Should the West Engage Putin's Russia?

SHOULD THE WEST ENGAGE PUTIN’S RUSSIA?

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: Ladies and gentlemen, welcome. My name is Rudyard Griffiths and it is my privilege to both organize this debate series and to serve as your moderator. I want to start tonight’s proceedings by welcoming the North American–wide radio and television audience tuning into this debate everywhere from CBC Radio’s Ideas to CPAC, Canada’s Public Affairs Channel, to C-SPAN, across the continental United States. A warm hello also to our online audience, watching right now on munkdebates.com; it’s terrific to have you as virtual participants tonight. And finally, I’d like to welcome the over 3,000 people that have filled Roy Thomson Hall to capacity for another Munk Debate.

Tonight represents a milestone for the Munk Debates: this is our fifteenth semi-annual event. We’ve been at this for seven-and-a-half years, and our ability to bring the brightest minds and the sharpest thinkers here to Toronto to debate the big issues facing the world and Canada would not be possible without the foresight, generosity, and commitment of our series hosts. Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in an appreciation for the co-founders of the Aurea Foundation, Peter and Melanie Munk.

Let’s get this debate underway and our debaters out here on centre stage. Arguing for the resolution, “Be it resolved the West should engage not isolate Russia,” is the Emmy Award–winning journalist, top-rated Russian TV broadcaster and bestselling author Vladimir Pozner. Pozner’s teammate tonight is Stephen F. Cohen, a celebrated scholar of Soviet and post-Soviet Russia and a contributing editor at The Nation magazine, who’s here from New York City.

One team of great debaters deserves another and arguing against the resolution is the Warsaw-based, Pulitzer Prize–winning author and Washington Post columnist Anne Applebaum. Anne’s debating partner tonight is Garry Kasparov, the prominent Russian dissident and chair of the New York–based Human Rights Foundation. He is, however, probably best known as the world’s greatest living chess player.

Before we call on our debaters for their opening remarks, I need to go over one housekeeping point: our countdown clock. This clock will appear on the screen at various times during tonight’s debate, including for opening and closing statements, and for timed rebuttals. When you see it count down to zero, please join me in a round of applause. This is going to keep our speakers on their toes, and our debate on schedule.

Let’s review how the audience voted on tonight’s resolution before this debate. You were asked, “The West should engage not isolate Russia.” Interesting results: 58 percent agree with the motion and 42 percent disagree. This debate could really go either way. And to get a sense of how much of public opinion is in play tonight we asked you a second question: Are you open to changing your vote depending on what you hear during this debate? We have an indecisive audience: 86 percent of you could go either way. So, things are very much in play.

Let’s welcome all the debaters to the stage.

We agreed beforehand to the order of opening statements. Vladimir Pozner, your six minutes start now.

VLADIMIR POZNER: Ladies and gentlemen, I have not come here to argue Russia’s case. I have come here to argue the case that isolating any country is not only counter­productive but dangerous, especially if the country is as big, as wealthy, as powerful, and as unpredictable as Russia.

Allow me to share with all of you a bit of history: When the Russian Empire crumbled in 1917 and the Bolsheviks came to power, the West refused to recognize first Soviet Russia and then the Soviet Union. Isolation and non-engagement were the words of the day, and so, for about a decade, the country was portrayed as an evil power by the Western media and left to stew in its own juices. The prediction was that it would inevitably fall apart — that it was economically dead in the water — and that its people would rise up and destroy the regime.

As we all know, none of this happened. In 1929, the West was hit by the worst economic crisis in its history. Meanwhile, in 1929, the U.S.S.R. announced its first five-year plan of economic development. Over those years of non-recognition and isolation, the Stalin-led Soviet leadership conducted a massive bloodbath throughout the country: it physically wiped out all political opposition; destroyed millions and millions of peasants who had refused to adhere to the collective farm system; and starved to death millions of Ukrainian farmers who would not bow to the draconian demands for wheat and flour. It was in the process of annihilating Russia’s most precious human resource, the intelligentsia, and was in the process of creating a new human entity, the so-called Homo Sovieticus. The Great Terror of 1937 and 1938 lay just ahead.

The West’s policy of non-recognition, non-­engagement, and isolation — non-interference, if you will — and the absence of any united outcry, all played a role in allowing the Soviet system to evolve the way it did.

It would be remiss of me, on the eve of the seventieth anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany, not to mention the fact that by the end of the 1930s, the West — in particular Great Britain and France — refused to engage the U.S.S.R. in an alliance against Hitler. The consequence was the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939 between Hitler and Stalin that contained a secret protocol that sold off the independent Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as a part of Poland, to the Soviet Union in exchange for a commitment to non-aggression between the two countries.

And while it was ultimately the Soviet Union that broke the Nazis’ back — a fact confirmed by the likes of Winston Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt — it is also true that the Soviet Union went on to occupy all the countries of eastern Europe as well as some of central Europe. It is also true that the country became a military superpower, and we should thank our lucky stars that World War III never happened, thanks to mutually assured destruction (MAD).

The U.S.S.R. did not fall apart because it was isolated, or because of non-engagement on the part of the West, which in fact made it stronger. The U.S.S.R. fell apart because the system ceased to function. It was simply not viable. And what was the West’s response when Gorbachev and then Yeltsin came to power? Did the West engage the new Russia?

If we look a little bit beyond the good old Gorby-era PR spiel that was spewed out by the West for popular consumption, the policy was essentially: You lost the Cold War and you’ll pay for it. Just shut up. Go back into your cave. You’re a second-rate country and we don’t care about you anymore.

Russia today would be a very different country had the West — the United States first and foremost — decided to engage Gorbachev’s Soviet Union and then Yeltsin’s Russia with the same aims with which it engaged post–World War II Germany and Italy, to help create and support democratic development and institutions.

In conclusion, the Russia that exists today is to a large extent the result of non-engagement by the West, of a policy aimed at humbling what is a nation of proud people. I vote for engagement because I want to see change in Russia, positive change both for Russia and for the West. Thank you.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: Anne Applebaum, you’re up next.

ANNE APPLEBAUM: Thank you, Rudyard, and thank you to this fantastic audience, but no thanks to whoever wrote the resolution that Garry Kasparov and I must oppose this evening. I, like the rest of you, believe very strongly that engagement is a positive thing. Engagement, integration, peace, and prosperity are all linked. Isolation, by contrast, sounds negative and confrontational.

I have been a long-time advocate for the integration of eastern Europe with the West, and initially I believed that engagement, which works so brilliantly in Poland, where I live, could work for Russia, too. Alas, I have concluded, after long experience, that for the moment it can’t — because this current Russian regime, as it now exists, cannot be engaged.

Putin’s Russia is not just another autocracy or traditional Russian dictatorship, as Stephen F. Cohen will probably tell you. Russia’s current leaders are not simply the political rulers of their nation. They are literally the country’s owners: they control all of its major companies, all of its media, and all of its natural wealth. During the 1990s they took over the Russian state, in league with organized crime, using theft, graft, and money laundering.

As a result, Russia is one of the most unequal countries in the world, with 110 Russians controlling 35 percent of the nation’s wealth. Many of those people also work in or with the Kremlin.

Whatever you want to call this system — a mafia state, a feudal empire — it’s a disaster for ordinary Russians, but it is also extremely dangerous for everybody else. In order to stay in power and to keep this tiny group of people enriched, Putin and his cronies have long needed not only to spread the system to their immediate neighbours but to undermine rule of law and democracy in the West as well.

