1. Owsei Temkin, The Falling Sickness: A History of Epilepsy from the Greeks to the Beginnings of Modern Neurology, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 36.
2. Frances Hill, The Salem Witch Trials Reader (New York: Da Capo Press, 2000), 59.
3. Temkin, Falling Sickness, 194.
4. Ibid., 225.
5. Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed. (Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association, 2000), 492–98. Hereafter DSM-IV.
6. Ibid., 493.
7. Carl W. Basil, Living Well with Epilepsy and Other Seizure Disorders (New York: Harper Resource, 2004), 73.
8. J. Lindsay Allet and Rachel E. Allet, “Somatoform Disorders in Neurological Practice,” Current Opinion in Psychiatry 19 (2006): 413–20.
9. “Introduction,” DSM-IV, xxx.
10. Peter Rudnytsky, Reading Psychoanalysis: Freud, Rank, Ferenczi, Groddeck (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 90.
11. Robert J. Campbell, Campbell’s Psychiatric Dictionary, 8th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 189.
12. Sigmund Freud and Josef Breuer, Studies on Hysteria, trans. James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 1957), 86.
13. Sigmund Freud, On Aphasia: A Critical Study, trans. E. Stengel (New York: International Universities Press, 1953), 55.
14. George Makari, Revolution in Mind: The Creation of Psychoanalysis (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 70.
15. Freud and Breuer, Studies on Hysteria, 160–61.
16. Christopher G. Goetz, Michel Bonduelle, and Toby Gelfand, Charcot: Constructing Neurology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 172–213.
17. Pierre Janet, The Major Symptoms of Hysteria: Fifteen Lectures Given in the Medical School of Harvard University (London: Macmillan, 1907), 324.
18. Ibid., 332.
19. Ibid., 325–26.
20. Ibid., 42.
21. Ibid., 38.
22. Eugene C. Toy and Debra Klamen, Case Files: Psychiatry (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 401.
23. Todd Feinberg, Altered Egos: How the Brain Creates the Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 28.
24. Rita Charon, Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories of Illness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 9.
25. J.-K. Zubieta et al., “Placebo Effects Mediated by Endogenous Opioid Activity on μ-Opioid Receptors,” Journal of Neuroscience 25 (2005): 7754–62.
26. Erika Kinetz, “Is Hysteria Real? Brain Images Say Yes,” New York Times, Sept. 26, 2006.
27. Sean A. Spence, “All in the Mind? The Neural Correlates of Unexplained Physical Symptoms,” Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 12 (2006): 357.
28. Goetz, Bonduelle, and Gelfand, Charcot, 192.
29. P. Vuilleumier et al., “Functional Neuroanatomical Correlates of Hysterical Sensorimotor Loss,” Brain 124, no. 6 (June 2001): 1077.
30. Quoted in Goetz, Bonduelle, Gelfand, Charcot, 187.
31. Freud and Breuer, Studies on Hysteria, 7.
32. Bertram G. Katzung, ed., Basic and Clinical Pharmacology, 9th ed. (New York: Lange Medical Books / McGraw-Hill, 2004), 156.
33. James L. McGaugh, Memory and Emotion: The Making of Lasting Memories (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 93.
34. Ibid., 107
35. Quoted in Daniel Brown, Alan W. Scheflin, and D. Corydon Hammond, Memory, Trauma, Treatment and the Law (New York: Norton, 1998), 95.
36. Françoise Davoine and Jean-Max Gaudillière, History Beyond Trauma, trans. Susan Fairfield (New York: Other Press, 2004), 179.
37. Onno van der Hart, Ellert R. S. Nijenhuis, and Kathy Steele, The Haunted Self: Structural Dissociation and the Treatment of Chronic Trauma (New York: Norton, 2006).
38. Ian Hacking, Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 21.
39. Janet, Major Symptoms, 131.
40. Ibid., 172.
41. Three Short Novels of Dostoyevsky, trans. Constance Garnett, ed. Avrahm Yarmolinsky (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 15.
42. Hans Christian Andersen, “The Shadow,” in Fairy Tales, vol. 2, trans. R. P. Keigwin (Odense, Denmark: Hans Reitzels Forlag, 1985), 188.
43. Klaus Podoll and Markus Dahlem, http://www.migraineaura.org. See also P. Brugger, M. Regard, and T. Landis, “Illusory Replication of One’s Own Body: Phenomenology and Classification of Autoscopic Phenomena,” Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 2, no. 1 (1997): 19–38.
44. Todd Feinberg and Raymond M. Shapiro, “Misidentification-Reduplication and the Right Hemisphere,” Neuropsychiatry, Neuropsychology and Behavioral Neurology (2, no. 1): 39–48.
45. Feinberg, Altered Egos, 74–75.
46. Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function,” in Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: Norton, 2006), 75–81.
47. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Child’s Relation to Others,” The Primacy of Perception, trans. William Cobb (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 117.
48. Shaun Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 26.
49. Roger W. Sperry, “Some Effects of Disconnecting the Cerebral Hemispheres,” Bioscience Reports 2, no. 5 (May 1982): 267.
