Spymaster

CHAPTER 52

Turkey was at the political crossroads of West and East. It was not only a NATO member, but also had the second-largest army within the organization.

Positioned on Syria’s northernmost border, Turkey had been unhappy with the “solutions” America was pushing in the country. In particular, it didn’t like at all the idea of a thirty-thousand-member “border force” composed of Kurdish fighters, whom Ankara saw as terrorists.

For its part, America had been concerned about how Turkey was drifting ever closer to authoritarianism. An attempted coup two years earlier had given the current nationalist President an excuse to consolidate power and conduct a purge, jailing many of his opponents — including teachers and intellectuals. Anyone who had spoken out about him had been imprisoned.

He had been particularly ruthless in regard to the military, firing any officers he felt were too pro-West. Hundreds of military envoys to NATO were recalled. Many fled rather than be thrown in jail. Those who replaced them mirrored the President’s thinking when it came to a collective dislike of NATO.

It wouldn’t take much to collapse Turkey’s relationship with NATO, leading to its withdrawal. That was why Oleg Tretyakov had decided to launch his Istanbul attack next.

Inflaming the Turks would not only drive a deeper wedge between them and the West, but would also drive them deeper into the arms of Russia.

The Russian President had been involved in a major charm offensive with the Turkish President. By all accounts, it had been working. Spectacularly so.

Turkey had invested tens of millions of dollars in multiple Russian air-defense systems. The purchase sent shockwaves through NATO, as the Russian system was incompatible with their systems. What’s more, Turkey would have to import Russians to run the new systems and, worst of all, would likely be sharing highly classified information about the NATO air-defense systems with their Russian counterparts. It was a very, very bad development. Turkey was an anti-NATO tinderbox — all it needed was the correct spark.

The best part for Tretyakov’s plan was that Turkish nationals with deep anti-NATO sentiments were not difficult to find. In fact, there had been an abundance of them. The greatest challenge was to find competent cell members with the right skills. The bombs Tretyakov wanted were difficult to build. They were even more difficult to transport and conceal. But difficult did not mean impossible.

His GRU team had successfully recruited a handful of highly qualified young Turkish men. With degrees in chemistry, physics, and electronics, they took to the technological aspects of the job quite easily.

Tretyakov’s biggest fear was that when it came time to plant the bombs, the young men would have a crisis of conscience, and would back out, unwilling to expose civilians to death and dismemberment. That was why the cell leader position had been such an integral component.

The man chosen was a Russian patriot of incomparable magnetism. He could have even the most hard-hearted cynic eating out of his hand and committed to his cause in an afternoon.

The young men had no clue that they were being manipulated by a foreign actor. They believed NATO was a blight on their country and that this attack would drive NATO out. By driving it out, the President of Turkey would then be unshackled. He would be free to create a perfect society for the Turkish people.

It was pure propaganda, of course, but it was a message that resonated with the young men. One which they wanted and needed to hear. It was much easier to blame Turkey’s problems on NATO rather than on the Turks themselves.

So, in a small house in an Istanbul slum, the materials for the bombs were collected and the bombs assembled.

The work was nerve-wracking, requiring painstaking attention to detail. The hours were long and the home was stifling. The men were forbidden to speak with friends or family members, especially toward the end, lest they give the plot away. In fact, they weren’t even aware of the final target until the last minute.

In order to protect the operation, the bombers had been required to conduct surveillance on multiple locations. There was a list of things the cell leader had instructed them to look for and to study.

When they returned from reconnaissance missions, he would quiz them for hours, testing how thorough they had been in their observations. Sometimes, he would even follow and surveil them himself — using his observations to further critique their performance. This had the added benefit of letting the men know that they were constantly being watched. Fear, in its many forms — even fear of failure — was a powerful motivator, and the Russians were experts in wielding it with surgical precision.

On the day the attack was to take place, the cell leader gathered the men together and finally revealed their target.

The Sirkeci railway station, once the terminus for the famed Orient Express, would be jammed with travelers returning to the city after a long weekend. Looking at a floor plan of the terminal, the cell leader discussed the best locations to plant their devices in order to maximize the damage.

As they went over the details of the operation, the cell leader studied them — their body language, facial expressions, tones of voice, and what they said. He searched for any indication that even just one of them was having second thoughts. There was no such indication. The operation was a go.

Carefully, they went through their final checks and packaged the devices. Most went into suitcases. Some went into backpacks.

Their target was the Marmaray subway platform beneath the train station, where the density of travelers would be the greatest.

At the appointed time, the men headed out in their separate directions. They would all be converging on the platform at the same time, but by different means — some via connecting trains, others on foot.

Oleg Tretyakov had wanted redundancy. If one of the bombers was delayed or captured, or his device failed to detonate, he wanted to make sure that there were multiple backups.

Each of the bombers had also been given deceptive pocket litter. If any of them were discovered by police and searched, evidence on their person would suggest a completely different target. This would put police into overdrive, and fritter away their resources as they rushed to a completely incorrect location, hoping to prevent any other bombers from striking.

At one point, Tretyakov had contemplated creating a cadre of red herrings — a separate cell of useful idiots, meant to get captured and completely cut off from the real bombers. He had abandoned the idea, though, as being too complex, and actually more likely to fail. There was also the very real prospect that even providing false clues could cause the entire city to go on high alert. Simple was better. So the members of the lone cell had been dispatched.

According to the plan, they would all converge at 4:58 p.m. Based on their traffic analysis, that gave them enough time to get in place, plant their devices, and leave just as they detonated.

Using the example of the train bombings in London and Madrid, the cell leader had taught them the importance of tradecraft, and what exactly to do, and not to do. They had practiced over and over again until everything was second nature. When word had come from Tretyakov that it was time to execute, the cell leader had every confidence his men were ready to go.

At two minutes before five o’clock, the polished, brightly lit subway system was packed. Men, women, and children were returning home from spending an afternoon or the weekend outside the city. It was an unusually pleasant day along the Bosporus. There had been plenty of sun and above-average temperatures.

Now, as the travellers trudged back to Istanbul, many carrying suitcases, backpacks, or messenger-style bags, their thoughts were on tomorrow and the start of the workweek. Very few were paying attention to what was going on around them.

Even fewer noticed the suitcases and backpacks that had been left along the crowded platform, or inside the packed train cars.

As the bombs detonated, they tore through everything — flesh, bone, steel, tile, and concrete.

Aboveground, buildings shook violently. Some thought it was an earthquake. Not until smoke began to billow out of the subway entrance did people begin to realize the horror of what had just happened.