Stalinism 1928-1940, Patriotic war 1941-1945, the Khrushchev and Brezhnev era

Stalinism, 1928-1940

DAVID R. SHEARER

In the late 1920s, the ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union, under the leadership of its General Secretary, Joseph Stalin, launched a series of'socialist offensives', a revolution that transformed the country. Within a few short years, the USSR bore little resemblance to the country it had been. In the 1920s, the Soviet Union was a minor industrial power, a poor but resource-rich country, based on a large but primitive agrarian network of small-hold peasant farms. By the late 1930s, very few individual farms remained. The country's agricul­tural production had been forcibly reorganised on a massive and mechanised scale. Most ofthe rural population lived on huge state-managed agrifarm com­plexes. Through state planning and forced investment, industrial production had doubled, then tripled and quadrupled. By the beginning of the Second World War, the Soviet Union had become an industrial military power on the scale of the most advanced countries. The Great Patriotic War, as the Second World War was called, accelerated these modernising processes, and brought about other major changes. The country, which had been nearly 80 per cent rural in the late 1920s, was, by the early 1950s, becoming increasingly urbanised, mobile and educated. Literacy rates had soared as the result of intensive state spending on education. Roads, rail lines, radio and air travel connected the previously isolated parts of the country. Cultures that had had no language boasted their own schools, organised national institutions, written literary tra­ditions and legal status as nations within the Soviet state. From an ethnically dominant Russian Empire, the Soviet Union was transformed into a state of constitutionally organised nations. By the time of Stalin's death in March 1953, the USSR had become an industrial, military and nuclear giant. It was one of only two global 'superpowers'. The Soviet Union's power was rivalled and checked only by the power of the United States.

This modernising revolution from above was one of the most remarkable achievements of the twentieth century, and one of the costliest in human lives. Stalin's revolution was full of brutal and shocking contradictions, even in such a brutally shocking century as the twentieth. The belief that they were building socialism motivated party and state leaders with a sincere concern to construct towns, build roads and schools, to introduce scientific methods of farming, to modernise industries and to uplift culture. This same belief allowed leaders to destroy churches, synagogues and mosques, move popula­tions wholesale, impoverish and work the population to the point of starvation and to imprison and shoot massive numbers of people. Soviet leaders claimed that they were building socialism and human dignity; what they created was an industrial-military state built, in large part, on the back of a slave labour system unprecedented in modern history. Stalinist officials, with few exceptions, saw no contradiction in their motives or actions. All were part of a grand histor­ical mission to construct a new, specifically socialist, kind of modernity. This chapter describes the state and society that developed out of Stalin's revolution from above.

Industrialisation, collectivisation and class war

To Stalinist leaders, building socialism in one country meant, first and fore­most, modernising and expanding the country's basic industrial sectors: iron and steel production, mining, metallurgy and machine building, energy gen­eration and timber extraction, and, of course, agriculture. During the 1930s, but especially in the years of the First Five-Year Plan, 1928-32, the Soviet state poured funds into the construction of heavy industrial projects, a 'bacchana­lian' orgy of planning, spending and construction, as one economist put it.[1]The results were dramatic, truly heroic on a historical scale, even while enor­mously wasteful and costly in both human and financial terms. These years of the Soviet industrial revolution have been made famous by the names of some of the world's largest construction projects. This was the era of Magnitogorsk, a metal city of 100,000 workers and families that was raised within the span of half a decade from the plains of central Siberia. No less dramatic was the rais­ing of Kuznetsstroi, another metallurgical and machine-building giant. The hydroelectric dam at Dneprostroi, started in 1928, generated its first power in 1934. The Volga River-White Sea canal system was built almost entirely by the killing machine of forced labour, yet it also stands as a major engineering feat. Tractor and locomotive manufacturing plants rose or were renovated and modernised. Military weapons, tanks, ships and aeroplane production also increased as secret military factories were constructed.

The litany of statistics chronicling Soviet industrial achievements under Stalin was and still is impressive. In the Russian Republic, alone, construction of new energy sources jumped the number of kilowatt hours of energy generated from 3.2 billion in 1928 to 31 billion in 1940. Coal production increased from 10 to 73 million tons per year, iron ore from 1 to 5 2 million tons, steel from 2 to 9 million tons. The Soviet Union went from an importer to an exporter of natural gas, producing 560 million metric tons by 1932.[2]

The drive for socialist industrialisation was impressive, but it was only one aspect of Stalin's revolution, one front of the socialist offensive. The second major front of the socialist offensive was played out in the countryside in the campaigns to collectivise agriculture. State control of the countryside was cru­cial, according to Stalinist leaders, if the effort to construct Soviet socialism was to succeed. It was through the international sale of agricultural surplus that industrialisation had to be financed and that the socialist cities were to be fed, yet throughout the 1920s, the countryside had been purportedly in the hands of a petty-bourgeois, anti-Soviet, private farm class. These 'rich' peasants, or kulaks in Bolshevik parlance, held the revolution hostage to the whims of the market and threatened the socialist sector by withholding grain from the state. The grain crises of 1927 and 1928 seemed to prove this point. Although the harvests in those years had been reasonably good, state agencies experienced serious difficulties meeting their procurement quotas. Peasant producers pre­ferred to sell to private buyers at higher prices than those offered by state buyers, or they withheld their grain altogether from the urban markets. In any case, the procurement crises of the late 1920s brought to a head the constraints on state-sponsored modernisation that faced the regime. Moderates within the party hierarchy such as Nikolai Bukharin and Mikhail Tomskii argued for tax and pricing mechanisms to coax grain from the countryside. They warned against any forced or repressive measures that would strain social and eco­nomic relations with private producers at a time when the government could ill afford such problems. They repeated Lenin's maxim that there be no third revolution to threaten the NEP truce between workers and peasants, town and countryside.

Stalin and those around him took a different and increasingly militant view. They argued that to placate the kulak class would only place the government and its plans in greater jeopardy. Stalin argued for outright requisitioning of grain at state prices, and he instituted such methods during personal visits to the Urals and Siberia in early 1928. Moderate party leaders opposed these policies. They were taken aback by Stalin's 'feudal-military' exploitation of peasants, and they accused Stalin of taking unilateral action against the party's policies of conciliation. This charge was true, but Stalin by then had won over the majority of the members of the party's top political bureau, the Politburo. In February 1929, the General Secretary forced a humiliating showdown with the moderates in the Politburo and the party's Central Committee.

Citing claims ofpopular support from workers and poor peasants, and with the backing of the party elite, Stalin launched the infamous collectivisation drive of the First Five-Year Plan period. Mass propaganda campaigns created an aura of legitimacy, even as Stalinist leaders mobilised local party committees, political police, internal security forces and even military units and volunteer gangs from urban factories. These were the shock troops that enforced the orderto collectivise. In the course ofthe ensuing several years, usingpersuasion and propaganda, but often outright force, the regime methodically destroyed the system of private land tenure in the country and organised agricultural production into large, state-administered farming administrations. Peasants and villages were organised either into collective farms, the kolkhozy, or into state farm administrations called sovkhozy. Kolkhozy were supposedly voluntary co-operative farm organisations, whereas sovkhozy were farms owned outright by the state, which paid peasant farmers as hired labour, a rural proletariat.

The campaign to collectivise agriculture was harsh, often brutal, and evoked strong peasant resistance. Official versions did not deny the fact of resistance but depicted it as part of the class struggle of rich, exploiting kulaks against socialism. Official versions claimed that the vast majority of poor peasants supported the regime and collectivisation. The judgement of most scholars, however, is that resistance was widespread, that there existed a broad peasant solidarity against the regime, and that collectivisation amounted to a general war against the countryside, not just a targeted class war against the kulak class enemy.[3] However one describes the collectivisation drive, it was horrific in its costs. Anyone who resisted collectivisation could be, and usually was, branded a kulak. Police and party officials confiscated the property and livestock of these individuals, arrested them and their families and exiled them to penal colonies, or even executed them as class enemies. In 1930 and 1931, the two most intense years of forced collectivisation and 'de-kulakisation', authorities deported 1.8 million peasants (about 400,000 households) as class enemies who had resisted collectivisation. The great majority of these peasants were deported to penal farms or settlements in remote areas of the country in Siberia, northern Russia and Central Asia. Many others were dispossessed and resettled into special farms in their home districts. By conservative estimates, well over 2 million rural inhabitants were deported by the end of 1933, when the regime ended the policy of forced mass collectivisation, and this does not include the unknown but surely large number of peasants who were executed, killed in outright fighting, or who died of harsh conditions even before they reached their places of exile.

By 1933, the regime had driven nearly 60 per cent of peasant households to join collective farms, although, remarkably, some 40 per cent or so of peasant families had managed to hold out against the wave of collectivisation. Individual peasant farms - edinolichniki - continued to exist legally, despite harsh tax and procurement policies and severe pressure to join collective farms. In 1930 and 1931, in fact, when the regime briefly relaxed coercive measures of collectivisation, peasants streamed out of collectives, reducing the overall proportion to a low of 21 per cent.⁴ Only by offering lucrative tax and other incentives could the regime begin to reverse the decline in collectivisation, and only by allowing peasants the right to own livestock and to farm their own plots was the regime able, finally, to persuade peasants to return to collectives in large numbers. By 1935, collectives encompassed about 83 per cent of peasant households, although by the end ofthe decade this number had declined to 63 per cent. In the most significant grain-growing areas, in Ukraine and western Siberia, the regime ensured that collectivisation reached nearly 100 per cent.

Agricultural production was severely disrupted as a consequence of the social war in the countryside, and the cost in livestock was also devastating. By 1934, the number of cattle, sheep, horses and pigs in the USSR was approx­imately half of what it had been in 1929, due in no small part to the peasant slaughter of livestock in protest against state policies. The cost in human lives of collectivisation was appalling, even above and beyond the wrenching costs of the de-kulakisation campaigns. In 1932, a combination of factors - poor har­vests, agricultural disruption caused by collectivisation and high state grain procurement quotas - precipitated famine in areas of Ukraine, the North Caucasus and central Russia, which left over 5 million people dead by the time

4 Viola, PeasantRebeh, p. 28, 196

the situation eased in late 1933 and 1934. Although the famine hit Ukraine hard, it was not, as some historians argue, a purposefully genocidal policy against Ukrainians. [4] Stalinist leaders certainly used the famine to break peasant resis­tance to collectivisation, and very likely to punish the Ukrainian countryside for having long resisted Soviet power. Still, no evidence has surfaced to suggest that the famine was planned, and it affected broad segments of the Russian and other non-Ukrainian populations both in Ukraine and in Russia.

Despite the excesses and costs, the Stalinists achieved their goal - a state-controlled agrarian sector. Beginning in 1930, state grain procurements increased dramatically, almost doubling yearly, despite the decline in harvests during the hard years of 1932 and 1933. In fact, the Soviet government con­tinued to export grain even during the famine, and the regime trumpeted collectivisation as a triumph of socialist modernisation. At first glance, it was. Collectivisation seemed to satisfy the regime's insatiable appetite for grain, and the state's agencies poured out statistics to prove that collectivisation had resulted in a large net transfer of economic and labour resources from agricul­ture to industry. For all the propaganda, however, the results of collectivisation were mixed. Many economic historians, and other students of Soviet history, argue that the costs of collectivisation, even in economic terms, far exceeded the benefits to the regime. The regime gained control over grain, but was forced to invest far greater amounts of money and supplies in agriculture than it got out of that sector.[5] The administrative costs alone were enormous and remained uncalculated, as did the massive investment needed to maintain police and party surveillance over the rural population. Productivity remained relatively low throughout much of the 1930s, despite the regime's goal to 'trac- torise' the countryside, and many collective farms amounted to no more than paper fronts for traditional household and village farm economies.[6] Still, in all, collectivisation altered the rural life of the country. The regime's harsh measures brought Soviet power, finally, to the countryside, and it did so with a vengeance. Party and police presence became pervasive in rural areas, as did the institutions of Soviet authority. Moreover, along with collectivisation came severe restrictions on peasants' freedom of movement. Rural inhabitants were forbidden to travel without the written permission of local authorities, and collective farm workers were, by and large, excluded from receiving the internal passports necessary to travel and to move from one location or place of work to another. Collectivisation bound peasants once again to the land in a way that many regarded as a second serfdom.

Peasants were not the only segment of the population affected by Stalin's socialist offensive against capitalist revivals. Destruction of the private farm economy went hand in glove with a general assault on private trade and other market remnants of NEP. The regime drove out the private trade networks, at first through increasingly heavy taxation, and then through decrees outlawing any private sale of goods. Police began arresting traders and middlemen - the officially reviled NEPmen of the 1920s. Authorities closed commission resale stores, they even banned local farm markets, and for a time even forbade the resale of personal property between individuals. All trading and any exchange of goods was to be done through state-approved stores, co-operatives, or through state-controlled rationing systems.

Stalinist leaders attempted to replace market mechanisms with the elements of a planned, socialist economy. The state's planning agency, Gosplan, took on the expanding burden not only of industrial investment, but of planning for all aspects of the Soviet economy. Through its series of five-year plans, the agency and its burgeoning number of commissions set priorities for the country's different economic sectors based on political priorities decided by the party leaders. Gosplan established prices and determined production and distribution quotas.

As with other aspects of the socialist offensive, the sudden thrust of the state into the private economy came at a high cost. State agencies were woefully unprepared for the task of supplanting private markets. Shortages racked the economy in all basic commodities. Goods disappeared even from state stores and were costly when they did appear. Hidden inflation from shortages and deficit industrial investment devastated the value of the currency, dropping it by more than half by the end of 1930. Rationing, which had begun as early as 1928 for bread, broadened to include almost all staple goods. Many areas of the country moved to barter of the few goods that existed, and families began to use any items of metal value on the black markets that sprang up outside the official price and rationing systems. Assessing the effects of this informal economy, one official commented ironically that it amounted to a social redistribution of wealth in unanticipated ways.

Such unanticipated consequences affected urban workers as well as rural inhabitants. The value of wages plummeted and, during the early 1930s, many state enterprises were so strapped for cash that they failed routinely to meet wage payments. This was due, of course, not only to money shortages, but also to widespread corruption and graft within the rapidly expanding state economic system. During the early 1930s, workers relied increasingly for food and other basic necessities on the growing rationing system in their workplaces and through trade union organisations. In order to keep a steady workforce, factory administrations suddenly found themselves in the business of providing housing, food and clothing shops, cafeterias, remedial education and other services that were not part of their production tasks for the state. In effect, they were forced to fill the vacuum left by the collapsing service and trade economy. This kind of corporatist economy was not what state planners had had in mind by a socialist revolution, but neither was it a capitalist economy.[7]

The domestic and international contexts

Stalin's industrial and agrarian revolution marked a radical break with the state capitalism of the 1920s, the gradualist policies of economic development and the social armistice that had underpinned NEP. Some of the most promi­nent leaders in the party opposed Stalin's plunge into social war and socialist modernisation, yet the Stalinists, supported by significant numbers within the party, believed that radical measures were necessary, and the grain crisis of the late 1920s was only one of several events that convinced Stalin that the revolution itself was in jeopardy. Domestically, the grain crisis was a signal to Stalin and those around him of the gathering strength of anti-Bolshevik social forces. In the mid-i920s, voting for local soviets had showed a small but disturbing trend towards support of former Menshevik and SR candidates.[8]Bolshevik leaders were convinced that this vote reflected strong pressure from kulaks and local private employers on poor peasants to vote anti-Bolshevik or not to vote at all. Moreover, finance commissariat studies claimed to show an alarming growth of private capital in the country, as opposed to only moderate rates of growth of the state's revenues.

These trends were disturbing enough, but they seemed to herald a grow­ing capitalist backlash inside the Soviet Union at a time when the country found itself increasingly isolated internationally. The virulent destruction of the communist movement in China in 1927 and the triumph of the nationalists suddenly presented Soviet leaders with a major threat along their weak and long southern borders. Moreover, the Chinese disaster occurred at the same time that the British government broke off relations and threatened war against the Soviet Union. The Soviet budget was already over-extended and foreign governments, led by the British example, expressed reluctance to offer the investment credits the Soviets needed for increased industrial development. By the late 1920s, the Soviet Union was weak, isolated and seemed to face a growing domestic as well as international threat. Such was the perception of the Soviet leaders, and not only Soviet leaders. In 1927, the German ambas­sador in Moscow cabled his superiors in Berlin to prepare a German response in the event that the Bolshevik government should collapse.[9]

In these conditions, Stalin turned inward. He became convinced that build­ing socialism in one country was the only alternative left to the Soviet Union, and he believed that the country needed to modernise quickly. In 1929, Stalin delivered the famous speech in which he declared the need to make up one hundred years of backwardness in ten, lest the country and the revolution be crushed. He called on the party and the working class once again to renew the revolution - to destroy the kulak class, once and for all, and to industrialise the country for its own defence. Stalin's revolution had begun.

Social dynamics and population movements

Policies of rapid industrialisation and forced collectivisation produced dra­matic population and demographic shifts during the 1930s and altered both the regional and urban-rural balance in the country. In some areas, these poli­cies - combined with the effects of widespread famine - precipitated death and migration on a nearly biblical scale. The forced relocation ofpopulations, policies of mass repression and the reconstruction of different nationalities added to the momentous and often calamitous changes experienced by the Soviet population under Stalin's rule. Industrialisation alone accounted for a significant growth in the number of urban centres and urban populations. In the years between the 1926 and 1937 all-union censuses, the overall popula­tion of the Soviet Union increased from 147 million to 162 million - about a 9 per cent increase - but the urban population in the country doubled during the same period, from about 26 million to 52 million. Only 18 per cent of that increase came from natural growth rates of the urban population, while about two-thirds (63 per cent) resulted from in-migration to existing cities and towns. Almost 20 per cent of the growth in urban populations resulted from the industrial transformation of rural population centres into cities and towns. In the Russian Republic alone, the number of population centres classified as cities increased from 461 to 571. The number of cities with populations over 50,000 increased from 57 to 110. In the country as a whole, the number of population centres classified as urban centres increased in the years between 1926 and 1937 from 1,240 to 2,364.

