The Case of the Daring Divorcee

Chapter Twelve

Judge Quincy L. Fallon looked down over the crowded courtroom and said, “This is the time heretofore fixed for the preliminary hearing in the case of the People of the State of California versus Adelle Sterling Hastings. Are you ready?”

Morton Ellis, one of the trial deputies of the district attorney’s office, said, “Ready for the People, Your Honor.”

Mason stood up. “If the Court please, the defendant is ready.”

“Very well,” Judge Fallon said. “Now, I want to make a few comments before we start taking evidence in this case.

“The Court understands from the press that a legal battle is going to be waged for the control of the estate. Minerva Shelton Hastings claims under a will, and Adelle Sterling Hastings, the defendant in this case, claims as the surviving spouse. Both parties have filed petitions which will duly be heard in the probate court.

“Now, this Court doesn’t intend to have this hearing in the criminal case develop into a squabble as to who is entitled to the estate or the management thereof. The sole question to be determined here is whether a crime has been committed and, if so, whether there is reasonable ground to believe the defendant is guilty of that crime. If she is, she will be bound over for trial in the superior court, and if she isn’t, she will be released.

“The Court realizes that it may be necessary to show some of the facts connected with the claims to the estate for the purpose of showing motivation, and quite possibly bias of the witnesses. But the Court wants the evidence concerning control of the estate limited to that purpose. It will serve no particular purpose to try the probate matter here, or for counsel to go on a fishing expedition with the different witnesses in the hope that some statement will be made which can be used in the probate hearing.

“With that in mind I caution you, gentlemen, to limit your examination, and in particular your cross-examination, within the bounds delineated by the Court.

“You may proceed, gentlemen.”

Morton Ellis, with crisp, businesslike efficiency, hurried through the opening stages of the trial.

A surveyor introduced a diagram of the premises, a floor plan of the upper and lower floors of the Hastings mansion. There were photographs of the exterior of the mansion. An autopsy surgeon testified that death was caused by two bullets from a .38-caliber revolver which had penetrated the brain; that the body had been found in bed; that death was instantaneous; that the man had evidently been killed while he was asleep; that the time of death had been sometime early in the morning of Monday, the fourth; that death could have been as late as eight o’clock in the morning of that day, or as early as one o’clock in the morning; that in his opinion the body had not been moved after death but had been found in exactly the position in which it had been lying when the shots were fired; the post-mortem lividity indicated as much.

Ellis said, “I will call Lieutenant Arthur Tragg as my next witness.”

Tragg came forward, was sworn, took the witness stand and told of the discovery of the body and introduced photographs of the body lying in the bed, the room in which the body had been found; and then produced the fatal bullets, one of which had been removed from the mattress after having passed entirely through the head; the other had been found inside the skull.

“Are you acquainted with Perry Mason, the attorney for the defendant?” Ellis asked.

“I am.”

“Have you had occasion to talk with him over the telephone from time to time?”

“I have.”

“Are you familiar with the sound of his voice?”

“I am.”

“I will ask you whether or not you had any conversation with Perry Mason on the morning of Tuesday, the fifth?”

“I did. Yes, sir.”

“And what was that conversation?”

“Mr. Mason called me, he told me that someone had been in his office the day prior to the telephone call.”

“Now, just a minute,” Ellis said, “that would have been Monday, the fourth.”

“That’s right.”

“And what else did Mr. Mason say?”

“He said that this caller had left a woman’s handbag in the office, that the handbag contained a gun, that the gun had been fired twice. He said further that subsequently the bag had been identified as being the property of Adelle Sterling Hastings, the defendant in this case, and suggested that I might care to examine the weapon.”

“And what did you do?”

“I asked one of the men on the homicide squad to put through a call to Garvin S. Hastings and get him on the phone. However, shortly after that a report came in that one of Hastings’ employees had gone to the house to see why Hastings had not been answering the phone and had found the man’s body in bed.”

“So what did you do?”

“I went to Mr. Mason’s office.”

“And what did you find there?”

“I found the defendant there.”

“Did you find the gun Mr. Mason had referred to?”

“Not then.”

“Did you subsequently locate it?”

“Just a moment,” Mason said. “I object to that question as calling for a conclusion of the witness.”

“Why, he certainly can answer whether or not he eventually discovered the gun,” Ellis said.

