The Putin System: An Opposing View

INDEX

Page numbers refer to the print edition but are hyperlinked to the appropriate location in the e-book.

accountability: as basic function of adequate government, 108; feared influence of Western views on, 211n7; introduction of, as necessary reform, 18; lack of, in authoritarian governments, 26; lack of, in Russian government, 81, 92, 133, 164, 173, 202; necessity of working institutions for, 41

Acemoglu, Daron, 26, 82

Aumann, Robert, 26

authoritarian system(s): adaptable vs. stagnation-prone forms of, 54–55; bureaucrats’ diversity of ideology in, 87–88; control of elections in, 76–77; control over private individuals, 36; extraction of rents in, 81–83; factors contributing to potential collapse of, 144–45; fear of immanent revolution as only constraint on, 82, 210n3; function of political parties in, 77; higher rate of failures of governance, 29; ideology, typical lack of, 85, 86–88, 160–61; as inevitable losers in global economic competition, 184–85; institutions in, 124–26, 129–30, 176; lack of checks and balances in, 81; as stage in all countries’ development, 114–15; theories on reasons for emergence of, 23; toleration of some public debate on issues, 87; transfer of power in, 21–22; varying central goals of, 80. See also peripheral authoritarianism

authoritarian system(s), Russia as, 66; and peripheral economic status, xi. See also peripheral authoritarianism of Russia

authoritarian systems’ transition to competition-based systems: cases of, 29–30; changing views on inevitability of, 140–41; factors likely to delay, 142–44

authoritarian systems vs. competition-based systems: advantages of competition-based system in complex society, 141–42; borderline cases, 24; dynamic or static system as separate issue from, 28–29; as key distinction, 21; public good as separate issue from, 24–26; relative adaptability of, 55; relative number of, 23, 36; rulers’ interest in modernization as separate issue from, 26–27

autocracy: instability of, 129–30; lack of functioning institutions in, 125–26; social base of, in near vs. distant economic periphery, 115–16; as stage in all countries’ development, 114. See also peripheral authoritarianism

autocracy in Russia: as Eurasianist form, 91–92; hardening of, 197; as mafia-life, 203; patronage and, 195; and presidential debates, 92; strengthening of, 135–36, 173, 202. See also future of Russian autocracy; peripheral authoritarianism of Russia

Baltic states, success of competition-based government in, 44

Belarus, European development path as only available option for, 155

Berezovsky, Boris, 34

Bowling Alone (Putnam), xiii

Brezhnev, Leonid, 185

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 140

bureaucracy: role in countries of near vs. distant periphery, 115–16; in Russia, and social support of government, 118–19, 121–22

cash flows in Russia: and corruption, 104; government control of, xvii, 104, 133–34, 194–95; government control of, as substitute for ideology, 90; government cutoff of political resources to other groups, 66, 67–71, 194–95; as substitute for ideology, 90. See also natural resources in Russia, export of

castling of 2008, 63, 145

Chechnya war (1994), negative effects of, 37–38

checks and balances: as antithetical to traditional Russian view of legitimate power, 48–49; lack of, in authoritarian systems, 81; as only way to assure effective government, 82; Russian drift toward totalitarianism and, 197–98, 199; theory of human nature underlying, 81–82

China: as peripheral authoritarian state, 114; as Russian competitor, 94, 95; successful modernization in, 25

Chubais, Anatoly, 34

civilizations, multiple, theory of, 138–39

civil rights, as issue in 1990s, 43

civil society institutions, Western, weakening of, xiii–xiv

competition-based systems: advantage in global economic competition, 185; attitudes of elites needed for transition to, 177–78; cases of decay into authoritarian regimes, 30; consensus on basic principles required for, 43–44; and democracy as ideology, 86; as “democratic” in loose sense of term, 22–23; difficulty of transition from peripheral authoritarianism to, 175–77; as final state of history, recent doubts about, 137–41; ideological party differences in, 85, 86; institutions required for, 41–42, 125; introduction of, as necessary Russian reform, 18; reversibility of transition to, 114–15; safeguards to preserve multiple centers of power, 22, 23; theories on reasons for emergence of, 23; totemic status of, as result of power of Western countries, 36; transfer of power in, 21–22. See also democratic system(s)

competition-based systems vs. authoritarian systems: advantages of competition-based system in complex society, 141–42; borderline cases, 24; dynamic or static system as separate issue from, 28–29; as key distinction, 21; public good as separate issue from, 24–26; relative adaptability of, 55; relative number of, 23, 36; rulers’ interest in modernization as separate issue from, 26–27

