HARRIS had been sending bombers by day to smash at the mysterious “ski sites “in the Pas de Calais, but too many German lighters swarmed up to protect them. It left him with a pretty problem… the targets were so small and well hidden that the squadrons would not be able to pin-point and bomb them accurately by night. Cochrane asked permission for 617 to try their precision bombing with P.F.F. (Pathfinder Force) to mark the pin-points with incendiaries, and Harris agreed.
Night after night 617 was briefed, but the target was smothered under low stratus cloud until, on December 16, Cheshire led nine Lancasters off. A Pathfinder “oboe” Mosquito flew with them to mark the target. “Oboe” was a new way of radar pin-pointing; two beams went out from England and crossed exactly over the target to let the pilot know when he was there. This night the “oboe” plane dropped a casket of incendiaries, and they cascaded into the wood that hid the “ski site”. At 10,000 feet 617 saw them winking among the trees like tiny glow-worms, swung in together according to the drill, nicely scattered so that the flak was ineffective, and all the 12,000-pounder “blast” bombs went down within a couple of minutes. Around the incendiaries the wood erupted in flame.
Back at Coningsby they developed the aiming-point photos (taken by photo-flash) and a groan went up. The markers had been 350 yards from the target; the bombs were all round the markers with an average error of only 94 yards, but that meant that the bombing was so good that the ski site was untouched.
It was the most accurate high-level night bombing of the war, but that made it all the more bitter.
It confirmed a suspicion both Cheshire and Cochrane had had… Pathfinders were fine for area marking but not precise enough for pin-point targets. Martin suggested they drop parachute flares over the target, lighting up the area so that a couple of aircraft could dive to low level and drop incendiary markers “spot on “the target. Cheshire agreed, but Cochrane, with the memory of the Dortmund Ems painfully fresh in his mind, would not hear of more low-level work.
Cheshire and Martin went off quietly and tried low-level marking on the ranges in the hope that they could get Cochrane to change his mind. They dropped practice bombs from about 200 feet using the low-level bomb sight and were only mildly satisfied with the results. They found they could land a bomb accurately but the trajectory was so flat that the bomb tended to bounce and skid 200 yards beyond the target. And at nighttime they found in the Lancasters that they were shooting past the range target before they saw it.
On December 20 they tried P.F.F. “oboe” marking again on an armament factory near Liege but found the town hopelessly cloaked under low cloud. On the way back (with their bombs) Martin saw a Lancaster going down in flames with one of the gunners still firing at the fighter. Back at Coningsby they waited up, more out of conscience than hope, but Geoff Rice one of the five survivors of the original squadron, did not return.
The weather closed in until the night of December 30, when they went with an “oboe” plane to another ski site. Three bombs were direct hits on the “oboe” markers, but the markers were again a couple of hundred yards off the target and the ski site escaped.
Chesire pleaded with Cochrane for permission to mark at low level. His idea was that P.F.F. should drop flares by “oboe” to illuminate the area, and he and Martin should fly low enough to put a marker right on the spot.
Cochrane replied with a flat ‘ ‘No “, and added, “Try and find another way. Try marking with the S.A.B.S. from about five thousand feet. If you can light the area enough with flares to get a sight, you ought to be able to do it accurately.”
Cheshire suggested in that case that 617 might as well carry their own flares and dispense with the Pathfinders. Cochrane agreed and on January 4 they flew back to the Pas de Calais without the “oboe” plane. From 12,000 feet the squadron dropped floating flares, but cloud foiled Cheshire and Martin at 5,000 feet, so they both dived to 400 feet (pre-arranged and strictly off the record) and skimmed over the dim clearing from different directions. The markers landed in the clearing but both sets bounced and skidded 100 yards into the woods, so that the clearing was straddled by them.
The squadron managed to put most of their bombs between the markers, badly damaging the ski site; Cheshire thought it was fairly successful but was not exactly delighted… skidding markers were too uncertain to rely on. In the next few days he, Martin and “Talking Bomb” kept experimenting to find a permissible way of marking.
Between 3,000 and 6,000 feet on a clear aiming point by day they found they could put down a marker within 40 yards of a target—near enough for Cochrane—but could not do it on a hazy target, and there was little chance of getting a clear enough aiming point at night. Moonlight and flares would help, but any important target was going to be camouflaged.
That: was the week the squadron moved from Coningsby to Woodhall Spa, about ten miles away. Woodhall was a one-squadrori station and that was the reason for the move. As a “special duties” squadron on new and rather hush-hush projects, Cochrane wanted them to go on working in somewhat exclusive isolation.
Cheshire and Martin kept experimenting to find a way of marking, and one day, flying back from the range, Martin saw a patch of seaweed in the water that took his fancy. Always ready to spice his flying with a little variety he peeled off in one of his usual spectacular turns, dived steeply and dropped a bomb. It was a direct hit.
