The Gorbachev era

ARCHIE BROWN

No period in peacetime in twentieth-century Russia saw such dramatic change as the years between 1985 and 1991. During this time Russia achieved a greater political freedom than it had ever enjoyed before. The Soviet system moved from being highly authoritarian to essentially pluralist. This process ended with the disintegration of the Soviet state, although even after the fifteen union republics went their separate ways, Russia remained the largest country in the world. The break-up itself was remarkably peaceful, in sharp contrast to the extensive violence that accompanied the separation of the constituent parts of Yugoslavia. Within what was sometimes called 'the outer empire', the Soviet leadership broke with the past by ruling out military intervention when, one after another, the countries of Eastern Europe became non-Communist and independent. The Cold War, which had begun with the Soviet takeover of East-Central Europe, ended definitively in I989 when the Central and Eastern European states regained their sovereignty.

Before these remarkable changes are examined in greater detail, the imme­diate prelude to the Gorbachev era deserves attention, albeit briefly. When Leonid Brezhnev died in November 1982 he was succeeded by Iurii Andropov who had earlier in the same year become the second secretary of the Com­munist Party of the Soviet Union, following Mikhail Suslov. Andropov had spent the previous fifteen years as chairman of the KGB and that organisation had left its mark on him. Immediately prior to running the security police, he had been an anti-Stalinist secretary of the Central Committee. Appointed by Nikita Khrushchev, Andropov gathered around him in the first half of the 1960s a team of highly capable consultants, who were to acquire a justified rep­utation as 'progressives' in the Brezhnev years and some of whom (especially Georgii Shakhnazarov) were to be among the most influential contributors to the 'New Political Thinking' of the Gorbachev era.

Andropov, once he had become General Secretary, continued the policy of cracking down on any sign of overt dissidence which he had pursued as KGB

3I6

chief, but somewhat widened the bounds of permissible discussion by speak­ing more about economic and social problems than the complacent Brezhnev had done. At the same time he demanded greater discipline in the workplace and made examples of some of the more notoriously corrupt officials who had prospered under his predecessor.[1] Although prepared to contemplate reform within strict limits, Andropov showed no sign during his fifteen months at the helm of being willing to engage in fundamental transformation of the Soviet system. Nevertheless, he made an unwitting contribution to that more ambi­tious task. Andropov was an admirer of the abilities and energy of Mikhail Gorbachev and he accorded him greater responsibility within the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Gorbachev was already a full member of the Polit­buro as well as a Central Committee secretary when Andropov reached the top post in 1982. At that time, however, his duties were confined to agricul­ture. Andropov gave him responsibility for the economy as a whole and also brought into the Secretariat two people who were to work with Gorbachev and who, in turn, were to become significant political actors in the perestroika (reconstruction) era, Egor Ligachev and Nikolai Ryzhkov.

Andropov had hoped that Gorbachev would be his direct successor and, as illness prevented him from working normally during the second half of his tenure of the top post, he relied increasingly on the younger man. In December 1983 he sent an addendum to a speech at a plenary session of the Central Committee, which he was too ill to attend in person, proposing that Gorbachev be designated to chair the Politburo and lead the Secretariat during his absence. That was a clear attempt to move Gorbachev from the third to the second position in the party hierarchy and to make him, rather than the more senior Konstantin Chernenko, Andropov's successor as party leader. Such a move was anathema to the old guard within the Politburo who, while they were as yet unaware of just how radical a reformer Gorbachev would be, were conscious that he was likely to wield a new broom that could sweep them aside. Chernenko, in consultation with two members of the top leadership team even older than himself, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikolai Tikhonov and Defence Minister Dmitrii Ustinov, took the decision to suppress the extra six paragraphs Andropov had added to his earlier text.[2]

When Andropov died in February 1984 he was succeeded by Chernenko, already aged seventy-two and in poor health. Several Politburo members who were worried about granting Gorbachevthe role of Chernenko's heir apparent tried to prevent him acceding to the vacant slot of second secretary. As a compromise it was agreed that Gorbachev would carry out the duties of the second-in-command without formally being recognised as such. This meant that he led the Secretariat and, when Chernenko was indisposed, chaired the Politburo as well. Later Gorbachev was recognised within the party apparatus as the second secretary, and responsibility for ideology and foreign affairs was added to his overlordship of the economy. However, there were many attempts to undermine him and to prevent him becoming the sole serious candidate to succeed Chernenko, whose health was in visible decline. It was, for example, only at the last minute that Gorbachev would be informed that Chernenko was too unwell to chair Politburo meetings.[3] A Central Committee plenum on scientific and technological progress that Gorbachev had been preparing was postponed, and Chernenko himself telephoned Gorbachev on the very eve of a December 1984 conference devoted to ideology to propose the postponement also of that event.[4] Chernenko's own immediate circle, strongly supported by the editor of the party's theoretical journal, Kommunist (Richard Kosolapov), was anxious to put a stop to the rise of Gorbachev. It seized upon the text of Gorbachev's speech prepared for the conference which, on the instigation of Chernenko's aides, had been circulated to members of the Politburo and Secretariat.[5] In it Gorbachev had used some of the new vocabulary of politics which would become commonplace during the period of perestroika and he attacked as irrelevant to the problems of real life a number of the tired formulae of Soviet doctrine, complaining about the attempt 'to squeeze newphenomena into the Procrustean bed of moribund conceptions'.[6] In a gesture of defiance that was very unusual in the strictly hierarchical Soviet Communist Party, Gorbachev firmly refused to go along with Chernenko's wishes that he change the formulations in his speech to which the General Secretary objected and that he postpone the conference.[7]

The conference had some reverberations in the highest echelons of the CPSU, but Gorbachev was still not clearly perceived to be a reformer. For his elderly colleagues in the Politburo, he was primarily a young man in a hurry.

When Chernenko died on 10 March 1985, this was just a week after Gorbachev's fifty-fourth birthday. He was still the youngest person in the top leadership team. Making full use of the possibilities offered by his position as second secretary, he lost no time in convening a meeting of the Politburo. It was held on the same evening that Chernenko died and it was agreed that the election of a new General Secretary would take place the next day. Less than twenty-four hours after Chernenko's death Gorbachev had not only been nominated as General Secretary by the Politburo but had also been elected to that office by the Central Committee. Both votes were unanimous, for when it came to the point Gorbachev's enemies within the leadership knew that they could not find a viable alternative leader, although both the Moscow party first secretary, Viktor Grishin, and the former Leningrad first secretary, Grigorii Romanov (whom Andropov had brought to Moscowto join the Secretariat ofthe Central Committee), had aspired to the top post.[8]

Launching political reform

While there had been an accumulation of problems over several decades, including a secular decline in the rate of economic growth and rising rates of infant mortality and alcoholism, and though the gulf between Soviet rhetoric and reality had led to an increase in popular cynicism, there was no strong pressure from below for change in 1985. The dissident movement had been crushed and the atmosphere was primarily one of political apathy and fatal­ism. In Brezhnev's time there had been a lot of talk about the 'scientific and technological revolution', but technologically the Soviet Union was lagging far behind the advanced Western countries and not faring well in compar­ison with the newly industrialising countries of Asia. Moreover, the war in Afghanistan was proving costly and becoming increasingly unpopular. Yet all the mechanisms of political control were firmly in place and it is highly likely that the system - and, accordingly, the Soviet state - could have survived into the twenty-first century had not radical reform, or 'revolution from above', shaken its foundations. Although Gorbachev, with some justification, spoke of the presence of 'pre-crisis phenomena' in the Soviet Union he inherited, it was not so much a case of crisis forcing radical reform as of radical reform generating crisis.[9]

The General Secretary in the post-Stalin era did not have a completely free hand in making appointments to the Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee. Generally, Soviet leaders required time to build up their power base, gradually bringing in known supporters who had worked with them in thepast. Gorbachev was unusual in that no one whom he promoted to eitherof the two highest organs ofthe CPSU was from his native Stavropol' where he had spent the whole ofhis career in the Komsomol and party between graduating from the Law Faculty of Moscow University in 1955 and being brought to Moscow as a secretary of the Central Committee in 1978.[10] Nevertheless, he used to the full his authority as General Secretary to make radical personnel changes in his first year. Among those who were ousted from the Politburo were Grishin, Romanov and Tikhonov. Ligachev was given full membership of the Politburo in April 1985 and became the second secretary within the party. Nikolai Ryzhkov was also promoted to the Politburo in April and was appointed chairman of the Council of Ministers in succession to Tikhonov in September 1985. An appointment that turned out to be even more important in retrospect than it appeared at the time was that ofBoris Yeltsin as first secretary ofthe Moscow party organisation, in succession to Grishin, in December 1985.

Much of the focus of the new leadership team was on getting the country moving again and one of the early catchwords of the Gorbachev era was uskorenie (acceleration). Gorbachev himself was from the outset, however, interested also in what he called 'democratisation', which included a greater tolerance of, and even encouragement for, a variety of views, although it did not yet signify for him or anyone in a position of authority fully-fledged pluralist democracy. Yet, it was symbolic of the way in which political reform edged ahead of economic change in Gorbachev's priorities that when in 1987 two important Central Committee plenary sessions put radical reform on the political agenda, it was the first of these, the January plenum, that was devoted to political reform and only the second, the June plenum, that focused on the economy. At the January plenary session, Gorbachev introduced some measures of intra-party democratisation and announced that there would be a special all-Union conference in the summer of 1988 'to discuss matters of further democratising the life ofthe party and society as a whole'.[11] That event, the Nineteenth Party Conference (discussed later in this chapter), was to be the point at which Gorbachev and his allies moved beyond reform and embarked on a path of systemic transformation. Already in January 1987 Gorbachev launched a strong attack on the stagnation in Soviet political thinking which, he claimed, had not advanced much beyond the level of the 1930s and 1940s. The June plenum on economic reform, accompanied by a document outlining the principles of economic reform, inaugurated an attempt to decentralise economic decision-making in the Soviet Union. While the assumption at this stage was that the economy would remain a centrally planned one, the aim was to try to keep the focus of central planners on issues of national importance, 'leaving all operational decisions to lower levels'.[12] The reform also extended the rights of workers to participate in factory decision-making.

While in the summer of 1987 a majority of the members of the Politburo and Secretariat were far from being committed to fundamental reform, four of the five most important politicians in the country by that time had been brought into those positions since Gorbachev succeeded Chernenko. The three most powerful politicians after Gorbachev, following the June 1987 plenum, were Ligachev, Ryzhkov and Aleksandr Yakovlev, followed by Eduard Shevardnadze. Of the top five, three - Gorbachev, Yakovlev and Shevardnadze - were firmly in the radically reformist camp, although Gorbachev often played the role of a 'centrist' in order to carry more conservative colleagues along with him. Ryzhkov had a more limited and technocratic view of reform, while Ligachev was increasingly identifying with those who felt that freedom to criticise the Soviet past and present was getting out of hand.

Yakovlev's promotion had been extraordinarily speedy. He was not one of the 470 people elected to full or candidate membership of the Central Committee in March 1981 at the end of the Twenty-Sixth Party Congress. Thus, Yakovlev could not be promoted to the Secretariat until that deficiency had been rectified at a party congress. He was not only duly elected to the Central Committee at the Twenty-Seventh Congress in February-March 1986 but also simultaneously promoted by Gorbachev to a secretaryship of that body. At the January 1987 plenum he became a candidate member of the Politburo and at the June plenum a full member. The diversity of view which had long existed within the Soviet Communist Party (although carefully concealed from most outside observers) was now increasingly clearly represented in the highest echelons of the CPSU. Yakovlev and Ligachev vied with each other for predominant influence within the Secretariat. Their disagreement and rivalry not only exemplified but also facilitated a growing intra-party as well as societal pluralism. According to their disposition, editors and party functionaries could take their cue from the radically reformist Yakovlev or the conservative Ligachev.

The new freedoms

One of the most important developments in the Soviet Union following Gor­bachev's selection as General Secretary was a change of political language. New concepts were introduced into Soviet political discourse and old ones shed the meanings they had been accorded hitherto by Soviet ideology. A case in point was the idea of freedom. Instead of freedom meaning the recogni­tion of (Marxist-Leninist) necessity, it acquired in the Soviet political lexicon its everyday meaning of freedom from constraints or, simply, 'ordinary free­dom, as established and practiced in the liberal democratic countries of the world'.[13] The term 'pluralism' had hitherto been used in Soviet publications and speeches only pejoratively in the context of attacks on East European 'revisionism' and on 'bourgeois democracy'. It was Gorbachev who broke that taboo by speaking positively about a 'socialist pluralism' and a 'pluralism of opinion' in 1987.[14] This gave a green light to social scientists and journalists to advocate pluralism and frequently to leave out the adjective 'socialist'.

From 1987 onwards there was also advocacy of checks and balances, separa­tion of powers, a state based upon the rule of law and a market economy. Some writers qualified these concepts by placing 'socialist' in front of them. Others did not. Since there was also, however, increasingly vigorous argument as to what constituted socialism (with the writer Chingiz Aitmatov using his speech to the First Congress of People's Deputies in 1989 to name, among other coun­tries, Switzerland as a fine example of socialism!),[15] the use of 'socialist' was not the constraint upon debate it would have been in the Soviet past. From very early in the Gorbachev era one of the key concepts given emphasis was glasnost', meaning openness or transparency, although glasnost, like perestroika, was about to enter the English and other languages, such was the international impact of the changes in the Soviet Union. In each year that followed 1985 glas­nost' became increasingly indistinguishable from freedom of speech. There were, nevertheless, occasions when glasnost' was conspicuous by its absence. The most notable was the disaster at the Chernobyl' nuclear power station in Ukraine on 26 April 1986. The news of what turned out to be the world's worst nuclear accident thus far came to Soviet citizens from the West by foreign radio (in a reversion to what was common in the unreformed Soviet system). It was not until 28 April that the accident was noted by Soviet television and much later before any detailed account was provided. Those within the Soviet Union who wished change to progress faster used Chernobyl', however, as an illustration of what was wrong with the system - from shoddy work at the nuclear plant, to the local attempt to cover up the scale of the disaster, to the reluctance of the Soviet leadership and mass media to provide prompt and accurate information about the catastrophe. The more reform-oriented parts of the mass media were soon carrying articles very critical of the absence of glasnost' on this occasion, a development that in itself would have been impossible prior to 1985 when even air crashes and some natural disasters in the Soviet Union went unreported in order to convey the impression that all was well on the home front. When, following Chernobyl', every catastrophe, whether natural (such as the Armenian earthquake in 1988) or man-made, was extensively reported and commented on, it appeared to some Soviet citizens that the incidence of misfortune had increased.

