The Gorbachev era, Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin in 1999 from Cambridge history of Russia, volume 3

1

Luc Duhamel, 'The Last Campaign against Corruption in Soviet Moscow', Europe-Asia Studies 56, 2 (Mar. 2004): 187-212.

2

For further detail on this episode, see Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 67-9.

3

Yegor Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick et al. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), pp. 53-4.

4

Ibid., pp. 46-8; Vadim Medvedev, V kommande Gorbacheva (Moscow: Bylina, 1994), p. 22; and Aleksandr Iakovlev, Sumerki (Moscow: Materik, 2003), pp. 369-70. For the text of the speech, see M. S. Gorbachev Zhivoe tvorchestvo naroda (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984).

5

Iakovlev, Sumerki, p. 369.

6

Gorbachev, Zhivoe tvorchestvo naroda, p. 41.

7

Iakovlev, Sumerki, pp. 368-70; Vadim Medvedev, Vkomande Gorbacheva, p. 22.

8

Gorbachev's allies, among them two people who were later to find themselves on oppo­site sides of the political struggle, Egor Ligachev and Aleksandr Yakovlev, who in 1984 was still the director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), had also not been idle in preparing for Gorbachev's succession to Chernenko. See Iakovlev, Sumerki,pp. 459-63; Anatolii Gromyko, Andrei Gromyko. Vlabirintakh kremlia: vospominaniia syna (Moscow: Avtor, 1997), pp. 92-5; Mikhail Gobachev, Zhizn' i reformy (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), vol. 1, pp. 266-7; and Ligachev Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin, pp. 72-9.

9

For interesting elaboration of that point, see Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970-2000 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

10

The nearest thing to an exception was Vsevolod Murakhovskii, who had been Gor­bachev's subordinate and later his successor as first secretary of the Stavropol' regional party organisation. Murakhovskii was brought to Moscow as head of a newly created State Committee for the Agro-Industrial Complex. It was not, however, a particularly powerful post, and Gosagroprom, as it was known, was abolished in early 1989, having failed to live up to Gorbachev's expectations.

11

M. S. Gorbachev, 'O perestroike i kadrovoi politike partii', in Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat'i, vol. iv (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), p. 354.

12

Ed A. Hewett, Reformingthe SovietEconomy:EqualityversusEjficiency (Washington: Brook­ings Institution Press, 1988), p. 349.

13

AndrzejWalicki, Marxism and the Leap to the Kingdom of Freedom: The Rise and Fall of the Communist Utopia (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 554-5. See also Archie Brown, 'Ideology and Political Culture', in Seweryn Bialer (ed.), Politics, Society, and Nationality inside Gorbachev's Russia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), p. 31.

14

Pravda, 15 July 1987, p. 2; and Pravda, 30 Sept. 1987, p. 1.

15

Izvestiia, 4June 1989, p. 2.

16

Alexander Tsipko, 'The Collapse of Marxism-Leninism', in Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich (eds.), The Destruction of the Soviet Economic System: An Insiders' History (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 169-86, esp. pp. 184-5.

17

Aleksandr Bovin, XXvek kak zhizn': vospominaniia (Moscow: Zakharov, 2003), pp. 682-3.

18

For the transcript of the Central Committee meeting which led to Yeltsin's removal from his Moscow party post and from candidate membership of the Politburo (although he remained a member of the Central Committee), see Izvestiia TsK CPSU, no. 2 (1989): 209-87. On Yeltsin's break with the party leadership in late 1987, see Leon Aron, Boris Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life (London: HarperCollins, 2000), pp. 200-17; and Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, 169-72 and 356-7.

19

For a more detailed account of the 'Nina Andreeva affair', see Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, pp. 172-5.

20

For the main points of that discussion, see 'O stat'e N. Andreevoi i ne tol'ko o nei', in M. S. Gorbachev, Gody trudnykh reshenii (Moscow: Al'fa-Print, 1993), pp. 98-110.

21

See e.g. Aleksandr Iakovlev, Predislovie, obval, posleslovie (Moscow: Novosti, 1992), p. 267.

22

Stephen White, Richard Rose and Ian McAllister, How Russia Votes (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1997), pp. 28-9.

23

On the emergence of new legislative and executive institutions and the switch from party to state power, see Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, pp. 188-205.

