib.org/state-capacity-is-sleight-of-hand/; “The Underbelly of State Capacity,” 7 June 2018, https://www.econlib.org/archives/2018/06/some_stuff_to_k .html; and “State Priorities not State Capacity,” 29 April 2020, https://www.econlib.org/state-priorities-not-state-capacity/.
102
Dincecco, State Capacity and Economic Development, 4-45; Johnson and Koyama, “States and Economic Growth,” 15-16.
103
Europe before 1914: Dincecco and Prado, “Warfare, Fiscal Capacity, and Performance,” and Dincecco, Political Transformations and Public Finances; Europe today: Bruszt and Campos, “Economic Integration and State Capacity.” North America: Acemoglu, Moscona, and Robinson, “State Capacity and American Technology.” Latin America: Cardenas, “State Capacity in Latin America.” Africa: Dincecco, Fenske, and Onorato, “Is Africa Different?” India before Colonial Rule: Dincecco, Fenske, Menon, and Mukherjee, “Pre-colonial Warfare”; and under colonial rule: Roy, “State Capacity and Colonial India.” China before communism: Ma and Rubin, “Paradox of Power.”
104
Geloso and Salter, “State Capacity and Economic Development.” Koyama agrees (cited at length by Bryan Caplan, “Koyama Responds on State Capacity,” 11 June 2018, https://www.econlib.org/archives/2o18/o6/koyama_responds.html).
105
Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” 42.
106
List, National System of Political Economy, Chapter 4 (“The English”).
107
It is important to this conclusion that we start from description of state capacity, not from a normative concept. For example, the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank (https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/) are sometimes used as measures of state capacity (e.g., Savoia and Sen, “Measurement, Evolution, Determinants, and Consequences”). These give weight to such aspects of “good” governance as transparency, accountability, and the rule of law. On those criteria, communist states would generally fall short. The point here is that, while the capacities of communist states may not have been normatively good, they were exceptional in scale and scope.
108
Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles, 3.
109
Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization,” based on a dataset of 161 authoritarian regimes from 1946 to 1998; Frantz, Authoritarianism, 217, based on an expanded dataset of 280 authoritarian regimes from 1946 to 2010, described by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions.” See also Dimitrov, “Understanding Communist Collapse and Resilience,” 5, based on a dataset of “39 noncommunist single-party regimes ...,20 nondemocratic monarchies, and 15 communist regimes.”
110
Levitsky and Way, “Durable Authoritarianism.”
111
Lachapelle et al., “Social Revolution and Authoritarian Durability,” 558; see also Smith, “Life of the Party”; Levitsky and Way, “Durable Authoritarianism.”
112
Yurchak, Everything Was Forever.
113
Johansson, “Security Management.”
114
Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin, “Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media,” 660-61. Their study used scores for media freedom from Freedom House and government effectiveness and regulatory quality scores from the World Bank; it used instrumental variables to check for reverse causation.
115
Economists will recognize this as a “toy” model in the sense of Bliss, “Application of Toy Economic Models.” It lacks generality; it is “silly, little, and useful.”
116
Frankland, Child of My Time, 83.
117
Egorov and Sonin, “Political Economics of Non-democracy,” 2.
118
Wintrobe, Political Economy of Dictatorship, 20-39; Greitens, Dictators and their Secret Police, 34.
119
Egorov and Sonin, “Dictators and Their Viziers”; Zakharov, “Loyalty- Competence Trade-Off in Dictatorships.” The prehistory of this idea is discussed in Chapter 5.
120
“Public choice” is essentially the idea that one can understand political activity in the same way as economic activity, that is, individual political actors pursue their perceived self-interest by allocating resources and cooperating or competing with others subject to material and institutional constraints. See Shughart, “Public Choice.”
121
Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin, “Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media.”
122
In the context of US secrecy, this language is found on almost every page of the chairman’s foreword to the Report of the Moynihan Commission, xxxi- xlv, as well as throughout the report itself. In the Soviet context see Mikoyan, “Eroding the Soviet ‘Culture of Secrecy’”; Zakharova, “Trust in Bureaucracy and Technology.”
123
Lih, “Lenin and Bolshevism,” 58, traces the Bolshevik idea of “conspirativeness” back to the revolutionary underground of 1906.
124
Plokhy, Chernobyl, 247-48.
125
On the secret councils of Imperial Russia, see Tarschys, “Secret Institutions in Russian Government.”
126
North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, 3-4.
127
Totalitarian rule: Goriaeva, Politicheskaia tsenzura v SSSR, 8. Foreign encirclement: Kurenkov, Ot konspiratsiia к sekretnosti, 219.
128
United Nations, Basic Principles of the System of Balances.
129
Goskomstat, Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1990 g., 5.
130
The problem of comparing “the size of the public sector” across the OECD is further discussed by Lanfranchi and Perrin, Measuring Public Employment in OECD Countries.
131
On Soviet statistics see Treml and Hardt (eds), Soviet Economic Statistics; Wheatcroft and Davies, “Crooked Mirror of Soviet Economic Statistics.”
132
Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/639, 6
133
To illustrate, ledger no. 221 of the Lithuania KGB listed decrees, directives, and instructions from the KGB headquarters in Moscow through 1972, divided into sections: top secret (pages 1 to 30), secret (31 to 90), nonsecret (121 to 180), and “for personnel” fpo lichnomu sostavu) (181 to 200). Hoover/LYA K-1/10/403, 1-110.
134
Hoover/GARF R94i4/ia/i93,4-40 (deed of transfer signed by former chief of MVD Gulag Chirkov and deputy chief Kovalev, 7 January 1953).
135
Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575,107 (deed signed by military unit 7557 chief of secret unit Kozyrevskii, manager of archival file office Yakushev, and secret unit despatcher Ludtsev, 10 November 1951)—a document with the wrong serial number. Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575, 28 (deed signed by MVD security administration chief of secretariat Polovnev and filing officer Laskina, 13 June 1951)—a document with the wrong number of sheets appended. Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575, 31 (deed signed by MVD Sakhalin ITL administration, chief of secret unit Sil’vanovskii, senior inspector Karpukhina, and senior inspector Kovbasa, 31 July 1951)—a document lacking “secret” classification. Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575, 33 (deed signed by Riazan oblast UMVD, chief of secretariat Aleshin, filing officer Gracheva, and typist Kochetygova, 13 August 1951)—a document intended for another recipient. Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575, 35 (deed signed by MVD Gulag senior operational commissioner of secretariat Shaposhnikov, assistant Petrova, and assistant inspector of secretariat Baranova, 17 August 1951)—documents wrongly numbered and wrongly addressed. From another archive, Hoover/LYA K-1/10/308, 56 (deed signed by 301 Training Parachute Regiment Capt. Sliadnev, Junior Sergeant Shlez- inger, and servicewoman Os’kina, addressed to USSR KGB special department chief, copied to Lithuania KGB second administration, 22 March 1963)—a document wrongly classified and wrongly addressed.
136
Hoover/LYA K-1/10/406, 1-2 (memo to Lithuania KGB deputy chairman Aleksandrov, signed by seventh department chief Bukauskas and seventh department second section chief Abramov, 14 March 1972). Hoover/LYA K-1/10/406, 16 (memo to Lithuania KGB acting deputy chairman for personnel Armonavicus, signed by USSR KGB training department chief Ivanov, 21 March 1972). Hoover/ LYA K-1/10/406, 17 (memo signed by Lithuania KGB chairman Petkevicius, 29 March 1972). Hoover/LYA K-1/10/406, 18-19 (finding of investigation, signed by Lithuania KGB investigation department senior investigator Urbonas and chief Kismanis, 3 March 1972; confirmed by Petkevicius, 4 April 1972). The proceedings were dropped, and the inspector was severely reprimanded.
137
Hoover/RGANI, 6/6/1575, 33-34 (report to Poskrebyshev, signed by KPK chairman Shkiriatov, 16 April 1951).
138
Hoover/GARF, R94i4/ia/i45 (Gulag chief Nasedkin to chiefs of camps of republics, regions, and provinces, 1 July 1946); Hoover/GARF, R94i4/ia/84, 6 (acting Gulag chief Dobrynin, decree no. 4,13 January 1947); Hoover/GARF, R94i4/ia/9i, 1 (Gulag chief Dolgikh to minister Kruglov, 22 May 1951).
139
Hoover/GARF, R9414/1/85, 170 (Gulag chief Dobrynin, “top-secret” decree no. 139,17 October 1947).
140
To illustrate: Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575,12 (deed signed by MVD GULAG security administration chief of organizational department Koriukin, senior lieutenant Grigor’ev and junior sergeant Safronova, 10 May 1951), counting secret and top-secret documents, 737 incoming and 371 outgoing. Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575, 13 (deed signed by MVD GULAG security administration senior assistant to chief of quartermaster’s division Ziuzin and secretary of quartermaster’s division Ragina, 8 May 1951), counting secret and top-secret documents for April, incoming 130, outgoing 73. Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575,14 (deed signed by MVD GULAG security administration senior instructor of political unit Bartkevich and secretary of political unit Karmanenkova, 15 May 1951) counting secret and top-secret documents for April, incoming 281, outgoing 88. Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575, 15 (deed signed by MVD GULAG security administration secretary of department of combat readiness Demushkina and senior assistant of the chief of department Taran, 8 May 1951) counting secret and top-secret documents for April, incoming from no. 736 to no. 907, outgoing from no. 3/46 to no. 3/74. Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575, 16 (deed signed by MVD GULAG security administration filing officer of secretariat Laskina and cryptographer of secretariat Chernenko, 10 May 1951) counting secret and top-secret documents for April, not numbered but all present and correct. Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575,18 (deed signed by MVD GULAG security administration senior veterinary officer Kuz’kin and secretary of operations department Kalmykova, 25 May 1951), counting secret and top-secret documents for April, incoming 805, outgoing 167. Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575,19 (deed signed by MVD GULAG security administration senior instructor of political unit Kuriachii and secretary of political unit Karmanenkova, 5 June 1951) counting secret and top-secret documents for May, incoming 185, outgoing 30. Hoover/ GARF R9414/1/2575, 20 (deed signed by MVD GULAG security administration filing officer of secretariat Laskina and cryptographer of secretariat Chernenko, 8 June 1951), counting secret and top-secret documents for April. Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575, 21 (deed signed by MVD GULAG security administration senior instructor of political unit Bartkevich and secretary of political unit Karmanenkova, 15 May 1951), counting secret and top-secret documents for 1 to 10 June, incoming 69, outgoing 27. Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575, 22 (deed signed by MVD GULAG security administration senior assistant to chief of quartermaster’s division Ziuzin and assistant to chief of quartermaster’s division Ovechkin, 12 June 1951), counting secret and top-secret documents for May, incoming 106, outgoing 89. Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575, 23 (deed signed by MVD GULAG security administration senior assistants to chief of orgstroi department Sorokin and Kurzikova, department secretary Safronova, 16 June 1951), counting secret and top-secret documents for May, incoming 748, outgoing 311. Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575, 24 (deed signed by MVD GULAG operations department officers Kuz’kin, Pvlov, Usatov, Rudnev, and Salo, 14 June 1951) counting secret and top-secret documents for May to 10 June, incoming 1,137, outgoing 259, and from the first of the year, incoming 4,028, outgoing 868.