The growing freedom of speech was a mixed blessing for the General Sec­retary who had allowed it to happen. On the one hand, it served Gorbachev's interests that radical reformists were now free to criticise party and state bureaucrats who were opposed to change. On the other hand, almost every social and national group had an accumulation of grievances which had been impossible to air publicly in the unreformed Soviet system. These problems now spilled out into the open and overloaded the political agenda with highly contentious issues. Nowhere was that more true than in the sphere ofrelations among different nationalities, a topic on which more will be said later in the chapter.

Some of the new freedoms, which were soon to be taken for granted, repre­sented a huge advance for Soviet citizens. Among the most important was the ending of the persecution of religion. A new religious tolerance prevailed and many places of worship were reopened. The year of the major turning point for this, as for much else, was 1988. In June the celebration of the millennium of Russian and Ukrainian Christianity tookplace with state support. New legisla­tion gave the Church the right to publish literature and to engage in religious education. Other traditional religions of the Soviet Union also benefited from the change of policy. The jamming of Russian-language foreign broadcasts to the Soviet Union was ended and foreign travel for Soviet citizens became easier. By the last years of the Soviet Union financial constraints had become more important than bureaucratic obstacles to freedom of travel.

The Soviet press acquired a spectacular diversity in the Gorbachev era. There were weeklies such as Ogonek (Little light) and Moskovskie novosti (Moscow news) (with new editors and transformed content from the summer of 1986) that were in the vanguard of reform and glasnost' and publications such as the newspaper Sovetskaia Rossiia (Soviet Russia) or the Komsomol journal Molodaiiagvardiia (Young Guard), which combined political conservatism with Russian nationalism. One periodical which published information that would have been unthinkable in the past, and was at times in a battle of words even with the more tolerant authorities of the perestroika era, Argumenty i fakty (Arguments and facts), sold, at the peak of its circulation, as many as 33 million copies a week. In general, the circulation of newspapers and journals reached far greater heights during the perestroika period than either before or since in Russia. An entirely new and independent newspaper, which incorporated the word 'independent' in its title, Nezavisimaia gazeta, began publication in 1990.

Films which had failed to pass the censor in the unreformed Soviet system were now screened and made a great impact - none more so than the anti- Stalinist Georgian film, Pokoianie (Repentance), which went on general release in November 1986. The backlog of forbidden literature was even longer. The solid monthly literary journals were able to fill their pages with high-quality creative writing and revealing memoir material that had failed to pass the cen­sor in times past. Many of the works of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn appeared in official Soviet publications for the first time, including his devastating indict­ment of the Soviet system, The Gulag Archipelago, which was serialised in the large-circulation literary monthly, Novyi mir (New world), in 1989. Other works deemed in the past to be especially dangerous, the very possession of which was a criminal offence - among them George Orwell's Animal Farm and Nine­teen Eighty-Four, Arthur Koestler's Darkness at Noon, Vasilii Grossman's Life and Fate, Doctor Zhivago (Boris Pasternak's Nobel prize-winning novel) and Anna Akhmatova's poem, Requiem, about the victims of Stalin - were published in large editions.

From early in the Gorbachev era criticism of Stalin and Stalinism - which had been banned in the Brezhnev years - resumed and the critiques became much more fundamental than Khrushchev's attack which had condemned some of Stalin's purges but did not question the system that had allowed him to get away with mass murder. It was in 1988 that the much bolder step, in the Soviet context, of criticising in print Marx and Lenin was taken. The first author to achieve this breakthrough was Aleksandr Tsipko in the pages of the popular science monthly, Nauka i zhizn' (Science and life). Tsipko, who had been brought into the Central Committee apparatus in 1986, was still working in the CPSU headquarters when he published a series of articles, beginning in November 1988, that were critical of the Bolsheviks and the consequences of their revolution. In his own words, he set the precedent of 'legal anti-Communism' and did so underthe protection of Central Committee Secretaries Yakovlev and Vadim Medvedev.[16] It is one of the paradoxes of the dismantling of the Communist system that the most decisive steps in that process were taken by high-ranking members of the Communist Party, including, crucially, the highest. These new freedoms, it is important to note, occurred at a time before Yeltsin was playing any part in national decision- making. Aleksandr Bovin rightly sees as one of Yeltsin's principal merits that he preserved the inheritance of freedom that Gorbachev introduced.[17] To see freedom of speech and publication as a product of post-Soviet Russia would be a serious distortion. The many new liberties were, on the contrary, among the most notable achievements of perestroika, although they contributed also to its ultimate undoing.

From political reform to systemic transformation

New concepts and a greatly enhanced freedom were accompanied by insti­tutional change. The point at which the policy pursued by Gorbachev and his supporters moved beyond an attempt to reform the existing system was in the run-up to the Nineteenth Party Conference in the summer of 1988. Encouraged by the removal of Boris Yeltsin in November 1987 from his post as Moscow party chief after he had criticised the party leadership and, in partic­ular, Ligachev at a Central Committee meeting the previous month, conser­vatives within the CPSU Central Committee began to fight back against the developing radicalism of Gorbachev's reforms.[18] (Yeltsin saw himself as being in the vanguard of perestroika, although his emphasis at that time was more on a greater social egalitarianism than on democracy. Gorbachev was the first to call for competitive elections.)

In early 1988 the apparatus backlash against radical reform became more apparent. A letter appeared under the name of Nina Andreeva, a hitherto unknown Leningrad lecturer, in Sovetskaia Rossiia on 13 March 1988, which attacked the processes under way in Russia from a neo-Stalinist standpoint. It received immediate support from within the Central Committee apparatus. Its publication date was deliberately chosen for a Sunday just before Gorbachev left for Yugoslavia and Yakovlev for Mongolia. In their absence Ligachev com­mended the article to journalists as 'a benchmark for what we need in our ideology today'.[19] There was a gap between publication of this document, which appeared to many to portend a dramatic change of official course, and its rebuttal. Most Russian intellectuals, including some who were later to crit­icise Gorbachev for 'half-measures' and 'indecisiveness', waited to see which way the wind was blowing. On Gorbachev's insistence, the Politburo discussed the Andreeva letter at a session that lasted for two days and it turned out that at least half the membership were basically sympathetic to the anti-reformist line it had expressed.[20] It was not until 5 April that an article appeared in Pravda rebutting 'Andreeva' point by point. It was given additional party authority by being unsigned, though it was drafted by Yakovlev, with the participation of Gorbachev, and represented a clear victory for the reformist wing of the leadership.

This, in turn, enabled Gorbachev, with particularly important help both from Yakovlev and from his recently appointed adviser on reform of the polit­ical system, Shakhnazarov, to radicalise the political agenda and to oversee the production of documents presaging far-reaching reform that were pre­sented to the Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988. The conference itself produced more open debate than had occurred at a party forum since the 1920s. Politburo members Mikhail Solomentsev, Gromyko and Ligachev were criticised by name and Gorbachev, though not yet explicitly named as some­one guilty of social democratic deviation from Communist orthodoxy, was the clear implicit target of several critical speeches from conservative Com­munists. Nevertheless, at that time the party remained notably hierarchical and Gorbachev still benefited from the authority traditionally enjoyed by the General Secretary. As a result, he was able to get the conference delegates to approve reforms that were both against the inner judgement of many of them and which constituted a fundamental departure from Soviet practice. The most important decision was to move to contested elections for a new legislature, the Congress of People's Deputies, which would in turn elect an inner body, the Supreme Soviet. The latter was to be in session for some eight months of the year - unlike the existing rubber-stamp Supreme Soviet which met for only a few days each year.

Until these elections were held in March 1989 the political institutional changes constituted what Yakovlev and many others have called a 'revolu­tion from above'.[21] The elections, however, galvanised Soviet society - some republics and nations more than others - and brought entirely new actors on to the political stage. They also provided the opportunity for one demoted politician, Boris Yeltsin, who had remained a nominal member of the Cen­tral Committee, to make a spectacular comeback and begin his ascent to power. Yeltsin stood for election in a constituency that comprised the whole of Moscow and he overwhelmingly defeated the favoured candidate of the party apparatus. A third of the seats were reserved for candidates from 'public organisations' (which ranged from the Communist Party itself to the Academy of Sciences and the Writers' Union and Film-Makers' Union). This was both a concession to institutional interests within the Soviet system and also, in the minds of some reformers, a way of getting talented people from out­side the political class into the new legislature. Among the deputies chosen from the Academy of Sciences was Andrei Sakharov. In the ballot by the elec­torate as a whole for the remaining two-thirds of the deputies, there was real contestation between two or more candidates in a majority of seats. About a quarter of the constituencies had only one name on the ballot paper. This, however, did not guarantee election, for the support of more than half of those voting was required. A number of officials, who had contrived to have no competitor, found themselves spurned. Among those thus defeated was a candidate member of the Politburo, Iurii Solov'ev, in Leningrad.[22] These first contested national elections marked a breakthrough to real political plu­ralism in the Soviet Union and kindled great public enthusiasm. The voter turn-out was higher than for any subsequent Russia-wide election up to and including the presidential election of 2004. Only a minority of those elected to the new Soviet legislature were committed to further transformative change, but some of those who were formed the Inter-Regional Group of Deputies which numbered Sakharov, Yeltsin, and the historian Iurii Afanas'ev among its leaders.

Other elections followed - in 1990 for the legislatures of all fifteen republics of the Soviet Union (which saw Yeltsin emerge as chairman ofthe Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic) and in 1991 for newly created republican presidencies. The most important of those elections was in June 1991 when Yeltsin got more votes than all his opponents put together to become president of the Russian Republic and the first popularly elected leader in Russian history. In March I990 the institution of the presidency had been created at the level of the Soviet Union. There was debate among reformers whether this should be a nationwide election or an indirect election by the legislature, the Congress of People's Deputies. Even a number of reformers (including the distinguished scholar, Academician Dmitrii Likhachev) urged Gorbachevto opt forthe latter. Some were for prompt indirect election on the grounds that, with tension rising as a result ofnationalist discontent and economic problems, the sooner a new executive was formed the better. Other supporters of Gorbachev were worried that he could lose the election, although it was in May 1990 that Yeltsin for the first time moved ahead of Gorbachev in the surveys conducted by the All-Soviet (later All-Russian) Institute for Public Opinon (VTsIOM), the most reliable of the opinion pollsters at the time. Gorbachev's election by the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR to become the Soviet Union's first executive president in March 1990 was a tactical victory, but probably a strategic error. If he had competed in a general election and won, he would have greatly strengthened his legitimacy in an era - which he himself had inaugurated - when this could no longer be conferred by the practice of seven decades whereby a group of senior Communist Party officials got together behind closed doors and chose the party leader who then automatically became the country's leader.

A systemic transformation occurred in the Soviet Union between 1988 and I990. By March I990 at the latest it was no longer meaningful to describe the Soviet state as Communist. The two most fundamental political characteris­tics of a Communist system were the monopoly of power of the Communist Party and 'democratic centralism' (meaning hierarchical subordination, strict discipline and absence of open debate, with the centralism a reality and 'demo­cratic' a misnomer). Both of these features had disappeared. The process had begun with Gorbachev's abolition of most of the economic departments of the Central Committee and of lower party economic organs in the autumn of 1988. Hitherto, ministerial and other state economic institutions had been under close party supervision. Now they acquired a new autonomy. Com­petitive elections, even when they were not multi-party elections, meant the end of democratic centralism. There was much intra-party debate, some of it conducted in the mass media, from 1986 onwards, and the elections for the new Soviet legislature in 1989 pitted one CPSU member against another, fre­quently displaying radically different political outlooks and advocating widely divergent policies. Their fate was decided by the electorate, among whom only 10 per cent of adults were members of the CPSU. Thus the Communist Party's monopoly of power was fast disappearing de facto in 1989 before it was removed de jure from the Soviet Constitution at a session of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR in March 1990.[23]

The creation of the Soviet presidency, while it did little to help Gorbachev at a time when his popularity was slipping and Yeltsin was emerging as a serious challenger to his authority, signalled the end of party hegemony. The Politburo had from early in the Soviet period been the ruling body of the country as well as of the party. From March 1990 onwards a state institution, the presidency, was more powerful than the highest party organs, although Gorbachev held on to his office of General Secretary to ensure that it did not fall into the hands of a conservative Communist who might attempt to reverse the process under way. A Presidential Council was created which was more authoritative than the Politburo, although it suffered from the absence of institutional underpinnings, a chain of command analogous to that which had prevailed in the CPSU.

At the same time as the new Soviet presidency and the Presidential Council were created in March 1990, so was a body known as the Federation Council. It was composed of the presidents or the chairmen of the supreme soviets of the union republics. As such, it was created from below - from the republics. Neither Gorbachev, as president of the Soviet Union, nor the Communist Party apparatus was able to determine who sat on the Federation Council. As the Presidential Council was chosen by Gorbachev, listening to advice but with full responsibility for the ultimate choice, it is evident that the loser of the power of appointment in both cases was the central CPSU apparatus. Moreover, the introduction of competitive elections in the republics as well as at the Centre meant that politicians had to take more account of public opinion than ever before. Whereas previously nothing was more important for a political leader in Estonia or Ukraine than the opinion held of him in the Central Committee building in Moscow, now the views of Estonians and Ukrainians assumed greater significance.

The president himself, Gorbachev, was the chief arbiter of executive decision-making - even more so than in the days when his power rested entirely on the General Secretaryship, for when party organs reigned supreme, he still had to take some account of opinion within the Politburo. However, the con­straints from outside the federal executive were far greater in 1990-1 than at any time since the consolidation of the Soviet regime in the 1920s. These came partly from republican institutions and, for Gorbachev, the challenges to his authority from Yeltsin in 1990-1 were of especial significance. There was also, however, a new politics at street level. The second half of the 1980s saw the development of new and independent organised groups. After the Nineteenth Party Conference and the decision to move to contested elections, it was clear that the dangers of engaging in such activity - which hitherto had been very real - were becoming a thing of the past. Two authors who have studied Rus­sian independent groups in contrasting ways agree at least that '1989 stands out as the crucial takeoff phase for autonomous political activity in Russia'.[24]Put another way: 'Elections of the People's Deputies of the USSR in 1989 and to the Russian Federation federal and local soviets in 1990 completely changed the character of Russian independent political groups. Before this, despite various impressive names, the "democratic" movement actually consisted of many small clubs.'[25] Some of the new groups turned into mass movements, most notably Democratic Russia, a loosely organised body which held its founding congress in October 1990 and played a significant part in mobilis­ing support for Boris Yeltsin in the Russian presidential election the following summer.

