Tapping Hitler's Generals

a

English: Tapping Hitler’s Generals: Transcripts of Secret Conversations, 1942–1945, London 2007; Spanish: Los Generales de Hitler, Barcelona 2008; Czech: Odposlechy. Nemecti generàlové v britském vàlecnèm zajeti v letech 1942–1945, Prague 2009; Slovakian: Opocúvani. Nemecki vysoki dostojnici v britskom väzeni (1942–1945), Bratislava 2009; Polish: Podsluchiwani. Niemieccy generalowie w brytyjskiej niewoli 1942–1945, Zakrzewo 2009.

b

Seidl, ‘Führerpersönlichkeiten’.

c

Guerrazzi, ‘Noi non sappaiamo odirare’; Neitzel and Welzer, ‘Soldaten: Protokolle vom Kämpfe’; Welzer, Neitzel and Gudehus (eds), ‘Der Führer war wieder viel zu human’; Römer, ‘Kameraden’; Gross, ‘Gefangen im Krieg Frontsoldaten der Wehrmacht und ihre Weltsicht’; Seidl, ‘Führerpersönlichkeiten’; Müllers, ‘Elite des Führers’.

d

Bell, ‘British Human Intelligence in the Second World War’. Helen Fry’s book, ‘M-Room’ sheds light on a few new details about the process of the tapping programme. This work, however, does not meet scholarly standards. The evaluation of the knowledge gained from the tapping programme is just as naive as the analysis of selected transcripts.

‡

Neitzel and Welzer, ‘Soldaten: On Fighting, Killing and Dying. The Secret WWII Transcripts of German POWS’.

e

Kühne, ‘Belonging and Genocide’.

1

Of the numerous publications of this kind, one could mention for example: Siewert, ‘Schuldig?’.

2

Searle, ‘Wehrmacht Generals’, p. 282.

3

Amongst them were more than 300 generals. For the full context see Wegner, ‘Erschriebene Siege’.

4

See additionally Eckert, ‘Kampf um die Akten’.

5

One is accordingly obliged to work with circumstantial evidence, which may be controversial, e.g. see recently Hürter, ‘Militäropposition’, and the riposte, Ringshausen, ‘Paraphen’.

6

The Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv at Freiburg has few legacies from former Wehrmacht generals providing detailed information about the war period, although the quantity of material is greater than that of the other two services. The diaries of Franz Halder were an early central source of Army history. Other important collections remain in private hands, e.g. letters and diaries of Generalfeldmarschall von Manstein.

7

See e.g. Hartmann, ‘Halder’, Clasen, ‘Reinhardt’. Johannes Hürter discusses this problem in his collective biographical study ‘Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber an der Ostfront 1941/42’. His book ‘Gotthard Heinrici’ provided a very revealing insight into Heinrici.

8

Author’s interview with former naval surgeon at Ijmuiden, Stabsarzt Dr Hans Lauterbach, November 1994. The difficulty here is that Dönitz left no private notes about his wartime service. For further aspects of the problem see also Ruschenbusch, ‘Dönitz’, Kraus, ‘Dönitz’.

9

Rafael Zagovec, in ‘Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg’, Vol. 9/2, pp. 289–381, deals comprehensively with the Western Allies’ interrogations of German prisoners. From this he shows that information about the morale of German soldiers was gained but makes no mention that the British were eavesdropping on their prisoners over a long period.

10

Gannon, ‘Black May’, pp. 334–83, provides a selection of eavesdropped protocols from the period March to August 1943. Blair, ‘Der U-Boot Krieg’, Vol. 2, p. 949, produces protocols from American camp sources.

11

Among the few to use this source are Schmidt, ‘Rudolf Hess’, p. 328: protocol SRGG 1236, 20.5.1945, TNA WO 208/4170 (Karl Bodenschatz on Hitler’s reaction to Hess’s defection) and Hoffmann, ‘Staatsstreich’, p. 913: protocol SRGG 1219, 15.5.1945, TNA WO 208/4170 (Karl Bodenschatz speaking to an RAF officer about the 20 July plot), both recorded at Latimer House (Luftwaffe overspill unit). Also Toliver/Constable, ‘Galland’, pp. 307–11; Irving, ‘Tragödie der deutschen Laftwaffe’, p. 373f. Irving posted Document 135 on an internet site and refers in his biography of Hitler, ‘Führer und Reichskanzler’, to protocol SRGG 1133 (TNA WO 208/4169) of which he gives a summary. Graf Rothkirch has never described killing Jews himself.

12

Neitzel, ‘Deutsche Generäle’.

13

Files TNA WO 208/4138 and 4139 contain the transcripts of prisoners captured at Normandy, an especially fruitful source of information for historians.

14

Schmundt’s activity report, 24/25 June 1943, p. 75.

15

Unless otherwise stated, all are to be found in TNA WO 208/3433, 3504. Duplicates are filed as SRGG reports in WO 208/4363.

16

Overy, ‘Verhöre’.

17

For USA see Blair, ‘Der U-Boot-Krieg’, Vol. 2, p. 949; for Germany see ‘Report on Special Installation at Dulag North and Dulag Luft’, TNA WO 208/3554. The only known German document is a general report mentioning eavesdropping installations (‘Abwehrstelle im Wehrkreis VI’, B No. 445/43 g II Kgf, v. 29.7.1943 in BA/MA RH 49/112), but additionally see, ‘Dulag Nord Abwehrstelle. b. MOK Nordsee’, B. NR.G1123/44 ET 7.6.1944 re technical interrogation of crew members of Canadian destroyer Athabaskan, sunk 29.4.1944: BA/MA RM 7/1261. German generals were at least occasionally eavesdropped on by the Soviets; see Leonid Reschin, ‘Feldmarschall im Kreuzverhör’.

18

‘Hitler’s Uranium Club’, see D. Hoffmann, ‘Operation Epsilon’.

19

CSDIC (UK) was subordinate to the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, the Inter-Service Topographical Unit (RN) and the Central Interpretation Unit (RAF, air reconnaissance). The comprehensive weekly Intelligence Summaries are at TNA AIR 22 and TNA ADM 223. For the value of prisoners of war for the overall intelligence picture, e.g. in the Battle of Britain, see K. Jones, ‘From the Horse’s Mouth’, where brief mention is made of the practice of eavesdropping on Luftwaffe crews. See also Fedeorowich, Axis Prisoners of War.

20

In their PoW camps the British used a total of 49 secret informers who reported on 1,506 prisoners. See Hinsley, ‘British Intelligence’, Vol. 1, p. 282f. Cf. CSDIC (UK), p. 6, TNA WO 208/4970.

21

Between 15.7.1942 and the opening of Beaconsfield on 13.12.1942, the interrogation and recording of Italian prisoners was undertaken at Newmarket using a mobile unit near the Italian PoW camp.

22

The usual stay in standard interrogation centres was a few days to several weeks. As soon as it was thought there was nothing more to be gained from him, a prisoner would be shipped out, before 1944, to either Canada or the Near East. Numbers to the end of 1943 were between 300 and 1,850 men, after Normandy this increased rapidly to 144,450 by the end of that year. Wolff, ‘Die deutschen, Kriegsgefangenen in britischer Hand’, p. 20f.

23

Kapitänleutnant Hans-Dietrich Freiherr von Tiesenhausen (22.2.1913–17.8.2000) was taken prisoner on 17.11.1942 when his U-boat was sunk. He arrived at Trent Park on 20.1.1943.

24

The following prisoners were with Crüwell at Trent Park for at least a few weeks from August 1942: Lt Schumann (Army), captured North Africa, 27.5.1942; Oberleutnant Faber, Fw190 pilot shot down 23.6.1942; Oberleutnant Guntram von Waldeck alias Krause, allegedly an Fw190 pilot claiming to have been shot down 2.9.1942, probably an informer; from 31.10.1942 Oberleutnant zur See Römer, commander U-353, sunk North Atlantic, 16.10.1942. The first German general captured by the British, Generalleutnant Johann von Ravenstein, was never at Trent Park.

25

A list of Trent Park prisoners exists only for the period from spring 1945 onwards.

26

No complete list of the prisoners held at Trent Park is available; the names of generals have been adduced from various sources.

27

Certain prisoners of 12.SS-Panzerdivision Hitler Jugend, believed to be implicated in the murder of Canadian prisoners in Normandy in June 1944, were interrogated and recorded at London District Cage. Some of these reports are at TNA WO 208/4295. See also Neitzel, ‘Des Forschens noch wert?’.

28

Sullivan, ‘Auf der Schwelle zum Frieden’.

29

‘Future Policy Regarding Interrogation Centres, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee’, Meeting, Tuesday 28 August 1945: TNA WO 208/3451.

30

A large number of generals arrived later at Island Farm Special Camp 11 at Bridgehead, South Wales opened on 6.1.1946. See website at www.islandfarm.fsnet.co.uk.

31

For German generals in American captivity see Krammer, ‘American Treatment of German Generals’.

32

Until 1945 the number of personnel at the three centres remained constant. In March 1945 CSDIC (UK) employed 967 staff, 218 of these being engaged on intelligence work, 192 were guards and 28 worked on technical maintenance, War Establishment Committee Investigating Section, CSDIC (UK) 19.3.1945 TNA WO 208/3451.

33

At TNA WO 208/4136–40 there are protocols for 3,838 Kriegsmarine prisoners overheard (SRN 1–4857), 3,609 Luftwaffe prisoners (SRA 1–5836), 2,748 Army and Waffen-SS prisoners (SRM 1–1264) and 2,076 prisoners of several branches together (SRX 1–2141).

34

TNA WO 208/4165–70.

35

TNA WO 208/4363–66, 77, 78.

36

TNA WO 208/4136.

37

TNA WO 208/4161–63.

38

GRGG 243, TNA WO 208/4363 is recommended as an index for all SRGG and GRGG papers to 31.12.1944. ‘The Generals – Views of German Senior Officer PoWs’, TNA WO 208/5550 is a 12-page synopsis of the 1943 conversations.

39

The identity of this person is not known. In the protocols under identity code A713, the informer is an Oberleutnant Krause, alias von Waldeck, allegedly ‘shot down in his Fw190 on 2.9.1942’. In June 1943 prisoner A713 was now a Hauptmann ‘shot down in his Ju88 on 1.6.1943’. These men were the same person. See SRX 1140, 8.10.1942, WO 208/4161 and SRX 1799, 23.6.1943, TNA WO 208/4163.

40

The true identity of ‘Lord Aberfeldy’ is unknown. He is not listed in ‘Burke’s Peerage’. Theodor Graf von Sponeck stated that before the war the British officer lived in Düsseldorf and lost a leg at Dunkirk. Sponeck, ‘Meine Erinnerungen’, p. 143.

41

CSDIC (UK), S.8, TNA WO 208/4136.

42

At the beginning of 1943, CSDIC (UK) employed 101 foreign nationals. TNA WO 208/3451.

43

SRM 70 to SRM 96, TNA WO 208/4136.

44

CSDIC (UK) especially Appendix E, ‘M-Room’, TNA WO 208/4970.

45

Menny, BA/MA N267/4.

46

In World War I, he was private secretary to Field-Marshall Douglas Haig; he later became an MP and served 1924–37 as Under-Secretary of State for Aviation in the Ministry of Transport. See Stansky, ‘Sassoon’.

47

From 1947 Trent Park was an Arts Training College under the Ministry of Education. After 1974 it formed part of the Middlesex Polytechnic, since 1992 a university.

48

Menny, BA/MA N267/4.

49

For a forthright description of Trent Park see Ramcke, ‘Fallschirmjäger’, pp. 79–82 and Heydte, ‘Muss ich sterben, will ich fallen’, p. 185. Erwin Menny remarked in his diaries that anything that could still be bought in England was incredibly expensive. This was because the British converted Wehrsold at a ludicrous rate of 1 pound sterling to 20 Reichsmark. BA/MA N267/4.

50

Menny, BA/MA N267/4.

51

Ibid., and Crüwell Diary, Vol. 2, p. 3.

52

Between November 1942 and January 1943, von Thoma read Clausewitz, ‘Vom Kriege’; Goethe, ‘Briefe’; Tirpitz, ‘Erinnerungen’; Langhoff, ‘Moorsoldaten’; Bismarck, ‘Gedanken und Erinnerungen’; Friedjung, ‘Zeitalter des Imperialismus’. Diary entries, 20.11 and 27.12.1942, 1.1, 11.1. and 17.1.1943. BA/MA N2/3.

53

For example, ‘Desert Victory’ on 9.4.1943 which von Thoma considered well done and in no way offensive to the Germans. Crüwell thought the Germans would have made a better production of it, SRM 194, 9.4.1943, TNA WO 208/4136. At the end of November 1943 ‘The Gentle Sex’ and a propaganda report about the ‘National Kommittee Freies Deutschland’ was screened. GRGG 90, 3.–9.10.1943. This was followed in the week beginning 6.2.1944 by ‘A Christmas Carol’ and ‘God Save the King’, GRGG 118, TNA WO 208/4363.

54

This applied very much to the camps in France, Belgium and to some extent Germany whence the generals were brought from the United States and Britain after 1945, although the situation deteriorated noticeably in British camps too. Thus von Thoma’s bitter complaint in November 1945 about the conditions at Grizedale Hall in Lancashire. Searle, ‘Wehrmacht Generals’, p. 298.

55

The attacks evoked astonishingly little reaction from the prisoners, as CSDIC (UK) remarked in GRGG 123, 20.–26.2.1944, TNA WO 208/4363.

56

Ferdinand Heim, ‘Seine Kalkulation’, BA/MA MSg 1/3149 p. 71.

57

See Crüwell’s statement, Document 8, 16.5.1943.

58

Ferdinand Heim, ‘Seine Kalkulation’, BA/MA MSg 1/3149.

59

Telegram 27.1.1941 No. 245 RLM Attaché Group, PAAA, R41141 (according to Rüdiger Overmans).

60

OKW A Ausl/Abw-Abt. 4091/41g, 11.6.1941, BA/MA, RM 7/3137.

61

See e.g. SRN 4677, March 1945, TNA WO 208/4157. For the various warnings not to betray information in captivity see for example ‘Extract from SR Draft No 2142’, TNA WO 208/4200.

62

See for example, SRN 185, 22.3.1941, TNA WO 208/ 4141; SRN 418, 19.6.1941; SRN 462, 28.6.1941, both TNA WO 208/4142; SRN 741, 10.1.1942 TNA WO 208/4143.

63

See for example SRM 741, 4.8.1944, TNA WO 208/4138.

64

‘Extract from Draft No. 2148’, 5.3.1944, TNA WO 208/4200.

65

Crüwell noted in his diary on 15.10.1942 (Vol. 2, p. 4) that he had had two days out with Colonel Richardson of the War Office, one to Hampton Court and the other to Windsor and Eton.

66

‘Notes on the Extraction of Information from PoWs’, MI19, 24.6.1943 TNA WO 208/3438. In mid-June Churchill forbade the ‘nonsense’ of ‘enemy generals being taken on sightseeing tours’. These were then severely restricted without his prior permission. This led to a fall-off in new information, and after CSDIC (UK) complained in March 1944, the ban was relaxed. See reports 11.6.1943, 15.6.1943 and 2.3.1944 in TNA PREM3/363/3.

67

GRGG 72, 14–20.8.1943, TNA WO 208/4363.

68

‘Extract from SR Draft 5915’ (GG), 16.8.1943, TNA WO 208/3473.

69

‘Extract from SR Draft 5917’ (GG), 15.8.1943, TNA WO 208/3473.

70

‘Extract from SR Draft 5914’ (GG), 16.8.1943, TNA WO 208/3473.

71

See Crüwell Diary, Vol. 1, 6.6.1942, p. 22; 13.6.1942, p. 72; 27.6.1942, p. 136; Vol. 2, 15.10.1942, p. 7f. A detailed conversation with Admiral Meixner about the strategic situation is documented at: SRGG 896, 26.4.1944, TNA WO 208/4168.

72

Per Hinsley, ‘British Intelligence’, Vol. III, I, p. 326f. There is no transcript of a ‘V-2 conversation’ in the SRM batch containing the spring 1943 discussion between the two officers. In the summary of 1943 conversations there is mention of ‘secret rockets’. It was probably here that Thoma made his prophecy. ‘The Generals – Views of German Senior Officer PoWs’, TNA WO 208/5550.

73

Another exception was a comprehensive discourse by Oberstleutnant von der Heydte regarding his parachute drop during the Ardennes campaign, probably the best detailed description of the operation in existence. To some extent the talk by Oberstleutnant Kogler, Wing Commander JG6, respecting the development of the air war in 1943/44, may have been useful to the Allies. Kogler was shot down during Operation ‘Bodenplatte’ on 1.1.1945. See SRGG 1131 (Heydte), 26.2.1945, also SRGG 1140 (Kogler), 15.3.1945, TNA WO 208/4169.

74

For all details see Hinsley, ‘British Intelligence in the Second World War’ (5 vols).

75

So far as can be determined, there were only ever three Austrians at Trent Park: Konter-Admiral Paul Meixner, Oberstleutnant Johann Kogler and Oberstleutnant Wilfried von Mueller-Rienzburg.

76

Kroener, ‘Strukturelle Veränderungen’. For the whole context see also Stumpf, ‘Wehrmacht-Elite’.

77

Only two generals who served within the Reich or occupied territories received a high decoration: Generalmajor Wahle the rarely awarded Knight’s Cross of the War Service Cross with Swords, and Generalmajor Krug the German Cross in Silver.

78

The first long conversation, lasting into the early hours of 21.11.1942, was harmonious except for a difference of opinion on Thoma’s attitude to National Socialism. SRM 99, 20.11.1942 and SRM 127, 26.11.1942, TNA WO 208/4136.

79

Thoma’s attitude was already clear from a conversation he had with Air Vice-Marshall Conrad Collier during the flight from Cairo to Gibraltar. TNA PREM 3/363/3, SRM 179, 20.11.1942, TNA WO 208/4136.

80

A typical outburst of rage by Thoma is documented in SRX 1610, 28.2.1943, TNA WO 208/4162.

81

SRM 136, 29.11.1942, TNA WO 208/4136.

82

SRM 82, 20.11.1942, similar statements in SRM 102, 21.11.1942; SRX 1422, 26.12.1942; GRGG 179, 24.8.1944, all TNA WO 208/4364 and SRX 1610, 28.2.1943, TNA WO 208/4162.

83

SRM 80, 20.11.1942, TNA WO 208/4136.

84

SRM 136, 29.11.1942, TNA WO 208/4136.

85

He stated this previously in conversation with Thoma, see SRM 98, 21.11.1942, TNA WO 208/4136.

86

SRM 118, 24.11.1942, TNA WO 208/4136.

87

SRM 82, 20.11.1942, TNA WO 208/4136.

88

SRM 79, 20.11.1942, TNA WO 208/4136.

89

Confirmed by Generaloberst von Arnim in respect of both Thoma and General Hans Cramer, from April 1942 to January 1943 Chief of Staff and Commander (General der Schnellen Truppen). See SRGG 191, 4.7.1943, TNA WO 208/4165.

90

Hitler and Thoma served with different Bavarian infantry regiments (Reserve-Reg. No. 16 and No. 3 respectively) and are unlikely to have met during WWI. After his return from American captivity on 27.10.1919, Thoma served with Reichswehr units at Munich where he would have been in close proximity to Hitler and a meeting may have occurred. SRM 78, 20.11.1942, TNA WO 208/4136.

91

For his assertion that a general must lead from the front see SRX 1572, 7.2.1943, TNA WO 208/4162. A rough description of his capture appears in SRM 108, 23.11.1942, TNA WO 208/4136.

92

Liddell Hart, ‘Deutsche Generale’, p. 79. Liddell Hart met Thoma at the end of 1945 when the expansion of the German panzer arm was discussed.

93

Förster, ‘Dynamics of Volksgemeinschaft’, p. 204f.

94

BA/MA RH 27/20–97 Materna had this information from Rudolf Ruoff, C-in-C 2.Pz.Armee, who had attended one of Hitler’s conferencesd on foreign affairs. To his reply, Materna allegedly responded, ‘Yes, but no politics here.’ SRX 1648, 11.3.1943. In his diary at the beginning of 1944, with regard to the foregoing, he wrote, ‘I was appalled at such ignorance’, BA/MA N2/3.

95

Spoeck, ‘Erinnerungen’, p. 64.

96

Thoma diaries his capture fully: 4.11.1942, BA/MA N2/3.

97

See diary entry, 31.12.1943.

98

SRX 1572, 7.2.1943, TNA WO 208/4162 and SRM 104, 22.11.1942, TNA WO 208/4163. In October 1940 Thoma had been on a fact-finding mission to Libya and provided Hitler with a totally negative impression of the Italian leadership and forces. ‘Das Deutsche Reich unde der Zweite Weltkrieg’, Vol. 3. pp. 202, 206.

99

No documents of this kind have been found in the files of the General der Schnelltruppen, 17.Pz.Div. (which Thoma commanded from 19.7.1941) nor the OKW.

100

Thoma made only two diary entries about the Russian campaign: on 20.1.1942 he described the cold and the breakdown of order in the front line, and next day the cold and despair in the line, ‘I have never known a similar situation in my 12 years’ experience of warfare’, Thoma Diary, BA/MA N2/2.

101

Thoma Diary, 23.10.1943, BA/MA N2/3.

102

His 1.1.1943 entry compared the situation for Germany as being similar to that of 1917, and references to the greater economic potential of the Allies occur everywhere. Thoma Diary, BA/MA N2/3.

103

Thoma Diary, BA/MA N2/3.

104

Typical of his attitude was his spontaneous reaction to a ‘Daily Telegraph’ report on 5 November 1942 on the retreat from El Alamein, ‘It makes you sick, but actually I had expected it.’ He comforted himself with Goebbels’s assurance that the war would be decided in Europe: SRX 1212, 5.11.1942, TNA WO 208/4161. For Crüwell’s hopes that despite everything the war could be won by the determination of the central leadership see SRX 1218, 31.10.1942, TNA WO 208/4161; for his reflections on the war situation see SRX 1149, 9.10.1942, TNA WO 208/4161; SRX 1535, 26.1.1943, TNA WO 208/4162; SRGG 342, 12.8.1943, TNA WO 208/4166. He remained unwavering at Trent Park. On 8.4.1944 he provided Admiral Meixner with a written comparison of the respective situations in 1917 and 1944 from which it is clear that he underestimated the Allies’ resources, and overestimated those of the Axis. In view of German coastal fortification work he considered an invasion unlikely and doubted that a Russian summer offensive could succeed. ‘The thing does not look hopeless’, he concluded. SRGG 892, 8.4.1944, TNA WO 208/4168, see also SRGG 819, 4.2.1944, TNA WO 208/4168.

105

SRM 79, 20.11.1942, TNA WO 208/4136.

106

For note about General von Schleicher see Crüwell Papers.

107

SRX 1185, 24.10.1942, TNA WO 208/4161 and SRM 79, 20.11.1942, TNA WO 208/4136.

108

See SRM 82, 20.11.1942, TNA WO 208/4136.

109

Crüwell Diary, Vol. 1, 2.7.1942, p. 173f.

110

Ibid., Vol. 2, 10.7.1943, p. 92.

111

Ibid., Vol. 2, 26.7.1943, p. 103.

112

Ibid., Vol. 1, 26.8.1943, p. 117.

113

Ibid., Vol. 2, 7.5.1944, p. 13.

124

Ibid., Vol. 2, 1.6.1945, p. 133f.

115

Ibid., Vol. 2, 30.11.1944, p. 55.

116

See SRX 1149, 9.10.1942; SRX 1155, 11.10.1942, TNA WO 208/4161.

117

Note on Hitler, Crüwell Papers.

118

SRX 1215, 29.10.1942, TNA WO 208/4161.

119

Crüwell Diary, Vol. 4, 3.9.1945, p. 175f.

120

SRX 1408, 23.12.1942, TNA WO 208/4162.

121

GRGG 42, 15.7.1943, TNA WO 208/4363.

122

SRM 160, 4.2.1943, TNA WO 208/4165.

123

In his memoirs, von Arnim pointed to the overwhelming supply of materials to the Allied side, and the ‘drying up’ of supplies to the Axis forces, the latter being left finally without air cover. ‘It was like being a fireman fighting a dangerous blaze and having someone shut off the water behind your back.’ BA/MA N61/4, p. 8.

124

For Frantz’s position in the dispute between Thoma and Crüwell see SRGG 161, 27.6.1943, TNA WO 208/4165.

125

On 27 June 1943 Admiral Meixner assured Crüwell of his support, SRGG 163, TNA WO 208/4165, but came down heavily against corruption in the Party, and a few weeks later considered the war lost. Crüwell thought of Meixner as ‘an especially nice person in whose company he liked to be’, Crüwell Diary, Vol. 3, 1.1.1944, p. 55.

126

For the formation of cliques and the first discussions see GRGG 57, 15.7.1943, TNA WO 208/4363, also letter dated 3.7.1993 from Dr Klaus Hubbuch to General Beckmann. Hubbuch correspondence files.

127

GRGG 113, 9–15.1.1944, TNA WO 208/4363.

128

Compare with the optimistic assessment of Boes in SRGG 428, 21.9.1943, TNA WO 208/4166.

129

In particular Kraus and Schnarrenberger (Thoma clique) and Egersdorf (Crüwell) distanced themselves from this dispute. GRGG 57, TNA WO 208/4363.

130

See Sponeck, ‘Meine Erinnerungen’, p. 143.

131

SRGG 191, 4.7.1943, TNA WO 208/4165.

132

For von Arnim’s discourse see SRGG 204, 9.7.1943, TNA WO 208/4165.

133

See e.g. SRGG 34, 11.7.1943, TNA WO 208/4363.

134

GRGG 58, TNA WO 208/4363. In summer 1943, the prisoners were supplied with the following political books: Spengler, ‘Untergang des Abendlandes’; Spengerl, ‘Preussentum und Sozialismus’; Heiden, ‘Europas Schicksal’; Langhoff, ‘Moorsoldaten’; Lochner, What about Germany?’. See GRGG 61, TNA WO 208/4363.

135

Ibid.

136

See GRGG 67, 70, 74, 78, 85, 19–25.9.1943, TNA WO 208/4363. The normal radio programme at Trent Park was as follows: 1000 BBC German news repeated at 1205, 1705 and 2200; 1400 news from Germany; 2140, 2240 and 2330, Calais-Sender (British propaganda broadcast from Bletchley Park); 2300 music from Calais-Sender; 0030 BBC German news in full. GRGG 169, 2–4.8.1944, TNA WO 208/4363.

137

Extract from SR Draft No. 5908 (GG), TNA WO 208/3473.

138

Extract from SR Draft No. 5914 (GG), TNA WO 208/3473.

139

GRGG 106, 5.12.1943, TNA WO 208/4363. The same behaviour continued at Clinton camp in the USA. After one of his ‘stupid’ speeches on 31.1.1945, when he said that it was only thanks to the Party (i.e. Hitler) that Germany had not yet lost the war, von Arnim was gradually cold-shouldered by most generals. Sponeck, ‘Meine Erinnerungen’, p. 146.

140

GRGG 115, 23–29.1.1944, TNA WO 208/4363.

141

GRGG 90, 3–9.10.43, TNA WO 208/4363.

142

See GRGG 89, 4.10.1943, TNA WO 208/4363.

143

See GRGG 89, 4.10.1943, TNA WO 208/4363. Here he gave Lord Aberfeldy to understand that the Nazi regime had to disappear. Since 1933 they had done much good, but now had gone too far. ‘Then he was asked how, in his opinion, Hitler and his gang should be got rid of, to which he replied, “By killing them”.’ Further proof of his attitude was a letter of 11.1.1944 to OKW chief Keitel refuting a ‘Daily Express’ report that Rudolf Hess had visited Trent Park. He finished the correspondence ‘Filled with the deepest confidence in our leadership… God bless the Führer in his onerous mission!’ BA/MA Pers 6/18. The failure to sign off with ‘Heil Hitler!’ would be seen as ambiguous.

144

See for example SRGG 661, 15.12.1943 and GRGG 107, 19–20.12.1943, TNA WO 208/4363.

