Target Manhattan

Azzard (Cont’d)

In terms of enforcement procedures your office decided to handle this case according to the procedures devised for dealing with kidnappings, isn’t that right?

Essentially, yes. A hostage-the city-was being held for ransom. In principle it was the same thing as a kidnapping. A mass kidnapping.

And the FBI is specifically organized to deal with the crime of kidnapping.

That’s right. As a result of the Lindbergh case, kidnapping was made a federal offense and came under the jurisdiction of government authority. We’re the enforcement arm.

Now, you have specific procedures for dealing with such cases?

Yes. We’ve had a lot of experience with ransom cases.

What are those procedures, in principle?

The first priority is the safety of the victim. The second priority is the apprehension of the perpetrators. The third is the recovery of the ransom.

In other words your regulations specify that no action be taken which might jeopardize the safety of the victim.

That’s correct. Of course, in certain kidnapping cases we’ve had peculiar problems along those lines.

Such as?

Well, sometimes you develop clues which indicate that the kidnappers intend to kill the victim whether or not the ransom is paid. In cases like that, sometimes you have to go ahead and move in on them even though you know it’s a risk.

Was this case in that category?

Not to our knowledge, no.

It’s been suggested Craycroft and Ryterband knew there wouldn’t be time to deliver the money. That they were simply looking for an excuse to bomb the city.

Well, they could have bombed it right at the start, if that was all they wanted. I don’t really buy that theory.

It has some rationale behind it, Mr. Azzard. They might have tried to justify such intentions by blaming the city itself for not producing the ransom. “You brought it on yourself,” that kind of rationalization.

Maybe. I’m not convinced.

So you didn’t feel you’d be justified in moving in on Craycroft before the ransom was paid, even if there were some way to get at him?

No. Our recommendation was to pay the ransom, and worry about recovering it after the threat had been removed.

To whom did you make that recommendation?

Specifically to Mr. Maitland, to Captain Grofeld, and-when he arrived-to Deputy Police Commissioner Toombes.

And did they agree with your analysis?

So far as I know they did. They didn’t argue the point.

What procedure did you have in mind to recover the ransom?

You try to use as many as you can. Circumstances differ, of course. In this case we had one built-in advantage. If the money was coming from the Federal Reserve disposal office, it meant they already had records of the serial numbers of the bills.

That’d be a pretty unpromising way of tracing the money, wouldn’t it?

It’s paid off now and then in the past. I grant you it’s slow. Usually by the time somebody spots a wanted bill in circulation, it’s been passed five or six times from hand to hand. But sooner or later you usually manage to trace one back to its source.

What other methods did you elect to employ in this case?

We decided to bring in three bleepers.

Could you explain that term, for the record?

Miniature battery-operated transmitters. It’s SOP to conceal them, for example, in the locks of suitcases in which the ransom is delivered. A direction finder can pinpoint the location of the bleeper by radio triangulation. It makes it possible for us to follow the ransom without showing ourselves.

So you decided to put minature transmitters into the cases in which the ransom would be delivered to Ryterband?

Yes. Two of those-one would be fairly obvious and the other would be well concealed. The theory was that we expected him to find the obvious one, and ditch it. Then he’d think he was safe. We’d still have the concealed one, to lead us to him afterward. But we had an additional advantage in this case. We had Ryterband himself. He was in that room with us for hours. We secreted a bleeper on Ryterband, without his knowledge.

How did you do that?

I had it brought up to the office from our headquarters by an agent. We slipped it to Agent Barstow, who’s quite deft. He managed to attach it to the back of Ryterband’s belt while Ryterband was looking out the window at Craycroft’s plane. Ryterband wasn’t aware of the contact; we distracted him by having Agent Cobb jostle him. Rather like a pickpocket.

Very ingenious.

It’s a procedure we’ve rehearsed regularly. We employ it fairly frequently, for various purposes. Both bleepers and bugs.

So you were fairly certain of being able to track Ryterband if he took delivery of the ransom and drove away.

Yes. As long as we could stay within about four miles of him. The effective transmitting range of the bleepers is about four miles in urban areas. More, of course, in open areas-up to about ten miles.

That extended range would apply to the open water?

That would depend on the amount of insulation around him. If he was on an ocean liner, for example, the range would be restricted by all the metal around him. On a small open boat we could pick him up from twelve or fifteen miles away.

Did you take any other official action at that time, other than fixing these radio-tracking devices to Ryterband and preparing two others for attachment to the ransom?

Yes. We made continuous efforts to talk Craycroft out of it, by using Ryterband’s transmitter.

Did Craycroft respond?

Not to us. He talked only to Ryterband.

Did you record those radio conversations between Ryterband and Craycroft?

We tape-recorded the ones that took place after about one o’clock. Prior to that time we didn’t have a recorder, but we made stenographic notes of the conversations. I can’t say we got anything very useful from them. They both knew the conversations were being monitored. Our people were standing right beside him when he was on the radio. They weren’t very likely to give us any information that would help us.

What did they talk about?

Ryterband did most of the talking. Keeping Craycroft abreast of what was going on in the office. Telling him they were making efforts to get the money together.

What was the nature of Craycroft’s responses?

Hard to tell. He said very little. Most of it was radio jargon. One-word responses like “affirmative,” “acknowledge,” “roger,” “negative,” that kind of thing. I was told by the reporter, Harris, that Craycroft was probably having his hands full flying the airplane and didn’t have a lot of time to devote to chatter. Evidently what he was doing was quite difficult. I wouldn’t know much about that end of it.

Then you were content to let them take the ransom and then go after them afterward?

That’s our standard procedure in ransom cases. But the problem here was that we didn’t know whether the money could be delivered in time. We had to try to work out ways to neutralize Craycroft’s bomber, because the money might not materialize. That wasn’t a matter of choice. It was dictated by the facts.

Brian Garfield

Target Manhattan

Adler (Cont’d)

General, did you at one point recommend that Charles Ryterband be taken up onto the roof of the bank?

I didn’t recommend it. I suggested it as one possible action.

To what purpose?

I told them they could try it. Take him up on the rooftop and hold a gun to his head. Tell the man in the plane that if he didn’t buzz off, we’d shoot the son of a bitch in the head. The suggestion was vetoed. I didn’t hold out much hope for it. Again, it was a military solution to a peacetime problem, and I suppose the two don’t gel.

Did you really think it would have worked?

It might have been worth a try. We didn’t have any idea how close the two men were. But Ryterband kept talking about his “brother.” I figured it might be worth a try.

But it was vetoed. By whom?

You might say it was a unanimous veto.