How does this work? Putin and his henchmen badly need to keep the international financial system safe for corrupt money. To do so, they buy Western politicians. For example, when in power, former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder stopped an investigation into a financial scam closely connected to Putin. Schröder now works for Gazprom, the Russian energy company.

Putin’s cronies have also invested heavily in strategically important European companies, hoping that by doing so they’ll acquire the political influence they need to protect their dishonest schemes. They make ample use of tax havens, thereby enriching the providers of these corruption services and depriving legitimate governments of revenue. How do we stop this? Only by disengaging and isolating the problem. Let’s get Russian money out of the Western financial system.

A second example: Putin and his henchmen are often frustrated by Western multilateral institutions, such as the European Union (EU) and NATO. A united EU energy policy would make it much more difficult for Russia to use its gas pipelines the way it does now — to blackmail and bully its neighbours. If it weren’t for NATO, Russia would find it much easier, for example, to take the land that it badly wants in the Arctic. And so the Russian regime has invested heavily in anti-European, anti-transatlantic, and even fascist political movements all across Europe.

A Russian bank has lent nine million euros to Marine Le Pen, the leader of the far right in France. Russia also maintains strong political and financial links to the anti-Semitic Jobbik party in Hungary and to far-right groups in Germany, Italy, and many other countries. What to do about this problem? We need to disengage and we need to isolate. Let’s get Russian money out of European politics.

A third example: the Russian regime has invested massively in an enormous system of disinformation — television stations in multiple languages, web sites, fake think-tanks, a vast army of Internet trolls — whose work is now well documented, and which are designed to create chaos and confusion. This isn’t traditional propaganda. It’s not about saying that Russia is a great country.

When a Russian missile shot down a Malaysian plane over eastern Ukraine last summer, the Russian media responded with multiple absurd conspiracy theories, including that the plane was full of dead people when it took off. But even on an ordinary day, Russia Today, the Russian English-language TV station, has reported on the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) invention of Ebola. The point of these stories is to create a fog of disinformation so that no one knows what is true and what is not anymore. How can we break through this fog and shore up our traditions of objective reporting? We have to disengage and isolate. Let’s work harder to identify Russian lies and get them out of our media.

You’ll note that I haven’t yet mentioned Ukraine, which is because I believe you can’t understand the recent crisis there until you understand the true nature of the current Russian regime. For two decades now, Russia has maintained control over Ukraine by investing in politicians, companies, and disinformation. Putin hoped to create a Ukraine with a copycat, colonial version of the political system he invented in Russia — and he almost succeeded. The young pro-European and pro-democracy Ukrainians, who protested on the streets in December 2013, were not fighting Russia as a nation. They were fighting oligarchs, corruption, and Putinism. How can we assist these young Ukrainians?

I repeat: we need to disengage and to isolate Putinist Russia. We need to maintain sanctions on Putin’s cronies, those 110 people around him who control their country. We need to make Putin pay a high price for invading a neighbour so that he doesn’t invade another one. And the best way to do this is to isolate Russian money, isolate Russian oligarchs, malign Russian political influence and propaganda, and prevent Russian violence and corruption from distorting the politics of Europe and North America. Putinism is a danger to Russians, to Ukrainians, and to all of us. Thank you very much.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: You finished with ten seconds on the clock, Anne. Impressive. Stephen, you’re up next.

STEPHEN F. COHEN: Unlike Ms. Applebaum, I come here, my first trip to Canada, as a patriot of American and Canadian security, on behalf of my family, and yours. I believe that we need a partner in the Kremlin if we are going to have global security — not a friend, but a partner who shares our fundamental security interest. To achieve that, we must not merely engage Russia; we must pursue full co-operation on security and other matters. National security, for both Canada and the U.S., still runs through Moscow. This is an existential truth.

I want you to consider something I’m going to share over the course of this debate. Remember what the former United States senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan once said: “Everyone is entitled to his or her own opinions, but not to his or her own facts.” It’s profound.

Here are the facts: The world today is much more dangerous, far less stable and ordered than it was twenty-five years ago when the Soviet Union existed. There are more nuclear states but less control over the sale of nuclear weapons, over nuclear know-how, and over nuclear material. There are more regional conflicts, more open ethnic and religious hatreds, and there is more political extremism and intolerance. As a result, there is more terrorism in more places.

And to make matters worse, there is more economic and social deprivation and resentment. And as we all know, there are more environmental dangers and foreseeable shortages of the earth’s resources.

Here’s the other fact: not one of these existential dangers can be dealt with effectively without Russia’s co-operation, no matter who sits in the Kremlin. Even after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia remains the world’s largest territorial country, and one that straddles the fateful frontline between Western and Islamic civilization. Russia still has, proportionately, more of the world’s natural resources, from energy to freshwater, than any other nation.

And, of course, Russia has its arsenals and stockpiles of every conceivable weapon of mass destruction. Whether we like it or not, Russia still has sympathizers, partners, and allies around the world, even in Europe and the Western hemisphere. These are facts. Not opinions.

What is the alternative? Our opponents say it is to isolate Russia. They want to weaken, destabilize, and carry out regime change — as if it were that easy — in Russia. They rely not on facts but on three fundamental fallacies based on their opinions.

Fallacy #1: In this globalized world, it is impossible to isolate Russia. Russia is too big, too rich, too inter­connected. Russia has many options, apart from the West. Ever since President Obama said, several months ago, that it was American policy to isolate Russia, the Russian state, under Putin, has signed more financial, political, economic, and military agreements with foreign states than Washington. Russia is connected. Russia has other places to go if we push it out of the West.

Fallacy #2: Isolating Russia from the West will not make Moscow more co-operative or compliant. Instead, we know what Russia will do — it’s already doing it. It will turn elsewhere, above all to China, and to many other regions and regimes around the world that harbour resentments against America, Europe, and Canada. And what will Russia do if we so isolate it? It will sell these countries nuclear reactors — excellent weapons. It will give them credit, and it will protect them politically at the United Nations with its veto.

Fallacy #3: A weakened, destabilized Russia will make every danger I have listed worse and create new ones. Consider, for example, if this policy of isolation, with its sub-policy of weakening Moscow, were to succeed. What would become of Russia’s weapons of mass destruction if Moscow’s control over them diminished? Think about that and yourselves. Think about your children. Think about this kind of madness. Is that what we really want?

Finally, what are the fundamental arguments our opponents make in favour of trying to isolate Russia? They make none that I can see. The towering example, and one which I knew Ms. Applebaum would mention, is Ukraine. What happened in Ukraine is entirely Putin’s fault. The West bears no responsibility: we made no mistakes in our policy whatsoever. This is not factual.

I want to conclude by pointing out what Ukraine has already cost us in terms of our national security. We have lost a security partner in the Kremlin, not just Putin, but perhaps for generations or, at least, years to come. It is splitting Europe against American leadership and possibly undermining the transatlantic alliance and plunging us into a new Cold War. It is bringing us closer to an actual war with nuclear Russia than we have been since the Cuban Missile Crisis. These are the facts.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: Thank you, Stephen. Garry Kasparov, you have six minutes.

GARRY KASPAROV: Thank you very much. I’m here not as just a neighbour of Mr. Cohen, because we both live on the Upper West Side of New York, but as a patriot of my country, Russia.

I don’t feel very comfortable arguing against the resolution. My dream when I was a kid, as a chess prodigy travelling abroad, playing under the Soviet and eventually under the Russian flag, was to help make my country a real factor in the progress of humanity. I knew that despite the regime that I hated — the Soviet Union at that time — that Russia had huge intellectual and cultural potential, and that it also had natural resources.

