CHAPTER 37

PROJECT SURROGATE

ALPHA CLEARANCE

BACKGROUND: IN SEPTEMBER 2011, IRAN ANNOUNCED THAT IT WAS OPENING ITS FIRST NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, BUSHEHR REACTOR 1. IT ALSO ANNOUNCED PLANS TO DEVELOP A 360 NW NUCLEAR PLANT IN DARKHOVIN.

IRAN’S NATIONAL LEADERS HAVE SAID PUBLICLY THEY ARE CONTINUING TO DEVELOP MIDSIZE URANIUM MINES. IT IS BELIEVED THEY ARE RECEIVING HELP FROM THE RUSSIANS IN DEVELOPING THE MINES AND POWER PLANTS. EXISTING MINES, STILL WITH URANIUM CAPACITY, WERE BUILT WITH HELP OF THE UNITED STATES UNTIL 1979 AND THE FALL OF THE SHAH.

Jeremy hears a sound, startles and looks up. It’s a squirrel scampering up a tree. Jeremy rubs his eyes, with both palms, trying to infuse himself with enough energy, enough focus, to make sense of this. Iran, Russia, please tell me this leads somewhere, Harry. He delves back in.

IN NOVEMBER 2011, THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY CONDEMNED IRAN FOR FAILING TO DISCLOSE THE EXTENT OF ITS RESEARCH. FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE IAEA’S BOARD OF GOVERNORS EXPOSED IN SOME DETAIL THE EFFORTS BY IRAN TO DEVELOP AND TEST NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND TO TRANSFORM ITS DOMESTIC NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION INTO ATOMIC WEAPONS.

THOSE EFFORTS HAVE BEEN INDEPENDENTLY VERIFIED BY OUR OWN ASSETS AND TWO ALLIED AGENCIES.

PREVIOUS EFFORTS:


SMALL-SCALE, SURGICAL STRIKES HAD SUCCEEDED IN SLOWING AND HAMPERING FULL-SCALE DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR ARSENAL BY IRAN. THIS SABOTAGE, INCLUDING ASSASSINATION OF LEAD SCIENTISTS, AND, POINTEDLY, CYBERATTACKS, WHILE EFFECTIVE TO A POINT, HAS, IN FACT, ULTIMATELY FAILED. WE NOW BELIEVE THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE THE CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES TO BUILD AT LEAST ONE AND MAYBE SEVERAL FULLY CAPABLE, ARMED NUCLEAR WARHEADS.

THIS INTELLIGENCE IS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC AND MEDIA ACCOUNTS SUGGESTING IRAN HAS BEEN DISARMED AND HAS BEGUN TO ALLOW LEGITIMATE INSPECTIONS BY INDEPENDENT AGENCIES. (PUBLIC ACCOUNTS HAVE BEEN MANUFACTURED TO MAXIMIZE POLITICAL AND MILITARY FLEXIBILITY BUT HAVE NOT DIMINISHED THE URGENCY FOR DISARMING IRAN.)

THE OPTIONS FOR DISARMING IRAN HAVE BEEN, AND REMAIN, EXTREMELY PROBLEMATIC. A DIRECT ASSAULT CARRIES CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES, NO LESS SO A DIRECT ATTACK BY OUR ALLIES IN THE REGION.

Jeremy pauses, fighting frustration, exhaustion. What does this have to do with anything? It’s not news that Iran wants a bomb and America and others want to stop it. He lets himself picture Emily, feeling adrenaline surge. He reads:

PROJECT SURROGATE:

IN NOVEMBER, 2012, EAGLE 1 APPROVED CLANDESTINE PROJECT SURROGATE TO BE RUN FROM THE PENTAGON OFFICES FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT.

THEIR CHARGE ENTAILED DESTROYING IRAN’S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WITHOUT ANY CONNECTION TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OR ITS ALLIES. AND WITHOUT ANY CONNECTION TO WEAPONS USED IN SUCH AN ACT OF SABOTAGE OR THAT COULD CONNECT THE WEAPONS TO ALLIES.

THEY WOULD FIND AND DEPLOY A SURROGATE.

THE INITIAL STAGES OF PROJECT SURROGATE SUCCEEDED. ASSETS WORKED THROUGH UNDERGROUND CONTACTS OBTAINED A “SUITCASE NUKE” FOR AN UNDISCLOSED SUM (TAKEN, AGAIN, OBVIOUSLY, OFF THE BOOKS) FROM A FORMER EXECUTIVE OF ROSOBORONEXPORT STATE CORPORATION. THE WEAPON HAD THE NECESSARY CAPABILITY OF DESTROYING IRAN’S WEAPONIZED FACILITY, EVEN WERE IT NOT DETONATED PRECISELY ON A HEAVILY ARMED AND DEFENDED TARGET.

PROJECT SURROGATE ALSO SUCCEEDED IN FINDING A HANDFUL OF FRINGE INDIVIDUALS AND VERY SMALL CELLS IN THE REGION TO COORDINATE THE STRIKE. IN PARTICULAR, TWO GROUPS, WITH HISTORIC ENMITY TOWARD THE IRANIAN SHIITE GOVERNMENT AND THEOCRACY.