By the time the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held its Twenty- Eighth (and last) Congress in the summer of 1990 it was no longer playing a decisive role in the political process, at least at the central level. A document adopted by the congress, 'Towards a Humane, Democratic Socialism', which would have been a sensation at the previous party congress in 1986, no longer made a significant impact. Work began on a new party programme and a draft of it was presented to a Central Committee plenum in the summer of 1991. It fully reflected Gorbachev's own intellectual journey in a little over six years from Communist reformer to democratic socialist of a type familiar in Western Europe (although not in Russia or the United States). However, among those who duly voted for what was essentially a Social Democratic platform, it appears that a majority had no intention of implementing it. Some of those present had already turned their minds to the issue of how to remove Gorbachev from office.

The failure of economic reform

The most immediate stimulus to change in the Soviet Union at the beginning ofthe Gorbachev era was the long-term decline in the rate of economic growth and the fact that the Soviet economy was not only lagging behind the most advanced Western countries but also was being overtaken by some of the newly industrialising countries in Asia. There was, however, no agreement on what should be done to remedy matters. The most radical reformers in the mid-1980s thought not in terms of a fully-fledged market economy but simply of making significant concessions to market forces along the lines of the Hungarian economic reform, launched in 1968. Others believed that what was needed was more discipline of the kind which Andropov had begun to impose. An influential group, which included the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Ryzhkov, was from early in the Gorbachev era in favour of raising prices but very cautious about leaving prices entirely to market forces. By the end of the 1980s large numbers of specialists had lost all faith in state planning of the economy and, instead of looking for a combination of plan and market, were ready for a more radical shift to the market. The economist Nikolai Petrakov, soon after he became Gorbachev's aide on economic matters at the beginning of 1990, told Ryzhkov that the State Committee on Prices should be abolished, since it made no sense for the state to be fixing prices. Ryzhkov agreed in principle but said the phasing-out of that State Committee should occur in a few years' time. Petrakov responded: 'Nikolai Ivanovich, you talk about the market as we used to talk about communism - it's always sometime later.'[26]

An economic error committed as early as May 1985 (and for which Ryzhkov was entirely blameless, since he opposed the policy on the grounds that it would lead to a serious reduction of state revenue) was the adoption of an anti-alcohol programme. The production of alcohol in state distilleries and wineries was drastically reduced, many retail outlets were closed, and illicit alcohol production filled the gap. The state's monopoly of this industry had previously, given the high level of alcohol consumption (especially of vodka in the Slavic parts of the Soviet Union), made a massive contribution to the revenue side of the budget. Since alcoholism and drunkenness were alarmingly widespread in Russia, the measure had some support, especially from women; but, in spite of apparent early success in reducing alcohol consumption, it was ultimately a failure. The prime movers in the Politburo for a major effort to reduce alcohol consumption were Egor Ligachev and Mikhail Solomentsev, but Gorbachev became associated with the campaign in the minds of most of the public, for he supported the principle of a fresh attempt to tackle what he recognised to be a serious social and moral problem.

A combination of the policy's growing unpopularity and Ligachev's loss of his position as second secretary of the CPSU in 1988 meant that from that year on the campaign was quietly abandoned.[27] There had been previous propaganda campaigns against excessive alcohol consumption, but none had been successful in the long term. By making it much harder for alcohol to be obtained legally at convenient locations and times, this new assault on the hard drinking culture did produce a sharp drop in legal sales which was reflected both in the official statistics, suggesting that vodka consumption in 1987 was less than half of what it had been in 1985, and by the hole that was left in the state budget.[28] However, if moderate drinkers drank less because of a reluctance to stand in long queues at the reduced number of shops selling alcohol, those at whom the measure was primarily aimed were less easily deterred. Hardened drinkers were prepared to queue for as long as it took or to fill the gap in legal supplies with 'moonshine', thus depriving the state of the large element of turnover tax on each bottle of liquor.

Bad luck as well as bad decisions complicated economic policy during per- estroika. Whereas a rise in oil prices had partially disguised Soviet economic inefficiency in the 1970s, a fall in oil prices in the second half of the 1980s did nothing to cushion economic reform. It is arguable, though, that this may have been a blessing in disguise in that it became increasingly clear that the existing economic system needed to be replaced by one operating on fundamentally different principles. Very few Soviet economists, not to speak of party and government officials, held such a view in 1985. Between then and 1990, how­ever, the economic philosophy of many of the social scientists, in particular, underwent a fast evolution. By 1990 the view was widely held among them that central planning would have to give way to an essentially market economy. There were, though, differences of opinion among reformers between those who favoured a mixed ownership system (state, co-operative and private) and those who wished to go the whole hog to private ownership.

The first move towards recognising a role for non-state economic enter­prise was the Law on Individual Economic Activity of November 1986. This legalised individual and family-based work, such as car repairs, taxi services and private tuition. A much more ambitious piece of legislation was intro­duced the following year. The Law on the State Enterprise, a compromise measure following debate within the leadership, in which Gorbachev played a leading role, devolved more authority than hitherto to the enterprise level - in particular, to factory managers. While the diagnosis that the Soviet economy was too centralised and that economic ministries had too much power was correct, the law did not achieve any of its intended results. The State Planning Committee (Gosplan) and the economic ministries found ways of maintaining many of their powers over the enterprises, even though the number of plan indicators was cut drastically. To the extent that there was some real devolution of authority to the factory level, it did more harm than good. Enterprises were able to charge higher prices for work of no higher quality than before. The law thus had inflationary consequences and also contributed to an increase in inter-enterprise debt. Decentralisation without price liberalisation and com­petition was doomed to failure, although at the time many Soviet reformers and Western observers saw the Enterprise Law as a step forward. This was so only in the sense that since the attempt to reform the Soviet economy pro­ceeded on the basis of trial and error, and in conditions of glasnost', the failures could soon be brought into the light of day. One of the most important of the unintended consequences of the Enterprise Law became apparent in the last years of the Soviet Union and in early post-Soviet Russia when a process of insider privatisation occurred. Taking advantage of the enhancement of their legal rights provided by the 1987 law, factory managers, often aided and abetted by local party officials, began to convert their control of industrial enterprises into ownership.

A more successful legislative act was the Law on Co-operatives of 1988. Going well beyond the law which had legalised individual economic enterprise, this law prescribed no maximum to the number of people who could be employed in a 'co-operative'. Many of the co-operatives became indistinguish­able from private enterprise but it was an advantage in the late 1980s that the former terminology could be supported by quotations from Lenin who in 1989 still topped a serious poll of Soviet citizens who perceived him as being by far the greatest person who had ever lived.[29] An open acceptance of large-scale private economic activity would have been seen as an embrace of capitalism to which a majority of the population, as well as a majority of the political elite, were at the time opposed.

Nevertheless, as political tensions rose in 1990 and the economy showed no signs ofthe 'acceleration' which one ofthe earlier slogans ofthe Gorbachev era had demanded, Gorbachev and Yeltsin came to an agreement in the summer of that year to set up a team of specialists to come up with concrete proposals for transition to a market economy. The group was to be drawn in equal numbers from Gorbachev and Yeltsin nominees. The leader of Gorbachev's team was Stanislav Shatalin, a sophisticated critic of the Soviet command economy of an older generation, while Yeltsin, in his capacity as chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, nominated Grigorii Iavlinskii, a much younger enthusiast for the market. In endorsing this project, Gorbachev completely bypassed the Communist Party hierarchy and offended the head of the government, Ryzhkov. The document that the Shatalin-Iavlinskii group produced became known as the '500-Days Plan', an ambitious attempt to make the transition to a market economy within that time period.[30] The 238-page programme did not so much as mention 'socialism' and made no concessions to traditional Soviet ideology. It envisaged the speedy construction of market institutions, large-scale privatisation and extensive devolution of power to the republics of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev, after reading the document more than once, and Yeltsin, without reading it, both gave the programme their initial enthusiastic endorsement. In response to the backlash from within the ministerial network, including the strong objections of Ryzhkov and the first deputy prime minister, Leonid Abalkin (himself a reformist economist), as well as from CPSU, military and KGB critics, Gorbachev retreated from his earlier support for the '500-days' document.

The issue was not by this time whether to move to a market economy, but rather when, how and to what kind of market economy. The Shatalin-Iavlinskii proposals were less a plan or programme and more a set of aspirations which were subsequently agreed to have been over-optimistic. Egor Gaidar, a mem­ber of the team which produced the document, subsequently saw its desiderata as more of a political than an economic statement and regarded them, on the basis of his own post-Soviet experience, as having been naive.[31] The politi­cal salience of the issue was, however, very great. Gorbachev's retreat from support of the Shatalin-Iavlinskii proposals undoubtedly lost him credibility among Russian radical reformists as well as within the republics most desirous of greater sovereignty. The mantle of leader of reform appeared now, in the eyes of many intellectuals, to be passing to Yeltsin. Finding himself deserted by a significant part of the constituency for change, Gorbachev became increas­ingly reliant on the more conservative elements within the leadership during the winter of 1990-1.

There is no doubt that the attempt to reform the Soviet economy ended in failure. Part of the reason for that was the tension between reforming an existing system to make it work better and replacing that system by one which had a quite different logic. In the early years ofperestroika the first aim was being pursued - and with only very limited success. By 1990-1, while there was not a consensus, there was at least a broad body of support among specialists for the idea that the command economy had to give way to a market economy. It was clearer to Gorbachev than to Yeltsin that this would mean tens of millions of citizens becoming worse off for some years to come. Freeing prices would improve the supply of goods and services but would also raise those prices to a level the majority could ill afford. That factor, together with the institutional opposition to change ofthetypeproposedby the Shatalin-Iavlinskii group, and concern about the possibly deleterious impact of economic systemic change on the territorial integrity of the USSR, made Gorbachev hesitate about pushing through the move to a market economy in practice that he had already accepted in principle. Much of the economic legislation of the perestroika years - not least the Law on Co-operatives - had helped to pave the way for marketisation, but the Soviet economy remained in limbo at the end of the Gorbachev era. It was no longer a functioning command economy but not yet a market system.

Ending the Cold War

If the results of economic reform during the perestroika period were, to say the least, disappointing, the outcome of the new direction of Soviet foreign policy was a dramatic improvement in Soviet relations with the outside world. Gorbachev came to power intent on making a qualitative change in this respect. He was determined to end the war in Afghanistan and to improve relations with the United States, Western Europe and China. He wished to move away also from Soviet tutelage of Eastern Europe. At a meeting with the East European Communist leaders as early as Chernenko's funeral Gorbachev told this disbelieving group that the Soviet Union would respect their sovereignty and independence and they, in turn, would have to take full responsibility for developments in their countries. In other words - and Gorbachev was to make this more explicit in November 1986 - the ruling parties of Eastern Europe had better earn the trust of their own people, for there would be no more Soviet military interventions if they ran into trouble.[32] Granting more independence to Communist leaders in Eastern Europe and respecting the full autonomy of those states were not, of course, the same thing. It was in 1988-9 that Gorbachev went beyond the former position to embrace the latter.

The issue of how decisive in ending the Cold War was the role played by political leaders - in particular, Gorbachev - is still a subject for debate, as are explanations in terms ofmaterial resources, ideas and Soviet domesticpolitics.[33]Some see these as alternative explanations. For others they are complementary, each having some bearing on the eventual outcome but to greatly varying extent. One argument which would accord primacy to American pressure - stressing, at the same time, the disparity between the material resources of the Soviet Union and the United States - holds that by stepping up military expenditure in a way the USSR would find difficult to match, the Reagan administration was inviting its Soviet adversary either to 'spend itself to death' or to capitulate. Expressed more moderately, this is stated as: 'The end of the Cold War was caused by the relative decline of Soviet power and the reassurance this gave the West.'[34]

However, the relative strength of the United States in relation to the Soviet Union was greater in the early post-war years when Stalin's takeover of Eastern Europe began the Cold War. Moreover, the Soviet Union, if less militarily strong than the United States in the mid-1980s, had enough nuclear weapons to destroy life on earth. It did not need to match the US, weapon for weapon, in order to maintain the division of Europe. At home, living standards, while low in comparison with Western Europe, were much higher than Soviet citizens had put up with over many decades. Even if there had been more widespread domestic dissatisfaction with Soviet foreign policy and with the domestic political order than, in fact, there was in 1985, the regime had sophisticated means of maintaining control and an apparatus of repression that had very successfully eliminated dissent. It could have continued to do so, using the mass media to present a propagandistic interpretation of Western aggressive intentions and the need for the Soviet Union to strengthen still further its defences, had the leadership opted for continuity rather than change in foreign policy.

Gorbachev was in a minority of one in the Politburo at the time he took over as General Secretary in believing that the Soviet Union as well as the United States had to react to the realities of the nuclear age in a new way. He was concerned that President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) increased the chance of Cold War turning into hot war by increasing reliance on fallible technology and technocratic rather than political decisions. He wished also to divert excessive military expenditure to civilian purposes, but he was initially alone also within the top leadership in being willing to tackle the power of the Soviet military-industrial complex. And even as leader, aware that he could be replaced as General Secretary at short notice by a CPSU Central Committee plenum, Gorbachev had to proceed cautiously in challenging the most powerful institutional interests within the Soviet system.