Rural areas emptied as cities filled up. In 1926, the urban population made up 18 per cent of the overall population of the USSR, but by the late 1930s, urban areas accounted for 30 per cent of the population. The most significant population shifts occurred, of course, during the early 1930s, the years of rapid industrialisation and collectivisation, and while all areas of the country were affected, the growth in industrial urbanisation affected some areas more than others. The greater Moscow and Leningrad urban areas experienced significant growth, their populations doubling during the late 1920s and 1930s. Areas such as eastern and western Siberia, the Urals and the Volga coal and industrial basin underwent rapid, almost unchecked, growth in their overall populations, and especially in their urban populations. These were the areas of the country that the regime targeted for intensive industrial development and mineral and other natural resource extraction. During the 1930s, the population of the Far Eastern administrative district soared 376 per cent. The population of eastern Siberia expanded by 331 per cent, western Siberia by 294 per cent, and the Urals by 263 per cent. The mining and industrial city of Kemerovo, in western Siberia, saw a sixfold increase in its population; Cheliabinsk, not far away, experienced a fourfold population increase, as did the rail, river and manufacturing centre of Barnaul, south of Novosibirsk. Cities such as Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk (the once and future Ekaterinburg), Vladivostok and Khabarovsk (the administrative centre ofthe eastern Siberian district) saw their populations triple during the late 1920s and 1930s.

These population shifts resulted from industrialisation, but also from the regime's systematic policies of repression, particularly against peasants, socially marginalised groups and certain national minorities. Major popula­tion shifts also came about as the result of a dramatic increase in forced labour populations, and from mass migration due to famine. During the early 1930s, de-kulakisation depleted rural areas, especially in the western parts of the USSR, of supposed class enemies.[10] Famine took its toll, either by killing large numbers of people or by forcing others to flee stricken areas. After 1932, mass deportations of peasants tapered off as the regime turned its attention to 'cleansing' major urban and industrial areas of socially marginalised and economically unproductive populations. Using newly enacted residence laws, police conducted mass sweeps of cities, industrial areas and border regions to rid them of what were described as 'anti-Soviet' and 'socially danger­ous' elements - criminals, wanderers, the indigent and the dispossessed, even orphans - the social detritus of Stalin's modernisation policies.[11] At the same time, the regime began large-scale deportations ofcertain nationalities. In the western borderlands, police singled out Poles and Germans for removal as early as 1932 and 1933. Deportations of Finnish-related populations began in Karelia and around Leningrad in earnest in the middle 1930s and continued up through the Finnish war in 1940. Fearful of'Asian' solidarity with the Japanese expansion in China, Soviet authorities deported 172,000 Soviet citizens of Korean descent from Far Eastern border areas in 1937 and 1938. During the Second World War, Stalin ordered the removal of a number ofpopulations supposedly sympathetic to German occupation forces and desirous of achieving national independence. The most infamous of these deportations resulted in the removal of the entire Chechen people and the Crimean Tatar population, shipped en masse to Central Asia.[12]

Most deported populations, some several million over the course of the 1930s, were resettled either in penal labour colonies or in the infamous forced labour camps in the eastern interior areas of the USSR. Large sections of the Urals, Siberia and Central Asia became the favoured dumping ground for unwanted or supposedly dangerous populations, as did the northern districts of European Russia. The turnover of camp populations varied dramatically from year to year due to death, escape and release of prisoners, but overall the camp populations grew steadily from about 179,000 in 1930 to half a million by 1934. The huge influx of prisoners during the Great Purges in 1937 and 1938 swelled camp populations to 1.5 million by 1940. Similarly, the populations of police-run prisons and colonies jumped during the 1930s, reaching 254,354 in 1935, according to official figures, and 887,635 by 1938. Slightly more than 250,000 of those held in prisons and labour colonies in 1938 were located in the Urals, Central Asia and Siberia. If the number of prisoners held in labour camps grew rapidly throughout the 1930s, the numbers of those deported as kulaks peaked in the early 1930s and then declined steadily. As noted above, however, most of the peasant deportations were also to the newly opened colonial areas in the eastern part of the country. In 1932, for example, nearly 1.1 million of the 1.3 million 'special settlers' - the kulak spetspereselentsy - lived in the Urals, Kazakhstan or in the agricultural regions of western Siberia.[13]

The Soviet regime exploited these populations ruthlessly as a source of extractive labour, and the Gulag and settlement colonies became, in time, an integral part of the Soviet state's economic planning system. This was especially true for the colonial development of raw materials industries such as logging and precious metal mining, but also for agriculture. As a result of these policies, the eastern regions of the country experienced a remarkable increase in overall population during the 1930s. So much so, that the head of the state's statistical agency, I. A. Kraval', recommended to the Politburo that the 1937 census undercount the population of Siberia so as to hide the extent of the demographic shift to that part of the country.

Along with massive migration, both forced and unforced, Stalinist poli­cies also created social dislocation on a massive scale, and authorities were hard pressed to cope with the resulting social disorder. In the first half of the 1930s, especially, waves of migrants, both legal and illegal, overwhelmed local communities and even large cities. The population of abandoned, runaway or orphaned children rose rapidly from approximately 129,000 in 1929 to well over half a million by 1934, and these figures counted only numbers that were offi­cially registered in the woefully inadequate and understaffed children's homes. Abandoned or orphaned mostly as the result of policies of de-kulakisation and conditions of famine, hundreds of thousands of children made their way to cities. Having no home and no work, socially alienated because of their background and the violence that made them homeless, the population of abandoned, runaway or orphaned children contributed to the growing and serious waves of petty criminality that marked city streets, marketplaces, train stations and other public areas. Millions of other people - rough peasants and dispossessed populations - also poured into the cities, factories and industrial construction sites. People were fleeing collectivisation and famine, running from penal colonies or just seeking a better life. Shanty towns, slums and raw campsites mushroomed on the outskirts of cities. Sometimes, whole villages appeared at the gates of shops, negotiating directly with foremen for work, food and shelter.

The sudden influx ofmigrants into cities and industrial sites strained public services and scarce housing and food supplies, and focused all that was mod­ern and brutally primitive about Soviet socialism during the inter-war decade. Novosibirsk, for example, the administrative centre ofwestern Siberia, shone with the gleam of Soviet modernity. The district executive committee build­ing, designed by the famous architect A. D. Kriachkov, and completed in 1933, won honourable mention at the Paris architectural fair in 1938. The city lav­ished funds on construction of the largest opera house east of Moscow in 1934, another architectural marvel and a palace of culture for the people. In contrast, the city of Barnaul, an industrial pit five hours by train south of Novosibirsk, could boast only two city buses in 1935. These served an impov­erished population of 92,000. The city could not generate enough electricity to illuminate street lights. Thousands of people suffered, while others died, of intestinal infections and malaria due to a lack of clean drinking water. Much of the city's population lived in the squalour of makeshift shanty huts and bathed in the industrially fouled waters of the Ob' River. Police rarely ventured into the burgeoning shanty towns, and public welfare programmes failed to cope. The city had no paved sidewalks and few paved roadways.[14]

The regime faced problems of control and legitimacy in rural as well as urban areas. Despite the regime's attempt to extend Soviet power, Soviet authority outside major cities and towns remained weak throughout much of the 1930s. The experience of Soviet power at local levels differed consid­erably from that wielded by the powerful centralised political institutions of the party. As often as not, local officials felt like they were holding a besieged outpost rather than wielding power as a ruling class. Reports by local polit­ical police officers and party heads reflected their sense of isolation. Many local officials sought transfers from 'backward' rural regions to urban or more centrally located postings, and the strains of isolation drove more than a few rural authorities to suicide. Political officials worried about the small number of Communist 'actives' in their areas. They also worried about the growing num­ber of peasant households withdrawing from collective farms and the hostile moods of kolkhozniki. Pointed disrespect for officials, both symbolic and real, resulted in violence and even murder. At times, local officials expressed open fear of confrontation with collective-farm peasants, and officials took threats against their lives as a serious possibility. Vandalism and theft of state property, including and especially rustling of animals, continued on a widespread scale. Armed and mounted bandits roamed large parts of the countryside requiring, in some instances, small-scale military campaigns to suppress them. In mixed ethnic areas, non-Russian populations frequently protected bandits and other outlaws from authorities. And, as rumours about a new constitution gathered force in 1935 and 1936, local leaders also worried about the revival of religious activity. Believing that they would be protected under new laws, lay priests and sectarians of all denominations began to proselytise again. Itinerant preachers spoke, at times to large gatherings of rural inhabitants, alternately promising to establish Christian collective farms or to bring God's judgement on the collective-farm system.

Consolidating Stalin's revolution: the victory of socialism and the retreat to conservatism

The cataclysmic social upheaval created by Stalin's modernising revolution left lasting effects, but the country experienced a relative period of stabilisation after mid-decade, and this was due largely to moderatingpolicies implemented by Stalinist leaders. Stalin signalled this turn and gave the hint of a social truce in his famous victory speech at the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934. In this major speech, Stalin proclaimed that the victory of socialism had been won in the USSR. He declared that organised class opposition had been broken and that the country had set the foundation for a socialist economy and society. He warned of the continued threat of enemies within and without, and of the difficult historical tasks that still lay ahead. He cautioned that because of continuing dangers, the party, the police and the state needed to remain strong and vigilant against the enemies who would try to undermine the Soviet achievement. Yet the vision of the near future that Stalin then laid before the congress was one of consolidation and amelioration, even a retreat, in some respects, from the extreme policies of the First Five-Year Plan period. Leaders did, in fact, shift investment priorities in the Second Five-Year Plan in order to ease food and other shortages and to compensate for the catastrophic decline in living standards. In rural areas of the country, the regime legalised small- scale market exchange again, and a new Stalinist 'charter' allowed kolkhozniki to own some livestock and to cultivate small private plots of land for their own use. The effect of these changes was immediate and beneficial. Food became available, if not plentiful, on a regular basis. While collective and state farms continued to under-produce, the small private plots of peasants saved the country from further starvation. Private farm plots made up only about 10-12 per cent of the arable land, but accounted for nearly two-thirds of the produce sold in the country during these years. Edinolichniki, although distrusted by the regime, provided an invaluable economic niche of support for the collective-farm system and became the core of a revived artisan culture in the countryside. These private economic activities, grudgingly permitted by the regime, quickly formed the basis of a new, second economy, which became indispensable for the maintenance of the state's huge and increasingly unwieldy official economy.

Culture and morality in the service of socialism

Stalinist leaders continued to pour money into military and heavy industrial development, but the regime also turned its attention during the mid- and late 1930s to the social, cultural and moral tasks of socialist construction. Cultural history is often given second place in discussions of the 1930s, even though cultural construction was an important aspect of Stalinism. The regime made significant efforts to extend basic education and health care to the population. The Stalinist regime tried hard to control what the public read and saw, but it wanted and needed a public that was literate and educated. As a result, the plans for economic development of any region (indeed, of the whole country) always included estimates for the construction of schools, numbers of clinics, teachers, doctors, nurses and even movie houses. In Novosibirsk, the gleaming centre of the new Siberia, the huge central opera house was completed in 1934, before the new central executive building and long before expansion of party headquarters. Every factory and workers' barracks had its newspaper boards, Red Reading Corners and literacy classes, and trade union organisations as well as local soviets provided free technical and basic education for citizens of all ages.

Stalinist educational achievements were impressive. Although the regime had promoted literacy and basic education throughout the 1920s, school atten­dance for all children became mandatory at the beginning of the 1930s. Many adults were also encouraged to take basic literacy classes. By the end of the decade, nearly 75 per cent of the adult population could read, a remarkable achievement compared to a literacy rate of 41 per cent, according to the 1926 census. Among children aged twelve to nineteen, literacy rates, according to the 1937 census, had reached 90 per cent. Some of the most significant advances occurred in rural and non-Russian areas and among women. Soviet authori­ties regarded education as a primary weapon in the struggle against what they considered backwardness, especially against traditional influences of religion and indigenous ethnic culture. The regime targeted women, especially, as a traditionally oppressed social group, but also because they were considered essential to the socialist education of children. As a result, the regime put significant effort into spreading educational opportunities in rural and non- Russian areas and among women. By the late 1930s literacy rates among all women in Russia reached over 80 per cent.[15]

The Stalinist regime lavished large amounts of money on art, literary pro­duction, film and other forms of entertainment. Art became, under Stalin, a form of social mobilisation, a means to bind the populace to the regime, and as Stalin extended state power into what had been private sectors of the economy, so too the Stalinist regime extended state control into the sphere of art and culture and into all aspects of public and private life. Indeed, in Stalin's socialist revolution, there was to be no distinction between public and private. 'The private life is dead', insisted Pasternak's character Strelnikov, in the novel Doctor Zhivago, and this phrase epitomised how life was to be lived in the new socialist motherland. Under Stalin, all art, culture and morality was to be put in the service of building socialism. Artists were to act as 'engineers of the soul', in Stalin's famous phrase. Their job was to construct the socialist individual, just as structural engineers were responsible for constructing buildings, roads, hydroelectric dams and steel mills.

Socialist realism became the criterion by which all art and culture was to be measured. The doctrine of socialist realism came, in fact, from Stalin, refined by the writer Maxim Gorky, as a way to describe life in direct, understandable ways, but in ways that would uplift the subject towards the goals of fulfill­ing socialism. Socialist realism was a dogma of art that was unapologetically didactic. It was not necessarily a recipe for saccharine sweet or escapist depic­tions of socialist plenty and happiness, even though much of socialist realist art degenerated to that level. The doctrine, as applied by censors, and even by Stalin himself, allowed for, and even demanded, the portrayal of conflict and sacrifice, even tragedy, but always with a moral message. That message was that the cause of building socialism was greater than the individual, that the individual found self-realisation only by denying selfish interests, by dissolving individual will into the will of the collective, and by giving the self completely to the cause of socialism and in the striving for socialism.

In practice, socialist realism found expression in representational and clearly programmatic forms, whether in literature, music, painting, film or other artis­tic genres. And while the dogma dictated the form in general, it did not entirely stifle creativity or breed simplicity. Socialist realist art did not always take the form of 'boy meets tractor'. In music, for example, the composers Dmitrii Shostakovich and Sergei Prokofiev abandoned the high formalist experimen­tation of their earlier careers after serious political censure and public humilia­tion. Both composers turned back to classical melodic and symphonic forms, but they continued to produce great works of music. The writer Valentin Katayev's novel Time Forward! (Vremia vpered) - about the heroic struggles by a young couple to overcome adversity and even sabotage on an industrial construction site - became a much and often poorly copied model of socialist realism in action. The movie Chapaev (1934) provided film history as well as Soviet audiences with grand action and heroes on a larger-than-life scale. Sergei Eisenstein's film epics Aleksandr Nevskii and Ivan Groznyi (Ivan the Terrible) are regarded as movie classics, just as Shostakovich's music score for Aleksandr Nevskii ranks as a musical and choral classic.

If socialist realism did not entirely stifle creativity, neither did it preclude truly popular forms of entertainment. American jazz music found an enthusiastic audience in the USSR during the 1930s, as did Charlie Chaplin movies. The country had no lack of its own schmaltzy radio ballroom crooners. P. Mikhailov was one of the best known, though by no means the only, of the radio singers of the late 1930s. His song 'The Setting Sun' was one of the most popular of the period - a syrupy ballad about palm trees and moonlight on an exotic Black Sea shore. Escapist musicals, Hollywood style, were also popular, but with a revolutionary Soviet twist. The film A Wealthy Bride (Bogataia nevesta) (1:937) portrayed the life of joy and plenty on a collective farm. It showed often on the wide screen, replete with copious amounts of food and drink, boisterous pranks, light romance and big choral numbers involving happy singing peasants in fecund marketplaces and in fields redolent of grain.

The Stalinist regime enforced aesthetic norms by extending monopoly con­trol over the organisation of all cultural production. Intrusion of the state into the country's cultural life went hand in glove with the extension of state power into the economy. Culture became a front, in the militarised language of the day, just as did the economy, in the campaign to mobilise the country to build socialism. Thus, any artist or writer who worked professionally had to belong to a corresponding union, which was closely regulated by the party and sub­ject to state censorship review. Decisions about what constituted acceptable socialist realist art could be arbitrary and depended greatly on the political and even personal politics of the union organisations, censorship boards and the artists themselves. Shostakovich, for example, regularly introduced modernist elements into his music. He covered himself and his music with a politically acceptable title or dedication, but while the lack of exactitude in aesthetic def­initions allowed some leeway in artistic endeavour, that vagueness could also be dangerous. Shostakovich found himself more than once fearing for his life as well as his artistic career under the scrutiny of Stalin's personal displeasure. Many artists wrote or composed 'for the desk drawer', realising that their work would very likely not pass censors, or deciding simply not to take the risk of being public cultural figures. Others abandoned creative production and retreated into safer but related activities. The writer Boris Pasternak spent much of the 1930s and 1940s producing his now famous series of translations of Shakespeare into Russian.

The middle 1930s witnessed a conservative turn in Stalin's social as well as cultural policies. The new Soviet morality rebuffed the liberalising trends of the 1920s and the cultural revolution of the early 1930s and heralded a return to traditionally gendered roles. 'Communist virtue' for men extolled patriarchal values ofmanliness and patriotism, duty and discipline, and family. The heroine welder in Ostrovskii's How the Steel was Tempered (Kak zakalialas' stal') - who could smoke, curse and shimmy down ropes from high altitudes just as well as any man - no longer provided a role model for women. Soviet advertising in the relative abundance of the mid- and late 1930s appealed to women as domestic and feminine consumers, not as revolutionary equals with men.[16] In the new morality, women were encouraged to provide the moral and emotional support for their worker husbands in the building of socialism. Official propaganda stressed child-bearing as the highest duty for women under socialism. Family and education were touted as the foundation of socialist society.[17]

Stringent laws reinforced these values. The series of family laws passed in 1936 were the most comprehensive of these and reversed many of the progres­sive statutes of the 1926 set of family laws. The new laws affirmed the nuclear family and made divorce more difficult to obtain. Abortion became a criminal offence once again, with severe jail penalties for both women and abortion­ists, although women continued to have abortions, and doctors continued to give them in large numbers. Child-support laws were strengthened, as were criminal statutes for men, primarily, failing to provide court-ordered family support. For a brief period, police even considered the idea of placing a special stamp in the internal passports of men who owed child support so that they could be traced.

Nationality under Stalin

Stalinist leaders sought to reconstruct Soviet nationalities on the same broad scale that they did society, culture and moral values. The peoples of the Soviet Union were to be mapped, schematised and rationalised - engineered, in a word - just as was the land, the economy and the human soul. Constructing nationality was not unique to Stalinism or to the Soviet Union. Most European states engaged in some form of nation-building, based on criteria of inclusion and exclusion, but the Soviet experiment differed fundamentally from the nation-building projects of other states. The Soviet state was not a nation- state, such as France or Germany, but a state of nations, a conglomeration of national political governments under a central controlling state system. The only other state resembling this model had been the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had been torn asunder by the strains of the Great War. Stalin understood - or at least he thought he understood - the explosive potential of national identity and, while he did not openly repudiate the conciliatory policies of the 1920s, he gave nationality issues a new politicised importance that they had not had.