Congress of People’s Deputies. See legislature

Constitution of 1993, and authoritarian system, 33, 37

corruption: destructive effects of, 107–9; functionalist arguments defending, 110; high-level types of, 101–2; low-level, effects of, 107–8; in peripheral economies, 135; presence in all societies, 101; and regression to premodern state, 108–9; in Western democracies, structural factors limiting, 106–7

corruption in Russia, 101–12; authoritarian government and, 112; destructive effects of, 109–10; distinctive features of, 102–6; elites’ selective enforcement of laws against, 111, 211n9; and export of capital, 104–6; government control of financial flows and, 104; high-level forms of, 102; as integral to system, 2, 102, 110–11, 135, 189–90; large scale of, 102, 106–7; and legal impunity as measure of success, 111; and loss of public purpose of government, 108; low-level corruption, forms of, 102; as non-essential feature of peripheral authoritarianism, 112; as out of control, 112; and regression to premodern state, 109; underdevelopment of large businesses and related institutions and, 102–4

Crimea, Russian annexation of: motives for, 157–58; and move toward totalitarianism, 167; political consequences of, 155; as product of Russian authoritarian government, 136; Yabloko’s opposition to, xvi

democratic system(s): absence of elements of, in Russian system of 1990s, 52–53; characteristics of, 52–53; competition-based systems as, 22–23; and economic growth, theories on relationship between, 23–24; as inevitable final state of history, recent doubts about, 137–41; limits of debatable issues in, 43–44; principles of, 137; Russian drift toward totalitarian state and, 163, 165, 197–98; vagueness of term, 20–21. See also competition-based systems

demodernization of Russia: corruption and, 109; current movement toward, 190; elite approval of, 187–88; government ideology and, 97–98, 135, 161–62, 163, 187, 188, 197; peripheral authoritarianism and, 112, 195

Derluguian, Georgi, 211n10

domestic policy of Russia, West’s abandonment of efforts to influence, 203

double standards in international relations, 138–39

dynamic political systems: characteristics of, 27–28; examples of, in both authoritarian and competition-based systems, 28–29

economic analysis in Russia, tendency toward over-simplification in, 10

economic freedom: assumed link to political freedom, 11–13; quasi-political functions of, 172; Russian drift toward totalitarian state and, 163, 171–73

economic growth: and democracy, theories on relationship between, 23–24; as goal, as unrelated to form of government, 26–27

economic growth in Russia: authoritarianism as obstacle to, 135; and economic initiatives, inability to complete, 83–84; lack of entrepreneurial class and, 8–9, 119–20; lack of internal engines for, 7, 9; weakness of institutions as drag on, 44–45, 130–31. See also European development path for Russia

economic system in Russia: as cause of current political ills, 1–2; characteristics in post-Soviet period, 2–5; decreased competition in, 14–15; dependence on export of small group of products, 7; destruction of individual savings in hyperinflation of 1992, 37, 51; lack of internal engines of growth, 7, 9; outdated institutions as drag on, 44–45; as peripheral capitalism, ix, xi, 4–5, 6–7, 9; privatization of 1990s, and establishment of oligarchy, 34, 38, 51; relatively small GDP, x–xi; resources to protect privileged class and working class incomes, 5; stabilization and perpetuation of, 5–6; and transition to modern economy, 4–5, 5–6, 8–9; as unchanged from early post-Soviet stasis, 6–7; as unplanned, eclectic system, 2–3. See also corruption in Russia; peripheral capitalist economy, Russia as; transition to modern economy

economic systems, complex interaction with social system, 11–13

educational system in Russia, push toward totalitarian state and, 166–67

election of 1996: author as candidate in, 34; elite control of, 33–35, 37, 168; foreign interference in, xvi; payoffs for Yeltsin supports following, 38; small window for change in, 37

election of 2004, fraud perpetrated in, 158

election of 2012, disruption caused by, 90–91

election of 2018: author as presidential candidate in, xviii, 196–97, 200–201; issues of importance in, 200–201; and movement toward totalitarian state, 199–200; and Putin’s control over political process, xvii, xviii; and Putin’s life-long rule, 203; Yabloko gains in, xvii–xviii