145

See SRGG 654, 14.12.1943, TNA WO 208/4167. In his diary Thoma always wrote praising the military successes of the German soldier always adding the rider that they could not change the outcome of the war. See 17.2.1944, 9.4.1944, 8.8.1944. That he was pleased to hear of German defeats is not conveyed by the protocols.

146

Thoma to Lord Aberfeldy, beginning August 1943. GRGG 70, TNA WO 208/4363.

147

On 23.10.1943 Thoma remarked that although one had access to everything in newspapers and radio, there were always those who remained ‘unshakeable optimists due to their fears or stupidity. A survey of the military, and above all economic situation, is impossible for them. They keep hoping – and they call it a sober assessment of the situation – as if there actually were any hope!’ Thoma Diary, BA/MA N2/3.

148

GRGG 109, 19–25.12.1943, TNA WO 208/4363. Not all inmates were happy with the Christmas sermon delivered by a Swedish priest. Hubbuch wrote indignantly in his diary, ‘We should look inside ourselves and acknowledge our guilt! What does he mean by that? We withdrew and our enemies devised the war guilt lie in the First World War.’ Hubbuch Diary, 24.12.1943.

149

GRGG 129, 10–16.4.1944 and GRGG 130, 17–23.4.1944, TNA WO 208/4363.

150

Crüwell Diary, Vol. 1, 5.6.1942, p. 18f.

151

Crüwell Diary, Vol. 1, 5.6.1942, p. 5.

152

Crüwell Diary, Vol. 2, 10.8.1943, p. 111. Crüwell is the only prisoner known to have complained about the catering. In the USA he was located in the military hospital at Camp Forrest (Tennessee) from 4.2.1945 to 3.5.1945 for his nerves and general debility. Crüwell Diary, Vol. 4, 11.5.1945, p. 95.

153

GRGG 114, 16–22.1.1944, TNA WO 208/4363.

154

GRGG 123, 20–26.2.1944, TNA WO 208/4363.

155

At first Cramer was not comfortable with the idea of returning home as a defeated general but eventually accepted that it had been for the purpose of political prestige that the troops at Stalingrad and Tunisia had not been extracted. GRGG 98, 1.11.1943; GRGG 106.5, 5–11.12.1943; GRGG 113.9, 15.1.1944; GRGG 123.20, 26.2.1944, TNA WO 208/4363.

156

GRGG 122.13, 19.2.1944, TNA WO 208/4363.

157

Memoirs, 1896–1944 (written in November 1944), p. 25, 25a.

158

Ibid., pp. 29–30.

159

GRGG 98, 1.11.1943, TNA WO 208/4363.

160

Oberstleutnant von Müller-Rienzburg, 1943, CO pilot training school A/B7, later allegedly a Luftwaffe liaison officer. According to the British he was ‘shot down in his Fw190 of II/SG4 in Italy’ and spent a few months at Trent Park in the spring of 1944.

161

The actual number of Obristen (colonels) is not known: for them Trent Park was a transit camp. In addition to these men must be added from the Mediterranean Generalmajor Kreipe, kidnapped from Crete by the British, and two regimental commanders of 362.Inf.Div. captured at the end of May 1944 in Italy and who spent a brief period at Trent Park that June.

162

In autumn 1944, with one exception, all generals and admirals captured at Brest (Ramcke, von der Mosel, Erwin Rauch, Otto Kähler and Karl Weber) as well as von Wülfingen, von Trescow and von Heyking, were all opposed to listening to the BBC news. GRGG 210.11, 12.10.1944, TNA WO 208/4364.

163

BA/MA N267/4. Oberst Köhn spoke in similar vein about Thoma’s joy when St Malo was finally surrendered, ‘This Thoma is very dangerous, he is a man who should be hanged as a traitor.’ GRGG 177, 22.8.1944, TNA WO 208/4363. Memoirs, 1896–1944 (written in November 1944), pp. 25, 25a.

164

For a thoughtful overview on the last battles for the Third Reich from multi-perspectives see Kunz, ‘Wehrmacht und Niederlage’.

165

The conversations were so pessimistic in character that even to the comparatively phlegmatic Konteradmiral Hennecke it seemed he was listening to Englishmen rather than Germans. GRGG 158.13, 14.7.1944, TNA WO 208/4363.

166

Konteradmiral Otto Kähler was the only prisoner at Trent Park who commented positively on Himmler’s speech of 18.10.1944 proclaiming the setting up of the Volkssturm.

167

Thoma rejected as eyewash the propaganda comparisons of the desperate current military situation with Frederick the Great because the latter was a war between crowned heads and not peoples. Diary, 6.6.1944, BA/MA N2/3. On 24.1.1944 Crüwell observed Friedrichstag, remarking that the older he grew, the more Frederick the Great was his idol and ‘in these difficult times the image of my hope’, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 66.

168

BA/MA N267/4 Menny was at Trent Park between 25.8.1944 and 23.9.1944 before his transfer to Clinton, USA. These lines date from late autumn 1944.

169

See also Reimann’s hopes, October 1944, GRGG 216, 26–28.10.1944 TNA WO 208/4364.

170

Fuller reactions to the Ardennes Offensive in GRGG 235, 16–18.12.1944, TNA WO 208/4364.

171

See also Salewski, ‘Die Abwehr der Invasion’.

172

BA/MA, MSg 1/1010.

173

Eberbach recognised at Normandy ‘that the people upstairs are crazy’. GRGG 277, 28–29.3.1945 TNA WO 208/4177. In 1979 he wrote that at the end of 1944 he had ignored the OKW order to destroy all civilian food depots in France and deport the male population for forced labour in Germany ‘because it would show us up as barbarians before the world’. BA/MA MSg1 1/1079. In a report made when Cdr, 3.Pz.Korps on the Eastern Front in October/November 1943, he had stated ‘During our retreat we had destroyed too little… all officers should be advised that more use is to be made of the practice than previously of shooting cowards on the spot.’ BA/MA RH10/55. Apparently Eberbach underwent a volte face in Normandy.

174

Wahle said that in August 1943 he and Olbricht discussed the whole situation and what should be done. ‘I told Olbricht there was nothing left for us but honourable defeat. He replied, “What do you want then, a people of 80 million simply cannot just go down.” Then I saw that Olbricht no longer had much hope.’ SRGG 1038, 10.9.1944, TNA WO 208/4168.

175

Elster reported fully on his capture to General Ramcke. SRGG 1061(c), 24.9.1944, TNA WO 208/4169. General Graf von Schwerin was accused in 1946 at the generals’ camp at Neu-Ulm of having capitulated too quickly in April 1945. Searle, ‘Wehrmacht Generals’, p. 26f.

176

BA/MA N267/4.

177

Wildermuth Diary, 11.3.1945, BA/MA, NL 251/73. In mid-November 1944, Heim said, ‘Therefore the only thing to do is carry on fighting, hold out to the last, even if that means we lose everything. A people which fights to the last moment finds the moral strength to rise again, a people which throws its weapons into the cornfield is finished for ever, history proves it.’ GRGG 221, 10–12.11.1944, TNA WO 208/4364. SS-Brigadeführer Meyer spoke out similarly, but later changed his opinion. GRGG 229, 27.11.1944–1.12.1944, TNA WO 208/4364.

178

Wildermuth Diary, 18.5.1945, BA/MA NL 251/73.

179

Hildegard Hamm-Brücher, conversation at Aschaffenburg, 17.7.2004.

180

GRGG 273, 16–19 March 1945, TNA WO 208/4177. The address appears in SRGG 1140, 15.3.1945, TNA WO 208/4169.

181

GRGG 286, 19–21.4.1945, TNA WO 208/4179.

182

General der Flieger Karl Heinrich Bodenschatz (1890–1979), Luftwaffe Liaison Officer at FHQ.

183

GRGG 323, 30.6.1945–5.7.1945, TNA WO 208/4179.

184

Neitzel, ‘Kampf um die Atlantik und Kanalfestungen’.

185

Henke, ‘Besetzung Deutschlands’, p. 155.

186

Ibid., p. 154ff.

187

Ibid., pp. 357–62.

188

Of the 3,149 Wehrmacht generals, 372 fell in the field in WWII and another 171 died as PoWs, about 17 per cent. The total of all Wehrmacht dead was 34 per cent, twice as high. Searle, ‘Wehrmacht Generals’, p. 17f; Overmans, ‘Militärische Verluste’, p. 319. The full list of dead Wehrmacht generals appears in Foltmann/Möller-Witten, ‘Opfergang’.

189

GRGG 254, 28–31.1.1945, TNA WO 208/4365.

190

Clausewitz, ‘Vom Kriege’, p. 243.

191

By contrast he did not react positively to Goebbels’s speech of 18.2.1943, see Document 7.

192

Similarly, see Konteradmiral Hennecke, GRGG 170, 5–8.8.1944, TNA WO 208/4363.

193

von Schlieben, GRGG 174, 15–16.8.1944, TNA WO 208/4363.

194

In the published protocols, remarks were made by Thoma, Neuffer, Felbert and Hennecke. There are similar expressions in the unpublished material, see e.g. GRGG 139, 3.6.1944 (Bassenge), GRGG 180, 25–26.8.1944 (Spang), TNA WO 208/4363.

195

On 23.10.1943 he wrote of the higher generals, ‘None of them served the Fatherland, but were the stooges of a sick man who could not think clearly. How bitter a thing that the Fatherland will be destroyed because of it.’ He criticised Hitler’s advisers and adjutants in similar vein in the 30.1.1944 entry. BA/MA N2/3.

196

See also GRGG 329.6, 20.7.1945, TNA WO 208/4179.

197

In autumn 1944, Bassenge spread the rumour that all ranks from Oberst upwards would be put on trial after the war. GRGG 216.26, 28.10.1944, TNA WO 208/4363.

198

GRGG 201.18, 19.5.1945, TNA WO 208/4177.

199

Thus Wildermuth’s worries about his family expressed in his diary take on a central importance. Wildermuth Diary, BA/MA NL 251/73.

200

For the general hatred of Communism see e.g. GRGG 25, GRGG 26, TNA WO 208/ 4363, SRX 1581 13.2.1943, TNA WO 208/4162.

201

See e.g. GRGG 178, 23.8.1944 (Aulock), GRGG 181, 25.8.1944 (Choltitz), TNA WO 208/4363.

202

See e.g. GRGG 12, TNA WO 208/4363.

203

Wildermuth Diary, 13.5.1945, BA/MA NL 251/73.

204

SRX 1648, 11.3.1943, TNA WO 208/4162.

205

The protocols contain few details reports about anti-partisan operations in the East. Von Schlieben told Bassenge about a large operation on the Eastern Front in which 2,000 prisoners had been shot by Russian auxiliary troops. GRGG 231.2, 6–7.12.1944, TNA WO 208/4364.

206

Thoma, see e.g. SRX 1401, 17.12.1942, TNA WO 208/4161.

207

On 3.5.1945 Thoma wrote that the ‘horrors of the concentration camps far exceeded what one could accept, since one only heard the occasional rumour.’ Diary, BA/MA N2/3. What he actually knew about the extermination of the Jews is unknown; the entry might have been written to cover his back.

208

Thus von Thoma talked about the mass graves of Jews at Odessa and Sevastopol, places where he had never been. SRX 1739, 7.4.1943, TNA WO 208/4163. Kreipe found ‘shameful’ those ‘measures which had been taken to transfer the Jews out’, GRGG 139, 3.6.1944, TNA WO 208/4363.

209

GRGG 323, 30.6.1945–5.7.1945, TNA WO 208/4178.

210

Generalmajor Sattler, captured at Cherbourg on 27.6.1944 and who had fought in France and Russia stated, ‘When I think back on the rumours I heard about the shootings in Poland, then the Hungarian Jews, the shootings in the Balkans. In France there was a lot of truth in it – the shootings and so on.’ GRGG 168, 31.7.1944–1.8.1944, TNA WO 208/4363. Although he had heard of the atrocities, apparently he did not know the scale.

211

Other protocols show the horror of some inmates at the crimes against the Jews, see e.g. GRGG 231, 6–7.12.1944, TNA WO 208/4363. Wildermuth noted on 20.4.1945 about the Allied reports on the concentration camps, ‘The impression is fearsome. Even here amongst the generals. It is the moral sentence of death on Germany.’ BA/MA NL 251/73.

212

See e.g. Franz and König in GRGG 297, 10.5.1945, TNA WO 208/4177 or Generalmajor Dornberger, GRGG 344.8, 13.8.1944, TNA WO 208/4179.

213

See also Köhn, 2.7.1944, the Soviets did not want peace because they had fallen too far under Jewish influence, GRGG 153, 3.7.1944, TNA WO 208/4363 and Oberst Aulock, ‘On balance the British have lost the war as much as we have. The American Jew has won it by the money he has made.’ GRGG 178, 23.8.1944, TNA WO 208/4363.

214

For Crüwell’s anti-Jewish utterances see also SRX 1221, 1.11.1942, TNA WO 208/4161: for racial discourses see also SRX 1094, 26.8.1942, TNA WO 208/4161; for Thoma’s remarks to a British officer about Jewish immigration into Germany in the inter-war period see SRGG 301, 28.7.1943, TNA WO 208/4166 and in similar vein to Burckhardt SRX 1536, 26.1.1943, TNA WO 208/4162. For Thoma’s, and particularly von Sponeck’s remarks on the inaccuracy of Nazi propaganda respecting Jews, GRGG 175.17, 18.8.1944, TNA WO 208/4363. For Ullersperger on the degenerative Jewish influence and the dangers of mixed marriages GRGG 262, 18–20.2.1945, TNA WO 208/4177.

215

SRX 1577, 11.2.1943, TNA WO 208/4162.

216

SRX 1184, 23.10.1942, TNA WO 208/4161.

217

Crüwell, for example, see SRX 1579, 12.2.1943, TNA WO 208/4162 or König, GRGG 302, 20–23.5.1945, TNA WO 208/4177.

218

Meyer visited Eberding in his room, to the latter’s disgust. Although they had long talks from time to time, Meyer mostly kept to his own quarters. GRGG 227, 22–23.11.1944, TNA WO 208/4364. Broich was concerned that the ‘100 per cent Nazi’ in the ranks would send secret reports to the Reich about everybody’s political opinions. GRGG 224, 17–18.11.1944, TNA WO 208/4364.

219

Dunckern never came to Trent Park. After long interrogations at Wilton Park he was sent to the USA.

220

SRGG 1133, 9.3.1945, TNA WO 208/4169.

221

As a precaution for possible charges by the Allies, the two lawyers at Trent Park, von der Hedte and Wildermuth, delivered talks describing what war crimes were and how one should act in proceedings as a witness or the accused. SRGG 1141, 3.4.1945, TNA WO 208/4177.

222

GRGG 371, 10–12.3.1945, TNA WO 208/4177.

223

He reported on the anti-partisan war at GRGG 172, 8–12.8.1944, TNA WO 208/4363. The 266.Inf.Div. War Diary has no valuable information about engagements between the Division and partisans. BA/MA RH26-266-9 (June – July 1944).

224

See note 205.

225

Halder, ‘Kriegstagebuch’, Vol. III, p. 243.

226

Ic, Interrogation Report. BA/MA RH21-2/654, pp. 250 and 253.

227

Ic, Report of 17.Pz.Div. to Pz.Gr.2, Ic BA/MA RH21-2/658 p. 222.

228

Ic Activity Report 17.8.1941–30.4.1942, BA/MA RH 27/20/189.

229

Oberleutnant Filster, adjutant, I/SR.59 of 20.Pz.Div. on 20.4.1942 drafted a memorandum on the Soviets in which he said, ‘To destroy them requires the harshest, most ruthless methods with all the physically and morally destructive weapons available…’ His 1a, Major Stoecker approved the clarity and style of the documented but then regretted that the racial differences had been underplayed. Thoma noted on the covering sheet ‘For the War Diary’, but his opinion is not recorded. BA/MA RH27/20–108.

230

Ic Report 11.Pz.Div. to XXXXVIII.Armeekorps, 14.7.1941, BA/MA RH24-48/198, Anl.29.

231

The protocols provide no definite indication as to which of the Trent Park inmates were involved in which war crimes. For the problem of proof, see note 329 to documents, below.

232

SRGG 520, 3.11.1943, TNA WO 208/4167.

233

See also SRX 1579, 12.2.1943, TNA WO 208/4162.

234

SRGG 495, 21.10.1943, TNA WO 208/4166.

235

For the most recent study on the military resistance see Heinemann, ‘Der militärische Widerstand’.

236

Irving, ‘Rommel’; Fraser, ‘Knight’s Cross’; Reuth, ‘Das Ende einer Legende’.

237

Remy, ‘Mythos Rommel’, pp. 277 and 286.

238

Irving and Fraser both rely on GRGG 1347, report of 19.8.1945 in TNA WO 208/4170, where Eberbach quoted Rommel as having said that Hitler ‘must be got rid of [loswerden]’.

239

On 14.10.1952 Eberbach wrote to historian Percy Schramm, ‘It was not Rommel’s intention to murder Hitler, but to put him on trial.’ BA/MA MSg 1/1079. On 15.5.1979 in a memorandum regarding his conversation with Rommel on 17.7.1944, Eberbach insisted he could only recall Rommel saying ‘Hitler must go’, BA/MA 15.5.1979 MSg 1/1079.

240

Thoma Diary, 30.1.1945, BA/MA N2/3.

241

Heim, ‘Seine Kalkulation’, p. 70, BA/MA MSg 1/3149.

242

GRGG 149, 22–27.6.1944, SRGG 506, 24.10.1943, TNA WO 208/4166.

243

SRGG 813, TNA WO 208/4167.

244

Researchers doubt whether Blumentritt, Rundstedt’s Chief of Staff, and his 1a, Bodo Zimmermann, answered in this form. Ose, ‘Entscheidung im Westen’, p. 157; Ziemke, ‘Des Führers gehorsamer Diener’, p. 489; see also Messenger, ‘The Last Prussian’, p. 197f.

245

See also Kroener, ‘Fromm’, e.g. p. 323.

246

Thoma Diary, 8.8.1944. BA/MA N2/3.

247

Some prisoners spoke on this theme only incidentally. Hennecke remarked on 21.7.1944 that he feared the attempt might lead to civil war. If Germany were defeated, Communism might then hold the balance. SRGG 963, 21.7.1944, TNA WO 208/4168. Menny, captured 21.8.1944, condemned the attempt four days later at Trent Park, saying that a regime cannot be toppled by the murder of its leader. GRGG 180, 25–26.8.1944, TNA WO 208/4363.

248

See SRGG 975, 11.8.1944, TNA WO 208/4168.

249

Eberhard Wildermuth to his wife Marianna, 8.2.1945, BA/MA NL 251/90.

250

Diary passages from captivity, BA/MA, N267/4.

251

Ludwig Crüwell to his brother Werner, 28.12.1943 (Crüwell Correspondence). similarly in his letter of 27.3.1944 to Waltraud, Graefin von Schweinitz, ibid.

252

See, inter alia, Searle, ‘Wehrmacht Generals’. Searle differentiates the generals’ political attitudes after 1945. Meyer, ‘Zur Situation der deutschen militärischen Führungsschicht’, pp. 652–707.

253

Oberst Aulock, commandant, St Malo fortifications, acknowledged that the surrender of the citadel was for him one of the most difficult decisions of his life and he was still asking himself if he could have kept fighting longer: GRGG 177, 22.8.1944, TNA WO 208/4363.

254

At the end of 1945 in PoW Camp 300, Wildermuth set down a comprehensive account of the battle for Le Havre based on notes he made at Trent Park between December 1944 and February 1945. The original is in his 1945 diary, BA/MA, NL 251/73.

255

The commandant of the Cherbourg fortifications, Generalleutnant Wilhelm von Schlieben, taken prisoner on 26.6.1944, wrote on 1.7.1944, ‘Purely from a military point of view I have nothing to reproach myself for, I say merely that it would have been a better outcome for me to die… Now I do not know if they wanted me to put myself in the path of a firing machine gun. That would have been an historical fact.’ SRGG 936, 1.7.1944, TNA WO 208/4168. Schlieben probably felt that the National Socialist leadership was annoyed at Allied press reports regarding the circumstances of the surrender. In fact Goebbels stated of Schlieben, whom he described as ‘a typical Schleicher-type Reichswehr creature’, that one could never speak of being taken prisoner in such a way that there was some kind of heroic aspect to it, while Hitler called Schlieben a ‘chatterbox’. Neitzel, ‘Kampf um die Atlantik- und Kanalfestungen’, p. 390f.

1

Rudolf Hess (26.4.1896–17.8.1987), from April 1933 Hitler’s deputy, flew to Scotland on 10.5.1941 on his own initiative and without Hitler’s knowledge with the intention of negotiating a peace deal with Britain before the attack on the Soviet Union. Schmidt, ‘Hess’.

2

In January 1941, 11.Pz.Div. was at Ploesti in Rumania to secure the oilfields. The division moved to the Bulgarian western border in March in preparation for the Balkans campaign.

3

Hitler awarded Crüwell the Oak Leaves on 1.9.1941 at FHQ ‘Wolfsschanze’. The second visit occurred on 19/20.5.1942, a few days after his wife’s funeral. On both visits Crüwell was deeply impressed and said he would never forget the experience as long as he lived. SRX 1259, 8.11.1942, TNA WO 298/4161: Ludwig Crüwell, ‘Begegnungen mit bedeutenden Persönlichkeiten. Erinnerungen und Abschiedworte für meine Kinder’ (1958), pp. 19–25, (Crüwell literary bequest).

4

Konstantin Freiherr von Neurath (2.2.1973–14.8.1956) was German Foreign Minister from 2.6.1932 to 4.2.1938.

5

Similarly in SRX 1496, 14.1.1943, TNA WO 208/4162.

6

Arthur Neville Chamberlain (18.3.1869–9.11.1940), British Prime Minister 28.5.1937–10.5.1940. Negotiated with Hitler the Munich Agreement of 30.9.1938 that allowed a German occupation of the Czech Sudetenland and prevented war. By occupying the remainder of the country on 15.3.1939, Hitler made a mockery of the treaty.

7

The generals were virtually unanimous in their feelings towards Roosevelt. Luftwaffe Generalleutnant Walter Friedensburg (1889–1959) considered him ‘one of the world’s cruelest monsters’ – ‘He is perhaps the greatest criminal there has ever been’ (SRGG 1154(c), 22.4.1945). Generalmajor Goerbig confessed at the beginning of May 1945, ‘When the American President (Truman) said how sorry he was that Roosevelt had not lived to experience the day, I could hardly conceal my joy that this piece of shit was denied the satisfaction’ (GRGG 296, 6–9.5.1945, TNA WO 208/4177).

8

See his remarks quoted in the Introduction.

9

Generalfeldmarschall Hans Günther von Kluge (30.10.1882–18.8.1944), from 18.12.1941 C-in-C Army Group Centre. Thoma refers here to a commanders’ conference on 21.3.1942 in which the C-in-C, 4.Pz.Armee, General Richard Ruoff, spoke about a foreign policy discussion he had had with Hitler in which the latter had asserted that Britain was making giant strides towards ‘Bolshevisation’. Thoma responded, ‘Previously we were ten times more Bolshevised than the British.’ The protocol does not indicate whether von Kluge attended the commanders’ conference.

10

Goebbels’s speech of 18.2.1943, very anti-Jewish in its opening passages, is reproduced in Heiber, ‘Goebbels-Reden’, Vol. 2, pp. 172–208.

11

On 20.11.1942 Hans Cramer was given command of Generalleutnant Heim’s weak XXXXVIII.Pz.Korps which, together with 1st Rumanian and 22nd German tank divisions, lay behind the front line held by the 3rd Rumanian Army. The previous day the Soviets had begun their pincer-offensive on Stalingrad, after which the Don Front collapsed. Later, while commanding ‘Gruppe Cramer’ near Kharkov, he witnessed another great Soviet offensive. He did not participate in von Manstein’s counter-offensive, which succeeded in recapturing Kharkov, because he had been transferred to the Führer-Reserve on 10.2.1943. On 13.3.1943 he arrived in Tunisia as Commanding General, Deutsches Afrika Korps, where he experienced the defeat of Heeresgruppe Afrika. The experience of two devastating defeats apparently lay behind his pessimism as to the future course of the war. SRGG 59, 22.5.1943, TNA WO 208/4165.

12

Thoma often drew this comparison with 1918 (see for example SRX 1644, 11.3.1943, TNA WO 208/4162).

13

Cramer means the two peace offers made by Hitler in the autumn of 1939 and summer of 1940 in which he proposed to guarantee the security of the British Empire in exchange for a free hand in the East. For further literature on this theme see Weinberg, ‘Welt in Waffen’, pp. 106–12, 173f. For Hitler’s speech of 19.7.1940 see also Lukacs, ‘Churchill und Hitler’, pp. 223, 277. The speech is reproduced in Domarus, ‘Hitler’, Vol. 2, p. 1540ff.

14

Oberstleutnant Graf Schenk von Stauffenberg (15.11.1907–20.7.1944) was transferred to 10.Pz.Div. as 1a (No. 1 General Staff Officer) in February 1943 and was seriously wounded on 7.4.1943. Active from May 1940 in the OKH organisational divisions, he had insight into the tense personnel situation in the Army, but had no involvement in personnel administration. Hoffmann, ‘Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg’, pp. 242f, 245, 253.

15

After the German defeats in the winter of 1942, Turkey became increasingly pro-British. Krecker, ‘Deutschland und die Türkei im Zweiten Weltkrieg’. For the political consequences of the defeat at Stalingrad for the Axis partners see also Förster, ‘Stalingrad’.

16

Cramer had no command in Italy. He must be speaking here of his journey to North Africa, during which, in Rome in March 1943 he very probably held several conversations at Italian High Command, although no details are known.

17

In the spring of 1943 Tito’s Communist partisans became stronger militarily. In the winter of 1942 the Wehrmacht failed to wipe them out in a major offensive, ‘Weiss’. The Italian 2nd Army had long been incapable of controlling its appointed zone of occupation in southern Croatia. Schmider, ‘Partisanenkrieg’, pp. 193–261.

18

On 9.4.1943 in Yugoslavia there were five German divisions (114, 117 and 118.Jäger-Div., 187.Res.-Div. and SS-Gebirgs-Div. ‘Prinz Eugen’) and 369th Croatian Infantry Division. Although able to fight, they would have had only limited value in the major offensives on the Eastern Front on account of their obsolete equipment. KTB OKW 1943, p. 261. For the usefulness of these units in battle, see Schmider, ‘Partisanenkrieg’, pp. 535–41.

19

The new ‘Panther’ tanks were used for the first time in battle in Operation ‘Zitadelle’ in July 1943, Schmider, ‘Partisanenkrieg’, pp. 535–41.

20

Hitler’s speech on Heldengedenktag (Heroes’ Memorial Day), 21.3.1943 is reproduced in Domarus, ‘Hitler’, Vol. 4, pp. 1999–2002. It was comparatively objective and summarised the great danger that Germany had faced from the Red Army in the winter offensive of 1942, but which had been successfully withstood. Corresponding to the less favourable war situation at the time, the speech was not immoderately optimistic.

21

Generaloberst Franz Halder (30.6.1884–2.4.1972) Chief of Army General Staff, 1.9.1938–24.9.1942.

22

Generalfeldmarschall Walther von Brauchitsch (4.10.1881–18.10.1948) C-in-C Army (ObdH), 4.2.1938–19.12.1940.

23

Joachim von Ribbentrop (30.4.1893–16.10.1946), from 4.2.1938 German Foreign Minister.

24

The identity of M180 is unknown.

25

This gloomy appraisal of the situation, very close to the reality, is noteworthy because Broich was not present at the devastating Soviet winter offensive of 1942/43. He commanded a rifle brigade of 24.Pz.Div. until 31.10.1942, when he was transferred to Tunisia.

26

This observation was most probably aimed at General von Thoma, who took four and a half years to progress from Oberst to General der Panzertruppe, although the last promotion from Generalleutnant to General der Panzertruppe took only four months.