During the 1930s, Soviet officials continued to encourage the development of national cultures and institutions under the rubric 'national in form, socialist in content'. This policy, begun in the 1920s, included the rooting (korenizat- siia) of different ethnic groups in their own republics, autonomous regions and oblasts. In contrast to the relatively laissez-faire policies of the 1920s, however, nationality policies of the 1930s reflected the same highly struc­tured, top-down character of other Stalinist state-building projects. Rather than allowing different ethnic groups to develop their own cultural traditions, Soviet officials in the 1930s aggressively organised officially sanctioned forms of nationality. Ethnographic studies burgeoned as scholars worked closely with officials to create over fifty written languages for peoples who had had no written forms of culture. Small nationalities were created and consolidated out of various nomadic cultures, and the state assigned to them their own territories. Alphabets were reformed and folk traditions were officially cel­ebrated, all within the encompassing context of the brotherhood of Soviet peoples.

Stalinist nationality policies had a sharp political edge to them, and not all nationalities were encouraged equally, as had been the policy in the 1920s. Stalin elevated Russian national culture, in particular, to pride of place and it was celebrated as the predominant culture among all the Soviet cultures. The ascendancy of Russian culture and Russian forms of patriotism was reinforced during the war, and several attempts were promoted, although rejected by Stalin, to create a specifically Russian Communist Party alongthe lines of other republic party organisations. Stalin rejected this trend, fearing that a Russian party could potentially form a rival centre of power. While he rejected an openly assimilationist nationality policy, Stalin nonetheless permitted Russians a dominant role in party affairs. Russian migration was encouraged into non- Russian areas, and Russian national culture went with the new immigrants. Russian language was instituted as the universal language of education and state affairs. Leaders took care to foster indigenous national elites, especially within the party structure, but most ofthe leading party and state positions at the republic and oblast levels were held by ethnic Russians, usually outsiders appointed from Moscow. Non-Russian institutions, organisations and journals inside the Russian republic were closed or scaled back as the Russian republic was Russified, and nationalities were territorialised in the 1930s in a way that had not been the case earlier. Institutions promoting ethnic consciousness and culture were confined, generally, to the territories designated for particular national groups.[18]

As the discussion above implies, national identity gained a new prominence in Soviet society, even as categories ofsocial class began to wane in importance as a means to determine one's identity and relation to state authority. In the early 1930s, when the state first issued internal passports, citizens were required to identify their national identity as well as their social-class status, yet class still counted as the primary defining criterion of inclusion and exclusion. The mass repressions associated with collectivisation and de-kulakisation were based on class and, initially, residence and rationing privileges associated with the new passport system were also based on social criteria of class and occupation. Then came the so-called victory of socialism in 1934, the officially announced defeat of organised class opposition in the country. The announcement of this victory did not end political repression, nor did it signal the end of class struggle, according to Stalin. Indeed, Stalin anticipated that the struggle against the enemies ofSoviet socialism would intensify as the socialist state grew stronger and anti-Soviet 'elements' grew more desperate, but Stalin also anticipated that the character of the state's struggle against its enemies would change as the nature of resistance also changed. What, exactly, Stalin anticipated is impossible to know, but the nature of repression and the criteria of inclusion and exclusion underwent a marked change during the i930s. As early as i933, deportations of so-called anti-Soviet elements from western border regions targeted specific national groups of Poles, Belorussians and Ukrainians. Stalin was especially suspicious of Ukrainian separatism, since resistance to collectivisation had been particularly strong in that republic and in the western border areas of the country. As the 1930s wore on, Stalin also came to mistrust certain other ethnic groups, which he suspected of having potential loyalties outside the USSR. By 1936, most campaigns of mass repression were being carried out against groups defined by national or ethnic rather than social criteria, and while the great mass purges of i937-8 started against so-called kulak and other marginalised social categories, these were quickly superseded by the great campaigns against Germans, Poles, Finns and Asian populations in the Soviet Far East. During the war, mass deportations continued, especially of ethnic groups from the Caucasus regions, which Stalin suspected of separatist and collaborationist tendencies, and in the years after the war, Soviet police and military units fought against strong Ukrainian separatist movements. By the early 1950s, nationality had almost all but replaced class as the most important criterion of Soviet identity, at least within the pre-Second World War borders of the USSR.

Mass repression, police and the militarised state

In late July 1937, N. I. Ezhov, the head of the political police and the Com­missariat of the Interior, issued the now infamous operational order no. 447. That order began one of the most bizarre, tragic and inexplicable episodes of Soviet history - the mass operations of repression of 1937 and 1938. By decree of the Politburo, the political police were charged to begin mass shoot­ing or imprisonment of several categories of what regime leaders considered socially harmful elements. Leaders regarded former kulaks, bandits and recidi­vist criminals among the most dangerous of these groups, alongside members of anti-Soviet parties, White Guardists, returned emigres, churchmen and sec­tarians and gendarmes and former officials of the tsarist government. By the end of November 1938, when leaders stopped the operations, nearly 766,000 individuals had been caught up in the police sweeps. Nearly 385,000 of those individuals had been arrested as category I enemies. Those who fell into this category were scheduled to be shot, while the remaining arrestees, in category II, were to receive labour camp sentences from five to ten years.

There exists almost nothing in open archives and other sources to explain fully the motivation behind these massive social purges, but we can at least understand the dynamics of the purges and something of the motivation behind them. We can compare the great social purges of the late 1930s to the campaigns of repression that preceded and followed them, and in this way place them within the context of a larger discussion of mass repression under Stalin. As in the early 1930s, and after several years of relative stability, the regime turned again on peasants during the Ezhovshchina. Collective and state farmers, as well as individual farmers (kolkhozniki, sovkhozniki, and edinolichniki), were arrested in the tens of thousands. Yet, the mass repressions of the late 1930s were more than a second de-kulakisation. Criminal elements, former convicts, sectarians and a host of other marginalised populations, along with farm workers, local Soviet officials and freeholder peasants, became targets of the state's campaigns of mass repression. As noted above, the repressions of 1937 and 1938 also encompassed significant numbers of national minorities, arrested under analogous operational orders. If the campaigns of mass repression began as a purge of socially suspect groups, they turned into a campaign of ethnic cleansing against 'enemy' nations.[19]

Here, then, were the elements that gave the Great Purges their particular characteristics and virulence. The de-kulakisation, social order and national deportation campaigns of the preceding years formed the background for the mass repressions of the late 1930s. The mechanisms employed during the repressions of 1937 and 1938 were similar to those used earlier to contain or dispose of undesirable populations and, in 1937 and 1938, the police targeted many of the same groups. Yet it was not just the threat of class war or social disorder that generated the mass repressions of the late 1930s. The threat of war introduced a xenophobic element into Soviet policies of repression and gave to those policies a sense of political urgency. By 1937, leaders were convinced that oppositionists, working with foreign agents, were actively organising socially disaffected populations into a fifth-column force. Authorities worried that inva­sion, which seemed increasingly likely in the late 1930s, would be the signal for armed uprisings by these groups, as well as by potentially hostile national populations. Each of these concerns - over social disorder, political opposition and national contamination - had generated separate political responses and operational policies of repression throughout the previous years. These politi­cal fears and operational initiatives coalesced in 1937 and 1938. The various fears of Soviet leaders combined in a deadly way within the context of imminent war and invasion and generated the vicious purges of those years. Ezhov, on orders from Stalin, launched the massive purge of Soviet society in 1937-8 in order to destroy what Stalinist leaders believed was the social base for armed overthrow of the Soviet government.[20]

Stalinist leaders employed the full coercive power of the state to achieve their objectives of socialist construction. Indeed, Stalin's use of mass repression as a normal instrument of policy defined one of the distinguishing characteris­tics of his regime. Lenin used mass repression brutally and without hesitation during the emergency of the civil war, yet he always regarded mass repres­sion as an extraordinary means of revolutionary struggle. Repression was not to be employed against party members or as a normal means of gover­nance. Hence the original name of the Cheka, the chrezvychainaia kommissia, the 'Extraordinary' Commission. During collectivisation and de-kulakisation, Stalin engaged in mass forms of repression still in this manner - as part of a revolutionary class war to establish Soviet power and the dictatorship of the party. Ironically, however, the 'victory' of socialism in 1933 and 1934 not only marked the end of class war; it also ended any pretence to class-specific forms of repression. Police used administrative forms of mass repression against an ever-widening range of social and then ethnic groups. During the mid- 1930s, especially, mass repression became the primary way authorities dealt with social disorder, engaging in large-scale police round-ups and passport sweeps to cleanse cities of marginalised and other supposedly anti-Soviet social groups. By 1935, for example, police had even taken over the country's massive orphan problem, with near sole jurisdiction to sweep orphan and unsuper- vised children into police-run rehabilitation camps. Leaders used mass forms of expulsion and deportation to redistribute the Soviet population, to construct politically acceptable national identities, to protect the country's borders, to colonise land and exploit resources, and to impose public order and economic discipline on Soviet society. Stalin, in other words, turned the extraordinary use of repression against political enemies into an ordinary instrument of state governance. Stalin's use ofmass repression set his regime apart from its Lenin­ist predecessor and from the selective use of repression employed by successive Soviet regimes.

The political police operated as the main instrument ofrepression, and one of several coercive organs centralised under the NKVD, the Commissariat of the Interior. The NKVD also included the infamous Gulag, or labour camp administration, the border guard forces, the NKVD's interior troops and the regular or civil police, the militsiia. During the 1930s, reforms took away local Soviet authority over the militsiia and subordinated the civil police to the state's centralised political police administration. This was a key part of Stalin's statist revolution and it had important consequences. Placing the civil police under control of the political police led inevitably during the decade to the merging of the two institutions and their respective functions - maintaining social order and protecting state security. As a result, the civil police were drawn increasingly into the business of mass repression, and the political police became drawn more and more into the coercive repression of day-to­day crimes and the resolution, through administrative forms of repression, of the country's major social problems.

The conflation of civil and political police functions was unintentional and it politicised the social sphere in a way uncharacteristic of the pre- and post- Stalin eras. It was the police, primarily through the constant campaigns of mass repression, social categorisation and deportation, which, unwittingly, became the primary institution within the Soviet state to define and reconstruct the social-geographic and national-ethnic landscape ofthe country. Police usurped and politicised many functions of the civil government. Still, it is inaccurate to describe the Soviet state under Stalin simply as a police state. The political police never attempted to gain control overthe government ortheparty. Except for a brief period during the Great Purges in the late 1930s, party officials maintained control over the police. Stalin always had final control over the NKVD. Moreover, Stalinist officials always regarded the use of special police powers as a temporary response to conditions of national crisis, even though the methods of mass police repression became, in effect, a normal means of governance under Stalin. The word in Russian that best describes the process that occurred during the 1930s is voennizatsiia, or militarisation of the state's institutions of social and civil order. Voennizatsiia was a word consciously used at the time and later by Soviet leaders to describe the martial-law or emergency-law state that Stalin built. And even though police were given sweeping emergency powers, the civil state was never entirely abrogated. Its institutions were, at least formally, strengthened by the 1936 constitution. Authorities of civil state institutions - in the procuracy, the judiciary and in local Soviet governments - continued with more or less success to assert their authority. In fact, Ezhov began to disentangle civil and political police structures even before the mass purges of the late 1930s. This process continued unevenly under Ezhov's successor, Lavrentii Beria, until the two institutions were finally and completely separated in the early 1950s. For as much as Stalinist leaders constructed the apparatus of a militarised state socialism, they also set the constitutional groundwork for a Soviet civil socialism. This was a dual heritage, which they passed on to their successors.

Conclusion

Stalin's revolution drove the USSR headlong into the twentieth century and it brought into being a peculiarly despotic and militarised form of state social­ism. Ideology and political habits, as well as personality, shaped the actions of Stalin and those around him. Elements of continuity carried over from ear­lier periods of Soviet and even Russian history, especially from the Leninist legacy of the War Communism period. Yet the actions of Stalinist leaders can­not be explained simply by reference to some essential ideology or political practice.[21] The mechanisms of power, the policies of repression and polic­ing and the bureaucratic apparatus of dictatorship that we know as Stalinism were unanticipated by Marxist-Leninist ideology or practice. Stalinism grew out of a unique combination of circumstances - a weak governing state, an increasingly hostile international context and a series of unforeseen crises, both domestic and external. The international context was especially important in shaping Stalin's brand of socialism. Stalin's personality gave to his dictator­ship its despotic and uniquely vicious character, but the militarised aspects of Stalinism may be attributed as well to the growing fears of war and enemy encirclement. Stalin's successors struggled with the legacy left by his dictator­ship, but as the circumstances passed that created Stalinism so did Stalinism. After the dictator's death in 1953, the character of the Soviet regime and Soviet society evolved in other directions.

Patriotic War, 1941-1945

JOHN BARBER AND MARK HARRISON

Standing squarely in the middle of the Soviet Union's timeline is the Great Patriotic War, the Russian name for the eastern front of the Second World War. In recent years historians have tended to give this war less importance than it deserves. One reason may be that we are particularly interested in Stalin and Stalinism. This has led us to pay more attention to the changes following the death of one man, Stalin, in March 1953, than to those that flowed from an event involving the deaths of 25 million. The war was more than just an interlude between the 'pre-war' and 'post-war' periods.¹ It changed the lives of hundreds of millions of individuals. For the survivors, it also changed the world in which they lived.

This chapter asks: Why did the Soviet Union find itself at war with Germany in 1941? What, briefly, happened in the war? Why did the Soviet war effort not collapse within a few weeks as many observers reasonably expected, most importantly those in Berlin? How was the Red Army rebuilt out of the ashes of early defeats? What were the consequences of defeat and victory for the Soviet state, society and economy? All this does not convey much of the personal experience of war, for which the reader must turn to narrative history and memoir.²

The road to war

Why, on Sunday, 22 June 1941, did the Soviet Union find itself suddenly at war (see Plate 14)? The reasons are to be found in gambles and miscalculations by

The authors thank R.W Davies, Simon Ertz and Jon Petrie for valuable comments and advice.

1 Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

2 Forty years on there is still no more evocative workin the English language than Alexander Werth's RussiaatWar, 1941-1945 (London: Barrie and Rockliffe, 1964).

all the Great Powers over the preceding forty years. During the nineteenth century international trade, lending and migration developed without much restriction. Great empires arose but did not much impede the movement of goods or people. By the twentieth century, however, several newly indus­trialising countries were turning to economic stabilisation by controlling and diverting trade to secure economic self-sufficiency within colonial boundaries. German leaders wanted to insulate Germany from the world by creating a closed trading bloc based on a new empire. To get an empire they launched a naval arms race that ended in Germany's military and diplomatic encirclement by Britain, France and Russia. To break out of containment they attacked France and Russia and this led to the First World War; the war brought death and destruction on a previously unimagined scale and defeat and revolution for Russia, their allies and themselves.

The First World War further undermined the international economic order. World markets were weakened by Britain's post-war economic difficulties and by Allied policies that isolated and punished Germany for the aggression of 1914 and Russia for treachery in 1917. France and America competed with Britain for gold. The slump of 1929 sent deflationary shock waves rippling around the world. In the 1930s the Great Powers struggled for national shares in a shrunken world market. The international economy disintegrated into a few relatively closed trading blocs.

The British, French and Dutch reorganised their trade on protected colo­nial lines, but Germany and Italy did not have colonies to exploit. Hitler led Germany back to the dream of an empire in Central and Eastern Europe; this threatened war with other interested regional powers. Germany's attacks on Czechoslovakia, Poland (which drew in France and Britain) and the Soviet Union aimed to create 'living space' for ethnic Germans through genocide and resettlement. Italy and the states of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire formed more exclusive trading links. Mussolini wanted the Mediterranean and a share of Africa for Italy, and eventually joined the war on France and Britain to get them. The Americans and Japanese competed in East Asia and the Pacific. The Japanese campaign in the Far East was both a grab at the British, French and Dutch colonies and a counter-measure against American commercial warfare. All these actions were gambles and most turned out disastrously for everyone including the gamblers themselves.

In the inter-war years the Soviet Union, largely shut out of Western markets, but blessed by a large population and an immense territory, developed within closed frontiers. The Soviet strategy of building 'socialism in a single country' showed both similarities and differences in comparison with national economic developments in Germany, Italy and Japan. Among the differences were its inclusive if paternalistic multinational ethic of the Soviet family of nations with the Russians as 'elder brother', and the modernising goals that Stalin imposed by decree upon the Soviet economic space. Unlike the Nazis, the Communists did not preach racial hatred and extermination, although they did preach class hatred.

There were also some similarities. One was the control of foreign trade; the Bolsheviks were happy to trade with Western Europe and the United States, but only if the trade was under their direct control and did not pose a competitive threat to Soviet industry. After 1931, conditions at home and abroad became so unfavourable that controlled trade gave way to almost no trade at all; apart from a handful of 'strategic' commodities the Soviet economy became virtually closed. Another parallel lay in the fact that during the 1930s the Soviet Union pursued economic security within the closed space of a 'single country' that was actually organised on colonial lines inherited from the old Russian Empire; this is something that Germany, Italy and Japan still had to achieve through empire-building and war.

The Soviet Union was an active partner in the process that led to the opening of the 'eastern front' on 22 June 1941. Soviet war preparations began in the 1920s, long before Hitler's accession to power, at a time when France and Poland were seen as more likely antagonists.

The decisions to rearm the country and to industrialise it went hand in hand.[22] The context for these decisions was the Soviet leadership's percep­tion of internal and external threats and their knowledge of history. They feared internal threats because they saw the economy and their own regime as fragile: implementing the early plans for ambitious public-sector investment led to growing consumer shortages and urban discontent. As a result they feared each minor disturbance of the international order all the more. The 'war scare' of 1927 reminded them that the government of an economically and militarily backward country could be undermined by events abroad at any moment: external difficulties would immediately accentuate internal ten­sions with the peasantry who supplied food and military recruits and with the urban workers who would have to tighten their belts. They could not forget the

Russian experience of the First World War, when the industrial mobilisation of a poorly integrated agrarian economy for modern warfare had ended in economic collapse and the overthrow of the government. The possibility of a repetition could only be eliminated by countering internal and external threats simultaneously, in other words by executing forced industrialisation for sus­tained rearmament while bringing society, and especially the peasantry, under greater control. Thus, although the 1927 war scare was just a scare, with no real threat of immediate war, it served to trigger change. The results included Stalin's dictatorship, collective farming and a centralised command economy.