141
Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/636,155-61 (deed of transfer, signed by LSSR KGB second administration first department, outgoing operational commissioner Marma and incoming Kirichenko, 11 June 1965). From earlier years see also Hoover/LYA K-1/10/34,348-51 (deed of transfer of LSSR MGB decrees held by Department “B”, signed by outgoing department secretary Nesytykh and incoming Litvinova, 8 December 1947), listing 234 decrees and directives of the Lithuania MGB including 69 top secret, 47 secret, and 117 nonsecret and other, noting that two are in the possession of comrades Andreev and Obukauskas; at the level of a parish office, Hoover/LYA K-1/10/35, 192-228 (deed of transfer, signed by LSSR MGB Zarasai parish outgoing division secretary Sukhorukova and incoming Shishin, 12 July 1949), listing 1,393 decrees, instructions and circulars of USSR and Lithuania MGB issued since 1939, of which 798 were top secret or secret; from the same period, Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575, 1 (deed of transfer signed by MVD GULAG security administration secretary of quartermaster’s division Ragina and deputy chief of quartermaster’s division Ovechkin, 16 May 1951); Hoover/GARF R94i4/ia/i93, 4-40 (deed of transfer signed by former chief of USSR MVD GULAG Chirkov and deputy chief Kovalev, 7 July 1953). Hoover/GARF R94i4/ia/i93, 64-99 (deed of transfer signed by Gulag secretariat first division outgoing deputy chief Savina and incoming Konovalov, 7 July 1953).
142
Hoover/GARF R94i4/ia/i93, 60 (Gulag chief Dobrynin to Interior minister Kruglov, 2 February 1948). The memo bears Dobrynin’s handwritten note: “The minister has been informed. He has decreed to search again for the aforementioned decree. Dobrynin. 2.2.48.”
143
Hoover/GARF R94i4/idop/i382, 56 (memo to all chiefs of camps, signed by NKVD administration for prisoners of war and internees chief Petrov, 10 November 1943).
144
To illustrate: for 1953 the MVD GULAG security administration had a list of 492 file titles (with 8 titles in reserve, taking the total up to 500), classified “top secret,” covering 27 typewritten pages, including directives, plans, and correspondence with each of the Gulag’s units and subunits. Hoover/GARF R94i4/idop/i94, 2-28 (nomenklatura of secret files of the MVD GULAG security administration for 1953, signed by security administration chief of secretariat Teterevenkov and acting chief of security administration Egnarov, 22 December 1952). For similar documents see Hoover/GARF R94i4/idop/i94, 80-82 (nomenklatura of 32 secret flies of the MVD GULAG secretariat for 1953, signed by deputy chief of secretariat Kovalev, no date but December 1952, classified “secret”) and Hoover/GARF R94i4/idop/i94, 83-84 (excerpt from nomenklatura of 16 secret files of the MVD GULAG secretariat, cryptography division, for 1953 (second half), signed by chief of cryptography division Malakhov, 29 August 1953, classified “secret”).
145
Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575,132-4 (deed of inspection of secret file keeping and the storage of state secrets at MVD Gulag, 69th militarized security detachment, signed by Karaganda province MVD administration, operational commissioner Tret’ian, 26 November 1951).
146
An inventory of incoming and outgoing secret correspondence of the MVD security administration in November 1952 found documents not yet filed, going back to January, with delays in filing in all departments. Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2588, 90 (deed of inventorization, signed by GULAG MVD security administration senior lieutenant of the internal service Babinskii and four others, dated 6 November 1952). A Lithuania KGB report on security in ministries and state organizations in April 1969 noted that the Kédainiai district party secretary was failing to keep files in good order. Hoover/LYA K-1/3/670, 67-73 (report “On the status of provision of preservation of state secrets in ministries and institutions of the republic,” signed by LSSR Council of Ministers chief of administration Petrila, April 1969) on pages 67-68.
147
In August 1944, the chief of Gulag complained of secrecy violations in camps and colonies. He cited reports from camps in the Khabarovsk region that listed files with top-secret papers, ledgers of secret correspondence, and stamps and seals openly accessible on office desks, and top-secret papers and topographical maps in cupboards open to prisoners. Hoover/GARF, R9414/1/324, 84 (Gulag chief Nasedkin to chiefs of local camp administrations, 19 August 1944). A Lithuania KGB report of April 1969 recorded that the safe for secret documents belonging to one of the local authorities was often left unsealed. It also criticized a variety of ministries, enterprises, and institutes for lack of separately enclosed office space for those executing secret paperwork. Hoover/LYA K-1/3/670, 67-73 (report “On the status of provision of preservation of state secrets in ministries and institutions of the republic,” signed by LSSR SM chief of administration Petrila, April 1969).
148
Khlevniuk et al., eds, Politbiuro TsK VPK(b), 293-300. Voznesenskii was afterward arraigned and executed for treason and undermining the economy (Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, 83-89).
149
See, in addition to those already cited, a Stalin-era MGB inspection of Gosprodsnab, the state committee for supply of consumer and industrial goods, reported at second hand in Hoover/RGANI, 6/6/1650, 21-23 (report to KPK chairman Shkiriatov, signed by responsible controller Byshov, June 1953); and on similar lines a Brezhnev-era report on local government and party organizations in Soviet Lithuania in Hoover/LYA K-1/3/670, 55-61 (report to the Lithuanian party Central Committee, signed by KGB chair Petkevicius, 31 March 1969). Hoover/ LYA K-1/3/670, 88-91 (to Lithuanian Council of Ministers chairman Manyusis I. A., signed by LSSR KGB chair Petkevicius, 1 April 1969).
150
Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2575, 17 (deed of file destruction signed by MVD GULAG security administration cryptographer of secretariat Chernenko and filing officer of secretariat Ivanova, 17 May 1951); Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2588, 13-37 (deed of file destruction signed by MVD GULAG security administration operation department chief of third division Shipkov, senior operational commission Kharchevnikov, and secretary of operations department Kalmykova, 1 April 1952). Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2588, 63-69 (deed of destruction, signed by MVD GULAG security administration operations department, senior operational commissioner Kharchevnikov, senior veterinary officer Kuz’kin, and secretary Kalmykova, 26 July 1952). Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2588,78-79 (deed of destruction, signed by MVD GULAG security administration, operations department deputy chief Khanevskii, senior operational commissioner Dmitriev, senior veterinary officer Kuz’kin, 14 August 1952), referring to a 32-page appendix listing each document destroyed); Hoover/GARF R9414/1/2590, 29-30 (selection of documentary materials of the USSR MVD GULAG security administration subject to destruction, signed by chief of secretariat Teterevenkov and four others, 16 December 1952).
151
Khlevniuk et al., Politbiuro TsK VPK(b), 296
152
Gregory and Harrison, “Allocation under Dictatorship,” 721.
153
The website of the US National Archives and Records administration observes: “Of all documents and materials created in the course of business conducted by the United States federal government, only i%-3% are so important for legal or historical reasons that they are kept by us forever” http://www.archives .gov/about/. Haines and Langbart, Unlocking the Files of the FBI, xvi, report: “In 1984 the National Archive proposed and the FBI accepted recommendations for the FBI Records Retention Schedule, which would preserve approximately 20 percent of all Bureau records as permanently valuable and allow for the destruction of the rest.”
154
Agursky and Adomeit, “Soviet Military-Industrial Complex,” 27-36.
155
Dunskaya, Security Practices of Soviet Scientific Research Facilities, 131.
156
The phrase “cult of secrecy” was popularized by Rubanov, “Ot kul’t sekret- nosti к informatsionnoi kul’tury.” Here I extend its meaning somewhat.
157
As discussed by Zakharova, “Trust in Bureaucracy and Technology.”
158
Hoover/LYA K-1/3/786, 28-38 (report “On the condition of and measures to improve work with documents in the LSSR KGB,” signed by chief of inspection Rupsys, chief of information and analysis division Andriatis, and chief of secretariat Grakauskas, 8 April 1974) on folio 33. This report also gave figures for the Lithuania KGB second (counterintelligence) administration alone (30,965 items of secret and top-secret correspondence in 1971, 31,236 in 1972, and 33,000 in 1973) and for the Kaunas city department of the KGB (4,658 items in 1973 up to 10 April, and 5,456 in the same period of 1974, an increase of 12 percent).
159
In 1971 the Lithuania KGB employed 1,218 officers, enlisted men, and civilian employees, reflecting slow growth over preceding years. Anusauskas, KGB Lietuvoje, 43.
160
This kind of copying seems to explain the local spread of most kinds of petty offending. Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman, “Crime and Social Interactions.”
161
File catalogues in Russian archives, if they exist, are paper based. Often, basic file descriptors are lacking. Published catalogues are generally not detailed at the file level. See for illustration the 700-page catalogue of the Gulag archive Sovetskaia repressivno-karatel’naia politika i penitentsiarnaia Sistema edited by Werth and Mironenko; also the online catalogues of GARF at http://opisi.garf.su/ and of RGAE at http://opisi.rgae.ru/.
162
Anusauskas, KGB Lietuvoje, 43.
163
Quoted by Weiner and Rahi-Tamm, “Getting to Know You,” 7.
164
These figures emerged from the Home Office’s annual “activity-based costing” review of police budgets: Ben Leapman, “Police Paperwork Costs Hit 1625m,” The Telegraph (London), 3 December 2006. The figure of £625 million extrapolated the Met’s figures across the country. In 2009 a Home Office report (Normington, Reducing the Data Burden on Police Forces) made recommendations to reduce paperwork burdens on the police—including to abolish activity-based costing. For this reason, there are no more recent figures.
165
E.g., US Information Security Oversight Office, 2011 Report to the President.
166
US Information Security Oversight Office, 2011 Report to the President: Cost Estimates, 3. In 2010 total US federal government costs of “information security” were ¢5.65 billion. This figure covers “information systems security” (the largest component) together with costs of classification management, declassification, operations security, and technical surveillance countermeasures. To this could be added $352.5 million laid out on “classification management,” making $6.0 billion in total. This figure excludes outlays on the physical security of persons and installations, declassification, education and training, operations security, technical surveillance countermeasures, and “security oversight, management, and planning.” In the same year, 95 percent of original classification activity was undertaken in the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice (US Information Security Oversight Office, 2011 Report to the President, 6), and 95 percent of ¢6.0 billion makes $5.7 billion.
167
US Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government. Fiscal Year 2013,74 and 76 (Table 3.2—Outlays by Function and Subfunction: 1962-2017, line items 051 “military personnel”), 153, and 752
168
Hoover/GARF, R-9492/2/79, 2-26.
169
And they did multiply. The previous edition of the instructions, dated 1929, was limited to 27 pages. The final edition, dated 1987, ran to 222 pages. Lezina, “Soviet State Security and the Regime of Secrecy,” 44.
170
Gorlizki, “Ordinary Stalinism,” 722-23
171
On the background, history, and outcomes of the KR project, see Kre- mentsov, Stalinist Science, 131-43; Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, 36-38.
172
Haynes and Klehr, Venona; Haynes et al., Spies.
173
Hough, “Debates about the Postwar World”; Zubkova, Russia After the War.
174
Roskin, “Toxin Therapy of Experimental Cancer.”
175
Ironically, it was the nationwide coordination of the secret meetings that caused news of the affair to leak abroad. Correspondence about the KR affair between Komsomol officials in Moscow and Frunze, Uzbekistan, was intercepted and shared in British-American signals intelligence transcripts. TNA, UKUSA Agreement Files, S/ARU-E/T54, “Party Action on the Anti-state Activities of Two Soviet Professors” (Codeword—Glint), September 25,1947, HW 75/167, https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.Uk/details/r/C11538964.
176
Gorlizki, “Ordinary Stalinism,” 721. Other consequences included complete bans on the publication of scientific reports of work in progress (Medvedev, Soviet Science, 121), and of economic statistics of any kind (Kaser, “Publication of Soviet Statistics,” 50).