It seemed to me, and to millions of others in my country and in eastern Europe, that our dream had come true in 1991. The regime collapsed, and we all remember the celebrating crowds, pulling down the statue of KGB founder Felix Dzerzhinsky, and the talk of purification and escaping from a cage. It was not an easy time; Yugoslavia had also collapsed and then it fell into a terrible civil war. Russia happily escaped that, thanks to Boris Yeltsin and his wisdom and ability to understand that we needed an agreement with the former Soviet republics.

Russia was engaged from the very beginning. What about all the billions and billions of Western money given as aid to support Russia’s economy? And in 1998, during the financial crisis, it was an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan that actually helped Russia to escape from the abyss. By the end of Yeltsin’s rule Russia was already on the verge of recovery. Actually, the highest growth of gross domestic product (GDP) in Russia was in the year 2000. And then Putin came to power. The greatest mistake Yeltsin made was to hand over power to a KGB lieutenant colonel nine years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

And what was the first thing Putin did? He restored the Soviet anthem for those who had ears to hear his long-term agenda. And we began to see the total collapse of the feeble democracy created under Yeltsin. First, the country became a one-party dictatorship, and then it became a one-man dictatorship, the most unstable and dangerous form of government. The whole legacy of the regime is based on his charisma and his ability to excite the audience — the entire propaganda machine works for his greatness. And again, we know from history that after running out of enemies inside a country, these dictators turn elsewhere.

In 2005, I stopped playing chess and I turned toward what some people have mistakenly called Russian politics. I say that because when you traditionally think of politics you think about political parties, debates, fundraising, and elections. Russia has no live television or public debates.

So I knew it would be an uphill battle, one in which my chess experience couldn’t help me at all. In chess we have fixed rules and unpredictable results. Putin’s Russia is the exact the opposite. And all of this has happened during the West’s engagement with the country. I remember watching with horror while Putin hosted the G7 in 2006. I never called it G8, by the way, because for me it was always G7 plus one.

Russian inclusion in the G8 was essentially given to Yeltsin as an advance, like a preliminary reward. Russia was not a democracy and it was not a great industrial power. China never made it into the G8 and neither did India, but Russia did. And how could we attack Putin and his democratic values if we watched him being embraced by Bush, Blair, Berlusconi, and Chirac? The Russian propaganda machine used this to Putin’s advantage.

And while we are talking about foreign aggression, I can’t avoid mentioning the issue of Ukraine. The Russian invasion of Ukraine undermines the authority of NATO and the United States. And it was the only thing Putin could do to maintain his grip on power. The economy alone could no longer sustain his reign.

He has become a ruler for life, and everybody seems to understand it. He needed to invade Ukraine for the same reasons he invaded Georgia in 2008. And let’s not forget that Ukraine was disarmed by the United States and the United Kingdom in 1994, when it was forced to sign the Budapest Memorandum. Few people in this audience know that at that time, Ukraine had the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world — more than the U.K., France, and China combined. Ukraine had 1,200 nuclear warheads. If some of these warheads were aimed at Moscow today, Putin would never have crossed the Ukrainian border. That document, which included the signatures of Bill Clinton and John Major, also disarmed small nuclear arsenals from Kazakhstan and Belarus. It created a nuclear-free former Soviet Union, but it was done in exchange for territorial integrity.

And if you think that Crimea is a regional, local problem, you’re wrong. The message being sent to every country in the world is that if you want to protect your sovereignty, get some nukes, which is why the Ukrainian crisis affects everybody on this planet. I don’t want to isolate Russia; I want to isolate Putin’s regime, which is a dangerous virus. You don’t engage a virus. It needs to be contained. Contamination is not the answer. Thank you.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: Great opening statements. Now, we’re going to move on to timed rebuttals. We want to give each side an opportunity to rebut what they have heard so far. The pro side will speak first. Vladimir, you’ve got two minutes.

VLADIMIR POZNER: If we’re going to be honest, the majority of people in this audience really don’t know much about Russia or Ukraine. And so the debaters up on stage can really say anything. Billions and billions of dollars were not invested in Russia. You’ve got to be kidding me. And whatever was invested was invested to make money.

And as for Putin’s supposed cronies, why are they called “cronies”? Why are they not his comrades? We’re debating semantics and not facts.

Here are the facts: if Ukraine had nuclear missiles, can you imagine what kind of a chess game we’d have? There would be nobody left to play it. Is that what we’re looking for? We should be thankful they don’t have missiles in that country. The fewer missiles there are in the world, the better. Do we want a Russia that is pushed out of everything, doing whatever it wants, and in no way answering for its actions? A country that is not under any pressure from the outside world because it’s not engaged? Or do we want a policy of engagement?

Russia has always been in the crosshairs of the West, and perhaps for good reason. So if you think this is just a Putin issue, you’ve made a big mistake. It’s about a much more basic relationship.

STEPHEN F. COHEN: I didn’t know that Mr. Kasparov was stalking me. I had no idea he lived on the Upper West Side. And I’m hoping we’ll end up in a coffee shop there for a friendly talk. But I wouldn’t want him making any Western policy.

Henry Kissinger, who is ninety-one and not thought to be soft on anybody, wrote in Ms. Applebaum’s own newspaper back in March 2014 that “the demonization of Vladimir Putin is not a policy; it’s an alibi for the absence of one.” I would say that Dr. Kissinger could have gone further and said that the demonization of Putin is an excuse to abandon analysis, to obscure perilous facts, and to make statements about an evil in Moscow — that it’s a mafia state — and to compare Putin to Hitler. This approach is wrong.

Alongside this line of thinking inevitably comes this romance of the Yeltsin ’nineties. Maybe it was great time for Mr. Kasparov. Maybe it was beneficial to Poland and eastern Europe. I don’t know. But when Mr. Yeltsin was forced from office, 75 percent of Russians lived in poverty, as Garry well knows. The billions and billions of American and Western dollars they so romantically think were sent to Moscow were collected by Mr. Yeltsin’s friends and sent back to the Bank of New York, where they were laundered — a criminal case was brought against the bank for that later. So this romantic idea of the 1990s is completely deceptive. Russia was on its knees, ruled by a weak ruler and pillaged by a mafia. So let’s think about the real problems in the world, and about our security, please.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: Anne?

ANNE APPLEBAUM: To be clear, the Russia we have today is the result of our failed policy of engagement. Have we isolated and humiliated Russia since 1991? I would say no. Post-Soviet Russia was not humiliated and was given de facto great power status, as you’ve just heard. Russia received the Soviet UN seat, and the Soviet embassies and nuclear weapons, which were transferred from Ukraine under the terms of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, a series of American presidents — all of them, in fact — have sought to build up Russia’s international status.

Presidents Clinton and Bush invited Russia to join the G8, even though Russia was not one of the world’s top economies. Russia was invited to join the Council of Europe, although it is not a democracy. Russia was invited to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), whose rules it systematically violates.

What was Russia doing during this same period, while we were engaging and inviting the country into our institutions? Putin invaded Chechnya, not once but twice. He invaded Georgia. He invaded Ukraine. He built up his military system.

Last month he held a military exercise in the Arctic, involving 80,000 troops, 220 aircraft, and 41 ships. Earlier this year he conducted an equally vast exercise in the Baltic. In 2009 and in 2013 he conducted military exercises, which concluded with a practice run of a nuclear bombardment of Warsaw.