In the mid-1930s the abstract threat of war gave way to real threats from Germany and Japan. Soviet war preparations took the form of accelerated war production and ambitious mobilisation planning. The true extent of militari­sation is still debated, and some historians have raised the question of whether Soviet war plans were ultimately designed to counter aggression or to wage aggressive war against the enemy.[23] It is now clear from the archives that Stalin's generals sometimes entertained the idea of a pre-emptive strike, and attack as the best means of defence was the official military doctrine of the time; Stalin himself, however, was trying to head off Hitler's colonial ambitions and had no plans to conquer Europe.

Stalinist dictatorship and terror left bloody fingerprints on war preparations, most notably in the devastating purge of the Red Army command staff in 1937/8. They also undermined Soviet efforts to build collective security against Hitler with Poland, France and Britain, since few foreign leaders wished to ally themselves with a regime that seemed to be either rotten with traitors or intent on devouring itself. As a result, following desultory negotiations with Britain and France in the summer of 1939, Stalin accepted an offer of friendship from Hitler; in August their foreign ministers Molotov and Ribbentrop signed a treaty oftrade and non-aggression that secretly divided Poland between them and plunged France and Britain into war with Germany.[24] In this way Stalin bought two more years of peace, although this was peace only in a relative sense and was mainly used for further war preparations. While selling war materials to Germany Stalin assimilated eastern Poland, annexed the Baltic states and the northern part of Romania, attacked Finland and continued to expand war production and military enrolment.

In the summer of 1940 Hitler decided to end the 'peace'. Having conquered France, he found that Britain would not come to terms; the reason, he thought, was that the British were counting on an undefeated Soviet Union in Germany's rear. He decided to remove the Soviet Union from the equation as quickly as possible; he could then conclude the war in the West and win a German empire in the East at a single stroke. A year later he launched the greatest land invasion force in history against the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union remained at peace with Japan until August 1945, a result of the Red Army's success in resisting a probing Japanese border incursion in the Far East in the spring and summer of 1939. As war elsewhere became more likely, each side became more anxious to avoid renewed conflict, and the result was the Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact of April 1941. Both sides honoured this treaty until the last weeks of the Pacific war, when the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and routed the Japanese army in north China.

The eastern front

In June 1941 Hitler ordered his generals to destroy the Red Army and secure most of the Soviet territory in Europe. German forces swept into the Baltic region, Belorussia, Ukraine, which now incorporated eastern Poland, and Russia itself. Stalin and his armies were taken by surprise. Hundreds of thou­sands of Soviet troops fell into encirclement. By the end of September, having advanced more than a thousand kilometres on a front more than a thou­sand kilometres wide, the Germans had captured Kiev, put a stranglehold on Leningrad and were approaching Moscow.⁶

and The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933-41: Moscow, Tokyo and the Prelude to the Pacific War (London: Macmillan, 1992); Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations and the Road to War, 1933-1941 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995); and Derek Watson, 'Molotov the Making of the Grand Alliance and the Second Front, 1939-1942', Europe-Asia Studies 54,1 (2002): 51-85.

6 Among many excellent works that describe the Soviet side of the eastern front see Werth, Russia at War; Seweryn Bialer, Stalin and his Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II (New York: Pegasus, 1969); Harrison Salisbury, The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad (London: Pan, 1969); books and articles by John Erickson including The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918-1941 (London: Macmillan, 1962), followed by Stalin's War with Germany, vol. i: The Road to Stalingrad, and vol. ii: The Road

The German advance was rapid and the resistance was chaotic and disor­ganised at first. But the invaders suffered unexpectedly heavy losses. Moreover, they were met by scorched earth: the retreating defenders removed or wrecked the industries and essential services of the abandoned territories before the occupiers arrived. German supply lines were stretched to the limit and beyond.

In the autumn of 1941 Stalin rallied his people using nationalist appeals and harsh discipline. Desperate resistance denied Hitler his quick victory. Leningrad starved but did not surrender and Moscow was saved. This was Hitler's first setback in continental Europe. In the next year there were incon­clusive moves and counter-moves on each side, but the German successes were more striking. During 1942 German forces advanced hundreds of kilo­metres in the south towards Stalingrad and the Caucasian oilfields. These forces were then destroyed by the Red Army's defence of Stalingrad and its winter counter-offensive (see Plate 15).

Their position now untenable, the German forces in the south began a long retreat. In the summer of 1943 Hitler staged his last eastern offensive near Kursk; the German offensive failed and was answered by a more devastating Soviet counter-offensive. The German army could no longer hope for a stalemate and its eventual expulsion from Russia became inevitable. Even so, the German army did not collapse in defeat. The Red Army's journey from Kurskto Berlin took nearly two years of bloody fighting.

The eastern front was one aspect of a global process. In the month after the invasion the British and Soviet governments signed a mutual assistance pact, and in August the Americans extended Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, followed by a German declaration of war, brought America into the conflict and the wartime

to Berlin (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975 and 1983); his 'Red Army Battlefield Performance, 1941-1945: The System and the Soldier', in Paul Addison and Angus Calder (eds.), Time to Kill: The Soldier's Experience of War in the West, 193 9-1945 (London: Pimlico 1997); John Erickson and David Dilks (eds.), Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994); three volumes by David M. Glantz, From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations, December 1942-August 1943 (London: Cass, 1991), When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler with Jonathan House (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), and Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998); Richard Overy, Russia's War (London: Allen Lane, 1997); Bernd Wegner (ed.), From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia, and the World, 193 9-1941 (Providence, R.I.: Berghahn, 1997); Antony Beevor, Stalingrad (London: Viking, 1998), and Berlin: The Downfall, 1945 (London: Viking 2002); Geoffrey Roberts, Victory at Stalingrad: The Battle that Changed History (London: Longman, 2000). For a wider perspective see Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

alliance of the United Nations was born. After this there were two theatres of operations, in Europe and the Pacific, and in Europe there were two fronts, in the West and the East. Everywhere the war followed a common pattern: until the end of 1942 the Allies faced unremitting defeat; the turning points came simultaneously at Alamein in the West, Stalingrad in the East and Guadalcanal in the Pacific; after that the Allies were winning more or less continuously until the end in 1945.

The Soviet experience of warfare was very different from that of the British and American allies. The Soviet Union was the poorest and most populous of the three; its share in their pre-war population was one half but its share in their pre-war output was only one quarter.[25] Moreover it was on Soviet territory that Hitler had marked out his empire, and the Soviet Union suffered deep territorial losses in the first eighteen months of the war. Because of this and the great wartime expansion in the US economy, the Soviet share in total Allied output in the decisive years 1942-4 fell to only 15 per cent. Despite this, the Soviet Union contributed half of total Allied military manpower in the same period. More surprisingly Soviet industry also contributed one in four Allied combat aircraft, one in three artillery pieces and machine guns, two- fifths of armoured vehicles and infantry rifles, half the machine pistols and two-thirds of the mortars in the Allied armies. On the other hand, the Soviet contribution to Allied naval power was negligible; without navies Britain and America could not have invaded Europe or attacked Japan, and America could not have aided Britain or the Soviet Union.

The particular Soviet contribution to the Allied war effort was to engage the enemy on land from the first to the last day of the war. In Churchill's words, the Red Army 'tore the guts' out of the German military machine. For three years it faced approximately 90 per cent of the German army's fighting strength. After the Allied D-Day landings in Normandy in June 1944 two- thirds of the Wehrmacht remained on the eastern front. The scale of fighting on the eastern front exceeded that in the West by an order of magnitude. At Alamein in Egypt in the autumn of 1942 the Germans lost 50,000 men, 1,700 guns and 500 tanks; at Stalingrad they lost 800,000 men, 10,000 guns and 2,000 tanks.[26]

Unlike its campaign in the West, Germany's war in the East was one of annexation and extermination. Hitler planned to depopulate the Ukraine and European Russia to make room for German settlement and a food surplus for the German army. The urban population would have to migrate or starve. Soviet prisoners of war would be allowed to die; former Communist officials would be killed. Mass shootings behind the front line would clear the territory of Jews; this policy was eventually replaced by systematic deportations to mechanised death camps.

Our picture of Soviet war losses remains incomplete. We know that the Soviet Union suffered the vast majority of Allied war deaths, roughly 25 million. This figure could be too high or too low by one million; most Soviet war fatalities went unreported, so the total must be estimated statistically from the number of deaths that exceeded normal peacetime mortality.[27] In comparison, the United States suffered 400,000 war deaths and Britain 350,000.

Causes of death were many. A first distinction is between war deaths among soldiers and civilians.[28] Red Army records indicate 8.7 million known military deaths. Roughly 6.9 million died on the battlefield or behind the front line; this figure, spread over four years, suggests that Red Army losses on an average day ran at about twice the Allied losses on D-Day. In addition, 4.6 million soldiers were reported captured or missing, or killed and missing in units that were cut off and failed to report losses. Of these, 2.8 million were later repatriated or re-enlisted, suggesting a net total of 1.8 million deaths in captivity and 8.7 million Red Army deaths in all.

The figure of 8.7 million is actually a lower limit. The official figures leave out at least half a million deaths of men who went missing during mobilisation because they were caught up in the invasion before being registered in their units. But the true number may be higher. German records show a total of 5.8 million Soviet prisoners, of whom not 1.8 but 3.3 million had died by May 1944. If Germans were counting more thoroughly than Russians, as seems likely up to this point in the war, then a large gap remains in the Soviet records.Finally, the Red Army figures omit deaths among armed partisans, included in civilian deaths under German occupation.

Soviet civilian war deaths fall into two groups: some died under German occupation and the rest in the Soviet-controlled interior. Premature deaths under occupation have been estimated at 13.7 million, including 7.4 million killed in hot or cold blood, another 2.2 million taken to Germany and worked to death, and the remaining 4.1 million died of overwork, hunger or disease. Among the 7.4 million killed were more than two million Jews who vanished into the Holocaust; the rest died in partisan fighting, reprisals and so forth.¹¹

How many were the war deaths in the Soviet interior? If we combine 8.7 million, the lower limit on military deaths, with 13.7 premature civilian deaths under German occupation, and subtract both from 25 million war deaths in the population as a whole, we find a 2.6 million residual. The scope for error in this number is very wide. It could be too high by a million or more extra prisoner-of-war deaths in the German records. It could be too high or too low by another million, being the margin of error around overall war deaths. But in fact war deaths in the Soviet interior cannot have been less than 2 million. Heightened mortality in Soviet labour camps killed three-quarters of a million inmates. Another quarter of a million died during the deportation of entire ethnic groups such as the Volga Germans and later the Chechens who, Stalin believed, had harboured collaborators with the German occupiers. The Leningrad district saw 800,000 hunger deaths during the terrible siege of 1941­4. These three categories alone make 1.8 million deaths. In addition, there were air raids and mass evacuations, the conditions of work, nutrition and public health declined, and recorded death rates rose.¹²

Were these all truly 'war' deaths? Was Hitler to blame, or Stalin? It is true that forced labour and deportations were part of the normal apparatus of Stalinist

11 Jewish deaths were up to one million from the Soviet Union within its 1939 frontiers, one million from eastern Poland, and two to three hundred thousand from the Baltic and other territories annexed in 1940. Israel Gutman and Robert Rozett, 'Estimated Jewish Losses in the Holocaust', in Israel Gutman (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, vol. iv (New York: Macmillan, 1990).

12 Peacetime deaths in the camps and colonies of the Gulag were 2.6 per cent per year from figures for 1936-40 and 1946-50 given by A. I. Kokurin and N. V Petrov (eds.), GULAG (Glavnoe Upravlenie Lagerei). 1918-1960 (Moscow: Materik, 2002), pp. 441-2. Applied to the Gulag population between 1941 and 1945, this figure yields a wartime excess of about 750,000 deaths. On deaths arising from deportations see Overy, Russia's War, p. 233. On deaths in Leningrad, John Barber and Andrei Dreniskevich (eds.), Zhizn' i smert' v blokadnom Leningrad^. Istoriko-meditsinskii aspekt (St Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2001). On death rates across the country and in Siberia, John Barber and Mark Harrison, The Soviet Home Front: A Social and Economic History of the USSR in World War II (London: Longman, 1991), p. 88.

repression. For example, Stalin sent millions of people to labour camps where overwork and poor conditions raised mortality in peacetime well above the norm in the rest of society. Because of the war, however, food availability fell to a point where more people were sure to die. Hitler caused this situation, and in this sense he chose how many died. Stalin chose who died; he sent some of them to the Gulag and allowed the conditions there to worsen further. If Hitler had not decided on war, Stalin would not have had to select the victims. Thus, they were both responsible but in different ways.

In short, the general picture of Soviet war losses suggests a jigsaw puzzle. The general outline is clear: people died in colossal numbers in many different miserable or terrible circumstances. But the individual pieces of the puzzle still do not fit well; some overlap and others are yet to be found.

In 1945 Stalin declared that the country had passed the 'test' of war. If the war was a test, however, few citizens had passed unscathed. Of those alive when war broke out, almost one in five was dead. Ofthose still living, millions were scarred by physical and emotional trauma, by lost families and lost treasured possessions, and by the horrors they had been caught up in. Moreover, the everyday life of most people remained grindingly hard, as they laboured in the following years to cover the costs of demobilising the army and industry and rebuilding shattered communities and workplaces.[29]

The Soviet economy had lost a fifth of its human assets and a quarter to a third of its physical wealth.[30] The simultaneous destruction of physical and human assets normally brings transient losses but not lasting impoverishment. The transient losses arise because the people and assets that remain must be adapted to each other before being recombined, and this takes time. Losses of productivity and incomes only persist when the allocation system cannot cope or suffers lasting damage. In the Soviet case the allocation system was undamaged. Economic demobilisation and the reconversion of industry to peacetime production, although unexpectedly difficult, restored civilian out­put to pre-war levels within a single five-year plan. A more demanding yardstick for recovery would be the return of output to its extrapolated pre-war trend. In this sense recovery was more prolonged; during each post-war decade only half the remaining gap was closed, so that productivity and living standards were still somewhat depressed by the war in the 1970s.[31]

On the edge of collapse

John Keegan has pointed out that most battles are won not when the enemy is destroyed physically, but when her will to resist is destroyed.[32] For Germany, the problem was that the Soviet will to resist did not collapse. Instead, Soviet resistance proved unexpectedly resilient. At the same time, from the summer of 1941 to the victory at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942/3 a Soviet collapse was not far off for much of the time.

Even before June 1941 the Wehrmacht had won an aura of invincibility. It had conquered Czechoslovakia, Poland, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxem­bourg, France, Norway, Denmark, Greece and Yugoslavia. Its reputation was enhanced by the ease with which it occupied the Baltic region and Western Ukraine and the warmth of its initial reception.

In contrast, Red Army morale was low. The rank and file, mostly of peasant origin, had harsh memories of the forced collectivisation of agriculture and the famine of 1932/3. The officer corps was inexperienced and traumatised by the purges of 1937/8.[33] In the campaigns of 1939 and 1940, and particularly the 'winter war' against Finland, successes were mixed and casualties were heavy. Rather than fight, many deserted or assaulted their commanders. In the first months of the war with Germany millions of Red Army soldiers rejected orders that prohibited retreat or surrender. In captivity, with starvation the alternative, thousands chose to put on a German uniform; as a result, while civilians collaborated with the occupiers in all theatres, the Red Army was the only combat organisation in this war to find its own men fighting on the other side under the captured Red Army General Vlasov.[34] The Germans also succeeded in recruiting national 'legions' from ethnic groups in the occupied areas.

As the Germans advanced, the cities of western and central Russia became choked with refugees bearing news of catastrophic setbacks and armies falling back along a thousand-kilometre front.[35] Some Soviet citizens planned for defeat: in the countryside, anticipating the arrival ofGerman troops, peasants secretly planned to share out state grain stocks and collective livestock and fields. Some trains evacuating the Soviet defence factories of the war zones to the safety of the interior were plundered as they moved eastward in late 1941. In the Moscow 'panic' of October 1941, with the enemy close to the city, crowds rioted and looted public property.

In the urban economy widespread labour indiscipline was reflected in persis­tent lateness, absenteeism and illegal quitting.[36] Food crimes became endemic: people stole food from the state and from each other. Military and civilian food administrators stole rations for their own consumption and for sideline trade. Civilians forged and traded ration cards.[37] Red Army units helped themselves to civilian stocks. In besieged Leningrad's terrible winter of 1941 food crimes reached the extreme of cannibalism.[38]

In the white heat of the German advance the core of the dictatorship threat­ened to melt down. Stalin experienced the outbreak of war as a severe psycho­logical blow and momentarily left the bridge; because they could not replace him, or were not brave enough to do so or believed that he was secretly testing their loyalty, his subordinates helped him to regain control by forming a war cabinet, the State Defence Committee or GKO, around him as leader.[39] At many lower levels the normal processes of the Soviet state stopped or, if they tried to carry on business as usual, became irrelevant. Economic planners, for example, went on setting quotas and allocating supplies, although the supplies had been captured by the enemy while the quotas were too modest to replace the losses, let alone accumulate the means to fight back.

Unexpected resilience

The Soviet collapse that German plans relied on never came. Instead, Stalin declared a 'great patriotic war' against the invader, deliberately echoing Russia's previous 'patriotic war' against Napoleon in 1812.

How was Soviet resistance maintained? The main features of the Soviet sys­tem of government on the outbreak of war were Stalin's personal dictatorship, a centralised bureaucracy with overlapping party and state apparatuses, and a secret police with extensive powers to intervene in political, economic and military affairs. This regime organised the Soviet war effort and mobilised its human and material resources. There were some adjustments to the system but continuity was more evident than change.

In the short term, however, this regimented society and its planned econ­omy were mobilised not on lines laid down in carefully co-ordinated plans and approved procedures but by improvised emergency measures. From the Krem­lin to the front line and the remote interior, individual political and military leaders on the spot took the initiatives that enabled survival and resistance.

The resilience was not just military; the war efforts on the home front and the fighting front are a single story. Patriotic feeling is part of this story, but Soviet resistance cannot be explained by patriotic feeling alone, no matter how widespread. This is because war requires collective action, but nations and armies consist of individuals. War presents each person with a choice: on the battlefield each must choose to fight or flee and, on the home front, to work or shirk. If others do their duty, then each individual's small contribution can make little difference; if others abandon their posts, one person's resistance is futile. Regardless of personal interest in the common struggle, each must be tempted to flee or shirk. The moment that this logic takes hold on one side is the turning point.