177
As described in Chapter 3, the downfall of Nikolai Voznesenskii, the wartime economic chief and once Stalin’s favorite, was triggered in March 1949 by a scandal over the negligent loss of secret papers in Gosplan, but his subsequent execution in August was for treason and undermining the economy under Article 58, which dealt with counterrevolutionary crimes. Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, 83-89.
178
Gorlizki, “Rules, Incentives and Soviet Campaign Justice”; Heinzen, ‘“Campaign Spasm’.”
179
Hoover/GARF, R-9492/ia/5i3, 8-18 (“Communication by the USSR Prosecutor”).
180
Krementsov, Stalinist Science, 136.
181
Lebina, “Defence-Industry Complex in Leningrad,” 187. See also Smyth, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes.
182
The scale, scope, organization, and conditions of Soviet forced labor have been an important focus of research in formerly secret Russian archives since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Significant histories and documentary collections on Soviet forced labor are now available, written in English and Russian from various disciplinary perspectives. In the English language see Alexopoulos, Illness and Inhumanity in Stalin’s Gulag; Applebaum, Gulag; Bacon, Gulag at War; Barnes, Death and Redemption; Bell, Stalin’s Gulag at War; Gregory and Lazarev (eds), Economics of Forced Labor; Khlevniuk, History of the Gulag. By contrast, this chapter has a narrow focus on forced labor as a business and how this business was affected by the secrecy governing the location and identification of labor camps. Closely related to that focus is research on the concealed existence and location of the Soviet “closed” cities, as discussed by Siddiqi, “Atomized Urbanism.”
183
Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1/335, 11-12 (“List of questions of the work of the GULAG of the USSR MVD and its peripheral organs that are state secrets [gosudarstvennaia taina],” signed by acting Gulag chief Dobrynin, 17 June 1947). Applebaum, Gulag, no, notes that “subsection” was an internal codeword for a labor camp. On 10 December 1951, USSR interior minister Kruglov issued a similar “List of questions of special importance [osoboi vazhnosti] about the GULAG of the USSR MVD, correspondence about which should be classified ‘top secret (special file),’” in Russian, sovershenno sekretno (osobaia papka) (Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1/335,71-72). Items 2 and 3 were “The location and information about numbers of the Gulag contingents engaged in the construction of especially important closed special construction projects of Glavpromstroi” (a reference to the newly founded Soviet atomic weapons industry) and “Summative information on the location of corrective labor camps and colonies and transit prisons of the USSR MVD.” Item no. 1 was “Summative information on the overall number of the contingent of prisoners maintained in all MVD camps (including special camps) and colonies, their physical condition and labor utilization”; this was the second item in the 1947 list.
184
“Vrozhdennyi terror: v 1922 godu v odnoi Moskve rabotali 9 kontslagerei,” 2 September 2021, https://newizv.ru/news/society/02-09-2021/vr0zhdennyy-terror-v-i922-godu-v-odnoy-moskve-rabotali-9-kontslagerey. The article reports the work of “journalist and historian” Vladimir Tikhomirov and provides scanned pages from Vsia Moskva, the city phone directory for 1922, as evidence.
185
Quoted by Bone, “Soviet Controls,” 81-83. “Dislocation” is evidently a too-literal translation of the Russian dislokatsiia, which generally means just “location.”
186
Liubertsy: Davies, Crisis and Progress in the Soviet Economy, 36. Solovetskii islands and White Sea Canal: Applebaum, Gulag, 59-62 and 80-82.
187
Davies, Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 35.
188
Davies, Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 395; Applebaum, Gulag, 74-76.
189
Applebaum, Gulag, 110.
190
Bacon, Gulag at War, surveys the pre-1991 literature. The most reliable clues to the size of the Gulag were contained in secret sections of the Soviet national economic plan for 1941, seized by German forces during World War II and later published in the United States. The 1941 plan was exploited by Jasny, “Labor and Output in Soviet Concentration Camps” (published in 1951) for an evaluation that turned out remarkably close to the figures revealed in the 1990s. Even today, aspects of Gulag life remain controversial. This is more because the archival records can be interpreted in different ways than because they are withheld. See Nakonechnyi, “Factory of Invalids.”
191
Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, 132.
192
Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1/119 to 205 contain these documents (also catalogued in Kozlov and Mironenko, Istoriia, vol. 7, 94). Some are dated before 1953, evidence of the preparation prior to Stalin’s death. Beria is known to have planned the reform of the Gulag but could not go ahead while Stalin lived (Tikhonov, “End of the Gulag”).
193
See “Russian Maps and Atlases in the National Library of Russia,” http://www.nlr.ru/eng/coll/maps/rus_map.html.
194
Losev and Kazakov, “Korpus voennykh topografov.”
195
Voronkov and Zakuvaev, “Topogeodezicheskoe obsluzhivanie.”
196
The expression, a direct translation from Russian, was adopted by Berliner, Factory and Manager, 156.
197
The Memorial website entry under “Volzhskii ITL MVD” at http://www .memo.ru/history/nkvd/gulag/r3/r3-63.htm provides these and following details.
198
Mailbox numbers were first issued, apparently, in 1939, to enable camps to subscribe to periodical publications without revealing their full addresses. Hoover/ GARF, 9414/1/21,1.49 (Gulag chief Filaretov, decree dated 16 January 1939).
199
Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i45, la, 3.
200
Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i45,4.
201
Hoover/GARF, R-9414/KI0P/45, 8.
202
Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i45, 26-27.
203
Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i45,42.
204
Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i45, 5.
205
Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i45, 6.
206
Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i45, 9-13.
207
Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i45,12-13.
208
Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i45,14-16.
209
Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i45,17.
210
Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i45, 31.
211
Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i45, 30.
212
Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i45, 22-23.
213
Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i45, 35.
214
Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i45, 36-40.
215
Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i45, 34.
216
Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i45, 43-50. The model letter is not without interest. It is written as if from the Mikhailovskii camp chief to the Sverdslovsk branch office of Gosbank. Headed “Top secret” and “In person only,” it reads: “I inform (you) that the Mikhailovskii corrective labor camp of MVD has been given the conventional designation ‘MVD facility no. 5401’. In connection with this I request (you), from 1 September 1950, to change the designation of settlement account no. 258 of the Mikhailovskii camp and rename it: ‘Settlement account no. 258 of MVD facility no. 5401 in the town of Sverdlovsk’.” In the top lefthand corner is a place marker for “Stamp with full designation of the camp.” The words “with the aim of preventing disclosure of the location of MVD corrective labor camps” are crossed out from the text of the letter. Too much information, perhaps.
217
Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i45,51-56 (the decree), 57 (model letter to railway officers), 58 (the same to bank officers).
218
Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i45, 24.
219
Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i45, 66.
220
Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i57,1-2. “Bazhenovskii ITL MVD,” telegraphic address “Kombinat”; address “Sverdlovsk province (oblast’), Asbest town”; mailbox number 35 or ED-35. See the entry on the Memorial website at http://www .memo.ru/history/NKVD/GULAG/r3/r3-19.htm.
221
For example, Hoover/GARF, R-94i4/idop/i87, 32-33 (Chuvash ASSR, 17 March 1953); file 204, 24-25 (Kaliningrad province, 10 March 1953); file 212,18-19 (Crimea province, 14 March 1953).
222
Hoover/RGANI, 6/6/1650,21-23 (report to KPKchairman Shkiriatov, signed by responsible controller Byshov, June 1953). The report responded to a former employee of the state committee who had complained of mismanagement and various abuses.
223
Akerlof, “Procrastination and Obedience.”
224
Rose-Ackerman, “Reforming Public Bureaucracy through Economic Incentives?”
225
Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira, “Excess Burden of Government Indecision.”
226
In this perspective the Soviet political economy is viewed from above as a hierarchical command system. The rationality of the model belongs to the ruler. In the context of the historical literature on Stalinism (surveyed by Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, 1-25), its spirit is closer to a totalitarian view than one that emphasizes plural interest groups or independently operating factions, but it is not designed to lend support to that view. It captures the facts that Stalin was clearly in charge, but also had to reckon with the behavior of others for whom unhesitating obedience would be just as dangerous as overt resistance. The dictator presented them with a Catch-22, from which they had to protect themselves at the same time as they attended to his orders. Richer models are possible, but they are not required here to understand the matter at hand.
227
Filtzer, Hazards of Urban Life, 18.
228
E.g., SebagMontefiore, Stalin, 48-49. A short guide to the scholarly literature pointing to mental illness in Stalin’s psychopathology is provided by Rachael Allen, “Stalin and the Great Terror: Can Mental Illness Explain His Violent Behavior?” Guided History (blog), http://blogs.bu.edu/guidedhistory/russia-and-its-empires/ rachael-allen/.
229
Conquest, Great Terror, 114; Medvedev, Let History Judge, 306; Bullock, Hitler and Stalin, 494; Tucker, “Dictator and Totalitarianism”; Service, Stalin, 343- 344; Kotkin, Stalin, vol. 2,492; Harris, Great Fear, 188.
230
Gregory, Political Economy of Stalinism, 76-109.
231
Harrison, “Dictator and Defense” and “Soviet Union after 1945”; Gregory, Schroder, and Sonin, “Rational Dictators and the Killing of Innocents.”
232
Markevich, “How Much Control Is Enough?”
233
Gorlizki, “Ordinary Stalinism.”
234
Moynihan Commission, Report, A-3.
235
For examples of such requests, see Harrison, One Day We Will Live without Fear, 156,166,174,193.
236
The Google Ngram Viewer, described by Michel et al., “Quantitative Analysis Of Culture,” shows that “komprometiruiushchie materialy” entered the Russian-language Google Books corpus (2019) in the 1920s but was not in widespread use before the 1990s. The abbreviation “kompromat” did not appear in Russian print publications until the end of the 1980s and, in English, not until the end of the century.
237
Wintrobe, Political Economy of Dictatorship, 20-39.
238
On the “mass operations” and “national operations” of the Great Terror, see Davies et al., Soviet Economy and the Approach of War, 12-19. On mass deportations from 1930 to 1953, see Tsarevskaia-Diakina, ed., Spetspereselentsy v SSSR.
239
Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Substate Dictatorship, describe the uses of kompromat for coercion in the personal regime of Mir Jafar Bagirov, the party boss of Azerbaijan after the war (35-39), and in the campaign of Lavrentii Beria to succeed Stalin in the months after the latter’s death (124-26). They go on to show that, as the Thaw got under way, the nature of kompromat changed—at least for middle- and high-ranking officials and at least temporarily: “The information that had once been used for Stalin-era kompromat was ... downgraded [but this] did not mean that blackmail was no longer used.... It was now, conversely, the fact that a leader had been a perpetrator of Stalin-era repressions that became the main source of kompromat” (127). The varied uses of kompromat outlived communist rule. On kompromat in modern Russia see Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works, 59-90; Mesquita, “Kompromat (Russia).”
240
Phelps, “Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism”; Arrow, “Theory of Discrimination.”
241
Inkeles and Bauer, Soviet Citizen, 265-80.
242
Panevézys Municipality, “Historical Facts,” https://www.panevezys.lt/en/ history/historical-facts.html. The definition of “class enemy” based on mixing socioeconomic criteria (anyone who owned significant property) with political criteria (anyone who resisted Soviet policies) is a familiar story in the history of communism. In Soviet history, see Lewin, “Who Was the Soviet Kulak?” In Chinese history, see Treiman and Walder, “Impact of Glass Labels on Life Chances in China.”
243
Yad Vashem, “Panevézys, Panevézys County, Lithuania,” https://www.yad vashem.org/untoldstories/database/index.asp?cid=5O3.
244
Reklaitis, Cold War Lithuania; Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency; Weiner and Rahi-Tamm, “Getting to Know You.”