You can’t have it both ways. You can’t say Putin was laundering his money in Western banks and that we were isolating him. What was Russia doing while we let it utilize our banking system and enrich itself? It was recreating a Soviet-style nuclear arsenal and a Soviet-style military to use against us.

GARRY KASPAROV: I am always willing to learn, but this is the first time I’ve heard someone suggest that a policy of engagement in the 1920s could have prevented Stalinist terror. I always believed that it was a criminal regime founded by Lenin and Stalin among others, and that whatever the West did in the 1920s was irrelevant. Lenin said, “We’ll treat the West as useful idiots who’ll sell us the very rope that we’ll use to hang them.”

Now, I’m not here to say that Yeltsin’s regime was a perfect democracy. I am very critical of Yeltsin, and I believe Russia missed great opportunities to become a proper democratic state with established institutions and a normal system of checks and balances. It didn’t happen, and there is a lot of criticism levied at Yeltsin, which is justified. But again, we avoided wars; we avoided ethnic conflict. We could have had a war like in Yugoslavia, if someone like Putin had been in power then.

And yes, I agree, there was massive corruption under Boris Yeltsin, especially in his second term when the oligarchs were ripping off the country. These very people who were stealing money were the ones who convinced Yeltsin to appoint Putin to protect them. They didn’t care about democracy; they wanted to protect themselves. And with very few exceptions, these people are still around.

When we talk about Putin’s friends, we are talking about people who were lucky. They shared the same desk with Putin at school or were in judo class with him, and now they are on the Forbes wealthiest list. As Anne said, the country is owned by very few families, and ironically, they are all people who are close to Mr. Putin. They are fighting for power, and it’s a fight for survival. The only item on Putin’s agenda is to stay in power, and he will keep it by whatever means necessary because he has no other choice. He will commit any crime to ensure he can stay in the Kremlin.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: Ladies and gentlemen, both sides of the debate have spoken. Now we want to get into an exchange between debaters. Vladimir, let’s start by asking you to pick up on something that Anne said. The Obama administration tried to roll back a number of policies that were seen as exclusionary to Russia. What did this famous reset do? It led to the conflict in Crimea and Ukraine. How do you respond to the perceived failure of that policy?

VLADIMIR POZNER: First of all, it did not. Secondly, Russia was so poor that they even misspelled the world “reset” in Russia. This policy did not lead to Crimea at all.

The bombardment of Yugoslavia is a perfect example of Russian humiliation; they begged us not to do it. And that was during Yeltsin’s time. The Russians were told to just shut up. And since the UN would not condone it, NATO led the mission. And then, of course, Kosovo was allowed to leave Serbia, although it had been a part of Serbia for over five hundred years.

Why was that possible? Why were the Russians ignored? This is the kind of humiliation that has led to the greatest anti-American sentiment in Russia that I have ever known, much more than during Soviet times. The average Russian today is absolutely anti-American, which was not the case before. There was anti-Bush, anti-Reagan sentiment, yes, but not anti-Americanism. This feeling is rooted in truth; it’s not just propaganda.

GARRY KASPAROV: No, there’s a lot of propaganda. My mother is seventy-eight. She was born and raised under Stalin. She said she has never heard such a concentrated message of hatred 24/7 on Russian television, like there is now.

VLADIMIR POZNER: Why are you yelling?

ANNE APPLEBAUM: That’s how he always talks.

GARRY KASPAROV: Because I am also Russian and I know Russia.

VLADIMIR POZNER: Oh, so Russians yell. That’s the idea, right? They also drink vodka, dance, and play the balalaika.

GARRY KASPAROV: I don’t drink.

VLADIMIR POZNER: Russians are normal people. Your mother has had her experience. I think I’m even older than your mother.

GARRY KASPAROV: Yes.

VLADIMIR POZNER: And I lived in the Soviet Union.

GARRY KASPAROV: But we lived on different sides of the fence. You were on the propaganda side; we were on the opposite side, listening to you.

VLADIMIR POZNER: No, that is not true. You don’t know anything about me. The propaganda in Russia was very different back then. It was far less sophisticated because Russia was totally isolated.

GARRY KASPAROV: You mean during the Soviet Union? Today it is more sophisticated. I agree.

VLADIMIR POZNER: Yes, today it is much more sophisticated. It is much more dangerous. I’m certainly not saying it isn’t, but the average Russian is also sadly more anti-American.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: Vladimir’s saying that the policy of isolation is stoking the anti-American sentiments that empower Putin and his ruling clique. Anne, why don’t you respond to that?

ANNE APPLEBAUM: We created Putin and his ruling clique. Our banking systems laundered their money and our tax havens protected it, so stop acting like they’re somehow a reaction to our isolation. We kept Putin on board. We invited him to the meetings and we tried to make him part of things. Initially, it was with very good intentions.

We wanted Putin to be part of the West. We had this idea that Russia was a candidate Western country and if we were just nice enough, they would join us. What we’ve discovered is that it has evolved into something really quite different. It’s not the Soviet Union. Soviet analogies are wrong. But it’s not Nazi Germany, either. It’s a very new, very sophisticated kind of propaganda-run state.

This is a country in which every single television channel and every single newspaper and almost every single Internet web site, with a few exceptions, is controlled by the state and run in such a way that they all appear to be slightly different. This is not one Pravda saying one thing every day. This is a wide spectrum of different media that all say the same thing using different perspectives and tones: the tabloid way, the sophisticated way, the entertaining way, or the news-focused way.

They’re telling people the same stories that Putin wants them to hear. And the story they’ve been telling for many months now is bitterly anti-American, bitterly anti-European, and coming very close to being warmongering in a way that I don’t remember.

The hatred toward Ukraine; the hatred toward Americans; the use of semi-fascist symbolism — this is something really, really new and different. No wonder people are anti-American.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: So is engagement nearly impossible because there isn’t a partner on the other side?

STEPHEN F. COHEN: Well, I’m having a hard time, because I tried to sign a contract with the audience whereby we would deal with some facts. I read ten Russian newspapers a day, and —

ANNE APPLEBAUM: How many Ukrainian newspapers do you read?

STEPHEN F. COHEN: I read ten Russian newspapers a day, across the spectrum. What Ms. Applebaum is describing is true in at least three of those ten — you hear the same story. But this is not the case in the other seven. There are at least three newspapers that are very pro-European, pro-American, and very critical of Putin.

What is astonishing for me to learn is that oligarchs and states launder money offshore. I had no idea such things happened in the world. I see a bigger problem in Russia because of the way this economic system formed in the 1990s. It absolutely has to be reformed.

Do I think it is Ms. Applebaum’s right to tell Russia or force Russia to do it? Absolutely not, because the result will be worse. This is for Russians to decide — not us. We need to decide if we need a Russian security partner in Russia, whether it is Putin or his successor.

And I would end with this point: I do not ever recall — and I’ve been around a long time — hearing people whom Ms. Applebaum and Mr. Kasparov represent speaking about a Soviet Communist leader in this way. In fact, when I listen to them, I have to say that there seems to be kind of a repressed nostalgia for the Soviet Union in their vendetta against Putin’s Russia.

ANNE APPLEBAUM: When you were giving your first introduction, Mr. Cohen, I wrote down “repressed Soviet nostalgia” on my notepad. You spoke with nostalgia of the days when the Soviet Union was still around and could help us regulate the world. This is what you dream of.