The main task of each side on the eastern front was not to kill and be killed. Rather, it was to organise their own forces of the front and rear in such a way that each person could feel the value of their own contribution, and feel confident in the collective efforts of their comrades, while closing off the opportunities for each to desert the struggle; and at the same time to disorganise the enemy by persuading its forces individually to abandon resistance and to defect.

A feature of the eastern front, which contributed to the astonishingly high levels of killing on both sides, was that both the Soviet Union and Germany proved adept at solving their own problems of organisation and morale as they arose; but each was unable to disrupt the other's efforts, for example by making surrender attractive to enemy soldiers. One factor was the German forces' dreadful treatment of Soviet civilians and prisoners of war: this soon made clear that no one on the Soviet side could expect to gain from sur­render. Less obviously, it also ensured that no German soldier could expect much better if Germany lost. Thus it committed both sides to war to the death.

In short, three factors held the Soviet war effort together and sustained resistance. First, for each citizen who expected or hoped for German victory there were several others who wanted patriotic resistance to succeed. These were the ones who tightened their belts and shouldered new burdens without complaint. In farms, factories and offices they worked overtime, ploughed and harvested by hand, rationalised production, saved metal and power and boosted output. At the front they dug in and fought although injured, leaderless and cut off. To the Nazi ideologues they were ignorant Slavs who carried on killing pointlessly because they were too stupid to know when they were beaten. To their own people they were heroes.

Second, the authorities supported this patriotic feeling by promoting resis­tance and punishing defeatism. They suppressed information about Red Army setbacks and casualties. They executed many for spreading 'defeatism' by telling the truth about events on the front line. In the autumn of 1941 Moscow and Leningrad were closed to refugees from the occupied areas to prevent the spread of information about Soviet defeats. The evacuation of civilians from both Leningrad and Stalingrad was delayed to hide the real military situation.

Stalin imposed severe penalties on defeatism in the army. His Order no. 270 of 16 August 1941 stigmatised the behaviour of Soviet soldiers who allowed themselves to be taken prisoner as 'betrayal of the Motherland' and imposed social and financial penalties on prisoners' families. Following a military panic at Rostov-on-Don, his Order no. 227 of 28 July 1942 ('Not a Step Back') ordered the deployment of 'blocking detachments' behind the lines to shoot men retreating without orders and officers who allowed their units to disintegrate; the order was rescinded, however, four months later. The barbarity of these orders should be measured against the desperation of the situation. Although their burden was severe and unjust, it was still in the interest of each individual soldier to maintain the discipline of all.

The authorities doggedly pursued 'deserters' from war work on the indus­trial front and sentenced hundreds ofthousands to terms in prisons and labour camps while the war continued. They punished food crimes harshly, not infre­quently by shooting. The secret police remained a powerful and ubiquitous instrument for repressing discontent. This role was heightened by the severe hardships and military setbacks and the questioning of authority that resulted. Civilians and soldiers suspected of disloyalty risked summary arrest and punishment.

Third, although German intentions were not advertised, the realities of German occupation and captivity soon destroyed the illusion of an alternative to resistance.[40] For civilians under occupation, the gains from collaboration were pitiful; Hitler did not offer the one thing that many Russian and Ukrainian peasants hoped for, the dissolution ofthe collective farms. This was because he wanted to use the collective farms to get more grain for Germany and eventu­ally to pass them on to German settlers, not back to indigenous peasants. On the other hand, the occupation authorities did permit some de-collectivisation in the North Caucasus and this was effective in stimulating local collaboration.

People living in the Russian and Ukrainian zones of German conquest were treated brutally, with results that we have already mentioned. Systematic brutality resulted from German war aims, one of which was to loot food and materials so that famine spread through the zone of occupation. Another aim was to exterminate the Jews, so that the German advance was followed immediately by mass killings. The occupation authorities answered resistance with hostage-taking and merciless reprisals. Later in the war the growing pressure led to a labour shortage in Germany, and many Soviet civilians were deported to Germany as slave labourers. In this setting, random brutality towards civilians was also commonplace: German policy permitted soldiers and officials to kill, rape, burn and loot for private ends. Finally, Soviet soldiers taken prisoner fared no better; many were starved or worked to death. Of the survivors, many were shipped to Germany as slave labourers. Red Army political officers faced summary execution at the front.

It may be asked why Hitler did not try to win over the Russians and Ukraini­ans and to make surrender more inviting for Soviet soldiers. He wanted to uphold racial distinctions and expected to win the war quickly without having to induce a Soviet surrender. While this was not the case, his policy delivered one unexpected benefit. When Germany began to lose the war, it stiffened military morale that German troops understood they could expect no better treatment from the other side. Thus Hitler's policy was counter-productive while the German army was on the offensive, but it paid off in retreat by diminishing the value to German soldiers of the option to surrender.

As a result, the outcome of the war was decided not by morale but by military mass. Since both sides proved equally determined to make a fight of it, and neither could be persuaded to surrender, it became a matter of kill-and- be-killed after all, so victory went to the army that was bigger, better equipped and more able to kill and stand being killed. Although the Red Army suffered much higher casualties than the Wehrmacht, it proved able to return from such losses, regain the initiative and eventually acquire a decisive quantitative superiority.

Underlying military mass was the economy. In wartime the Soviet Union was more thoroughly mobilised economically than Germany and supplied the front with a greater volume of resources. This is something that could hardly have been predicted. Anyone reviewing the experience of the poorer countries in the First World War, including Russia, would have forecast a speedy Soviet economic collapse hastened by the attempt to mobilise resources from a shrinking territory.

On the eve of war the Soviet and German economies were of roughly equal size; taking into account the territorial gains of 1939 / 40, the real national product ofthe Soviet economy in 1940 may have exceeded Germany's by a small margin. Between 1940 and 1942 the German economy expanded somewhat, while the level of Soviet output was slashedby invasion; as a result, in 1942 Soviet output was only two-thirds the German level. Despite this, in 1942 the Soviet Union not only fielded armed forces more numerous than Germany's, which is not surprising given the Soviet demographic advantage, but also armed and equipped them at substantially higher levels. The railway evacuation of factories and equipment from the war zones shifted the geographical centre ofthe war economy hundreds of kilometres to the east. By 1943 three-fifths of Soviet output was devoted to the war effort, the highest proportion observed at the time in any economy that did not subsequently collapse under the strain.²⁵

There was little detailed planning behind this; the important decisions were made in a chaotic, unco-ordinated sequence. The civilian economy was neglected and declined rapidly; by 1942 the production of food, fuels and metals had fallen by half or more. Living standards fell on average by two-fifths, while millions were severely overworked and undernourished; however, the state procurement of food from collective farms ensured that industrial workers and soldiers were less likely to starve than peasants. Despite this, the economy might have collapsed without victory at Stalingrad at the start of 1943. Foreign aid, mostly American, also relieved the pressure; it added about 5 per cent to Soviet resources available in 1942 and 10 per cent in each of 1943 and 1944. In 1943 economic controls became more centralised and some resources were restored to civilian uses.²⁶

25 Mark Harrison, 'The Economics of World War II: An Overview', in Harrison (ed.), Economics of World War II, p. 21.

26 Harrison, SovietPlanninginPeaceandWar, chs. 2 and4,andAccountingforWar, chs. 6and7.

How did an economy made smaller than Germany's by invasion still out­produce Germany in weapons and equipment? Surprising though this may seem, the Soviet economy did not have a superior ability to repress con­sumption. By 1942 both countries were supplying more than three-fifths of their national output to the war effort, so this was not the source of Soviet advantage. Stalin's command system may have had an advantage in repress­ing consumption more rapidly; the Soviet economy approached this level of mobilisation in a far shorter period of time.

The main advantage on the Soviet side was that the resources available for mobilisation were used with far greater efficiency.[41] This resulted from mass production. In the inter-war period artisan methods still dominated the production of most weapons in most countries, other than small arms and ammunition. In wartime craft technologies still offered advantages of quality and ease of adaptation, but these were overwhelmed by the gains of volume and unit cost that mass production offered. The German, Japanese and Italian war industries were unable to realise these gains, or realised them too late, because of corporate structures based on the craft system, political commitments to the social status of the artisan and strategic preferences for quality over quantity of weaponry. In the American market economy these had never counted for much, and in the Soviet command system they had already been substantially overcome before the war.

The quantitative superiority in weaponry of the Allies generally, and specif­ically of the Soviet Union over Germany, came from supplying standardised products in a limited assortment, interchangeable parts, specialised factories and industrial equipment, an inexorable conveyor-belt system of serial man­ufacture, and deskilled workers who lacked the qualifications and discretion to play at design or modify specifications. Huge factories turned out proven designs in long production runs that poured rising quantities of destructive power onto the battlefield.

The Red Army in defeat and victory

A contest over the nature of revolutionary military organisation began in March 1917, when the Petrograd Soviet decreed that soldiers could challenge their officers' commands. While the army of Imperial Russia disintegrated, the Red Guard emerged as a voluntary organisation of revolutionaries chosen for working-class origin and political consciousness. But when revolution turned into civil war these founding principles had to face the realities of modern military combat. Trotsky, then commissar for war, responded by institut­ing conscription from the peasantry and the restoration of an officer corps recruited from imperial army commanders willing to serve the new regime.

The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army that Trotsky created reflected a sweeping compromise of political principles with military imperatives: pro­fessional elements combined with a territorial militia, military training of the rank and file side by side with political education and party guidance, and dual command with military officers' orders subject to verification by political 'commissars'; the latter term, used widely in English and German, approxi­mates only loosely to the Russian politruk (short for politicheskii rukovoditel': political guide or leader). After the civil war Trotsky's successor, Frunze, intro­duced military reforms that created a General Staff and unified military dis­cipline. Over the next quarter-century the Red Army evolved from its radical origins to a modern military organisation.

A feature of the revolutionary tradition in the Red Army was its emphasis on offensive operations, and specifically in the counter-offensive as the best means of defence. Underlying this was the belief that, in a world polarised between capitalism and communism, no country could attackthe Soviet Union without risking mutiny at the front and revolution in its rear. Therefore, the moment when it was attacked was the best moment for the Red Army to launch a counter-attack. When this proved to be an illusion, Red Army doctrines shifted to a more defensive stance based on a war of attrition and falling back on reserves. Then, when forced industrialisation created the prospect of a motorised mass army with armoured and air forces capable of striking deep into the enemy's flanks and rear, Tukhachevskii's concept of'deep battle' again radicalised Red Army thinking. [42]

The size of the armed forces followed a U-shaped curve in the inter-war years. It stood at 5 million at the end of the civil war in 1921 and 5 million again at the German invasion of 1941. In the 1920s wholesale demobilisation and cost-cutting took the Red Army and Navy down to little more than half a million. In the 1930s modernisation and recruitment reversed the decline. The Red Army of 1941, with its thousands of tanks and aircraft, bore little visible comparison with the ragged-trousered regiments who had won the civil war.

Beneath the surface, the new army was nearer in spirit to the old one than might appear. It was difficult to break the mould of the civil war. One problem was that, as numbers expanded, the quality ofpersonnel deteriorated amongst both rank and file and officers. It was impossible to recruit officers in sufficient numbers, give them a professional training and pay them enough to command with integrity and competence. Another was the cost of re- equipping the rapidly growing numbers with motorised armour and aviation at a time of exceptional change in tank and aircraft technologies. The industry of a low-income, capital-scarce country could not produce new weapons in sufficient numbers to equip the army uniformly in the current state of the arts; instead, the army had to deploy new and obsolete weapons side by side.

Then in 1937/8, in the middle of rapid expansion, Stalin forced the Red Army through a major backward step in the bloody purge that he inflicted on its leadership. Most commanding officers down to the level of corps com­manders were executed; altogether, more than twenty thousand officers were discharged after arrest or expulsion from the party. Stalin carried out the purge because he feared the potential for a fifth column to develop in the armed forces, as in other structures of Soviet society, that would emerge in wartime to collaborate with an adversary and hand over the key to the gates.[43]He determined to destroy this possibility in advance by savage repression. He believed that this would leave the army and society better prepared for war.

Stalin succeeded in that the purge turned the army's command staff, ter­rorised and morally broken, into his absolutely obedient instrument. At the same time, while continuing to grow rapidly in numbers, it declined further in quality. Officer recruitment and training had to fill thousands of new posts and at the same time replace thousands ofempty ones. The mass promotions that resulted had a strongly accidental character; they placed many competent but poorly qualified soldiers in commanding positions and many incompetent ones beside them. Bad leadership brought falling morale amongst the rank and file. The army paid heavily for incompetent military leadership at war with Finland in 1939/40, and more heavily still in the June 1941 invasion.

The backward step that the Red Army took in 1937 was expressed in its organisation and thinking. Organisationally, Stalin sought to compensate for officers' collapsing prestige and competence by returning to the model of dual command: in 1937 military commanders again lost their undivided authority to issue orders, which had to be countersigned by the corresponding politruk (political commissar). Unified command was restored in 1940; then, in the mili­tary chaos of 1941 followingthe German invasion, Stalin once more returned to the politruk system, finally restoring unified command in the military reforms of 1942.

In military thinking the Red Army also took a step back, marked by a return to the cult of the offensive. The main reason was Stalin's fear of defeatist tendencies in the armed forces; since retreat was the first stage of defeat, his logic ran, the easiest way to identify defeatism was to connect it with plans for Tukhachevskii's 'deep battle', which envisaged meeting the enemy's invasion by stepping back and regrouping before launching a counter-offensive. Thus, the advocates of operations in depth were accused of conspiring with Nazi leaders to hand over territory. As a result, when war broke out many officers found it easier to surrender to the Wehrmacht than to retreat against Stalin's orders.

Soviet military plans for an enemy attack became dominated by crude notions of frontier defence involving an immediate counter-offensive that would take the battle to the enemy's territory. Stalin now hoped to deter German aggression by massing Soviet forces on the frontier, apparently ready to attack. This was a dangerous bluff; it calmed fears and stimulated compla­cency in Moscow, while observers in Berlin were not taken in. The revived cult of the offensive also had consequences for the economy The planned war mobilisation of industry was based on a short offensive campaign and a quick victory Threats of air attack and territorial loss could not be discussed while such fears were equated with treason. As a result, air defence and the dispersal of industry from vulnerable frontier regions were neglected.

Stalin was surprised and shocked when Hitler launched his invasion. Having convinced himselfthat Hitler would not invade, he had rejected several warn­ings received through diplomatic and intelligence channels, believing them to be disinformation. When the invasion came, he was slow to react and slow to adapt. Better anticipation might not have prevented considerable territo­rial losses but could have saved millions of soldiers from the encirclements that resulted in captivity and death. After the war there was tension between Stalin and his generals over how they should share the credit for final vic­tory and blame for early defeats. In 1941 Stalin covered his own responsibility for misjudging Hitler's plans by shooting several generals. The army had its revenge in 1956 when Khrushchev caricatured Stalin planning wartime military operations on a globe.

The war completed the Red Army's transition to a modern fighting force, but the process was complicated and there were more backward steps before progress was resumed. As commander-in-chief, Stalin improvised a high command, the Stavka, and took detailed control of military operations. He demanded ceaseless counter-attacks, regardless of circumstances, and indeed, in the circumstances of the time, when field communications were inopera­tive and strategic co-ordination did not exist, there was often no alternative to unthinking resistance on the lines of'death before surrender'. This gave rise to episodes of both legendary heroism and despicable brutality. Overtime Stalin ceded more and more operational command to his generals while keeping control of grand strategy.

For a time the army threatened to become de-professionalised again. Reservists were called up en masse and sent to the front with minimal training. More than 30 million men and women were mobilised in total. The concepts of a territorial militia and voluntary motivation were promoted by recruiting 'home guard' detachments in the towns threatened by enemy occupation. These were pitched into defensive battle, lightly armed and with a few hours' training, and most were killed. The few survivors were eventually integrated into the Red Army. At the same time, partisan armies grew on the occupied territories behind German lines, sometimes based on the remnants of Red Army units cut offin the retreat; these, too, were gradually brought under the control of the General Staff. Once the tide had turned and the Red Army began to recover occupied territory, it refilled its ranks by scooping up able-bodied men remaining in the towns and villages on the way. Offsetting these were high levels of desertion that persisted in 1943 and 1944, even after the war's outcome was certain.

The annihilating losses of 1941 and 1942 instituted a vicious cycle of rapid replacement with ever-younger and less-experienced personnel who suffered casualties and loss of equipment at dreadful rates. This affected the whole army, including the officer corps. At the end of the war most commanding officers still lacked a proper military education, and most units were still commanded by officers whose level of responsibility exceeded their substantive rank.

In the end, three things saved the Red Army. First, at each level enough of its units included a core of survivors who, after the baptism of fire, had acquired enough battlefield experience to hold the unit together and teach new recruits to live longer. Second, in 1941 and the summer of 1942, when the army's morale was cracking, Stalin shored it up with merciless discipline. In October 1942 he followed this with reforms that finally abolished dual com­mand by the political commissars and restored a number of traditional grada­tions of rank and merit. Third, the economy did not collapse; Soviet industry was mobilised and poured out weapons at a higher rate than Germany. As a result, despite atrocious losses and wastage of equipment, the Soviet soldier of 1942 was already better equipped than the soldier he faced in armament, though not yet in rations, kit or transport. In 1943 and 1944 this advantage rose steadily.

By the end of the war the Red Army was no longer an army of riflemen supported by a few tanks and aircraft but a modern combined armed force. But successful modernisation did not bar soldiers from traditional pursuits such as looting and sexual violence, respectively encouraged and permitted by the Red Army on a wide scale in occupied Germany in the spring of 1945.

Government and politics

The war ended in triumph for Soviet power. Whether or not the Soviet Union has left anything else of lasting value, it did at least put a stop to Hitler's imperial dreams and murderous designs. This may have been the Soviet Union's most positive contribution to the balance sheet of the twentieth century.

Millions of ordinary people were intoxicated with joy at the announcement of the victory and celebrated it wildly in city squares and village streets. But some of the aspirations with which they greeted the post-war period were not met. Many hoped that the enemy's defeat could be followed by political relaxation and greater cultural openness. They felt the war had shown the people deserved to be trusted more by its leaders. But this was not a lesson that the leaders drew. The Soviet state became more secretive, Soviet society became more cut off and Stalin prepared new purges.[44] Ten years would pass before Khrushchev opened up social and historical discourse in a way that was radical and shocking compared with the stuffy conformity of Stalinism, but pathetically limited by the standards of the wider world.