245
In 1970 the Communist Party of Lithuania had 116,600 members, or 3.7 percent of the 3,166,000 population. At least one-third of that population was under 18, and so ineligible for party membership. On that basis, I estimate that 5 to 6 percent of all those aged 18 and over were party members. Probably, however, that share was much lower in the older age groups that were seeking permission to travel abroad.
246
This law cracked down on the pilfering of food and industrial materials in the context of postwar food shortages and consumer price increases; while it was in operation, the average sentence exceeded that for murder. See Gorlizki, “Theft under Stalin,” 302.
247
Noting the unjust convictions handed out in the Stalin era, a party Central Committee report dated June 1955 argued that the party’s habit of requiring its members to declare the past convictions of themselves and family members risked compounding the earlier injustices. Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Substate Dictatorship, 126. There is no sign that these considerations retained any influence with the KGB of Soviet Lithuania by the 1970s.
248
The KGB bureaucracy was divided into numbered subunits. In Soviet Lithuania the second administration was responsible for counterintelligence and its third department was responsible for the economy. So, the full title of what this book calls the economic department of the KGB counterintelligence administration was “the third department of the second administration of the Soviet Lithuania KGB.” Its functions as of 1966 are described in Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/644, 39-47 (“Report on the Second Administration of the KGB of the Council of the Ministers of the Lithuanian SSR,” by chief of the Soviet Lithuania KGB second administration Col. Obukauskas, 31 January 1966). The KGB economic department also supervised visits by foreigners to economic facilities.
249
Grybkauskas, “KGB veikla sovietinés Lietuvos pramonés monèse,” 100.
250
TsSU, Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR. 2922-1972, 594.
251
Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/670, 92-94 (1968). According to Anusauskas, KGB Lietu- voje, 88, there were just over 9,000 KGB “agents” and “trusted persons” in 1967 and 10,000 in 1969. The role of pressure in recruiting KGB informers is discussed in Chapter 6.
252
Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/664,1-13 (“Plan of agent and operative work of the third department of the second administration of the Soviet Lithuania KGB for 1968,” from chief of the third department of the second administration of the Soviet Lithuania KGB Lt.-Col. Akimov, 4 March 1968).
253
Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/656, 87 (Summary of speech “On the condition of agent and operative work on reinforcement of the regime of secrecy at facilities of industry, communications, and transport and provision of secrecy and security of movement of special-purpose military transports by rail,” 24 February 1966); K-1/3/668, 4-13 (“Plan of agent and operative measures at industrial facilities for the first half of 1969,” from Soviet Lithuania KGB Kaunas city department third division chief Trukhachev, 12 February 1969); K-1/3/668, 179 (“Report on results of work of the third division for 1969,” from Soviet Lithuania KGB Kaunas city department third division chief Trukhachev, 9 December 1969).
254
Burinskaité, “Lietuvos SSR KGB dezinformaciné veikla,” 101. Such visits could be made only with the approval of the USSR Council of Ministers, after consultation with the KGB and armed forces General Staff. Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/670, 29-30 (“Extract from instructions on the procedure for application of the Rules of residence for foreigners and stateless persons in the USSR,” 28 February 1969).
255
Grybkauskas, “The Soviet Dopusk System,” 84.
256
Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/664, 120-132 (“List of institutions, organizations, and enterprises of the Lithuanian SSR at which the second administration of the Soviet Lithuania KGB is obliged to undertake counterintelligence work,” from Soviet Lithuania KGB second administration chief Col. Naras, 18 June 1968).
257
For KGB-regulated facilities in 1961 and 1971, employment figures are from Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/793, 60 (“Information on basic elements of the operational situation on the territory served by the KGB of the republic,” undated but evidently compiled in early 1972 in response to a request from Moscow for this information.) For public-sector employment in 1961 and 1971, figures are linear interpolations on data for i960, 1965, 1970, and 1975, found in TsSU, Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v i960 g., 638, Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR. 1922-1972 gg, 601, and Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR. 1922-2982, 402.
258
Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/793, 60.
259
Grybkauskas, “The Soviet Dopusk System,” 80.
260
In 1979 the Lithuanian public sector employed 1.4 million blue- and white-collar workers of all kinds (TsSU, Narodnoe khoziaistvo v 1979 godu, 390).
261
Grybkauskas, “The Soviet Dopusk System,” 84.
262
Radio electronics was the fastest growing branch as shown by the chart “The number of Soviet defence plants by industry,” Keith Dexter and Ivan Rodionov, displayed on the website of The Factories, Research and Design Establishments of the Soviet Defence Industry: A Guide, https://warwick.ac.uk/vpk.
263
Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/654, 112-13 (“Report on measures to reinforce the regime of secrecy in enterprises and institutions of the city of Kaunas,” from chief of Soviet Lithuania KGB Kaunas city department third division Maj. Trukhachev, 12 October 1967). See also Grybkauskas “Nomenklatürinis sovietinés Lietuvos pramonés valdymas,” 36.
264
Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/654, 122 (From Soviet Lithuania KGB chairman Col. Petkevicius to chief of Soviet Lithuania KGB second chief administration Col. A. M. Gorbatenko, October 1967).
265
Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/654, 105-20 (“Report on measures to reinforce the regime of secrecy in enterprises and institutions of the city of Kaunas,” from chief of Soviet Lithuania KGB Kaunas city department third division Maj. Trukhachev, 12 October 1967).
266
This was the written rule from 1959, according to Lezina, “Soviet State Security and the Regime of Secrecy,” 58 (and, one supposes, the unwritten rule long before that).
267
Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/654,101-4 (From chief of Soviet Lithuania KGB Siauliai city department Lt. Col. Zilinskas to deputy chief of Soviet Lithuania second administration third department Lt. Morkunas, 16 September 1967).
268
Denial of travel visas: “There is no information why, and no one even asks. Those who have been stopped guess at it. One of them, in his childhood, lived in temporarily occupied territory, the other has been corresponding too freely with foreigners. No one knew about this in the institute, but the ‘files’ reflected it all.” Zhores Medvedev, Medvedev Papers, vol. 1, 201,
269
Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/664,24 (Report on the high-frequency line from Kaunas by deputy chief of the Kaunas city KGB Lt. Col. Snakin to chief of second administration Col. A. I. Naras, received 11 April 1968). See also K-1/3/664,29-36 (Report from Soviet Lithuania KGB chairman J. Petkevicius to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania, 7 May 1968); Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/670, 4549 (Report from chief of the Siauliai city KGB Col. Zilinskas to Soviet Lithuania KGB deputy chairman comrade M. N. Aleksandrov, 30 January 1969).
270
Grybkauskas, “The Soviet Dopusk System,” 37-39.
271
When the change took place is an interesting question. Enterprise directors were always key figures in local party organizations, and Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Substate Dictatorship, 73-77, show that the secret police had lost much of its arbitrary authority over local party officials by the late 1940s. At this time Stalin was still alive, and the Thaw was several years in the future.
272
Dunskaya, Security Practices of Soviet Scientific Research Facilities, 128-29, also 20-22. The author began work in the 1950s as a specialist on guidance and control systems in the special design bureau (SKB) of the Moscow Radio Plant. In the 1970s she moved to the Academy of Sciences Institute of the History of Science and Technology as a specialist in quantum electronics and laser technology.
273
The testimony of Zhores Medvedev, cited above (footnote 34), suggests otherwise, however.
274
Holquist, “State Violence as Technique,” 154.
275
Figes, People’s Tragedy, 534-35.
276
Gregory, Terror by Quota, 106-31.
277
Khlevniuk, Master of the House, 166-202.
278
Quoted by Gregory, Terror by Quota, 196. See also Gregory, Schroder, and Sonin, “Rational Dictators and the Killing of Innocents.”
279
Quoted by Sebag Monteflore, Stalin, 194.
280
Wartime disloyalty took many forms, few of which are easily measured. Here is a measure from the state’s own statistics: from 1941 to 1945 the secret police and military tribunals sentenced almost half a million Soviet citizens for counterrevolutionary crimes, one-third of whom were executed. Werth and Mironenko, eds., MUSSOT'J'C repressii v SSSR, 608.
281
Kotkin, Stalin, vol. 1, chapter 10.
282
Egorov and Sonin, “Dictators and Their Viziers.” Consistently with this idea, people with truly indispensable talents were placed in institutional settings where they could be watched more closely, usually research institutes, occasionally in prison laboratories. There was no other place in the system for the independent agency of visionary entrepreneurs like Steve Jobs or Bill Gates. On the atomic physicists, see Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb; on the missile designers, Siddiqi, The Red Rockets’ Glare; on the relative concentration of informers in colleges and institutes, Harrison and Zaksauskiené, “Counter-intelligence in a Command Economy,”143.
283
Zakharov, “Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off in Dictatorships.”
284
Conquest, “Academe and the Soviet Myth,” 94.
285
Brus, Socialist Ownership and Political Systems, 200. In a similar spirit Scharpf and Glâfiel, “Why Underachievers Dominate Secret Police Organizations,” show, in the case of Argentina under military dictatorship, that career concerns drove otherwise mediocre public servants into the secret police, where hard work and a willingness to perform unpleasant tasks could compensate for lack of talent or other distinction.
286
Bon-Maury et al., Le coût économique des discriminations, 14.
287
Hsieh et al., “Allocation of Talent and U.S. Economie Growth,” 1460,1463.
288
Jureniene, “Women’s Position in Lithuanian Labour Market”; Pinchuk, “Sovietization of the Jewish Community.”
289
The Affirmative Action Empire is the title of Terry Martin’s study of the evolution of Soviet nationalities policy in the 1920s and 1930s.
290
Pinchuk, “Sovietization of the Jewish Community,” 391-92.
291
In a new study of communist and postcommunist Hungary, Bukowski et al., “Social Mobility and Political Regimes,” show that successive regime changes brought dramatic changes in the representation of historically low-status family names in Hungary’s political elite, but rates of social mobility into elite occupations and groups at least one remove from the central government remained low and unchanged throughout. The question of how to balance social levelling versus social stratification also arose among scholars studying communist China. See for example Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China” (published in 1975) and the same author’s thirty-year retrospective, “Rethinking Equality and Inequality in the PRC.”
292
Ottaviano and Peri, “Economic Value of Cultural Diversity.” To explain the benefits of diversity, the economist Ricardo Hausmann suggests the model of an alphabet. A complex idea requires many words using most letters of the alphabet. In a homogeneous society, where everyone lives in the same way and shares the same background, each person knows only the same few letters. No matter who collaborates, complex ideas can’t arise; conventional wisdom and groupthink predominate. What is needed is collaboration with people who can pool the knowledge that comes from different backgrounds and experiences. Together they can combine a wider range of letters to make more complex words, sentences, and conceptions. Thus, increased variety produces innovation. Hausmann et al., Atlas of Economic Complexity, 20.
293
Genetic diversity: Ashraf and Galor, “The 'Out of Africa’ Hypothesis,” find that the level of development around the world is “hump-shaped” in a predictor of genetic diversity: that is, genetic diversity promotes development up to a point, so you can have too little of it and also too much, but somewhere there is a right amount. Ethnolinguistic diversity: Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, “Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions”; Alesina and La Ferrara, “Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance.”
294
The sphere of counterintelligence was defined by Nikitchenko et al., Kon- trrazvedyvatel’nyi slovar’, 142, as “struggle with the intelligence agencies of other states and the disruptive activities of the organizations and persons that they exploit” (my emphasis). Scanning society for signs of disruption and checking for evidence of foreign agents at work were then the tasks of KGB surveillance and investigation.
295
Stalin, “Politicheskii otchet tsentral’nogo komiteta XVI s”ezdu VKP(b),” 368 (27 June 1930).