A combination of new Soviet leadership and new ideas was more important than the difference in material resources between the USSR and the USA in bringing about change. Domestic Soviet politics were also more important than the international environment between 1985 and 1988. This changed in 1989 when the citizens of East European countries demanded and secured their independence. The speed at which this happened left Gorbachev responding to events, rather than setting the international agenda, as he had done, to a great extent, in his earliest years in office. One of the features that distinguished Gorbachev from his predecessors as Soviet leader was a strong aversion to violence. This is, on the whole, recognised both by those who think well of Gorbachev and by his severe critics in post-Communist Russia. In the words of Vladislav Zubok: 'The principle of non-violence was not only Gorbachev's sincere belief, and the foundation of his domestic and foreign policies, but it also matched his personal "codes" . . . The critics claim that Gorbachev "had no guts for blood", even when it was dictated by raison d'etat.'[35] There was, moreover, as Anatolii Cherniaev has affirmed, 'a total lack in Gorbachev of undue respect for the military or any kind of special fascination with military parades and demonstrations of military power'.[36]

By bringing in a new foreign-policy team early on, consisting of Eduard Shevardnadze as foreign minister, Cherniaev as main foreign policy adviser, Anatolii Dobrynin as head of the International Department of the Central Committee, and Vadim Medvedev in charge of the Socialist Countries Depart­ment ofthat body, Gorbachev opened the way forboth newthinking onforeign policy and new behaviour. From the outset Aleksandr Yakovlev was also an influential adviser and from 1988 he was the overseer of international affairs within the Central Committee. While Gorbachev pursued what George Bres- lauer has characterised as a 'concessionary foreign policy', the Soviet Union was not forced into this.[37] It was, rather, a price that a minority of the Soviet elite - including, however, the principal power-holder - was prepared to pay for what they (perhaps, in retrospect, naively) believed would be a more peaceful and self-consciously interdependent world. The policy was intimately bound up with the changes that the same people wished to make at home. Liberalisa­tion, followed by democratisation, within the country was linked to abandon­ing imperial pretensions abroad. Ronald Reagan, contrary to the belief of most of the Soviet experts on American politics, turned out to be a valuable partner for Gorbachev in international negotiations. His anti-Communist credentials were sufficiently strong to offer him protection at home, and although there were important inter-agency tensions within the American administration,

Reagan believed that change within the Soviet Union (and of Soviet interna­tional conduct) was possible, and, in the words of his ambassador to Moscow, 'always came down ultimately in support of dialogue'.[38]

The coming to power of Gorbachev led to the toppling of ideological ortho­doxy in Soviet thinking on international affairs even more quickly than on the economy and the political system. The concept of 'reasonable sufficiency' in military expenditure (rather than fully matching the potential adversary), the idea that 'all-human values' had supremacy over class values and that there were universal interests which took precedence over those of any one country led to an emphasis on interdependence that marked a qualitative step forward from the old Soviet doctrine of'peaceful coexistence'. International relations were no longer seen as a zero-sum game, a deadly struggle between socialism and capitalism, but rather an arena where, through co-operation, all countries could benefit.[39]

The first fruits of the new co-operation were to be seen in arms reduction agreements. There were summit meetings between Gorbachev and Reagan at Geneva (1985), Reykjavik (1986), Washington (1987) and Moscow (1988). The Reykjavik meeting came close to outlawing a wide range of nuclear weapons, but ultimately foundered on disagreement over whether work on SDI should or should not be confined to the laboratory. Although both leaders left that meeting greatly disappointed, it did not sour the Gorbachev-Reagan relationship. The Washington summit in December 1987 ended by eliminating a whole category of nuclear weapons, both Soviet SS-20s and the American cruise and Pershing missiles. This 'zero option' had been Reagan's policy since 1981, and so he could take some pride in the outcome. However, hard­line Washington critics, as well as hard-line Moscow ones, were upset, for the former had believed that no Soviet leader would dare admit that installing the SS-20s had been a mistake, and they had counted on the continued presence of American medium-range missiles in Europe.

The improvement in East-West relations was further enhanced by the Soviet Union's decision to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. Gorbachev had been looking for an exit strategy from the beginning of his General

Secretaryship but he had to take account of the reluctance of the Soviet mili­tary to depart in a manner which looked like a defeat. He wished, therefore, to encourage reconciliation among the warring parties in Afghanistan and sought American help in doing so. In April 1987 Gorbachev told American Secretary of State George Shultz that the Soviet Union wanted to get out of Afghanistan but the United States was not doing anything to make it easier.[40]In July of the same year Gorbachev stated in a newspaper interview that 'in principle, Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan has been decided upon'.[41]Eduard Shevardnadze repeated the request for American help in September 1987, in order that 'a reactionary fundamentalist Islamic regime' would not take power in Afghanistan. He made it clear, however, that the Soviet Union was committed to withdrawal, in any event.[42] It was April 1988 before an agreement on the Soviet army's withdrawal was actually signed. Soviet troops began leaving in substantial numbers the following month and the process was completed by the agreed date of 15 February 1989. By that time President Reagan had already made his celebrated visit to Moscow. Asked by a reporter inside the grounds of the Kremlin what had happened to the 'evil empire', the term Reagan had applied to the Soviet Union in 1983, the American president responded: 'I was talking about another time, another era.'[43]

Appropriately, since the Cold War had begun with the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe, it ended with the Central and East European countries achiev­ing independent statehood. The key shift of Soviet policy which facilitated this occurred, along with so much else of immense future significance, in the sum­mer of 1988. In his major speech to the Nineteenth Conference of the CPSU on 28 June, Gorbachev followed a passage in which he had been speaking about the Communist countries of Eastern Europe with these words:

The concept of freedom of choice holds a key place in the new thinking. We are convinced of the universality of this principle in international relations at a time when the most important general problem has become the very survival of civilisation . . . That is why the policy of force [politika sily] in all its forms and manifestations has become historically obsolete.[44]

Gorbachev could scarcely have been more explicit in opposing military inter­vention as a policy, even though up until then Western governments had taken it for granted that, in the last resort, the Soviet Union would use force of arms to maintain Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Gorbachev expressed similar sentiments to those in his party conference speech in his address to the United Nations in December 1988, although they were given less publicity than the 'hard news' of substantial Soviet troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe.[45]

In 1989 the Central and East Europeans took Gorbachev at his word. One after another the countries of the region rejected their ruling parties and the Moscow connection and became independent and non-Communist. Except in Romania, where the deposed president, Nicolae Ceau§escu was executed by firing squad, the 'revolutions', if they can be called that, were peaceful. Soviet troops remained in their barracks and not a shot was fired in Eastern Europe by a Russian. The contrast with Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia 1968 could not have been more stark.[46] The final piece of the jigsaw fell into place with the tearing down of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. A summit meeting between Gorbachev and the new American President George Bush in December 1989 in Malta was the first time a Soviet and American top leader gave a joint press conference at the end of it and treated each other as partners. The Soviet Foreign Ministry's adroit press spokesman, Gennadii Gerasimov, was able to announce: 'We buried the Cold War at the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea.'[47]

The Cold War was pronounced dead many times, but it is safe to say that the ideological reasons for its continued existence had ceased to exist before the end of 1988 and that it ended in political reality in 1989. The reunification of Germany in 1990 was a natural consequence of Soviet acquiescence in the destruction of the Berlin Wall.[48] The suddenness of the process, nevertheless, took both the Soviet leadership and its Western counterparts by surprise.

Gorbachev hadbecome the first Soviet leader since the end ofthe Second World War to recognise in 1987 that Germany might not remain divided for ever, but neither he nor, at that time, Chancellor Helmut Kohl imagined for a moment that within three years unification would have occurred. Given, however, Gorbachev's aversion to the use of force to preserve unpopular Communist regimes in East-Central Europe, the logic of events led to his telling Chancellor Kohl in February 1990 that it was up to the Germans to decide in what kind of state they wished to live and the speed with which they would attain it.[49]Both within the International Department of the Central Committee and in Soviet military circles, there was criticism of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze for not striking a tougher bargain over Germany. Against that, the countries of what had been the 'Soviet bloc' were returned to the citizens of East-Central Europe in a remarkably peaceful process. While events had passed beyond the control of Moscow, the Soviet Union could have greatly complicated them. Had not Soviet troops been kept in their barracks throughout the region, the short-term outcome might have been different and would certainly have been bloodier. In the specific case of German unification, Gorbachev's conduct of negotiations (that were delicate and dangerous for him in the context of Soviet domestic politics) left a legacy of German goodwill both for him personally and for Russia.

From pseudo-federation to disintegration

From the outset ofperestroika, its proponents had stressed how crucially inter­related were both domestic and foreign policy. Whereas in the first three and a half years of perestroika, this meant that domestic change in the Soviet Union was having a dramatic impact on international relations, from early 1989 the boot was on the other foot. Developments in Eastern Europe began to feed back into Soviet domestic politics in a way which threatened and ultimately destroyed the unity of the Soviet state.

The break-up of the Soviet Union had several proximate causes in addition to the legacy of the past. That legacy, however, was especially important in two respects. First, the suppression of national aspirations and the severe per­secution of even peaceful manifestations of nationalism meant that there was an underlying resentment of the Soviet political order that existed to some degree in all the union republics, but was more widespread in some than oth­ers. It amounted to outright disaffection in the three Baltic states which had been forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union against the will of the great majority of their populations in 1940. The second legacy was an institutional one. The fact that the union republics had their own 'national' branches of the Communist Party (with the exception of Russia - until 1989), their own Councils of Ministers, Supreme Soviets and Academies of Sciences meant that under conditions of liberalisation and democratisation they had available to them institutions through which they could articulate distinctive national sen­timents and demands. The significance of this element of institutional path determinism is indicated by the fact that the only Communist states which disintegrated in the course of transition from Communist rule were the three that had federal forms (the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) and by the equally significant datum that it was the fifteen union republics of the USSR, which were the best endowed with institutional resources - and not other national territories, such as the so-called 'autonomous republics' or 'autonomous regions' - that achieved independent statehood. Thus, though the power structure of the unreformed Soviet Union could fairly be charac­terised as 'pseudo-federal', the federal forms which up until 1985 played an extremely circumscribed role in the political life of the country were of great latent importance.[50]

Yet another legacy of the pre-perestroika Soviet period that played its part in fomenting national discontent was, paradoxically, one of the success stories - the achievement of near-universal literacy in the USSR and the existence of a substantial stratum of the population in all of the republics who had received a higher education. It is, as a rule, intellectuals rather than peasants who are the bearers of nationalist ideology. In the Central Asian republics, in partic­ular, a native intelligentsia and national consciousness were equally the cre­ations of the Soviet period. New ways of looking at the world were both a result of higher education and broadening intellectual horizons, on the one hand, and the federal forms, on the other, even though it was well into the Gorbachev era before the latter acquired federal substance. Contrary to the predictions of some scholars, however, it was not from the Asian and Islamic parts of the Soviet Union but from its most westerly European republics that the strongest pressure for sovereignty emanated.[51] The majority of cit­izens of Soviet Central Asia, like a majority of inhabitants of Belarus, had independent statehood thrust upon them in 1991. Only a minority had been striving for it.

Perestroika produced its own impetus for centrifugal pressures. Glasnost' brought to the surface injustices and discontent that it would have been dan­gerous to air earlier. These revelations, in turn, had a radicalising effect on opinion within several of the republics. Moreover, the reduction and subse­quent removal of the 'leading role' of the Communist Party took away a key institutional pillar not only of the Soviet system but of the Union. The federal forms had been tolerated by Soviet leaderships prior to perestroika because they were outweighed by the 'leading role' of the party. The party remained strictly hierarchical and even republican party first secretaries had to be highly responsive to instructions coming down the line from the Central Committee in Moscow. This meant that the party, at the level of the union republic Cen­tral Committee, could, and did, place limits on the extent to which republican ministries or republican institutes of the Academy of Sciences might ignore Moscow's wishes.

As already noted, both democratic centralism and the monopoly of power of the Communist Party had ceased to exist by 1989 when competitive elections for a new legislature, the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, took place and were followed a year later by contested elections for legislatures in the republics. While the institutional changes were especially important in permitting national movements to gain a strong foothold within a system in flux, the withering away of Marxism-Leninism also played a part. Although many officials, not to speak of ordinary citizens, had paid only lip-service to the ideology, its thorough debunking by the end of the 1980s left space open for other ideologies, of which nationalism turned out to be especially important for the future (or, more precisely, non-future) of the Union. As Ronald Suny has aptly put it:

[National] pasts were constructed and reconstructed; traditions were selected, invented, and enshrined; and even those with the greatest antiquity ofpedigree became something quite different from past incarnations. While alternative discourses of affiliation, like class and gender, were silenced, the dominance of the national discourse defined its constituents almost exclusively as subjects of the nation, effacing the multiplicity of possible identities.[52]

A series of flashpoints in particular republics exemplified and exacerbated nationality-related problems. The appointment of a Russian, Gennadii Kolbin, as first secretary of the CPSU in Kazakhstan (on the recommendation of the outgoing first secretary, Dinmukhamed Kunaev) in December 1986 provoked riots in Alma Ata (Almaty). In July 1987 Moscow's Red Square was the scene of a sit-down demonstration by Crimean Tatars demanding to be allowed to return to the homeland from which they had been exiled by Stalin. From February 1988 the temperature ofthe dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the land of Nagorno-Karabakh was seldom below boiling point. The federal authorities found this an especially intractable problem, since both Armenians and Azeris were utterly convinced of their historic claim to the territory. The fact that this predominantly Armenian enclave was within the Soviet republic of Azerbaijan had long been a sore point for Armenians. It was - for Gorbachev and the federal authorities - just one of the unintended consequences of liberalisation that Armenians in their tens of thousands felt able to raise the issue sharply less than three years into perestroika. The dispute led to inter-ethnic violence in 1988 with at least thirty-two people, mainly Armenians, killed in the city of Sumgait in Azerbaijan where many more Armenian homes were wrecked. In turn there were fatal attacks on Azeris in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Armenia itself. A further escalation of violence occurred in 1990 when a pogrom of Armenians in Baku killed at least sixty people. This led Gorbachev's special envoy, Evgenii Primakov, to urge strong action against the Popular Front in Azerbaijan. The indiscriminate nature ofthe onslaught subsequently ordered by Soviet senior officers on the spot produced an official death toll of eighty-three, though according to Azeri nationalist sources several hundred people may have died. The cycle of violence merely further inflamed national passions and did nothing to resolve the problems.

This was never more evident than in the case of the violent suppression of a peaceful demonstration by young people in Tbilisi in April 1989. Soviet troops, with the support of the first secretary of the CPSU in Georgia (and against the explicit wishes of Gorbachev who had asked Shevardnadze to fly to Georgia to negotiate a peaceful end to the stand-off), brutally attacked the protestors. Nineteen of the demonstrators (mainly young women) were killed and several hundred were injured. From that time on, Georgian nationalism was more than ever a force to be reckoned with. Similarly, violence against protesters in the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius, and the Latvian capital, Riga, in early 1991 merely added fuel to the fires of national discontent. Gorbachev, in the winter of 1990-1, had made a tactical shift in the direction of more conservative forces and at times his rhetoric was a throwback to an earlier period. He desperately wished to preserve the Union, but was not willing to pay the price of bloodily suppressing nationalist movements. Each use of excessive force by

Soviet troops was intended by their chiefs in the power ministries to be but the beginning of a more general crackdown on all fissiparous movements. They also hoped to separate Gorbachev from the most liberal-minded members of his team and from the democratic movement that had developed after 1989 in Russian society. In the latter aim in particular the conservatives had some success. Yet - in contrast with the sustained violence in Chechnya in post-Soviet Russia - each incident in which force was used in the Gorbachev era was a one-day event. The forces favouring violent suppression of national and separatist movements were never given their head to 'finish the job', partly because of Gorbachev's reluctance on moral grounds to shed blood and partly because he realised that such violence as had been applied was entirely counter-productive.

Separatist movements in the Soviet Union were given a huge impetus by developments in Eastern Europe in 1989. It was at this point that the radicali- sation of the political agenda came full circle. Developments within the Soviet Union itself had been the key to change in the rest of Communist Europe. The peoples of Central and Eastern Europe had decided to test the sincerity of Gorbachev's professed willingness to let the people of each country decide for themselves the character of their political system. They could not fail to notice that, to their surprise, domestic liberalisation had gone further by the end of 1988 within Russia than it had in most of the Warsaw Pact countries. The outcome of taking Gorbachev at his word was that in the course of one year Eastern European countries became non-Communist and independent. For Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, this was especially significant. They were no longer ready to argue simply for greater sovereignty within a renewed Soviet Union but for an independent statehood that would be no less than that enjoyed by Czechs, Hungarians and Poles.[53] Moreover, competitive elections had brought to the fore politicians - including, in the case of Lithuania, even the Communist Party first secretary (Algirdas-Mikolas Brazauskas) - ready to embrace the national cause.