24

M. Steven Fish, Democracy from Scratch: OppositionandRegimeintheNewRussianRevolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 35.

25

Alexander Lukin, The Political Culture oftheRussian'Democrats ' (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 81.

26

Author's interview with Petrakov, Moscow, June 1991.

27

Stephen White, Russia Goes Dry: Alcohol, State and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni­versity Press, 1996), p. 183.

28

Ibid., p. 141.

29

Even in 1994 and 1999 when the same question was put to Russian respondents by the leading survey research organisation which had conducted the 1989 survey, Lenin came second only to Peter the Great in the list of 'most outstanding people of all times and nations' in the perception of respondents. See Boris Dubin, 'Stalin i drugie: Figury vyssheivlastivobshchestvennom mneniisovremennoiRossii', Monitoringobshch- estvennogo mneniia (Moscow: VTsIOM), 1 (Jan.-Feb. 2003): 13-25, at p. 20.

30

Perekhod k rynku: Chast' 1. Kontseptsiia i Programma (Moscow: Arkhangel'skoe, 1990).

31

Egor Gaidar, Dni porazhenii ipobed (Moscow: Vagrius, 1996), p. 65.

32

Gorbachev, Zhizn'ireformy,p. 311; and Alex Pravda, 'Soviet Policy towards Eastern Europe in Transition: The Means Justify the Ends', in Neil Malcolm (ed.), Russia and Europe: An End to Confrontation (London: Pinter, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), pp. 123-50, at p. 134. Within the Soviet Politburo Gorbachev sometimes used more traditional language. See Mark Kramer, 'The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 1)', Journal of Cold War Studies 5, 4 (Fall 2003): 178-256, at p. 183.

33

See esp. Richard K. Herrmann and Richard Ned Lebow (eds.), Ending the Cold War: Interpretations, Causation, and the Study of International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

34

William C. Wohlforth, 'Realism and the End of the Cold War', International Security 19, 3 (Winter 1994/5): 91-129, at p. 96.

35

Vladislav M. Zubok, 'Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War: Perspectives on History and Personality', Cold War History 2, 2 (Jan. (2002): 61-100, at p. 82.

36

Anatolii Cherniaev 'Forging a New Relationship', in William C. Wohlforth (ed.), Cold War Endgame: Oral History, Analysis, Debates (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), p. 21.

37

On Gorbachev's way ofjustifying his change of Soviet foreign policy, see George W Bres- lauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), esp. pp. 70-8.

38

Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended (New York: Random House, 2004), p. 64. See also Archie Brown, 'Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War', pp. 31-57, esp. 50-2, and George W Breslauer and Richard Ned Lebow, 'Leadership and the End of the Cold War: A Counterfactual Thought Experiment', in Herrmann and Lebow, Ending the Cold War, pp. 161-88, esp. 180-4.

39

Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), esp. pp. 193-228; and Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, esp. pp. 220-5.

40

GeorgeP. Shultz, TurmoilandTriumph: MyYears as Secretary ofState (New York: Macmillan, 1993), p. 895.

41

Ibid., p. 910. 42 Ibid., p. 987.

42

43 Don Oberdorfer, The Turn: How the Cold War Came to an End - the United States and the

43

Soviet Union, 1983-1990 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1992), p. 299.

44

Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat'i, vol. vi, pp. 347-8.

45

Pavel Palazchenko (citing George Shultz), My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania University Press, 1997), p. 370.

46

For an excellent study of the events of that year, see Jacques Levesque, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

47

Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (London: Little, Brown, 1993), p. 165.

48

On the political process of German unification, see Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993); Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); Mikhail Gorbachev, Kak eto bylo (Moscow: Vagrius, 1999); andViacheslavDashichev, 'On the Road to German Unification: The View from Moscow', in Gabriel Gorodetsky (ed.), Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991: A Retrospective (London: Cass, 1994), pp. 170-9.

49

Dashichev, 'On the Road to German Unification', p. 176.

50

See Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), esp. chs. 1 and 2; and Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

51

Cf.Helene Carrere d'Encausse, L'Empire Eclate (Paris: Flammarion, 1978).

52

Ronald G. Suny The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the SovietUnion (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 160.

53

Archie Brown, 'Transnational Influencesin the Transition from Communism', Post-Soviet Affairs 16, 2 (Apr.-June 2000): 177-200.