296
Why was Stalin’s expectation at fault? One possibility is a mistaken assumption—that, when crossing languages and cultures, it is possible to find exactly equivalent meanings, with nothing lost or added in translation. Another possibility is proposed by Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 448-51: compulsory ethnic labelling and the promotion of non-Russian languages may have had the unintended consequence of reinforcing awareness of deep-rooted ethnic differences.
297
Davies et al., The Soviet Economy and the Approach of War, 106-7, 237.
298
Smith, Russians (published in 1976), 142.
299
This is the “encapsulated interest” model of trust, proposed by Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 7-9.
300
Misztal, “Trust and the Variety of Its Bases,” 335. An example of the first stream is Luhmann, Trust and Power. Examples of the second stream are Gambetta, “Can We Trust?” and Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness. To the rational and normative foundations of trust, Misztal adds emotional commitment.
301
Among those who reject the ideas of generalized and institutional trust are representatives of both the streams identified by Misztal. See Hardin (a rational- choice theorist), Trust and Trustworthiness, 60-62, and Luhmann (a normative thinker), “Familiarity, Confidence, Trust,” 97-99.
302
But Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, condemns this approach as a “slippage” (55), and a “vernacular usage” allowing “implications that are wrong” (60); generalized trust is not trust, just “optimistic expectations about being able to build successful relationships with certain, perhaps numerous, others (although surely not with just anyone)” (62).
303
These questions take the form recommended by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Guidelines on Measuring Trust, 197. In each case the answers should be scaled from о (“Not at all”) to 10 (“Completely”).
304
On the external validity of such measures, see Kaiser and Oswald, “Scientific Value of Numerical Measures”; Diener, Inglehart, and Tay, “Theory and Validity of Life Satisfaction Scales.”
305
Many mechanisms can bring about cooperation, and trust is only one of them. Others discussed below include coercion or threats of violence, and rewards based on monitoring. Cook, Hardin, and Levi, Cooperation without Trust.
306
Acemoglu and Wolitzky, “Economics of Labor Coercion.”
307
Alesina and Giuliano, “Culture and Institutions”; Algan and Cahuc, “Trust and Growth.”
308
Hosking, “Trust and Distrust in the USSR” (introducing a special issue of the Slavonic and East European review on the same theme), 1,25.
309
Shlapentokh, “Trust in Public Institutions in Russia”; McKee et al., “Do Citizens of the Former Soviet Union Trust State Institutions”; Kuchenkova, “Interpersonal Trust in Russian Society.”
310
Other trust categories were neither (trust nor distrust), not much, not at all, and don’t know. The number of Russian respondents was 1,961. Inglehart et al., World Values Survey: Round Two, 340.
311
Nunn and Wantchekon, “Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust.”
312
Nikolova, Popova, and Otrashchenko, “Stalin and the Origins of Mistrust.”
313
Nikolova, Popova, and Otrashchenko, “Stalin and the Origins of Mistrust.”
314
Gorlizki, “Structures of Trust,” 124.
315
Brecht, Poems, 440.
316
Gorlizki, “Structures of Trust”; Tikhomirov, “Regime of Forced Trust”; also Ledeneva, “Genealogy of Krugovaya Poruka.”
317
Compare the legal concepts of controlling and coercive behavior in personal relationships, described in Home Office, “Controlling or Coercive Behaviour,” 3-4.
318
Breton and Wintrobe. “Bureaucracy of Murder,” 910.
319
The idea that horizontal trust is a negative for corporate performance might seem old-fashioned in today’s world of team building and “distributed leadership.” Breton and Wintrobe appear to base their argument on scale. To improve productivity, horizontal cooperation needs to be coordinated across an entire organization. In an organization of any size, this is harder to achieve than the concealment of local shirking and diversion of resources. Smaller groups can more easily impede coordination than improve it. And horizontal trust is built more easily in smaller groups. Regardless of intentions, horizontal trust is more likely to worsen productivity than improve it. This plausibly suggests why a twentiethcentury command-and-control bureaucracy such as the Soviet state consistently prioritized vertical over horizontal relationships. Gregory and Harrison, “Allocation under Dictatorship,” 747-49. On vertical versus horizontal trust in the Soviet context see Belova, “Economic Crime and Punishment.”
320
But not in all times, an exception being China from 1967 to 1973, when the use of undercover informers was condemned as contradicting the mass line of the Cultural Revolution. Schoenhals, Spying for the People, 1-9.
321
Kuromiya and Peplonski, “Stalin, Espionage, and Counter-Espionage,” relate this way of thinking to the idea of “total” espionage (that is, that anyone could be a spy). They suggest that the idea spread from the security thinking of Japan in the early twentieth century to Germany in the 1920s and the Soviet Union in the 1930s. They describe Stalin’s mass killing of suspects in the 1930s as a corresponding form of total counterespionage. From that perspective, one could understand the KGB of the 1960s and 1970s as continuing to practice total counterespionage but replacing Stalin’s “kill all suspects” by “watch all suspects.”
322
Nikitchenko et al., eds, Kontrrazvedyvatel’nyi slovar’, 9-10, 55, 93-94, 279-80.
323
Anusauskas, KGB Lietuvoje, 71. According to the 1959 census, Soviet Lithuania was a country of 2.7 million people, of whom four-fifths belonged to the titular ethnic group (others were mainly Russians and Poles) TsSU, Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v i960 g., 18-20.
324
The number of KGB informers in 1962 was given as 164,774 by Vladimir Se- michastnyi in his report “On the results of work of the KGB of the USSR Council of Ministers and its organs in the localities for 1962” to Nikita Khrushchev, 1 February 1963 (Hoover/Volkogonov papers, container 28 [reel 18]). The number had barely increased five years later (in his annual report for 1967, dated 6 May 1968, found in the same location), Semichastnyi’s successor Andropov gave 24,952 as the number of new agents recruited in 1967, being 15 percent of the total number, which would therefore have been roughly 166,350.
325
Harrison and Zaksauskiené, “Counter-Intelligence in a Planned Economy, 142-43.
326
Anusauskas, KGB Lietuvoje, 71 (the sum of agents and trusted persons in that year).
327
Church Committee, “Use of Informants in FBI Intelligence Investigations.” At that time, the main focus of FBI investigations was America’s political fringes from the Ku Klux Klan to the Black Panthers. In the following years, the FBI became more engaged with organized crime and narcotics. Informant numbers swelled, reaching 2,800 in 1980 and “well beyond 6,000” in 1986. Ronald J. Ostrow and Robert L. Jackson, “U.S. Agents Make Increasing Use Of informants: But ‘Handlers’ Face Complex Legal Hazards When Condoning Criminal Acts”, Los Angeles Times, 15 June 1986, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-06-15- mn-11287-story.html.
328
As mentioned in the text, there were 1,500 FBI informers in 1975, or 7 per million of the US population at the time. For the Soviet Union, the nearest comparable year is 1967. In his annual report for 1967, dated 6 May 1968 (Hoover/Volkogonov papers, container 28 [reel 18]), Yurii Andropov gave 24,952 as the number of new agents recruited in 1967, being 15 percent of the total number, which would therefore have been roughly 166,350. This made 0.7 per thousand of the Soviet population at the time. Finally, 0.7 per thousand is one hundred times 7 per million. Numbers of informers were on an upward trend in both countries in this period, but a difference of two orders of magnitude could not be closed by shifting the base of one of the measures by a few years.
329
This is noted by Verdery, Secrets and Truths, chapter 3, in connection with informer recruitment by the Romanian Securitate.
330
Schoenhals, Spying for the People, 110.
331
The related KGB project for a database of informers’ reports on the behavior of Soviet citizens travelling abroad in groups is described by Harrison, One Day, 169-70.
332
Hoover/LYA, 1/3/798, 184-186 (“Explanatory report” by Col. Kurenkov, chief of analysis for the Moscow city and province KGB, 30 July 1974); the forms themselves follow at folios 187-1 to 187-боЬ.
333
From the last months of Soviet rule in Lithuania, for example, Agent Gin- taras (Amber) writes in Lithuanian: “I [name] promise to keep secret [my] cooperation with the security organs. I will sign further documents ‘Gintaras.’ 1989.03.01 [signed] Gintaras” (personal communication from Inga Zaksauskiené, 1 February 2019).
334
Hart, Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure, 73-92.
335
This is confirmed from another setting. A Stasi officer “kept several cards up his sleeve to be played depending how the meeting unfolded. Most candidates agreed to become informers on the initial request. If they wavered, however, [he] would remind them in blunt terms of some infraction, however minor, from their past. Very rarely did candidates then have the courage to refuse.” Another officer kept in reserve that the candidate’s wife had been caught with anticommunist leaflets, and she would be prosecuted if the candidate refused to cooperate. The candidate “freely agreed to work for the Stasi” so the threat was never voiced. See Bruce, The Firm, 87.
336
Verdery, Secrets and Truths, Chapter 3, writes of Romania: “What do we know about the relation of officers to their informers? Relatively little, for those two categories of people seldom write memoirs.” The personal histories of a variety of collaborators across Eastern Europe are collected in Apor, Horvath, and Mark, eds., Secret Agents and the Memory of Everyday Collaboration.
337
Skucas, “Lithuania,” 419. The Latvian KGB archive, in contrast, has recently published 4,141 personal files of KGB informers. Latvian Public Broadcasting, “First Batch of Latvia’s KGB Archives Published Online,” 20 December 2018, https://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/society/first-batch-of-latvias-kgb-archives-pub lished-online.a3O37O4/.
338
Agent Rimkus resembled the Chinese agents in Liaoning province, bordering Korea, recruited during the Korean War, as described by Schoenhals, Spying for the People, 121. One of them “insisted he be told by his handlers what they had in store for him if and when ‘the situation becomes critical’”: “Some agents could not bring themselves to believe that the [People’s Republic of China] stood any chance of emerging victorious from a military confrontation with the United States. In conversation with their handlers, they raised questions such as ‘How many aircraft do you have?’ ‘Do you have any B-29 bombers?’ ‘When the situation becomes really tense, will I be able to go with you?”’
339
For examples from the Stalin period see Harrison, “Dictator and Defense,” 5-7. From the Cold War, the reports of six urban and rural district KGB commissioners to the KGB and party leaders in Vilnius about rumors of war circulating in Soviet Lithuania in June 1956, sparked by a partial mobilization of Soviet army reserves, are preserved in Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/506,336-56.
340
Ruta’s breakdown oddly resembled the crises experienced by the idealistic young Soviet people of thirty years previously, described by Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind, 106-12. They dreamed of solidarity and of serving the community. Involuntarily doubting the nature of their society and the wisdom of its leaders, they found themselves isolated and their dreams poisoned, as they confided in their diaries. More than one felt the urge to confide in the authorities: “The only thing that I would like to have ... is trust of the NKVD,” wrote Julia Piatnitskaia. I thank Claire Shaw for pointing me in this direction.
341
“Like most secret services, the Stasi had a pathological fear of walk-ins.” Schmeidel, Stasi: Shield and Sword, 37.
342
Gieseke, History of the Stasi, 80, quotes from the Stasi’s Dictionary of Political-Operational Work: the “trusting relationship” between case officers and informers should involve “full trust” on the informer’s part, whereas the case officer “must always bear in mind the security and control aspect.”
343
Hoover/LYA, K-1/10/300,24-25 (letter to Col. T. N. Beskrovnyi, chief of the USSR KGB chairman’s group for study and generalization of the experience of operative work and information about the adversary, from Soviet Lithuania KGB chairman Col. A. Randakevicius, 14 March 1961).