When Gorbachev had declared each people's 'right to choose', he had in mind existing states. He truly believed that there was a 'Soviet people' who had a lot in common which transcended national differences. His doctrine of liberation was not intended to lead to separatism in the USSR. When he came round to recognising the reality of the Soviet Union's own 'nationality problem', his preferred solution was to turn pseudo-federation into genuine federation-even, as a last resort, in late 1991 into a loose confederation. In April 1991 Gorbachev initiated a new attempt to negotiate a Union Treaty that would preserve a renamed Union on a voluntary basis. Only nine out of the fifteen republics participated in the talks. The fact that they went ahead regardless reflected the fact that Gorbachev and the liberal wing of the leadership (people such as Yakovlev, Shakhnazarov and Cherniaev) had come to accept de facto that the Union would not consist of as many as fifteen republics in the future. They wished, however, that secession, where it had become a political necessity, would be orderly and legally defined.

Events conspired against the preservation of even a smaller union. The election of Yeltsin as Russian president in June 1991 gave him a legitimacy to speak for Russia that was now greater than that of Gorbachev, who had been only indirectly elected by a legislature representing the whole of the USSR more than a year earlier. For some time Yeltsin had been pressing for Russian sovereignty within the Union. In May 1990 he insisted that Russian law had supremacy over Union law. This was a massive blow against a federalist solution to the problems of the Union.[54] The same claim had been made on behalf of Estonia, but Russia contained three-quarters of the territory of the USSR and just over half of its population, so the threat to the future of a federal union was of a different order. Nevertheless, by the summer of 1991, the nine plus one negotiations had produced a draft agreement which Yeltsin and the Ukrainian president, Leonid Kravchuk, were prepared to sign. The president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev, at that time a strong supporter of preserving a Union, played a constructive role in securing the agreement.[55]Gorbachev had made many concessions. A vast amount of power was to be devolved to the republics, so much so that the conservative majority within the CPSU apparatus, the army and the KGB were convinced that this would be but a stepping-stone to the break-up of the Soviet Union.

Thus, with the draft Union Treaty due to be signed on 20 August 1991, and with Gorbachev preparing to fly back to Moscow from his holiday home in Foros on the Crimean coast, the final blow to the Union was struck by people whose main aim was to preserve it. Gorbachev, his wife and family and one or two close colleagues (including Cherniaev) were put under house arrest on 18 August and a state of emergency was declared in Moscow early in the morning of 19 August. A self-appointed State Committee for the State of Emergency was set up in which the Soviet vice-president, Gennadii Ianaev, had been persuaded to play the most public role. In order to provide a fig leaf of legality, the plan had been to persuade Gorbachev to hand over his powers (temporarily, he was told) to the vice-president.

From the moment that Gorbachev denounced the delegation which had been sent to cajole or intimidate him into acquiescing with their action (which had begun with cutting off all his telephones) the putschists were in trou- ble.[56] The key figures in this attempt to turn the clock back (which, if it had succeeded, would logically have resulted in severe repression in the most dis­affected republics and a return to a highly authoritarian regime in the Soviet Union as a whole) were, unsurprisingly, the chairman of the KGB, Vladimir Kriuchkov, the powerful head of the military-industrial complex of the Soviet Union, Oleg Baklanov, and the minister of defence, Dmitrii Iazov. Many senior Communist Party officials sympathised with them and one Politburo member, Oleg Shenin, was intimately involved in the coup attempt. Because, however, the CPSU had by this time lost whatever prestige it once enjoyed, the emphasis of the plotters was on patriotism and preserving the Soviet state. There was no reference to restoring the monopoly of power of the Communist Party or to Marxism-Leninism. Many people demonstrated in Moscow against the coup, but throughout the country as a whole most citizens waited to see who would come out on top. Many republican and most regional party leaders assumed that those who had taken such drastic action would prevail and hastened to acknowledge the 'new leadership'.

It emerged, however, that even the most conservative section of the Soviet party and state establishment had been affected by the changes in Soviet society and the new norms that had come to prevail over the previous six and a half years. Yeltsin, in the Russian White House (the home at that time of the Russian government), became the symbol of resistance to the coup. He received strong support from Western leaders, although a few had initially been prepared to accept the coup as a fait accompli, among them President Mitterrand of France. The tens of thousands of Muscovites (several hundred thousand over several days when account is taken of comings and goings) who surrounded the White House raised the political cost of its storming, but would not have prevented the building and its occupants being seized, if the army, Ministry of Interior and KGB troops had acted with the kind of ruthlessness they displayed in pre-perestroika times. Yet, faced with political resistance, the forces of coercion themselves became divided. Since the coup leaders were people who had for several years been denouncing Gorbachev - at first, in private, and of late in public - for 'indecisiveness', it is ironic that their own indecision made certain the failure of the coup. They lacked the resolution to carry it to its logical conclusion and gave up the attempt as early as 21 August.

The putsch was, however, a mortal blow both for the Union and for the leadership of Gorbachev. Having seen how close they had been to being fully reincorporated in a Soviet state which wouldhave been a throwbacktothepast, the Baltic states instantly declared their independence. This was recognised by the Soviet Union on 6 September. Four days later Armenia followed suit, while Georgia and Moldova already considered themselves to be independent. While Gorbachev had been isolated on the Crimean coast, Yeltsin had been the public face of resistance to the coup, and Gorbachev's position became weaker and Yeltsin's stronger in its aftermath. Taking full advantage of this further shift in the balance of power, Yeltsin was no longer content with the draft Union Treaty that was to have been signed in August. New negotiations saw further concessions from Gorbachev which would have moved what remained of a Union into something akin to a loose confederation. Ultimately, this did not satisfy the leaders of the three Slavic republics - Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine, and Stanislav Shushkevich of Belarus. At a meeting on 8 December 1991 they announced that the Soviet Union was ceasing to exist and that they were going to create in its place a Commonwealth of Independent States (see Map 12.1). Not the least of the attractions of this outcome for Yeltsin was that with no Union there would be no Gorbachev in the Kremlin. In the months following the coup he had been sharing that historic headquarters of Russian leaders with Gorbachev, but, given their rivalry, such a 'dual tenancy', like 'dual power' in 1917, could not last.

In a televised 'Address to Soviet Citizens' on 25 December 1991, just as the Soviet state itself was coming to an end, Gorbachev announced that he was ceasing to be president of the USSR. He said that, although he had favoured sovereignty ofthe republics, he could not accept the complete dismemberment of the Soviet Union and held that decisions of such magnitude should have been accepted only if ratified by popular will. Looking back on his years in power, he observed that all the changes had been carried through in sharp struggle with 'the old, obsolete and reactionary forces' and had come up against 'our intolerance, low level of political culture and fear of change'. Yet, he could justly claim that the society 'had been freed politically and spiritually', with the establishment of free elections, freedom of the press and freedom of

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worship. On foreign policy the gains seemed to Gorbachev to be especially clear:

An end has been put to the 'Cold War', the arms race and the insane mili­tarisation of our country, which disfigured our economy, social thinking and morals. The threat of world war has been removed.

Moreover:

We opened ourselves up to the rest of the world, renounced interference in the affairs of others and the use of troops beyond our borders. In response, we have gained trust, solidarity and respect.

Looking ahead, Gorbachev had words of warning:

I consider it vitally important to preserve the democratic achievements of the last few years. We have earned them through the suffering of our entire history and our tragic experience. We must not abandon them under any circumstances or under any pretext. Otherwise, all our hopes for a better future will be buried.57

57 The full text of Gorbachev's resignation speech is to be found in Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn' i reformy, vol. i, pp. 5-8; and in the abbreviated English translation of that book: Gorbachev Memoirs (London: Transworld, 1996), pp. xxvi-xxix.

The Russian Federation

MICHAEL McFAUL

The immediate afterglow of the failed coup attempt in August 1991 must rank as one of the more optimistic periods in Russian history. In August 1991, like many other times in Russia's past, Kremlin rulers had issued orders to suppress the people. This time around, some of the people resisted. For three days, a military stand-off ensued between those defending elected representatives of the people in the White House - the home to Russia's Congress of People's Deputies - and those carrying out orders issued by non-elected leaders in the Kremlin.[57] Popular resistance to the coup attempt was not widespread. In fact, except for Moscow, St Petersburg and the industrial centres in the Urals, there were no signs of resistance at all.[58] But this concentrated opposition, especially in Moscow, produced major consequences for Russia's history. In this round of conflict between the Russian people and their rulers, the people prevailed. The victory created an atmosphere of unlimited potential. One Western publication declared, 'Serfdom's End: a thousand years of autocracy are reversed'.[59]

The triumph, however, also fuelled inflated expectations about what was to come next. The victors immediately accomplished some symbolic gestures, such as the arrest of the coup plotters and the destruction of Feliks Dzerzhin- sky's statue outside the KGB's headquarters. But the bigger tasks of creating a new state, economy and polity soon erased the euphoria of August 1991 for Russia's political leadership. Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the unquestioned hero of the dramatic August events, most certainly seemed overwhelmed. He spent three weeks in September outside Moscow on vacation.

58
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800 miles
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Bashkortostan 3,943 Khakassia 567
Buriatia 1,038 Komi 1,251
Chechnya and Ingushetia* 1,270 Mari El 750
Chuvashia 1,338 Mordovia 963
Dagestan 1,802 North Ossetia 632
Gorno-Altai 191 Tatarstan 3,642
Kabardino-Balkaria 754 Tuva 309
Kalmykia 323 Udmurtia 1,606
Karachai-Cherkessia 414 Yakutia 1,094
Tuvinian 64 '
70

Map 13.i. Ethnic Republics in 1994

August 1991 may have punctuated the end of one regime, but did little to define the contours of what was to follow. As in all revolutions, destruction of the ancien regime came easier and more quickly than the construction of a new order.[60] Throughout the autumn of 1991, it remained uncertain what kind of political regime or economic system would fill the void left by the collapsing Soviet state. Some within Russia were convinced that the command economy had to be dismantled and replaced by a market system. Others had a different view. Likewise, many within Russia spoke about the need to destroy the last vestiges of autocracy and erect a democracy But among these advocates of regime change, there was little agreement about the ultimate endpoint. And with hindsight, we now know that many powerful actors within the Soviet Union had no intention of building democracy, as the majority of regimes in place today in the states of the former Soviet Union are forms of dictatorship, not liberal democracies.[61] Even the borders of the new political units were unclear. And those who had a notion ofwhat the endpoint should be regarding political and economic change did not have a roadmap in hand for how to get there.

Even if Yeltsin and his supporters had known precisely what they wanted and had a blueprint for creating it, they still did not have the political power to implement their agenda. In August 1991, Yeltsin of course was the most popular figure in Russia. Yet, this popularity was ephemeral and perhaps not as widespread as observers stationed in Moscow made it out to be. Yeltsin's authority was not institutionalised in either political organisations or state offices. Even the powers of his presidential office - created just two months earlier - were not clear. Equally ambiguous was the strength of those political forces that favoured preservation of the Soviet political and economic order. The coup had failed, but those sympathetic to the coup's aims were still in power in the government, the army, the KGB, in local governments and even in the Russian Congress of People's Deputies. Fearing a replay of 1917, Yeltsin and his band of revolutionaries decided not to use force against their enemies. In attempting to advance a peaceful revolution, however, the new leaders in Moscow were constrained by lingering legacies of the Soviet era for the rest of the decade.

Yeltsin and his allies, therefore, did not enjoy a tabula rasa in constructing a new state, economy and political system after the 1991 coup. Although Russia's abrupt, revolutionary mode of transition removed guideposts for navigating the transition, the non-violent nature of the transition also allowed many indi­viduals, institutions and social forces endowed with certain rights and powers in the Soviet system to continue to play important political and economic roles in the post-Soviet era. The clash between fading old institutions and groups, emerging new actors, forces and practices, and robust mutations between the old and the new defined the drama in Russian history throughout the 1990s.[62]

Dissolving the Soviet Union

In tackling the triple agenda of state formation, economic transformation and regime change, Yeltsin made the creation of an independent Russian state his first priority. He had no popular mandate for this momentous task. Only a few months earlier, in March 1991, over 70 per cent of Russian citizens had voted to preserve the Soviet Union. After the August coup attempt, however, Yeltsin saw the dissolution of the Soviet Union as both inevitable and desirable. The Baltic republics took immediate advantage of the power vacuum in Moscow after the coup to push for complete independence from the Soviet Union. Other republics followed the Baltic lead. The week after the coup attempt, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet voted overwhelmingly (321 in favour, 6 against) to declare Ukraine an independent state, and set 1 December 1991 as the date for a referendum to obtain a popular mandate for their decision. Georgia and Armenia quickly followed by voting in September for full independence. At the time, Gorbachev was still formally the president of the Soviet Union, but in actuality he had little authority or power left to sanction these rebellious republics, and Yeltsin most certainly was not going to order troops into these places to defend Soviet territorial integrity. After all, he had declared Russia a sovereign country a year earlier. Instead, Yeltsin devoted his energies to guiding the Soviet Union to peaceful disintegration.

Yeltsin first banned the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, dissolving the only organisation potentially capable of making and implementing pol­icy at the all-Union level. Yeltsin also suspended the publication of several Communist newspapers, and purged the leadership at other important media outlets. Though most were senior CPSU officials, leaders in other republics did the same in their territories. Next, Yeltsin and his allies moved quickly to recast most of the ministries and organisations of the Soviet state as Russian entities. The strategy regarding most of these state organs was co-option, not coercion or dissolution.[63] Yeltsin and his government adopted a more cautious strategy regarding the so-called power ministries. With the CPSU in disarray, the Soviet armed forces, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs were the only organisations that had the capacity (and quite possibly the legitimacy) to construct an alternative all-Union administrative authority. After all, most of the Soviet Union's armed and best-trained troops were stationed beyond the Russian Republic's borders.[64] To begin to neutralise these institutions, there­fore, Yeltsin appointed loyal allies to head them. But in contrast to his strategy towards other ministries, Yeltsin allowed the power ministries to remain under Soviet jurisdiction during this transitional period. He eventually incorporated these ministries into the Russian government after Soviet dissolution, but with­out initiating any serious internal reforms within these ministries.[65] Nor did Yeltsin establish firm civilian control over these bodies. Above all else, Yeltsin, as well as other republican leaders, feared a divided and polarised army.