The Cold War era is something for which I have no nostalgia — half of Europe was enslaved during that period. Totalitarianism ruled hundreds of millions of people. You have this idea that if only the U.S. and Russia could work together once again we could create some kind of stability. Russia is not a country that wants stability. Russia is interested in chaos. It created chaos in Ukraine.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: Garry, let me bring you in here. Some would suggest that the recent Russia-Iran deal helped defuse that conflict. And some would say that Russia saved Obama’s proverbial bacon on his squiggly red line in Syria over chemical weapons. How do you respond to those examples of Russian co-operation?

GARRY KASPAROV: Co-operation implies that you make concessions and that you do something that may hurt you and your interests in order to bolster your relationship with your partner. In both cases, Russian interests are winning. Russia has been supplying Iran with nuclear technology, so let’s not forget that this uranium goes to Russia. Russia will hold the key, which enhances Putin’s position in the international arena.

And let’s not forget that these negotiations went on forever, and Putin’s interest was always to keep the pressure on in the region because it helped to push up oil prices, something vital to Putin’s financial survival.

As for Syria, Putin’s priority from day one was to save a mass murderer named Bashar al-Assad, and he’s succeeded. There are many reasons why he stepped in to do so: one was probably some form of dictators’ brotherhood. Believe me, after so many dictators were washed away by public anger in the Arab world, Putin didn’t want to allow Assad to be toppled because then Russians could see that dictators were also vulnerable.

And let’s not forget that Putin is always looking at the map of the pipelines. Gas supplies are very important. They are his grip on Europe. Syria is potentially vital for a Qatar, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey pipeline, which could make Russian gas redundant. So in both cases Putin played the role of a saviour — the white knight at the eleventh hour — but he was the greatest beneficiary.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: How do you all respond to that?

VLADIMIR POZNER: If Mr. Kasparov is saying that Putin stands up for Russia’s interests, then I would have to suppose that he does, from a certain viewpoint. I read your interview opposite mine in the newspaper where you kind of laugh at Putin’s popularity. You know as well as I do that the people who did the poll — the Levada-Centre — are honest people.

The poll was not government sponsored — the Levada-Centre is a very respectable organization. The poll showed that over 80 percent of Russian people support Putin. Now, there has got to be some reason for it. These are not stupid people. Propaganda is propaganda, but these are people who have lived in the country a long time. They know what propaganda is. So what do they see in Putin?

I’m not defending Putin; I’m explaining a situation. What they see in Putin is a man who has brought Russia back. Russians no longer feel that they are in second place, that they are not a great nation. They’ve been told by others previously to just get out of our face. And now they can say, we’re back and if you don’t like us we don’t care. But we’re back thanks to Putin. This is the sentiment and something that has to be understood, whether good or bad. It is a fact. And there is a reason for it. It’s not just because Russia is an autocratic state. When my colleague, Stephen F. Cohen, talks about the Russian media he is right. There is a lot of media that would dispute what Ms. Applebaum is describing, like Novaya Gazeta, Komsomolskaya Pravda, and Moskovskij Komsomolets.

ANNE APPLEBAUM: We give you Novaya Gazeta.

VLADIMIR POZNER: What I’m saying is that they are about as different as ABC, NBC, and CBS. It’s propaganda on both sides.

GARRY KASPAROV: Wow.

ANNE APPLEBAUM: I haven’t heard that kind of moral equivalence in a long time.

VLADIMIR POZNER: The people here do not read Ukrainian or Russian newspapers, so they don’t know what’s happening.

GARRY KASPAROV: When was the last time you were in Kiev?

VLADIMIR POZNER: This is funny. I was in Kiev two and some years ago to receive the honourary title of Man of the Year of Ukraine.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: There we go: Man of the Year of Ukraine. Let me bring Stephen into this conversation.

STEPHEN F. COHEN: I hope you noticed that the chess master just got checkmated. Look, I understand this fixation on Putin. I really do. Personally, I don’t care much about Putin. I wish I were going to live long enough to see how my fellow historians evaluate Putin’s role as a leader of Russia. And I think it is going to be a big debate, the positives and the negatives.

But let me address the elephant in the room: Wasn’t NATO expanding toward Russia’s borders when we were supposedly embracing the country in the 1990s?

Think about it like this: What if I found out where you lived and parked all my military equipment across the street. And then I told you that I was just there for your security. I’m making sure no one breaks into your house. And then I notice that you’ve brought a few folks around who have brought all their military equipment, and that now you’re across the street from my house, too. But don’t worry because its all for your security — NATO is about democracy and you need democracy.

Let’s be serious. We were continuously warned by liberal Russians — people we liked in Russia — that we were pushing too far. Eventually, rightly or wrongly, the Russian political elite decided that this expansion of NATO was a way of making sure Russia would forever be a subservient state to the West.

And the brass ring — or rather, the silver ring — in all of this was Georgia. A proxy war ensued in 2008 as a result. Ukraine has also been another brass ring; it is openly spoken about in Washington.

If you think this is good policy, and if you believe we should push our power as close to Russia as we can and bring Ukraine into the Western security system because it’s ultimately good for us, then say so and then let’s debate that issue. But don’t go on about the demon Putin, because the Russian understanding of Ukraine mirrors the concept of NATO expansion from the beginning.

The Russians invaded Ukraine because the Russian political class believed that NATO was on its way not only to Kiev, but also to Crimea. Now, we can say that’s crazy, but perception in politics is everything. If you isolate Russia, they’re going to perceive it in an even more extreme form, and we will never be safe.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: Let’s hear from Anne on NATO.

ANNE APPLEBAUM: I’ll say this because you invited me to, Mr. Cohen, but that’s crazy. First of all, why did NATO expand? Let’s tick back the clock again to the 1990s. Who wanted expansion? It was the central Europeans who wanted it. It was not an American idea. I remember because I was in Warsaw at the time. The central Europeans wanted it because they were afraid: they were afraid of Russia, even then. They saw what Russia was becoming.

The United States very reluctantly agreed to expand the security zone so that the people — all 100 million of them — would be able to transition to democracy and begin economic development and growth without fear of invasion. And it worked. It was unbelievably successful.

STEPHEN F. COHEN: It worked?

ANNE APPLEBAUM: It worked for the central Europeans: a hundred million people were safe. A region that had been the source of two world wars has not been a source of conflict since then. How did we do it? The strategy was carried out in a manner designed to reassure Russia from the beginning. Russia was included in every piece of negotiation. No NATO bases were ever placed in the new member states.

Until 2013, no exercises were ever conducted in new member states. In response to Russian objections — and this is a very important point — both Ukraine and Georgia were openly and definitively denied NATO membership in 2008, which has been repeated ever since. It is no longer on the table. Mr. Cohen, why are you looking at me that way?

STEPHEN F. COHEN: In 2008?

ANNE APPLEBAUM: In 2008 at a NATO meeting, they said there would be no membership plan for Ukraine and Georgia. And since then it hasn’t been on the table.

STEPHEN F. COHEN: They said something else at that meeting in 2008, that NATO membership remains open to Georgia and Ukraine.

ANNE APPLEBAUM: Yes, theoretically, which means it remains open to Russia as well.

STEPHEN F. COHEN: Oh, please.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: Vladimir, let’s hear from you on this topic. I know it’s something you feel strongly about.

ANNE APPLEBAUM: No, wait. I haven’t finished my point yet. Since 2008, Russia has been rebuilding its military, invading one neighbour after another, while the American army scaled back its European forces, so much so that by 2013 there was not one single American tank in Europe. You think this is an aggressive policy? There is no way that Putin believed that NATO was a genuine military threat. This is propaganda he has been using at home as a way to consolidate his power.