“No, he can’t,” Mason said, “because he has no way of knowing whether the gun he discovered was the same gun that I had referred to over the telephone, or the same gun that I had in my office.”

“Oh, Your Honor,” Ellis said, “this is simply quibbling. We can trace that gun from the woman’s handbag to Mason’s desk, from Mason’s desk to the office of Garvin Hastings, where one of the employees, Simley Beason, had concealed it, and then we can trace it into the possession of Lieutenant Tragg.”

“Then go ahead and trace it,” Mason said, “but don’t ask this witness if the gun that he eventually recovered was the same gun that was in my office drawer. That’s a conclusion.”

“All right, all right,” Ellis conceded with poor grace. “I’ll withdraw the question and I’ll ask the witness this question: Did you inquire about the gun when you went to Mr. Mason’s office?”

“I did.”

“Did you ask him to produce it?”

“I did.”

“And what, if anything, did Mr. Mason do in connection with that request?”

“He opened a drawer in the right-hand side of his desk and seemed very much surprised when he found that the drawer was empty.”

Morton Ellis said, “I will ask you, Lieutenant Tragg, if you have certified copies of the firearms record in your possession showing the sales of firearms to Garvin S. Hastings.”

“I have.”

“Will you please give me those records?”

Tragg passed over two sheets of paper.

“What do these records show generally, Lieutenant?”

“Those are official documents which are kept in accordance with the provisions of California law. They show the purchase of two guns from The Sportsman Supply Center.”

“And what do these documents cover, Lieutenant?”

“The purchase of two weapons, two Smith and Wesson thirty-eight-caliber revolvers of similar model. The first one is for a Smith and Wesson gun with a two-and-a-half inch barrel, number C 48809, which was sold on the date appearing on this sheet. The other was purchased some months later and is for a similar model Smith and Wesson gun, with the serial number C 232721.”

“Very well. Now will you tell US what conversations you had with Perry Mason, as attorney for the defendant, in connection with this firearm which he told you about and which he said he was unable to produce after you had reached his office.”

“Mr. Mason told me that he had taken a gun from the defendant’s handbag which had been left in his office; that he had placed that gun in the upper right-hand drawer of his desk; that the gun had disappeared.”

“Now, when did this conversation take place, Lieutenant?”

“This was on Tuesday, the fifth.”

“And did Mr. Mason tell you what he had done with reference to trying to locate that gun?”

“He did, at a later conversation.”

“What did he say?”

“He said that he had made an investigation himself and through his private detective, Paul Drake, head of the Drake Detective Agency; that as a result of that investigation he found that a man had entered his office on the morning of Tuesday, the fifth, at about the time the charwoman was cleaning up the office; that this man had been carrying a brief case and had represented himself to be Perry Mason — if not in direct words, at least by his conduct — and had gone on into the office, stayed there for about ten minutes and then had left.

“Mr. Mason told me that by a process of reasoning and detective work he had located this man and learned his identity, that the man was Simley Beason, the office manager of the Hastings Enterprises.”

“Did he tell you anything else?”

“He said that Simley Beason had taken that gun and had wrapped it up in paper and then sealed the paper, and had deposited the package in the bottom of a golf bag.”

“And then what?”

“He said that Mr. Beason in his presence had telephoned his secretary — Beason’s secretary — to take the gun from the golf bag and bring it to Mason’s office; that when the secretary arrived it appeared the wrappings had been tampered with.”

“And did Mr. Mason say what he did with reference to that gun?”

“He called me on the telephone and told me that he had the gun for me and later on told me that he also had the wrappings in a box which I could look over for fingerprints if I so desired.”

“And what did you do?”

“I went to Mr. Mason’s office and picked up the gun.”

“Did you subsequently make ballistics tests with that gun?”

“I did.”

“And did you try to match up the specimen bullets which you fired from that gun with the fatal bullets, one of which had been taken from the body of Garvin Hastings, and one of which had been taken from the mattress?”

“I did.”

“What did you find out?”

“The fatal bullets were fired from this weapon.”

“I show you a weapon, being a Smith and Wesson revolver, number C 48809, and ask you if you recognize this weapon.”

“I do, yes, sir. It has my mark on it and I have a note of the number.”

“Is that the gun that you received from Mr. Mason?”

“It is.”

“Lieutenant, did you examine this gun for fingerprints?”

“I did.”

“Did you find any fingerprints on it?”