344
Hoover/LYA, K-1/10/300, 48-65 (Report on the status of agent-operative work in the apparatus of the Soviet Lithuania KGB administration for Trakai district by Maj. Gomyranov, consultant, February 1961); the words quoted in the text are on page 50. Also K-1/10/300, 65-81 (Report on the status of agentoperative work of the Akmené KGB apparatus on 5 February 1961, by Lt. Col. Tumantsev, senior consultant of the Soviet Lithuania KGB chairman’s group for generalization and study of operative work, 21 February 1961); 82-95 (Report on the status of agent-operative work in the apparatus of the Soviet Lithuania KGB commissioner in the town of Birzai, by Maj. Gomyranov, consultant of the Soviet Lithuania KGB group for generalization and study of operative work, March 1961); 97-108 (Report on the status of agent-operative work in the Taurag district apparatus ofthe KGB on 20 March 1961, by Maj. Snakin, operative officer of the Soviet Lithuania KGB second administration, March 1961); 111-64 (Report on the status of work in the Kaunas apparatus of the Soviet Lithuania KGB, by Col. Matulaitis, chief of the Soviet Lithuania KGB second administration, 25 April 1961).
345
“Published in Sbornik no. 2 for 1976” is noted by hand on the first page.
346
Miller, Narratives of Guilt and Compliance, 22.
347
In East Germany, Schmeidel, Stasi: Shield and Sword, 36; Dennis, Stasi: Myth and Reality, 104-6; Miller, Narratives of Guilt and Compliance, 48-49. In Romania, Verdery, Secrets and Truths, chapter 3. As for the Soviet Union, the author has received personal accounts in conversation.
348
From China Schoenhals, Spying for the People, 141-42, gives an example of seizing the right moment to recruit an agent, cited in the original source as exemplifying good practice.
349
In the 1960s, in East Germany at roughly the same time as most of our stories, Stasi researchers estimated that only 7.7 percent of “unofficial collaborators” in Karl-Marx-Stadt were recruited under duress. Miller, Narratives of Guilt and Compliance, 41, 47. Dennis, Stasi: Myth and Reality, 98, suggests that this was policy: Stasi guidelines of a few years later recommended that recruitment should be based on “the candidates’ positive political stance, on their personal needs, and interests, on the desire to atone for misdemeanors,” or a combination. “Atonement” might be a cynical euphemism for blackmail, but the desire to atone for misdemeanors implies what we see to have been fairly frequent in our Soviet data: a compromised past, followed by regret. On similar lines, Schmeidel, Stasi: Shield and Sword, 38, attributes the low rate of recruitment by threats to career concerns: the typical Stasi officer advanced by recruiting informers and was damaged by failures, so preferred the willing to the unwilling.
350
Miller, Narratives of Guilt and Compliance, 42.
351
That third-party verification was considered normal is implied by a report on the condition of the agent network managed by the KGB Trakai office. A stream of criticisms includes the remark: “Following recruitment of an agent, no evidence of verification is added to the personal file.” (Hoover/LYA, K-1/10/300, 48-65, Report on the status of agent-operative work in the apparatus of the Soviet Lithuania KGB administration for Trakai district by Maj. Gomyranov, consultant, February 1961). Miller, Narratives of Guilt and Compliance, 15, suggests that the East German Stasi aimed to confirm the accuracy of all agent reports by systematic triangulation.
352
Our reports place considerable weight upon the agent’s willingness to report in writing. It was seen as an inferior outcome when the agent reported verbally to the case officer, who had to write up the report afterward. In East Germany, as argued by Miller, Narratives of Guilt and Compliance, 15, the Stasi discouraged verbal reporting because of the discretion it gave to the case officer to filter the detail given by the informer.
353
For Chinese informers before the Cultural Revolution, the exploits of Sherlock Holmes were recommended reading. Schoenmals, Spying for the People, 179.
354
Hoover/LYA, K-1/10/311, 87-94 (Report on the expediency and appropriateness of cash outlays under Art. 9 (special outlays) in the organs of the Soviet Lithuania KGB, by Lt. Col. Babintsev, chief of the Soviet Lithuania KGB chairman’s group, 23 June 1962).
355
From the 1930s, see Figes, Whisperers, 258-71. From the 1970s, see Smith, Russians, 141-142, and Harrison, “There Was a Front,” 45-46.
356
Mel’nichenko, Sovetskii anekdot.
357
Fitzpatrick, “Signals from Below.” See also the row heading “Complaints and Petitions” in Table 3.3.
358
The myth and reality are explored by Kelly, Comrade Pavlik.
359
Khlevniuk, Khoziain, 392-95.
360
In China in 1957, a security officer attributed widespread informal awareness of the interception of mail to indiscreet colleagues. Schoenhals, Spying for the People, 133.
361
That this was possible is indicated by occasional KGB documentation of efforts to avoid it. “With the aim of legalizing the agent evidence of X’s unhealthy utterances” (in other words, to disguise the true origin of the evidence), “her colleagues Y and Z interviewed her covertly. In their submissions they both indicated that in their presence at the end of May this year X expressed anti-Soviet nationalist judgments.” Hoover/LYA. K-1/3/697, 80-82 (Report to Maj.-Gen. Yu. Yu. Petkevicius, chairman of the Soviet Lithuania KGB, on preventive measures implemented in relation to X, no date but November 1972, names redacted by the author).
362
Carelessness: Harrison, “There Was a Front,” 46. Conscience: Figes, Whisperers, 259. A few years ago, the author heard of a young man who, on being approached by the KGB to provide information, immediately told all his friends, knowing that this would halt his recruitment. According to Gieseke, History of the Stasi, 94, in dissident and church circles this was “the most proven method” of refusing Stasi recruitment without saying no to the face of the recruiter.
363
Smith, Russians, 142.
364
Figes, Whisperers, 251.
365
For the 1930s see Figes, Whisperers, 251-58, and Hosking, “Trust and Distrust,” 14-17.
366
Oring, “Risky Business,” 212.
367
Smith, Russians, 142.
368
Neuendorf, “Surveillance and Control,” 261-62.
369
Lichter, Loftier, and Siegloch, “Long-Term Costs of Government Surveillance.” The evidence of this paper is based on the third-stream definition of trust, discussed earlier in the chapter: trust is allowed to mean whatever respondents have in mind when they respond to survey questions about trust.
370
Lichter, Loftier, and Siegloch, “Long-Term Costs of Government Surveillance,” 11. This study uses a subset of Stasi informers designated as “operative” informers. Pooling the data from all the East German counties at that time gives an average operative informer density of 3.8 per thousand. If all categories of Stasi informers were counted, the total in 1980 would be 170,000 (Gieseke, “German Democratic Republic,” 199), making an informer density of just over 10 per thousand in the East German resident population of the time.
371
As the authors report, informer density was determined by Stasi leaders at the level of larger districts, the borders of which were redrawn in the 1950s on the basis of economic factors that can be controlled for. To limit the scope for other confounding factors, the study exploits the variation of outcomes when counties on either side of district borders are compared with each other. Lichter, Loffler, and Siegloch, “Long-Term Costs of Government Surveillance,” 7,16.
372
As noted by Bergson, “Russian Defense Expenditures,” 373.
373
For these aspects of the grey zone in Soviet history, see Cooper, “Civilian Production”; Cooper, Soviet Defence Industry; Barber et al., “Structure and Development”; Simonov, “Mobpodgotovka”; Markevich, “Planning the Supply of Weapons”; Davies, “Planning for Mobilization.”
374
Wheatcroft and Davies, “Crooked Mirror of Soviet Economic Statistics,” concisely describe the most common biases and distortions.
375
Bergson, “Reliability and Usability.”
376
Wiles, “Soviet Military Finance,” 6.
377
The harvest in 1932 (and, to a lesser extent, in following years): Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 444. The population in 1939: Davies et al., Soviet Economy and the Approach of War, 150-51. Human losses in World War II: Harrison, “Counting the Soviet Union’s War Dead,” 1036. Property losses in the same war: Babichenko, Debit and Credit of War, 167.
378
Plotnikov, Biudzhet sovetskogo gosudarstva; Voznesenskii, Voennaia ekono- mika SSSR; Bergson, “Russian Defense Expenditures.”
379
For Soviet net material product utilized for consumption and accumulation in 1980, see TsSU, Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1985 g, 411. Soviet GDP at current prices in 1980 was not known with any precision at the time, but it was retrospectively reported as 619 billion rubles: see Goskomstat, Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1990 g, 5-
380
The real GDP of the Soviet Union in 1980 was around 40 percent of that of the USA (see the Maddison Project Historical Statistics dataset, https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/. The real value of reported Soviet military outlays should therefore have been in the region of 3 percent (of Soviet GDP) divided by 4.8 percent (of US GDP), multiplied by 40 percent (the ratio of Soviet to US real GDP), which equals 25 percent of the United States.
381
Firth and Noren, Soviet Defense Spending, 34-37.
382
For retrospective analysis, see Easterly and Fischer, “Soviet Economic Decline.”
383
Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.
384
The following discussion is based on Gregory and Harrison, “Allocation under Dictatorship,” 744-47.
385
Here and below, defense shares of Soviet GNP are based on the retrospective estimates used in Table 7.7.
386
The CIA’s dollar estimates raised specific issues that I do not discuss here. A persistent critic of the dollar estimates was Franklyn D. Holzman, who argued that, by neglecting substitution (or index-number) biases, the CIA overestimated the real value of Soviet military outlays. Holzman, “Are the Soviets Really Out- spending the U.S.?”
387
Swain, “Soviet Military Sector,” 109
388
Central Intelligence Agency of the United States, Estimated Soviet Defense Spending; Lee, Estimation of Soviet Military Expenditures; Rosefielde, False Science (first edition). It was suggested that the building-block methodology could only give a lower bound on Soviet spending because its coverage of the building blocks was inevitably incomplete. For the categories of equipment that were covered, the CIA was alleged to understate the rates of growth of true quantities and costs. That is, it attributed too much of observed price changes to hidden inflation and so failed to capture the full improvement in the quality of Soviet weapons through time; this led to understatement of the value of Soviet military stocks relative to the United States. At the same time, it failed to observe the full extent of price inflation, and this led to understatement of the cost of Soviet defense activity to the economy supplying it. Both Lee and Rosefielde argued that the CIA methodology lacked transparency, withholding the evidence base of prices and quantities from which the building blocks were valued, and the procedure for consistent revision of serial data when new information was factored in. Finally, they diagnosed lack of robustness from the character of CIA responses to new information. In the most celebrated case, when the “benchmark” figure of 50 billion rubles in 1970 transpired, it was more than twice the previous CIA estimate. The latter was then revised upward. The CIA claimed that this revision would have happened anyway in the course of repricing and was independent of the “new information”. Burton, “Estimating Soviet Defense Spending,” replied for the CIA, but neither Rosefielde, False Science (second edition) nor Lee, CIA Estimates of Soviet Military Expenditures, was reconciled. Although the CIA’s direct costing exercise was wound up after the fall of communism, those formerly engaged in it continued to defend their position. Noren, “Controversy over Western Measures”; Firth and Noren, Soviet Defense Spending.
389
Rosefielde, False Science (second edition).
390
Lee, CIA Estimates of Soviet Military Expenditures.
391
Barber et al., “Structure and Development of the Defence Industry Complex,” 21.
392
Higher DIA figures are presented in Michaud, “Paradox of Current Soviet Military Spending,” but the methodology was also represented by Duchêne, “How Much Do the Soviets Spend,” Duchêne and Steinberg, “Soviet National Accounts,” and Mochizuki, “Estimating Soviet Defence Expenditures,” and it had its roots in Becker, “Soviet Military Outlays. The latter scholars are among those that tended to come up with estimates lower than the CIA. A similar methodology underlay the SIPRI figures shown in Table 7.5. The reasons why shared principles could give rise to a wide range of estimates were explored by Matosich, “Estimating Soviet Military Hardware Purchases.”