27

Apparently the inmates were unaware that Trent Park had been converted from an interrogation centre for ‘normal’ prisoners into a bugged centre to eavesdrop on senior officers. Even after this rejoinder the prisoners exercised no especial caution in their conversations.

28

The prisoners were also permitted to listen to the German radio programmes.

29

Between 24.7.1943 and 3.8.1943, Hamburg was bombed on four occasions by night and twice by day by British and American bombers; 41,500 persons lost their lives. ‘Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg’, Vol. 7, p. 40.

30

The identity of this Oberst could not be ascertained.

31

This report has not been found in the archives.

32

Stalin’s readiness for a diplomatic solution was signalled through various channels, but Hitler always rejected any idea of a compromise. Hildebrand, ‘Das vergangene Reich’, pp. 787–806.

33

It was a forlorn hope that Generalfeldmarschall Keitel (22.9.1892–16.10.1946), head of OKW, and the C-in-C Kriegsmarine, Grossadmiral Dönitz (16.9.1891–24.12.1980) would attempt to unseat the Führer. For Keitel see Mueller, ‘Keitel’. For Dönitz the latest literature is Schwendemann, ‘Deutsche Menschen vor der Vernichtung durch den Bolshevismus retten’, and Jörg Hillmann, ‘Die Reichsregierung in Flensburg’.

34

At the 1934 census, Great Britain had a population of 48,789,000. Butler, ‘British Political Facts’, p. 323.

35

The draft of Goebbels’s radio broadcast of 3.12.1943 appeared next day in the ‘Völkischer Beobachter’.

36

The Trent Park commandant was Major Topham. Ramcke, ‘Fallschirmjäger’, p. 80.

37

Generaloberst Alfred Jodl (10.5.1890–16.10.1946), from 23.8.1939 Chief of the Wehrmacht Command Staff.

38

Army C-in-C Generaloberst Werner Freiherr von Fritsch (4.8.1880–22.9.1939) was accused by the Gestapo of having been blackmailed in 1936 for a homosexual act. Replaced on 4.2.1938 by Brauchitsch, he was proven innocent by the Reich Military Court the following month. Appointed by Hitler to head Art.Reg.12, he fell on the outskirts of Warsaw during the Polish campaign. There was outrage amongst senior commanders at the Gestapo allegation, a fabrication based on false identity. The best short account with sources is Mühlheisen, ‘Fritsch’, a detailed presentation appears in Janssen/Tobias, ‘Der Sturz der Generäle’.

39

General Kurt von Schleicher (7.4.1892–30.6.1934) and Generalmajor Ferdinand von Bredow (16.5.1894–30.6.1934) were shot dead the same day by SS men during the Röhm putsch. Fallois, ‘Kalkül und Illusion’.

40

Hitler never considered the possibility of a special peace settlement. See Hildebrand, ‘Das vergangene Reich’, pp. 787–806, Martin, ‘Deutsche-sowjetische Sondierungen’.

41

Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt (12.12.1875–24.2.1953) was the longest-serving Wehrmacht general of World War II. He was appointed C-in-C West on 15.3.1942; a convincing strategy to repel the Allied landings eluded him. After the Allies landed in Normandy in June 1944, Hitler transferred him to the Führer-Reserve on 2 July 1944.

42

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Britain frequently took the long view by siding with former enemies against allies. An example was the difficult alliance with France following the Vienna Congress of 1815, as the result of which both fought Britain’s former ally during the Napoleonic Wars, Russia, in the Crimean War (1853–56). Historical parallels to the hope expressed here that Britain might change sides to fight alongside Germany against the Soviet Union are rare, but one occurred in 1808 during the war against Spain (1796–1808) when the latter allied with Britain against Napoleon.

43

In 1944/45 the United States carried more political weight than Great Britain. Ovendale, ‘Anglo-American Relations’ pp. 50–70; Dobson, ‘Anglo-American Relations’, pp. 72–100; Hathaway, ‘Great Britain and the United States’, pp. 9–15.

44

A number of Trent Park inmates were visibly disappointed that the damage to London caused by the V-1 and V-2 campaign was less than expected. See Otto Elfeldt, SRGG 988, 24.8.1944, TNA WO 208/4168, and Erwin Menny, diary notes BA/MA, N267/4. Further reaction to the first wave of projectiles are reproduced in GRGG 146, 11–16.6.1944, TNA WO 208/4363, and for expectations of the V-2 see SRGG 980, 24.8.1944, TNA WO 208/4168. For V-weapons propaganda following the defeat at Stalingrad see Hölsken, ‘V-Waffen’, pp. 93–114. Between 12.6.1944 and March 1945 the Germans fired 5,822 V-1 flying bombs and 1,054 V-2 rockets on Britain; 8,938 persons were killed, 24,504 injured; 31,600 buildings were destroyed, 1.42 million damaged. These effects were too slight to influence the course of the war. Ibid., p. 200f.

45

Soviet policy in the Baltic states of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia from the summer of 1940, and Eastern Poland from 17.9.1939 was directed towards deportations, not mass killings. The most recent estimates show that the Soviets deported 315,300 to 340,000 persons from Eastern Poland up to June 1941. Applebaum, ‘Gulag’, puts the number of Balts deported in 1940/41 at 160,000. For Estonia see Laar, ‘Estland und der Kommunismus’. In Poland, however, the Russians murdered 14,587 Polish PoWs and 7,285 civilians. For additional data see Musial, ‘Schlachtfeld’; and Häufele, ‘Zwangsumsiedlungen’.

46

Kurt Zeitzler (9.6.1895–25.9.1963) was Chief of the Army General Staff 24.9.1942–20.7.1944.

47

The naval coastal battery ‘Marcouf’, equipped with three 21-cm guns, was the heaviest in Normandy. It lay behind ‘Utah’ beachhead and was subjected to heavy Allied bombardment from April 1944. On the night of 5.6.1944, 101 Lancaster bombers dropped 598 tonnes of bombs on the battery. Nowadays it is a popular tourist attraction. Harnier, ‘Artillerie im Küstenkampf’, pp. 92–7.

48

Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin discussed military and strategic questions at the Teheran Conference, 28.11–1.12.1943, with the aim of coordinating efforts. The Anglo-American landings in France were agreed for May 1944, while the three leaders agreed that the borders of Poland would be shifted westwards and East Prussia annexed to the Soviet Union. Most questions remained unfinalised for lack of preparation and the short period of the conference. No agreement as to the territorial extent of the Russian advance westwards was reached either at Teheran or Yalta. Eubank, ‘Summit at Teheran’.

49

Hennecke refers to the three heavy daylight raids on Munich on 11, 12, and 13.7.1944 in which 2,807 B-17 bombers of the 8th USAAF dropped 5,783 tonnes of bombs and inflicted great damage on the city; 1,613 persons lost their lives, 3,955 were injured as the result of the attacks. Permooser, ‘Luftkrieg im Raum München’, pp. 321–41.

50

If and when Hitler made this remark cannot be established.

51

A locality at the southern end of Cherbourg town where a command post had been engineered into a mountain, and where Hennecke and Schlieben were captured.

52

Robert Reiter, CO, Art.Reg.1709, 709.Inf.Div.

53

On 8.8.1918 the British 4th Army (including the Canadian and Australian Corps), flanked by French 1st Army, attacked the trenches of German 2.Armee south-east of Amiens using over 500 tanks. Within a few hours the attackers had forced a great breach in the front, taken 29,000 prisoners and captured 400 guns. Ludwig stigmatised this as ‘the black day of the German Army’ because of the great losses in material and the only brief resistance offered by whole units before surrendering. Between 8 and 11 August around Amiens the Germans lost 74,000 men, the Allies 22,000. But neither Neuffer nor Reimann was there. Bose, ‘Katastrophe des 8. August 1918’. For a general view from the British perspective see Harris, ‘Amiens to the Armistice’.

54

Hitler’s frequent amateurish meddling no doubt proved of benefit to the Allied cause. The generals used it to deflect attention from their own errors and heaped blame on Hitler alone for the disasters in the second half of the war. Wegner, ‘Erschriebene Siege’. For Hitler’s role as supreme leader see Klaus Schmider’s study ‘Warlord Hitler’, Sutton, 2007.

55

Hennecke was very pessimistic about the military situation following the collapse of Army Group Centre after the surrender at Minsk on 11.7.1944. Contrary to his fears, however, the front was repaired and the Russian drive into Germany repealed. Evacuations were only achieved from Memel, which the Russians had encircled in mid-October 1944.

56

During the Spanish Civil War there were numerous cases of the children of Republicans being taken to the Soviet Union. Kowalsky, ‘La Unión Soviética y la Guerra Civil española’, pp. 96–121.

57

Until 1.3.1945 Turkey resisted pressure from the Western Allies to enter the war. Diplomatic relations with Berlin were broken off on 2.8.1944.

58

As Chief of the Army General Staff, Kurt Zeitzler had been agitating since June 1944 for Hitler to pull out of the Baltic states in order to strengthen the central sector of the Eastern Front. Hitler declined this and the request of C-in-C, Army Group North, Generaloberst Friessner, for permission to pull back a few weeks later. Hitler’s main preoccupation was the possibility that he would lose Finland from the Axis. Only after Helsinki had departed the coalition on 2.9.1944, and a major Soviet offensive began 14 days later, did Hitler approve the withdrawal of units around Riga. Meier-Welcker, ‘Abwehrkämpfe am Nordflügel der Ostfront’. For coalition politics see Salewski, ‘Staatsräson und Waffenbrüderschaft’.

58a

Vizeadmiral Hans-Erich Voss (30.10.1897–18.11.1969), from 1.3.1943 permanent representative of C-in-C, Kriegsmarine at FHQ.

59

Meant here is Generalleutnant Graf Max von Montgelas (1860–1938), great-grandson of the Bavarian president and son of Bavarian diplomat Ludwig von Montgelas. 1879 entered Bavarian Army; 1900 Battalion Cdr, East Asiatic Expeditionary Corps; 1901–3 Military Attaché, Peking. 1910–12 Senior QM, Kaiser’s General Staff; 1912–15 CO, 4.Bavarian Inf.Div. After the war he worked for Foreign Ministry on publication of ‘Deutsche Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch’ (German documents relating to the outbreak of war). He was a convinced opponent of the Versailles Treaty and the ‘German War Guilt’ clause.

60

Recent research on Großadmiral Erich Raeder (24.4.1876–6.11.1960), C-in-C, Kriegsmarine, prove his strong affinity to National Socialism. Jörg Hillmann, ‘Erich Raeder’, University of the Bundeswehr, Hamburg, in preparation.

61

La Glacerie, a village a few miles south of Cherbourg.

62

Generalfeldmarschall Walther von Brauchitsch and Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock (3.12.1880–4.5.1945) never contradicted Hitler in personal conversation, but as C-in-C Army Group South in 1942, Bock was very critical of the operational leadership during the summer offensive and was relieved of command on 15.7.1942. Janssen, ‘Walther von Brauchitsch’. For Bock, see Mühleisen, ‘Fedor von Bock’.

63

Schaefer took a similarly gloomy view in SRGG 273, 16–19.3.1945, TNA WO 208/4177. On 10.4.1951 the generals were eventually granted a pension corresponding to their rank. Meyer, ‘Führungsschicht’, p. 648f.

64

See note 38 above.

65

Charles de Gaulle (22.11.1890–9.11.1970), addressing the Comité de Défense Nationale in Algiers on 12.8.1944, demanded the French occupation of the Rhineland without limit of time, the international control of the Ruhr and the prevention of a German central government. Young, ‘France’, p. 9.

66

Alfred Rosenberg (12.1.1893–16.10.1946), from 17.6.1941 to 30.4.1945 Reich Minister for the Eastern Territories. For his life see Ernst Piper, ‘Rosenberg’.

67

Chief of the Army Personnel Bureau, Generalleutnant (1.11.1944 General der Infanterie) Wilhelm Burgdorf (15.2.1895–1.5.1945) addressed the course for senior adjutants on 3.8.1944 regarding the events of 20 July 1944. ‘Tätigkeitsbericht Schmundt’, p. 192.

68

At Goering’s initiative the Wehrmacht introduced the Hitler salute on 21.7.1944.

69

Choltitz gives more details of his conversation with Hitler here than in his memoirs, but both accounts say much the same thing. Choltitz, ‘Soldat unter Soldaten’, p. 222f. and ‘Brennt Paris?’, pp. 6–11.

70

For Choltitz’s commands in this period see his short biography.

71

General der Infanterie Hermann Reinecke (14.2.1888–10.10.1973), 1938 Chief of Bureaux, General Wehrmacht Affairs, from which the General Wehrmacht Bureau was created in 1939, and of which he remained head to the war’s end. From 1.1.1944 he was also Chief of the National Socialist Command Staff at OKW. 28.10.1948 sentenced to life imprisonment at Nuremberg, October 1954 released. Streit, ‘Reinecke’. For his activity in the field of military education see Förster, ‘Geistige Kriegführung’.

72

General der Infanterie Rudolf Schmundt (13.8.1896–1.10.1944) was Chief Wehrmacht adjutant to Hitler, 28.1.1938 to his death and from 1.10.1942 head of the Army Personnel Bureau.

73

Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Lewinski known as von Manstein (24.11.1887–10.6.1973) was C-in-C, Army Group South in January 1944.

74

Generaloberst Karl Adolf Hollidt (24.4.1891–1.6.1973) was C-in-C, 6.Armee in January 1944.

75

No itinerary for senior commanders of all Wehrmacht branches at Posen exists, either as a detailed programme or as a list of those attending. It probably lasted two, and not the four days suggested by Choltitz. On 26.1.1944 Himmler addressed the assembled generals on the extermination of the Jews. If the memoirs of Freiherr von Gersdorff are believed, Choltitz was one of the few present who understood the enormity of Himmler’s words. The conference at FHQ Rastenburg followed on 27.1.1944. Förster, ‘Geistige Kriegführung’; Gersdorff, ‘Soldat im Untergang’, p. 145. Graf Rothkirch was also present at the Posen session. See his account, especially Hitler’s address at SRGG 1135(c), 9.3.1945, TNA WO 208/4169, and also the version of Generalleutnant Richard Veith at SRGG 1149, 24.4.1945, TNA WO 208/4169.

76

See note 65 above.

77

For a concise summary of the protests by Johannes Blaskowitz (10.7.1883–5.2.1948) against crimes by SS and police units in Poland, see Clark, ‘Blaskowitz’. Because of his criticisms, Blaskowitz never made Feldmarschall and received only second-class appointments. In a letter dated 6.2.1940 as C-in-C East he wrote, ‘The feelings of the Army towards the SS and Polizei vary between abhorrence and loathing, and every soldier feels disgusted and revolted by their crimes. In this connection one must not forget, however, that the Wehrmacht was also involved in the crimes in Poland’. Böhler, ‘Tragische Verstrickung’.

78

Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb (5.9.1886–29.4.1956), from September 1939 to 16.1.1942 C-in-C, Army Group C, North.

79

Generalleutnant Kurt von Schleicher, influential Secretary of State at the Reichswehr Ministry involved in the fall of Reich Chancellor Hermann Müller and the installation of the presidential Cabinet. In December 1932 Reich Chancellor, failed in his attempt to find a broad social basis for his labour-creation methods. His attempt to break up the NSDAP by hiving off the Strasser wing also failed, forcing him into isolation in January 1933, when he stepped down. He was murdered with his wife on 30.6.1934, as part of the Röhm putsch. Plehwe, ‘Schleicher’.

80

The pre-war concentration camps differed from the wartime variety. The first wave of arrivals in 1933 consisted of political opponents. From the autumn other groups such as beggars, recidivists and vagrants were incarcerated. The average stay at a camp pre-war was 12 months. In August 1939 the six camps at Buchenwald, Dachau, Flossenbürg, Mauthausen, Ravensbrück and Sachsenhausen had a total of 21,400 inmates, of whom 13,000 were convicted criminals at the end of 1938. Wachsmann, ‘From Indefinite Confinement to Extermination’, p. 177. The total number of deaths between 1936 and 1939 in all camps was 4,171. Müller-Römer’s estimate of the situation is therefore incorrect. Drobisch/Wieland, ‘System der Konzentrationslager’, pp. 288, 303, 339.

81

Eberbach was thinking here of the new Type XXI and XXIII Elektro-boote (E-boat) whose mass production had begun and which could have changed the fortunes of the U-boat Arm if put into service earlier. The same goes for the Me262 jet, due for supply to operational squadrons shortly after this conversation took place. See Neitzel, ‘Bedeutungswandel der Kriegsmarine’, p. 264ff; Blair, ‘U-boot Krieg’, Vol. 2, p. 824f.; Schabel, ‘Wenn Wunder den Sieg bringen sollen’.

82

Choltitz was promoted faster than Bassenge, three years his junior. He rose in two years from Oberst to Generalleutnant, while Bassenge took three and a half years to rise from Oberst to Generalmajor. Choltitz’s later ascent was presumably due to his having been the commander of units that had proven their worth well in Holland and Russia.

83

Oberst Andreas von Aulock (23.3.1893–23.6.1968) put up a stubborn defence of St Malo between 5 and 17.8.1944. At 1400hrs on the last day he sent a final signal, ‘Mein Führer! The battle for St Malo will end today or tomorrow. Under the heaviest bombardment one defensive position after another has been reduced to rubble. If we go under, it will only have been after a fight to the bitter end. God protect you with his hand. Long live the Führer!’ Ose, ‘Entscheidung im Westen’, p. 251f. See also Neitzel, ‘Kampf um die deutschen Atlantik- und Kanalfestungen’, p. 396f. Aulock was at Trent Park from 22 to 28.8.1944. On the day of his arrival he described the battle for St Malo at great length. He regretted having had to take 1,500 civilians into consideration, ‘I would rather have let them die and held the town’. (GRGG 177, 22.8.1944, TNA WO 208/4363). The defence of St Malo so impressed Hitler that at Army Group B on 7 September 1944 he asked ‘which people had been appointed as new commanders to fortifications and defence zones along the Channel coast, and if they had the commitment to defend it as at St Malo’ (OKW/WFSt/Op. West Nr 7733260/44 gKdos, Chiefs, 7.9.1944, BA/MA, RH 19-IX/5, p. 88).

84

Generalleutnant Alfred Gerstenberg (6.4.1893–1.1.1959) Luftwaffe Cdr in Rumania is probably meant here. After the arrest of the Rumanian Head of State Ion Antonescu on 23.8.1944 by the Rumanian opposition, he had tried unsuccessfully to prevent the new Rumanian Government from changing sides. Gerstenberg failed to bring Bucharest and its troops under control. On 28.8.1944 he was captured by the Soviets.

85

On the night of 18.9.1944, 206 RAF Lancaster bombers and six Mosquitos attacked Bremerhaven, inflicting heavy damage on the city centre and docks; 618 people were killed, 1193 injured. Middlebrook/ Everitt, ‘Bomber Command War Diaries’, p. 586.

86

On the night of 11.9.1944, 226 RAF Lancaster bombers and nine Mosquitos attacked Darmstadt. A fire-storm ensued in which 11,000–12,000 persons were killed and 52.4 per cent of the city destroyed. See Engels, ‘Deutschlands Zerstörung aus der Luft’.

87

In March 1945 around three million people lived in Germany west of the Rhine, about half the number there in 1939. The exodus was the result of a planned evacuation and privately organised flights. Henke, ‘Besetzung Deutschlands’, p. 351f.

88

Oberst Claus Graf Schenk von Stauffenberg.

89

Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel (15.11.1891–14.10.1944), 15.1.1944 C-in-C Army Group B, France; seriously wounded 17.7.1944 when his car was attacked by low-flying aircraft.

90

See note 81 above.

91

Oberstgruppenführer Sepp Dietrich (28.5.1892–21.4.1966); from March 1933 Chief, Stabswache, Reich Chancellery (from September 1933 Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler). Dietrich was involved in the Röhm putsch murders, later became CO, SS-Div. Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler as career officer; 27.7.1943 CO, 1.Pz.Korps, which also fought in Normandy; 5.11.1944 CO, 6.SS.Pz.Armee; 6.8.1944 awarded Diamonds. See Clark, ‘Josef Sepp Dietrich’, see also Document 159.

92

According to Manfred Rommel, his father was convinced that Sepp Dietrich would follow him if there were an armistice in the West. Fraser, ‘Knight’s Cross’, p. 541. Dietrich is alleged to have told Rommel, ‘You are my superior officer, and therefore I will obey all your orders’. Gersdorff, ‘Soldat im Untergang’, p. 165. G. Meyer, ‘Auswirkungen des 20.Juli 1944’, p. 475f.

93

As regards Waffen-SS war crimes in the Soviet Union there is to date little reliable information. The same applies to atrocities committed to SS-Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (LAH). Andrei Angrick indicates that the Division assisted Sonderkommando 10a in the murder of Jews at Taganrog, although he gives no closer details. Angrick, ‘Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord’, p. 315f, see also p. 311. According to Stein, ‘Geschichte der Waffen-SS’, p. 245, at the beginning of 1942 the LAH murdered 4,000 Red Army prisoners.

94

For the alleged military ‘failure’ of the coalition partners at Stalingrad and the political consequences see Kehrig, ‘Stalingrad’, pp. 45–217; Förster, ‘Stalingrad’.

95

Franz von Papen (29.10.1879–2.5.1969) belonged to the conservative wing of the Centre; 1921–32 Member of Reichstag, 1.6.1932–17.11.1932 Reich Chancellor, until mid-1934 Vice-Chancellor in Hitler’s first Cabinet, then envoy in Vienna and from April 1939 ambassador to Turkey.

96

On 19 April 1919 Rudolf von Sebottendorf obtained approval to form a Freikorps from members of the Thule Society and other volunteers. Its purpose was to put down the revolutionary republic in Munich. By the end of the month Freikorps Oberland was 250 strong and after reaching Munich quickly swelled to battalion size. Hagen Schulze, ‘Freikorps und Republik’, p. 96. The Freikorps made its name as a military force for its role in the storming of the Annaberg monastery in Silesia in May 1921, and as a political force for its nationalist, anti-democratic and to some extent anti-Jewish attitude. The successor organisation Bund Oberland contributed to the destabilisation and eventual break-up of the Weimar Republic. See Barth, ‘Dolchstosslegende’; Fenske, ‘Konservatismus’; Lohalm, ‘Völkischer Radikalismus’. The ‘Iron Division’ – not to be confused with the Kiel Iron Brigade’ founded at Kiel in January 1919 – was formed on 18.1.1919 from remnants of the German 8.Armee and with Allied approval. Its purpose was to impose law and order in the Eastern Baltic. Sauer, ‘Vom Mythos eines ewigen Soldatentums’. After the Allies and German Government withdrew support from the unit, the Iron Division kept fighting in the Baltic states until December 1919, latterly alongside the Russian Western Army under Prince Avaloff-Bermondt. After its disbandment, its former members worked to undermine the Weimar Republic, as did most Freikorps men from the region. See also Liulevicius, ‘Kriegsland im Osten’; Nagel, ‘Fememord’.

97

The defence of Brest tied down three US divisions and denied the Allies access to a large natural harbour. The Allied advance, though delayed, was not decisively hampered. Neitzel, ‘Kampf um die deutschen Atlantik- und Kanalfestungen’, pp. 397–405.

98

Operation ‘Market Garden’ was begun on 17.9.1944 with the objective of clearing the way into Germany. Three parachute divisions were dropped behind the German lines to capture the bridges at Eindhoven, Nijmegen and Arnhem. The British First Airborne Division failed to take the bridge at Arnhem crucial to the advance and sustained heavy losses. Detlev Vogel, ‘Deutsche und Aliierte Kriegführung im Westen’, pp. 606–11.

99

Choltitz is referring here to Churchill’s speech of 28.9.1944 in the House of Commons, reproduced in Churchill, ‘Speeches’, pp. 6990–7007. Churchill, who barely mentioned the Arnhem debacle, mentioned in his address the Jewish Brigade fighting the Germans in Italy and which was to take part in the eventual occupation of Germany; one cannot say of the speech that it was especially hate-filled. The Jewish Brigade was formed in September 1944 from Palestinian Jews and fought only in Italy. It was disbanded in 1946. Beckman, ‘The Jewish Brigade’.

100

Fregattenkapitän Karl Palmgreen (2.9.1891–16.9.1970) CO, 38.Minesweeping Flotilla, was awarded the Oak Leaves to his Knight’s Cross on 11.7.1944. He was not at Le Havre between 31.7.1944 and 14.8.1944 to receive the decoration. On 24 August the flotilla returned to the Baltic via Dieppe, Boulogne and Dunkirk, and so Palmgreen avoided capture. War Diary, 38.Minesw.Flot., 16.7.1944–28.2.1945, BA/MA, RM69/236.

101

This is the classic conservative doctrine of the intent to encircle Germany. It is interesting to note that Ramcke refrains from expounding this theory in his 1943 book ‘Vom Schiffsjungen zum Fallschirmjäger-General’, in which the basically non-political text presents him as a very brave soldier originating from humble circumstances. At the end of October 1944 he said, ‘Whatever is said about Hitler and the Kaiser before him, the fact remains that all the wars in Europe in the last 300 years were engineered exclusively by Great Britain and simply for their notorious balance of power. Individual British people are very charming, but the British as a whole are swine.’ GRGG 214, 20–3.10.1944, TNA WO 208/4363. See also GRGG 233, 12–16.12.1944, GRGG 238, 23–6.12.1944, TNA WO 208/4364.

102

The idea espoused here by Ramcke that the Waffen-SS recruited extensively from within the nobility – an opinion also occasionally put forward after the war – has no basis in fact. Only 10 per cent of Waffen-SS generals were nobles, and the proportion amongst the Sturmbannführer grades was only 1.9 per cent, both clearly less than the Army officer corps (1943 all active officers 6.5 per cent; May 1944, all generals, about 20 per cent), Wegner, ‘Hitler’s Politische Soldaten’, p. 224.

103

The blockade remained in force until 12.7.1919. The Allies used this as an additional instrument to pressurise the Germans into signing the Treaty of Versailles.

104

The number of people who starved to death as the result of the blockade after the Armistice is unknown. Berger, ‘Germany after the Armistice’, p. 207 puts the figure of deaths per day at 800. There are no official statistics. See Vincent, ‘The Politics of Hunger’, p. 145. Berger’s figure for the first half of 1919 is clearly an overestimate. The latest research on the subject had provided no fresh data. Osborne, ‘Britain’s Economic Blockade of Germany’.

105

After the death of Heydrich in early June 1942, as a reprisal for his assassination 198 persons were executed at the village of Lidice west of Prague on 9.6.1942, and the locality razed to the ground. Karl Vogel, ‘Lidice’.

106

Hitler refused to have an arsenal of biological weapons for offensive use despite the reports of his leading military advisers on such weapons of mass destruction in Allied hands, for example the British anthrax bombs.^f See Rolf-Dieter Müller, ‘Albert Speer und die Rüstungspolitik im Totalen Krieg’, pp. 716–27.

^f Translator’s note. Germany had a large store of nerve gases however.

107

Bassenge is probably referring to Himmler’s speech of 26.7.1944 to 545.Volksgrenadier-Div. at Bitsch. In his long discourse he gave advice on how the officer corps should handle the men under its command. Himmler, ‘Geheimreden’, pp. 215–37, esp. p. 225.

108

‘Die Lagerpost. Nachrichten aus der Heimat und aller Welt für die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in England’ was a weekly information sheet in simple format appearing for the first time in May 1942. It provided comparatively sober news reports together with themes for discussion and puzzles. Edition No. 74 of 7.10.1943 is at TNA WO 208/3467.

109

Von Brauchitsch received no gifts of property from Hitler, but in common with others of Generaloberst rank and above enjoyed a ‘function supplement’ of RM4,000 monthly. Rumours circulated that Hitler had made him a gift of between RM80,000 and 250,000. Janssen, ‘Brauchitsch’, p. 86.

110

Generalfeldmarschall Walther von Reichenau (8.10.1884–17.1.1942). The ambitious Reichenau was keen to succeed Fristch as C-in-C Army in February 1938, and was actually recommended by Hitler for the post, but ran into determined opposition from prominent Army generals, amongst them von Rundstedt. Reichenau remained to the forefront but died in January 1942 while C-in-C Army Group South as the result of a heart attack. Simms, ‘Reichenau’; Richter, ‘Walther von Reichenau’.