When he landed he jumped out of “P Popsie” quivering with excitement. “That’s it, sir,” he said jauntily to Cheshire. “We’ve got it. I didn’t use the bomb-sight when I dropped that thing over the seaweed and it was a piece of cake. If we can dive-bomb markers point-blank over a target we can put ‘em right on the button without the bomb sight and they won’t skid off. What’s more, we could see the target much better from above than coming up to it down low.”
Cheshire went out and tried it that afternoon and it worked like a charm, almost without practice.
Next night they went back to the Pas de Calais. Munro dropped flares and Martin, turning a blandly blind eye to orders, tried his new method, peeling off, sticking his nose steeply down and aiming his whole aircraft at the ski site. He found that dive-bombing low at night in a four-engined plane was a slightly hair-raising business but dropped his markers in the dive and pulled out at about 400 feet. They were a new type of marker, red and green flares known as “spot fires”, and as he pulled up and levelled off Martin saw the two lights like red and green eyes winking in the middle of the clearing. It was a clear night; from 12,000 feet they were plainly visible, and the rest of the squadron plastered the rocket site out of existence.
A couple of nights later they went to another flying-bomb site; Martin dived low again, laid his spot fires accurately and a few minutes later the target was littered about a few smoking craters.
Cheshire went to Cochrane and told him of the new method (that is, told him of the seaweed and the trials over the range, not of Martin’s actual dives over the targets). Knowing that Cochrane approved of low-level marking on every count except the risk, Cheshire assured him that the diving attack, straight down, up and away, with only a few fleeting seconds near the ground, was reasonably safe. He added earnestly:
“Sir, if’ we’re going to mark accurately we must be low enough to see exactly what we’re doing, and I’m sure that Martin is right when he says that right low down we’re actually safer. I can’t find any way of marking accurately from medium level. Will you let us try this new way on some lightly defended target?”
Cochrane considered for a moment, looked up and said, “All right, we’ll give it a trial.”
The target he chose was the Gnome-Rhone aero-engine factory at Limoges, 200 miles south-west of Paris. The Germans had taken it over but there was hardly any flak for miles.
There was an immediate complication. War Cabinet vetoed the target because the Germans had 300 French girls working in the factory on night shift and there were French homes near-by. Churchill would not have French people killed if he could possibly avoid it, particularly as this was not a vital target.
Cheshire replied that as far as the homes were concerned he would guarantee they would put all bombs on the target itself. To protect the girls in the factory he offered to make several dummy runs over the factory to give everyone plenty of time to get clear. Cochrane backed him up and, after a silence from Whitehall, permission came through for the raid, on the understanding that if one Frenchman was killed there would be no more.
Twelve aircraft took off into bright moonlight and reached Limoges just before midnight. The town was evidently not expecting bombs because the blackout was bad. Lights showed all over the place and in the factory itself all the workshop lights were on and it was obvious that the Germans had them working hard.
Cheshire dived low and hurtled over the factory at a hundred feet, and as he climbed and turned he saw all the lights vanish. He dived back over it again, and Astbury, his bomb aimer, could see people running below and throwing themselves flat. A third time he dived in warning, and on his fourth run held her down to 50 feet till he was practically scraping the workshop roofs. Astbury called “Bombs gone!” and a cluster of brilliantly glowing incendiaries cascaded into the exact centre of the workshops. In the Lancaster the cameraman filmed it.
Martin dived in the same way and two red spot fires joined the incendiaries. Cheshire called, “Markers dead centre. Bomb as ordered.”
At “Zero plus 1” (one minute past midnight) Shannon dropped the first 12,000-pounder from 10,000 feet. It exploded in the middle of the incendiaries and blew them to smithereens but started a big fire that was just as good. In the next eight minutes nine more bombs fell right on the factory, and one fell just outside in the river. The last man, Nicky Ross, had a “hang-up”; his bomb did not release, so he went away and came in on another run. At “Zero plus 18” his 12,000-pounder lobbed in the crater that Shannon’s bomb had made.
Cheshire cruised overhead for a while, but there was nothing to see but flames and smoke and soon he turned for home. Apart from two machine guns there was no opposition and none of the Lancasters was holed, not even Cheshire’s.
In the morning a recce aircraft brought back pictures which showed that of the factory’s forty-eight bays half were scars on the ground and the rest were only shells. A target had never been more completely expunged, and Cheshire knew that, on undefended targets at least, he had proved his point. Coch-rane was delighted.
A message reached England from Limoges not long after. The girls of the Gnome-Rhone factory wished to thank the R.A.F. for their considerate warning and would be pleased to welcome the people concerned after the war.