There were two Soviet state institutions that Yeltsin did not want to seize, but rather destroy - the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies and the Soviet presidency. He and his government first sought to discredit the Soviet parlia­ment by blaming Soviet legislators for tacit acquiescence to the coup. As Yeltsin stated the week after the coup attempt, 'During the days of the putsch, there was no supreme legislative power in the country, there was no parliament. The junta had a free hand. Through its inaction, the Supreme Soviet provided the junta with most-favored status.'[66] In response to Yeltsin's prodding, the Soviet Congress approved on 5 September 1991 a new law on governing the Soviet Union during a transitional period in which the Congress de facto surrendered its governing authority to an executive body called the USSR State Council. The axe fell next on the Soviet presidency. Although enjoying Gorbachev's co-operation during this volatile period, Yeltsin wanted to use the opportunity of the failed August putsch to eliminate his nemesis from politics forever.[67] To eliminate Gorbachev's position and prevent the Soviet leader from attempting to create a new looser union, Yeltsin met with his counterparts from Ukraine and Belarus to sign the Belovezhskaia Accord on 8 December 1991. This short accord effectively dismantled the USSR.[68] Amazingly, it met little resistance in any of the three signatory countries. By the end of the year, the largest country in the world ceased to exist.

The new political system

Like many other revolutionary leaders in similar situations, Yeltsin could have taken advantage of August 1991 to establish an authoritarian regime.[69] Several of Yeltsin's advisers did urge him to consider an authoritarian strategy, at least as an interim solution to collapsing state power throughout the country and as a means for introducing unpopular economic reforms. On the other hand, Yeltsin could have taken steps to consolidate a democratic polity. He could have disbanded old Soviet government institutions, adopted a new constitu­tion codifying the division ofpowerbetween executive, legislative andjudiciary as well as federal and regional bodies, and called new elections to stimulate the development of a multi-party system. Many leaders in the democratic movement expected him to do so. Yeltsin, however, pursued neither strategy.

Although he did not attempt to erect a dictatorship, he did little to consoli­date a new democratic polity. Importantly, he resisted calls for new national elections and actually postponed regional elections scheduled for December 1991. He also did not form a political party. He delayed the adoption of a new constitution, even though his own constitutional commission had com­pleted a first new draft as early as October 1990. Yeltsin also failed to disman­tle many Soviet-era governmental institutions, including, most importantly, the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Republic.[70]

Launching economic transformation

Yeltsin's priority was not the creation or consolidation of a new democratic political system (or a new authoritarian regime). Rather, once the borders of the new Russian state were secure, Yeltsin turned his attention to disman- tlingthe command economy and creating a market economy. He and his new government inherited a bankrupt economy - no hard currency reserves, a ballooning budget deficit, foreign debt of $80 billion, declining industrial pro­duction, a monetary overhang and a scarcity of goods that compelled many experts to predict starvation. After some hesitation, Yeltsin came to believe that only radical reforms could redress these desperate economic conditions. He hired a team of young reformers, led by his new deputy prime minister for the economy, Egor Gaidar, to initiate such reforms, which acquired the unfortunate label of 'shock therapy'.[71]

Gaidar's programme for economic reform called for immediate liberali­sation of prices and trade while at the same time achieving macroeconomic stabilisation through control of the money supply and government spend­ing.[72] Once stabilisation had been accomplished, massive privatisation was to follow. Gaidar's plan was consistent with his neo-liberal approach to mar­kets and market development; the less the state intervened in the market the better.

The consequences of Yeltsin's reform sequence and strategy

Yeltsin's greatest achievement as president was the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union. Initiating economic reform was another important accomplish­ment. Executing the measures successfully, however, was not.

InJanuary 1992, Yeltsin and Gaidar did succeed in introducing dramatic price liberalisation. Prices on most food items (exceptions were milk, bread and other main staples) as well as almost all consumer durables were freed overnight. Significant price controls, however, remained in the energy sector. At the time, government officials, trade union chiefs and journalists all predicted riots, work stoppages and general social unrest. Gaidar himself predicted his own dismissal by the end of the month. None of these scenarios transpired. This peaceful transition towards free prices represented a monumental step for a country where prices had been controlled for over sixty years. By the end of the decade, few goods were rationed, long queues were rare and Russian shops were filled with goods to sell.

The January 1992 price liberalisation produced a sharp rise in inflation. What is striking in retrospect, however, is how low inflation was in compar­ison with the rates to follow. Monthly inflation rates steadily declined from 38 per cent in February 1992 to 9 per cent in August 1992. Politics, however, quickly eroded Gaidar's ability to implement macroeconomic stabilisation.[73]Tight government money threatened directors and workers of large state enterprises. These groups used the moment of the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies in the spring of 1992 to launch an assault against Gaidar's reforms. Rather than call for Gaidar's dismissal, leaders of the parliamentary faction, Industrial Union, mobilised other conservative forces in the parliamentary body to strip the president of his extraordinary powers. Ambiguously defined rules of the game, including most importantly the absence of a new Russian constitution, made possible this kind of strategy. Although Yeltsin fought and defeated the original move to dilute his executive powers, he did later compro­mise with the anti-reform coalition in the parliament by agreeing to appoint three new deputy prime ministers closely associated with the industrial lobby - Vladimir Shumeiko, Georgii Khizha and Viktor Chernomyrdin - into his gov­ernment. During the painful first year of the transition from the command economy, Yeltsin began to lose confidence in his young team of economic advisers.[74] By the end of the year, Yeltsin acquiesced to pressure from the Rus­sian Congress and dropped his acting prime minister Gaidar. Yeltsin replaced Gaidar with the more conservative Chernomyrdin, the former head of the gas company, Gazprom. For many, this was the end of economic reform in Russia.

The consequences of these political battles for macroeconomic stabilisa­tion were profound.[75] By the summer of 1992, government transfers to state enterprises began to increase dramatically. Even more importantly, however, Gaidar and his team lost control of monetary policy. As part of this compro­mise with the industrialists, Viktor Gerashchenko was appointed head of the Russian Central Bank. Soon after his appointment, Gerashchenko approved the clearing of inter-enterprise debt as well as cheap credit lines for state enterprises. As a result of these changes in both fiscal and monetary policies, inflation began to soar again in the autumn of 1992, reaching 25 per cent per month by the end of the year. Central Bank credits amounted to 31 per cent of GDP.[76]

Though sequenced to begin after liberalisation and stabilisation, privati­sation has been singled out as the 'driving force behind economic reform in Russia' and 'the heart of the transformation process'.[77] As defined by Yeltsin's first post-Communist government, the policy of privatisation of large state enterprises aims to create privately owned, profit-seeking corporations owned by outside shareholders that do not depend on government subsidies for sur­vival. If enterprises must generate profits to cover expenditures and pay div­idends to stockholders, then they will be compelled to rationalise assets, a process that will include downsizing, restructuring and bankruptcy.

On paper, Russian privatisation looked successful. By January 1994, 90,000 state enterprises had been privatised. The record on the actual creation of real private property rights, however, was less rosy. Privatisation of small shops and services created actual owners endowed with clearly delineated property rights. Privatisation of large state enterprises did not. Instead, by the sum­mer of 1993, insiders had acquired majority shares in two-thirds of Russia's privatised and privatising firms, state subsidies accounted for 22 per cent of

Russia's GDP, while indicators of actual restructuring (bankruptcies, downsiz­ing, unemployment, unbundling) were not positive.[78]

Again, the problem was politics. Well before the collapse of the Soviet regime, the Soviet institutional arrangements governing property rights allowed directors to appropriate many of the rights associated with ownership. When the Yeltsin government's privatisation programme threatened to re­allocate property rights, these directors organised to defend their claims.[79]Their venue of struggle once again was the Congress of People's Deputies. While Gaidar and his privatisation tsar, Anatolii Chubais, had hoped to imple­ment their original privatisation programme through presidential decree, industrialists in the Congress argued that such an important act had to have the force of law. After some hesitation, Yeltsin agreed to submit the privati­sation programme for parliamentary approval. Over a hundred amendments were added to Chubais's original privatisation programme, including two new options for privatisation, which allowed managers to acquire control of their firms. Not surprisingly, insiders acquired the majority of enterprises privatised under this new law.

Polarisation over economic issues between the president and his govern­ment on the one hand and the Russian Congress on the other eventually provoked conflict over basic political issues. The absence of well-defined polit­ical rules of the game fuelled ambiguity, stalemate and conflict both between the federal and sub-national units of the state. Both confrontations ended in armed conflict.

October 1993

The Russian Congress ofPeople's Deputies was an odd foe for Boris Yeltsin. In i990, this body had elected Yeltsin as its chairman. After Yeltsin became presi­dent, this Congress then elected Yeltsin's deputy chairman, Ruslan Khasbulatov to become speaker. In August i99i, Yeltsin, Khasbulatov and their supporters huddled inside the Congress building - the White House - as their chief defen­sive strategy for thwarting the coup. In November i99i, the Congress voted overwhelmingly to give Yeltsin extraordinary powers to deal with economic reform. In December i99i, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Congress rati­fied Yeltsin's agreement to dissolve the Soviet Union. Only six deputies voted against the agreement.

The portrayal, therefore, of the Congress as a hotbed of Communist con­servatism is misleading. To be sure, Communist deputies controlled roughly 40 per cent of the seats in the Congress and the anti-Yeltsin coalition - which included Communists and non-Communists - grew over time.[80] Yet, the ini­tial balance of power within the Congress did not prevent Yeltsin from being elected chairman. It should not have prevented him from reaching agreement with this Congress about the rules ofthe game that governed their interaction with each other.

Initially after the putsch attempt, the institutional ambiguity between the president and Congress did not have a direct impact on politics, as most deputies in the Congress at that time supported Yeltsin. After price liberalisa­tion and the beginning of radical economic reform in January 1992, however, the Congress began a campaign to reassert its superiority over the president. The disagreement over economic reform in turn spawned a constitutional crisis between the parliament and president.[81] With no formal institutions to structure relations between the president and the Congress, polarisation crystallised yet again, with both sides claiming to represent Russia's highest sovereign authority. During the summer of i993, in preparing for the Tenth Congress of People's Deputies, deputies drafted a series of constitutional amendments that would have liquidated Russia's presidential office altogether. Yeltsin pre-empted their plans by dissolving the Congress in September 1993. The Congress, in turn, declared Yeltsin's decree illegal and recognised Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi as the new interim president. In a replay of the 1991 drama, Russia suddenly had two heads of state and two governments each claiming sovereign authority over the other. The October 1993 'events' - the euphemism coined to describe the armed conflict between the president and the parliament on 3-4 October 1993 - was a national tragedy for Russia. For the second time in as many years, debates about institutional design moved beyond the realm of peaceful politics and into the arena of military confrontation. In 1991, the military stand-offtookthe lives ofthree defenders ofthe White House. In i993, several hundred people died in the fighting between warring branches of the Russian state. In addition to the loss of life, the October events ended

Russia's romantic embrace of democracy. If the end of the military stand-off in i99i triggered rapturous support for the new regime and the democratic ideals that it claimed to represent, the end of fighting in 1993 marked a nadir of support for the Russian government and the end of optimism about Russia's democratic prospects.

This tragic moment also created opportunity. After dissolving the parlia­ment in October 1993 through the use of force, Russian President Yeltsin was free to draft the constitution as he and his aides saw fit. This new constitution spelled out a set of basic guarantees for all Russian citizens and codified a new system of government, which included the office of the president, a prime min­ister and the government, and a bicameral parliament, consisting of a lower house, the State Duma, and an upper house, the Federation Council. In the first election to the Duma, held in December i993, a presidential decree ruled that half the seats (225) were to be determined by a majoritarian system in newly drawn electoral districts while the other half (225) were to be allocated according to a system of proportional representation (PR). Parties had to win at least 5 per cent to win seats on the PR ballot.[82] Later codified as law, these rules for electing the Duma have remained in place ever since. Two represen­tatives from each region of Russia - that is eighty-nine republics, krais, and oblasts of the Russian Federation - constitute the Federation Council, though the process of selecting these two representatives has changed over time.

The new constitution gave the president extraordinary powers, compelling some to label the new regime a form of authoritarianism.[83] The president appoints the prime minister. The lower house of parliament, the State Duma, must approve the president's choice for prime minister. But if they reject the president's candidate three times, then the Duma is dissolved and new elections are held. Not surprisingly, votes against the prime minister have been few and far between. The president also has the right to issue decrees, which have the power of law until overridden by a law passed by both the upper and lower houses of parliament and signed by the president. The president also controls the nomination process of judges in the Constitutional Court and Supreme

Court.[84]

Yeltsin's opponents ridiculed this new basic law, claiming not without merit that the new constitution gave the president extraordinary powers and the pro­cess of drafting the constitution was undemocratic. There was no compromise between different parties or regional leaders in the making of this constitution. Rather, Yeltsin imposed his will and then offered voters the choice to reject or accept his constitution. Nonetheless, most of Yeltsin's opponents participated in the December 1993 elections, in effect signalling that they were willing to acquiesce to these newly imposed rules. Perhaps most importantly, the lead­ership of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation decided that it was in the party's best interest to participate in rather than boycott the December 1993 vote.[85] In a referendum in December 1993 marred by claims of fraud, a majority of voters approved the constitution.[86] After the referendum, no major political force in Russia mobilised to challenge the constitution. After years of ambiguity, Russia had a new set of formal rules for organising politics accepted both by the majority of the population and by all strategic political actors.

Chechnya

The same constitutional ambiguity that fuelled conflict between Yeltsin and the Congress also allowed federal conflicts to fester. Eventually, one of them - Chechnya - exploded into a full-scale war.

Tensions between Moscow and the regions arose well before the 1993 executive-legislative stand-off.[87] Immediately after the August 1991 coup attempt, General Jokhar Dudayev and his government declared Chechnya's independence. In March of the following year, Tatarstan held a successful referendum for full independence. The first of several federal treaties were signed in March 1992, but negotiations over a new federal arrangement embed­ded within a constitution dragged on without resolution into the summer of i993, prompting several other republics as well as oblasts to make their own declarations of independence complete with their own flags, customs agents and threats of minting new currencies. Yeltsin allowed these federal ambiguities to linger. Consumed with starting market reform and then dis­tracted by the power struggle with the Congress, Yeltsin opted not to devote time or resources towards constructing a Russian federal order. Moreover, the Russian state was too weak to exercise sovereignty over a breakaway republic like Chechnya, which enjoyed de facto independence during this period. After the October 1993 stand-off, Yeltsin did put before the people a new constitution, ratified in December 1993, which formally spelled out a solution to Russia's federal ambiguities (see Map 13.1). The new constitution specified that all constituent elements were to enjoy equal rights vis-a-vis the Centre. Absent from the document was any mention of a mechanism for secession.