elections: in authoritarian systems, 76–77, 90–91; varying types of, 206–7n6

elections in Russia: government control of, 33–35, 38, 40–41, 78, 79–80, 168, 199–200, 208n9; as means of expressing support for authorities, 92; Putin’s elimination of political opposition and, 170–71, 199–200; reasons for continuing, 79

elites, Russian: anti-Western sentiment in, 8, 95, 134–35, 148, 149; blocking of reform, 9, 157, 185–86; cold reception from Western counterparts, 152–53, 182–83; consolidation of, 15–16, 33, 171; control of, through uncertainty and fear, 111; and development of Russian authoritarianism, 42–44, 54; law restricting foreign asset ownership by, 70–71, 106, 165, 174; refusal to address real problems facing nation, 188; and Russian demodernization, approval of, 187–88; and Russian isolationism, 61, 150, 151–52, 154; social base of support for, 116–23; support of, as necessary for reform, 6–7, 177–78, 181; suppression of dissent in, 39, 71; and Ukrainian crisis, 158; values of, 187. See also oligarchs

entrepreneurial class, in countries of near vs. distant periphery, 115–16

entrepreneurial class in Russia: functional, failure to produce, 8–9; government support of, in 1990s, 117–18; loss of government support, 119–20

Eurasianism: autocracy in, 91–92; as destructive fantasy, 185–86; roots of, 166; vertical hierarchy of power in, 122–23

Eurasianism, Russian embrace of: and alternative Eurasian values, 158, 159, 166; belt of instability created by, 159; and empire-building, 136; and focus on traditional Russian values, 97; move toward totalitarianism and, 165–66; ongoing consolidation of, 167; as product of self-identification crisis, 52; and turn from European development path, 155; and Ukrainian crisis, 155–59

Europe: necessity of continued expansion, 160; value of alliance with Russia, xv, xviii, xix, 160

European development path for Russia: benefits of, 184; competition as reality of, 183–84; as only available option, 155, 160; refusal to follow, 179–80, 183; refusal to follow, Ukrainian crisis as result of, 155–59; Russian mischaracterization as submission to West, 183

Federal Assembly. See legislature

financial crisis of 2008–09, Russian response to, 60, 151

foreign assets, laws forbidding, for Russian officials (“nationalization of the elite”), 70–71, 106, 154, 174

foreign funds entering Russia, close monitoring of, 70–71

freedom of speech, Russian public’s disappointment with, 89

Fukuyama, Francis, 137

future of Russian autocracy: author’s presidential candidacy in 2018 and, 196–97, 200; collapse as necessary step toward change, 204; dependence on external environment, 186; ongoing slide into premodernism, 190; possibility of prediction, 136; and push toward totalitarianism, 146, 162–63; Putin’s embrace of authoritarianism and, 145; and Putin’s life-long rule, 203; room for opposing forces to change course of, 195–97, 200–201, 204; threat to continued existence of, 191. See also Eurasianism; reform of Russian system

futures of political systems, predictability of, 136–45; historians’ revised thinking on, 137–41

globalization, and attraction of West for global elite, 105

Gusinsky, Vladimir, 67

human rights, Russian drift toward totalitarian state and, 163, 165

Huntington, Samuel, 212n1

ideology: authoritarian systems’ lack of, 85, 86–88, 160–61; in competition-based systems, 85, 86; risks of formulating, 161; role in countries’ ability to compete globally, 177–78; in totalitarian systems, 85, 86

ideology of Russian government: 1990s reform ideology, 88; control of financial flows as substitute for, 90; lack of, in 2000s, 88–90, 161, 197

ideology of Russian government in 2010s, 90–100; on bond of people and government, 161–62; casting of opposition to ruling elite as destructive fifth column, 92–93, 195; clannish, premodern tone of, 187; conflation of ruling elite with state itself, 38, 48, 91–92, 197, 210n6; emphasis on traditional values, 97–98, 135, 161–62, 163, 197; and Eurasianist values, 165–66; and government as product of national spirit, 163–64; on hostile West as primary source of Russian problems, 93–96, 162, 165, 195, 198–99, 210–11n7; and hostility to minorities, 97–100, 166; ideological uses of Russian pride, 96–97; increasing reliance on, 197–99; intellectual bankruptcy of, 188; as mix of past ideologies, 163, 212n5; obligatory compliance with, 162–63, 164; reasons for resurgent interest in, 90–91, 100, 161, 211n8; risks of, 100–101, 162, 166–67; on Russian mission of benevolent empire, 198; and Russian nationalism, 163, 165, 180, 198; as sign of declining confidence of regime, 162; spread by institutions, 198–99; as top-down imposition, 199; and transition to totalitarian state, 162–63; xenophobia in, 162, 165, 197