54

See Aron, Boris Yeltsin, p. 377.

55

Georgii Shakhnazarov Tsena svobody: Reformatsiia Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnika (Moscow: Rossika Zevs, 1993), p. 233.

56

On the coup, see Mikhail Gorbachev, The August Coup: The Truth and the Lessons (London: HarperCollins, 1991); Anatoly Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, trans. and ed. Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), esp. Afterword to the U.S. Edition', pp. 401-23; and V Stepankov and E. Lisov Kremlevskii zagovor: Versiia sledstviia (Moscow: Ogonek, 1992).

57

The situation represented a classic revolutionary situation of dual sovereignty. See Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), ch. 9.

58

For assessments of national resistance, see John Dunlop, The Rise ofRussia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 236-7.

59

This title is from Time, 2 Sept. 1991, p. 3.

60

For elaboration of the frame of revolution as a method for understanding change in post-Communist Russia, see Vladimir Mau and Irina Starodubrovskaya, The Challenge of Revolution: Contemporary Russia in Historical Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

61

In his classifications of regimes in the former Soviet space at the end of 2001, Larry Diamond ranks only three (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) as liberal democracies, one (Moldova) as an electoral democracy three (Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine) as ambiguous regimes, two (Russia and Belarus) as competitive authoritarian regimes, five (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) as hegemonic electoral authoritar­ian regimes, and one (Turkmenistan) as a politically closed authoritarian regime. See Larry Diamond, 'Thinking about Hybrid Regimes', Journal of Democracy 13, 2 (Apr. 2002): 30. For arguments explaining this variation, see Steven M. Fish, 'Democratization's Req­uisites', Post-Soviet Affairs 14,3 (1998): 212-47; Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way 'The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism, Journal of Democracy 13, 2 (Apr. 2002): 51-65; and Michael McFaul, 'The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World', World Politics 54, 2 (Jan. 2002): 212-44.

62

At the beginning of the 1990s, the losers from change in the post-Communist order were thought to be the greatest enemies of reform. See, most importantly, Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Later in the decade, those that benefited from partial reform emerged as the real threat. SeeJoel Hellman, 'Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions', World Politics 50 (1998): 203-34.

63

On the process, see Egor Gaidar, Dni porazhenii ipobed (Moscow: Vagrius, 1996).

64

Dale Herspring, 'Putin and the Armed Forces', in Dale R. Herspring (ed.), Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), p. 155.

65

Yeltsin did divide the KGB into three separate bureaucracies. Reforms within the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defence were minimal.

66

Yeltsin, speech to Extraordinary Congress of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, in Izvestiya, 4 Sept. 1991, pp. 4-7; reprinted in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 53,37 (16 Oct. 1991): 3.

67

Yeltsin and Gorbachev despised each other. On their criticisms ofeach other during the autumn of 1991, see Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1996), chs. 30 and 31; and Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia (New York: Random House, 1994), ch. 3. For an independent assessment of this complicated relationship, see George Breslauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), ch. 7.

68

Agreement of the Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States', 8 Dec. 1991; reprinted in Alexander Dallin and Gail Lapidus (eds.), The Soviet System: From Crisis to Collapse, revised edn (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), p. 638.

69

On this pattern, see ThedaSkocpol, 'Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization', World Politics 40, 2 (Jan. 1988): 147-68.

70

On the reasons for inaction, see Michael McFaul, Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), ch. 4.

71

On the general formula, see Anders Aslund, Post-Communist Economic Revolutions: How BigaBang? (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992); and Jeffrey Sachs, Poland's Jump to the Market Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993).

72

On the formation of this team, see Anders Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1995).

73

For details, see Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), ch. 3.

74

Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, p. 165.

75

See Timothy Frye, 'The Perils ofPolarization: Economic Performance in the Postcom- munist World', World Politics 54, 3 (Apr. 2002): 308-37.

76

Bridget Granville, The Success of Russian Economic Reforms (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), p. 67.

77

Stanley Fisher and Alan Gelb, 'The Process of Socialist Economic Transformation', Journal ofEconomic Perspectives 5, 4 (Fall 1991): 98.

78

Joseph Blasi, Maya Kroumova and Douglas Kruse, Kremlin Capitalism: Privatizing the Russian Economy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, i997). For an even more critical assessment, see Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes, Russia's Virtual Economy (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2002).

