The Mind’s I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul - читать бесплатно онлайн полную версию книги автора Douglas R. Hofstadter (ч. notes)

Notes

1

For additional information on the authors and the works cited in the text, consult “Further Reading” beginning on p. 465.

2

“Borges and I,” by Jorge Luis Borges, translated by James E. Irby, from Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings, edited by Donald A. Yates and James E. Irby. Copyright © 1962 by New Directions Publishing Corp. Reprinted by permission of New Directions, New York.

3

Selections from On Having No Head, by D. E. Harding, Perennial Library, Harper & Row. Published by arrangement with the Buddhist Society, 1972 Reprinted by permission.

4

“Rediscovered the Mind,” by Harold J. Morowitz. From Psychology Today, August 1980. Reprinted by permission of the author.

5

Excerpt from “Computing Machines and Intelligence.” Mind, Vol. LIX. No. 236 (1950). Reprinted by permission.

6

Possibly this view is heretical. St Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologica, quoted by Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945], p. 458) states that God cannot make man to have no soul. But this may not be a real restriction on His powers, but only a result of the fact that men’s souls are immortal and therefore indestructible.

7

This selection appeared previously as “Metamagical Themas: A Coffeehouse conversation on the Turing test to determine if a machine can think.” In Scientific American, May 1981, pp. 15–36.

8

(See selection 22, “Minds, Brains, and Programs,” p. 375)

9

Excerpt from “The Tale of the Three Story-Telling Machines,” from The Cyberiad by Stanislaw Lem, translated by Michael Kandel. Copyright © 1974 by The Seabury Press, Inc. Reprinted by permission of The Continuum Publishing Corporation.

10

11

12

13

14

Not to he confused with the Andromeda galaxy, which is two million light years away.

—Eds.

15

16

See selection 25, “An Epistemological Nightmare,” for a story featuring a machine that can outdo a person at “brain reading.”

17

18

As in Hilary Putnam’s famous “Twin Earth” thought experiment. See “Further Reading.”

19

This essay was first presented to a seminar on the philosophy of mind conducted by Douglas C. Long and Stanley Munsat at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

20

In Brainstorms.

21

22

23

24

25

26

“Non Serviam” from A Perfect Vacuum: Perfect Reviews of Nonexistent Books by Stanislaw Lem. Copyright © 1971 by Stanislaw Lem; English translation copyright © 1979, 1978 by Stanislaw Lem. Reprinted by permission of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.

27

Credo quia absurdum est (Prof. Dobb’s note in the text).

28

Jerry Fodor, “Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology” (see “Further Reading”).

29

30

“The Circular Ruins,” translated by James E. Irby, from Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Others Writings, edited by Donald E. Yates and James E. Irby. Copyright © 1962 by New Directions Publishing Corporation. Reprinted by permission of New Directions, New York.

31

32

Also, “understanding” implies both the possession of mental (intentional) states and truth (validity, success) of these states. For the purposes of this discussion we are concerned only with the possession of the states.

33

Intentionality is by definition that feature of certain mental states by which they are directed at or about objects and states of affairs in the world. Thus, beliefs, desires, and intentions are intentional states; undirected forms of anxiety and depression are not.

34

I am indebted to a rather large number of people for discussion of these matters and for their patient attempts to overcome my ignorance of artificial intelligence. I would especially like to thank Ned Block, Hubert Dreyfus, John Haugeland, Roger Schank, Robert Wilensky, and Terry Winograd.

35

36

“What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” by Thomas Nagel appeared in The Philosophical Review, October 1974. It is reprinted by permission of the author.

37

See “Further Reading” for Nagel’s references.

38

Perhaps there could not actually be such robots. Perhaps anything complex enough to behave like a person would have experiences. But that, if true, is a fact which cannot be discovered merely by analyzing the concept of experience.

It is not equivalent to that about which we are incorrigible, both because we are not incorrigible about experience and because experience is present in animals lacking language and thought, who have no beliefs at all about their experiences.

39

By “our own case” I do not mean just “my own case,” but rather the mentalistic ideas that we apply unproblematically to ourselves and other human beings.

40

Therefore the analogical form of the English expression “what it is like” is misleading. It does not mean “what (in our experience) it resembles,” but rather “how it is for the subject himself.”

41

Any intelligent extraterrestrial beings totally different from us.