“At the time I first examined the gun I didn’t find any fingerprints on it. I dusted the gun with fingerprint powder for the purpose of developing latent fingerprints. Nothing was developed that would be of help. Later on, however, when I got the gun at headquarters I found that there was a dried fingerprint on the weapon. This fingerprint did not take powder because there was no moisture left in it. It was a print which had thoroughly dried. It had been handled by some person whose finger contained some sticky substance, such perhaps as sweetened saliva, or perhaps which had come from moist tobacco. Anyway the fingerprint could be observed in a certain light.”

“Did you photograph that fingerprint?”

“Yes, sir.”

“You have that photograph here?”

“Yes, sir.”

“Now, have you checked that fingerprint to find whose finger made that print?”

“Yes, sir.”

“Whose print?”

“That print was the middle finger of the right hand of the defendant, Adelle Hastings.”

“I would like to have this revolver introduced in evidence, if the Court please, as prosecution’s Exhibit B-12.”

“Just a moment,” Mason said. “Before I either stipulate the gun may be received in evidence or object to it, I would like the privilege of asking questions on voir dire.”

“Very well,” Judge Fallon ruled. “You may interrogate the witness.”

“Lieutenant, you have stated that I told you I had the gun. Now, isn’t it a fact that what I told you was that I had a gun?”

“I think you said you had recovered the gun.”

“That had been taken from my desk drawer?”

“That was my understanding.”

“Did I tell you that the gun came from the defendant’s handbag?”

“Now wait a minute,” Tragg said. “Actually, I believe the conversation about the gun was with you, and then it appeared the gun had disappeared and then I believe your secretary called me and told me that the gun which had been misplaced had now been found and was available.”

“Now, I told you, did I not,” Mason asked, “that Simley Beason had taken this gun from my office and wrapped it in paper, sealed the paper, but that when the package was returned to my office the paper had been cut with a razor or sharp knife and there was no way of telling that this was the gun which had come from the defendant’s handbag?”

“Objected to as calling for hearsay evidence,” Ellis said.

Mason said, “That’s not hearsay evidence. Lieutenant Tragg has testified as to what I told him. I am now trying to test his recollection by cross-examining him on the entire conversation.”

“The objection is overruled. Answer the question,” Judge Fallon ruled.

“Yes,” Tragg said.

“So,” Mason said, “if what I told you is correct, there is no way of showing that this gun is the one that I took from the defendant’s handbag or the one that Simley Beason took from my office.”

“Objected to as being argumentative and calling for a conclusion of the witness,” Ellis said.

“Sustained,” Judge Fallon said.

Mason smiled. “Lieutenant Tragg,” he said, “you have identified this gun as the gun from which the fatal bullets were fired?”

“Yes, sir.”

“You know therefore it is the gun with which the murder was committed.”

“Yes, sir.”

“You have never seen that gun in the possession of the defendant, have you?”

“I have not. No, sir.”

“Exactly. And from what I told you in the conversation you have testified to, you can’t swear that after Simley Beason took this particular gun, wrapped it and put it in the golf bag, someone didn’t take out the package, slit the paper, unwrap the gun, wrap up another gun in the paper and put it back in the bottom of the golf bag, can you?”

“The same objection,” Ellis said.

“If the Court please,” Mason said, “this is a different question. I am asking him now if as a result of the conversation he had with me, he can connect that gun with the defendant.”

“The objection is overruled,” Judge Fallon said. “I think this question is legitimate cross-examination in regard to the conversation that the witness had with Perry Mason.”

“No, sir,” Lt. Tragg said, “from what you told me I can’t positively swear that this gun hadn’t been unsubstituted after Simley Beason took it. I can’t positively swear that the gun that you gave me was the gun that you took from the woman’s handbag, and I can’t positively swear from your conversation that this identical gun was connected with the defendant; that is, you understand, Mr. Mason, from your conversation, from what you told me.

“I can, however, swear from a fingerprint that this gun had been handled by the defendant at a time when she had some foreign, sticky substance on the middle finger of her right hand.”

“Exactly,” Mason said. “That substance could have had sugar in it?”

“Yes, sir, sugar, nail polish, mending cement, any one of a dozen things.”

“And had dried?”

“Yes, sir.”

“And left a latent print to which dusting powder did not adhere?”

“Yes, sir.”

“And yet it was a lasting latent print?”

“Yes, sir.”