111

The described visit took place at the beginning of February 1944. For Karinhall and the court he held there see Knopf/Martens, ‘Görings Reich’.

112

Feldmarschall Erhard Milch (30.3.1892–25.1.1972), from 1938 to 7.1.1945 Luftwaffe Inspector-General; 19.11.1941–20.6.1944 General in charge of aircraft production.

113

On the night of 16 May 1943, a special unit of 617 Squadron, RAF Bomber Command, attacked the Möhne, Sorpe and Eder dams in the Ruhr. Organisation ‘Todt’ put thousands of men to repair the damage, and all dams were restored by October 1943.

114

Generaloberst Bruno Loerzer (22.1.1891–22.8.1960), WWI fighter ace (44 kills, Pour le Merite). Goering flew as his observer in 1914/1915 before both were assigned to other units. 25.10.1939–22.2.1943 Commdg Gen. II.Fliegerkorps; from 23.2.1944 Head of Luftwaffe Personnel Bureau, Head of Personnel Equipment and National Socialist Leadership of Luftwaffe and Reich Air Ministry (RLM); 20.12.1944 Führer-Reserve.

115

This can only be Goering’s daughter Edda (b. 2.6.1938).

116

Taormina, a town on the east coast of Sicily between Catania and Messina where II.Fliegerkorps Staff had its HQ for some months.

117

Even in captivity, Eberding did not understand that the purpose of the war was not simply to repeal the Versailles Treaty, but pursued far more wide-reaching aims. He had also not read ‘Mein Kampf’, where Hitler had condemned the 1914 frontiers as completely inadequate. For the Treaty of Versailles and its application between the wars see e.g. Krumeich, ‘Versailles 1919’.

118

Wilhelm Frick (12.3.1977–16.10.1946), founding National Socialist, involved in Hitler putsch, 8/9.11.1923; 30.1.1933–24.8.1943 Reich Interior Minister.

119

The Hitler myth received its first substantial blow with the defeat at Stalingrad. Up to immediately before the invasion – Meyer is speaking here of May 1944 – the hope was still widespread that a decisive turn in the war was imminent and that Hitler would then quickly usher in ‘Endsieg’. Even Meyer’s assessment that the German people still ‘believed in’ Hitler is plausible on the basis of numerous other sources, but is not capable of empirical proof. The final break with Hitler did not occur until the spring of 1945. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Mythos’.

120

Meyer refers here to the political-ideological assimilation of Army and Waffen-SS in 1944. This process has not been researched conclusively. The early premise has been that only sections of the three Wehrmacht services and the Waffen-SS felt especially bound to Hitler. An exact quantification cannot be made on the basis of what was known at the time. An interesting indication is provided by Peter Leeb in his dissertation ‘Das Deutsche Westheer’, where he states that while the Waffen-SS in the West kept fighting even when a situation was hopeless, Army units had already surrendered earlier. Förster, ‘Geistige Kriegführung’.

121

The Army C-in-Cs were not implicated in the coup attempt of 20.7.1944. In the run-up there were consultations that confirmed the conspirators in their belief that if successful they could count on the support of field marshals Rommel and von Kluge. Heinemann, ‘Der militärische Widerstand’, pp. 863–71. On 17.7.1944 Stauffenberg learned of a rumour that FHQ would be blown up in the next few days. This was ‘a leak from his closest circle’. Ibid., p. 832.

122

After the withdrawal of German forces from Greece, the Greek Government in exile took over the running of affairs. The Communist EAM left the government on 1.12.1944. In December 1944 and January 1945 heavy fighting occurred with British forces. After three years of civil war, in 1949 the pro-monarchists gained control of Greece. Tim Jones, ‘British Army’; Smith, ‘Victory of a Sort’.

123

During the Ardennes offensive from 16.12.1944 to 24.12.1944 US forces lost 8,497 dead, 46,170 wounded, 15,000 prisoners and 5,900 missing. ‘Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg’, Vol. 9/1, p. 632.

124

Choltitz refers here to his talk with Hitler on 7.8.1944. See Document 32.

125

There are no documents relating to Meyer’s visits to Hitler. In his memoirs he only mentions receiving the Oak Leaves from Hitler at FHQ Winniza, Ukraine, at the end of February 1943. Kurt Meyer, ‘Grenadiere’, p. 185f.

126

The text of Goebbels’s speech of 31.12.1944 has not survived. In his diary he mentions it only briefly, ‘I recorded my end-of-year speech at midday. It is of a basically different character to my Christmas speech. In it I mention political problems and can therefore step out of myself more. It is not a good thing if I always deliver my speeches like a sermon. They must have some polemic again.’ Goebbels, ‘Diaries’, Vol. 14, p. 500f. Hitler’s speech of 1.1.1945 is reproduced in Domarus, ‘Hitler’, Vol. 2, pp. 2179–85.

127

This officer cannot be identified. According to some accounts, on 11.12.1944 Schaefer was in Nancy with an American diplomat and an intelligence officer, possibly General Robert A. McClure, Chief of the Psychological Warfare Division at SHAEF. Schaefer was unable to suggest any method of convincing the Germans to lay down their arms. He had described the fortifications at Zweibrücken to the Americans two days before in order to spare the town. BA/MA, Msg 2/79.

128

Chiang Kai-shek (31.10.1887–5.4.1975), from 1927 Head of the Chinese National Government of the Chinese People’s Party (Kuomintang) was far stronger in 1945 than his civil war opponent Mao Tse-tung (26.12.1893–9.9.1976). He had gained a status with the Allies during World War II and participated in the Cairo Conference of 26.11.1943. In 1945 he was one of the ‘Big Four’ statesmen. The main actor in the struggle against Japan, he received substantially more military aid from the USA than Mao. On 14.8.1945 in a ‘Treaty of Friendship’, Stalin guaranteed the National Government large-scale concessions in northern China. With that the politics of expansion, which had terminated abruptly in 1905, began to roll again. Chen, ‘China in 1945’.

129

Ramcke shows himself here as favouring the anti-Jewish and anti-Bolshevist core ideas of Nazi ideology. Volkmann, ‘Russlandbild im Dritten Reich’. For Ramcke’s thoughts on Jewish Bolshevism, see Förster, ‘Russlandbild’. For an overview of the ideological alignment of the German military, see Förster, ‘Geistige Kriegführung’. For the repeated claims of strong Jewish influence behind Bolshevism, see Slezkine, ‘Jewish Century’.

130

The number of Germans wounded in World War II is 52.4 million.

131

Felbert served on the Eastern Front in WWI. It is known, however, that as Feldkommandant he had at least 17 insurgents executed. See note 354 below.

132

Hitler’s speech of 30.1.1945 is reproduced in Domarus, ‘Hitler’, Vol. 2, pp. 2195–8. The generals were concerned particularly at the following passages, ‘The horrifying fate unfolding today in the East, and which is killing tens and hundreds of thousands in village and province, in the countryside and in cities will, despite all setbacks and tribulations, be beaten back and overcome by us in the end… Providence had it in her hand on 20 July to extinguish my life and put an end to my life’s work by the bomb that exploded within a metre and a half of me. I see it as a confirmation of the mission entrusted to me that the Almighty protected me that day. In the coming years I will therefore pursue the path of uncompromising representation of the interests of my people, undeterred by any emergency and danger, and permeated by the holy conviction that ultimately the Almighty will not abandon him who in all his life never wanted anything but to save his people from a fate which, by its size and significance, it never deserved.’

133

He means here the youngest of the three sons, Götz Eberbach, born 1930.

134

General der Panzertruppen Leo Reichsfreiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg (2.3.1886–27.1.1974), 1.4.1933–12.10.1937 Military Attaché in London, then CO, 3.Pz.Div.; from 15.2.1940 Cmmdg Gen., XXIV.Pz.Korps; 26.6.1942 of XXXX.Pz.Korps and 1.10.1942 of LVIII.Pz.Korps, from which Pz.Gr. West was formed. On 3.7.1944 he was relieved for pessimistic assessment of situation, replaced by Eberbach; until the end of the war he was Inspekteur der Panzertruppen. Geyr was critical of the regime, and Hitler called him ‘defeatist’ and ‘pessimist’ frequently after his time as military attaché. He had therefore to take a back seat at the Army Personnel Bureau. Although a proven commander at the front, he was never promoted to Generaloberst. He was unwilling to commit himself to active resistance to the regime and declined Stauffenberg’s approach in September 1942. Ose, ‘Entscheidung im Westen’, pp. 55, 151ff.; Peter Hoffman, ‘Stauffenberg’, p. 253. For Geyr and his influence on German rearmament, see Searle, ‘Wehrmacht Generals’, esp. p. 32ff.

135

The ‘Revenge for Sadova’ was a contemporary expression of French sensitivity at the shift in the European balance of power following the Prussian victory on 3.7.1866 at Königgrätz – this battle being named by the French after the nearby town of Sadova. This victory not only decided the war, but as a result Prussia rose from being a junior power to a major power of equal status to the France of Napoleon III.

136

The exact number of all German war dead is unknown. To the 5.3 million Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS dead must be added 400,000 dead by Allied bombing and 500,000 dead in expulsions and deportations. To these must also be added the civilian victims of the Nazi regime and the final battles of 1945, so that the final tally must lie somewhere between seven and eight million. Overmans, ‘Verluste’.

137

The shooting of prisoners by Grossdeutschland Division mentioned by Broich must have occurred in July 1942 during the advance on Voronezh when the unit was close to Broich’s 24.Pz.Div. It is the first mention of this war crime known to research.

138

The ‘Sunday Times’ article referred to by Eberbach remains unidentified. The four editions of January 1945 contain no mention of such reports by the Russians.

139

Schulz, ‘Der deutsche Napoleon’.

140

Generalleutnant Wolfgang Thomale (25.2.1900–20.10.1978). From 1.6.1938–14.5.1941 Staff, OKH Inspekteur der Panzertruppen; 15.5.1941 CO, III.Pz.Reg.25; 5.8.1941, CO, Pz.Reg.27; 1.4.1942 OKH liaison officer between Chief of Army Ordnance and CO, Ersatzheer, Generaloberst Friedrich Fromm and Armaments Minister Speer; 1.3.1943 Chief of Staff, Insp. Gen. der Panzertruppen.

141

Generaloberst Heinz Guderian (17.6.1888–14.5.1954) was the founder of the German panzer force and a highly successful commander of panzer formations in Poland, France and Russia. He was highly decorated (Knight’s Cross, 27.10.1939, Oak Leaves 17.7.1941), Hitler relieved him of command on 26.12.1941, and he was not re-employed until 1.3.1943, as Insp. Gen der Panzertruppen. After the coup attempt of 20.7.1944 Hitler made him chargé d’affaires for the Chief of the Army General Staff. After violent arguments with Hitler he was retired on 28.3.1945 and spent the period from 10.5.1945 to 17.6.1948 in US captivity. In recent publications his role, particularly as Chief of the Army General Staff, has been viewed critically. Wilhelm, ‘Guderian’.

142

See note 63 above.

143

None of the German generals at Trent Park was handed over to the Soviets. As a rule the Western Allies tried in their own tribunals those generals accused of war crimes committed in the East. The only exceptions were field marshals von Kleist and Schörner, who were in British and US captivity respectively at the war’s end, and were given over to the Soviets.

144

Generalmajor Rudolph-Christoff Freiherr von Gersdorff (27.3.1905–26.1.1980). Eberbach was apparently unaware that Gersdorff had been part of Henning von Tresckow’s resistance group and active in the coup plans while at Army Group Centre (20.4.1941–1.2.1944). Gersdorff is said to have rigged a bomb inside his uniform to kill Hitler and himself at a Berlin exhibition on 21.3.1943. From 29.7.1944 he was Chief of Staff, 7.Armee, of which Eberbach was C-in-C. Gersdorff, ‘Soldat im Untergang’.

145

For crimes committed by French troops during the occupation of the Ruhr from 11.1.1923 see Jeannesson, ‘Übergriffe’.

146

A connection between Ramcke and a Leutnant Hamm cannot be confirmed. Ramcke does not mention this officer in his memoirs.

147

For art theft by the Nazis see Heuss, ‘Kunst- und Kulturraub’, and Kurz, ‘Kunstraub in Europa’, where France is treated comprehensively (pp. 119–250).

148

After the spring and summer offensives of 1918 had brought no penetrative successes, morale in the Germany Western Army plunged perceptibly. Behind the front, thousands of soldiers milled around, lacking the will to gamble their lives for a lost cause. Wilhelm Deist has coined this as a ‘covert military strike’. Estimates range from 750,000 to a million ‘quitters’ in the last months of the war. Deist, ‘Verdeckter Militärstreik’.

149

The US 10th Armoured Division took Trier on 1–2.3.1945. Whereas the Neue Brücke over the Moselle was destroyed by explosives towards 1900hrs on 1 March, the Römer Brücke fell into American hands undamaged early the next morning. Christoffel, ‘Krieg am Westwall’, p. 478f.

150

The Kyll is a tributary of the Moselle. Its source is found on the Belgian frontier, it flows south through the Eifel and empties into the Moselle at Trier.

151

Rothkirch was acting commander of various corps from 1.1.1944 before he reformed 3.Armeekorps at Trier on 3.11.1944. There are no details of a deployment on the Eastern Front during 1944.

152

In his capacity as Cdr Ersatzheer from mid-September 1944, Himmler planned ‘the expansion of the Resistance in the border territories’. He first used the term ‘Werewolf’ in a speech on 28.10.1944. Chief of the planned Werewolf organisation, ‘Inspector-General for Special Defence at Reichsführer-SS’ was SS-Obergruppenführer and General der Waffen-SS Hans Prützmann (31.8.1901–21.5.1945), former HSSPF Ukraine/Russia South (November 1941 – September 1944). He supervised the training of small commando units to operate against Allied occupation forces on German territory. Their major achievement was the assassination of Oberbürgermeister Franz Oppenhoff (18.8.1902–25.3.1945) of Aachen. After this ‘success’, Goebbels set the organisation along a new path with his ‘Werewolf Proclamation’ at the beginning of April 1945 in which he exhorted the German population as a whole to take up arms against the invader. Even if the Werewolf never achieved the importance that the National Socialist leadership hoped for it, and had no influence on the course of the war or the postwar period, its potency should not be underestimated. Biddiscombe, ‘Werwolf!’; also Henke, ‘Besetzung Deutschlands’, pp. 160–8, 943–53.

153

On 26.2.1945, 2.Pz.Div. had one battleworthy Panther and two half tracks. The heavily battered 79 and 352.Volksgrenadier-Divisions also formed part of LIII.Korps. War Diary, 53.Armeekorps, Ia, BA/MA RH 24-53 /130.

154

See note 152 above.

155

Units of the US 89th Infantry Division took Eisenach on 6.4.1945 without a fight. The heavy damage to the town was the result of five air raids between February 1944 and February 1945. Brunner, ‘Bewegte Zeiten’, p. 65f.

156

For the fighting for Wesel, during which Josef Ross was taken prisoner, see Berkel, ‘Krieg vor der Haustür’.

157

After a short fight, Wertheim fell to 1st and 2nd Battalions, Reg.222, US 42nd Inf.Div. on 1.4.1945. The town received mortar and artillery fire on several occasions that day, the first before noon after a brief exchange with German resistance and again in the afternoon to convince Major Hermann Dürr to hoist the white flag. The road bridge over the Tauber, damaged by explosives set by German pioneers, was re-opened to traffic after a few hours. Contrary to Pfuhlstein’s allegation, the artillery damage was negligible. No deaths were reported amongst the civilian population. Ehmer, ‘Kampf um Nassig’.

158

On 11 and 12.12.1944 at FHQ Adlerhorst near Bad Nauheim, Hitler addressed between 20 to 30 generals. A part of his speech has survived. Domarus, ‘Hitler’, Vol. 2, p. 2171f. Viebig was present at Bad Nauheim in his capacity as CO, 277.Volksgrenadier-Division.

159

Generaloberst Hans-Georg Reinhardt (1.3.1887–22.11.1953) was C-in-C, Army Group Centre from 16.8.1944, relieved by Hitler for insubordination, 26.1.1945. On 16.12.1944 he noted in his diary, ‘Counter-attack in the West is beginning. Marvellous.’ (BA/MA N245/3) Reinhardt was a gifted and courageous panzer general who, despite many doubts over Nazi aggression, knuckled down and expressed no open criticism of Hitler to his face until January 1945. By doing so Reinhardt rose above the mass of German generals who followed Hitler’s orders to the end either through cowardice, self-deception or fanaticism. Clasen, ‘Reinhardt’.

160

The Chief of 7.Armee General Staff was Generalmajor Rudolph Christoff Freiherr von Gersdorff (27.3.1905–26.1.1980).

161

Generalleutnant Dr (Dentistry) Rudolf Hübner (29.4.1897–1965) was an infantry officer who distinguished himself (Knight’s Cross) as a regimental commander. September 1943 – January 1945, Head Section P2, Army Personnel Bureau, then CO, 303.Inf.Div., Döberitz. On 9.3.1945 Hitler ordered the setting up of a ‘Flying Court Martial’ under Hübner’s command. In this capacity he answered to the Führer directly and received his orders from him personally. The Flying Court Martial was competent to try all charges involving members of the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS, and could carry out its sentences immediately. The first victims of these mobile murder squads were four officers held responsible for the loss of the bridge at Remagen on 7.3.1945. The enabling order appears at Müller/Ueberschar, ‘Kriegsende 1945’, p. 163f.

162

Generalleutnant Willibald Utz (20.1.1893–1954), CO, 2.Gebirgs-Div. from 9.2.1945.

163

See note 161 above.

164

For the speech by Frederick the Great to his generals and regimental commanders on 4.12.1757, the eve of the Battle of Leuthen, see Kroener, ‘Nun danket alle Gott’.

165

General der Infanterie Gustav Höhne (17.2.1893–1.7.1951), from 1.12.1944 Cmmdg Gen. LXXXIX.Pz.Korps.

166

In a radio broadcast on the late evening of 1 May 1945, Grossadmiral Dönitz announced the ‘hero’s death’ of Adolf Hitler and issued a proclamation to the armed forces in the following terms, ‘German Wehrmacht! My comrades! The Führer has fallen. Loyal to his grand concept to save the people of Europe from Bolshevism, he has sacrificed his life and found a hero’s death. One of the greatest heroes in German history has left us. In proud veneration and mourning we lower our flags before him. The Führer has named me as his successor as Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht and Head of State. I assume supreme command of all services of the German Wehrmacht with the intention of continuing the struggle against the Bolshevists until such time as the fighting forces and the hundreds of thousands of families in the German East have been saved from slavery and extermination. I am compelled to fight on against the British and Americans insofar as, and as long as, they hinder me in the execution of the struggle against Bolshevism. From you, who have already performed such great historical deeds and who now long for an end to the war, the situation demands further unconditional service. Only by carrying out my orders without reservation can chaos and defeat be avoided. That man is a coward and traitor who precisely now abandons his duty and by so doing leaves German women and children to die or become slaves. The oath of loyalty sworn to the Führer is still valid henceforth for each one of you without anything further from me as the successor appointed by the Führer.’ The complete text of the proclamation is reproduced in Domarus, ‘Hitler’, Vol. 2, p. 2250f. For Dönitz’s role as Hitler’s successor see Hillmann, ‘Reichsregierung in Flensburg’. For other reactions to the speech see SRGG 1177(c), 2.5.1945, TNA WO 208/4169.

167

Generalfeldmarschall Ernst Busch (6.7.1885–17.7.1945) was C-in-C, North-West from March 1945. On 1.5.1945 Dönitz nominated him C-in-C, North, with the task of leading the struggle in the North outside Norway and Denmark. Short biography at Mitcham, ‘Busch’. Contrary to the statement in the protocol, he was not a signatory to the partial capitulation in northern Germany. OKW War Diary, Vol. 8, p. 1670f.

168

Franz appears to have forgotten that Hitler became Reich Chancellor under President Hindenburg and succeeded in seizing power in the land subsequently.

169

Heim had a surprisingly perceptive view that coincides with modern research ideas. Many generals such as Manstein could not, or would not, see that the defeat of the German Reich was inevitable. Overy was right in saying, however, that the Allied first had to win the war. Overy, ‘Why the Allies Won’.

170

There is no prominent statement by Frederick the Great from which one might infer that he admired Russian soldiers. On the contrary, the Prussian monarch spoke frequently of them in adverse vein. Kunisch, ‘Friedrich der Grosse’.

171

For the operational efficiency of the Red Army see Mawdsley, ‘Thunder in the East’ together with Russian literature.

172

Despite the great operational successes of the Red Army from the winter of 1942 onwards, one should not overlook the fact that in its offensives it received repeated bitter setbacks to inspire caution. Tank corps which pushed too far forward were wiped out between the Donetz and Dnieper in February 1943, at Warsaw in August 1944 and at Grosswardeien in September 1944. For the superiority of the Wehrmacht over the Red Army in armoured tactics see Karl-Heinz Frieser, ‘Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg’, Vol. 8.

173

The plan for the French campaign was an idea of Generalleutnant Manstein. Hitler realised that it fitted in with his own concept and adopted it. Frieser, ‘Blitzkrieg-Legende’, pp. 71–116.

174

Heim is right if he doubts that the Blitzkrieg experience in France was transposed on Russia. It was hoped to break the backbone of the Red Army by means of great encirclements near the border. The German military leadership vastly underestimated the enormous resources and will to resist of the Soviets. ‘Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg’, Vol. 4.

175

In all, 62 different types of lorry of German manufacture were used by the Wehrmacht. Oswald, ‘Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer’, p. 169f. The Army in the East was chronically short of lorries from the summer of 1941 onwards so that captured vehicles were increasingly pressed into service, which augmented the varieties. Although Armaments Minister Speer decided in 1942 to concentrate on producing only three weight classes of lorry, the problem of the variety of types remained unresolved. In the spring of 1943 on the Eastern Front there were 110 types of lorry identified with one particular division. Rolf-Dieter Müller, ‘Albert Speer’, p. 633f.

176

The Red Army had only two standard lorries, the GAZ-AA and ZIS-5. Most of the Lend-Lease vehicles were Studebaker US-6s.

177

To make up for the enormous losses in manpower due to the huge areas of territory falling under German occupation, the remainder of the workforce was obliged to perform compulsory overtime. An 11-hour day was required, all holidays were discontinued, many concerns went over to 24-hour production. Concerns vital to the war effort increased the workforce by employing women and teenage children and by taking workers away from non-essential occupations. Zverev, ‘Ekonomika Vajuscich Derzav’, p. 316. For the construction of bunkers and firefighting duties etc., a local Air Raid Precaution (MPO) was formed, run by the NKVD (see note 213 below), which mobilised all local residents aged between 16 and 60 for civil defence. If the military situation demanded it, MPO would also assemble a Home Army (Narodnoe Opolocenie). Its members would frequently be volunteers, although occasionally press-gang methods would be employed. Löwe, ‘USSR’, p. 1228. Also Barber/Harrison, ‘Soviet Home Front’.

178

See note 205 below.

179

Between June 1940 and June 1941, 950 T-34/76As were built. These were succeeded by 9,290 T-34/76Bs between January 1941 and mid-June 1942. Deployed at the front in August 1941 for the first time, the production figures prove that by 1942 it had become the standard Soviet tank. Zaloga/Grandsen, ‘Soviet Tanks’.

180

As a result of the German advance, by the autumn, significant centres of industry fell under German control. Production from iron ores fell in 1942 by between 32 and 38 per cent in comparison to pre-war levels, cast iron by 32 to 49 percent, steel 26 to 35 per cent. More than 80 per cent of all armaments factories, including 94 per cent of all aircraft factories, were close to the areas of war interest or not far from the front. In the regions east of the Urals a total of 3,500 major industrial projects were commenced and running in the 1941–45 period. Zverev, ‘Ekonomika’, p. 315ff. In the third quarter of 1941, 1,360 major concerns, mostly armaments, were evacuated east of the Urals. By the end of the year the number had risen to 1,523, by mid-1942 more then 1,200 were in operation at the new locations. Hildermeier, ‘Geschichte der Sowjetunion’, p. 634f.

181

The Geman 3.7-cm PAK36 anti-tank gun was the standard weapon of the Army from 1936 to 1941; 20,000 were built before production was halted in March 1942. In France in 1940 it was observed that the round did not penetrate the armour of British and French heavy tanks, and the gun was also found to be ineffective against Soviet tanks of the types T-34, KW-1 and KW-2. It was replaced during 1942 by the 5-cm and eventually 7.5-cm PAK40, delivered from February 1942. Hogg, ‘Deutsche Artilleriewaffen’, pp. 289–305; Hahn, ‘Waffen’, pp. 99–103. In the summer of 1941 the Soviet Army introduced the 5.7-cm ZIS-2 anti-tank gun, which in its various further developments remained in service to the end of the war.

182

Heim is probably referring here to the skilfully disguised push by the Red Army against Army Group Centre under the codename ‘Operation Bagration’, commencing 22.6.1944. The German assessment of the enemy situation before the assault was contradictory. Although the Department of Foreign Armies East had identified the focal point of the Soviet attack, they were surprised by its strength. Hitler and the Army Group Centre commanders were both deceived by the Soviet intention. Rolf-Dieter Müller, ‘Der Zweite Weltkrieg’, pp. 322–4.

183

The population of the Soviet Union at the beginning of 1940 was 194 million. Zverev, ‘Ekonomika’, p. 314. The mention of millions of Chinese coolies reflects the growing fears in the United States and Europe at the end of the nineteenth century that Russia could make use of this reservoir of Chinese people. Neitzel, ‘Weltmacht oder Untergang’, pp. 113–17, 240–5, 278f.

184

During the October Revolution and civil war the social layer of intelligentsia diminished from an estimated 2 million (1917) to barely 1 million (1923), but then rose again to 5.9 millions by 1939. Melville/Steffens, ‘Bevölkerung’, p. 1188f. Against that the Russian upper classes had been destroyed at the latest by the Stalinist industrialisation. Ibid., p. 1174.

185

This quote relates to losses amongst front-line troops. By the end of 1944, the Red Army had lost 26,579,242 officers and men of which 10,472,209 were classified as total losses (killed, died of natural causes, dead by accident, missing and PoW). Of the latter, 5.7 million were PoWs according to German statistics. Krivoseev, ‘Grif sekretnosti snjat’, p. 143f. By the end of 1944 the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS had 2,743,000 dead on the Eastern Front (Overmans, ‘Verluste’, p. 279) and 955,000 had been taken prisoner (Böhme, ‘Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in sowjetischer Hand’, p. 49), therefore 3,698,000 men. The ratio of total losses including PoWs is therefore 1:2.83, losses alone 1:1.74.

186

The strength of a Soviet rifle division was between 9,300 and 10,000 men.

187

For the partisan movement in the Ukraine, Berkhoff, ‘Harvest of Despair’, pp. 275–8.

188

Only twice did the Red Army deploy large military formations behind the German lines. After the Moscow counter-offensive in the winter of 1941, 250th Airborne Reg. and two battalions, 201st Airborne Brigade, in all around 1,640 men, were landed 40 kilometres south of Viasma near Znamenka and Zhelanye. H. Reinhardt, ‘Luftlandungen’. On 24.9.1943, 4th and 5th Airborne Brigades were set down about 40 kilometres behind the German front at Krementshug south-east of Kiev for the purpose of setting up bridgeheads over the Dnieper. The operation was poorly coordinated and the troops were soon overwhelmed by German forces. Glanz, ‘The Soviet Airborne Experience’, pp. 91–112, Zaloga, ‘Inside the Blue Berets’, pp. 95–116. See also Karl-Heinz Frieser in ‘Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg’, Vol. 8. The Soviets also dropped a large number of well-trained agents in small platoons to collaborate with partisans. The total number is disputed. According to Thomas, ‘Foreign Armies East’, p. 274, there were more than 130,000 agents. This seems doubtful, for the number of active partisans in the summer of 1944, the height of their activity, did not exceed 280,000. Bonwetsch, ‘Der Grosse Vaterländische Krieg’, p. 944, note 2.