institutions: important functions of, 123–25; as keeper of norms and rules, 129–30; of peripheral economies, lack of full development in, 175

institutions in authoritarian regimes: difficulty of developing competitive-based system from, 176; important functions of, 124–26; as instruments of rulers’ will, 129–30

institutions in Russia: adequate, failure to create, 189; corrupt practices taking place of, 189–90; demodernizing influence of, 190; instability of, 130; lag behind developmental needs, 44–45; purging of “troublemakers” from, 164–65

institutions in Russia, weakness of, 30–32, 40, 41–42, 125–31; costs of, 127–28; as drag on economic development, 44–45, 130–31; and increasing irrelevance, 166–67

intelligentsia, role in supporting Russian authoritarianism, 209–10n1

international relations: as amoral contest for power, 139–40; and multiple civilizations theory, 138–39; and Russian casting of opposition to ruling elite as fifth column, 93. See also isolationism of Russia; West, Russian confrontation with

international view of Russia: Chechnya war and, 37–38; and legitimacy granted by elections, 79; Russia’s lack of interest in, 202–3

internet, and criticism of rulers, 209n1

investments in Russia, limited opportunity and high risk of, 104–5

Islam, militant, Russia’s views on, 94, 95

isolationism of Russia: and ceding of voice in world affairs, 178–79; as dangerous misdirection, 185–86; and descent into parochialism, 178–81; and diminishing economic opportunities, 183; economic effects of, 172, 173; increases in, 146, 149–50, 153–54, 173, 195; and lack of interest in Western perceptions, 202–3; laws forbidding foreign assets for Russian officials, 70–71, 106, 154, 174; and outside organizations, increased restrictions on, 202; and potential for implosion, 181; and protection of authoritarian rule, 195; Russia’s ability to neutralize international influences, 134

judicial system, Russian: ineffectiveness of, 31, 40, 56, 128–29; instability of, 130; media attacks on, 49

Khodorkovsky, Mikhail, 58–59, 67–68, 208n11

law in Russia: as instrument of rule, 111, 133, 211n9. See also rule of law in Russia

Lebed, Alexander, 34

legislature: and corruption, 103–4; costs of delegitimation of, 127–28, 211–12n13; decaying effectiveness in 2000s, 56; elimination of political opposition and, 169–70; Kremlin control of, 126–27; lack of real power in 1990s, 31, 40; media efforts to undermine, 49; Yeltsin’s disbanding of (1993), 31, 37, 168

Libya, and tensions between Russia and West, 148

loans-for-shares auctions, 34, 38, 51

lower classes: role of, in countries of near vs. distant periphery, 115–16; in Russia, and social support of government, 118

Luzhkov, Yuri, 39

market reforms, Russian public’s disappointment with, 88–89

media, global, Russia’s inability to influence, 181

media, Russian: attacks on legislature’s authority, 49; and changing social support of government, 121–22; control of information agenda, 72, 133–34, 209–10n1; coverage of 2018 election, 201; and Federal Assembly, criticisms of, 126; freedom allowed to non-political programming, 74; government control of, xviii, 14, 66–67, 71–75, 207–8n9; government tolerance of negligible fringe outlets online, 67; and hostility to minorities, 100; and instability of institutions, 130; lack of alternatives to status quo as central message of, 72–75; large incomes allowed to loyal managers of, 74; and movement toward totalitarian state, 164, 199; public’s skepticism about, 72; stoking of fears of external threat, 190; support for new Russian ideology, 162, 198; support for Russian parochialism, 178

media, Western, on Russia, ix, xi

Medvedev, Dmitry, 63, 145

military, Russian, economic impact of high spending on, 190–91

minorities: hostility toward, in new Russian ideology, 97–100, 166; Soviet policy of multiculturalism and, 98–99

nationalism, Russian: in ideology of Russian autocracy, 163, 165, 180, 198; on Russian mission of benevolent empire, 198