79

Michael McFaul, 'State Power, Institutional Change, and the Politics of Privatization in Russia', World Politics 47, 2 (Jan. 1995): 210-43.

80

Josephine Andrews, When Majorities Fail: The Russian Parliament 1990-1993 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

81

See Thomas Remington, The Russian Parliament: Institution Evolution in a Transitional Regime, 1989-1999 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), ch. 4.

82

See Robert Moser, Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Represen­tation in Russia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001).

83

Donald Murray, A Democracy of Despots (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995); Lilia Shevtsova, Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Realities (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999); and Peter Reddaway and Dmitrii Glinski, The Tragedy of Russia'sReforms:MarketBohhevismagainstDemocra£y (Washington: U.S. Institute ofPeace, 200i).

84

For details, see Eugene Huskey, Presidential Power inRussia (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe,

i999).

85

Joan Barth Urban and Valerii Solovei, Russia's Communists at the Crossroads (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997), p. 107.

86

Timothy Colton, 'Public Opinion and the Constitutional Referendum', in Timothy Colton and Jerry Hough (eds.), Growing Pains: Russian Democracy and the Election of 1993 (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), pp. 291-310; and A. A. Sobianin and V G. Sukhovolskii, Demokratiia, ogranichennaiafahifikatsiiami:vyboryireferendumyvRossii v 1991 -1993 gg. (Moscow, 1995).

87

For overviews, see Steven Solnick, 'Is the Center Too Weak or Too Strong in the Russian Federation?', in Valerie Sperling (ed.), Building the Russian State: Institutional Crisis and the Quest for Democratic Governance (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2000), pp. 137-56; and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, 'The Russian Central State in Crisis', in Zoltan Barany and Robert Moser (eds.), Russian Politics: Challenges of Democratization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 103-34.

88

Shevtsova, Yeltsin's Russia, p. 111.

89

For accounts of the war, see John Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

90

John Dunlop, 'How Many Soldiers and Civilians Died during the Russo-Chechen War of 1994-1996?' Central Asian Survey 19, 3 and 4 (2000): 338.

91

In the wake of the election, the Journal of Democracy commissioned several articles from Russian and American scholars and practitioners. The editors gave the cluster of articles the title, 'Is Russian Democracy Doomed?' See Journal of Democracy 5, 2 (Apr. 1994): 3-41.

92

For a flavour of his views at the time, see Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Poslednii brosok na iug (Moscow: TOO Pisatel', 1993).

93

Matthew Wyman, Stephen White, Bill Miller and Paul Heywood, 'Public Opinion, Parties, and Voters in the 1993 Russian Elections', Europe-Asia Studies 47 (1995): 602.

94

The importance of the PR electoral system cannot be underestimated in accounting for Zhirinovsky's surprising victory. In single-mandate races, LDPR candidates won only five seats in the Duma and no seats in the Federation Council. In a pure majoritarian electoral system, the Liberal Democratic Party would have won less than ten seats in the parliament.

95

Peter Reddaway 'Red Alert', The New Republic, 29 Jan. 1996, p. 15; Daniel Singer, 'The Burden of Boris', The Nation, 1 Apr. 1996, p. 23; and Jerry Hough, Evelyn Davidheiser, Susan Goodrich Lehmann, The 1996 Russian Presidential Election (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1996).

96

The following two paragraphs are adapted from Michael McFaul, Russia's 1996 Presi­dential Election: The End of Polarized Politics (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1997).

97

Lilia Shevtsova,'El'tsin ostanetsya, dazhe esli proigraet', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26 Apr. 1996, p. 3. Yeltsin admits that he contemplated such a plan, but then rejected it. See Boris Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), pp. 24-5.

98

Yeltsin appointed Chubais deputy prime minister in charge ofthe economy, including the Finance Ministry, and named Boris Nemtsov, a young reformist from Nizhnii Novgorod and a darling of Western aid programmes, as another deputy prime minister.

99

Daniel Treisman, 'Fighting Inflation in a Transitional Regime: Russia's Anomalous Stabilization', World Politics 50 (1998): 235-65.

100

See most famously, Richard Layard and John Parker, The Coming Russian Boom: A Guide to New Markets and Politics (New York: Free Press, 1996).