“The average latent print, containing moisture and sebaceous matter retains its moisture for only a relatively short period of time?”

“Yes, sir.”

“But this was a different type of print?”

“Yes, sir.”

“Not as perishable as the ordinary print?”

“That’s right.”

“Then, for all you know it may have been left there last Christmas when the defendant was eating Christmas candy and the gun was in the possession of her husband?”

Tragg’s face flushed. “I can’t tell when the print was made.”

“It could have been made last Christmas?”

“It could have been.”

“Exactly,” Mason said. “That is all of my questions on voir dire. I now object to the introduction of the evidence on the ground that it is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and no proper foundation has been laid.”

Judge Fallon said, “The proper foundation has been laid to identify this as the murder weapon and it may be received in evidence as the murder weapon.”

Ellis said, “I will now withdraw Lieutenant Tragg and call Simley Beason as a witness.”

Beason marched to the witness stand as one who faces an inescapable ordeal. He raised his right hand, took the oath and after giving his name and address to the clerk, looked with steady hostility at Morton Ellis.

“Your name is Simley Beason, you were on the fourth and fifth of this month employed as office manager at Hastings Enterprises, and had been so employed for a period of some four years prior to that date?”

“Yes, sir.”

“Your Honor,” Ellis said, “this is a hostile witness and I am going to have to use leading questions to interrogate him.”

“He hasn’t shown any evidence of hostility so far,” Judge Fallon said. “Proceed with your examination along the regular lines. If it becomes apparent that he is hostile I will so rule and permit you to ask leading questions.”

“Very well, Your Honor.”

“I call your attention to Tuesday, the fifth of the month, and ask you if you saw the defendant at that time?”

“I did, yes, sir.”

“When did you first see her?”

“Somewhat early in the morning.”

“How early?”

“I didn’t look at my watch.”

“Was it before daylight?”

“I can’t remember.”

“Where did you meet her?”

“At a restaurant.”

“How did you happen to meet her there?”

“She had told me she would be there.”

“This was an all-night restaurant?”

“Yes.”

“You met with the defendant and had breakfast there with her?”

“Yes.”

“And conversed during breakfast?”

“Naturally we didn’t simply sit there and stare at each other.”

“Just answer the questions,” Ellis said. “Did you or did you not converse with the defendant?”

“I’ve answered the question. I told you we did.”

“And following that conversation, you went to Mr. Mason’s office, that is, to the building where Mr. Mason has his offices?”

“Yes.”

“And entered that building?”

“Yes.”

“Did you sign a register in the elevator?”

“Yes.”

“Did you sign your own name?”

“No.”

“You signed an assumed name?”

“Yes.”

“And did you take the elevator to the floor on which Mr. Mason has his offices?”

“Yes.”

“And went down to Mr. Mason’s offices?”

“Yes.”

“What did you do when you arrived at Mr. Mason’s offices?”

“I went in.”

“Was there anyone there to let you in?”

“Yes.”

“Who was it?”

“A charwoman.”

“And you had some conversation with her?”

“Yes.”

“What did you tell her?”

“I can’t remember.”

“And did you take something from Mr. Mason’s office?”

“I refuse to answer.”

“On what ground?”

“On the ground that the answer may incriminate me.”

Ellis looked at Judge Fallon.

“Very well,” Judge Fallon said. “This witness is a hostile witness. You may have your ruling and use leading questions — although you have been doing so without objection from the defense. Proceed.”

“Did you take a gun from Mr. Mason’s office?”

“I refuse to answer on the ground that the answer might incriminate me.”

“Later on in Mr. Mason’s office and in the presence of Mr. Mason, did you telephone your secretary at the Hastings Enterprises?”

“Yes.”

“What is the name of this secretary?”

“Rosalie Blackburn.”

“What did you tell her over the telephone?”

“I told her to go to my locker, after getting a key from my desk, to take my golf clubs out of my golf bag, to turn it upside down and she would find a package wrapped in paper in the golf bag, that she was to bring me that package.”

“To Mr. Mason’s office?”

“Yes.”

“And she did this?”

“I don’t know.”

“What do you mean, you don’t know?”

“I don’t know whether she did what I had told her to or not.”

“You do know that she appeared at Mason’s office with package, do you not?”

“Yes.”

“That was the same package which you had put in the golf bag?”

“I don’t know.”