VLADIMIR POZNER: The us-versus-NATO discussion in no way consolidates his power at home. As far as the Russian people are concerned the issue has nothing to do with his power. But NATO has everything to do with the Russian psyche. And perception, as has been said, is very important. Let me remind you of what happened in 1962.

In 1962, two independent countries — the Soviet Union and Cuba — agreed to put Soviet missiles on Cuban soil, the reason being that there were American missiles in Turkey and the Soviets decided it would be a good idea to have their missiles closer to the United States. This was in the height of the Cold War. Two countries have the right to make that kind of decision, but when the United States found out that this was happening, it said, Not in our backyard. The U.S. demanded that the missiles be removed and said, We will sink your ships if we have to. We were on the verge of World War III and all parties seemed okay with that fate. These are facts.

ANNE APPLEBAUM: Mr. Pozner, one of the things negotiated with—

VLADIMIR POZNER: May I finish my—

ANNE APPLEBAUM: No, you can’t.

VLADIMIR POZNER: Well, thank you very much for exhibiting the way the West speaks to Russia.

ANNE APPLEBAUM: One of the things negotiated with Russia was an agreement not to move nuclear missiles. That is a fact that you left out.

VLADIMIR POZNER: I disagree with you — that agreement did not happen. Rightly or wrongly, this is the way Russia looks at NATO. It sees it as a threat. NATO was created to protect the West from a possible Soviet invasion, but there is no more Soviet Union and there has not been one for over twenty-five years. The Warsaw Pact, which was the Soviet’s answer to NATO, is no longer upheld.

I tend to trust Mikhail Gorbachev. He told me three times that James Baker, the then U.S. secretary of state, expressed to him that if they agreed to the unification of Germany and took down the Berlin Wall, NATO would not move one inch to the east. Now, you may say he’s lying, but I think he’s telling the truth. During the Soviet period, which didn’t last very long after that, NATO did not move to the east. It only shifted under Clinton.

And when the Russians questioned this move east under Clinton, Yeltsin was told that they didn’t have an agreement. The U.S. said, We had an agreement with the Soviet Union, but you’re Russia. And so in 1991, Poland and Czechoslovakia, which was still Czechoslovakia back then, became members of NATO. And finally, NATO found itself on Russia’s border, in Estonia and Latvia.

You may think that there’s nothing dangerous about the whole scenario. I’m telling you — and this is perhaps a holdover of the Cold War mentality — that NATO is seen as a threat. In regards to Ukraine, the Russians have said, We will not allow NATO to be on our border in the southwest; we will not allow it, just as America did not allow the missiles in Cuba. You can condone it, or not condone it, but that is how it is perceived.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: Garry?

GARRY KASPAROV: A couple of points. One is about Russian leaders, the elites. Mr. Cohen repeatedly said there are no Russian elites making decisions. In fact, there is one man who makes all the decisions. And by the way, these Russian elites, as a combined entity, know exactly where to put their kids, their money, their fortunes: south Kensington in London, Miami, probably in this country as well. So this whole idea of the Russian elites being afraid of the West is not true because they know that they can be safe with their fortunes and their future generations here.

Another myth, which I have heard repeatedly tonight, is that Putin is very popular. I don’t want to argue with you about the Levada-Centre’s integrity. I give them full credit. But what is an opinion poll? Somebody calls you anonymously and asks what you think about Mr. Putin. You know, it makes me really proud of my country that 20 percent of people said they didn’t like Putin, knowing it could be the KGB on the other end of the phone.

We’re being accused of being Cold Warriors, warmongering crazies, but we want to live in the twenty-first century. We are hearing about the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in America and Russia. Sometimes I hear about Germany. What about the countries in between? I believe those people have the same rights.

VLADIMIR POZNER: I agree.

GARRY KASPAROV: I was in Kiev two weeks ago, not two years ago. And I was proud to meet this young Ukrainian who stood against the corrupt regime of Viktor Yanukovych. I believe it is the right of Ukrainians to decide what will happen to their country. Support for NATO membership in Ukraine eighteen months ago was merely 16 or 17 percent. It’s now quadrupled. Guess why?

It is not always Russians and Ukrainians at war there, against each other. I spoke to many people who fought on the eastern front against Russia, and most of them are ethnic Russians. They are fighting Putin’s invading armies because they don’t want to live in Putin’s Russia. This is the Russia I want to see.

VLADIMIR POZNER: Good.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: Okay, Stephen and then Anne.

STEPHEN F. COHEN: But we’re back to Putin again. Are we going to have a discussion of what is in the best interest of the West? That really is embedded in the question, isn’t it? Should we engage Russia or should we have a debate about how we are going to get rid of Putin?

Ms. Applebaum wrote a wonderful book of history called Gulag, and I strongly recommend you read it if you have an interest in the subject because a master historian is at work there. But now comes the “however.”

I understand that, for one reason or another, she views this whole saga of NATO expansion from the perspective of central and eastern Europe. But the story she told of NATO expansion is written nowhere in the history books we have now. There was tremendous pressure on Clinton in the United States to go back on the word that had been given to Gorbachev about NATO expansion. The whole history of NATO expansion that we’ve heard tonight is the fairy-tale version: NATO expanded to protect and save central and eastern European countries from a menacing Russia while bringing democracy along the way. But it isn’t the true story.

There is another debate we should be having here, though some of you won’t even like the question: Does a nation, any nation, have the right to join NATO if it technically qualifies for membership? I don’t think it does.

NATO is a security organization. It’s not the Chamber of Commerce. It’s not a non-selective sorority or fraternity. You get in if we like you. It’s a security organization and the only criterion that matters is, does this country’s membership enhance our security?

NATO has brought us the greatest crisis in international affairs since the Cuban Missile Crisis. And a lot of people, including NATO member states, are rethinking the organization. Read what the Czech president has been saying, or what is being said in Hungary or in the other half of Poland. There are a lot of fundamental questions about whether or not this has really enhanced the security of Europe. But that is the subject for another debate. You don’t get a debate with opinion; you get one with facts. And these are facts.

GARRY KASPAROV: The president of the Czech Republic, Miloš Zeman, received campaign funds from Lukoil, the Russian oil company. And he was defied by his own parliament.

ANNE APPLEBAUM: Yes.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: I want to be conscious of time, but I’d like to deal with a topic that is on a lot of people’s minds. Anne, you and I spoke about this earlier so I want you to answer it for the audience. It’s about the presence of nuclear weapons, the large nuclear arsenal that Russia has at its disposal. I’m sure many people would naturally feel a tendency to come over to the compromise camp on the basis that we just can’t afford to get this wrong. We can’t risk the potential for an escalation that could flow from a policy of isolation. How do you respond to that?

ANNE APPLEBAUM: First I want to respond to Mr. Pozner, who didn’t let me correct him. One of the other elements of NATO expansion, which was very important, was an agreement to not move nuclear missiles, an agreement which the West has kept. This is why the Cuban Missile Crisis analogy is completely wrong.

VLADIMIR POZNER: It’s not wrong at all. It’s fear.

ANNE APPLEBAUM: Fear has nothing to do with it.

VLADIMIR POZNER: It’s fear on both sides.