101

On this period, see David Hoffman, The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia (New York: Public Affairs, 2002); and Chrystia Freeland, Sale of the Century: Russia's Wild Ride from Communism to Capitalism (New York: Crown Publishers, 2000).

102

Sergei Aleksashenko, Bitva za rubl' (Moscow: AlmaMater, 1999).

103

See David Woodruff, Money Unmade: Barter and the Fate ofRussian Capitalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999); and Vadim Medvedev, Obshchii krizis ekonomiki: prichini i posledstviia (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond sotsial'no-ekonomicheskih isledovanii [Gorbachev-fond], 1999), esp. pp. 94-8.

104

Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1997), p. 535.

105

See DebraJaveline, Protestand the Politics of Blame: The Russian Response to Unpaid Wages (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).

106

John Lloyd, 'Who Lost Russia? The Devolution of Russia', New York Times Magazine, 15 Aug. 1999.

107

Yeltsin, quoted in Bill Powell and Evgeniya Albats, 'Summer of Discontent', Newsweek (International edition), 19 Jan 1999.

108

John Thornhill, 'Primakov Defies IMF Advice', Financial Times, 17 Sept. 1998, p. 2.

109

As to why, see Evgenii Primakov, Vosem' mesyatsevplyus...' (Moscow: Mysl', 2001).

110

For accounts of the second Chechen war, Matthew Evangelista, The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003); Anne Nivat, Chienne de Guerre: A Woman Reporter Behind the Lines of the War in Chechnya (New York: Public Affairs, 2000); and Anna Politkovskaya, ADirtyWar: ARussianReporter in Chechnya (London: Harvill Press, 2001).

111

ITAR-TASS, 'Operatsiia nachalas', goriachaiakhronika', Rossiiskaiagazeta, 14 Aug. 1999,

p. 3.

112

Vladimir Zainetdinov, Aleksei Siviv, Maria Beloklova, 'Vchera v shkolakh ot Chukhotki do Kaliningrada prozvenel pervyi zvonok. A v Okhotnom riadu poslednii zvonok', Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 2 Sept. 1999, p. 1.

113

David Hoffman, 'Russian Premier Pins Bombing on Chechens', Washington Post, 16 Sept. 1999, p. A26.

114

'Goriachaia Khronika: Konechnaia tsel' unichtozhit' banditov', Rossiiskaia gazeta, 6 Oct. 1999, p. 1.

115

Mark Kramer, 'Civil-Military Relations in Russia and the Chechnya Conflict', Policy Memo Series 99 (Cambridge, Mass.: Program on New Approaches to Russian Security, December 1999).

116

Human Rights Watch, 'Now Happiness Remains: Civilian Killings, Pillage, and Rape in Alkhan-Yurt', Chechnya, Russia/Chechnya 12, 5 (D) (Apr. 2000): 1-33; Human Rights Watch, 'February 5: A Day of Slaughter in Novye Aldi', Russia/Chechnya 12, 9 (D) (June 2000): 1-43; Human Rights Watch, 'The "Dirty War" in Chechnya: Forced Disappear­ances, Torture, and Summary Executions', Russia 13,1 (D) (Mar. 2001): 1-42; and Human Rights Watch, 'Burying the Evidence: The Botched Investigation into a Mass Grave in Chechnya', Russia/Chechnya 13, 3 (D) (May 2001): 1-26. The Chechnya Weekly, published by the Jamestown Foundation, also has provided comprehensive coverage of events related to the war, including extensive reporting on human rights violations. Amnesty International, Physicians for Human Rights, Doctors of the World, and Doctors without Borders have also contributed to the documentation of human rights abuses. In Russia, Memorial has provided the most comprehensive coverage ofhuman rights abuses inside Chechnya.

117

This figure is cited in Sarah Mendelson, 'Russia, Chechnya, and International Norms: The Power and Paucity of Human Rights? NCEEER Working Paper, 17 July 2001, p. 11.

118

See Michael McFaul, Andrei Ryabov and Nikolai Petrov (eds.), Rossiia v izbiratel'nom tsikle: 1999-2000 godov (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2000).

119

See the articles on political and economic developments under Putin in Herspring, Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, as well as the more negative assessment of Putin in Lilia Shevtsova, Putin's Russia (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).