“Well, it contained the same article you had put in there, didn’t it?”

“I don’t know.”

“What do you mean, you don’t know?”

“I took no means of identifying the article which was in there.”

“That article was a gun, wasn’t it?”

“The package I put in there contained a gun, yes.”

“And that was the same gun you had taken from Mr. Mason’s office, wasn’t it?”

“I refuse to answer on the ground that the answer might incriminate me.”

“But you admit you put a package in your golf bag?”

“Yes.”

“And that package contained a gun.”

“Yes.”

“And that package was taken out of the golf bag by your secretary?”

“Objected to,” Mason said, “as calling for a conclusion of the witness.”

“Sustained.”

“But you did instruct your secretary to take the package from the golf bag.”

“Yes.”

“And bring it to Mr. Mason’s office.”

“Yes.”

“And she did so?”

“I don’t know.”

“Weren’t you there? Didn’t she deliver the package to you?”

“She delivered a package to me, but I have no way of knowing whether it was the same package that I put in the golf bag. I will add by way of explanation that I had taken steps to identify the contents of that package by carefully sealing the paper and affixing a label to the outside identifying the contents of the package. When the package was delivered to me the seals had been cut, the package had been opened, and I have no way of knowing whether the contents of the package had been substituted.”

“The article that you put in the package was a gun, was it not?”

“Yes, sir.”

“A thirty-eight-caliber Smith and Wesson revolver?”

“Yes, sir.”

“And that was the same gun you got from Mr. Mason’s office?”

“I refuse to answer on the ground that to do so may incriminate me.”

“All right. Now, we’ll go back to your meeting with the defendant. Isn’t it a fact that your trip to Mr. Mason’s office was inspired by something the defendant had told you?”

The witness hesitated.

“Well,” Ellis pressed, “isn’t that a fact? Go on, answer the question.”

“I refuse to answer on the ground that to do so may incriminate me.”

“Now, if the Court please,” Ellis said, “it is quite apparent that the witness is attempting to hide behind his constitutional rights and is availing himself of them when there is no legal reason for him to do so. It may be perfectly proper for him to refuse to commit himself in connection with a burglary of Mr. Mason’s office, but as far as his conversation with the defendant is concerned, it was not a privileged conversation and there was certainly nothing that would incriminate him in relating that conversation.”

“May I be heard?” Mason asked.

“Certainly,” Judge Fallon said.

“If it should appear,” Mason said, “that the defendant and this witness conspired to get some evidence from my office, then the taking of the gun would be an overt act which would make him guilty of a separate crime, the crime of criminal conspiracy. Taking the gun is one thing, conspiring to take it is another. They are both crimes.”

“That’s splitting hairs,” Ellis said.

“No, it isn’t,” Mason said. “Whenever you people draw up an information or a complaint against a person you put in just as many counts as you can think of. You put in a count of criminal conspiracy and you put in a count of the criminal act. Then you try to talk a jury into returning a verdict of guilty on every count in the indictment. You claim each count is a separate crime, that you don’t make the law, you only enforce it, that if the legislature has chosen to make it a crime to conspire to commit an unlawful act and a defendant conspires to commit such an act and then does commit the act, he’s guilty of two separate crimes.

“Now, you can’t eat your cake and have it too.”

Judge Fallon twisted his lips in the ghost of a smile.

“I think the point is well taken,” he ruled. “I fail to see that the conversation is pertinent or relevant unless it had to do with some aspect of this crime, and if it does it may well be that the defendant and the witness did conspire to do certain things and the witness has grounds to feel that answering the question would tend to involve him in a crime of conspiracy.”

“All right,” Ellis said, savagely turning to the witness, “you wrapped a gun in paper and put it in the golf bag, didn’t you?”

“Yes, sir.”

“Had you ever seen that gun before?”

“Before what?”

“Before you put it in the golf bag.”

“Yes, sir.”

“Where?”

“I refuse to answer on the ground that the question may incriminate me.”

“Had you ever seen it prior to the fifth of this month?”

“I don’t know.”

“Why don’t you know?”

“Because I don’t know whether this was the same gun I saw or not.”

“You saw a gun that was like it in appearance?”

“Yes.”

“Where?”

“I can’t recall all the places I have seen similar gun. The company undoubtedly manufactures hundreds of thousands of these guns and I have seen them in display cases in sporting goods stores, and in various other places.”