393
The pioneer of this line of thinking was Birman, Secret Incomes.
394
Steinberg, “Estimating Total Soviet Military Expenditures”; “Trends in Soviet Military Expenditure”; The Soviet Economy, 1970-1990.
395
Wiles, “Soviet Military Finance”; Wiles, “How Soviet Defence Expenditure Fits.”
396
Rosefielde, “Soviet Defence Spending.”
397
Harrison, “Economic Growth and Slowdown,” 62-63.
398
Sandle, “Brezhnev and Developed Socialism,” 183-85.
399
The White House, Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Table 3.1 (Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940-2025), https://www .whitehouse.gov/omb/historical-tables/.
400
Service, End of the Cold War, 209-18; see also Kimball, “Looking Back.”
401
The Chernobyl catastrophe began in the early hours of 26 April 1986. Two and a half days passed before the first reluctant official admission. It was addressed by US president Reagan in a radio broadcast of 4 May. Ten more days passed before Gorbachev broke his own silence. Plokhy, Chernobyl, 233-35.At the time of Reagan’s broadcast, Secretary of State George P. Shultz was quoted as saying that “while Chernobyl has no ‘one-on-one connection’ with the arms control process, ‘the problem of verification is a very important problem’ that must be addressed completely before any arms control agreement can be reached.” Jack Nelson, “Reagan Criticizes Disaster Secrecy: Soviets ‘Owe World an Explanation’ for Chernobyl Blast, President Says,” Los Angeles Times, 4 May 1986, https://www .latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-05-04-mn-3685-story.html.
402
The Hoover Archive, Vitalii Leonidovich Kataev collection, Box 12, File 13 (“TsK KPSS. О predlozheniiakh MID SSSR po povysheniiu otkrytosti voennoi deiatel’nosti SSSR,” dated November 1986). The Kataev collection is based on a private archive. It is not always clear whether documents represent final or preliminary drafts, whether memoranda were sent, or whether recommendations were adopted. Sometimes this can be inferred indirectly.
403
Hoover/Kataev, 12/13 (“TsK KPSS. K porucheniiu о povyshenii otkrytosti voennoi deiatel’nosti SSSR,” dated April 1987).
404
Hoover/Kataev, 12/13 (“TsK KPSS. К porucheniiu о povyshenii otkrytosti voennoi deiatel’nosti SSSR,” dated April 1987).
405
Hoover/Kataev, electronic files, 2002c48_disk_04_mic.pdf (“Sovetskii VPK—vzgliad izvnutri,” page 22).
406
Hoover/Kataev, electronic files, 2002c48_disk_04_mic.pdf (“Sovetskii VPK—vzgliad izvnutri”). Akhromeev was a true Soviet conservative. In the end he could not reconcile himself with
407
Hoover/Kataev, 1/1 (“V. L. Kataev. Perechen’ arkhivnykh materialov. Kom- mentarii к nekotorym iz nikh,” undated).
408
Hoover/Kataev, electronic files, 2002c48_disk_04_mic.pdf (“Sovetskii VPK—vzgliad izvnutri”).
409
Bornstein, “The Soviet 1963 Industrial Price Revision”; Schroeder, “The 1966-67 Soviet Industrial Price Reform.”
410
Hoover/Kataev, electronic files, 2002c48_disk_04_mic.pdf (“Sovetskii VPK—vzgliad izvnutri”).
411
Hoover/Kataev, 1/1 (“V. L. Kataev. Perechen’ arkhivnykh materialov. Kom- mentarii к nekotorym iz nikh,” undated).
412
Hoover/Kataev, electronic files, 2002c48_disk_04_mic.pdf (“Sovetskii VPK—vzgliad izvnutri”).
413
Hoover/Kataev, 12/13 (“TsK KPSS. К porucheniiu о povyshenii otkrytosti voennoi deiatel’nosti SSSR,” dated April 1987).
414
Hoover/Kataev, 12/13 (“TsK KPSS. V sootvetstvii s porucheniem TsK KPSS doklady vaem ...”). Bobkov’s name was added by hand after crossing out the name of KGB Chief Chebrikov. This document has other annotations including a date, 20 July 1987, and, above the heading, the reference “P78/VII.” This seems to correspond with resolution P78/VII on the future declassification of the defense budget, adopted by the Politburo on 6 August 1987, mentioned in other documents in the same file (“T.t. Masliukovu Yu. D. (sozyv) . . .”, 13 dated August 1987), and 11/31 (“Spravka. Dlia aktivizatsii nashei vneshnei politiki,” accompanied by a memo dated 22 March 1989).
415
Compare Firth and Noren, Soviet Defense Spending, 130.
416
Hoover/Kataev, 12/13 (“T.t. Masliukovu Yu. D. (sozyv) ...”)
417
Hanson, “Soviet Economic Reform,” provides contemporary insight into the deadlock behind the failure of Soviet economic reforms under Gorbachev. For a retrospective view, see Miller, Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy, 55-73.
418
Rubanov, “Ot kul’ta sekretnosti.”
419
“Rubanov Vladimir Arsent’evich,” on the website of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, a Russian NGO think-tank, http://svop.ru/ рубанов-владимир-арсентьевич/.
420
Rubanov, “Ot kul’ta sekretnosti,” 32.
421
Gorbachev’s briefing for the London visit can be found in Hoover/Kataev, 11/31 (“General’nomu sekretariu TsK KPSS” dated March 1989), and possibly also 12/13 (“K poezdke”).
422
Hoover/Kataev, 11/31 (“Spravka. Dlia aktivizatsii nashei vneshnei politiki,” no date but evidently March 1989).
423
Hoover/Kataev, 11/31 (“O raskhodakh na oboronu,” accompanied by a memo dated 22 March 1989).
424
Hoover/Kataev, 11/31 (“Spravka. Dlia aktivizatsii nashei vneshnei politiki”).
425
The defense budget was broken down into six headings: personal and operating costs (20.2 billion), procurement (32.6 billion), RDTE (15.3billion), construction (4.6 billion), other items (production and delivery of nuclear weapons, 2.3 billion), and pensions (2.3 billion). Firth and Noren, Soviet Defense Spending, 186.
426
Central Intelligence Agency of the United States, Defense in the 1989 Soviet State Budget. Published studies are by Steinberg, “Soviet Defense Burden”; Cooper, “Military Expenditure of the USSR”; and Firth and Noren, Soviet Defense Spending, 185-188.
427
Noren, “Controversy over Western Measures,” 262. The statements were made by Defense Minister Yazov, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Politburo member Yegor Ligachev, and even Gorbachev himself.
428
Steinberg, “Soviet Defense Burden,” 257.
429
Quoted by Noren, “Controversy over Western Measures,” 26on (emphasis added).
430
Masliukov and Glubokov, “Planirovanie i finansirovanie voennoi promysh- lennosti,” 105
431
Cited by Firth and Noren, Soviet Defense Spending, 260П.
432
Gorbachev, Memoirs, 215.
433
Firth and Noren, Soviet Defense Spending, 188-91.
434
Masliukov and Glubokov, “Planirovanie i finansirovanie voennoi promyshlennosti,” 105.
435
Masliukov and Glubokov, “Planirovanie i finansirovanie voennoi promyshlennosti,” 105.
436
Masliukov and Glubokov, “Planirovanie i finansirovanie voennoi promyshlennosti,” 106. Specifically, “outlays on the organs of state administration on the organization of the defense complex .. . a number of tasks undertaken by institutes of the Academy of Sciences and the Higher School out of their own budgetary allocations and [funding of] dual-purpose projects . .. the part of capital investments directed toward the development of the defense complex, minus depreciation costs included in the prices of military products ... outlays incurred for the maintenance of necessary mobilization inventories.”
437
Mashukov and Glubokov, Planirovanie i finansirovanie voennoi promysh- lennosti,” 106-107. “In an annual report to Congress in 1989, [US Secretary of Defense] Carlucci gives the distribution of US defense outlays by items, where outlays on salaries are 44 percent of the total ($131.5 billion). Given that the structure of Soviet outlays was similar, and setting the average annual salary in the USSR (3,168 rubles in industry in 1989) equal to the average annual salary in the USA ($25,600, or 15,560 rubles at the official rate), then outlays on defense in the USSR would be 152 billion rubles (16.6 percent of GNP), which matches the estimates of American specialists on Soviet military outlays, based on the cost of production in American values.” For an earlier argument on similar lines, see Holzman, “Are the Soviets Really Outspending the U.S.?”
438
Butler Committee, Review of Intelligence, 14-15.
439
Harrison, Accounting for War, 110.
440
Harrison, “Soviet Industry and the Red Army.”
441
Cooper, “Defense Industry and Civil-Military Relations,” 170.
442
Treml, Censorship, Access, and Influence.
443
Arrow, “The Value of and Demand for Information.”
444
On availability cascades in a free society, see Kuran and Sunstein, “Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation.” This prescient paper was published in 1999 when Facebook did not exist, and the number of internet users worldwide was no more than 300 million,
445
For these and other examples see Cull et al., Soviet Subversion, Disinformation and Propaganda; Rid, Active Measures.
446
Rid, Active Measures, 10-11. Similarly, Bennett and Livingston, “Brief History of the Disinformation Age,” 3, describe the goal of disinformation as the disruption of rule-based institutions. A focus of recent literature on information wars and disinformation is the potential they create for democratic breakdown, especially in the United States: see Benkler, Faris, and Roberts, Network Propaganda; Bennett and Livingston, eds., Disinformation Age; Lindberg, ed., Automatization Turns Viral. Glaeser, “Political Economy of Hatred,” provides a canonical discussion of the use of false histories to mobilize support for authoritarian leaders by polarizing societies and focusing popular anger against outgroups.
447
Hoover/RGANI, 89/21/66, 1 (“On the question of the procedure for familiarization with CPSU Central Committee documentation and materials of Central Committee members and leaders of regional party committee in the complex sociopolitical situation,” to the CPSU Central Committee from deputy head of the Central Committee general department P. Laptev and first deputy head of the Central Committee organizational department Yu. Ryzhov, 5 March 1991).
448
Solnick, Stealing the State.
449
For a powerful memoir of the time see Gilman, No Precedent, No Plan; for a strongly argued retrospective, Mau, “Russian Economic Reforms.”
450
Acemoglu and Robinson, Narrow Corridor, 33-73.
451
Kryshtanovskaya and White, “From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite.”
452
Snegovaya and Petrov, “Long Soviet Shadows,” 9.
453
On continuity from the Soviet KGB to Russia’s FSB, see Service, Kremlin Winter, Chapter 20.
454
Kim Murphy, “Russia’s New Elite Draws from Old KGB,” Los Angeles Times, 10 November 2003, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2oo3-nov-1o-fg -spiesio-story.html.
455
Snegovaya and Petrov, “Long Soviet Shadows,” 10.
456
“Putin Deplores Collapse of the USSR,” 25 April 2005, BBC News, http:// news.bbc .co.uk/i/hi/448 0745. stm.
457
Kryshtanovskaya and White, “Sovietization of Russian Politics.”
458
Harrison, “Soviet Economy, 1917-1991,” 200.
459
Shleifer and Treisman, “A Normal Country,” and “Normal Countries.”
460
For 2016 see Di Bella, Dynnikova, and Slavov, “Russian State’s Size and Footprint,” 12, and statistics of the World Bank, https://data.worl dbank .org/indica- tor/GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS?locations=RU. For the Soviet Union in 1980, see Tables 2A.1 and 2A.2. For government spending, reported as around 35 percent of GDP in 2016 by Di Bella, Dynnikova, and Slavov, “Russian State’s Size and Footprint,” 10, the contrast with the past would have been less stark.