As for the social divisions that the war had opened up, Stalin preferred vengeance to reconciliation. While the Germans retreated he selected entire national minorities suspected of collaboration for mass deportation to Siberia. The Vlasov officers were executed and the men imprisoned without forgive­ness. No one returned from forced labour in Germany or from prisoner-of-war camp without being 'filtered' by the NKVD. Party members who had survived German occupation had to account for their wartime conduct and show that they had resisted actively.[45]

There were other consequences. The Soviet victory projected the Red Army into the heart of Europe. It transformed the Soviet Union from a regional power to a global superpower; Stalin became a world leader. It strengthened his dictatorship and the role of the secret police.

Nothing illustrates Stalin's personal predominance better than the lack of challenge to his leadership at the most critical moments of the war. As head of GKO and Sovnarkom, defence commissar, supreme commander-in-chief and General Secretary of the Communist Party, Stalin's authority over Soviet political, economic and military affairs was absolute. From the moment when his colleagues asked him to lead the war cabinet Stalin exercised greater influ­ence over his country's war effort than any other national leader in the Second World War. Washing away his mistakes and miscalculations in 1941 and 1942, the victory of 1945 further strengthened his already unassailable position.

The establishment of the five-man GKO was a first step to a comprehen­sive system of wartime administration that institutionalised pre-war trends. GKO functioned with marked informality. Meetings were convened at short notice, without written agendas or minutes, with a wide and varying cast of supernumeraries. It had only a small staff; responsibility for executing deci­sions was delegated to plenipotentiaries and to local defence committees with sweeping powers. But it was vested, in Stalin's words, with 'all the power and authority of the State'. Its decisions bound every Soviet organisation and citizen. No Soviet political institution before or after possessed such powers. Another pre-war trend that continued in wartime was the growth in influ­ence of the government apparatus through which most GKO decisions were implemented. Its heightened importance was reflected in Stalin's becoming chairman of Sovnarkom on the eve of war and thus head of government.

The role of central party bodies declined correspondingly. The purges of 1937/ 8 had already diminished the role of the Politburo. Before the war it met with declining frequency; all important decisions were taken by Stalin with a few of its members, and issued in its name. During the war the Politburo met infrequently and the Central Committee only once; there were no party congresses or conferences. It was at the local level that the party played an important role in mobilising the population and organising propaganda. It did this despite the departure of many members for the front; in many areas party cells ceased to exist.

The NKVD played several key roles. While repressing discontent and defeatism, it reported on mass opinion to Stalin. In military affairs it organ­ised partisans and the 'penal battalions' recruited from labour camps. In the economy it supplied forced labour to logging, mining and construction, and to high-security branches of industry. These roles gave it a central place in wartime government. Beria, its head, was a member of GKO throughout the war and deputy chairman from 1944, as well as deputy chairman of Sovnarkom. Not accidentally, reports from him and other security chiefs constituted the largest part of Stalin's wartime correspondence.

In economic life the overall results of the war were conservative and fur­ther entrenched the command system. The war gave a halo of legitimacy to centralised planning, mass production and standardisation. It showed that the Soviet economy's mobilisation capacities, tried out before the war in the cam­paigns to 'build socialism' by collectivising peasant farming and industrialising the country, could be used just as effectively for military purposes: the Soviet economy had devoted the same high proportion of national resources to the war as much wealthier market economies without collapsing.[46]

Had the war changed anything? At one level Hitler had made his point. Germany had fought two world wars to divert Europe from the class struggle and polarise it on national lines. The Second World War largely put an end to class warfare in the Soviet Union. By the end of the war nationality and ethnicity had replaced class origin in Soviet society as a basis of selection for promotion and repression.³³

Other influences made the post-war economy and society more militarised than before. The country had paid a heavy price in 1941 for lack ofpreparedness. In the post-war years a higher level of economic preparedness was sustained so as to avoid a lengthy conversion period in the opening phase of the next war. This implied larger peacetime allocations to maintain combat-ready stocks of weapons and reserve production facilities to be mobilised quickly at need.

After an initial post-war demobilisation, the Soviet defence industry began to grow again in the context of the US nuclear threat and the Korean war. Before the Second World War, defence plants were heavily concentrated in the western and southern regions of the European USSR, often relying on far-flung suppliers. The Second World War shifted the centre of gravity of the Soviet defence industry hundreds of kilometres eastward to the Urals and Western Siberia. There, huge evacuated factories were grafted onto remote rural localities. A by-product was that the defence industry was increasingly concentrated on Russian Federation territory.

After the war, despite some westward reverse evacuation, the new war economy of the Urals and Siberia was kept in existence. The weapon facto­ries of the remote interior were developed into giant, vertically integrated production complexes based on closed, self-sufficient 'company towns'. Their existence was a closely guarded secret: they were literally taken off the map.

The post-war Soviet economy carried a defence burden that was heavier in proportion to GNP than the burdens carried by the main NATO powers. Whether or how this contributed to slow Soviet post-war economic growth or the eventual breakdown of the economy are questions on which economists find it hard to agree; there was certainly a substantial loss to Soviet consumers that accumulated over many years.

Finally, the war established a new generation that would succeed Stalin. At the close of the war in Europe GKO members comprised Stalin (65), Molotov (55), Kaganovich (51), Bulganin (50), Mikoyan (49), Beria (46), Malenkov (43) and Voznesenskii (41); Voroshilov (64) had been made to resign in November 1944. Members of the Politburo included Khrushchev (51) and Zhdanov (49). Stalin's successors would be drawn from among those in their forties and early fifties.[47] These were selected in several stages. First, the purges of 1937/8 cleared their way for recruitment into the political elite. Then they were tested by the war and by Stalin's last years. Those who outlived Stalin became the great survivors of the post-war Soviet political system. Once they were young and innovative. Having fought their way to the top in their youth, they became unwilling to contemplate new upheavals in old age. The war had taught them the wrong lessons. Unable to adapt to new times, they made an important contribution to the Soviet Union's long-term decay.

Stalin and his circle

YQRAM GQRLIZKI AND OLEG KHLEYNIUK

Research in recent years has highlighted the limits of the Stalinist state. Aside from the numerous forms of resistance, both physical and symbolic, which they faced, Soviet bureaucracies under Stalin often lacked the resources or co-ordination to provide a consistent and effective system of administration. In between campaigns, as one commentator has noted of the countryside in the late 1930s, 'neglect by Soviet power was as characteristic as coercion, and perhaps sometimes even as much resented'.[48] Despite these limitations, the Stalinist state did have the capacity to mobilise its officials and to transform the lives of its citizens. The most powerful state-sponsored campaigns overturned traditional modes of existence and effected reorganisations against which the combined forces of armed rebellion and popular resistance would prove to be no match.[49] Although some enjoyed the support of activists on the ground, the most important campaigns of this kind were driven from above, usually from the very summit of the political system. Some of the key turning points of this period, such as forced collectivisation, the Great Purges, and the onset of the Cold War, were the consequence of decisions taken by a small leadership group around Stalin. Although Stalin attracted the support of a variety of constituencies within Soviet society, he was never a mere cipher for these groups, but was rather a powerful and independent force in a social order that would come to bear his name.

Stalin's personality left a giant imprint on the Soviet system. The leader's approach to solving problems was, first, overwhelmingly coercive. While this was not entirely exceptional, given the Bolshevik state's origins in revolution and civil war, Stalin ratcheted up the combination of pressure and violence to new levels. This devotion to force was an important factor in converting an already brutal regime into a terrorist dictatorship, the excesses of which were gratuitous and unnecessary by any standards.[50] On matters of policy Stalin was also extremely stubborn. Ideological concessions and policy retreats were, on the whole, only wrung out of him under considerable duress, normally when the country was teetering on the edge of crisis. Augmented by a personality cult, which tended to present it as a mark of the leader's 'infallibility', this obduracy would, as towards the end of his life, when Stalin steadfastly blocked much-needed reforms in key sectors, cost his country dear.

For all its brutality and bloody-mindedness, this position of 'firmness' did, from Stalin's perspective, serve a particular purpose: to secure his own posi­tion as the leader of a separate, powerful and respected socialist state. Many of Stalin's actions were guided by quite rational calculations towards the attain­ment of this goal.[51] While this pragmatism has most often been observed in Stalin's behaviour on the international stage, it was also evident in domestic affairs. Perhaps nowhere was this more apparent than in Stalin's relations with his immediate colleagues. Despite a reputation for arbitrary brutality, Stalin systematically promoted younger functionaries and treated with great care those high-level leaders whose qualities, either as workers or as symbols of the revolution, he valued; after the Great Purges in particular, this was a group towards which the leader exhibited a surprising degree of self-restraint and moderation.[52]

The attention Stalin paid his colleagues was fully merited, for these deputies played an indispensable role in running the Soviet state. Well known in their own right, most members of the Politburo managed important portfolios and headed powerful personal networks. In two periods - during the war and in the early 1950s - Stalin was forced to hand over complete control of certain jurisdictions to this leadership substratum. Rather than being an inherently stable or inert form of rule, Stalin's one-man dictatorship was repeatedly in tension with powerful oligarchic tendencies.[53] Maintaining the upper hand would prove to be a taxing business, one which would keep the ageing leader on his toes.

Stalin's relations with his deputies were not fixed or constant over time. In this chapter their evolution is divided into four phases. We begin by assessing the rise of the Stalinist faction in the 1920s. The consolidation of dictatorship from the 1920s to the late 1930s and the operation of the Stalinist dictatorship at its peak, following the Great Purges, is the subject of the second section. The chapter then goes on to examine Stalin and his entourage during the war years, a period of marked decentralisation. The chapter concludes by looking at Stalin's last years, as the decision-making structures of the post-Stalin era began to take shape.

Rise of the Stalinist faction

With victory in the civil war, the locus of political struggle in the early 1920s shifted to the upper reaches of the Bolshevik Party. In the lead-up to Lenin's death, the broad collegial leadership which had existed under him dissolved into factions, usually consisting of short-term tactical alliances. The consolidation of a 'Stalinist faction' out of these groupings was the result of an extremely convoluted process and an outcome which few would have predicted.

The first stage took place from the end of 1923 to 1924, when a solid majority formed within the Politburo against Leon Trotsky, whose impetuous behaviour and poor political judgement stoked up widespread unease within the leadership.[54] To co-ordinate their stand, in August 1924 a 'septet' was cre­ated, consisting of six members of the Politburo (that is, all of the Politburo, apart from Trotsky) and the chair of the Central Control Commission, Valerian Kuibyshev. It was this 'septet'which took the key decisions, bringing to official sessions of the Politburo (attended by Trotsky) resolutions which it had agreed beforehand. Once Trotsky had been sidelined, however, the septet's coherence quickly evaporated, and it soon broke off into two wings, with the minority group, consisting of Kamenev and Zinoviev, eventually drifting off towards Trotsky. Following a bitter dispute, all three leaders of the Zinoviev-Trotsky bloc were expelled from the Politburo in autumn 1927.

With a clear majority ending up in Stalin's inner circle of the 1930s, it is tempting to think of the Politburo of late 1927 as staunchly 'Stalinist'. At this stage, however, rank-and-file members of the Politburo still enjoyed a consid­erable degree of latitude. Their autonomy was bolstered by the still-prevailing norm of'collective leadership' which rested on a comparatively clear-cut divi­sion oflabour within the cabinet. Apart from Stalin himself, who led the party apparatus, Aleksei Rykov chaired the Council of People's Commissars (Sov­narkom, which managed the economy), and Nikolai Bukharin acted as chief ideologist to the party. So long as no one leader fully dominated the summit of the political system, other members of the Politburo remained more or less free to pursue their own course. The same applied to the middle layers of the power pyramid, the members of the Central Committee, on whose votes much would depend in the coming power struggle.

Relatively free of constraints, members of the Politburo were allowed to migrate from one ad hoc alignment to another, depending on the issue at hand. The looseness of the 'Stalinist faction' was evident, for example, in the summer of 1927 when the break in diplomatic relations with Britain, the murder of the Soviet ambassador in Poland and the clampdown against the Communists in China, placed it under enormous strain. Stalin, on vacation in the south, received regular dispatches from Molotov on Politburo debates. Molotov reported that one group, including those who were ostensibly Stalin's followers, such as Ordzhonikidze, Voroshilov and Rudzutak, had criticised the policies being implemented in China, with Voroshilov, who would later emerge as one of Stalin's most fanatical supporters, going so far as to ' "roundly con­demn" [your] leadership over the last two years'.[55] Another issue on which opinions were divided was whether Trotsky and Zinoviev should be imme­diately expelled from the Central Committee. Some of Stalin's allies, such as Kalinin, Ordzhonikidze and Voroshilov, argued that the matter should be deferred until the party congress. Stalin, still in the south, fumed at this, though to little avail. It was only after Stalin insisted that his vote be counted in absen­tia, and when, at the last moment, one Politburo member, Kalinin, switched sides that, on 20 June 1927, the Politburo decided, by the slimmest of margins, to have the two expelled.[56]

The one exception to this pattern of fluid alignments was the stand taken by Viacheslav Molotov. From his appointment as secretary of the Central Committee in 1921, Molotov had pledged his unswerving loyalty to Stalin, and for much of the 1920s he remained his only unconditional supporter on the Politburo. This absolute allegiance would prove to be one of Stalin's most important assets in the struggle which unfolded in 1928, once the united opposition of Trotsky and Zinoviev had finally been crushed, and the Politburo 'majority' had lost the common enemy against which it had closed ranks in earlier years.

One fact that would play a major role in bringing the Stalinist faction into line was a debate that emerged in 1928. Having encountered serious economic difficulties, above all in the countryside, the Politburo adopted a series of 'emergency measures', which included the forced expropriation of grain from the peasantry and the suppression of private trade. At first there were no significant disagreements over the use of this 'extraordinary approach'. It was only when it became apparent that this ostensibly temporary strategy was to be frozen into a permanent mode of government that two groups began to form in the Politburo. The first, led by Stalin, insisted on a continuation ofthe measures. The second, represented by Rykov, Bukharin and Tomskii, called for a retreat, even if this meant granting concessions.

One of the principal reasons why the Stalin group triumphed was that their message was more closely attuned to the sentiments of rank-and-file members of the party. Stalin's definition of the situation in terms of class war, and his use of slogans such as 'assault on the Kulak', appealed to the mores of War Communism which continued to carry great resonance for many Bolsheviks.[57]Stalin also possessed key organisational resources, not the least of which was his control, as General Secretary of the Central Committee, of personnel assignments within the party apparatus. [58]

This did not mean, however, that Stalin's victory was in any way prede­termined. Among second-level officials on the Central Committee, as well as among Politburo members themselves, there remained a strong willingness to resolve the conflict amicably. Many Central Committee members feared a large-scale conflict which might destroy the balance ofpower within the Polit­buro and thereby their own 'parliamentary' role as the Politburo's final court of appeal. Even more seriously, Central Committee and Politburo members recognised that a split in the cabinet would force them to take sides, and to risk their own career in the case of defeat. Reflecting this mood, Ordzhonikidze wrote to Rykov in November 1928: 'I am frankly imploring you to bring about a reconciliation between Bukharin and Stalin . . . It is laughable, of course, to speak of your "replacement" or of Bukharin's, or of Tomskii's. That really would be madness. It is true that relations between Stalin and Bukharin have taken a turn for the worse, but we must do all we can to reconcile them. And this can be done . . . In general, Aleksei, we must approach with inordinate care any issues which might plunge us into a "fight". We need the greatest self-control not to let all this come to blows.'[59]

The impetus to break this delicate equilibrium came from Stalin, who seemed determined to force a choice on his Politburo colleagues. To this end, he did his utmost to open up a rift within the Politburo. 'Andreev is fully behind the Central Committee position,' he wrote to Molotov. 'Tomskii, it turns out, tried (at the plenum) to "wear him down" . . . but was unable to "lure" him'; 'under no circumstances', Stalin noted on another occasion, 'should we let Tomskii (let alone anyone else) "sway" Kuibyshev or Mikoyan'.[60]It is likely that Stalin also used blackmail to firm up his alliance. In December 1928 and March 1929 the Central Control Commission received materials from the archives of the tsarist police which showed that two current members of the Politburo, Mikhail Kalinin and Ian Rudzutak, had years earlier betrayed other revolutionaries. The fact that these documents, which were sufficient to have the two expelled, or even arrested, had surfaced at the same time as the struggle with the 'Rightists' was coming to a head is unlikely to have been a matter of chance.[61]

An important consequence of the victory over the 'Rightists' was the forma­tion within the Politburo not simply of a majority faction, but of one relatively unified group under Stalin. Although still a collective body, this group was no longer an alliance of equals. It was now headed by a single leader, who had disposed of the original cast of would-be successors to Lenin. No longer able to manoeuvre between leadership contenders, the position of rank-and-file members of the Politburo and of the Central Committee had been seriously weakened. Thus, following the tumultuous policy clashes of late 1928 and early 1929, the rough balance of power at the apex of the political order, which had persisted throughout the 1920s, was finally broken.

From oligarchy to dictatorship

With the defeat of the 'Rightists', Stalin's position was strengthened. Lazar Kaganovich, Sergei Kirov and Stanislav Kosior were nowrepaid fortheir loyalty to Stalin with full membership of the Politburo, while a number of others who had supported Stalin - Andrei Andreev, Anastas Mikoyan, Grigorii Petrovskii, Sergei Syrtsov and Vlas Chubar - had made it onto the Politburo as candidate members. After a brief pause, Stalin continued his purge of the cabinet. In December 1930 a former loyalist, Syrtsov, was removed from the Politburo for vocal dissent and for his ties to another critic, the first secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee, Vissarion Lominadze, while the last 'Rightist', Aleksei Rykov was also expelled, and his place on the Politburo taken by Sergo Ordzhonikidze.

Although an important staging post on the road to dictatorship, the lead­ership system of the early 1930s is best viewed as a phase of unconsolidated oligarchic rule. In this system, Politburo members still retained considerable political influence. In leading a key department of government, every member of the Politburo not only took operational decisions and controlled consider­able resources, but formed around himself an extensive network of person­ally devoted functionaries. While intrusions into the personal domain of a Politburo member were possible they were, as a rule, accompanied by unholy scandals. The significance ofthese Politburo 'patrimonies' was such that Stalin himself would have to take them seriously.