42

It may be easier than I suppose to transcend interspecies barriers with the aid of the imagination. For example, blind people are able to detect objects near them by a form of sonar, using vocal clicks or taps of a cane. Perhaps if one knew what that was like, one could by extension imagine roughly what it was like to possess the much more refined sonar of a bat. The distance between oneself and other persons and other species can fall anywhere on a continuum. Even for other persons the understanding of what it is like to be them is only partial, and when one moves to species very different from oneself, a lesser degree of partial understanding may still be available. The imagination is remarkably flexible. My point, however, is not that we cannot know what it is like to be a bat. I am not raising that epistemological problem. My point is rather that even to form a conception of what it is like to be a bat (and a fortiori to know what it is like to be a bat) one must take up the bat’s point of view. If one can take it up roughly, or partially, then one’s conception will also be rough or partial. Or so it seems in our present state of understanding.

43

The problem I am going to raise can therefore be posed even if the distinction between more subjective and more objective descriptions or viewpoints can itself be made only within a larger human point of view. I do not accept this kind of conceptual relativism, but it need not be refuted to make the point that psychophysical reduction cannot be accommodated by the subjective-to-objective model familiar from other cases.

44

The problem is not just that when I look at the Mona Lisa, my visual experience has a certain quality, no trace of which is to be found by someone looking into my brain. For even if he did observe there a tiny image of the Mona Lisa, he would have no reason to identify it with the experience.

45

The relation would therefore not be a contingent one, like that of a cause and its distinct effect. It would be necessarily true that a certain physical state felt a certain way. Kripke (1972) argues that causal behaviorist and related analyses of the mental fail because they construe, for example, “pain” as a merely contingent name of pains. The subjective character of an experience (“its immediate phenomenological quality,” Kripke calls it [p. 340]) is the essential property left out by such analyses, and the one in virtue of which it is, necessarily, the experience it is. My view is closely related to his. Like Kripke, I find the hypothesis that a certain brain state should necessarily have a certain subjective character incomprehensible without further explanation. No such explanation emerges from theories which view the mind-brain relation as contingent, but perhaps there are other alternatives, not yet discovered.

A theory that explained how the mind-brain relation was necessary would still leave us with Kripke’s problem of explaining why it nevertheless appears contingent. That difficult seems to me surmountable, in the following way. We may imagine something by representing it to ourselves either perceptually, sympathetically, or symbolically. I shall not try to say how symbolic imagination works, but part of what happens in the other two cases is this. To imagine something perceptually, we put ourselves in a conscious state resembling the state we would be in if we perceived it. To imagine something sympathetically, we put ourselves in a conscious state resembling the thing itself. (This method can be used only to imagine mental events and states—our own or another’s.) When we try to imagine a mental state occurring without its associated brain state, we first sympathetically imagine the occurrence of the mental state: that is, we put ourselves into a state that resembles it mentally. At the same time, we attempt perceptually to imagine the nonoccurrence of the associated physical state, by putting ourselves into another state unconnected with the first: one resembling that which we would be in if we perceived the nonoccurrence of the physical state. Where the imagination of physical features is perceptual and the imagination of mental features is sympathetic, it appears to us that we can imagine any experience occurring without its associated brain state, and vice versa. The relation between them will appear contingent even if it is necessary, because of the independence of the disparate types of imagination.

(Solipsism, incidentally, results if one misinterprets sympathetic imagination as if it worked like perceptual imagination: It then seems impossible to imagine any experience that is not one’s own.)

46

See Davidson (1970); though I do not understand the argument against psychophysical laws.

47

Similar remarks apply to Nagel (1965).

48

This question also lies at the heart of the problem of other minds, whose close connection with the mind-body problem is often overlooked. If one understood how subjective experience could have an objective nature, one would understand the existence of subjects other than oneself.

49

I have not defined the term “physical.” Obviously it does not apply just to what can be described by the concepts of contemporary physics, since we expect further developments. Some may think there is nothing to prevent mental phenomena from eventually being recognized as physical in their own right. But whatever else may be said of the physical, it has to be objective. So if our idea of the physical ever expands to include mental phenomena, it will have to assign them an objective character—whether or not this is done by analyzing them in terms of other phenomena already regarded as physical. It seems to me more likely, however, that mental-physical relations will eventually be expressed in a theory whose fundamental terms cannot be placed clearly in either category.