NATO, history of tensions with Russia, 147

natural resources in Russia: elite’s belief in government ownership of, 119–21; elite’s seizure of control over, 57, 120. See also oil and gas revenues

natural resources in Russia, export of: as basis of economy, 7, 104–5, 181, 194; control of, as basis of elite’s power, 5, 119, 121, 151, 194–95, 207–8n9

neoliberalism, and weakening of Western institutions, xiii

oil and gas revenues: and consolidation of authoritarian regime, 119, 195, 207–8n9; control of, as basis of elite’s power, 121, 151, 194; as cushion against reform pressures, 59–60; elite’s seizure of control over, 120; and failure to develop diversified economy, 104–5, 194–95; as stabilizing influence on Russian economy, 5; and transition of social base into form characteristic of low-development countries, 119–20

oligarchs: illegitimacy of property ownership, 34, 38, 51, 58; lack of status as class, 57–59

parochialism, Russian descent into, 178–81; media support for, 178; and potential for implosion, 181

peripheral authoritarianism: dependence on core Western nations, 134–35; as inevitable result of peripheral economy, 174–75; institutions in, 125–26, 129–30; limited influence on international affairs, 176; and only currently-existing form of authoritarianism, 113; and patronage autocracy, 195; Russian system as, 133; social base of countries in near vs. distant economic periphery, 115–16; value of designation for analysis of Russia, 113–15; wide variations in economies of, 113–14. See also authoritarian system(s)

peripheral authoritarianism of Russia, 17; characteristics of, 133–35, 194; corporatism of, 122–23; current neo-totalitarian stage of, 84, 146, 162–63; development of, in 1990s, 16, 32–37, 39, 41–42, 135–36, 167–68; elites’ contentment with, 178–79; as inevitable loser in global economic competition, 184–85; as political postmodernism, 112, 188–89, 201; preservation of rent incomes as central goal of, 65; public’s tacit acceptance of, 39, 48; relative freedom allowed to depoliticized individuals, 36; repetition of historical flaws in Russia government, 45–46; weak institutions characteristic of, 130–31. See also future of Russian autocracy; political system in Russia; reform of Russian system

peripheral authoritarianism of Russia, ill effects of: descent into parochialism, 178–81; and grotesque form of political postmodernism, 188–89; and growing unrest, 100; inability to self-adjust, 190; lack of inherent goals, 80, 84; ongoing impact of, 193; and regressive values and lifestyles, 179, 185; social deformities created by resistance to change, 157; tendency toward stagnation, 54–55, 112, 135–36; transition of social base into form characteristic of low-development countries, 116–23; and worsening of economic conditions, 182. See also corruption in Russia; demodernization of Russia; totalitarian Russian state, push toward

peripheral authoritarianism of Russia, power in: consolidation of, 14, 16, 18–19, 194, 197; control of appointments to all major posts, 65; control of elections, 33–35, 38, 40–41, 78, 79–80, 168, 199–200, 208n9; control of media and information flow, 66–67, 71–75, 133, 135; control of political parties, 78–79; elite control of economic resources, xvii, 5, 33, 40, 48, 51, 65, 104, 119, 121, 131, 133–34, 151, 194–95; perception of checks and balances as effort to undermine government, 48–49; prevention of concentration of political resources by other groups, 66, 67–71. See also vertical hierarchy of power

peripheral capitalist economies: authoritarianism as inevitable result of, 174–75, 194; ease of elite dominance of, 175; flight of talent from, 182; lower demands on governments of, 142–43; social base of near vs. distant periphery, 115–16; worsening of economic conditions and, 182

peripheral capitalist economy, Russia as, ix–xi, 4, 134–35; and antagonist relations with West, xi; attraction of West and, 105; and authoritarianism, xi, 174–75; effects of increased isolationism on, 183; elite’s difficulty accepting realities of, 182–83; and export of capital, 104–6; export of natural resources as basis of, 7, 104–5, 181, 194; high levels of corruption in, 101, 102; lost opportunity to join economic core, 184; perpetuation of, 6–7, 9; and revocable oligarchical ownership of assets, 175; as shaped by conditions of Soviet foundation, 101, 193–94; solidification of image over time, 7–8; Western sanctions and, xii; worsening of economic conditions and, 182. See also corruption in Russia

peripheral regime status, Russian resentment of: as driver of Russian policy, ix, xii–xiii; and ongoing confrontation with West, 150; and rise of anti-Western sentiments, 8, 134–35. See also West, Russian confrontation with

political freedom, assumed link to economic freedom, 11–13

political parties in authoritarian systems, 77, 210n2

political parties in Russia: government control of, 78–79; increasing irrelevance of, 166, 168–69, 199