189

No detailed work exists on the deployment of Wehrmacht and SS forces against partisans on the Eastern Front.

190

For convoys of partisan plunder see Edition Musial, ‘Sowjetische Partisanen’ which though rich in material is neither comprehensive nor impartial. Also see dissertation by Alexander Brakel, ‘Baronowicze 1939–1944’.

191

No adequate academic study on partisan anti-railway warfare using both German and Russian original sources has been made. It would seem that its influence on military developments at the front were slight because partisans failed to interrupt the German supply lines for any considerable period of time. Berkhoff, ‘Harvest of Despair’, p. 278f.

192

Meant here is Lt-Gen. Mikhail Popatov (1902–65), C-in-C, Soviet 5th Army. He entered the Red Army in 1920 and took part in the closing stages of the civil war. A Party member from 1926, he fought with success against the Japanese in 1939 and in 1941 took command of 5th Army at Kiev. On 21.9.1941 he was captured by the Germans; 1958–65 Chief of Military District, Odessa. His last rank was Col-General. Maslov, ‘Captured Soviet Generals’, p. 54ff.

193

General der Kavallerie Ernst Köstring (20.6.1876–20.11.1953) was born of German parents in Moscow and served as military attaché there from 1935 to 1941. In May 1941 German ambassador Werner Graf von Schulenburg authored a memorandum signed by Köstring and embassy advisers Gustav Hilger and Kurt von Tippelskirch in which they declared themselves opposed to the war. Gorodetsky, ‘Täuschung’, p. 262.

194

Thoma informed Crüwell of a conversation with Hitler after his return from the Spanish Civil War in which Hitler had said, ‘Look, I never go for intellect, I go only for intuition’. SRM 114, 24.11.1942, TNA WO 208/4136.

195

Heim is probably speaking of Churchill’s radio broadcast on 13.5.1945 in which he said, ‘And if you hold out alone long enough, there always comes a time when the tyrant makes some ghastly mistake. On June 22nd 1941 Hitler… hurled himself on Russia and came face to face with Marshal Stalin and the numberless millions of the Russian people.’ Churchill, ‘Speeches’, Vol. VII, p. 7160.

196

See note 200 below.

197

Between 90 and 95 per cent of German soldiers in Red Army captivity in 1941 failed to survive. Probably most were murdered fairly soon after capture. Böhme, ‘Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in sowjetischer Hand’, p. 110. Atrocities against German prisoners occurred in the jurisdiction of 6.Armee, where Ferdinand Heim was Chief of Staff, particularly at the outset of the campaign. In the appendices to 6.Armee War Diary, Ia, some cases of crimes against German prisoners are documented in detail, some with an autopsy report and photographs. This material does not substantiate claims of ‘innumerable cases’. Evidence of Soviet breaches of international law occur for example in the following files: -LI Armeekorps, Ic, Activity Report No. 1, 19.6.1941–31.7.1941 (BA/MA RH 24-51/54) (mutilated German corpses at Skomorochy, also mentioned at BA/MA RH 20-6, AOK 6, Ic/03, evening report, 1.7.1941, folio 41); 56.Inf.Div., Ic, Activity Report, 22.6.1941–1.8.1941 (BA/MA RH26-56/18) (Report on ‘Bitterness’ at Soviet war crimes); 99.(Light) Inf.Div., Ic, to Gen.Kdo XVII.Armeekorps, Ic, Breaches of international law by Red troops, 2.7.1941 (BA/MA RH26-99 /21) (Reprisals ordered in response to Soviet war crimes); and 168.Inf.Div., Ic, Activity Report, 22–30.6.1941 (BA/MA RH26-168/40) (from 24.6.1941 several cases of serious mistreatment of German soldiers behind their own lines, responsibility not unequivocally clear).

198

6.Armee Staff was never at Kiev, a fact that Heim was at pains to emphasise after the war to support his assertion that he knew nothing about the mass murder at Babi Yar. The Army Staff was at Zhitomir to 13.9.1941 and moved from Ivankov to Prjevejasslav and Lubny to Poltava on 19.10.1941, where it remained until the spring of 1942. Details at BA/MA RH20-6/711.

199

Thoma presumably refers here to an OKH instruction at the end of August 1941 to execute not only the Commissars, but also the political leaders (Politruks) competent from regimental level downwards. A special order regarding ‘Regiment-Kommissars’ of November/December 1941 is unknown. See ‘Das Deutsche Reich und Der Zweite Weltkrieg’, Vol. 4, p. 1067f. The Army soon recognised that the Commissar Order bolstered the resistance of the Red Army. See also ibid., p. 1068.

200

Michail Tuchatshevsky (16.2.1893–11.6.1937) was Chief of the Red Army General Staff from 1925 to 1928, and from 1931 Head of Ordnance. In connection with the collaboration over armaments there had been bilateral visits to field manoeuvres and tours of inspection from 1925. Thus in 1928/29 five Soviet commanders of the third Assistant Commanding Officers’ course stayed in Berlin for up to a year. Zeidler, ‘Reichswehr und Rote Armee’, pp. 224–7, Gorlow, ‘Geheimsache Moskau-Berlin’, p. 156.

201

Major-General Pawel Below commanded a 20,000-strong battle group formed from elements of 1.Guard-Cavalry Corps, airborne troops and partisans, which became encircled behind the German lines in the Smolensk/Kirov area during the Soviet winter offensive. Thoma’s 2.Pz.Div. set about wiping out this battle group from March 1942 onwards, and had succeeded by the beginning of June 1942. The partisan units were assembled in independent ‘divisions’ of which the unknown colonel mentioned here was apparently the partisans’ liaison man to Below’s staff. ‘Das deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg’, Vol. 6, p. 865f. For the organisation of Below’s units, see Armstrong, ‘Soviet Partisans’, p. 177f; Hinze, ‘Hitze’, pp. 124–8.

202

From the summer of 1941 numerous Russian so-called ‘volunteers’ were attached to German units and performed valuable service, particularly in supply. In May 1943 they numbered about 600,000. J. Hoffmann, ‘Wlassow-Armee’, p. 14.

203

The Commissar Order itself was not likely to have fallen into Red Army hands since the document was only circulated at Armee command level. It is quite possible that the Russians captured files that had been compiled at divisional level and which made reference to the Commissar Order. ‘Das deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg’, Vol. 4, p. 438.

204

A placename resembling ‘Vlasitchi’ cannot be found in a gazeteer of Russian localities.

205

Brauchitsch and Halder definitely did not refuse the Commissar Order. After Hitler’s address to the generals on 30.3.1941, Halder even ordered the first draft prepared. This was then passed from OKH to OKW, where it was put into its final textual form ready for signature. Brauchitsch’s explanatory notes of 8.6.1941 did not attempt to transform the order in any way, but merely aimed to prevent Army units from committing excesses. That some Army commanders watered down the Commissar Order, or ignored it, is documented. The extent to which the order was enforced has given rise to controversy in the past. Felix Römer’s Kiel dissertation ‘Besondere Massnahmen’ was based on a review of all available German archive material and proved that in more than 80 per cent of all German divisions commissars were liquidated, although the final total of commissars and politruks executed cannot be determined exactly because of the poor documentation on hand. Römer estimates it at ‘a high four-digit figure’, but ‘never 10,000’. ‘Das deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg’, Vol. 4, pp. 435–40, 1069f; Rohde, ‘Politishe Indoktrination’, Hartmann, ‘Halder’ pp. 241–54.

206

As General der Schnellen Truppen, von Thoma rarely left OKH HQ at Zossen until July 1941, and then only for short tours of inspection. He may therefore have been party to the internal debates about the Commissar Order, although his pocket diary has no entries to that effect. BA/MA N2/2.

207

To which OKW order von Thoma is referring here is unknown. Not until the structural change in the officer corps in the autumn of 1942 did it become obligatory for generals commanding troop units to endorse whole-heartedly ‘the National Socialist worldview’. Thoma, taken prisoner in North Africa at the beginning of November 1942, may not have been aware of this change. Förster, ‘Führerheer’, p. 318.

208

General der Panzertruppe Walther Nehring (15.8.1892–20.4.1983), from 26.10.1940 CO, 18.Pz.Div.; 9.3.1942 Cmmdg Gen., Deutsches Afrika Korps; 15.11.1942 appointed Cdr, German forces in Tunisia; 9.12.1942 Führer-Reserve; 10.2.1943 C-in-C, XXIV.Pz.Korps; 21.4.1945 C-in-C, 1.Pz.Armee.

209

No such order by Nehring has been found in the War Diary, 18.Pz.Div., which deployed alongside Thoma’s 17.Pz.Div. in the summer of 1941, nor in the Deutsches Afrika Korps War Diary.

210

Brauchitsch and Halder not only tolerated SS atrocities in Poland in 1939/1940, but became deeply inveigled in a war of extermination against the USSR in 1941 from an anti-Bolshevist standpoint. Hartmann, ‘Halder’.

211

The report to OKW to which Thoma refers here is unidentified. On 31.12.1941 he maintained that amongst other things he had written, ‘For a decent German soldier it is a disgrace and a scandal that he is being trained in this manner, in a way that is unworthy of a German soldier.’ He received no reply to this letter. SRX 1442, 31.12.1944, TNA WO 208/4162. 24,000 Jews were murdered in Minsk in August and November 1941. Thoma can have had only indirect knowledge of these massacres because his division stood several hundred kilometres east of the city; on a tour of the front he was in the Minsk area on 1.7.1941 and 17.7.1941. When he took command of 17.Pz.Div.on 21.7.1941, this was already south-east of Smolensk. Accordingly it is more probable that he was referring to smaller-scale murders from the beginning of July 1941. Gerlach, ‘Kalkulierte Morde’, p. 549, ‘Enzyklopädie des Holocaust’, Vol. II, p. 950f, and see Thoma, diary entries 1, 17, 21.7.1941, BA/MA 2/2. A locality called Pskip cannot be found in the Russian gazeteer of placenames.

212

Crüwell was attempting here to justify the German mass murders behind the front as a reaction to illegal partisan warfare. This allowed him to knowingly skirt the fact that the Wehrmacht – independent of the danger that actually existed to some extent from dispersed Red Army units – proceeded with mindless brutality against the civilian population. Army units murdering tens of thousands of civilians under the pretext of combating partisans. This is not to mention the 700,000 to 750,000 victims of the SD-Einsatzgruppen in the period to the spring of 1942, which Crüwell also plays down valiantly. ‘Das deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg’, pp. 1030–78; Krausnick/Wilhelm, ‘Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges’, p. 620. It is also interesting that Thoma apparently knew that all Jews in the occupied territories were to be liquidated. For the mass murder of the Jewish civilian population in the Soviet Union, see Longerich, ‘Politik der Vernichtung’, pp. 293–418.

213

OGPU, Soviet secret service, 1922–24. At the time of World War II it was known as NKVD. For the alleged NKVD shootings in Poland see Musiel, ‘Konterrevolutionäre Elemente’.

214

Ludowice is about 30 kilometres north-east of Thorn in Poland (formerly West Prussia), but Neuffer is probably thinking of another, White Russian locality of similar name near Minsk. Neuffer became Chief of Staff, Luftgaukommando Moskau on 1.12.1941 and would not have been aware of the murder of 7,000 Jews at Minsk on 20.11.1941. His account refers most probably to executions in March 1942 when 5,000 Jews were murdered. Neuffer was transferred out of Russia in April 1942. ‘Enzyklopädie des Holocaust’, Vol. II, p. 951.

215

For the involvement of Lithuanian auxiliaries in the mass shootings on the Eastern Front, see Dean, ‘Collaboration’; Stang, ‘Hilfspolizisten’.

216

From April to November 1942 Neuffer was CO, 5.Flak.Div. at Darmstadt. At this time there were seven large-scale deportations of Jews from Frankfurt am Main that had apparently not escaped Neuffer’s notice. ‘Dokumente zur Geschichte der Frankfurter Juden’, p. 532f.

217

In the spring of 1943, German troops 20 kilometres west of Smolensk in the Katyn Forest discovered the mass graves of 4,363 Polish officers murdered by the Red Army in 1940. Nazi propaganda made the best possible use of this opportunity. Goebbels, ‘Diaries’, Vol. 8, entries for 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24 and 28.4.1943.

218

Oberst Johannes Heym (6.10.1894–?) was commandant of several airfields during the war. He was captured in Tunisia and arrived at Trent Park in mid-May 1943. On 21.8.1943 he was transferred to the United States.

219

During the invasion of Belgium in the summer and autumn of 1914, there spread amongst German troops an irrational fear of snipers, as a result of which they weighed in with great brutality against the civilian population, killing 6,500 persons and laying waste to 20,000 dwellings. The beginning of trench warfare quickly put an end to this madness. Horne/Kramer, ‘German Atrocities’.

220

From June 1941 to June 1942 Liebenstein was Chief of Staff, Pz.Gr.2. The number of Soviet prisoners killed by this army has not yet been established. An approximate figure is expected from Römer’s ‘Besondere Massnahmen’. So far it is only certain that by the end of August 1941, 141 Commissars had been shot. ‘Germany and the Second World War’, Vol. 4, p. 567.

221

Until 15.8.1941 Ludwig Crüwell was CO, 11.Pz.Div., which acted in concert with Pz.Gr.1, Army Group South. A report by Ic, 11.Pz.Div. states that 10 Commissars were shot dead on 14.7.1941. Ic Report, 11.Pz.Div. to XXXXVIII.Armeekorps, BA/MA RH 4-48/198, Appx 29.

222

See additionally Streit, ‘Keine Kameraden’, p. 128.

223

Hitler expressed his distrust of Army generals on numerous occasions, as for example on 5.11.1939 when he threatened Brauchitsch that he would ‘exorcise the spirit of Zossen’. One of the greatest crises occurred in the winter of 1941 and autumn of 1942 when the generals were not in a position to carry out Hitler’s unrealistic orders. See e.g. Kershaw, ‘Hitler, 1936–1945’, pp. 369f, 605–11, 693–701, Hartmann, ‘Halder’, p. 331ff. One of Hitler’s typical outbursts of rage against generals of the nobility fell on Karl-Wilhelm von Schlieben after he surrendered his Cherbourg command post on 26.6.1944. ‘Hitlers Lagebesprechungen’, p. 261, note 345.

224

See note 244 below for other references to German war crimes in Greece.

225

Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein (14.1.1899–31.1.1970) is meant here. From 25.2.1940 to 29.8.1941 Ia, Pz.Gr.2; from 5.10.1941 to 6.5.1943, Staff, North Africa. He was then flown out of Tunisia. Pz.Gr.2 was stationed in Warsaw for several weeks prior to the attack on Russia, and in this period Bayerlein would have been in the immediate vicinity of the ghetto created in November 1940. Szarota, ‘Warschau unter dem Hakenkreuz’; Guderian, ‘Erinnerungen eines Soldaten’, p. 139. Thoma mentioned that a doctor assigned to his division ‘was always going on about Völkisch matters, in racial stories’. It was from this doctor that he had learned of the dreadful conditions in the Warsaw ghetto. From the protocols it is not certain whether Thoma ever went through the ghetto himself. SRXX 1577, 11.2.1943, TNA WO 208/4162.

226

This is a reference to the mass murder of 33,771 Jews at Babi Yar near Kiev between 29 and 30.9.1941. See Rüss, ‘Babij Jar’, pp. 483–508.

227

See note 202 above.

228

Albert Leo Schlageter (12.8.1894–26.5.1923) attempted to blow up a stretch of the Duisburg – Düsseldorf railway track during the Ruhr disturbances. Arrested by the French, he was condemned to death on 8.5.1923 and executed on 26.5.1923. The Schlageter case caused an uproar, although he was by no means the only victim of French and Belgian repressive methods in the Ruhr. Up to 1.8.1924 141 Germans had been killed there. Franke, ‘Der erste Soldat’, p. 33; Zwicker, ‘Nationale Märtyrer’.

229

The speaker refers here to the 16 men killed during the Hitler putsch of 9 November 1923.

230

This is a reference to Hitler’s conviction that only he could lead Germany to ‘greatness’ in a war. Kershaw, ‘Hitler, 1936–1945’, p. 320; Heer, ‘Glaube des Adolf Hitler’, pp. 293, 319.

231

The speaker alludes here to the German – Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 23.8.1939, a relationship that brought Germany major economic benefits in the period to 21.6.1941. Ahmann, ‘Hitler-Stalin-Pakt’; Weinberg, ‘Eine Welt in Waffen’, pp. 222–7.

232

The following passage identifies the speaker as Generalleutnant von Broich. He had been in Russia in 1941 as CO, Reiter-Reg.22 and 1, and in this capacity would probably not have been shown the Commissar Order. See note 242 below.

233

The opinion given here that the killing of hostages is covered by international law is misleading. The 1907 Hague Convention relating to land warfare contained no binding regulations, and it was left to individual states to interpret how each would react in warfare to illegal resistance. See in this connection the dissertation (in preparation) of Andreas Toppe, ‘Wehrmacht und Völkerrecht’, also ‘Zwischen Hammer und Sichel – Bewaffneter Widerstand der Bevölkerung in Ostmittel-europa während des Zweiten Weltkriegs und die Reaktion der deustchen und sowjetischen Besatzungsmacht’ in AHF No. 72, 8.11.2001.

234

Arnim probably means the great uprising by Indian nationalists against the British Raj that shocked the nation in August 1942 and was put down by force of arms. Hutchins, ‘India’s Revolution’.

235

Details of the involvement of the Army Weapons Office chemists in the gassings are not known to exist.

236

In Berditschev, Ukraine, on 4.9.1941 1,500 Jews, on 15.9.1941 18,600, and on 3.11.1941 another 2,000 were shot dead by German and Ukrainian police. In Zhitomir, these police shot dead 5,000 Jews in July and August 1941, and on 18.9.1941 another 3,145 Jews. ‘Enzyklopädie des Holocaust’, Vol. 1, p. 185, Vol. 3., p. 1308. The identity of the senior police official mentioned here is unknown. All that can be confirmed is that the last Jewish survivors of Berditschev were executed in July 1942 by the local Sipo head, Alois Hülsdünker; Mazov, ‘Berditschew’. During his captivity Reimann spoke out about his front experiences in Russia mainly to stress the enormous losses suffered by German units during the 1941 advance. SRGG 736, 3.1.1944, SRGG 745, 6.1.1944, both TNA WO 208/4167, and SRGG 820, 7.2.1944, TNA WO 208/4168.

237

Most recorded texts of the BBC German Service were destroyed after the war. Therefore the material broadcast on the evening of 19.12.1943 cannot be reconstructed. Balfour, ‘Der deutsche Dienst der BBC’, p. 141. BBC News brought daily reports about the war crimes trial in Kharkov. BBC Written Archive Centre, letter dated 24.10.2002 to this author.

238

The first trial of German military personnel was held at Kharkov between 15 and 18.12.1943. Hauptmann Wilhelm Langheld (Military Abwehr), SS-Untersturmführer Hans Ritz, Reinhard Retzlaff (Secret Field Police) and a Russian collaborator were accused of the murder of Russian prisoners and civilians by the use of a mobile gassing truck. The accused were all condemned to death and hanged publicly. The trial was public, film cameras being allowed and a stenographed transcript was made available in several languages. Zeidler, ‘Stalinjustiz contra NS-Verbrechen’, p. 25ff; Streim, ‘Behandlung’, p. 251ff.

239

Hans-Jürgen von Arnim.

240

General der Artillerie Walther von Seydlitz Kurzbach (22.8.1888–28.4.1976) was Chairman of the anti-Nazi ‘Bund Deutscher Offiziere’ and Vice-President, ‘Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland’. Captured at Stalingrad 31.1.1943 as Commdg Gen. LI.Armeekorps, he pleaded for Hitler to be overthrown and an end to the war. Ueberschar, ‘Nationalkomitee’; older material, Frieser, ‘Krieg hinter Stacheldraht’. On Seydlitz, see Reschin, ‘General zwischen den Fronten’; Carnes, ‘General zwischen Hitler und Stalin’.

241

Nothing is known of shootings by the SS-Leibstandarte in Greece in 1941. The exact circumstances in which Thoma and Dietrich knew each other from the 1920s is also unknown. From 1920 Thoma was active in 7.Bavarian (mot.)/7.Bav.Reichswehr-Div.; Dietrich was a member of Reichsbund Oberland and claimed to have taken part in the Hitler putsch, and so they were both in Bavaria. The conversation between Thoma and Dietrich can only have been held on 3.5.1941: Thoma was on an inspection tour in Greece from 28.4.1941 to 8.5.1941 and took part in the victory parade in Athens on 3.5.1941. Sepp Dietrich led the SS-Leibstandarte in the same parade. See Thoma Diary, 3.5.1941, BA/MA N2/2; Lehmann, ‘Die Leibstandarte’, Vol. 1, p. 425f. It also seems that Thoma and Dietrich met just after the French campaign. Thoma reported of this reunion, ‘I can only repeat what Sepp Dietrich said to me towards the end of the French campaign in Normandy, “Look here, Herr General – you know what I was; I am an able soldier, I won’t let anyone deny that, but a leader – that I am not.”’ SRGG 953, 11.7.1944, TNA WO 208/4168.

242

What Thoma says is incorrect. The Commissar Order of 6.6.1941 was an OKW guideline signed by Warlimont by virtue of his office. It had come from OKH and been given two additional paragraphs of limitations. It was distributed in this form to the Army Groups and Armies. Hitler never signed any order regarding Commissars. Transmission of the Order below Army Group/Army level was never envisaged. The Commissar Order is reproduced in Streim, ‘Behandlung’, p. 350f; see also ‘Das deutsche Reich im Zweiten Weltkrieg’, Vol. 4, p. 437f. The inspiration for the Order came from Hitler and was adopted willingly by both OKH and OKW. Although the extent to which it was enforced is not known in detail because of the paucity of source material, it was the rule rather than the exception to carry it out. See Römer, ‘Besondere Massnahmen’, and ‘Das deutsche Reich im Zeiten Weltkrieg’, Vol. 4, pp. 440–7. Even if the idea and the instructions to exterminate European Jewry did not originate with the Wehrmacht, it was in many ways implicated in the extermination programme. German soldiers had not only guilty knowledge of the acts but were also involved as active partners. Besides the mass murders in Russia in this connection, attention is drawn to the murder of the Jewish male population of Serbia. For the Wehrmacht involvement in National Socialist State crimes see R-D. Müller/Volkmann, ‘Die Wehrmacht’, pp. 739–966; and Manoschek, ‘Serbien ist judenfrei’.

243

It is not known when and where Broich had these friendly troops shot, neither in the files of Kav.Reg.21, 22 and 1, nor 1.Kav.Div., 24.Pz.Div. and 10.Pz.Div. It is also not known if Broich ever took part in shooting Commissars. 1.Kav.Div. War Diary records the shooting of a single Commissar on 16.7.1941, the exact circumstances and the names of those involved are omitted. BA/MA RH 29-1/4.

244

Krause refers in his account to German reprisals in October 1941 when units of Inf.Reg.382 of 164.Inf.Div. burnt down the villages of Kato and Ano Kerzilion and murdered over 200 civilians after partisans had sabotaged the Saloniki – Serres railway line. In October 1941 a total of 488 Greek civilians were murdered by German soldiers. The harsh reprisals led to the premature collapse of the partisan movement here, as had occurred in Serbia. Mazower, ‘Inside Hitler’s Greece’, p. 87f; Fleischer, ‘Im Kreuzschatten der Mächte’, p. 130; and ‘Schuld ohne Sühne’. Fritz Krause was Artillery Cdr 142 in Greece from 15.12.1941 to 31.8.1942 and knew Oberst Helmuth Beukemann (9.5.1894–13.7.1981), CO, Inf.Reg.382 there, who informed him of the massacres. Beukemann commanded the regiment from 13.1.1941 to 18.8.1942, and as CO, 75.Inf.Div., which fought on the southern sector of the Eastern Front, rose to the rank of Generalleutnant. He was transferred to OKH Personnel-Reserve on 10.7.1944 and not used again.

245

Neuffer’s version has a few inaccuracies. The leading German private stud farm at Schlenderhan was founded by Eduard Oppenheim (1831–1909) in 1869 and passed later into the possession of the Jewish banking family. Simon Alfred Oppenheim (1864–1932) ran the racetrack. His wife Florence ‘Flossy’ née Mathews Hutchins was – as Neuffer says – not Jewish and attended school at Frankfurt am Main. Since Simon Oppenheim died in 1932, he was not the person mishandled. His two sons Waldemar (1894–1952) and Friedrich Carl (1900–78) were classified ‘Mixed Race, 2nd Degree’, by the Gestapo and were merely monitored until their arrest following 20.7.1944. As the name Oppenheim was common in Frankfurt, Neuffer confused the events told to him by Broich as pertaining to Simon Alfred Oppenheim. Stürmer et al., ‘Wiegen und Wägen’.

246

See note 214 above.

247

General der Flieger Veit Fischer (18.5.1890–30.10.1966), 23.10.1941–31.3.1943 Cmmdg Gen. and CO, Luftgau Moskau; 1941–45 Luftwaffe Cdr, May 1945–7.10.1955 Soviet PoW.

248

Imperial Germany of World War I was guilty of numerous breaches of international law although the scale obviously did not approach that of WWII. Neitzel, ‘Kriegsausbruch’; also Henkel, ‘Deutsche Kriegsverbrechen’.

249

Oberst Hauck, 362.Inf.Div., PoW in Italy from 24.5.1944, expressed the same sentiment. ‘The worst ranks are the officers from Leutnant to Hauptmann inclusive. I used not to converse with my Leutnants because there was such a gap that no basis existed at all.’ GRGG 147, 16/17.6.1944, TNA WO 208/4363.

250

Unfortunately none of the files of Schützen-Reg.108/14.Pz.Div., commanded by Schlieben in Yugoslavia and at the beginning of the Russian campaign, which could throw light on his political and military outlook, have survived.

251

Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz (see note 77 above), October 1939 – May 1940 C-in-C East, and in this capacity protested vociferously against SS murders. In the Polish campaign, Sattler was CO, Inf.Reg.176/61.Inf.Div., which remained in Poland as occupation troops until November 1939 when transferred to the West. He probably had only hearsay knowledge of Blaskowitz’s protests. Clark, ‘Blaskowitz’. The later Feldmarschall Georg von Küchler (30.5.1881–25.5.1968) commanded 3.Armee in Poland and complained frequently at the mistreatment of Polish civilians. When a court martial sentenced a private of the SS-Verfügungstruppe Artillerie Reg. who had been involved in the murder of 50 Jews, to one year’s imprisonment, he refused to confirm the sentence on the grounds that it was too mild. This led to a violent quarrel with the Gauleiter of East Prussia and Himmler. Küchler could do nothing to prevent the sentence being quashed altogether when the Waffen-SS received its own rules of justice in October 1939. Despite his own feelings, however, in July 1940 in the West he prohibited any criticism by his own 18.Armee soldiers of the brutal repressive measures against civilians in occupied Poland, ‘…I emphasise the need to ensure that all soldiers of the Army, especially the officers, withhold all criticism of the struggle against the population in the General-Gouvernement, for example the treatment of the Polish minority, the Jews and Church affairs. The final racial solution to this struggle, which has raged for centuries on the eastern borders [of the Reich] demands particularly strong measures. Certain units of Party and State are entrusted with the carrying out of the racial struggle in the east. The soldier must stay clear of these duties of other units. This means that he must not criticise that operation.’ McCannon, ‘Küchler’; Stein, ‘Geschichte der Waffen-SS’, p. 244.

252

Generalmajor Joachim Lemelsen (26.6.1888–30.3.1954) had SS-Obermusikmeister Müller-Jon of the SS-Leibstandarte arrested for the murder of 15 Jewish civilians and demanded that he be tried by Army Group. See Thun-Hohenstein, ‘Verschwörer’, p. 184. Between 21 and 28.9.1939 the LAH fought alongside 29.Inf.Div./XV.Armeekorps under General Hoth north of Warsaw around the Modlin fortifications. Sponeck was Hoth’s Ia, and his account therefore has a high degree of plausibility. For the general context see Cüppers, ‘…auf eine so saubere und anständige SS-mässige Art: Die Waffen-SS in Polen, 1939–1941’.