This pattern of relationships became most fully apparent in 1931, when the Politburo had to face up to the effects of its radical policies, which included food shortages, housing crises, labour disturbances, deportations and rebel­lion. The sense of deepening crisis led to very real showdowns on the Politburo. In what would become a common refrain, Stalin blamed many of the coun­try's woes on the shoddy work and departmental egoism of his colleagues. Politburo members in turn resisted Stalin's onslaught with whatever means they had, including the threat of resignation. One of the fiercest clashes arose in connection with orders for imported goods. Despite a steep rise in foreign debts, the economic commissariats insisted on an increase in deliveries from abroad. Although Stalin accused his colleagues of wrecking the state bud­get, his demands that new orders be rescinded went unheeded. In September 1931, he finally issued an ultimatum, declaring that he would cut short his vacation and return to Moscow for a special sitting of the Politburo.[62] Stalin's manoeuvre, which resembled his tactics over the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev in 1927, was a response to the still powerful oligarchic forces which continued to constrain him. Yet while the earlier dispute had centred on an essentially political question, the new one - and others like it - revolved around the economic issue of resource allocation. Battles over economic and organi­sational questions of this kind were a typical feature of leadership debates in the early 1930s.

The existence of such conflicts should not be confused with the view that Stalin was surrounded by 'radicals' and 'moderates', between whose stands the leader continuously vacillated. Certainly, recent research does not lend much support to this position, nor to the view that there were 'factions' as such in the Politburo at all in this period.[63] In fact, virtually all conflicts in the Politburo appear to have been driven by bureaucratic interests, rather than by questions of principle or ideology. Hence, the same member of the Politburo could at any one time adopt a 'moderate' position and at others 'radical' ones, depending on the particular needs and requirements of the department which

he headed. [64]

In fact, most members of the Politburo were 'moderates' in the sense that they had an interest in maintaining unconsolidated oligarchical rule and, through that, preserving overall stability within the system. The personal rights and jurisdictions of Politburo members remained the final barrier preventing the establishment of a full-blown personal dictatorship at the centre. Attempts by Politburo members to preserve these oligarchic privileges added up to a defence of a more 'moderate' line, marked by certain checks and balances. We may observe this phenomenon most clearly in the conflicts which flared up between Stalin and his long-term friend and Politburo colleague, Sergo Ordzhonikidze.

One of the best-known leaders of the 1930s, Ordzhonikidze headed the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, a powerful portfolio which became the insti­tutional symbol of Soviet industrialisation. As he learned to defend the interests of his own department and to attract qualified, enterprising managers to work under him, Ordzhonikidze turned into a proponent ofmoderation within the leadership. The slightest attempt to encroach on his department was warded off, and Ordzhonikidze guarded his traditional right to 'punish or pardon' his own people with great fervour. It was on these grounds that Ordzhonikidze had regular run-ins with other leaders, most notably Stalin.[65] Their differences reached a head in 1936, as Stalin began a sweeping purge of Soviet official­dom which included sanctioning the arrest of Ordzhonikidze's elder brother. Although Ordzhonikidze put up a stout defence of his own particular patri­mony, the scope of resistance was limited. Rather than engaging in principled opposition, Ordzhonikidze's main goal appearsto havebeento convince Stalin to end attacks on Ordzhonikidze's 'own' people. Ordzhonikidze's eventual sui­cide on 18 February 1937, on the eve of the Central Committee plenum which pronounced a policy of widening repression, amounted to a last desperate act of defiance against Stalin's onslaught on Politburo prerogatives.

Faced with the choice of fighting for the last vestiges of collective rule or succumbing to the shrill demands from Stalin on carrying out a mass purge, most members of the Politburo and of the Central Committee capitulated.[66]The mass terror which followed numbered among its victims hundreds of thousands of ordinary citizens, as well as party-state officials at all levels.[67]The epidemic of arrests and confessions opened up leads implicating those around Stalin. For the first time in Soviet history members and candidates of the Politburo - Kosior, Chubar, Eikhe, Rudzutak and Postyshev - were arrested and executed. By the end of the purges, two members of the Politburo had been executed, one, Ordzhonikidze, had committed suicide and three candidate members had been shot. Close aides and relations of other Politburo leaders were also defenceless against the purge. The wife of the head of state, Mikhail Kalinin, was sent to the camps, while the case of Molotov's wife, Polina Zhemchuzhina, came up several times at Politburo meetings. Although she narrowly escaped prosecution, Zhemchuzhina was dismissed as commissar of fish industries, thereby sending a further pointed message to her husband and his cabinet colleagues. In asserting his power to have anyone he wished fired, prosecuted or killed, Stalin had attained the truest hallmark of a tyrant.[68]

The late 1930s may be regarded as the high water mark of Stalin's dictator­ship, a fact underscored by two key developments. First, Stalin now promoted a new cohort of junior figures who had played no role during the revolution and owed their rise entirely to the dictator. In March 1939, following the Eighteenth Party Congress two young Stalinists, Zhdanov and Khrushchev, were elected as full members of the Politburo, while the new commissar of internal affairs, Lavrentii Beria, was made a candidate member. They were joined in Febru­ary 1941 by three other up-and-coming career administrators, Nikolai Voz- nesenskii, Georgii Malenkov and Aleksandr Shcherbakov, who also became candidate members. Each of these figures performed clearly designated roles. The thirty-nine-year-old Beria had been summoned from Georgia to work in Moscow in August 1938, when Stalin decided to appoint him, in place of Ezhov, as commissar of internal affairs. Stalin had already formed a favourable impression of Beria in the early 1930s. Nominating him as first secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee, Stalin, in a letter of 12 August 1932, had observed: 'Beria makes a good impression. He is a fine organiser, is business­like, and is an able worker.'[69] In 1937, a second member of the new cohort, Georgii Malenkov, was only thirty-five. By this time he had already served in a number of party posts including, as of 1934, as head ofthe department of leading party agencies at the Central Committee. Set up to assert control over regional leaders, the department assumed a critical role during the purges, affording Malenkov direct and regular access to Stalin. Following the Eighteenth Party Congress, at which Malenkov delivered one of the major speeches, he became a Central Committee secretary. In March 1941, a third member of this new cohort, the thirty-seven-year-old chair of Gosplan, Nikolai Voznesenskii, was chosen by Stalin as first deputy chair of Sovnarkom. Prior to his promotion to Moscow, Voznesenskii had worked in Leningrad under Zhdanov, and it is quite possible that Zhdanov had recommended Voznesenskii to Stalin. At the same time it is clear that Stalin rated Voznesenskii highly as a specialist and as a person who was fully committed to the Stalinist cause. In becom­ing first deputy prime minister, Voznesenskii had, like Beria and Malenkov, leapfrogged over a number of more senior and experienced Politburo members.

The second measure of Stalin's supremacy was the ease with which he manipulated decision-making structures to suit his own needs. The years 1937-8 had witnessed the end of the 'old' Politburo as a collective decision­making body. On 14 April 1937 two Politburo commissions were established for the consideration of high-level secret issues. These were then superseded by a smaller 'ruling group' of the Politburo, the so-called 'quintet' which, apart from Stalin, consisted of Molotov, Mikoyan, Voroshilov and Kaganovich. While this group convened regularly in Stalin's office, the formal Politburo, as a collective body with well-defined procedures, ceased to function. On 17 January 1941 Stalin explained the principles behind the new arrangement: 'We at the Central Committee have not convened a meeting of the Politburo for four to five months now. All questions are prepared directly by Zhdanov, Malenkov, and others at meetings with specialist colleagues and, far from losing out, the leadership system as a whole has actually improved.'[70]

A further indicator of Stalin's new status was his own appointment as chair of Sovnarkom in May 1941, a move which finally confirmed Stalin as absolute leader of the country (and not simply of the party) and as successor to Lenin (who had himself served as head of Sovnarkom). The appointment appears to have been carefully orchestrated by Stalin. Following a succession of attacks on the then head of Sovnarkom, Molotov, on 28 April 1941 Stalin sent members of the higher leadership a note: 'I thinkit is no longer possible to carry on "running things" like this. I suggest we raise the matter at the Politburo.'[71] On 4 May 1941 a Politburo resolution drew up a new pecking order. In addition to having been sacked as chair of Sovnarkom, Molotov, now a regular deputy chair, had been overtaken by Voznesenskii, who had been made first deputy chair in March. At the same time, in a break with existing party conventions, Zhdanov was officially designated as Stalin's 'deputy' in the party, with responsibility for directing the work of the party apparatus.[72]

With these reorganisations a new dictatorial order was consolidated. Stalin now held the two supreme offices of the party-state and had appointed as his first deputies not old colleagues, but new figures, Zhdanov and Voznesenskii. The dictator was in turn supported by an informally constituted 'ruling group' (now expanded from the original 'quintet' to include recently promoted fig­ures such as Voznesenskii, Zhdanov, Malenkov and Beria) which met at his discretion and drew up decisions, depending on Stalin's wishes, either in the name of the Politburo or of Sovnarkom.

At the first session of the new bureau of Sovnarkom on 9 May 1941, Stalin once again reminded his companions of their dependence on his good will. Molotov, who had presented a paper on bonuses for engineers and who, as we have seen, had been Stalin's most faithful follower, bore the brunt of Stalin's attack. Iakov Chadaev, who took the minutes of the meeting, recalls:

Stalin did not conceal his disapproval of Molotov. He very impatiently listened to Molotov's rather prolix responses to comments from members of the bureau ... It seemed as if Stalin was attacking Molotov as an adversary and that he was doing so from a position of strength . . . Molotov's breathing began to quicken, and at times he would let out a deep sigh. He fidgeted on his stool and murmured something to himself. By the end he could take it no longer:

'Easier said than done,' Molotov pronounced in a low but cutting voice. Stalin picked up [Molotov's] words.

'It has long been well known,' said Stalin, 'that the person who is afraid of criticism is a coward.'

Molotov winced, but kept quiet - the other members of the Politburo sat silently, burying their noses in the papers . . . At this meeting I was again convinced of the power and greatness of Stalin. Stalin's companions feared him like the devil. They would agree with him on practically anything.[73]

On the eve of war Stalin had become a fully fledged dictator. Without concerning himself with notions of 'collegiality', he settled some of the most important issues of the day single-handedly. Accordingly there is not even a perfunctory reference in the Politburo records to the most historic decisions of the day, such as the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939. At the same time, it would be wrong to think that, even at this stage, all the elements of 'oligarchic' leadership had vanished. Even at the height of dictatorship there continued to exist, albeit in a weakened and attenuated form, in-built forces pushing towards oligarchic or collegial rule. These found expression in the relative autonomy of Politburo leaders in dealing with everyday operational issues and in the emergence of powerful networks of patron-client relations tying Politburo leaders to circles of dependants beneath them. This tension between personal dictatorship and oligarchical rule would carry on into the war period and beyond.

War years

The months leading to the war revealed the downside of Stalin's obstinate nature and of the highly concentrated system of decision-making he had cre­ated. In addition to blocking much-needed reorganisations of the General Staff, Stalin dismissed a series of detailed intelligence reports on the German build-up for war as 'provocations'.[74] Stalin's state of denial reached a head on the first day of the German attack. 'I only saw Stalin confused once,' Zhukov later recalled, 'and that was at daybreak on 22 June 1941.'[75] For most of the first morning, Stalin still clung to the hope that this was an act of provocation instigated by the German generals without Hitler's knowledge or consent. Such hope evaporated, however, with the official declaration of war by the German ambassador, Schulenburg, later on in the morning. 'During that first day [Stalin] was unable to pull himself together and take hold of events,' recounted Zhukov.[76]

In the first months of the war Stalin committed a succession of blunders. By mid-October, as the Germans approached Moscow, the leader's confidence had reached a low ebb. In a break with precedent, Stalin let the commander of the Moscow front, Georgii Zhukov, have a free hand in organising the city's defence. Observers recall Zhukov treating Stalin brusquely and even rejecting his advice:

[Stalin's] eyes hadlost their old steadiness; his voice lacked assurance. But I was evenmore surprised by Zhukov's behaviour. He spoke in a sharp commanding tone. It looked as if Zhukov was really the superior officer here. And Stalin accepted this as proper. At times a kind of bafflement even crossed his face.[77]

The summer and autumn of 1941 saw Stalin weaker than possibly at any time since coming to power. Yet the vulnerability of the Soviet system in these months meant that the ruling circle now needed Stalin more than ever. On 30 June four leaders, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria and Voroshilov, gathered in Molotov's office and decided to create a State Defence Committee (GKO) to take overall command of the war effort. When the four visited Stalin at his dacha, to which he had retreated in despair two days earlier, following the fall of Minsk, it was to beseech him to head the new committee. Despite the leader's temporary fall from grace, this approach by Stalin's deputies was not at all surprising. After over a decade of ceaseless propaganda, the cult of Stalin had assumed significant proportions as a popular motivator. The aura around Stalin also served to integrate the country's decision-making bodies and to co­ordinate the higher ranks of leaders and decision makers. Among top officials,

Stalin's word carried more weight than did that of any general or ordinary Politburo member. When the high command (Stavka) was established on the second day of the war, and the commissar of defence, General Timoshenko, was appointed its head, none ofthe nine Politburo members who served on it 'showed any intention of taking orders from the commissar'.³¹ It was only later, on 19 July, when Stalin himself became commissar of defence, and then on 8 August, when he became supreme commander-in-chief of the Soviet armed forces, that the Stavka gained genuine authority.

Despite a profusion of new bodies, such as the GKO and the Stavka, there were important continuities with pre-war structures. While the GKO was given overall command of the war effort, and it was directly modelled on the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence from the civil war, it was a pre-eminently civilian body. With all its members from the Politburo, the GKO was, in key respects, the direct successor to the Politburo's 'ruling circle', whose membership and operating norms Stalin had shaped in the preceding years. Setting up the GKO gave formal cover for Stalin's civilian ruling circle to exercise unlimited powers as a 'war cabinet'. These included the authority to reorganise the armed forces, to take charge of military production, to undertake personnel changes, and to control the agencies of repression.

At the same time, the GKO epitomised the versatility of the Soviet sys­tem in adjusting to conditions of crisis. Under the GKO the mode of gov­ernance over subordinate bodies shifted with remarkable speed to an emer­gency regime.³² Under this system procedures were simplified in the extreme. 'Meetings of the GKO in the usual sense of the term - that is, with definite agendas, secretaries and protocols - did not take place. Procedures for reach­ing agreement with [other agencies] were reduced to a minimum,' recalled General Khrulev.³³ Given the overlap in membership between the GKO, the Politburo and Sovnarkom, it was not always apparent in what capacity a meeting had been convened, nor on whose authority a resolution had been passed.

In addition to heading the Politburo and Sovnarkom, Stalin chaired meet­ings of the GKO and the Stavka, acted as commissar of defence and, as of

31 N. G. Kuznetsov, cited in A. A. Pechenkin, 'Gosudarstvennyi komitet oborony v 1941 godu', Otechestvennaia istoriia 4-5 (1994): 134-5.

32 See SanfordR. Lieberman, 'Crisis Management in the USSR: Wartime System of Admin­istration and Control', in Susan Linz (ed.), The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanhead, 1985). The term 'emergency regime' comes from John Barber and Mark Harrison, The Soviet Home Front 1941 -1945: A Social and Economic History of the USSR in World War II (London: Longman, 1991), pp. 197-200.

33 A.VKhrulev.'StanovleniestrategicheskogotylavVelikoiOtechestvennoivoine',Voenno- istoricheskii zhurnal 6 (1961): 66; cited in Lieberman, 'Crisis Management', p. 61.

14 September 1942, led a new key GKO Transport Committee. The extraor­dinary burdens on Stalin left him with no choice but to completely let go of certain leadership functions on which he had earlier kept half an eye. The main beneficiaries of this process of delegation were Stalin's companions on the GKO, who were now given full and unqualified charge of whole sectors of the war effort. Thus members of the GKO were entrusted with the authority to convene meetings and to arrive at decisions of importance under their own steam, without reference to the overburdened leader.

The emergency regime, consisting ofplenipotentiaries, ad hoc committees and very high levels of autonomy for GKO members, was particularly well suited to the early phase of the war. Yet while well adapted to a situation of crisis, this system of decision-making was far from effective over the long term. In many areas, the conversion of the economy to munitions production was carried too far, as a result of which by 1942 it was the dwindling stocks of coal, oil, iron and steel, rather than limited munitions capacity, which had become the key factor constraining the Soviet war effort.[78] Greater co-ordination was required to rectify these imbalances. A big step in this direction was achieved on 8 December 1942 with the formation of a GKO Operations bureau, and with the reconstitution, also on that day, of the Sovnarkom bureau which took up responsibility for considering economic plans and the state budget, as well as for overseeing the work of economic commissariats not under the jurisdiction of the GKO bureau. As the war progressed, the authority and status of both

bureaux grew.[79]

It is significant that Stalin played no part on either bureau. As the war unfolded, the delegation of powers to GKO members and the emergence of a more balanced and co-ordinated system of economic decision-making was matched by a narrowing of Stalin's commitments, which focused increasingly on military issues and foreign affairs. Further, as Stalin's grasp of military mat­ters improved, the obstinacy he had displayed in the early stages of the war gave way to a certain pragmatism. From the spring of 1942 Stalin removed incom­petent cronies such as Voroshilov and Budennyi as well as political appointees such as Kulikand Mekhlis on whom he had relied earlier. In October 1942 Stalin also abolished political commissars - political appointees who shadowed mil­itary leaders at the front - and he became more willing to defer matters of strategic leadership to a group of senior military figures on the Stavka. Further, whereas in the first months of the war virtually every bungled operation had resulted in executions, Stalin was now willing to heed the advice of top military aides in sparing the lives of commanders in the field.[80]

The war had caught Stalin off guard and highlighted the flaws of the one­sided form of government he had fashioned in the preceding years. At the same time, the war also showed how mutually interdependent Stalin's leadership was with the social and administrative system which had formed in the 1930s. In the early days of the conflict, Stalin's deputies saw that they needed Stalin and the cult which surrounded him to boost morale and to co-ordinate the higher ranks of Soviet officialdom. For his part, in the guise of the State Defence Committee, Stalin was able to keep his ruling circle and informal modes of decision-making similar to those he had installed before the war. The one major difference was that, with the advent of an 'emergency regime', Stalin was compelled to hand over total responsibility for certain spheres to his deputies. Originally constituted on an informal basis, this delegation of powers was formalised with the establishment of the GKO and Sovnarkom bureaux in December 1942. It was this relatively decentralised system of wartime governance which lasted until the effective end of hostilities in May 1945.