political system in Russia, 18; fragmented power structure in post-Soviet period, 15, 16; intimidation of dissenting voices, 208n9; need for analysis of, 9–11; as peripheral authoritarianism, 16; as unchanged from early post-Soviet system, 15–16, 18–19. See also peripheral authoritarianism of Russia; totalitarian Russian state, push toward

political system in Russia, in 1990s, 30–52, 39; absence of characteristics of democracy, 52–54; Bolshevik methods of reformers, 51; conflation of patriotism and loyalty to chief of state, 38, 48; de facto continuance of Soviet bureaucratic structures, 32, 206n5; elite control of elections, 33–36, 37, 40–41; elite monopolization of resources and, 33, 40, 48, 51; elite payouts to political supporters, 38; establishment of institutionalized “successor to the president,” 39, 168; evolution into authoritarian system, 32–37, 41–42, 135–36; failure of West to productively engage, 49–51; failures of basic functions of governance, 53–54; formation of oligarchical system, 34, 38; institutions’ lack of power, 30–32, 40, 41–42; institutions’ lag behind developmental needs, 44–45; lack of consensus on organizing principles for, 32, 42–44; and lack of governability vs. true competitive system, 41–42; lack of wealthy class able to support democratic system, 46–47; misunderstanding of democracy in, 32; post-Soviet ideological crisis and, 52; reform ideology, 88; repetition of historical flaws in Russia government, 45–46; rule of law, decline of, 31–32, 40, 53; social base characteristic of near-core peripheral economies, 116–19; and Soviet destruction of propertied class, repercussions of, 46–47

political system in Russia, in 2000s, 54–63; author’s warnings about, 57; brief flirtations with responsive reforms, 59, 63; choice of stagnation-prone version of authoritarianism, 54–55, 57, 62, 135–36; corporatism, development of, 122–23; decaying effectiveness of institutions, 56; effects of stagnation-prone authoritarianism, 56; entrenchment of authoritarian government, 62–63; failure of West to productively engage, 61–62, 208–9n12; and financial crisis of 2008–09, 60; lack of government ideology, 88–90; lack of wealthy class able to support democratic system, 57–59; loss of control over events, 56; oil and gas revenues as cushion against reform pressures, 59–60; responses to 1990s failures of governance, 53–54; rule of law, decline of, 56; transition of social base into form characteristic of low-development countries, 119–23

political systems, analysis of: competition-based vs. authoritarian systems, 21; dynamic vs. static systems, 27–28. See also competition-based systems vs. authoritarian systems; terminology for political systems

Politkovskaya, Anna, 200–201

postmodernism, political: global growth of, 188; peripheral authoritarianism of Russia as, 188–89, 201

power, transfer of: in competition-based vs. authoritarian regimes, 18–19; through regular democratic means, as necessary Russian reform, 18; Yeltsin’s establishment of “successor to the president” position, 39, 168. See also elections; peripheral authoritarianism of Russia, power in

Primakov, Yevgeny, 39

private sector, Putin’s shrinking of, 207n9

progressives in West, benefits of alliances with Russian counterparts, xv, xviii–xix

property ownership: conditionality of, in ideology of Russian autocracy, 198; delegitimization by corrupt privatizations of 1990s, 38, 58, 208n10; and destruction of individual savings in hyperinflation of 1992, 27, 51; illegitimacy of, in eyes of last Soviet generation, 47–48; as issue in 1990s, 42–43; Putin’s shrinking of private sector and, 207n9

property ownership, legitimate: characteristics of, 58; need to establish, 6; Russia’s failure to establish, 189

property privatization, exclusion of sources of government’s economic power from, 69

property privatization of 1990s: and delegitimization of property ownership, 38, 208n10; and establishment of oligarchy, 34, 38, 51, 58; negative consequences of, 8

public, Russian: belief in lack of alternatives to status quo, 72–75, 135; brainwashing about threat from West, 146, 153; tacit acceptance of authoritarianism, 39, 48

public good as goal, as separate issue from form of government, 24–26

Putin, Vladimir: and castling of 2008, 63, 145; cold reception by Western leaders, 152; foreign powers’ abandonment of efforts to influence, 203; impatience with opposition viewpoints, 173; increasing autocratic power of, 173, 202; lawlessness of, in Western view, 183; as official successor to Yeltsin, 39, 168; reelection in 2004, fraud perpetrated in, 158

Putin, third presidential term of: and confrontation with West, 145–46, 152; increased Russian isolationism in, 146, 149–50, 153, 172, 173; and push toward totalitarianism, 146