253

There is no record of such an order.

254

Vyasma/Viasma.

255

Nothing else is known about the engagement of partisans by Spang’s 266.Inf.Div. See Introduction, note 223.

256

Up to December 1941, 2,365 Jews were murdered at Gomel, and buried at Letshshinez on the road to Rechiza. ‘Enzykloädie des Holocaust’, Vol. 1, p. 552.

257

From 16 to 31.10.1943 (personnel file says 30.11.1943), Menny led 123.Inf.Div. defending the Dnieper island of Chortiza, where he sustained heavy losses. Menny remained on the island constantly and led his units successfully in the defence and counter-attack. It is certain that this division was not transferred to the Eastern Front from Norway. Possibly the event involved 333.Inf.Div., which Menny commanded from 7.6.1943 to 15.10.1943, and which came to Russia from France, being wiped out in October around Zaporoshye on the Dnieper. BA/MA Pers 6/750.

258

Zaporoshye.

259

It is not known to which camp Broich was referring.

260

Meant here is the later Generalleutnant Hans von Graevenitz (14.7.1894–9.12.1963), 1.8.1938–31.3.1943 Chief of OKW Assistance and Supply. The meeting between Broich and Graevenitz must have taken place before the latter’s promotion to Generalmajor on 1.2.1942.

261

During World War II around 5.7 million Russian prisoners passed through German hands. The exact number of those failing to survive captivity is estimated by Streit (‘Keine Kamaraden’, pp. 244–9) at 3.3 million, by Streim (‘Behandlung’, p. 246) at 2.53 million. The numbers for August 1944, when this conversation was recorded, were not much lower.

262

Nothing has been found in the archives regarding this incident. For the general context see Lappenküper, ‘Der Schlächter von Paris’.

263

Meant here is the steel magnate Albert Vögler (8.2.1877–14.4.1945), Chairman of the Board, Vereinigte Stahlwerke (United Steelworks), Düsseldorf. During the war he served the Armaments Ministry as General Plenipotentiary for the Ruhr.

264

Eberbach is probably referring here to Himmler’s speech to Wehrmacht generals at Sonthofen on 5.5.1944 on ‘The Final Solution to the Jewish Question’, in which he said, ‘Had we not excluded the Jews from Germany, it would not have been possible to have endured the bomber offensive.’ On 24.5.1944 Himmler addressed the generals at Sonthofen on the same theme. He could have spoken to Eberbach on this occasion. Himmler, ‘Geheimreden’, p. 202. For the Sonthofen speeches, see Förster, ‘Geistige Kriegführung’, p. 606f.

265

It is not known where Choltitz carried out these shootings of Jews. Presumably they occurred in his time as regimental commander in the Crimea, 1941/42, see note 285 below.

266

There are no court-martial papers for 20.Pz.Div. at the Bundesarchiv Kornelimünster, and so this case cannot be examined.

267

Later he admitted to having carried out only three death sentences on German soldiers. GRGG 228, 24–26.11.1944, TNA WO 208/4364. Nothing is known about these executions, and Ramcke did not mention them in a comprehensive signal describing the situation on taking over the fortifications, see 1.Skl.27479/44 gKdos 5.9.1944 BA/MA RM7/149, nor were executions mentioned in a long report from Oberleutnant (Naval Artillery) Jenne, AII to the Naval Commandant, Brittany, who escaped to Lorient on 10.9.1944 aboard a KFK, nor in a report by Naval Commandant Konteradmiral Kähler to the Lorient harbour commander. ‘Kampf um Brest, Bericht Oberlt.(MA) Jenne, AII Seekommandant Bretagne’, BA/MA RM 35II/68.

268

Meant here is Gzhatsk (or Gshask) 200 kilometres east of Smolensk on the main highway to Moscow.

269

Seyffardt refers here to the transportation of about 673,000 PoWs from the battles at Viasma and Briansk in October 1941 in which he was involved as CO, Inf.Reg.111/35.Inf.Div./3.Pz.Armee. The prisoners were force-marched cross-country as the crow flies for 150–250 kilometres to Smolensk before being entrained for PoW camps in the ‘Reich Commissariat Ostland’. The death rate was very high, exact numbers are not known. Streit, ‘Keine Kamaraden’, pp. 162–71, Gerlach, ‘Kalkulierte Morde’, pp. 843–8.

270

Heyking was probably talking here of Himmler’s speech to the generals at Sonthofen on 5.5.1944 in which he said, ‘You may imagine how heavy a burden it was for me to carry out this order, which I obeyed and executed from obedience and utter conviction’, Himmler, ‘Geheimreden’, p. 202.

271

From the surviving files at BA/MA it is not apparent if Inf.Reg.16, commanded by Choltitz, enforced the Commissar Order or not.

272

Army C-in-C Brauchitsch, Chief of the Army General Staff Halder, C-inC Army Group A von Rundstedt, Army Group B von Bock and Army Group C von Leeb all spoke out strongly against the early attack on France demanded by Hitler. Frieser, ‘Blitzkrieg-Legende’, pp. 110–15. For an introduction to the associated coup plans see Peter Hoffmann, ‘Staatsstriech’, pp. 165–86.

273

Even Eberbach remarked that Ramcke had systematically destroyed Brest. GRGG 214, 20–23.10.1944, TNA WO 208/4363. Oberleutnant Jenne (see note 267 above) wrote in his report from Brest, ‘To clear the bomb damage, parties were assembled from Organisation Todt and railwaymen from the beginning. Their primary job was to keep the main supply routes open and carry out repairs. The Fortification Commandant decided later to burn down the area along the arterial road and blow up the walls to collapse inwards upon themselves. This was to avoid undesirable masses of rubble falling on the supply route in later air raids.’ ‘Kampf um Brest, Bericht Oberlt.(MA) Jenne, AII Seekommandant Bretagne’, BA/MA RM 35II/68.

274

In the French Revolution, the city of Toulon placed itself voluntarily under the protection of Admiral Hood, who then seized a major part of the French war fleet. The British, their allies and French royalists were unable to beat off the attack of the Revolutionary Army and fled the city. It is not true to say that Hood destroyed it. Blanning, ‘French Revolutionary Wars’, p. 200.

275

In the gorge at Babi Yar, SD-Sonderkommando.4a and two parties from Polizei-Reg. Süd executed 33,771 Jews between 29 and 30.9.1941. A platoon of engineers from 6.Armee blew in the sides of the gorge to conceal the traces of the massacre. The name of the pioneer battalion commander involved is not known. Why Oberst Otto Elfeldt was at Kiev in September 1941 as Chief of Staff to the General of Artillery is likewise unknown. See Arnold, ‘Eroberung und Behandlung der Stadt Kiew’; Rüss, ‘Wer war verantwortlich für das Massaker von Babij Jar?’; and Wiehn, ‘Die Schoah von Babij Jar’.

276

The shooting of a Scharführer of SS-Div. Hitlerjugend at Caen described here by Kurt Meyer is not documented in the German archives.

277

Eberbach meant here the ‘Gerichtsbarkeitserlass’ of 13.5.1941, which lifted the obligation to prosecute German soldiers who committed crimes against Soviet civilians, although rape was excluded. The total number of prosecutions fell sharply upon its introduction into the field. Meyer and Eberbach may have had knowledge of this document. A special order from Hitler in 1941 regarding punishment for rape is not known. Beck, ‘Wehrmacht und sexuelle Gewalt’.

278

Hitler to the Reichstag, 30.1.1939. The speech is reproduced in Domarus, ‘Hitler’, Vol. 2, pp. 1047–67, here p. 1058.

279

SS-Brigadeführer and Generalmajor der Polizei Anton Dunckern (29.6.1905–19.12.1985), SD and finally SS and police chief of Metz, where he was taken PoW by the Americans in November 1944. He was interrogated at another centre and taken to the USA in April 1945. Sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment by a French military court in 1951, he was released in 1954 and became a lawyer in Munich. For his interrogation reports see SRGG 1120-1124, 11–23.1.1945, TNA WO 208/4169.

280

A thorough investigation of which war crimes Meyer may have had knowledge has not been made. Since he served with the SS from 1931 (SS-LAH from 1934), and the Waffen-SS must always be considered as integral to the SS, it is hardly likely that he had no idea of the scale of Nazi war crimes. Against him personally, however, there lies only the shooting of Canadian PoWs in Normandy. Margolian, ‘Conduct Unbecoming’; Nassua, ‘Ahndung’.

281

Meyer was captured on 7.9.1944 near Namur. After ridding himself of his soldier’s paybook and bloodied camouflage smock he assumed the identity of an Oberst of 2.Pz.Div. After a short spell in hospital he was transferred to a PoW camp where he was recognised on 8.11.1944 and flown to England. His memoirs deal with this episode at length. Kurt Meyer, ‘Grenadiere’, pp. 313–32.

282

The list of dead at IfZ has 83 names, 50 of them SA people. Gritschneider gives 90 names, Gritschneider, ‘Der Führer hat sie zum Tode verurteilt’, p. 60ff. The total number of those murdered is put at between 150 and 200. Longerich, ‘Die braunen Bataillone’, p. 219. Sepp Dietrich appeared at Stadelheim prison in company with a group of SS men with orders to kill SA leaders Hans-Peter von Heydebreck, August Schneidlhuber, Wilhelm Schmidt, Hans Erwin Graf von Spretti, Edmund Heines and Hans Hayn detained there. It cannot be determined reliably whether Dietrich was one of the shooters. The murderers of Röhm were Theodor Eicke (17.10.1892–16.2.1943) and Michael Lippert (14.4.1897–1.9.1969). Gritschneider, ‘Der Führer hat sie zum Tode verurteilt’, pp. 32–6.

283

Nothing is known regarding material support for those bereaved by the murders of 30.6.1934.

284

Meyer refers here to the liberation of Maidanek death camp at Lublin by the Red Army on 24.7.1944.

285

The major mass shooting of Jews in the Crimea took place at Simferopol between 13 and 15.12.1941, when units of Einsatzgruppen D shot 10,000 to 11,000 people in the city park. Inf.Reg.16 commanded by Choltitz was at Sevastopol at this time. What massacre was observed by the regimental officer is unknown. The total number of victims of genocide in the Crimea is estimated at about 40,000. ‘Enzyklopädie des Holocaust’, Vol. 2, p. 821f. For the involvement of local military field offices in the Holocaust see Oldenburg, ‘Ideologie und militärisches Kalkül’, pp. 159–224.

286

For euthanasia and its development in the eugenics of the Kaiserreich and Weimar republic see Klee, ‘Euthenasie’.

287

On Hitler’s order on 2.8.1944, Keitel summoned a session of the Wehrmacht Honour Court under the presidency of von Rundstedt. The other judges were Guderian, General der Infanterie Walter Schroth (3.6.1892–6.10.1944), General der Infanterie Karl Kriebel (26.2.1888–28.11.1961) and Generalleutnant Karl-Wilhelm Specht (22.5.1894–3.12.1953). The latter, who had won the Oak Leaves on the Eastern Front as CO, Inf.Reg.55 in 1941, was Insp.-Gen., Führer-Youth Movement. Generalmajor Ernst Maisel (16.9.1896–16.12.1978) prepared the protocols. Generalleutnant Heinrich Kirchheim deputised for Guderian at two sessions and at the special session for Speidel. The Honour Court was required to decide if officers suspected of complicity in the conspiracy were to be discharged from the Wehrmacht so that they could be tried in the People’s Court, or simply released. It heard no legal argument and relied solely on evidence presented by the RSHA and Gestapo. At the first session on 4.8.1944, 22 principal conspirators involved in the 20.7.1944 coup attempt were expelled from the Wehrmacht, including Generalfeldmarshall von Witzleben and Generaloberst Ludwig Beck. At the four sittings of 4, 14, 24.8.1944 and 14.9.1944, 55 Army officers were discharged from the Wehrmacht and another 29 released on the recommendation of the Honour Court (including Hans Cramer on 24.8.1944 and Alexander von Pfuhlstein on 14.9.1944). Charges against 19 other officers were dropped. At a special session on 4.10.1944, by majority decision Speidel was not dismissed from the Wehrmacht, and his superior officer Rommel was implicated accordingly. Keitel and Specht voted against Speidel. For the Honour Court, see Ueberschär, ‘Stauffenberg’, p. 150f; Reuth, ‘Rommel’, p. 238ff; Domarus, ‘Hitler’, Vol. 2, p. 2137f; and ‘20 Juli 1944’, p. 195ff.

288

Elfeldt was Chief of Staff to General der Artillerie at OKH in the spring of 1942. It is not known when he spoke to Graevenitz, who was head of the OKW PoW office. For camp commandants who interceded for their Soviet prisoners see Hartmann, ‘Massensterben oder Massenvernichtung?’.

289

Makejewka, town in the Donetz basin. Kittel was commandant of nearby Stalino (today Donezk) from 15.5.1942 to 19.9.1942.

290

See note 305 below.

291

Mezciems, today a suburb of Daugavpils (Dvinsk).

292

Here meaning SS-Gruppenführer and Generalleutnant der Polizei Paul Hennicke (31.1.1883–25.7.1967), Police President of Weimar, April 1938 – October 1942.

293

In Document 125 Kittel states that he met Hennicke in Rostov.

294

Kittel means the concentration camp at Cracow-Plaszow that was built in 1942 as a forced-labour camp and was turned into a death camp in 1944. Between 22,000 and 24,000 were interned there that summer. About 8,000 were murdered there. ‘Enzykloädie des Holocaust’, Vol. 2, p. 118f. Kittel was commandant of Cracow city on 8.8.1944.

295

SS-Brigadeführer and Generalmajor der Polizei (8.11.1944) Dr (Law) Walter Bierkamp (17.12.1901–16.4.1945), Sipo and SD Cdr, Cracow, June 1943 – February 1945.

296

Hans Frank (23.5.1903–16.10.1945) from 12.10.1939 General Governor of Poland. Housden, ‘Hans Frank’.

297

SS-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Koppe (15.6.1896–2.7.1975) HSSPF (Higher SS Police Chief). For the wrangling over jurisdiction between Hans Frank and the HSSPF in Poland see Birn, ‘Die Höheren SS und Polizeiführer’, pp. 197–206.

298

SS-Obergruppenführer Friedrich Wilhelm Krüger (8.5.1894–10.5.1945), 4.10.1939–9.11.1943 HSSPF East.

299

For Rostov see note 305 below, for Lublin note 326 below. Schaefer had already heard of mass killings, including those of women and children, at Maidanek. Kittel confirmed that it had been going on there for several years. SRGG 1089(c), 27.12.1944, TNA WO 208/4169.

300

Kittel meant the death camp at Auschwitz in Polish Upper Silesia.

301

For gifts to generals see note 394 below.

302

See note 77 above.

303

There is no document proving the shooting of Commissars by Wahle’s Inf.Reg.267/94.Inf.Div. for November 1941. See Activity Report by Ic, 94.Inf.Div, 29.6.1941–12.12.1941. The only such incident within the Division’s jurisdiction is a liquidation on 2.9.1941, Ic morning report, Gruppe Schwedler (IV.Armeekorps) to 17.Armee, 2.9.1941, BA/MA RH20-17/278.

304

Prtemovsk near Bachmut, between Rostov and Kharkov.

305

Kittel apparently came to Dvinsk in his capacity as Oberst, Army Group North Führer-Reserve, and witnessed the murder of Jews there. Around 14,000 Jews were killed at Dvinsk in three phases in July, August and November 1941. In Document 119, Kittel himself reports having protested against the time and place of the shootings, but not against the deed. ‘Enzyklopädie des Holocaust, Vol. 1, p. 375.’ The 3,000 or so Jews living in Stalino were murdered between December 1941 and April 1942. After that, numerous Jews from outlying communities were brought to the city and murdered. Kittel was city commandant from 15.5.1942 to 20.9.1942. The 2,000 Jews remaining behind in Rostov were killed off between 11 and 12.8.1942, a date before Kittel’s appointment as commandant of Rostov on 20.9.1942. For the murder of Jews there see Angrick, ‘Besatzungspolitik’, pp. 320–2, 560–4. Later Kittel admitted having signed a death warrant at Rostov condemning five persons to be shot under martial law. ‘One death sentence which I carried out I still regret today because it was a Russian who had shot at two Rumanian soldiers stealing his chickens.’ SRGG 1089, 27.12.1944, TNA WO 208/4169.

306

Wildermuth was never a Feldkommandant. Possibly his service as a regimental commander in Serbia or as fortress commandant at Le Havre is meant, or he is being confused with Generalmajor Felbert.

307

Edwin Graf Rothkirch und Trach commanded 330.Inf.Div. from 5.1.1942. It was deployed the following month at Demidov, north of Smolensk, and also north of the Dnieper during the Soviet winter offensive.

308

In the Reich Commissariat Ukraine, on whose territory Rothkirch’s Oberfeldkommandantur 365 had its HQ at Lvov, total power was vested in the hands of the HSSPF Russia South, Hans-Adolf Prützmann. In the ‘Wagner – Heydrich Agreement’ of 28.4.1941, the Wehrmacht had given the SS a free hand to root out ‘anti-State and anti-Reich movements’. Ueberschär/Wette, ‘Überfall’, p. 249f. Nothing is known of a special local arrangement between Rothkirch as Oberfeldkommandant 365 or as CO, 330.Inf.Div., and the police.

309

See note 296 above.

310

See note 297 above.

311

Here meaning SS-Gruppenführer and Generalleutnant der Polizei Paul Hennicke (31.1.1883–25.7.1967), Police President of Weimar, April 1938 – October 1942. No details are known regarding the murder of civilian convicts by the SD.

312

See also Document 119.

313

Rothkirch had been at HQ, Commdg Gen. Security Forces, Army Group Centre, since 8.10.1943 and was appointed Cdr, White Russia. Following a positive appraisal by Feldmarschall Busch he was promoted to General der Kavallerie on 1.1.1944.

314

Up to January 1942 in Lvov alone about 11,000 Jews were killed. For the extermination of Jews in the Eastern Galician region of Oberfeldkommandantur 365 see Pohl, ‘National-Sozialistische Judenverfolgung’. In this post, Rothkirch apparently had a rather reserved attitude towards the SS. Alongside the civilian administration and the SS apparatus within the General-Gouvernement, as Wehrmacht representative Rothkirch had only a subordinate role in the region. Ibid., p. 93. For the role of the Oberfeldkommandantur see Krannhals, ‘Die Judenvernichtung in Polen’.

315

In July and August at Zhitomir, 5,000 Jews were murdered. Those not caught up in the first massacres were killed on 18 September 1941 when 3,145 Jews were executed 10 kilometres outside the city. Broich was probably referring to this occurrence. Why he came to Zhitomir as CO, Reiter-Reg.22./1.Kav.Div. subordinated to Pz.Gr.2, Army Group Centre, is not known. Between 12 and 20.9.1941 while the division was out of the line to rest and repair, Broich apparently took the opportunity to visit Zhitomir. War Diary, 1.Kav.Div., BA/MA RH29/1-4. There is no trace of an Oberst von Monich in the Army List.

316

Choltitz flew to Berlin on 4.7.1942 to deliver a radio broadcast on the fighting at Sevastopol; a facsimile of the speech is published by Timo von Choltitz at www.choltitz.de. The Chief of Staff referred to here is Oberst Freidrich Schulz (15.10.1897–30.11.1976) who was Chief of Staff, 11.Armee between 12.5.1942 and 27.11.1942. In his memoirs, Choltitz did not mention the shooting of Jews in the vicinity of Simferopol airfield. Choltitz, ‘Soldat unter Soldaten’, p. 217. A total of about 40,000 Jews and Crimean hussars were murdered in the Crimea. ‘Enzyklopädie des Holocaust’, Vol. 2, p. 822.

317

See Document 133 and note 329 below.

318

Karl Röver (12.2.1889–15.5.1942) was Gauleiter of Weser-Ems from 1.10.1928 until his unexpected death.

319

For the general context see Heuzeroth, ‘Verfolgte aus religiösen Gründen’ and Pohlschneider, ‘Der NS-Kirchenkampf in Oldenburg’.

320

The Janovska camp was at Lvov. It had no gas chambers but estimates range from 10,000 to 200,000 persons murdered there. ‘Enzyklopädie des Holocaust’, Vol. 2, p. 657ff. The nearest gas chambers were at Belzec camp, about 70 kilometres north-west of Lvov, where 600,000 Jews, Gypsies and Poles were murdered between mid-March and December 1942. For the murder of Jews in Galicia see Sandkühler, ‘Endlösung in Galizien’.

321

What knowledge Ramcke had of the Holocaust can no longer be ascertained. Since he spent only four weeks from February 1944 on the Eastern Front in Ukraine it is possible that he knew little of it.

322

Dr Karl Lasch (29.12.1904–3.6.1942), Governor, Galicia district of General-Gouvernement with his seat at Lvov, 1.8.1941–24.1.1942. Lasch was recalled peremptorily on 14.1.1942 and executed on 3.6.1942 for corruption. For Lasch see Sandkühler, ‘Endlösung in Galizien’, esp. p. 447f; and Pohl, ‘NS-Judenverfolgung’ esp. p. 76f.

323

Rothkirch also mentions this in SRGG 1133(C), 9.3.1945, TNA, WO 208/4169. Under the cover name ‘Aktion 1005’ from June 1943 the SS began removing the evidence of mass murders in the East by opening the graves and burning the corpses. Spector, ‘Aktion 1005’.

324

At Kutno, captured by German troops on 15.9.1939, the Jewish population was corralled into a ghetto in June 1940 where they lived under the most appalling circumstances. During March and April 1942 the ghetto was gradually emptied, the inhabitants being taken to Kulmhof camp for extermination. Nothing is known of the mass shootings of Jews at Kutno.

325

In ‘Weltwoche: Unabhängige Schweizerische Umschau 13’, (1945), No. 585, p. 3 (26.1.1945), accompanying an article ‘Kann sich Hitler noch auf die SS verlassen?’ (‘Can Hitler Still Rely on the SS?’), a photograph was published above a caption indicating that it portrayed Polish civilians unearthing mass graves containing the corpses of their murdered countrymen. It shows two SS men, a number of civilians with shovels, and some corpses in civilian clothes. In the article an anonymous SS man speaks of events at Zhitomir in the winter of 1942 in which tens of thousands were murdered and interred in mass graves.

326

At Lublin-Maidanek death camp approximately 250,000 people were murdered by gassings and mass shootings between October 1941 and July 1944. The only large concentration camp in Czechoslovakia was at Theresienstadt (today Terezin), a ghetto-like complex 60 kilometres north-west of Prague. Between 24.11.1941 and 20.4.1945, 140,000 Jews were brought there from western and central Europe; 33,000 died of starvation and the poor hygiene conditions in the overcrowded camp; 88,000 went to the death camps in the east. ‘Enzyklopädie des Holocaust’, Vol. 3, pp. 1403–7.

327

General der Artillerie Alfred von Vollard-Bockelberg (18.6.1874 – disappeared 1945), 6.9.1939 Military Cdr, Posen; 26.10.1939 C-in-C, Border Region Centre; 5.11.1939–14.5.1940 CO, Wehrkreis I, Königsberg. At this time Rothkirch was Ia, XXXIV.Armeekorps stationed in the General-Gouvernement and probably met Vollard-Bockelberg in October 1939.

328

Between 25.12.1942 and 10.6.1943, Wilhelm Daser was CO, Oberfeldkommandantur 670 at Lille, one of nine districts under the Military Cdr, Belgium and Northern France, General Alexander von Falkenhausen. Between 27.11.1942 and 10.7.1944, Falkenhausen had 240 hostages shot in 18 separate incidents; 30 persons were shot during Daser’s period in office, 10 of whom were executed in Brussels on 16.1.1943 for attacks on Wehrmacht personnel in Oberfeldkommandantur 670 district. Daser authorised the seizure of hostages as a reaction to the attacks, but the death sentences were handed down by Falkenhausen. Weber, ‘Die innere Sicherheit’, esp. p. 139ff; Warmbrunn, ‘Occupation of Belgium’.

329

Wildermuth refers here to the massacre at Kralievo in the nine days from 15.10.1941, in which 4,000 to 5,000 civilians were shot dead as a reprisal by units of 717.Inf.Div. After the town was attacked by Chetniks on 5.10.1941, the Dornier aircraft factory was closed the following day for the alleged unreliability of the workforce. These employees were then held in a workshop of railway coachmakers together with workshop and railroad staff. On 11.10.1941 the Chetniks launched a second attack on Kralievo that lasted until 16.10.1941. The attacks had had artillery support while Wehrmacht troops came under fire from the civilian population. On 15 and 16.10.1941 between 300 and 1,755 hostages were shot, including the Dornier employees. That a German factory supervisor was shot as a hostage is not confirmed by the archive. The Kralievo district commandant, Oberleutnant Alfons Matziowicz, had issued an instruction on 15.10.1941 that 100 Serbs were to be shot for every dead German. This was authorised under Keitel’s order of 16.9.1941 that the death of a German was to be expiated by the killing of 50 to 100 Serbs; OKW War Diary, Vol. 1, p. 1068. There is scarcely any evidence of Wildermuth’s involvement in the shootings. The 717.Inf.Div. files do not indicate when and on whose orders any particular batch of hostages were shot, although most were carried out by elements of Inf.Reg.749 under Major Desch, senior officer at Kralievo. This unit was guilty of other massacres in the Kralievo area after 16.10.1941. The activity report of Wildermuth’s Inf.Reg.737 for September 1941 does prove, however, that atrocities were committed in his direct area of jurisdiction before the October incident. The report states, ‘140 to 150 enemy dead, 6 wounded, 92 prisoners, 32 prisoners shot, 98 houses, 8 dwellings, 2 villages set alight and destroyed. 39 own forces killed, 47 wounded.’ BA/MA RH26-117/3. The Commdg Gen. Serbia, Franz Böhme (15.4.1885–29.5.1947) expressed harsh criticism at the unleashing of reprisals. ‘The shooting of our agents, Croats and the workforce of German armaments factories are errors that cannot be made good.’ Plenipotentiary Commdg Gen. Serbia, Chief Mil. V./QuNo 3208/41. 25.10.1941 BA/MA RH26/342-14. In Wildermuth’s comprehensive fund of documents the only mention of hostages being shot is a diary entry for 18.10.1941, ‘Kralievo has become a dead city. The viciousness of our reprisals was fearsome’, BA/MA NL251-100. His biographer does not speak of the events at Kralievo. Kohlhaas, ‘Eberhard Wildermuth’, p. 99f. See also Manoschek, ‘Serbien ist judenfrei’, pp. 155–8. A concise arrangement of the crimes in the context of the partisan war appears in Schmider, ‘Auf Umwegen zum Vernichtungskrieg?’.

330

In World War I, 48 German soldiers were executed for desertion, cowardice, etc. The British executed 291 of their own soldiers, To these must be added the executions of more than 750 Italian, 18 Belgian and 35 US soldiers (between April 1917 and June 1919). In France the courts martial handed down 2,400 death sentences to Army personnel of which about 500 were carried out. Beckett, ‘The Great War’, p. 227f; Bach, ‘Fusillés pour l’exemple’.

331

The protest of General der Artillerie Paul Bader (20.7.1883–28.2.1971), Cmmdg Gen. of Higher Command LXV, Belgrade cannot be found in the archives.

332

On 18.10.1942 Hitler ordered that all commandos were to be executed without exception even if they wore uniform. This was as a reprisal for the British commando raid on the Channel Island of Sark on 4.10.1942 when German prisoners had been bound in such a way that they strangled themselves if they attempted to struggle free. No pardons were to be allowed. Individual commandos were to be handed over to the SD. The Order was first enforced on 11.12.1942 when two ‘Cockleshell Heroes’, members of an SBS canoe operation to attack shipping at Bordeaux, were executed. The original of the Order is at BA/MA RW41/v.606. For the application of the Order, see Friedrich, ‘Das Gesetz des Krieges’, pp. 295–306; Messerschmitt, ‘Kommandobefehl und Völkerrechtsdenken’.

