The Cobra Event

The Reality Behind The Cobra Event

The creation of advanced biological weapons using methods of genetic engineering and biotechnology is sometimes called 'black biology.' My previous book, The Hot Zone, which was about the threat of emerging viruses, particularly the Ebola virus, led me naturally to biological weapons: What is a bioweapon? Who has them? What can these weapons do? The characters and story developed here are fictional, not based on any real persons or contemporary events, but the historical background is real, the government structures are real, and the science is real or based on what is possible.

The Cobra Event is also about forensics, which is the science of looking at physical evidence to analyze a crime and identify its perpetrator. I call the particular forensic operation in this book a 'Reachdeep operation.' Reachdeep is a term invented by me, but it is in fact a special type of criminal investigation, and it is defined by a partly classified presidential order known as National Security Directive 7. If a biologic terror attack were to occur in the United States, there are organizations that would implement an operation similar to Reachdeep. My sources include people at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in the U.S. military, and elsewhere in the government who have been given the task of preparing for a Directive 7 emergency. At one point I was at the F.B.I. Academy in Quantico, Virginia, where I heard an F.B.I. scientist who knows a lot about biological weapons describe them to a class of agents in training. He said in a simple way, 'You will be dealing with this during your careers.' The room became very quiet. You could have heard a pin drop. I would say they believed him.

I pursued the subject of biological weapons with the same reporting methods I've used for my previous books, which were nonfiction. The nonfiction roots of this book run deep. I conducted numerous interviews with experts, some of whom did not wish to go on the record by name but were willing to give detailed factual information on condition of anonymity. My sources include eyewitnesses who have seen a variety of biological-weapons installations in different countries, and people who have developed and tested strategic bioweapons. They are scientists, medical doctors, and technical people, both military and nonmilitary. They understand what they have seen, and they describe it with precision.

As I drafted this story, I re-interviewed people, telling them the story as it developed, asking them, 'Could this happen? Is this how the U.S. government would work? How would you respond to this?'

The transparent substance I call 'viral glass' in this book is an actual material. I have chosen not to give its technical name or describe it too precisely. I have deliberately distorted and blurred certain key aspects of the bioweapons-making process so as not to publish a deployable recipe.

The biosensor technology that I call 'Felix' does not presently exist but is in development. Biosensor research is often classified, so I have had to make educated guesses as to what may be possible. What I call the 'hand-held Boink' biosensors actually do exist now in prototype form. (I call them Boinks because I imagine them giving off a chiming tone when they detect a biological weapon.) They have been partly developed by the United States Navy.

The natural strain of the virus in this book is real, and engineered strains of it have been developed with a broadened host range. The virus has great peaceful potential because it is so versatile. Its versatility also makes it a potential weapon. I have imagined the engineered form of the virus that appears here as Cobra, but it should be taken as one example of a wide range of possibilities that actually exist for the construction of advanced bioweapons. The knowledge is public, the techniques are commonplace. The dark apple hangs on the tree.

For many years the scientific community told itself and the public that biological weapons were not much of a problem, but recently there has been a painful shift in thinking. Many scientists have come to believe that biological weapons are a serious threat that has not been reckoned with. People close to this process have described it to me as an opening of the eyes. Even so, some experts are reluctant to talk too freely about biological weapons, for fear that the information could spark bioterrorism or might encourage countries to cross the threshold into biological weaponry. Other experts say that the problem has become so bad that the public simply must be told. I say that problems that aren't moved into the light of general public discussion become less manageable as time goes by. Public awareness can help shape a constructive response from governments and scientists around the world far more effectively than the lone warnings of a few experts.

In case anyone should accuse me of being 'antiscience,' let me say that I am exactly the opposite of that.

Open, peer-reviewed biological research can reap great benefits. Genetic engineering is a process, like metallurgy. Steel can be used for ploughshares or swords. What is dangerous is human intent. The next emerging virus may not come from a tropical rain forest; it may come from a bioreactor. In a deeper sense it will come from the human mind. To think that the power of the genetic code is not being bent toward weapons is to ignore the growing body of evidence, the lessons of history, and the reality of human nature. As Thucydides pointed out, hope is an expensive commodity. It makes better sense to be prepared.

Richard Preston 1998