“And,” Ellis said, leveling an accusing forefinger at the witness, “some of those ‘other places’ included a woman’s handbag, did it not?”

“Yes.”

“What woman?”

The witness hung his head. “Mrs. Hastings,” he said.

“Aha!” Ellis said. “Now, after all this painful agony on examination you admit that you saw this gun in the handbag of the defendant.”

“Now, just a moment, if the Court please,” Mason said. “I object to the side comments by counsel and also to the question itself. The witness didn’t say he had seen this gun in the defendant’s handbag.”

Morton Ellis said, “It could have been the same gun, for all he knows.”

“And it could have been a different gun, for all you know,” Mason said.

“I’m going to sustain the objection to the question in its present form,” Judge Fallon said.

“Very well,” Morton Ellis said, “we’ll let it go at that. Now then, was any statement made to you as to where the gun came from?”

“Yes, sir.”

“What was the statement?”

“Mrs. Hastings said that her husband had given it to her and told her to keep it in her handbag, that he believed in women having some form of protection when they were out alone at night. If she should have a blow-out or car trouble of some sort she would be completely helpless stalled by the side of the road.”

“That,” Morton Ellis announced triumphantly, “is all.”

“Just a moment,” Mason said. “I have a question or two on cross-examination. You have said that you saw such a gun in the handbag of Mrs. Hastings?”

“Yes, sir.”

“And that Mrs. Hastings told you her husband had given it to her for her protection, particularly when she was driving at night?”

“Yes, sir.”

“Did she say anything about how often she carried it?”

“Well, not in so many words, but I gathered that she carried it a good deal of the time in her handbag.”

Judge Fallon looked at Ellis. “That of course is a conclusion. Does the prosecution wish to strike it out?”

Ellis smiled and said, “The prosecution does not wish to strike it out, Your Honor. Let defense counsel go right ahead. Such a cross-examination may be a little hard on his client but the prosecution certainly doesn’t want to stop it in any way.”

“There is no need for making such a comment,” Judge Fallon said. “The Court merely called attention of the prosecution to the fact that the witness had testified to an obvious conclusion.”

“And the prosecution has no desire whatever to interpose objections to this line of testimony,” Ellis said.

Mason turned to the witness. “You gathered from the conversation you had that she had been given this gun, that it was her property?”

“Yes, sir.”

“And that she was carrying it?”

“Yes, sir.”

“And knew how to use it?”

“Yes, sir.”

Ellis turned to survey the spectators in the courtroom with a broad, triumphant grin.

“And you say this was Mrs. Hastings, with whom you had these conversations?”

“Yes, sir.”

Mason’s eyes twinkled. “Was it Adelle Sterling Hastings, the defendant in this action?”

“No, sir. Those conversations were with Minerva Shelton Hastings, the former wife.”

Abruptly the grin faded from Ellis’s face. A look of sickly consternation replaced it as he jumped to his feet. “Now just a moment, Your Honor, just a moment,” he said. “This now appears to have been a carefully planned trap hatched up between defense counsel and this witness, knowing that when he said Mrs. Hastings I would assume he meant the defendant. I object to these questions, I move to strike out the answers on the ground that they are conclusions of the witness.”

Judge Fallon said sharply, “You had your opportunity to interpose an objection. The Court noticed the manner in which the witness referred, not to the defendant, but to Mrs. Hastings, and knowing that there were two Mrs. Hastings the Court followed the examination with considerable care. The witness carefully refrained from ever mentioning the defendant. He referred simply to Mrs. Hastings.”

“It was a trap — a deliberately prepared trap,” Ellis said.

“I know of no law,” Judge Fallon said, “which prevents defense counsel from putting traps along the road he expects his adversary to follow. I’m afraid, Mr. Deputy District Attorney, you’re going to have to look out for your own traps. In view of the fact that there were two Mrs. Hastings, the Court noticed the peculiar wording of the answer of the witness and wondered if you intended to ask the witness to specify which Mrs. Hastings he was referring to. The answers will stand.

“Do you have any more questions of this witness, Mr. Mason?”

“I have no further cross-examination,” Mason said.

Beason started to leave the stand.

“Just a moment, just a moment,” Ellis said. “I have a couple of questions.”

Beason settled back into the seat.

“You discussed your testimony with Mr. Mason before coming into court?” Ellis asked.

“Yes, sir.”