ANNE APPLEBAUM: Okay, so there is fear. But what is the answer to the question about nuclear missiles? Fear and fear of nuclear weapons is very central to this issue. It actually explains why we aren’t more enthusiastic about helping Ukraine. If Ukraine were being invaded by Belarus, we might give them some radar weapons and not worry about it. Why don’t we help Ukraine? It is because we’re afraid of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. And we are also afraid, as one of my opponents said, that this is an irrational country that might sell nuclear weapons to other people one of these days. We don’t know what it might do. It might run off the ranch and do something crazy. How have we dealt with a country like that in the past? It is called deterrence. Deterrence is not an aggressive policy. It is not an offensive policy. It is defensive.

The deterrence argument is premised on the idea that if you bomb us, we will bomb you back. It is a very unattractive policy and no one likes it. It’s MAD or Dr. Strangelove; it’s a horrible thought, but this is the only policy we have right now that works. It is the only policy that we are capable of using now toward Putin’s Russia, which does not want to engage with us anymore. Russia today pumps out propaganda against us in all kinds of different ways in all kinds of countries, whether it’s, as Garry says, funding the Czech president’s election or funding the far right in France. This is a country that does not want to be part of our system anymore and has made that very clear.

What can we do? We can deter. We need to ensure that our awareness of Putin’s dictatorial practices goes all the way up to the Kremlin. And the word “cronies” is an important one. Because what are they? They are just a bunch of rich guys who are friends of his but are somehow very powerful. What other word do we have to describe them? We need to ensure that Putin’s cronies know we will respond if provoked. We don’t have a better policy.

I watched all of this happen; I’ve read the history of the Soviet Union; I’ve watched the transition and now we’re back to exactly the place I would have never wanted us to be. In some ways it is one of the great tragedies of my life.

VLADIMIR POZNER: I think we’re in a much worse place than we were, quite frankly, because back then there were two ideologies facing each other. Now there is no ideology in Russia.

ANNE APPLEBAUM: Oh, yes there is.

VLADIMIR POZNER: No, for most people there isn’t. They don’t even know what the future holds, or what they are working for. Whether or not this was true back in the Soviet days is a different issue.

ANNE APPLEBAUM: The good old days!

VLADIMIR POZNER: No, those were terrible days, but it was an ideology from the beginning. You know as well as I do that the Red Scare was about ideology. It is no longer about ideology now. It is geopolitical. It is about whose interests are at stake.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: So why does this put us in a more dangerous position?

VLADIMIR POZNER: Because it is unpredictable. And something else has changed: back in the bad old days, there was real fear of nuclear weapons. Children hid under desks, and movies came out like The Day After. People were very aware. Today, people don’t even talk about nuclear weapons.

ANNE APPLEBAUM: Except in Poland.

VLADIMIR POZNER: It’s very dangerous. They’re not talking about them anywhere.

ANNE APPLEBAUM: That is not correct.

VLADIMIR POZNER: They’re not present in our conversations the way they used to be. And I think that’s a bad thing.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: I’m going to go to Garry to comment on this point and then I’m going to give Vladimir and Stephen the last word.

GARRY KASPAROV: I wish nobody ever had to talk about nuclear weapons. But Russian television has been talking about them over and over again for the last year, and threatening the West. What about those big billboards that promote turning America into radioactive ash?

VLADIMIR POZNER: You have one person saying that, come on.

GARRY KASPAROV: That’s Channel Two, Russian television: one person says it but 100 million people are watching and listening. Putin publicly says he would use nukes if the West stood up to him in Crimea.

VLADIMIR POZNER: He did not say he would use nukes.

GARRY KASPAROV: He did.

STEPHEN F. COHEN: They talked about going on high alert, but the United States has been on high alert a dozen times.

VLADIMIR POZNER: Let’s be a little bit more precise. He did not say he would use nukes. Khrushchev said, “We will bury you” back in the 1950s. Remember that?

GARRY KASPAROV: Yes. I read that in the books, and I’ve listened to Putin.

VLADIMIR POZNER: Do you even know the idiot who said that we’ll turn you into radioactive ash? His name is Dmitry Kiselyov and I saw him say it on television, so it wasn’t Putin. It’s as if you listened to Rush Limbaugh and he said something along those lines and you inferred that he represented the viewpoint of all Americans. If you’ll excuse me, this Dmitry guy is a jerk for saying such things.

GARRY KASPAROV: You are free to have jerks of all stripes on American television, but not in Russia. In Russia you are only allowed one.

VLADIMIR POZNER: But it’s not a Russian policy. It’s one person. And that’s very clear.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: Let’s get Stephen in here.

GARRY KASPAROV: Limbaugh is not on the White House payroll. The person who said that was on the Kremlin payroll. That is the difference.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: Stephen, let’s give you the final say on this topic: How does the threat of nuclear weapons flow into the discussion of isolation versus engagement?

STEPHEN F. COHEN: I will take the rabbinical view here that both Kasparov and Pozner are right. Talk of nuclear weapons has re-emerged, but not in the same way that we were conscious of during the Cold War. Ms. Applebaum wrote a column recently that essentially said we should rattle our nuclear weapons, which concerned me.

It is absurd for people to be talking like that, and Ms. Applebaum has already echoed her column’s sentiments here today. We are wading into dangerous territory. I would ring the alarm even more than Mr. Pozner and suggest that we are living in a new Cold War and it is potentially more dangerous than the last one. This is where the nuclear weapons come in, for several reasons.

First, the epicentre of the last Cold War was in Berlin. This one is in Ukraine, right on Russia’s border, so imagine the possibilities for provocation, mistakes, and all the rest.

Second is something that really worries me: during the last Cold War, over forty years ago, the great powers developed a series of rules of conduct — hot phones, hotlines, constant discussion, meetings — that kept us safe. There are no rules of conduct yet in this new Cold War. And that is why anything can happen.

A third reason is that there is no opposition to another Cold War in the United States, and there was a lot of opposition to it before. You will remember that one of the great achievements of Reagan and Gorbachev was to eliminate intermediate-range cruise missiles — and this is the only time a category of nuclear weapons has been eliminated, ever. That was 1987, if I’m not mistaken. It was an enormous achievement that made everybody safer. These missiles need only four or five minutes to reach their targets.

Now both sides are talking about reintroducing intermediate-range cruise missiles. The Russians are talking about putting them in Crimea and Kaliningrad. The United States is talking about putting them back in western Europe. This is extremely dangerous.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: We’re going to move to closing statements. Let’s have Garry Kasparov up first. Garry, you’ve got three minutes.

GARRY KASPAROV: I will have to ask for Mr. Cohen’s forgiveness, because I want to talk about Vladimir Putin again. There are differences between the Soviet Union and Russia today, because, as Mr. Pozner said, in the bad old days there was the politburo. The ten worst people in the world can make more balanced decisions than one man. And with Vladimir Putin there is no way out. He presents himself as a strongman who can protect Russia against endless enemies.

And I’ve said from the very beginning of this debate, since I am a Russian patriot, that I want to see my country free and strong and able to play a role — a positive role — in the world. I don’t want to hear the same jokes as the ones that recently have been revived in eastern Europe. For example, Putin is entering the country and is asked by a customs officer, “Occupation?” And he answers, “Yes, of course.”

This is not the image of Russia I want to see projected. It is hard for me to argue for isolation, but this is not the isolation of Russia — this is the isolation of a dictator. The strength of a dictator is like the strength of a mafia boss, the capo di tutti capi, the ringleader of all. He maintains power not because he is elected or because he has a birthright but because he protects everybody and is invincible, so nobody can go after him. And he prevails as long as he keeps this image of the strongman. And every time the free world makes concessions to him, he becomes more and more arrogant.