The formal rules of a new constitution did not resolve the conflicts between the Centre and the regions. Negotiation overthe distribution ofpowerbetween the central and sub-national governments continued. But all sub-national gov­ernments except one - Chechnya - acquiesced to a minimalist maintenance of a federal order. Ironically, the clarity of rules generally highlighted the specific problem of Chechnya's status.

After solidifying his power with the defeat of the Russian Congress and the adoption of a new constitution, Yeltsin committed to a military solution following a series of challenges from Dudayev regarding Russian sovereignty during negotiations over the federal treaty in the spring of 1994 and a spate of bus hijackings in the region that summer. A failed coup attempt orchestrated by Russia's Federal Security Service was followed by a ground assault on 1 December 1994 and a full-scale air attack beginning on 11 December 1994.[88]For the second time in as many years, Yeltsin had ordered the deployment of Russian military forces against his own people.[89]

On the eve of attack, Defence Minister Pavel Grachev predicted that the mil­itary action would be over within hours. The results of the invasion, however, were disastrous as Russia's armed forces proved ill-prepared to fight such a war (see Plate 24). By the time Russia finally sued for peace in the summer of 1996, an estimated 45,000-50,000 Russian citizens had lost their lives.[90] Moreover, the negotiated settlement that ended the war did not resolve Chechnya's sovereign status, an ambiguity that would later help to spark a second war (discussed below).

Founding elections: 1993-6

In addition to the constitutional referendum, Yeltsin also decreed that elec­tions for the State Duma and the Federation Council would take place on 12 December 1993. These new parliamentarians were to serve only an interim two-year term, and then face election again in i995 for a full four-year term. Earlier in the year, Yeltsin had pledged to hold early elections for the presidency. After the October i993 events, he withdrew that pledge and instead scheduled the next presidential election for 1996. After two years of no elections in post- Communist Russia, this electoral calendar offered voters a chance to choose their national leaders three times in as many years.

Between June 1991 - the timing of the last national election in Soviet Russia - and December 1993 when the first set of competitive elections in the post-Soviet era were held, monumental changes unfolded in Russia, making predictions about electoral outcomes difficult. During this interval, the Russian econ­omy as well as the Russian state had continued to contract, while political polarisation had generated instability and then outright military confronta­tion. Voter turn-out in December 1993, reported officially at 54.8 per cent, was markedly lower than any previous competitive elections in Russia in 1989,1990 and 1991.

Some outcomes from 1993 went according to the Yeltsin administration's plan. In the referendum, the official count claimed that 58.4 per cent supported Yeltsin's constitution, while 41.2 per cent opposed it. Elections to the upper house, the Federation Council, and elections in single-mandate districts for the Duma were unremarkable, producing pro-Yeltsin victories in most contexts. The one extraordinary electoral outcome in 1993 occurred on the proportional representation ballot for the Duma. Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his extreme nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) won almost a quarter of the popular vote. At the same time, the pro-Yeltsin Russia's Choice secured a paltry 15 per cent, less than half of what was expected, while the other 'democratic' parties all won less than i0 per cent of the popular vote. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation and their allies, the Agrarian Party of Russia, won less than 20 per cent of the vote, while new 'centrist' groups combined for nearly a quarter of the vote.

Zhirinovsky's splash onto the Russian national stage shocked governmen­tal officials in both Moscow and the West.[91] Because he spouted a venomous brand of racism and chauvinism and criticised in equal proportion the Com­munists and democrats, Zhirinovsky appeared to represent a new, third force in Russian electoral politics - militant nationalism. Russian fascism seemed ascen­dant, whilebothpro-democratic (andpro-Western) forces and pro-Communist forces seemed to be on the decline.[92] At this moment, Russia's political and economic future seemed highly uncertain. Public opinion surveys indicated a rise in the degree of trust in the fairness of the electoral process.[93] At the same time, pro-Yeltsin elites in Moscow hinted that the Kremlin would never allow someone like Zhirinovsky to come to power, no matter what the voters said, suggesting that the elections were not the final determinant of who ruled Russia.

With the advantage of hindsight, it is clear that Zhirinovsky's 1993 victory did not mark the beginning of fascism's ascendance in Russia. Rather it was the unique circumstances of the autumn of i993 that allowed his star to rise. After two and a half years of falling production, double-digit inflation and general economic uncertainty, everyone expected the opposition or protest vote in i993 to be substantial. In the immediate aftermath of this mini-civil war in downtown Moscow, the Communists were still regrouping in Decem­ber. Weeks before the December vote, it was uncertain whether members of the Russian Communist Party would even be allowed to participate. Com­munist disarray allowed Zhirinovsky to capture the opposition, protest vote. In addition, Zhirinovsky's brilliant television campaign, the first real mass- media campaign in Russian electoral history, established his party as the most aggressive and abrasive enemy of the status quo.[94]

Over the next years leading up to the next parliamentary election in 1995, economic conditions in Russia did not improve, leaving the distribution of

michael mcfaul

support between pro-government and opposition voters relatively the same. In this two-year interval, however, Zhirinovsky's appeal among opposition voters faded at the same time as the Communist Party reorganised and grew once again as Russia's most important opposition force. Although the Communist Party was challenged by important splinter groups on the Left, including Viktor Anpilov's radical Working Russia, the party entered the i995 campaign as the most united and best organised political party in Russia. Building upon networks and structures left from several decades of Communist Party rule in Russia, the CPRF used the resources accorded to the party by the Duma to strengthen regional party organisations during the two-year interval between parliamentary votes.

This organisational work paid off as the CPRF made impressive gains over its 1993 showing by winning almost a quarter of the popular vote and thereby reclaiming its role as the leader of the opposition. Buoyed by party identifi­cation on the ballot, CPRF candidates also dominated single-mandate races, winning an astonishing fifty-eight seats. Zhirinovsky's LDPR won less than half its 1993 total, but was still placed second with 11 per cent of the popular vote. The total percentage ofvotes for anti-governmental parties well exceeded 50 per cent, giving hope to the opposition, CPRF leader Ziuganov in particu­lar, that Yeltsin could be defeated in the presidential context in the following year.

Division and poor electoral performances among those considered pro- government or pro-reform helped to fuel optimism in the opposition's camp. The number of electoral blocs that registered for the ballot rose dramatically, from thirteen in i993 to forty-three in i995 and most of the new contestants were considered reformist or centrist blocs. Eight of the new electoral blocs in 1995 were direct descendants of Russia's Choice from 1993, while an amazing twenty electoral blocs emerged from the Democratic Russia of 1991. Early in the campaign period, the Yeltsin administration openly promoted the forma­tion of two new electoral blocs led by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin that would be loyal to the Yeltsin regime. Chernomyrdin's Our Home Is Russia was supposed to represent the Right of centre, while Rybkin was ordered to form a left-of-centre bloc. The Rybkin project all but collapsed before the vote, but even Chernomyrdin's new 'party of power' did not perform well, just barely breaking into double digits. Grigorii Iavlinskii's Iabloko (Apple), the self-proclaimed leader of Russia's democratic opposition, won 7 per cent, well below expectations and almost a full per­centage point below Iabloko's i993 showing. Former acting prime minister Egor Gaidar and his Democratic Choice of Russia (DVR) suffered the greatest setback in 1995, winning just 3.9 per cent of the popular vote, less than one-third of their 1993 total.

Most analysts interpreted these results as a firm rebuff of both Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.[95] Yeltsin subsequently began the 1996 presiden­tial campaign looking as if he would follow other first time post-Communist leaders and be defeated in the second election. To defeat Ziuganov and stay in power a second term, Yeltsin turned the 1996 presidential election into a referendum on the revolution.[96] Yeltsin obviously could not ask voters to judge him by the achievements of his administration over the previous four years - a list of accomplishments that included economic collapse, armed conflict with parliament and war in Chechnya (discussed above and below). Instead Yeltsin's strategy was to convince voters that Russia had to proceed with what he and his allies had started in 1991 -the transformation of Russia into a market economy and democratic polity. In making this case, Yeltsin's campaign also emphasised that the current president was the lesser of two evils. The Yeltsin campaign also scared voters into thinking that revolutionary turmoil would ensue should Ziuganov win. To make it easier for voters to support Yeltsin, his campaign first worked to eliminate or mute the president's negatives. First, Yeltsin's image had to be changed. The president lost twenty pounds, stopped drinking and began to appear frequently in public again. Second, negative policies had to be changed. Public opinion polls demonstrated that two were most salient - unpaid wages and the war in Chechnya. To create a sense of urgency around the issue, Yeltsin created a special government commission tasked with pay­ing all salaries by 1 April. In the process of fulfilling this goal, Yeltsin sacked numerous regional government heads as well as several of his own cabinet officials including his deputy prime minister, Anatolii Chubais. Yeltsin also raised pensions, increased salaries of government employees (including mili­tary personnel), and began doling out government transfers on the campaign trail. Yeltsin addressed his other big negative at the end of March when he pledged to end the war in Chechnya. In May, the first Russian troops began to leave.

Parallel to this positive campaign to remake Yeltsin's image, policies and government, Yeltsin's team also unleashed a hard-hitting negative media blitz against Communism at the end of the campaign. The Yeltsin campaign suc­cessfully defined the election as a referendum on seventy years of Soviet Com­munism, and deftly avoided lettingthe vote be about Yeltsin's record. Ziuganov tried to bring the focus back to Yeltsin's record, but did not succeed, in part because he enjoyed little access to the national media and in part because he offered no viable alternative to Yeltsin's reforms. Instead of tracking to the centre and becoming a Social Democrat, Ziuganov fused his traditional Communist slogans with nationalist themes. The strategy did not attract new voters. Instead, the campaign became defined by the mass media (virtually monopolised by Yeltsin), as a contest not between two individuals, but between two ways of life.

By 1996 Russia had in place a political system that no longer seemed on the verge of collapse or overthrow. The i996 vote reaffirmed that elections were the only legitimate means for obtaining political power. At one critical moment in the spring campaign, Yeltsin seemed ready to postpone the vote, ban the Communist Party and rule by decree.[97] But he did not. In survivingthis important milestone, Russia's constitution also seemed to be strengthening. Moreover, those elected under the guise of this new law also seemed to be acquiescing to the new political rules. Though the Duma had been dominated by anti-Yeltsin forces between i994 and i996, the relationship between the new parliament and president survived new elections for the parliament in 1993 and 1995, votes of no confidence in the government during the summer of 1995, a presidential election in 1996 and the subsequent legislative approval of the prime minister soon thereafter. Co-operation between these two branches was becoming routinised and rules-based.

A return of the Communists also faded as a threat after the 1996 vote. Whether President Ziuganov actually would have tried to resurrect a com­mand economy is a hypothetical question. That he would not have the chance to try ever again seemed certain after the 1996 vote. Instead, prospects for deep­ening market reforms seemed better than ever. The following year, Russian government officials as well as several Western financial institutions predicted positive growth rates for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1997, Yeltsin also reorganised his government to empower a group of young reformers.[98] He made an even bolder reconfiguration of the government in the spring of 1998 when he dismissed Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and appointed an even younger, and more reformist government headed by Sergei Kirienko. Called a reformer's 'dream team' by many Russian and Western commentators, the new government came into office with an express desire to finally truly reform Russia's ailing economy.

There was some good economic news. Annual inflation dropped to 22 per cent in 1996 and 11 per cent in 1997, while the exchange rate on the rouble remained relatively stable. In 1997, Russia finally did record positive growth - albeit very small growth - for the first time in the decade.[99] That same year, Russia's new stock market boomed, helping in part to fuel upbeat forecasts about Russia's economic future.[100]

Beneath the surface, however, the Russian polity and economy still had many ills. On the political side, it was actual illness - Yeltsin's illness - that crippled the president's second term from the outset. Yeltsin spent the first months of his second term recovering from multiple-bypass heart surgery. After a brief appearance in the Kremlin in December, Yeltsin finally returned to active duty as president in the spring of 1997. Throughout his entire second term, however, Yeltsin never seemed fully engaged. As a result, a small group of Yeltsin confidants - called the Yeltsin 'family' - seemed to rule Russia from inside the Kremlin. This family - which included Yeltsin's daughter - wielded power by working closely with Russia's oligarchs, and one - Boris Berezovsky - in particular.[101]

The August 1998 financial crisis

In addition to a crisis in leadership, the negative consequences of Russia's par­tial economic reform were beginning to accumulate in the second half of the 1990s. Shock therapy in Russia failed because it was never attempted. Instead, throughout most of the 1990s, Yeltsin allowed Chernomyrdin and his govern­ment to creep along with partial reforms - reforms that included big budget deficits, insider privatisation and partial price and trade liberalisation, which in turn combined to create amazing opportunities for corruption and spawned a decade of oligarchic capitalism. The nadir of this period was loans-for-shares, a scheme under which Yeltsin and his government gave away Russia's most valuable companies to these oligarchs for a song.

After the ratification of the constitution in 1993, the Russian government did acquire control over Russia's Central Bank and thereafter pursued a more stringent monetary policy. But budget deficits persisted throughout the 1990s, as the government continued to fail to pass balanced budgets through the parliament.[102] Last-minute deals needed to pass the budget, particularly with the Agrarian Party, consistently resulted in the proliferation of financial obli­gations that the government could never meet, which in turn necessitated the constant sequestering of expenditures. Persistently poor tax collection also undermined sound fiscal policy. Russia's oligarchs were particularly notorious for not paying taxes, creating real revenue-raising problems for the govern­ment. In 1998, the deficit was still 150 billion roubles ($25 billion) - more than 5 per cent of GDP.

In the early part of the decade, the Central Bank simply printed new money and issued new credits to compensate for the deficit, a policy that fuelled inflation and undermined the stability of the exchange rate. In the latter half of the decade, after the enactment of the constitution gave the executive branch control over the Central Bank, the government deployed a new set of non-inflationary methods to deal with the deficit.

First, the Central Bank stopped printing money. The lack of liquidity in the economy also stimulated the use of barter, a highly inefficient method of trans­action.[103] By 1998, experts estimated that over half of all industry transactions took place through barter. In addition, tight monetary policy exacerbated the accumulation of debt between enterprises. According to one estimate, inter- enterprise debts increased from 33.9 per cent of GDP in 1993 to 54.2 per cent of GDP by the end of 1997.[104]

A second method was simply not to pay money owed to state employees. This strategy resulted in an explosion of wage and pension arrears. Because workers and pensioners were not organised collectively to protest against the state's nefarious behaviour, the Russian government could get away with this method of 'macroeconomic stabilisation'.[105]

Third, in addition to their debts with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the Russian government began borrowing money from international markets. The Eurobond was the instrument of choice. By the summer of 1998, the Russian government had borrowed $4.3 billion through such medium and long-term instruments.50

As a fourth new method for raising revenue, the Russian Finance Ministry introduced new debt instruments in 1995, the short-term bond or gosudarstven- nye kratkosrochnye obligatsii or GKO and the medium-term bond known by its acronym, OFZ. GKOs matured after three or six months, making them espe­cially attractive to those investors looking for quick turnaround on their money. Many celebrated the GKOs as a particularly useful innovation since it brought money into the Russian state coffers in a non-inflationary way, while at the same time gave investors an incentive for maintaining low inflation rates and a stable currency.