“And did Mr. Mason tell you that you probably would be asked if you had ever seen a gun similar in appearance to the one which has been introduced in evidence in this case as the murder weapon?”

“Yes, sir.”

“And did you tell Mr. Mason that you had seen such a gun in the possession of Minerva Hastings?”

“Yes.”

“And didn’t Mr. Mason tell you that if you had an opportunity you were to state that you had seen such a gun in the possession of Mrs. Hastings, without mentioning that it was Minerva Hastings?”

“He said something to that effect, yes.”

“Now then,” Ellis said, smiling triumphantly, “did you ever see a similar gun in the possession of the defendant, Adelle Sterling Hastings? Now, answer that question yes or no.”

“Yes.”

“Was it in her handbag?”

“Yes.”

Again Ellis turned to the spectators in the courtroom with a triumphant smile. “That,” he announced, “is all.”

Again Beason started to leave the stand.

“Just a moment,” Mason said, “I have a few questions on recross-examination.

“Did you ever see a gun in her purse more than once?” Mason asked.

“Yes. There was another time.”

“When was that?”

“I can’t remember the exact date.”

Mason said, “Then you saw two guns in her possession. One,” Mason said, holding up the index finger of his left hand, “the gun that the decedent purchased which was not the fatal gun, and two,” here Mason held up the index finger of his other hand, “the gun that was the fatal gun?”

“Just a minute, just a minute,” Ellis said, “I object to the question as calling for a conclusion of the witness.”

“I don’t see how that calls for a conclusion of the witness,” Mason said.

“He can’t tell whether there were two separate guns,” Ellis said. “Unless he compared them with the numbers he doesn’t know what gun it was.”

Mason smiled at Judge Fallon. “I think,” he said, “the district attorney has made my point perfectly. The witness saw a gun. He doesn’t know whether it was the fatal gun which some murderer had substituted in the witness’s golf bag, or whether it was a weapon which the decedent had given the defendant for her own protection and which had been stolen from her.”

Mason made a little bow to the assistant district attorney and said, “And, if the Court please, that concludes my recross-examination.”

“Now, wait a minute,” Ellis said, “that’s not a fair presentation. The witness should answer the question.”

“He can’t answer the question,” Mason said, “because you’ve objected to it.”

“Well, there hasn’t been any ruling of the Court,” Ellis said, and then added suddenly, “I’ll withdraw the objection.”

“Very well,” Mason said, “answer the question, Mr. Beason.”

“I don’t know what gun it was,” Beason said. “It could have been the same gun both times, it could have been different guns, it could have been any gun. I understand that Smith and Wesson manufactures thousands of guns, all of which are identical.”

Ellis said irritably, “It’s quite easy for the witness to answer the question in that manner after counsel has so adroitly pointed out the proper answer to make under the guise of making an objection.”

“If the Court please,” Mason said, “I didn’t make the objection. The prosecution did that.”

“I have no further redirect,” Ellis said.

“That’s all, Mr. Beason. You’re excused.”

“You’re excused,” Judge Fallon said to the witness.

Ellis glanced at the clock.

Judge Fallon nodded imperceptibly, said, “It is the hour for the usual noon adjournment. Court will recess until two o’clock this afternoon.”

The spectators rose as Judge Fallon left the bench and went through the door leading to his chambers.

Mason caught Simley Beason’s eye and beckoned to him.

Taking Beason’s arm, Mason stood close to him where there was no chance of being overheard and said, “What were you afraid of, Beason?”

“Afraid?” Beason asked, his voice showing surprise. “What do you mean, afraid? I wasn’t afraid. I didn’t want to help the prosecution’s case any more than necessary.”

Mason said, “You were afraid, Beason. There was too much relief in your manner when the deputy district attorney said he had no questions on redirect.”

Beason shook his head, his expression one of puzzled innocence. “Why no, Mr. Mason, you have me wrong.”

Mason said, “I don’t think I’ve made any mistake, Beason. I’ve examined too many witnesses in court and seen too many people under the stress of emotion to make that much of a mistake. What information were you withholding that you were afraid the prosecution was going to inquire about?”

“Absolutely nothing,” Beason said.

“All right,” Mason told him, “we’ll let it go at that.”

Beason caught Adelle Hastings’ eye as a policewoman took her arm to escort her to the jail. Between them flashed a look of significant understanding, a momentary glance of triumph.