Putin’s power over Russian government: and election of 2018, xvii, xviii, 203; initial consolidation within existing post-Soviet system, 18–19; Yabloko’s resistance to increase in, xviii

Putnam, Robert, xiii

Realeconomik (Yavlinsky), 143

reform of Russian system: alliance of Western and Russian progressives in, xv, xviii–xix; attitudes of elites needed for transition to competition-based system, 177–78; brief flirtations with, in 2000s, 59, 63; dependence on influences from West, xiv–xv; desired outcomes of, 17–18; elite support necessary for, 6–7, 177–78, 181; impossibility of, in current system, 65, 75; room for opposing forces to change course of, 195–97, 200–201, 204; serious disruption required to dislodge elite, 37. See also transition to modern economy

regional governments, central government control over, 68, 78, 168, 207n9

rent extraction in authoritarian systems, 81–83

rent extraction by Russian bureaucracy, 80–85; increased costs and declining efficiency resulting from, 83–85; lack of checks and balances and, 81–82; preservation of, as goal of government, 65; slowing of, and need for ideology, 90, 161; as source of power, 5, 65, 121, 131, 134, 194; and staffing of agencies, 87

rents, types of, 143

resources, Kremlin-controlled, distribution to other branches of government, as necessary reform, 18

Robinson, James, 26

rule of law in Russia: decline of, 14, 31–32, 40, 53, 56; failure to establish, 189; instability of, 130; judiciary’s ineffectiveness and, 128–29; reforms needed to establish, 6. See also corruption in Russia

Russian meddling in Western countries: degree of, ix–x, xii–xiii; efforts to discredit Western values, xii–xiii, xiv; interference in elections, x, xii; potential for increase in, xiv; realignment to Russia’s advantage as goal of, xiii; weakening of Western institutions and, xiii–xiv; Yabloko’s opposition to, xvi, xviii

Russian revolution of 1917–1918: outdated institutions as factor in, 45; Tsarist resistance to change and, 157

“Russian world” concept, 165, 180

Saltykov-Shchedrin, Mikhail, 38

separation of powers: as characteristic of democratic systems, 53; Russian drift toward totalitarian state and, 197–98

Serdyukov, Anatoly, 208n9

Shchekochikhin, Yuri, 200–201

Skripal, Sergei, 203

smart power resources, Russia’s lack of, 181

social base of Russian rulers, transition into form characteristic of low-development countries, 116–23

social systems, interaction with economic systems, 11–13

societal goals, as separate issue from type of system, 24–26

soft power resources, Russia’s lack of, 181

Soviet Union: age of stagnation in, 185; decline in educational and cultural standards in, 46; and delegitimization of property ownership, 47–48; destruction of propertied class, repercussions of, 46–47; as deviation from Russia’s natural European development path, 155; ideological influence on Russian government of 1990s, 51–52; inevitability of collapse, 189

static political systems: characteristics of, 27–28; examples of, in both authoritarian and competition-based systems, 28–29

Syria, Russian interference in: and tensions between Russia and West, 148, 149; Yabloko’s opposition to, xvi–xvii, xviii

terminology for political systems, 19; change in meaning over time, 20; democratic, as term, 20–21; reductive nature of labels, 13, 19, 24; subjective bias in, 13, 20, 24

territorial conquest: as obsolete form of exploitation, 142–43; Russian foreign policy focus on unification of ethnic Russians, 165, 180, 198

totalitarian Russian state, push toward, 84, 146, 162–63; and denigration of critics as tools of foreign interests, 164; and diminishing economic opportunities, 183; and distancing from Western values, 163, 165, 197–98; and economic competition and innovation, narrowing of opportunity for, 171–73; economic consequences of, 185; election of 2018 and, 201; and elimination of political competition, 167, 168–71, 199–201; features vs. totalitarianism of past century, 188–89; and foreign policy focus on territorial expansion to unify ethnic Russians, 165, 180, 198; hardening of totalitarian features, 163; and increased concentration of power in Putin, 202; and increased focus on ideology, 197–99; increasing autocratic power of Putin, 173; and institutions, increasing irrelevance of, 166–67; and lack of government accountability, 164; media and, 164; and obligatory compliance with ideology, 162–63, 164; and political postmodernism, 188–89, 201; purging of “troublemakers” from institutions, 164–65; room for opposing forces to affect, 195–97, 200–201, 204; and vertical power hierarchy, xvii, 167. See also ideology of Russian government in 2010s

totalitarian systems, use of ideology for social control, 85–86

transition to modern economy: authorities’ blocking of, 9, 157, 185–86; authorities’ political will and, 9–10; disappearance of once-available options, 14; failed, causes of, 4–5; lack of entrepreneurial class to implement, 8–9; potential for, as unclear, 13–14; reforms needed to effect, 4–5, 5–6

translations of political works, value for universal language of mutual understanding, xix