333

On 14.6.1944 a force of 243 RAF bombers attacked Le Havre, sinking numerous German warships and destroying large areas of the town and its docks. French casualties at 75 dead and 150 injured were light as the result of the dock area having been evacuated. For the attack see Hümmelchen, ‘Die deutschen Schnellboote’, p. 175f; and Tent, ‘E-boat Alert’, pp. 146–82.

334

By the end of 1937, 13,260 inmates had been registered at Dachau concentration camp. That year the camp had an average population of 2,535. This figure increased to 5,068 persons in 1938 after the camp was enlarged. That year 18,681 new prisoners passed through its gates. Kimmel, ‘Konzentrationslager Dachau’, p. 371; Drobisch/Wieland, ‘System der Konzentrationslager’, pp. 288, 303.

335

Commandant of Dachau camp in 1937 was SS-Oberführer Hans Loritz (12.12.1895–13.1.1946).

336

It is uncertain which person named Hasse is meant here. Possibly Broich was speaking of the later General der Infanterie Wilhelm Hasse (24.11.1895–13.1.1946) who, like Broich, was an Oberstleutnant in 1937. For Josias Erbprinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont see note 356 below. Thoma, a native of Dachau, also visited Dachau camp before the war. SRXX 1580, 12.2.1943, TNA WO 208/4162.

337

Oberst Franz August Maria Lex, from 1944 CO, Art.Reg.170; PoW 7.11.1944 Middelburg, Walcheren (Netherlands); Trent Park from 7.12.1944.

338

Werner Altemeyer, Head of Mayor’s Staff, Riga.

339

Skirotava near Riga.

340

On 30.11.1944, 1,035 Berlin Jews were executed on the edge of woodland near Rumbula. On 1.8.1941 and 9.12.1941 25,000–28,000 Jews, the entire population of the Riga ghetto, were murdered at Rumbula. ‘Enzyklopädie des Holocaust’, Vol. 2, p. 1230. For the massacres and Bruns’s statement see also Jersak, ‘Entscheidungen zu Mord und Lüge’, pp. 333–7.

341

General der Pioniere Alfred Jacob (1.4.1883–13.11.1963), from 1938 Inspector of Army Engineers and Fortifications.

342

Oberst (later Generalmajor) Erich Abberger (6.4.1895–3.5.1988), from 1.10.1939–1.9.1942 Chief of Staff to General Jacob, see note 341 above.

343

Hauptmann (Reserve) Dr Otto Schulz du Bois.

344

Admiral Wilhelm Canaris (1.1.1887–9.4.1945), from 1.1.1935 Head of Military Abwehr at OKW; 23.7.1944 arrested on grounds of his close contacts to military conspirators; 8.4.1945 admitted to treason in kangaroo court at Flossenbürg concentration camp; 9.4.1945 executed by hanging.

345

Bruns spoke out on 18.12.1948 in the OKW trials at Nuremberg as a witness against Feldmarschall Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb. See also Friedrich, ‘Das Gesetz des Krieges’, pp. 416–19.

346

About 99,000 Jews were murdered at Odessa, mostly by Rumanian forces. ‘Enzyklopädie des Holocaust’, Vol. 2, p. 1058f.

347

See note 217 above.

348

For the night of the Reich Pogrom in Vienna see Ganglmair, ‘Novemberpogrom 1938’; Rosenkranz, ‘Reichskristallnacht’.

349

Dr Irmfried Eberl (8.9.1910–16.2.1948) is probably indicated here. At the beginning of 1940 he took over as head of the Brandenburg-Havel Euthanasia Institute and in the autumn of 1940 the institute at Bernburg/Saale. A total of at least 18,000 persons were murdered at both places under his directorship. Eberl was commandant at Treblinka death camp in 1942. He was conscripted into the Wehrmacht on 31.1.1944. After the war he practised as a doctor at Blaubeuren, where he was arrested in January 1948 and committed suicide the following month. He was not a lawyer, he had studied medicine at Innsbruck. Schulze, ‘Euthenasie in Bernburg’, pp. 155–7; Gehler, ‘Heilen durch Töten’, pp. 361–82.

350

By September 1941 the planned euthanasia programme had claimed 70,273 victims. Although organised euthanasia was halted after massive protests, another 20,000 persons were killed in ‘wildcat’ actions. Klee, ‘Euthanasie im NS-Staat’.

351

Up to February 1942, about two million Russian PoWs had died in German captivity, 500,000 of them in the period from November 1941. Streit, ‘Keine Kamaraden’, p. 128.

352

Between 3.4.1940 and 13.5.1940 the NKVD murdered 14,587 Polish officers and police in Soviet captivity, of which 4,404 were killed at Katyn near Smolensk, 3,896 at Kharkov and 6,287 at Kalinin. Misial, ‘Das Schlachtfeld zweier totalitärer Systeme’, p. 24f.

353

In 1944 Generalstabsintendant Friedrich Pauer was Departmental Head V2 at OKH Army Admin.

354

A source documenting Felbert’s activities as Feldkommandant Besançon in detail is not known. The Feldkommandantur 560 War Diary (BA/MA RH36-206) is not very enlightening, but mentions in passing that its war court condemned 18 terrorists to death on 18.9.1943, of which 17 were shot ‘without incident’ on 26.9.1943. 40 death warrants signed by Felbert therefore seems a realistic figure. In his memoirs written in captivity at the end of 1945 he says, ‘…As Feldkommandant I tried to relieve the civilian population of the burden that is always so heavy under foreign occupation. I saved many people from the death penalty, preserved many from long prison sentences and prevented many acts of violence by subordinate officers. But one could not be everywhere and one did not get to hear everything, and so certain things happened which should not have happened.’ ‘Memoirs’, p. 57. This statement was supported by French eyewitnesses in the court proceedings and also by official documents. Felbert, Wehrmacht Commander, North-Eastern France, pointed out on 4.2.1944 that the Feldkommandant was not king in his kingdom and one had to get used to the fact that the SD was not subordinate to him, and it was of great importance to cooperate with this service office.

355

Himmler ordered the setting-up of the concentration camp at Auschwitz on 27.4.1940. At this time Otto Elfeldt was Staff Officer, Artillery, Army Group A in the West. There is nothing to indicate his having visited Poland, and his knowledge of events there is therefore noteworthy.

356

Josias Erbprinz zu Waldeck-Pyrmont (13.5.1896–30.11.1967), 6.10.1938 to the capitulation HSSPF Fulda-Werra. Sentenced to life imprisonment, Buchenwald trials, 14.8.1947, released 1.12.1950.

357

Kurt Dittmar, Pionierführer 1.Armee, was in France in the summer of 1940 and took over 169.Inf.Div. in February 1941, at that time in the process of formation in the Reich. There is no evidence that he might have come to Paris, or even France, later, and so one assumes that Dittmar knew of the existence of Auschwitz by the early summer of 1940.

358

Between 29.10.1942 and 1.11.1942, the 20,000 Jews inhabiting the ghetto at Pinsk were shot (‘Enzyklopädie des Holocaust’, Vol. 3, p. 1113f.). If Feuchtinger was ever there is not known. From October 1941 to August 1942 he commanded Art.Reg.227/227.Inf.Div., which fought on the northern sector of the Eastern Front, a great distance from Pinsk. Subsequently he served with OKH Führer-Reserve and after April 1943 was exclusively in France.

359

General der Infanterie Edgar Röhricht (16.6.1892–11.2.1967) arrived Trent Park 7.6.1945. The exact number of the dead at Dresden resulting from the air raid on the night of 13.2.1945 is now estimated at between 25,000 and 40,000. The most recent study is Taylor, ‘Dresden’.

360

Eberbach’s statement was used against Kurt Meyer at his trial for war crimes before a Canadian tribunal beginning 10.12.1945 at Aurich. Meyer was sentenced to death on 28.12.1945, the sentence being commuted to life imprisonment. Meyer was released in 1956. See note 280 above.

361

CO, Kradschützen (Motorcycle Rifle) Battalion 34/4.Pz.Div. was Major Erich von Stegmann (6.4.1896–?), succeeded on 9.1.1942 by Rittmeister Bradel. Neumann, ‘Die 4.Panzer Division’, p. 444.

362

See note 375 below.

363

On 20.12.1941 during a five-hour talk with Hitler, Guderian attempted to convince him to rescind his order of 16.12.1941 to halt. On 25.12.1941 Guderian was relieved of command after retreating without authority. Reinhardt, ‘Die Wende vor Mosakau’, pp. 225, 228. In his memoirs Guderian provided a much less dramatic version of the conversation than Thoma does here. Guderian, ‘Erinnerungen eines Soldaten’, pp. 240–6. Thoma stayed in Berlin from 1 to 7.8.1942 to accept his promotion to Generalleutnant, and visited Guderian on the morning of 5.8.1942. Diary 1942, BA/MA N2/2 and note 393 below.

364

General der Infanterie Rudolf Schmundt (13.8.1896–1.10.1944) had been Chief Wehrmacht Adjutant to Hitler from 28.1.1938, and from 1.10.1942 Head of the Army Personnel Bureau. He saw it as his mission to bind the Army to Hitler and National Socialism. Schmundt was not free of idealism and spared no effort to assist the commanders at the front. As an ardent admirer of Hitler he would not allow any kind of criticism of the Führer. See Stumpf, ‘Rudolf Schmundt’, and also short biography in ‘Tätigkeitsbericht Schmundt’, pp. 15–22.

365

Also Peter Hoffmann, ‘Die Sicherheit des Diktators’; Seidler/Zeigert, ‘Führerhauptquartiere’, pp. 97–110, provide an overview of Hitler’s burgeoning self-protective measures.

366

See note 49 above.

367

These names were not mentioned in the radio bulletins. The first report broadcast by German radio was an official announcement of the attempted assassination and stated only that Hitler had survived a bomb attempt unscathed and had received Mussolini for a long conference. The text is reproduced in Domarus, ‘Hitler’, Vol. 2, p. 2127. See also Peter Hoffmann, ‘Staatsstreich’, p. 540.

368

Hitler’s radio address towards midnight on 20.7.1944 appears at Domarus, ‘Hitler’. According to this transcript Hitler’s concluding words were, ‘In this I see a finger of Providence indicating that I must continue my work, and therefore I shall!’

369

It is not known in what capacity Reimann was involved with the NSDAP in the 1930s.

370

On 21.7.1944 a communiqué was issued regarding the introduction of the ‘Hitler salute’ throughout the Wehrmacht as advocated by Dönitz, Goering and Keitel. The Army was not mentioned in the text. In his address on the evening of 20.7.1944 Hitler did speak about the obedience to orders of the German Army. Domarus, ‘Hitler’, Vol. 2, pp. 2129–31.

371

For the reactions of Thoma and Bassenge to the assassination attempt see SRGG 961, 21.7.1944, TNA WO 208/4168. Both believed initially in the possibility of a simulated attempt as a pretext for a purge. Thoma’s first reaction was, ‘Now it has begun internally. I always told you… I know Stauffenberg very well. I was with him, Graf Stauffenberg, at HQ and he was always quite frank with his opinion, which was also mine’.

372

Oberst Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg (15.11.1907–20.7.1944), 1938 – May 1940 Staff Officer Ib, 1.Light-Div.; May 1940 – February 1943 OKH Organisations-Abt.; February – April 1943 Staff Officer Ia, 10.Pz.Div.; 7.4.1943 seriously wounded, low-level air attack. Lost an eye, his right hand and two fingers of left hand; 1.10.1943 Chief of Staff, General Army office; 1.7.1944 Chief of Staff, C-in-C, Ersatzheer (Replacement Army). Peter Hoffmann, ‘Stauffenberg’.

373

This protocol confirms the details that Broich made in 1962 about his conversations and attitude towards Stauffenberg. See ibid., p. 273f. For his visits to commanders at the front see note 387 below.

374

Heinrich Himmler became C-in-C, Ersatzheer and Heinz Guderian Chief of Army General Staff. Presumably Sponeck had listened to Hitler’s radio broadcast on the night of 20.7.1944 and misheard. In his speech Hitler stated that he had appointed Himmler C-in-C of the Heimat (i.e. Homeland) Army. See note 367 above for the speech.

375

Generaloberst Hans Jürgen Stumpff (15.6.1888–9.3.1968). At this time Stumpff was C-in-C, Luftflotte Reich. His jurisdiction was not affected by 20 July, nor was he mentioned in Hitler’s speech. Since it is unlikely that Sponeck and Stumpff met in the war, having regard to their respective military duties, Sponeck had probably been influenced by Bassenge. The latter was Stumpff’s Chief of General Staff at Luftflotte 5 between 1.8.1940 and 4.10.1940, and had said of his superior on 21.7.1944, ‘Stumpff is the biggest twit you can imagine. I was his Chief of Staff. So, I was glad, I mean really glad, when I got away from him. Appalling.’ SRGG 961, 21.7.1944, TNA WO 208/4168.

376

Nina Schenk Gräfin von Stauffenberg, née Freiin von Lerchenfeld (27.8.1913–02.04.2006).

377

At his death he was 37.

378

The bomb exploded during the midday situation conference at FHQ Wolfsschanze, Rastenburg, in East Prussia. Stauffenberg took part in this conference in his capacity as Chief of Ersatzheer Staff reporting on the formation of the Volksgrenadier-Divisions.

379

Stauffenberg had brought with him two explosive charges, but armed only one and left it in an attaché-case below the map table. Therefore the explosive effect was less than expected and killed only four of the 24 persons present, sparing Hitler. See note 389 below.

380

Radio broadcast by Hitler. Domarus, ‘Hitler’, Vol. 2, p. 2127ff.

381

Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt (12.12.1875–24.2.1953) was relieved of command as C-in-C West on 2.7.1944 and transferred to Führer-Reserve. He was not involved in the coup and later proved his loyalty to Hitler. Recalled to his former post on 5.9.1944, in August and September he was President of the Wehrmacht Honour Court (Ehrenhof), the purpose of whose sittings was to expel from the Wehrmacht those officers involved in the plot in order that they could be brought before the People’s Court. Ziemke, ‘Gerd von Rundstedt’; Messenger, ‘The Last Prussian’; Huber, ‘Gerd von Rundstedt’. The British officer, most probably ‘Lord Aberfeldy’ made most of his references to generals Hoepner, von Witzleben and Beck, who were all discharged from the Wehrmacht, having been involved in the plot.

382

Generaloberst Freidrich Dollmann (2.2.1882–28.6.1944), from 25.10.1939 C-in-C 7.Armee, which had been dislodged from Normandy in June 1944. On 28 June he suffered a heart attack at his command post. According to a report by Generalmajor Max Pemsel, Chief of Staff, 7.Armee, Dollmann committed suicide because he felt culpable for the defeat of his force. Ose, ‘Entscheidung im Westen’, p. 152, note 305.

383

General der Artillerie Erich Marcks (6.6.1891–12.6.1944), Cmmdg Gen., LXXXIV.Armeekorps, lost his life to a low-level air attack while visiting the front north of St Lo.

384

Stauffenberg’s wife Nina (see note 376 above) was arrested at Schloss Lautingen near Ebingen where she had been staying since 18.7.1944. The family had owned the property since the early seventeenth century. Peter Hoffmann, ‘Stauffenberg’, pp. 15, 422, 447.

385

Alfred Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg (27.6.1860–20.1.1936) had been Major-at-Readiness between 1908 and 1918 and Senior Marshal at the Court of the King of Württemberg.

386

If both charges had been detonated, the blast would probably have been sufficient to kill all present in the barrack hut. See note 379 above.

387

In September 1942, Stauffenberg visited General der Infanterie Georg von Sodenstern (15.11.1889–20.7.1955), Chief of General Staff, Army Group B, and the Cmmdg Gen. XXXX.Pz.Korps, Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg, and attempted without success to recruit them for the planned assassination of Hitler. On 26.1.1943 he attempted to persuade Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein to head a coup d’état, which he declined. One cannot simply say that Manstein was the only field marshal ‘who had not gone along with it’. Broich repeats here Stauffenberg’s impressions on the field marshals as a whole. Stauffenberg could only infer from Henning von Tresckow’s soundings that Feldmarschall von Kluge was not opposed to a conspiracy but did not want to be part of it. At that time Stauffenberg could only have been certain of the support of von Witzleben. After the conversation with von Manstein, Stauffenberg remarked, ‘These guys are either shitting their pants or have straw heads, and don’t want it.’ Peter Hoffmann, ‘Stauffenberg’, pp. 250, 252f, 262f, 265–8. Broich was of the opinion in October 1943, from a conversation with Bassenge, ‘that all had said they were ready’, but none wanted to lead it. ‘Manstein is the only one who said… the time is not yet ripe, and he rejected it absolutely, and it is madness.’ SRGG 506, 24.10.1943, TNA, WO 208/4166.

388

General der Infanterie Kurt Zeitzler (9.6.1895–25.9.1963) was Chief of the Army General Staff from 24.9.1942 to 20.7.1944. He applied to be relieved on four occasions and was only successful finally by reporting sick on 10.7.1944. Stahl, ‘Zeitzler’.

389

Four persons lost their lives when the bomb exploded: stenographer Dr Heinz Berger died the same afternoon; Oberst Heinz Brandt, Ia Staff; Operations-Abt. and General der Flieger Günther Korten, Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff died on 22.7.1944; Generalleutnant Rudolf Schmuundt, Hitler’s Senior Wehrmacht Adjutant and Head of the Army personnel Office on 1.10.1944. Peter Hoffmann, ‘Staatsstreich’, p. 496.

390

The proclamations by Grossadmiral Dönitz are reproduced in, inter alia, Padfield, ‘Dönitz’, pp. 431, 434. The telgram of loyalty from Erhard Milch is reproduced in Irving, ‘Tragödie der deutschen Luftwaffe’, p. 365.

391

Should read Kurt Zeitzler.

392

See note 141 above.

393

In February 1944, Guderian was assigned the Polish estate Deipenhof in the Reichsgau Wartheland for the equivalent of RM1.24 million. The German Reich dispossessed the Polish owners. Ueberschär/Vogel, ‘Dienen und Verdienen’, pp. 169–72.

394

Generalfeldmarschall Ritter von Leeb (5.9.1876–29.4.1956) received from Hitler in 1941 and 1943 two monetary gifts totalling RM888,000, which he used in August 1944 to acquire a woodland property of 214 hectares situated north of Passau. It is therefore incorrect to say that he turned down donations. Ueberschär/Vogel, ‘Dienen und Verdienen’, pp. 151–7. Leeb commanded Army Group North during the Russian campaign in 1941. Relieved by Hitler on 6.1.1942, he was not used again. Leeb was firmly opposed to the invasion of France, and was the only Army Group commander prepared to participate in a coup under Halder. When Halder was surprised by Hitler’s change of mind on 5.11.1939 and cancelled the coup preparations, Leeb lost interest and obeyed Hitler’s orders to prepare the attack. Subsequently he had no further contact with the opposition. Peter Hoffmann, ‘Staatsstreich’, pp. 161–5, 175, 179–83, 188f, also Leeb, ‘Tagebuchaufzeichnungen’, esp. pp. 50–4.

395

Here Sponeck had figured out the motivation of the conspirators, to go through with the coup despite its poor prospects in order to prove that the German resistance movement ‘had dared to take the decisive gamble’ as Henning von Trescow put it. It was not the intention to whitewash the Army morally or the officer corps as a whole, only the conspirators. Fest, ‘Staatsreich’, p. 240.

396

British propaganda called the Elser attempted assassination ‘a second Reichstag fire’. Haasis, ‘Georg Elser’, p. 56. The ‘Germany reports’ of the SPD exiles show that immediately after the attempt there were suspicions that either Hitler himself, or certain NSDAP circles, were the string-pullers. This was based on the fact that it would not otherwise have been possible to have planned and carried out the action without the Gestapo and SS having known about it (ibid.). The SS came across rumours at a Fulda clerical seminar that attributed the attempt to the Party. The clergymen obtained their information from a Strasbourg transmitter (ibid., p. 61). A few days after the attempt Heinrich Müller assumed that Strasser and the Schwarze Front were behind Elser (ibid., p. 210), a theory advanced by the ‘St Galler Tageblatt’ on 24.11.1939 in an article probably inspired from Germany. Ernst Eggert, a stool pigeon at Sachsenhausen, circulated the rumour at the beginning of 1940 that Elser was an SS man and the attempt had been staged. His reasoning for this was that Elser was receiving such good treatment in custody that he could not possibly be a ‘real’ assassin and at the least had a good relationship with the SS. From his cell at Sachsenhausen Martin Niemöller also espoused this theory; he had heard the rumour before Elser arrived at the camp and maintained the assertion after the war (ibid., p. 214ff). One of Elser’s guards, SS man Walter Usslepp, alleged that Hitler and Himmler had put Elser up to it personally (ibid., p. 222). Many corresponding witness accounts occur in the IfZ archive ZS/A.17.

397

Ley said in his speech, ‘Degenerate to the marrow, blue-bloodied into idiocy, corruptible to the point of tribulation and cowardly as all low creatures, that is the nobility which the Jew sends forth against National Socialism, puts a bomb in their hands and turns them into murderers and criminals… if reactionaries believed they could raise their heads again, now they will have finally understood that their time has gone for ever. We will make up for that which had previously, perhaps consciously, been overlooked. This scum must be eliminated, exterminated root and branch. It is not sufficient just to seize the culprits and bring them ruthlessly to account – the whole brood must be wiped out. This goes above all for the traitors in Moscow, London and New York. Every German must be made aware that if he sets himself up against Germany at war, in print or by the spoken word, or incites treason by his act, then he and his family must die… whoever betrays us will be exterminated.’ Robert Ley, ‘Gott schütze den Führer’, in ‘Der Angriff’, No. 180, 23.7.1944. Short extracts are reproduced in Conze, ‘Adel und Adeligkeit in Widerstand’, p. 269.

398

Generalleutnant Hans Graf von Sponeck (12.2.1888–23.7.1944), a cousin of Theodor Graf von Sponeck; CO, 22.Inf.Div., Poland, France and USSR; 22.10.1941 Leader, XXXXII.Armeekorps. Without reference to FHQ, on 29.12.1941 he abandoned the Kertsch Peninsula in the Crimea and was relieved of command two days later. Condemned to death by court martial on 23.1.1942 for ‘negligent disobedience in the field’, the sentence was commuted on 22.2.1942 to six years’ stockade at Germersheim. A petition for remission of the sentence by von Manstein on 20.6.1943 was refused by Hitler. Following 20.7.1944, he was murdered on Himmler’s order.

399

Reimann was confusing the twin older brothers of Stauffenberg, Alexander and Berthold. The former (15.3.1905–27.1.1964) graduated in Ancient History in 1931 and was Professor Extraordinary at Würzburg from 1936. He was Ordinarius in Ancient History at Strasbourg for a short while in 1942 before his recall to the front. On 20.7.1944 he was serving in Athens as Leutnant (Reserve) with LXVIII.Armeekorps. He had no knowledge of his brother’s activities. Taken into Sippenhaft (detention as a close relative of a traitor) on 30.7.1944, he was shunted between various concentration camps and prisons until the end of the war. His twin brother Marineoberstabsrichter Berthold Graf Schenk von Stauffenberg (15.3.1905–10.8.1944), a Navy judge, was implicated in the plot and hanged. He was one of only three naval officers actively involved in the resistance. The standard work on the Stauffenberg brothers is Peter Hoffmann, ‘Stauffenberg’. See also Hillmann, ‘Der 20 Juli 1944’.

400

Hitler spoke on 4.8.1944 at FHQ Wolfsschanze to a gathering of Reichsleiters and Gauleiters. The official communiqué of 5.8.1944 stated that the traitors had not only been active in sabotaging the efforts and struggles of the nation since 1941, but since the very seizure of power itself. Domarus, ‘Hitler’, Vol. 2, p. 2138. The text of the speech by Reichs-Commissar in Norway Josef Terboven (23.5.1898–11.5.1945) is not recorded.

401

Generalleutnant Rudolf Stegmann (6.8.1894–18.6.1944) fell at Briebeque, Normandy as CO, 77.Inf.Div., which he had led since 1.5.1944.

402

Regarding the Honour Court presided over by von Rundstedt see note 287 above.

403

From 1794 in the French Revolution three marshals were guillotined: Augustin-Joseph de Mailly (b. 1708), Philippe de Noailles, Duc de Mouchy (b. 1715) and Nicolas Luckner (b. 1722), a native of the Oberpfalz.

404

See notes 407 and 479 below.

405

Julius Streicher (12.2.1885–16.10.1946) was one of the earliest NSDAP members and founded the violently anti-Jewish weekly newspaper ‘Der Stürmer’ in 1923. From 1929 he was Gauleiter of Central Franconia (Mittelfranken). His rise to riches led to a Party inquiry that deprived him of his offices in 1940. He continued to publish the newspaper. He was condemned to death at Nuremberg and hanged.

406

Generalfeldmarschall Erwin von Witzleben (4.2.1881–8.8.1944), from 2.10.1938 C-in-C, Gruppenkommando, Frankfurt am Main; 1.9.1939 C-in-C, 1.Armee; 26.10.1940–28.2.1942 C-in-C West. Steinbach, ‘Zwischen Gefolgschaft, Gehorsam und Widerstand’.

407

On 8.8.1944 the following eight officers involved in the 20 July plot were hanged at Berlin Plötzensee prison: Robert Bernardis, Albrecht von Hagen, Paul von Hase, Erich Hoepner, Friedrich Karl Klausing, Hellmuth Stieff, Erwin von Witzleben, Peter Graf Yorck von Wartenburg. Fest, ‘Staatsstreich’, pp. 300–4.

408

From 1.4.1939 Spang was CO, Lower Rhine Fortifications and as such was subordinate to von Witzleben (see note 406 above). Between 16.9 and 15.11.1940 Spang was Chief of Staff, 1.Armee and worked alongside von Witzleben.

409

Generaloberst Ludwig von Beck (29.6.1880–20.7.1944), from 1.7.1935 to 8.8.1938 Chief of the Army General Staff.

410

Between 1925 and 1934 Spang served with Artillery Reg.5, of which Ludwig Beck was CO from 1.2.1929 to 1.10.1931.

411

Lieutenants Hanns Ludin and Richard Scheringer, and Oberleutnant Hans Friedrich Werdt established contacts with the NSDAP in 1929 for the purpose of forming National Socialist cells within the Reichswehr, and published a broadsheet calling for a ‘national revolution’. The three officers were arrested on 10/11.3.1930 and charged with preparing an act of high treason. The Reich Court at Leipzig sentenced them to 18 months’ military prison on 4.10.1930. As Regimental CO, Beck expressed to the court his understanding for the motives of the accused, which arose from a sense of national idealism, and condemned them only on disciplinary grounds. Bucher, ‘Reichswehrprozess’; Klaus-Jürgen Müller, ‘Beck’, pp. 61f, 331–4.

412

Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt, 1.3.1942–2.7.1944 and 5.9.1944–10.3.1945 C-in-C West. He replaced Feldmarschall Erwin von Witzleben in this position.

413

Gerd von Rundstedt spoke excellent French and had a friendly correspondence with Marshal Pétain. The statement that he attempted to spare the French people appears more than dubious on the basis of contemporary research. ‘Das deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 5/2, pp. 174–81. See also Ziemke, ‘Gerd von Rundstedt’. The affair is clarified in Peter Lieb’s published dissertation ‘Das deutsche Westheer in die Eskalation der Gewalt’.

414

Generaloberst Erich Hoepner (14.9.1886–8.8.1944) probably met Spang in World War I as a Staff Officer.

415

Hoepner proved himself a very able panzer leader in the Polish, French and Russian campaigns. After ordering 4.Pz.Armee to retreat from Moscow on 8.1.1942 he was relieved of command and discharged the Wehrmacht for cowardice and disobeying orders. He was also deprived of the right to wear uniform and decorations. Hitler was so enraged by other unauthorised retreats that he decided to make an example of Hoepner. In Berlin, Hoepner contacted Olbricht and took an active part in planning the coup d’état of 20 July. He was sentenced to death by the People’s Court on 8.8.1944 and executed by hanging at Berlin-Plötzensee prison the same day.