THIS PLAN CARRIED ENORMOUS RISK. BUT PROJECT SURROGATE PUT IN PLACE TWO IRONCLAD FAIL-SAFE MECHANISMS. FIRST, THE TWO PARTNERS IN THE REGION THEMSELVES HAD A LONG HISTORY OF OPPOSITION TO ONE ANOTHER. ONE WAS JEWISH EXTREMISTS AND THE OTHER CHRISTIAN EXTREMISTS. EACH WAS GIVEN ONE-HALF THE NUCLEAR SUITCASE — IN EFFECT, THE EXPLOSIVE ITSELF AND A DETONATOR COMPONENT. FOR THE PLAN TO SUCCEED, THEY WOULD NEED TO COOPERATE, AND COULD NOT USE THE DEVICE AGAINST ONE ANOTHER OR THE COUNTRIES THEY PURPORT TO REPRESENT.

BETWEEN THE TWO LOCAL “PARTNERS,” THE LEAD WAS GIVEN TO THE SMALL CELL WITH ARAB TIES. THAT WAY, IT WOULD IDEALLY LOOK TO IRAN LIKE THE ATTACK CAME FROM ROGUE ELEMENTS IN THE REGION, RATHER THAN ANYONE WITH TIES TO ISRAEL.

BUT THERE WAS A MUCH MORE CRITICAL FAIL-SAFE: THE UNITED STATES ALONE MAINTAINED THE LAUNCH CODE FOR THE WEAPON. IT COULD BE DETONATED IF AND ONLY IF THE CODE WERE PROVIDED, WHICH WOULD HAPPEN ONLY MOMENTS BEFORE AN ATTACK AND ONLY IF THE AMERICANS WERE 100 PERCENT SATISFIED OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS.

WITHOUT THE LAUNCH CODE, THE SURROGATE WOULD BE INERT.

Jeremy’s eyes begin to glaze over. Not with exhaustion or boredom, but as a product of analysis; he’s reading and trying to make sense of this. There’s a secret project to undo Iran’s nuclear capability by nuking it, and doing so using some secret group or organization, cells, two groups that are not affiliated with the United States, and that are not historically affiliated with each other. He’s struck that it’s totally far-fetched and also totally in keeping with the kind of weird stuff he’d come to expect from people in the Pentagon. So these cells would be armed with a nuclear suitcase and sent off to bomb Iran but with some kind of secret detonation code provided by the United States. And this connects to the end of the world how exactly?

CONCLUSION OF SURROGATE:

AFTER THE INITIAL SUCCESSES IN ACCESSING AND DEPLOYING TWO SEPARATE PARTS OF AN INERT NUCLEAR WEAPON, PROJECT SURROGATE RAN INTO NOT WHOLLY UNEXPECTED AND NONTRIVIAL CHALLENGES. COORDINATION BETWEEN THE CELLS GREW DIFFICULT. THE LOCAL PARTNERS CLEARLY SOUGHT TO BARGAIN AND PARRY THEIR NEWFOUND RELATIONSHIP. THE OFFICE OF PEACE AND CONFLICT SUCCESSFULLY OVERCAME THIS OBSTACLE AND THE LOCAL PARTNERS REALIZED THE WEAPON COULD SUCCEED ONLY THROUGH COOPERATION.

SEPARATELY, THE OPERATION FELL INTO MORE BASIC, AGE-OLD CHALLENGES INVOLVING LACK OF CLEAR INTELLIGENCE FROM IRAN AS TO THE LOCATION OF THE WARHEADS. AFTER THE LOCATION WAS IDENTIFIED TO A SATISFACTORY EXTENT, TWO NEAR LAUNCHES WERE ATTEMPTED, BOTH THWARTED BY SIMPLE BUT NOT INSUBSTANTIAL LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS, INCLUDING ONE OPERATION ABORTED DUE TO INCLEMENT WEATHER THAT PREVENTED DELIVERY OF THE LAUNCH CODES TO LOCAL PARTNERS COORDINATED ON THE IRANIAN BORDER.

ULTIMATELY, THE DECISION CAME DOWN TO SCRAP PROJECT SURROGATE. THE LOCAL PARTNERS PROVED EVEN LESS RELIABLE THAN EXPECTED AND SOME CONCERN AROSE IN THE OFFICE OF PEACE AND CONFLICT THAT SAID PARTNERS WERE EXHIBITING AN UNEXPECTED LEVEL OF COOPERATION.

FURTHER, ORDERS CAME DOWN THAT A BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC OR MORE FORMAL MILITARY RESOLUTION MIGHT SUFFICE (INCLUDING A LATE-GAME TURN IN THE RUSSIANS’ POLITICAL CLIMATE THAT SUGGESTED THEIR OWN OIL INTERESTS MIGHT WORK IN FAVOR OF THEIR EXERTING FURTHER PRESSURE ON THE SHIA THEOCRACY).

A SMALL EFFORT WAS MADE TO RECOVER ONE OR BOTH PIECES OF THE SUITCASE NUKE OBTAINED FROM ROGUE RUSSIAN AGENTS. BUT, IN THE END, IT WAS DECIDED THAT THESE TWO ISOLATED PIECES WERE NOT JUST INERT BUT ULTIMATELY AND COMPLETELY UNUSABLE WITHOUT THE LAUNCH CODES.

Jeremy pauses, struck. There isn’t much of the document left, but something is finally clicking for him. He reads again the phrase: “the suitcase nuke obtained from rogue Russian agents.” Russian agents, suitcase nuke. The computer’s been telling him to pay attention to the Russian arms organization, something with access to nuclear weapons, or material. Is this the connection, or one connection?

There is little to satisfy him in the last few sentences.

PROJECT SURROGATE WAS DISBANDED IN MARCH 2013. IT IS CONSIDERED NEITHER A SUCCESS NOR A FAILURE BUT A WORTHWHILE RISK IN A DANGEROUS WORLD.

OFFERED INTO THE RECORD,

— LT COL. LT

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