As a package, however, these schemes for maintaining stabilisation were not sustainable in the long run. The GKO market grew exponentially. In 1994, the short-term bond market amounted to only $3 billion. By 1997, GKO debts outstanding totalled $64.7 billion, which ballooned to $70 billion in the summer of 1998.51 In this same summer, two related external shocks - the Asian financial crisis and falling oil prices - began to reverberate in Russia. The same people who were losing money in South Korea had money tied up in Russia.52 To provide incentives for these investors to keep their money in Russia, the Finance Ministry responded by continually raising the return rates on GKOs.53 A month before the crash, yields on these treasury bills had reached 113 per cent.54 The fall in oil prices decreased Russian export revenues, causing the Russian current account to go from a $3.9 billion surplus in 1997 to an estimated $4.5 billion deficit in 1998.55 Russian tax receipts fell dramatically, as did Central Bank reserves. In effect, the Russian government was bankrupt.

50 Joseph Kahn and Timothy L. O'Brien, 'Easy Money: A Special Report: For Russia and its U.S. Bankers, Match Wasn't Made in Heaven', New York Times, 18 Oct. 1998, p. 1.

51 Hoffman, The Oligarchs, p. 469.

52 On the worldwide crisis, see Paul Blustein, The Chastening: Inside the Crisis that Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled the IMF (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).

53 At first, the Russian government resisted IMF advice of raising interest rates, preferring instead to spendforeign currency reserves to defend the rouble. Eventually however, they were compelled to raise interest rates. See US GAO Report to the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 'Foreign Assistance: International Efforts to Aid Russia's Transition Have Had Mixed Results', Nov. 2000, GAO-01-8, p. 46.

54 John Thornhill, 'IMF and Russia in a New Loan Accord', Financial Times, 8 July 1998, p. 2.

55 William H. Cooper, 'The Russian Financial Crisis: An Analysis of Trends, Causes, and Implications', Report for Congress, 18 Feb. 1999, pp. 98-578. Available online at: www.cnie.org/nle/inter-16.html

In a drastic, desperate move, the Russian government announced on 17 August 1998 a compulsory conversion of short-term GKOs into longer-term debt instruments. The Russian debt market immediately collapsed as investors refused to believe that the Russian government would ever pay back this bor­rowed money. On this same day, the Russian government also announced a ninety-day moratorium on payment of all hard-currency loans owed to West­ern commercial banks. Simultaneously, the government announced a new trading price for the rouble at 30 per cent lower than the day before. In one day, the two alleged economic achievements of the Yeltsin era - control of inflation and a stable, transferable currency - were wiped away.

These emergency measures did little to halt the economic crisis. The stock market all but disappeared, the rouble continued to fall and banks began to close. Responding desperately to a desperate situation, Yeltsin fired Kirienko and his government the next week and nominated Viktor Chernomyrdin as his candidate for prime minister. As the confirmation process for Chernomyrdin dragged on throughout September, the economy continued to collapse. The rouble continued to plummet, banks refused to allow withdrawals, prices soared and stores emptied as people started to stockpile durable goods such as cigarettes, sugar and flour.

Renewed political polarisation

The August 1998 financial meltdown jolted the regime in Russia like no other event since the October 1993 stand-off. In combination with a subsequent banking scandal, the August 1998 crisis sparked a 'who lost Russia' debate in the West.[106] At the time, Russia looked as if it had failed at making the transition from a command economy to a market system.

Russia's transition from authoritarian rule to democracy also looked less certain. In the immediate aftermath, the financial crisis changed the de facto distribution of power between political actors and institutions in the country in favour of the parliament. This shift in the distribution of power, in turn, threatened to undermine Russia's constitutional stability. The Duma demon­strated its new (if temporary) importance by dominating the selection process of a new prime minister. Unlike previous votes for a new prime minister, Duma deputies did not capitulate to Yeltsin's demands, but made it clear that they would vote down his candidate, Viktor Chernomyrdin, if the president nominated him for a third time. Yeltsin relented and nominated the Duma's preferred candidate, Evgenii Primakov. Though not obligated constitutionally to consult the Duma on ministerial appointments, Primakov (with Yeltsin's acquiescence) nonetheless co-operated with Duma leaders to form a coali­tion government. Taking advantage of Yeltsin's weakness, Primakov and his Communist allies in the Duma floated the idea of limiting the powers of the presidency through an extra-constitutional pact. Yeltsin worried about even more radical challenges to his authority, warning potential conspirators, 'we have enough forces in order to stop any plans for taking power'.[107] That these ideas were even circulating demonstrated that the political rules of the game established in 1993 were still vulnerable in 1998.

From August 1998 until May 1999, Russia's Communists had their best opportunity to challenge the existing economic and political order after their candidate, Primakov, became prime minister against Yeltsin's wishes in the wake of the August 1998 financial meltdown. Upon assuming office, Primakov invited a Communist Party member, Iurii Masliukov, to serve as his economic tsar. Rhetorically, Primakov and Masliukov promised to reverse radical eco­nomic reforms, raise pensions and wages, curtail the activities of Western agents of influence such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, toss 1,000 bankers in jail and hinted at restoring state control over prices and property.[108] In practice, Primakov and his Communist allies in the govern­ment pursued none of these policies but instead proved to be as fiscally con­servative and monetarily stringent as previous reform governments.[109] Instead of chasing the IMF out of Russia, Primakov continued to negotiate with this 'tool of imperialism' and even agreed to introduce a package of legislation recommended by the IMF. In its negotiations with the World Bank, the Pri­makov government actually rejected the bank's recommendation for pension payments as too high. When offered the opportunity to roll back capitalism, Russia's Communists instead adhered to the general principles of the system in place.

Another challenge to constitutional stability erupted in the spring of 1999 when the Duma opened impeachment proceedings against the president. In the week leading up to the impeachment vote, held on 15 May 1999, Yeltsin looked certain to be impeached by the Duma on at least one count - his decision to invade Chechnya in 1994. In a bold counter-attack, just days before the impeachment vote, Yeltsin fired Primakov. Yeltsin's dismissal of the popular prime minister inched Russia closer to a constitutional crisis. If the Duma had impeached Yeltsin and also rejected his nominee for prime minister, Sergei Stepashin, the Russian constitution is silent on what should have happened next. Push did not come to shove, however, as the Duma did not muster the necessary two-thirds vote to pass any of the five impeachment articles. Days later, Duma deputies overwhelmingly approved Yeltsin's nominee for prime minister. In August 1999, Yeltsin fired Stepashin and nominated Vladimir Putin as his replacement. The Duma approved Yeltsin's candidate without a fuss.

Invading Chechnya again

Just as the political crisis in Moscow began to subside in the summer of 1999, a new crisis of even greater proportions ignited again in the Caucasus.[110] In early August, a multi-ethnic force headed by Chechen commander Shamil Basaev invaded the Russian republic of Dagestan, claiming Dagestan's liberation from Russian imperialism as their cause. Russian armed forces responded by launch­ing a major counter-offensive against the Chechen-led 'liberation' movement.[111]On 1 September, the war came to Moscow, when an explosion in downtown Moscow wounded forty-one people.[112] Further terrorist attacks in Moscow and elsewhere killed more than 300 Russian civilians in one month. Russians understood the terrorist attacks to be acts of war committed by Chechnya and its foreign supporters. Society demanded a response, and the Russian govern­ment responded.[113] In October Russian troops crossed into Chechen territory for the second time that decade.[114] Chechnya was to be liberated from the bandits and terrorists by any means necessary. Over 100,000 troops were sent to the theatre to accomplish this objective.

Initially, Russian armed forces were more successful in this second war.[115]More methodical and relying to a greater extent on air power, Russian forces eventually recaptured Groznyi and most of Chechnya's cities by the beginning of 2000, while the Chechen fighters remained in the mountains. The nature of human rights violations in this second war increased dramatically (or they were better documented).[116] Western experts estimate that 400,000 people have been displaced.[117] But final victory proved elusive. Resistance continued. In September 2004 Chechens held hundreds of children hostage in a school in Beslan, North Osetia. Russian troops stormed the school, and over 340 people died in the assault.

The end of Yeltsin's Russia and the beginning of Putin's Russia

The combination of a massive economic crisis, a new war and an ailing and unpopular president created real uncertainty about the 1999-2000 electoral cycle. In the run-up to the 1999 parliamentary elections, a newpolitical coalition called Fatherland-All Russia seemed poised to compete with the Communist Party for the highest vote totals. Led by former Prime Minister Primakov, Fatherland-All Russia looked at the 1999 parliamentary vote as a primary for the 2000 presidential vote - the real prize in Russia's political system. In the summer of 1999, Primakov polled well ahead of all other presidential hopefuls. A changing of the guard - a final test of Russia's democratic institutions - looked

imminent. [118]

For Yeltsin, allowing Primakov to replace him would have signalled defeat for reform. So he anointed an alternative, Vladimir Putin. By selecting Putin to become his new prime minister in August 1999, Yeltsin made it clear that he considered this former KGB agent his heir apparent.69 Few others believed that Putin had a chance. He displayed little charisma, had no political party or other interest groups behind him and had never run for office. In his first month in office, his approval rating hovered in the single digits. By the end of the year, however, his popularity had soared to well above 70 per cent.70 In the 1999 parliamentary election, a new pro-Kremlin electoral bloc, Unity, rode Putin's coat-tails to a surprising second-place finish, just behind the Communist Party.71 As the result of a major negative campaign launched by media outlets friendly to the Kremlin, Fatherland-All Russia suffered a devastating defeat in the 1999 vote, winning only 13 per cent of the popular vote. Primakov subsequently decided not to compete against Putin in the presidential election the following year, guaranteeing a Putin landslide in the first round of the 2000 vote.72

Putin's popularity exploded in the autumn of 1999 due first and foremost to his handling of the Chechen war. It was an odd formula for gaining pop­ularity. After all, Yeltsin's first war with Chechnya was extremely unpopular and had to be ended before he could win re-election in 1996. In this second intervention, the Russian people believed that the rationale for this war was self-defence. Second, relying more on air power, the Russian military appeared to be more successful in the second war. Consequently, this second Chechen war was initially very popular. During the 2000 presidential campaign, public support remained steady at roughly 60 per cent; it did not waver, as many had predicted, when Russian casualties increased. Opinion polls conducted in the autumn of 1999 demonstrated that people were grateful to Putin for accepting responsibility for the security of the Russian people. He looked like a leader who had taken charge during an uncertain, insecure time and had delivered on his promise to provide stability and security.

In addition to Chechnya, Putin benefited from several other factors. He was young, energetic and new while his competitors were the opposite. Putin

69 Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries, p. 337.

70 Agentstvo regional'nykh politcheskikh issledovanii (ARPI), Regional'nyi Sotsiologicheskii Monitoring 49 (10-12 Dec. 1999): 39. Sample size: 3,000 respondents in 52 Federation subjects.

71 On how, see Timothy Colton and Michael McFaul, 'Reinventing Russia's Party of Power: Unity and the 1999 Duma Election', Post-Soviet Affairs 16, 3 (Summer 2000): 201-24.

72 For details on the campaign, see Timothy Colton and Michael McFaul, Popular Choice and Managed Democracy: The Russian Elections in 1999 and 2000 (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).

also positioned himself as a candidate different from Yeltsin. Putin's youth and energy provided a striking contrast to his old and sick predecessor. He was also unknown, allowing people to project into his candidacy all sorts of images and orientations. With the exception of his policy towards Chechnya, he was a tabula rasa on which voters could write what they wanted. In addition the economy had begun to turn around as devaluation from the August 1998 crisis and rising oil prices had helped to make 1999 Russia's first year of economic growth in a decade. Finally, Putin benefited from extensive positive coverage in the Russian media, most of which was still owned by the state or was friendly to the Kremlin (see Plate 25).

Conclusion

In leaving office on 31 December 1999, Yeltsin bequeathed to his successors several serious political and economic conundrums. Russian democratic insti­tutions were weak, the economy was growing but still in need of further reforms and corruption and crime remained rampant. Most tragically, the war in Chechnya continued with little prospect for genuine resolution. Yeltsin already has earned his place in history as one of Russia's most important lead­ers. What kind of adjectives will modify his legacy, however, will only become clear after the resolution ofthese lingering issues. He could be remembered as the father of Russian democracy and the initiator of Russia's market economy and sustained economic growth. Or he could be remembered as the first post- Communist leader who squandered Russia's first chance of becoming a liberal democracy and a capitalist economy. Yeltsin's last important decision - his appointment of Vladimir Putin as prime minister and then as acting president - will have a profound effect on how the Yeltsin legacy is finally judged. To date, Putin has pressed forward with furthering economic reforms, but at the same time has undermined Russia's already fragile democratic institutions.[119]

Yet, Yeltsin also created the foundation for his successors to succeed and secure for him the more positive modifiers to his legacy. The revolution is not over, but it also has not reversed. The Soviet Union is gone and will never be resurrected. Communism also will never return to Russia. Russia has not gone to war with Ukraine, Latvia or Kazakhstan to defend Russians living there and is less likely to do so today than when Yeltsin first took office. Though

michael mcfaul

they threatened with periodic electoral splashes, neither neo-fascists nor neo- Communists ever succeeded in coming to power in the 1990s and do not seem poised to do so in the near future. Even the Russian Communist Party has lagged behind its counterparts in Eastern Europe in not being able to recapture the Kremlin. Individual freedoms in Russia have never been greater.

Finally, by avoiding the temptation of dictatorship, Yeltsin also established an important precedent of democratic behaviour that will raise the costs for future authoritarian aspirants. In defiance of his critics, he did not cancel elections in 1996, he did not suspend the constitution after the August 1998 financial crisis, and he did not stay in power by any means necessary. On the contrary, he won re-election in 1996, abided by the constitution and even invited Communists into his government in the autumn of 1998, and then stepped down willingly, peacefully and constitutionally. Although Putin has shown little proclivity for deepening democratisation in Russia, his cautious approach to decision­making will make it very difficult for him to break this precedent. If dissolving the Soviet Union was Yeltsin's most important destructive act, his seizure and surrender of power through democratic means may be his most important constructive act.

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