If Putin is not stopped in Ukraine, he will continue to move further outside of Russia. He will start provocations in the Baltic countries in order to undermine NATO because he needs chaos and muddy waters. That is the way for him to survive politically. It is all about domestic politics, because he has nothing else to offer besides foreign policy expansion.

On the subject of isolation again, we spoke a lot about the Cold War, and Henry Kissinger was mentioned. I was a kid, but I remember him and learned more about him later on. In 1974 there was a big debate in the U.S. Senate about the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. It was a provision that proposed tying trade with human rights in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Kissinger spoke against it. There was a great man, Andrei Sakharov, my role model, who was harassed and eventually ended up in exile. He promoted what you may call isolation, in order to weaken the regime.

It is very important that we send this message not just to Putin but also to his cronies. His cronies, or inner circle, the Russian bureaucracy, and the middle class in Moscow, all need to understand that the policies of engagement that enhance Russia’s strength will no longer continue. And the free world will stand behind its values and will not think about Putin’s Russia but about the future of my great country. Thank you.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: Three minutes, Stephen.

STEPHEN F. COHEN: I was going to begin with a lighthearted remark and say that it would really be fun just to see Kasparov and Pozner go after each other one-on-one. I was in Moscow in early March in kitchens where Russians on both sides of the political spectrum had exactly these types of conversations. So a big debate goes on in Russia.

But when Kasparov said that he thought Sakharov was going to be on his side today, I suddenly felt, I wouldn’t say angry, but I would say really disappointed. Some things should be sacred, and I think Sakharov’s name is one of them. Under absolutely no circumstances would Sakharov have supported Russian isolation. Everything the father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb wrote promoted engagement on these issues. You need to go back and read. Worshipping somebody without reading them is probably not the right way to go.

The same thing can be said about Putin. I am not pro-Putin. I have no sentimental attachment to Putin whatsoever. As a historian, he’s a subject of study to me. Start reading what Putin actually says, including the speech he gave when he annexed Crimea. He said, “They have driven us into a corner and we have nowhere to retreat to.” He’s talking about NATO. He’s talking about the encroachment on Ukraine.

Isolation will only exacerbate those distorted perceptions of us, assuming you think they’re distorted. So let me end by returning to an astonishing thing that Ms. Applebaum said. She said that Putin’s Russia does not want to be part of our system any longer, which implies the old Russia wanted to be, but Russia under Putin no longer wants to be. It’s a strange statement because, first of all, you can go to the Kremlin web site in English and read every dangerous speech Putin has given: he is on his knees pleading to be part of the West and lamenting that he has been driven out of it.

Don’t put your hands up, Garry. I would not come here and lie to you. Read his last six or seven large speeches on the Ukrainian crisis.

There is one other thing: Russia was never part of our system. I said at the beginning of this debate that I would focus on facts, not opinions. Ms. Applebaum omitted an important detail with her fairy-tale story about NATO expansion. The fact is, NATO expansion excluded Russia from the post-Soviet European system of security. How can they not want to be part of a system of which they were never made a part?

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: Anne.

ANNE APPLEBAUM: Ladies and gentlemen, it has no doubt been a very confusing evening. You have just heard two very radically different accounts of contemporary Russia. You have heard on one side that Russia is a little bit difficult, but that it is the kind of state we need to speak to and engage with. Our opponents argue that we need to talk to Russia, and that it is very important that we are reasonable so that we can continue to divide up the world the way we once did twenty-five years ago. I don’t really want to support this approach because I’m not really pro-Putin.

On our side, you’ve heard an argument that Russia is actually a nation that thinks differently. The reason we keep talking about Putin and his cronies is because he is an owner-occupier — these are owner-occupiers. They are not just politicians. They own Gazprom. The owners of Gazprom are the leaders of the country. They use their businesses and their media inside their country, inside Ukraine, inside central Europe, and all over the West in order to achieve their own ends.

And what are their ends? They want to remain in power. Everything that Putin does is to support his ultimate goal of maintaining power, whether it’s building up his nuclear arsenal, carrying out military exercises, claiming that Malaysian planes were shot down by Martians, or whatever else it may be. We are forced to talk about him because he is so dominant.

Our side of the debate, and certainly not our opponents, have not talked enough about the people who have been the most important victims of the West’s policy of engagement until now: the young, energized Ukrainians who stood on the Maidan last year in the cold in order to fight Putin-style corruption and dictatorship. In the past eighteen months, these men and women have created new television stations from scratch; run for parliament and won on anti-corruption tickets; and have set up organizations designed to promote good government and transparency.

They may well not succeed, since they have extra­ordinary obstacles to overcome, but their goal is to create a more democratic, fair, and less corrupt world in the twenty-first century, and Putin’s Russia is trying to stop them. I repeat: Ukraine is not Putin’s only target. He also wants to undermine our societies, corrupt our politicians, and spread conspiracies inside our media. He hopes to persuade Europeans to succumb to the old temptations of the fascist far right.

To stop this from happening, and to stop him from destroying Ukraine, we need to isolate Russia by enforcing our own corruption laws, disentangling ourselves from the drug of Russian money, and re-establishing Western solidarity, which he is trying to destroy.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: Mr. Pozner, you have the last word.

VLADIMIR POZNER: Thank you. I refuse to play this game of who’s nice and who’s not. I care about Russia so I’m only going to ask you one question: What are the consequences of isolating Russia? Well, on my count, there is a minimum of ten. And all ten are detrimental to the West.

First, it plays into the hands of the chauvinist, anti-Western forces in Russia that dream of bringing down the Iron Curtain again. Second, it plays into the hands of the traditionally anti-Western Russian Orthodox Church. Third, it reinforces the feeling now shared by 73 percent of all Russians that the West, led by the United States, is the enemy. Fourth, it turns Russia eastward into a partnership with communist China, a partnership that is both dangerous and threatening to the West. Fifth, it makes Russia ever more unpredictable. Sixth, it plays into the hands of Russia’s military industrial complex. Seventh, it reinforces the traditional Russian desire to circle the wagons in view of what seems like a hostile environment. Eighth, it minimizes any outside information for the Russian people who presently have access to Western media, movies, and to the Internet. Ninth, it cuts off travel for all average citizens, including for tourism, exchanges, and educational opportunities. And tenth, it leads to the birth of a generation of Russians hostile to the West.

What are the consequences of the West engaging Russia? By engaging Russia, I mean opening its doors to as many Russians as is physically possible, easing visa restrictions or waiving them altogether, allowing Russians to visit, to work, to send their children to schools and universities, to develop human contacts. By doing so, the West will achieve a profound change in people’s mindsets, which will fundamentally change the country’s politics and its policies. It will not happen overnight. But it will inevitably happen. And this beyond a shadow of a doubt will be a huge benefit for the West and, by the same token, for Russia and for the Russian people.

And, finally, I’d like to say that if, as Ms. Applebaum once wrote, the Russian president dreams of setting down a new Iron Curtain, well then isolating Russia is playing right into Mr. Putin’s hands. Thank you very much.

RUDYARD GRIFFITHS: Ladies and gentlemen, we’ve been treated to a superb hour and a half tonight. I want to thank our debaters; on behalf of the entire audience, bravo! And again, thank you to the Aurea Foundation for making this all possible. This is the kind of informed conversation that benefits us all, regardless of what side of this issue you stand on.

Summary: The pre-debate vote was 58 percent in favour of the resolution and 42 percent against it. The final vote showed 48 percent in favour of the motion and 52 against. Given that more of the voters shifted to the team against the resolution, the victory goes to Anne Applebaum and Garry Kasparov.