Ukraine, European development path as only available option for, 155, 160

Ukraine, Russian interference in: goal of, 158; and Maidan revolution, 156; potential political repercussions of, 155; as product of Russian authoritarian government, 154–55, 157–58; Putin’s elimination of political opposition and, 169; Russia’s deviation from natural European development path and, 155–59; and tensions between Russia and West, 148, 149, 151; Yabloko’s opposition to, xvi, xviii

uniformed agencies: role of, in countries of near vs. distant periphery, 115–16; in Russia, and social support of government, 118

United Democratic Party Yabloko. See Yabloko

United Russia Party, xvii, 68, 202

United States: election of 2016, Russian interference in, x, xii; as villain, in Russian ideology, 93–96. See also entries under West

universal language of mutual understanding, decay of, xix

Urlashov, Yevgeny, 79–80

vertical hierarchy of power: as characteristic of Eurasianism, 122–23; and control of elections and political processes, 68–69, 76, 77, 104; and control of financial flows, 104; corporatism and, 122–23; establishment of, 168–71; and push toward totalitarianism, xvii, 167

Wallerstein, Immanuel, 211n10

wealthy class: as necessity for support of political parties, 46–47, 57–58; oligarchs lack of status as, 57–59

West, Russian confrontation with: belt of instability created by, 159; and blaming of Western sanctions for deteriorating economy, 151; economic factors driving, 151–52; hard-line Western responses, as counterproductive, xii; history of tensions, 147; and increased Russian isolationism, 146, 149–50, 153–54, 172, 173; intensification of, 145–46, 148; vs. Kremlin’s rhetoric on cooperation, 150; as new, long-term status quo, 150, 154; and new ideology, effort to develop, 146; obstacles to reversal of, 154; possibility of different relationship, xi; and potential Russian expansionism, 158–59, 180, 198; as product of Russia’s authoritarianism, xi; and propaganda value of Western accusations, 203; Putin’s cold reception by Western leaders and, 152; and refusal to abide by Western rules, 146, 147–48, 153, 180; restrictions on opposition to, 146; and Russian defiance of Western objections, 148–49; Russian drift toward totalitarian state and, 163; Russian elite’s support for, 150, 152, 153–54; and toxic environment for Russia’s neighbors, 159; Ukrainian crisis and, 155–59; as unlikely to change Western values, 180; and upswing in public’s patriotic feeling, 153; West’s characterization as disruptive and hostile, 148, 149; and West’s sanctions, 149, 153–54; Yabloko’s commitment to easing, xvi. See also isolationism of Russia

Western democracies: corruption in, structural factors limiting, 106–7; declining interest in spread of democratic government, 143–44; effects on Russia of economic changes in, 10–11; high-level types of corruption in, 101–2, 106; loss of purpose and direction in, 10–11; Russian fear of political interference from, 95–96, 146, 210–11n7; Russia’s economic and psychological dependence on, ix, 134; as villain, in Russian ideology, 93–96, 210–11n7

Western European elections, Russian interference in, x, xii

Western institutions: resources for strengthening, xiv; weakening of, and vulnerability to Russian influence, xiii–xiv

Yabloko: author as founding member of, xv; gains in 2018 election, xvii–xviii; platform of, xv–xvii; protests against Syrian intervention, xvii; resistance to further consolidation of Putin’s power, xviii

Yanukovych, Viktor, 156

Yavlinsky, Grigory: experience with Russian system, ix; as founding member of Yabloko, xv; as presidential candidate in 2018 election, xviii, 196–97, 200–201; as presidential candidate in election of 1996, 34

Yeltsin, Boris: de facto control of government, 31; and election of 1996, xvi; and establishment of authoritarian system, 33–36, 37; and establishment of “successor to the president” position, 39, 168; loans-for-shares auctions, 34, 38; and post-Soviet fragmented power structure, 15, 16; showdown with legislature (1993), 31, 37, 168

Zyuganov, Gennady, 34