Post-war dictatorship

During the war Stalin had delegated large swaths of authority to his deputies and set aside ideological differences with his coalition partners. Soon, however, a souring of relations with the West would bring a swift end to the relaxation of the war years. In a programmatic speech to voters of 9 February 1946, Stalin once again highlighted the need to strengthen the sinews of national power, most notably heavy industry. The laying out of long-term plan priorities was accompanied by a newly belligerent rhetoric in which Stalin sought, to quote one commentator, to transform the post-war period 'into a new prewar period' in which a 'postulated external danger [was] the primary fact of national life and the internal policies of the government [were] a compulsive response to it'.[81] This return to the ideological matrix of the pre-war years was matched by a much harsher and less accommodating approach to his Politburo companions. Here too, the leader clawed back the discretion he had ceded during the war and, in a series of attacks, resurrected the relations of strict subservience and control which had predominated in the late 1930s.

On 4 September 1945 the GKO was dissolved and a month later Stalin left Moscow for his first major break from the capital in almost a decade, leaving affairs of state in the hands of a 'quartet' consisting of Molotov, Malenkov, Beria and Mikoyan. While in Sochi the leader closely followed events in Moscow, receivingbetween twenty and thirty documents a day, andbecame increasingly dismayed by what he regarded as the 'independent' political line being pursued by Molotov in relations with the Western powers. Matters reached a head at the beginning of December, when Stalin launched a vicious assault on Molotov: 'None of us has the right to change the course of our policies unilaterally,' Stalin argued. 'But Molotov has accorded himself this right. Why, and on what grounds?' 'I can no longer regard this comrade as my first deputy,' Stalin concluded. Stalin sent the message to the other members of the quartet - but not to Molotov - and asked that they read it out to him. On 7 December the triumvirate reported: 'We summoned Molotov and read out your telegram in full. After some hesitation Molotov admitted that he had made many mistakes but he regarded the lack of trust in him as unjust, and shed some tears.' On the same day Molotov sent his own reply to Stalin. 'Your ciphered message is filled with deep distrust towards me, both as a Bolshevik and as a person, which I take as a most serious party warning for all my further work. I shall try through deeds to regain your trust, in which every honest Bolshevik sees not only personal trust, but also the trust of the party, which is dearer to me than my own life.'[82]

To resurrect the relations of strict subordination of the immediate pre-war years, Stalin visited attacks of similar severity on each member of his quartet.[83]Mikoyan's apology, which Stalin extracted from him in the autumn of 1946, would prove to be quite typical: 'Of course neither I nor others', Mikoyan conceded, 'can frame questions quite like you. I shall devote all my energy so that I may learn from you how to work correctly. I shall do all I can to draw the lessons from your stern criticism, so that it is turned to good use in my further work under your fatherly guidance.'[84]

At the same time, given their qualities either as revolutionary symbols or as hard-working administrators - it was for these reasons that they were in the ruling circle to begin with - Stalin was reluctant to dispense with the services of any member of the quartet altogether. Instead, he sought to curb the independence they had gained during the war and to bring about a return to the status quo ante of the first post-purge years.

The personal subjugation of Stalin's close circle was accompanied by a reorganisation of the country's top decision-making bodies. Within the Polit­buro itself, Stalin soon re-established the intrinsically fluid and patrimonial arrangements of the late 1930s. Convening the Politburo as an informally con­stituted 'ruling group' offered Stalin several advantages. Apart from arranging its meetings as and when he wished, Stalin could bypass the tedious pro­cedure for having members formally elected by the Central Committee. It was, for example, nearly five months before Voznesenskii's election as a full member of the Politburo, that Stalin dictated a Politburo resolution that the 'sextet [i.e. the ruling group] add to its roster the chair of Gosplan [the State Planning Commission], comrade Voznesenskii, so that it now be known as the septet'.[85] Often, admission to the ruling group was not accompanied by any formal resolutions as such. Without any official decision to go by, it is only indirectly that we may infer that Kaganovich was admitted to it on his return to Moscow from Kiev in December 1947, so that the 'septet' became an 'octet', and that Bulganin joined in February 1948, swelling the group into a 'novenary'.

As much as it suited Stalin to have relatively informal arrangements at the very highest levels, he and his colleagues did not lose sight of the need for effective administration lower down. Thus the relatively rule-less activity of a Politburo dominated by him went hand in hand with greater institution- alisation elsewhere, most notably at the Council of Ministers (Sovmin), the successor to Sovnarkom. Particularly important in this respect was a resolu­tion of 8 February 1947 'On the Organisation of the Council of Ministers', which laid out a clear division of labour between the Politburo and Sovmin in which the former, led by Stalin, was accorded the right to consider all matters of a 'political' nature, such as governmental appointments, issues relating to defence, foreign policy and internal security, while Sovmin, without Stalin, was expected to deal with all mainstream economic issues and matters of everyday governmental administration. The February resolution also marked the consolidation of a new supra-ministerial order at Sovmin, consisting of a hierarchy of sectoral committees attended by specialists which met at regular intervals and complied with clearly established procedures.[86]

In the post-war period Stalin thus operated through two committees: the Politburo, over which he almost always presided, and the main bureau of the Council of Ministers, which nearly always convened without him. The combination of Stalin's highly personalised leadership, as represented by the Politburo, and the technocratic features of Sovmin, allowed Stalin to marry personal-autocratic features of rule with modern committee-based decision- making.

The consolidation of two key features of the early post-war period - the tightening of Stalin's grip over his deputies and the establishment of a split system of leadership committees - was not an entirely smooth or continu­ous affair. One flashpoint which would disfigure the leadership system was a purge, orchestrated by Stalin, which would come to be known as the Leningrad Affair.[87] Its immediate trigger was a scandal surrounding a seemingly innocu­ous all-Russian wholesale fair held in Leningrad from 10 to 20 January 1949. When it emerged that proper authorisation for the fair had not been granted, the three leaders who had organised the fair, M. I. Rodionov, P. S. Popkov and the Central Committee secretary, A. A. Kuznetsov, all of whom had long-running ties to the city, were taken to task. To stave off allegations of his own links with this group, the Politburo member Voznesenskii, him­self from Leningrad, admitted to Stalin that the previous year Popkov had approached Voznesenskii with a request that the latter act as a 'patron' of Leningrad. This revelation was to have disastrous consequences, for the idea that any leader other than Stalin could exercise 'patronage' over a territory was entirely anathema to the dictator. On 15 February Kuznetsov, along with Popkov and Rodionov, were dismissed, and Vosnesenskii was given a stern warning.

One factor which may have fuelled the Leningrad Affair was the existence of two loose groupings within the leadership, one consisting of natives of the city associated with the deceased former Leningrad first secretary, Andrei Zhdanov, and the other headed by two thrusting young Politburo leaders, Malenkov and Beria.[88] There is little evidence, however, that any member of either group aimed to have their adversaries killed. Ever conscious of Stalin's volatile state of mind, both groups knew that a fresh round of bloodletting at the very highest levels could easily swerve out of control and claim other victims, not least themselves. The key role in taking this affair over the edge and turning it into a mini blood-purge would belong to Stalin.

Although Voznesenskii had earned a reprieve in February, his dismissal would follow shortly afterwards. As a member of the younger generation of Politburo leaders, Voznesenskii, who had seen no revolutionary service and whose symbolic worth was limited, had been promoted and retained by Stalin solely on the basis of his organisational talents and reliability. As the head of Gosplan, Vosnesenskii's main assignment was to provide the political lead­ership under Stalin with accurate information on the economy. When Stalin discovered, towards the end of February, that Voznesenskii had deliberately massaged economic statistics, his retribution was swift. On 5 March Vosnesen- skii was dismissed as chair of Gosplan and two days later he was forced out of the Politburo.

For some time, Stalin vacillated over what to do with Vosnesenskii. After several months the latter's fate was sealed when he was charged with losing secret documents. In a last-ditch attempt to earn Stalin's forgiveness Voznesen- skii pleaded in a letter: 'I appeal to the Central Committee and to you, comrade Stalin, and beg you to pardon me ... and to believe that you are dealing with a man who has learned his lesson .. .'[89] Waving aside this appeal, on 11 Septem­ber 1949 the Politburo confirmed a recommendation of the Commission of Party Control to have Voznesenskii expelled from the Central Committee and to hand him over for trial.⁴⁶ On 27 October 1949 Voznesenskii was arrested and joined Kuznetsov and the others, who had been detained earlier that sum­mer. Following a year of confinement and interrogations Voznesenskii and the other 'Leningraders' were convicted at a secret trial in September 1950 and executed on 1 October.

In selecting his victim and moment of retribution Stalin was often quite unpredictable, and, accordingly, he could turn virtually any untoward circum­stance into a pretext for punishment. We cannot be certain about what tipped the balance in this instance. It is clear, however, that a number of established Stalinist norms had been violated. The strict hierarchy of decision-making had been flouted and there appeared to be evidence that a Moscow-based network of senior leaders had exercised patronage over regional clients in Leningrad. For his part, Voznesenskii had violated his assignment, which involvedproviding accurate statistics to the Politburo. At the same time, despite the potential, frequently realised in the 1930s, for ever-expanding networks to be implicated in such a purge, the scope of the Leningrad Affair would prove to be surprisingly narrow.

Last years

After the drama of 1949, the next two years were a period of relative calm and moderation within the leadership, as the ageing dictator spent an increasing amount of time in the south. On this basis the higher leadership began to consolidate and to lay the foundations of collective rule. While Stalin was out of the capital, issues within the Politburo's brief were discussed at meet­ings of a Stalin-less ruling group, known as the 'septet', which operated as a collective decision-making body. At its sessions questions appear to have been properly debated and authentic fact-finding commissions were set up for supplementary investigation of contentious issues. Indeed, the septet's work methods when Stalin was away began to approximate the pattern of Politburo decision-making which had prevailed prior to the establishment of a full-blown dictatorship.

Arguably of greater significance were the regular meetings of the supreme governmental agency in this period, the Bureau ofthe Presidium ofthe Council of Ministers. At the time of its foundation on 7 April 1950 the bureau consisted of five members, Bulganin, Beria, Kaganovich, Mikoyan and Molotov, who were joined by a sixth member, Malenkov, in mid-April, and by a seventh, Nikita Khrushchev, who began attending its meetings on 2 September 1950. While the bureau consisted entirely of members of the Politburo's ruling group, unlike the Politburo it never met with Stalin, not even when Stalin was in Moscow. At the same time, the bureau convened very regularly, normally once a week. Thus the ruling group of the Politburo had regular opportunities to meet without Stalin and outside the very framework of the Politburo in order to discuss issues of national importance within a committee structure with a clear membership, well-defined procedures and set agendas. These meetings afforded an embryonic collective leadership the opportunity to meet regularly and to forge a set of mutual understandings.

There are indications that in his last year Stalin settled on what might be termed an anti-oligarchic strategy aimed at undercutting the relatively stable and independent system of collective leadership which had taken hold over the previous two years, especially at the Council of Ministers. Stalin's strategy consisted of three elements. First, in December 1951 Stalin finally called a party congress, which convened the following October. The congress afforded Stalin a convenient pretext for loosening the ties of senior Politburo members to the

Council of Ministers and for focusing attention instead on a new Central Committee Presidium Bureau, which would meet under him. The second prong of Stalin's anti-oligarchic strategy was an onslaught on two Politburo veterans, Molotov and Mikoyan, who were left out of the Central Committee Bureau. As on earlier occasions, for example in 1941 and 1945, Stalin reserved his most stinging attackfor Molotov. At the post-congress plenum, making explicit reference to the events of autumn 1945 described earlier, Stalin openly accused Molotov of cowardice, capitulationism and, critically, of personal betrayal. These accusations were all the more astounding for the fact that they ran against the widely heldperception of Molotov as Stalin's most devoted follower.

The third and boldest element of Stalin's anti-oligarchic strategy was the fabrication of a notional 'conspiracy' by a group of mostly Jewish doctors to murder members of the Soviet leadership. 'Jewish nationalists', Stalin told a session of the Presidium on 1 December 1952, 'believe that their nation has been saved by the United States (there they can become rich, bourgeois and so on). They believe they are obliged to the Americans. Among the doctors there are many Jewish nationalists.'[90] On 13 January 1953 the national daily, Pravda, published a TASS bulletin, originally dictated by Stalin, and a lead edi­torial, commissioned and heavily edited by him, on the activities of a group of 'doctor-wreckers' most of whom, it claimed, were the tools of an 'inter­national Jewish Zionist organisation'.[91] The publication ushered in a frenzied nationwide campaign with heavy anti-Semitic overtones and led to yet more arrests.

Concocting the Doctors' Plot served a dual purpose. First, it demonstrated Stalin's undiminished control of the secret police, a factor which continued to underpin his control of Politburo colleagues. The plot, secondly, was designed to prevent Stalin's fellow leaders from lapsing into a 'spirit of geopolitical com­placency'.[92] Paradoxically the USSR's achievements over the previous decade, which included its defeat of Nazi Germany, the acquisition of a ring of buffer states in Eastern Europe and the testing of the atom bomb in 1949, had pre­sented Stalin with a problem, namely the view, seemingly widely held by other members of the leadership, that the country's new-found strength and secu­rity could enable it to relax and to focus on domestic issues. The Doctors' Plot was, to quote Robert Tucker, 'Stalin's desperate attempt to dramatise the postulated persistence of the capitalist encirclement'.[93]

It was a measure of Stalin's unimpeachable authority that there were no open challenges to his rule over these last months. At the same time, Stalin was unable to take any of the thrusts of his anti-oligarchic strategy as far as he may have wished. Thus, for example, the organisation of the Central Committee Presidium Bureau, the equivalent of which Stalin had dominated for over twenty years, was made part of Khrushchev's brief, and, in a further break with tradition, it was resolved that, in Stalin's absence, the cabinet could be chaired by Malenkov, Khrushchev or Bulganin.[94] Stalin also appears to have dispensed with the services of his long-standing aide and the head of the special sector, Aleksandr Poskrebyshev, a month or so before his death.[95] The second prong of Stalin's strategy, the excommunication of Molotov and Mikoyan, also appears to have had limited success. Stalin's displeasure towards Mikoyan and Molotov had virtually no bearing on the attitudes of other top leaders towards the two, who were covertly told of leadership meetings and quickly reassumed their positions once Stalin died.[96] Third, despite the frenzied and bigoted atmosphere it created, the purge implications of the Doctors' Plot should not be overstated. Unlike the Great Terror in the 1930s, which had been supported in public by all top Politburo leaders, this campaign was waged by secondary functionaries, mostly from the Central Committee apparatus, and did not receive a public endorsement from any of Stalin's inner circle.[97]Equally, claims that the regime planned to hold public show trials, or to deport Jews to special camps in the east, much as other ethnic minorities had been 'cleansed' and relocated during the war, now appear to be misplaced.[98]

It appears that in Stalin's last months his poor health and declining energy had begun to take their toll. Certainly, whatever plans Stalin had in store for his colleagues and for the country's Jews were cut short by a sudden deterioration in his health. On 1 March 1953 Stalin, unusually, did not call on his staff. When, late that evening, the assistant warden of the dacha brought in the post, he found Stalin lying on the floor. On their arrival the following morning Stalin's physicians diagnosed a brain haemorrhage, and the next day they informed the ruling group that the leader had no hope of recovery. By 8.00 p.m. on 5 March, while Stalin was technically still alive (he died at 9.50 p.m.), the ruling group had convened a joint session of the Presidium and of the Central Committee.[99]Notwithstanding the turmoil of Stalin's last months, the leadership would rely on the collegial decision-making structures and mutual understandings forged in the proceding years, to see itself through the uncertainties of the early post-Stalin transition.

Conclusion

The entrenchment of Stalin's dictatorship was a multi-stage process in which oligarchic tendencies were persistently represented. By the end of the 1920s a fully-fledged Stalinist faction had been formed, yet there were still strong elements of collective rule. At this stage Stalin still had to accommodate the cut and thrust of high-level bureaucratic politics and to win colleagues onto his side. Any semblance of resistance was only crushed with the purges of the late 1930s which left the Politburo and Central Committee, newly infused with a young cohort of Stalin appointees, as institutionally malleable bodies subject to the dictator's whims. For Stalin the leadership system of the late 1930s represented the high-water mark of dictatorship, an ideal to which the leader would strive to return in later years.

At the height of his powers, in March 1939 Stalin declared to the Eighteenth Party Congress that 'there is no doubt that we will not use again the method of the mass purge'. Although we are unlikely ever to know whether Stalin seriously intended to keep his pledge, there are indications from the post­war years that Stalin recognised the benefits of relative equilibrium within the political system. Despite the devastating personal consequences for those involved, the Leningrad Affair of 1949 was the only occasion after the 1930s in which high-ranking politicians lost their lives, and the purges of the personal networks which accompanied it were relatively confined in scope. Equally, when, in the early 1950s, oligarchic tendencies began to set in and to constrain Stalin's leadership, as they had in the early 1930s, the anti-oligarchic strategy pursued by Stalin was far less bloody or robust than it had been when Stalin had broken the back of the 1930s collective leadership, fifteen years before.

The latter phase of Stalin's life has sometimes been depicted as a time of Stalin's mental decline and of the system's institutional disarray.[100] In fact from the second phase ofthe war on, we find evidence ofinstitutional consolidation. As for Stalin himself, we see a rationalisation of his own commitments, as the leader shed a variety of secondary duties and focused on a narrow range of core activities. As Stalin grew older and his powers waned, he was forced to relinquish even more of these. It is in the Doctors' Plot that we find, distilled to their essence, the two irreducible functions that Stalin could never let go of. In this final, desperate, lunge he turned to repression and ideology in order to counter oligarchical forces which, despite his own supreme dictatorial powers, would never quite go away.

The Khrushchev period, 1953-1964

WILLIAM TAUBMAN

The Twentieth Congress ofthe Soviet Communist Party convened on 14 Febru­ary 1956 in the Great Kremlin Palace. On 25 February, the day the congress was slated to end, Soviet delegates attended an unscheduled secret session at which their leader, Nikita Khrushchev, talked for nearly four hours with one intermission. His speech was a devastating attack on Joseph Stalin. Stalin was guilty of 'a grave abuse of power'. During his reign 'mass arrests and deportation of thousands and thousands of people, and execution without trial or normal investigation, created insecurity, fear, and even desperation'. Stalinist charges of counter-revolutionary crimes had been 'absurd, wild and contrary to common sense'. Innocent people had confessed to such crimes 'because of physical methods of pressure, torture, reducing them to uncon­sciousness, depriving them of judgement, taking away their human dignity'. Stalin himself had been personally responsible for all this: he 'personally called in the interrogator, gave him instructions, and told him which methods to use, methods that were simple - to beat, beat and once again, beat'. 'Honest and innocent Communists' had been tortured and killed. Khrushchev assailed Stalin for incompetent wartime leadership, for 'monstrous' deportations of whole Caucasian peoples, for a 'mania of greatness', and 'nauseatingly false' adulation and self-adulation.¹