461
By 2017 the ratio was almost 160 percent. See Our World in Data, https:// ourworldindata.org/grapher/mobile-cellular-subscriptions-per-ioo-people?tab =chart&country= RUS ~OW I D_W R L.
462
Printer, scanner, and multifunction printer market revenue in Russia from 2016 to 2021 (in US dollars), Statista, https://www.statista.com/forecasts/1o8o221/ printer-scanner-revenue-in-russia.
463
Plokhy, Chernobyl, 310.
464
Grimsted, “Archives of Russia Five Years After,” 20-21; also, Russian Federation, “Zakon о gosudarstvennoi taine. N5485-1,” Moscow, 21 June 1993, https:// fstec.ru/en/1o7-tekhnicheskaya-zashchita-informatsii/dokumenty/zakony/362 -zakon-rossijskoj-federatsii-ot-2i-iyunya-i993-g-n-5485-i.
465
Grimsted, “Archives of Russia Five Years After,” 21.
466
Fedor, Russia and the Cult of State Security; Service, Kremlin Winter, Chapter 20.
467
The physicist Lech Borkowski lists statues of Dzerzhinskii and monuments to him still standing in Saratov, Ufa, Taganrog, Novosibirsk, and Kras- noiarsk, two in Volgograd, and a Feliks shopping center in Dzerzhinskii Street, Kirov. Personal communication dated June 7, 2021, and Dr hab. Lech S. Borkowski (@LechSBorkowski), “Comment on the @MCinParis article in @TheSunday Times 13 Feb 2021 about Mayor of Bristol @MarvinJRees friendship with Navalny,” Twitter, 14 February 2021, 5:38 p.m., https://twitter.com/LechSBorkowski/ status/1361127668616429568. In September 2021, two new Dzerzhinskii memorials were unveiled, one in Krasnodar and the other in Simferopol’, a Ukrainian city in Russian-occupied Crimea. See “New Russian Monuments to Soviet Secret Police Founder Spark Controversy” Moscow News, 13 September 2021, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2o21/o9/13/new-russian-monuments-to-soviet-secret-police -founder-spark-controversy-a75032.
468
Discussed by Harrison, “Counting the Soviet Union’s War Dead.”
469
Cooper, Russian Military Expenditure, 35-36. Chapter 5 above discussed the incentives to inflate the secret sphere in Soviet times.
470
See the Appendix to this chapter, “Espionage as Open-Source Data Collection.”
471
Anticorruption: Oleg Shchedrov, “Russia’s Medvedev Sets out Anticorruption Drive,” Reuters, July 2, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rus sia-medvedev-corruption-idUSLo24266682Oo8o7O2. Transparency for intelligence agencies: Ilya Arkhipov, “Medvedev Orders Online Disclosures by Russian Secret Services,” Bloomberg, 10 August 2011, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2on-o8-io/medvedev-orders-online-disclosures-by-russian-secret-ser vices. The Open Government Partnership: “Russia to Join Open Government Partnership,” RT, December 14, 2012, https://www.rt.com/russia/medvedev-open-gov ernment-join-042/. Fiscal transparency: International Monetary Fund, Russian Federation Fiscal Transparency Evaluation.
472
Russian Federation, Postanovlenie ot 6 fevralia 2010 no. 63 “Ob utverzh- denii Instruktsii о poriadke dopuska dolzhnostnykh lits i grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii к gosudarstvennoi taine,” http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd =i02i35832&rdk=.
473
Alex Howard, “Russia Withdraws from Open Government Partnership. Too Much Transparency?” Open Government Partnership, 21 May 2013, https:// www.opengovpartnership.org/stories/russia-withdraws-from-open-government -partnership-too-much-transparency/.
474
International Monetary Fund, Russian Federation Fiscal Transparency Evaluation Update, 15-16.
475
Ivan Tkachev and Anton Feinberg, “Rossiia raskryla v OON tol’ko 42% svoikh voennykh raskhodov,” RBK, August 30, 2017, https://www.rbc.ru/economic 8/30/08/2017/598588189879470192154521; Andermo and Kragh, “Secrecy and Military Expenditures.”
476
Cooper, Russian Military Expenditure, 33-34.
477
“Ex-minister Mikhail Abyzov’s Shock $6zM Fraud Detention, Explained,” Moscow Times, 27 March 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/03/27/ex -minister-mikhail-abyzovs-shock-62-million-fraud-detention-explained-a64976.
478
Vaypan and Nuzov, Russia: “Crimes Against History.”
479
Memorial: “Russia Censured Memorial Rights Group as ‘Foreign Agent/” BBC News, 9 November 2015, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe -34767014; The Levada Centre: “Russia’s Levada Centre Polling Group Named Foreign Agent,” BBC News, 5 September 2016, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world -europe-37278649.
480
“Russia: Opposition Figure Navalny’s Foundation Declared‘Foreign Agent,”’ BBC News, 9 October 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-49986o16.
481
This interpretation would be in line with Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin, “Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media.”
482
On power and money in Putin’s Russia, see Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy, and Miller, Putinomics.
483
Tkachev, “Sekretnye materialy.”
484
Service, “Report for the Litvinenko Inquiry,” 4.
485
Satter, It Was a Long Time Ago.
486
Dunlop, Moscow Bombings of September 1999.
487
In 2015 North Korea’s GDP per head (at purchasing power parity) was estimated at $1,700 (compared with $42,770 for South Korea in 2019). For Vietnam, Cuba, and China in 2017 the same figures were $6,900, $12,700, and $18,200 respectively. CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/.
488
Harrison, “Soviet Economy, 1917-1991,” provides discussion and justification.
489
For the affinity of early and mid-twentieth-century mass production to both communism and national socialism, see Link, Forging Global Fordism.
490
See Our World in Data on Moore’s Law, https://ourworldindata.org/gra pher/transistors-per-microprocessor; on cellular subscriptions, https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/mobile-cellular-subscriptions-per-ioo-people; on internet users https://ourworldindata.org/internet; on users of social media https://ourworldindata.org/rise-of-social-media).
491
Hong and Kim, “Will the Internet Promote Democracy?”
492
Frantz, Authoritarianism, 217, based on a dataset of 280 authoritarian regimes from 1946 to 2010, described by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions.”
493
Guriev and Treisman, Spin Dictators.
494
Hong and Kim, “Will the Internet Promote Democracy?”
495
Frantz, Authoritarianism, 117-18; Dukalskis, Authoritarian Public Sphere.
496
Frantz, Authoritarianism, 108-10.
497
Clark et al., Shifting Landscape of Global Internet Censorship.
498
Sergei Guriev, “The Future of Putin’s Information Autocracy,” Project Syndicate, 27 December 2019, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ putin-popularity-information-autocracy-by-sergei-guriev-2019-12.
499
Sergei Guriev, “We May Already Be Seeing Russia’s Return to the Repressive Dictatorship of the 20th Century,” Institute of Modern Russia, 5 August 2021, https://imrussia.org/en/opinions/3321-sergei-guriev-%E2%80%9Cwe-may-already-be-seeing-russia%E2%8o%99s-return-to-the-repressive-dictatorship-of -the-20th-century%E2%8o%9D).
500
Menni et al. “Real-Time Tracking of Self-Reported Symptoms.”
501
“China Employs Two Million Microblog Monitors State Media Say,” BBC Chinese Service, 4 October 2013, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worl-china-243969571.
502
The working population of China’s urban areas in 2013 was 382.4 million. “Statistical Communique of the People’s Republic of China on the 2013 National Economic and Social Development,” National Bureau of Statistics of China, 24 February 2014, http://www.stats.g0v.cn/english/PressRelease/201402/ t20140224_515103.html.
503
For discussion on these lines in relation to China, see Luttwak, Rise of China, 81-82,100-101.
504
Edmonds, “Start from the Political.”
505
“Istochniki: rossiiskie vlasti ne byli gotovy к vvedennym protiv strany sanktsiiam. Vozmozhno, po tomu chto Putin skryl plan vtorzheniia ot mnogikh podchinennykh,” Agenstvo, 2 March 2022, https://www.agents.media/rossijskie-vlasti-sanktsii/.
506
Polina Beliakova, “Russian Military’s Corruption Quagmire,” Politico, 8 March 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-military-corruption- quagmire/; Alex Crowther, “Russia’s Military: Failure on an Awesome Scale,” Centre for European Policy Analysis, 15 April 2022, https://cepa.org/article/ russias-military-failure-on-an-awesome-scale/.
507
Vatulescu, Police Aesthetics, 6. For the “Iron Curtain,” see Winston S. Churchill, “The Sinews of Peace,” speech at Westminster College, Fulton, MO, 5 March 1946, International Churchill Society, http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/ speeches/i946-i963-elder-statesman/i2O-the-sinews-of-peace.
508
Applied to law making, this saying is traced back to the lawyer John Godfrey Saxe, writing in the Daily Cleveland Herald on 2 March 1869, by Fred Shapiro in “Our Daily Bieg: Uncovering More Quote Authors,” Freakonomics, 5 March 2009, https://freakonomics.com/2oo9/o3/o5/our-daily-bleg-uncovering-more-quote-au thors/. (A “bleg” is a blog entry that begs the reader for further information.)
509
“Russian ‘Spy’ Avoids Jail Term,” BBC News, 19 February 2003, http:// news.bbc.co.Uk/1/hi/world/europe/2779959.stm.
510
AAAS Human Rights Action Network, case no. reo2o8_dan, 12 November 2004, on the website of the American Association of the Advancement of Science, http://shr.aaas.org/aaashran/alert.php?a_id=290.
511
“Aleksandr Nikitin: Researcher Facing Imprisonment,” Amnesty International, http://web.archive.0rg/web/20031226015639/http://www.amnestyusa.org/ group/bannedbooks/1998/russia.html.
512
“Aleksandr Nikitin Faces Further Persecution,” Amnesty International, 1 August 2000, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/aleksandr-nikitin-faces -further-persecution.
513
“Russia: Release of Imprisoned Journalist Grigory Pasko Must Be Made Unconditional,” Amnesty International, 23 January 2003, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/russia-release-imprisoned-journalist-grigory-pasko -must-be-made-unconditional.
514
“Evrosud otkazal Grigoriiu Pas’ko,” Kommersant, 27 May 2010, https:// www.kommersant.ru/doc/1375949.
515
C. J. Chivers, “The Defender of a Lesser-Known Guarantee in Russia,” New York Times, 27 October 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2oo7/1o/27/world/ europe/27pavlov.html.
516
“‘They Followed Me All the Way to the Airstairs.’ Human Rights Lawyer Ivan Pavlov Explains Leaving Russia after the Authorities Made His Job Impossible,” Meduza, 9 September 2021, https://meduza.i0/en/feature/2021/09/09/ they-followed-me-all-the-way-to-the-airstairs).
517
Brett Stephens, “Putin’s Political Prisoners,” Wall Street Journal, 19 February 2008, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120338385727075719.
518
Carl Levitin, “Russian Scientist ‘Tried to Smuggle Spy Device to China,”’ Nature 401, no. 200 (16 September 1999), https://www.nature.com/articles/45628.
519
“Case no. 52” (7 April 2004), http://www.case52.org; “Case Study: Igor Sutyagin,” Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/eca/ russia/4.htm.
520
Ian Black, “Igor Sutyagin Is Odd Man Out in Spy Swap Deal,” Guardian, 17 August 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2o1o/aug/17/igor-sutyagin -spy-swap.
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