416

Paul von Hase (24.7.1885–8.8.1944), from 15.11.1940 to 20.3.1944 City Commandant, Berlin and a leading figure in the attempted coup. October 1905 joined Kaiser-Alexander-Garde-Grenadier-Reg.1; 1921 married a Latvian from Mitan, Margarethe Freiin von Funck. Hase had four children (Alexander, Ina, Maria and Friedrich-Wilhelm). Kopp, ‘Paul von Hase’.

417

At 1600hrs on 20.7.1944, Keitel passed the following order to all Wehrkreis commanders by telephone or signal, ‘All orders from the Bendler-Strasse bearing the signatures of Generaloberst Hoepner, Feldmarschall von Witzleben, Gen.d.Inf. Olbricht or Gen.Oberst Fromm are invalid. These generals are to be considered mutineers. Oberst Graf von Stauffenberg carried out the attempt on the Führer’s life. Henceforth only the orders of the Reichsführer-SS and the Chief of the OKW are to be obeyed. All measures “Walküre” are to be cancelled. Closest liaison is to be maintained with the Gauleiters, senior SS and police chiefs.’ Since this order was also passed by telephone, there may be minor differences between the various texts. A mention of Halder in this connection is unproven and probably the result of an error of memory. The order is reproduced in, inter alia, ‘Tätigskeitsbericht Schmundt’, p. 165.

418

SA-Obergruppenführer and General der Polizei Wolf Heinrich Graf von Helldorf (14.10.1896–15.8.1944); 1926 joined NSDAP; 1932 SA-Führer, Berlin-Brandenburg; 1932 Member Prussian Parliament; 1933 Member Reichstag; July 1935 Police President of Berlin. Despite his Nazi past and involvement in wrongdoings of the regime, from 1938 he was involved in the resistance, consorting with Goerdeler’s circle, and was involved in the coup plot of 20 July 1944.

419

Close contact between Stauffenberg and Choltitz is not confirmed by research.

420

It is not known with which SS-Oberführer Choltitz spoke immediately after the attempt. LXXXIV.Armeekorps, which he commanded at that time, was subordinate to 17.SS-Pz.Grenadier-Div. ‘Götz von Berlichingen’ under SS-Brigade-Führer Otto Baum. What contact Choltitz had with Baum is unknown. In his memoirs, he mentioned only a conversation with his own Chief of Staff about the assassination attempt. During the train journey from FHQ Wolfsschanze to Berlin on the night of 7.8.1944, Choltitz talked with Reichsleiter Robert Ley, whom he did not know, and who explained to him the new Sippenhaft Law, which allowed the arrest of a traitor’s kith and kin. Choltitz, ‘Brennt Paris?’ p. 13f, on Sippenhaft see, for example, Hett/Tuchel, ‘Die Reaktionen des NS-Staates’, pp. 383–8.

421

Generalleutnant Friedrich Brieth (25.5.1892–9.7.1982) commanded from 5.4.1943 to 24.5.1944 Artillery School I in Berlin. It trained artillery and regimental commanders.

422

Probably meant here is Burkhart Freiherr Loeffelholz von Colberg (6.5.1913–30.10.2000), who served in North Africa, latterly as Ia, 334.Inf.Div. He was flown out of Tunisia, then occupied various Staff positions, ended the war as Oberstleutnant and served with the Bundeswehr until 30.9.1971, retiring in the rank of Oberst.

423

Generalmajor Martin Lattmann (10.2.1896–11.8.1976) was captured at Stalingrad as CO, 14.Pz.Div. From 25.8.1940 to 15.4.1942 he was CO, Training Staff, Artillery School Jüterbog (from 26.1.1942 Artillery School II) and as such was responsible for the weapons training courses for young officers and applicants for the officer-reserve. Lattmann was decried as a ‘wild Nazi general’ but went through an ideological volte-face in captivity, joined the anti-Nazi Bund Deutscher Offiziere and took up a position on its left wing. After the war he served as a Generalmajor of the Volkspolizei at the DDR Interior Ministry and was active for various economic commissions. Frieser, ‘Krieg hinter Stacheldraht’, pp. 193, 371.

424

Between 8.2.1942 and 28.4.1942 at Demyansk, around 100,000 German soldiers remained encircled until 16.Armee opened a corridor for them; the then Generalleutnant Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach commanded the relief units from X.Armeekorps. ‘Das deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg’, Vol. 4, pp. 639–41.

425

Tschugujew, city on the Severny Donetz.

426

Kharkov in the Ukraine.

427

Meant here is Oberst Hans Lattmann (b. 24.12.1894), summer 1944, Artillery Staff Officer, Army Group B. Lattmann was once assessed by Rommel as a ‘convinced National Socialist’ and so the statement he made to Beck is all the more interesting.

428

For Dietrich see note 91 above.

429

Generalleutnant Hans Speidel (28.10.1897–28.11.1984), from 14.4.1944–5.9.1944 Chief of Staff, Army Group B in France. He had prior knowledge of the 20 July plot and was arrested on 5.9.1944, but skilfully avoided incriminating himself and remained in detention until the war ended.

430

Oberst Hans-Jürgen Dingler (b. 30.3.1904), from 12.2.1944 to 4.1945 Chief of Staff, LVIII.Res.Pz.Korps. Postwar with West German Intelligence Gehlen/BND.

431

General der Panzertruppe Walter Krüger (23.3.1892–11.7.1973), Cmmdg Gen. LVIII.Res.Pz.Korps, was a highly decorated panzer leader who probably from his time as regimental commander in 1937 onwards had gained general ideas from Beck. It is not proven that they were any closer than this.

432

For Bayerlein see note 225 above. Fritz Bayerlein was awarded the Swords to his Knight’s Cross on 20.7.1944. With his Pz.Lehr.Div. he had fought off numerous American attacks west of St Lo from 11 July. This may explain why he was in such good spirits at that point. A few days later the American Great Offensive crushed his unit. On 27.7.1944 he reported that his division had been wiped out. Ritgen, ‘Panzer Lehr Division’, pp. 155–70.

433

The date of these talks is unknown. Ritter mentions in his biography of Goerdeler that Choltitz spoke with him in March 1944. At the time Choltitz was a corps commander in Italy, therefore it is more likely that the meeting occurred between 16.4.1944 and 13.6.1944, when Choltitz was in the OKH Führer-Reserve. The detailed knowledge that Choltitz possessed of the course of the event is astonishing. Probably he had obtained the information from his Staff in Paris, who were in on the secret. Another source alleges that before the attempt in July 1944, Choltitz already knew everything about it. Oberleutnant Curt Vogel reported on a conversation between Choltitz and Generalmajor Eugen König, CO, 91.Luftlande-Div. (BA/MA MSg 1/647 and 2579).

434

General der Infanterie Friedrich Olbricht (4.10.1888–20.7.1944), from 15.2.1940 Chief of Army General Bureau.

435

Carl Goerdeler (31.7.1884–2.2.1945), 1930–37 Oberbürgermeister, Leipzig. Envisaged as Reich Chancellor in the event of a successful coup.

436

General der Nachrichtentruppe Erich Fellgiebel (4.10.1886–4.9.1944), from August 1938 Chief of Army Signals and Chief of Wehrmacht Signals Links at OKW, an early recruit to the Resistance. His task on 20.7.1944 was to cut off the signals systems at FHQ. He was arrested the next evening.

437

After 20.7.1944 Zeitzler was not sought out despite many lingering suspicions. Stahl, ‘Zeitzler’, p. 289.

438

See Document 32.

439

Meant here is lawyer Hans-Bernd von Haeften (15.12.1905–15.8.1944), from 1934 diplomatic service; 1940 Deputy Leader, Cultural Political Dept, Foreign Ministry. He was a member of the Kreisau circle and was earmarked for State Secretary at the Foreign Ministry should the coup have been successful. Arrested 20.7.1944, executed at Berlin-Plötzensee prison.

440

Estimates of the numbers executed in the wake of 20 July vary. Hoffmann writes of between 600 and 700 persons arrested, about 200 tried and executed. There were in addition to these an unknown number of semiofficial and unofficial executions. Hoffmann, ‘Staatsstreich’, p. 652.

441

Generaloberst Erwin Jaenecke (22.4.1890–3.7.1960), from 1.6.1943 C-in-C 17.Armee (Caucasus and latterly Crimea), advised Hitler on 29.4.1944 in two verbal reports to abandon Sebastopol and allow his reduced Army the opportunity to retreat. He had the full agreement of Zeitzler, Chief of Army General Staff, and Heusinger, Chief of Operations Division, for his plan. Jaenecke described the catastrophic situation in an emotional manner and hammered the map table repeatedly. The second conference in the evening was even more tense. While returning to the Crimea he received the report that Hitler had relieved him of command and replaced him with his former Chief of Staff, Allmendinger. Jaenecke was expressly forbidden to return to the Crimea. A pre-court-martial investigation came to nothing. On 31.1.1945 he was discharged the Wehrmacht. KTB note on journey, C-in-C to FHQ, BA/MA RH20/17-270. Meanwhile Goerdeler had attempted to recruit Jaenecke for a conspiracy involving front commanders and the General Staff. Jaenecke supported the plan but contributed nothing. During their investigations of 20 July plot, the Gestapo came across his name on numerous occasions, and he was interrogated for eight hours in September 1944, RSHA concluding that he was not involved. Ritter, ‘Goerdeler’, p. 383; Jaenecke to Xylander, 4.11.1944, BA/MA N761/4. The few letters in his literary bequest leave no impression of an especially realistic appraisal of the strategic situation, nor of an even peripheral supportive stance for the opposition. On 24.2.1944 he wrote to his former commanding officer, Generaloberst Blaskowitz, ‘I still cannot imagine that the British and Americans are so stupid that they will do the Russians’ work for them and give the Bolshevists in Europe a leg-up into the saddle. On the other hand the Jews’ hatred is probably so great that all reasonable considerations take a back seat’, BA/MA N761/4. Pfuhlstein reported at Trent Park that at Olbricht’s instigation he had spoken to Heusinger and Zeitzler’s adjutant in order to gauge the extent of Zeitzler’s disillusion with Hitler. He had been told that Zeitzler was not yet ‘ripe’ to be indulged regarding the plans for a coup. GRGG 285, TNA, WO 208/4177.

442

Goerdeler made numerous attempts to obtain an interview with Zeitzler. Beck and Stauffenberg considered these efforts useless. Choltitz, to whom Goerdeler had been introduced in the autumn of 1943 through the mediation of Choltitz’s cousin Baron Palombini, apparently promised to arrange that Goerdeler and Zeitzler should meet but then decided against it. Ritter, ‘Goerdeler’, p. 383.

443

Generaloberst Friedrich Fromm (8.10.1888–12.3.1945), Chief of Army Armaments and C-in-C Ersatzheer from the outbreak of war, knew of the coup plot by his Chief of Staff, Stauffenberg, but refused any involvement once he knew that Hitler had survived the assassination attempt. On the early morning of 21.7.1944 he had the four conspirators Stauffenberg, von Haeften, Olbricht and von Quirnheim shot in the Bendler-Strasse courtyard. Fromm himself was executed by shooting at Brandenburg-Görden Penitentiary on 12.3.1945. There is a very recent, monumental biography on Fromm: Kroener, ‘Fromm’.

444

After the failure of the coup, Fromm gave Beck the oportunity to kill himself. Beck made two attempts, both of which failed. Fromm then ordered that he be ‘put out of his misery’, which was probably carried out by a Feldwebel. Kroener, ‘Fromm’, pp. 702–8.

445

Himmler, nominated Fromm’s successor on 20.7.1944, made his appearance at the Bendler Block for the first time on 22.7.1944. Choltitz’s account must have been obtained from one of two other SS-Führer. Just after midnight on 21.7.1944 SS-Sturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny (12.6.1908–5.7.1975) arrived at the Bendler Block with a company of SS to support the Wachbataillon under Major Ernst-Otto Remer (8.8.1912–5.10.1997). SS-Obergruppenführer and General der Polizei Dr Ernst Kaltenbrunner (4.10.1903–15.10.1946), from 30.1.1943 Chief of RSHA and SD, had arrived there shortly before. Kroener, ‘Fromm’, p. 708f.

446

Manstein was certainly an independent thinker, but he had never been prepared to become involved politically against Hitler and had developed no major political ideology. He satisfied himself with the hope of achieving a ‘stand-off’ with the Russians on the Eastern Front. There is no academic biography. For general reading see Syring, ‘Erich von Manstein’.

447

The poorly prepared Kapp putsch of 13–17.3.1920 cannot be compared to the coup attempt of 20.7.1944 because of the difference in the prevailing conditions. There is comprehensive documentation on the former, ‘Der Kapp-Lüttwitz-Ludendorff Putsch. Dokumente’. From the older existing literature, the best account is Erger, ‘Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch’.

448

There is no doubt that the conspirators attempted to isolate the communications at FHQ Wolfsschanze, but this was frustrated by the complexity of the installation. The failure to shut down the distribution network run by the Reichspost was caused mainly by the refusal of Telegraphy Senior Inspector Senor to cooperate. Peter Hoffmann, ‘Staatsstreich’, pp. 415–28, 504, 508–11.

449

Eberbach was referring here to the brief conversation he had on 17.7.1944 at HQ, Pz.Gr. West shortly before Rommel was seriously wounded.

450

Genertalleutnant Alfred Gause (14.2.1896–30.9.1967) was from September 1941 to 7.5.1943 (with a short break) Chief of Staff, Pz.Gr./Pz.Armee/Heeresgr.Afrika, from 15.6.1944–10.9.1944 Chief of Staff, Pz.Gr. West and 5.Pz.Armee.

451

Meant here is Oberstleutnant (from 1.8.1944 Oberst) Franz Herber, Chief, Abt.Ib, General Army Bureau, who towards 2100hrs appointed himself leader of the counter-coup at the Bendler Block and, together with other officers of the General Army Bureau, helped put down the Stauffenberg putsch and released Fromm. Kroener, ‘Fromm’, p. 697.

452

The meeting of Geyr, Eberbach and Stauffenberg probably took place in mid-July 1941 when Stauffenberg visited the XXIV.Pz.Korps advanced command post in the area between Orsha and Smolensk. At that time Eberbach was CO, 5.Pz.Brigade/4.Pz.Div./XXIV.Pz.Korps. Leo Reichsfreiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg (2.3.1896–27.1.1974) was a friend of the Stauffenberg family. From 1922 to 1925 he had been Chief, 4.Squadron/18.Reiter-Reg. at Bad Cannstadt, and Claus’s eldest brother Alexander von Stauffenberg served under him there. Peter Hoffmann, ‘Stauffenberg’, pp. 49, 135f, 223. For Stauffenberg’s later attempts to recruit Geyr to the Resistance see note 387 above.

453

Eberbach was confusing two events here – possibly on the basis of misleading National Socialist press reporting in which the conspirators were blamed for the destruction of Army Group Centre. One event concerns General der Artillerie Fritz Lindemann (11.4.1894–22.9.1944), from 1.10.1943 General der Artillerie at Chief of Army Armaments and CO, Ersatzheer. He was involved in planning the coup, was arrested on 3.9.1944 and died 22.9.1944 as the result of a bullet wound to the stomach inflicted during his arrest. Mühlen, ‘Sie gaben ihr Leben’. The second event concerned Generalmajor Gerhard Lindemann (2.8.1896–28.4.1994), from end May 1944 CO, 361.Inf.Div., captured by Soviets 22.7.1944 on central section of Eastern Front. Together with Generalleutnant Eberhard von Kurowski (10.9.1985–11.9.1957) – from 1.6.1943 CO, 110.Inf.Div., also captured by Soviets in July 1944 – on 14.8.1944 he broadcast on the radio station ‘Freies Deutschland’ a message inciting troops of Army Group Centre to lay down their arms. ‘Tätigkeitsbericht Schmundt’, p. 201. Lindeman and Kurowski also signed the declaration of the 50 generals of 8.12.1944.

454

Major Joachim Kuhn (b. 2.8.1913), under Stieff at Organisations-Abt., Army General Staff, was active in procuring explosives for an assassination attempt in 1943. From 22.6.1944 he was 1a, 28.Jäger-Div. A few days after 20.7.1944, his divisional commander Gustav Hostermann von Ziehlberg (10.12.1898–2.2.1945) received orders to place Kuhn under arrest and bring him to Berlin. Von Ziehlberg advised him of this and offered Kuhn the oportunity to avoid arrest by shooting himself. Instead, Kuhn crossed the Soviet line on 27 July. Von Ziehlberg was then court-martialled and sentenced to nine months’ detention to be served at the front. Following a finding of guilt in a second trial in which he was charged with ‘premeditated disobedience to an order in the face of the enemy’, he was sentenced to death and executed by firing squad on 2.2.1945 at Berlin-Spandau. For Kuhn see esp. ‘Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des 20.7.1944’ and ‘Tätigskeitsbericht Schmundt’, pp. 181, 184, 287 and 297.

455

Generaladmiral Otto Schniewind (14.12.1897–26.3.1964) was not implicated in the plot, and he never held a minor role. From March 1943, C-in-C Naval Group Command North, he entered Führer-Reserve 31.7.1944. For the involvement of the Kriegsmarine see Hillmann, ‘Der 20 Juli und die Marine’.

456

Eberbach vastly overestimates the extent of the support for the coup attempt. The basic problem of the plotters was that only the odd general supported it. The refusal of von Manstein was the rule, not the exception.

457

Why Hitler appointed Guderian to act as Chief of the Army General Staff on the evening of 20.7.1944 because of suspicions about Zeitzler has never been properly addressed by research. The plotters had recruited Guderian to gauge the depth of support amongst the Army generals. Subsequently Guderian indulged in homage to Hitler and his orders then bore evidence of a ruthless fanaticism in the sense of a ‘fight to the last shell’. Wilhelm, ‘Guderian’.

458

On Thomale see note 140 above. He was not implicated in the 20 July plot. What Eberbach meant by his observation that Thomale had been courageous in Berlin is unknown.

459

For Hitler’s daily itinerary see Seidler/Zeigert, ‘Führerhauptquartiere’, pp. 110–14; Neumärker, ‘Wolfsschanze’, pp. 74–7.

460

General der Artillerie Eduard Wagner (1.4.1894–23.7.1944), from 1.8.1940 Army QM-General, joined the Opposition circle around Halder in 1939 but then immersed himself in his duties until 1942 and was thus implicated in the brutal policies in the war in the east. A long-term waverer, by the summer of 1944 he had become a leading advocate of the need to assassinate Hitler. He eluded his pursuers by suicide. Peter, ‘Eduard Wagner’.

461

Oberst Eberhard Finckh (7.11.1899–30.8.1944), friendly with Stauffenberg from 1936, implicated in plot in Paris as Senior QM to Military Cdr, France. Arrested 26.7.1944, condemned to death by People’s Court 30.8.1944 and executed same day at Berlin-Plötzensee.

462

General der Infanterie Walter Buhle (26.10.1894–27.12.1959), 1.9.1939 Chief, Organisations-Abt. at OKH; from 15.2.1942 Chief of OKW Army Staff; 1.2.1945 Chief of Army Ordnance. He suffered minor injuries in the 20 July blast.

463

Eberbach means Oberst Joachim Meichssner (4.4.1906–29.9.1944). At OKH from 1937, Olbricht recruited him to the conspiracy. Temporarily active with Buhle at OKW Army Staff, he was then appointed Chief of the Organisations-Abt., Wehrmacht Command Staff, where he had access to the Führer’s situation conferences but did not want to be the assassin. Arrested end of July 1944, sentenced to death by the People’s Court 29.9.1944 and executed same day at Berlin-Plötzensee.

464

On 10.7.1944 Hitler ordered the C-in-C Ersatzheer and Chief of Army Ordnance to set up 15 new ‘Sperr-Divisionen’ (barrier divisions) (29.Welle) as soon as possible. The intention was originally that they should protect the Reich borders in the East with effect from 1.9.1944. On 13.7.1944 the units were redesignated ‘Grenadier Divisions’, and by the beginning of October 1944 the 17 divisions of 29.Welle were now renamed ‘Volksgrenadier Divisions’. Equipped only with anti-tank guns, artillery and transport, they were used mainly in the east from August 1944. It is not known if Hitler’s idea for the barrier divisions influenced the conspirators to act at a particular time. Kroener, ‘Fromm’, esp. p. 667.

465

The former Battle Commandant of Aachen, Oberst Wilck, expressed the opinion on 28.10.1944 that the Army was 40 per cent Nazi and 60 per cent ‘against’. If the Führer held on to the reins of power and that was the split, then the war would go on until Berlin fell and Germany was destroyed, Wilck prophesied. SRGG 1067, 28.10.1944, TNA, WO 208/4169.

466

Generalleutnant Paul Gerhard (20.4.1881–12.10.1953), from 1.8.1940 to 19.1.1945 Wehrersatz-Inspecteur, Allenstein. He had been CO, Inf.Reg.7 in 1931.

467

Freidrich Werner Graf von der Schulenburg (20.11.1875–10.11.1944), from 1934 to 1941 German ambassador to Moscow, joined the Goerdeler circle of resistance workers and was to have been Foreign Secretary had the coup been successful. Executed at Berlin-Plötzensee.

468

In a 1953 report, Pfuhlstein stated that Canaris had also been present, ‘Canaris and Oster were standing together naked at the washbasin, Oster with a toothbrush in his mouth, completely numbed, gazing at me with a look of total horror. Canaris, who seemed a broken man physically, also stared at me in horror. He was holding the washbasin with both hands so as not to sink to his knees.’ Quoted from Höhne, ‘Canaris’, p. 548. Generalmajor Hans Oster (9.8.1888–9.4.1945), from 1939 Head of OKW Abwehr Overseas Office at HQ, was one of the leading figures of the resistance movement; expelled from the Wehrmacht, 16.3.1943. The conspirators planned for him to be President of the Reich Military Court in the event of a successful coup. Found guilty of treason by SS tribunal at Flossenbürg concentration camp 8.4.1945 and executed illegally the following day. The Gestapo found a letter on Oster addressed to Canaris in which Pfuhlstein was described as a reliable man ‘for the envisaged task’. GRGG 285(c), TNA, WO 208/4177. In his interrogation by the British, Pfuhlstein was very critical of Admiral Canaris, calling him a ‘desk general’. Höhne, ‘Canaris’, pp. 547–51; ‘Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung: Die Kaltenbrunner-Bericht’ pp. 370f, 405–8.

469

At Küstrin, Pfuhlstein met the following: General der Panzertruppe von Esebeck, Chief of Wehrkreis Command XVII (Vienna); Generalleutnant Sinzinger, City Commandant, Vienna; Generalmajor Siegfried von Stülpnagel, City Commandant, Stettin; Generalleutnant Speidel, Chief of Staff, Army Group B; Major Johann von Hassel, son of ambassador Ulrich von Hassel; Oberstleutnant von Kluge, son of the field marshal; Major Hoepner, son of Generaloberst Erich Hoepner; Major Fellgiebel, brother of General Erich Fellgiebel; Krieggerichtsrat Dr Kayser; Hauptmann Paulus, son of the field marshal; and Oberst von Cannstein, formerly of the Kavallerie-Schule, Blomberg. GRGG 285(c), TNA, WO 208/4177.

470

General der Infanterie Joachim von Stülpnagel (5.3.1880–15.7.1968), ended World War I as head of OHL Organisations-Abt. Between the wars he was a close colleague of General Hans von Seeckt. Pensioned-off 31.12.1931. After 20.7.1944 arrested as a ‘politically unreliable’ general and held for several months, including a stay at Ravensbrück concentration camp. Siegfried von Stülpnagel was a brother of Joachim and was detained between 5.8.1944 and 22.4.1945.

471

Ernst August Prinz von Hannover (1914–87) during the Russian campaign an Oberleutnant on Staff, Pz.Gr.4 (Generaloberst Hoepner). Severely wounded at Kharkov in the spring of 1943, he was arrested after 20 July and spent a few weeks at Gestapo HQ.

472

Bad Kösen an der Saale, situated between Halle and Weimar.

473

Hjalmar Schacht (22.1.1877–3.6.1970), 1933–39 President, Reichbank; 1934–37 Reich Economy Minister; 1935–37 General Plenipotentiary for the War Economy; until 1944 Reich Minister without Portfolio. He was in touch with the conspiracy from 1938. Arrested 23.7.1944 and taken directly to Ravensbrück; 31.8.1944 transferred to Gestapo HQ where according to his own testimony he remained four months before being sent to Flossenbürg. Schacht, ‘Abrechnung mit Hitler’.

474

Franz Halder was arrested at Aschau, 21.7.1944 and delivered to Ravensbrück three days later. He spent the period 7.10.1944–7.2.1945 in the Gestapo HQ dungeons. Schall-Riaucour, ‘Aufstand und Gehorsam’, pp. 329–32.

475

Revin, town in northern France where the US Army had an interrogation camp for a short while.

476

Which Generalmajor commanded a panzer korps in the spring of 1945 is not known. The details are too general to identify whom Kirchheim meant here.

477

Kirchheim was speaking of the trials of: Oberstleutnant Bernhard Klamroth, Major (Reserve) Hans-Georg Klamroth, Major Egbert Hayessen, Legationsrat Adam Trott zu Solz, Legationsrat Bernd von Haeften and SA-Gruppenführer Wolf Graf von Helldorf before the People’s Court on 15.8.1944. All six accused were sentenced to death. Adam von Trott zu Solz (9.8.1909–26.9.1944) worked in the information section at the Foreign Ministry and acted as an intermediary between the conspiracy and overseas. He was arrested 26.7.1944. Execution of his sentence of death was delayed for over a month. For the trials of 15.8.1944 see Wagner, ‘Volksgerichtshof, pp. 601–67; Würmling, ‘Adam Trott zu Solz’.

478

Roland Freisler (30.10.1893–3.2.1945), 1933 Secretary of State, Reich Justice Ministry, from 1942, President, People’s Court.

479

For Hoepner see notes 414 and 415 above.

480

For Helldorf see note 418 above. The Major of the Reserve mentioned here is Hans-Georg Klamroth.

481

For the Honour Court see note 287 above. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, from 30.1.1943 Head RSHA, Chief of Sipo and SD.

482

SS-Gruppenführer Heinrich Müller (28.4.1900 – disappeared 29.4.1945), Head of Gestapo.

483

In its session of 4.10.1944 the Honour Court had to decide whether Speidel should answer before the People’s Court. This protocol supports the affidavit sworn by Guderian and Kirchheim in 1946 regarding the hearing. Both defended Speidel against Keitel and Kaltenbrunner on the basis that Speidel had reported the attempted assassination of Hitler to Rommel, and thus had done all that duty required of him. The acquittal of Speidel now implicated Rommel. For more see Reuth, ‘Rommel’, p. 238ff.

484

Kirchheim also spoke briefly about the Honour Court hearing in SRGG 1180(c), 1.5.1945, TNA WO 208/4169. Kirchheim was obliged to justify himself to his fellow prisoners because shortly after his capture he had made an appeal to Keitel on Radio Luxembourg to lay down arms, having recently been a judge of the Honour Court. Von Thoma called him ‘scum’ and would not forget how he had delivered comrades to the gallows. GRGG 288, 24–26.4.1945, TNA WO 208/4177.

485

See note 477 above.

486

Meant here are Oberstleutnant Bernhard Klamroth (20.11.1910–15.8.1944) and his elder cousin and father-in-law Major (Reserve) Johannes Georg Klamroth (12.10.1898–26.8.1944).

487

The fragmentary remains of the recording tapes do not support the idea that Freisler behaved himself any better in the third session of the People’s Court on 15.8.1944. ‘Also in this principal trial he was unrestrained and tyrannical.’ Wagner, ‘Volksgerichtshof’, p. 684.

488

Pfuhlstein reported in captivity that he had shared a ticklish situation with Kaltenbrunner when Hungarian soldiers attempted to take them both prisoner. It was only Pfuhlstein’s determined reaction that avoided their being shot. This must have occurred on 19.3.1944 upon the German occupation of Hungary. GRGG 286, 19–21.4.1945, TNA, WO 208/4177. Black, ‘Ernst Kaltenbrunner’, does not mention the affair.