50. Dahlia W. Zaidel, “A View of the World from a Split-Brain Perspective,” http://cogprints.org/920/0/critchelyf.pdf.
51. Quoted in Feinberg, Altered Egos, 94.
52. Mark Solms and Oliver Turnbull, The Brain and the Inner World (New York: Other Press, 2002), 82.
53. M. S. Gazzaniga, J. E. LeDoux, and D. H. Wilson, “Language, Praxis, and the Right hemisphere: Clues to Some Mechanisms of Consciousness,” Neurology 27 (1977): 1144–47.
54. A. R. Luria and F. I. Yudovich, Speech and the Development of Mental Processes in the Child (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1971).
55. Davoine and Gaudillière, 115.
56. A. R. Luria, Higher Cortical Functions in Man, trans. Basil Haigh, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1962), 32.
57. Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1961), 9.
58. Freud and Breuer, Studies on Hysteria, 49.
59. Ibid., 44.
60. Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, trans. James Strachey (1923; repr., New York: Norton, 1960), 32–33.
61. Charles Dickens, David Copperfield (1850; repr., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 1.
62. Joe Brainard, I Remember (New York: Penguin, 1975), 28. Joe Brainard is known chiefly as a visual artist. He was part of the group of writers and painters known as the New York School, which included John Ashbery, Fair-field Porter, Alex Katz, Kenward Elmslie, Frank O’Hara, James Schuyler, Kenneth Koch, and Rudy Burkhardt. His work is in the Museum of Modern Art and the Whitney Museum. He died in 1994. I Remember inspired the French writer Georges Perec to do his own version of this memory-generating machine: Je Me Souviens.
63. Faraneh Vargha-Khadem, Elizabeth Isaacs, and Mortimer Mishkin, “Agnosia, Alexia and a Remarkable form of Amnesia in an Adolescent Boy,” Brain 117, no. 4 (1994), 683–703.
64. Ibid., 698.
65. Charles D. Fox, Psychopathology of Hysteria (Boston: Gorham Press, 1913), 58.
66. A. R. Luria, The Man with a Shattered World, trans. Lynn Solotaroff (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 92.
67. Quoted in Elaine Showalter, Hystories: Hysterical Epidemics and Modern Culture (London: Picador, 1998), 34.
68. Georges Didi-Huberman, Invention of Hysteria: Charcot and the Photographic Iconography of the Salpêtrière, trans. Alisa Hartz (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
69. Alan B. Ettinger and Andres M. Kanner, Psychiatric Issues in Epilepsy: A Practical Guide to Diagnosis and Treatment, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins, 2007), 471–72.
70. DSM-IV, 494.
71. Ibid., 496.
72. The experiences of soldiers with conversion disorder may shed light on one of the reasons women may be more vulnerable to hysteria than men outside of combat situations. If powerlessness and a feeling of having no active role in your fate are linked to the illness, then it makes sense that women, who have traditionally had far less autonomy than men, would suffer in higher numbers. Similarly, in many reference books, including the DSM, there is repeated speculation that hysteria is more common in uneducated people from developing societies, which seems to be another way of saying that people who feel their will is undermined by forces they don’t control may be more likely to succumb to a conversion.
73. C. S. Myers, Shellshock in France 1914–18 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), 42–43.
74. Edwin A. Weinstein, “Conversion Disorders,” http://www.bordeninstitute.army.mil/published_volumes/war_psychiatry/WarPsychChapter15.pdf, 385.
75. R. J. Heruti et al., “Conversion Motor Paralysis Disorder: Analysis of 34 Consecutive Referrals,” Spinal Cord 40, no. 7 (July 2002): 335–40.
76. DSM-IV, 467.
77. Trevor H. Hurwitz and James W. Pritchard, “Conversion Disorder and fMRI,” Neurology 67 (2006): 1914–15.
78. Goetz, Bonduelle, and Gelfand, Charcot, 178–79.
79. K. M. Yazici and L. Kostakoglu, “Cerebral Blood Flow Changes in Patients with Conversion Disorder,” Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging 83, no. 3 (1998): 166.
80. Vuilleumier et al., “Functional Neuroanatomical Correlates,” 1082.
81. D. W. Winnicott, Home Is Where We Start From: Essays by a Psychoanalyst (New York: Norton, 1986), 32.
82. Vuilleumier et al., “Functional Neuroanatomical Correlates,” 1082.
83. Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind, 41.
84. Karen Kaplan-Solms and Mark Solms, Clinical Studies in Neuro-Psychoanalysis: Introduction to a Depth Neuropsychology (New York: Karnac, 2002), 151–52.
85. Ibid., 190–91.
86. Ibid., 177.
87. Benjamin Libet, “Do We Have Free Will?” Journal of Consciousness Studies 6, no. 8–9 (1999): 47–57.
88. Julian Offray de La Mettrie, Machine Man and Other Writings, trans. and ed. Ann Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
89. Jaak Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 52.
90. Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), 3–79.
91. William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (1897; repr., New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 2005), 92.
92. Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), 19–20. I have simplified Husserl. We all have both Körper, a sense of our material selves, and Leib, an inner living awareness, but this distinction is enough to serve my purpose here. It seems clear, however, that in sickness the body becomes more thinglike. Its reality as not only Leib but also Körper is brought home.
93. D. W. Winnicott, “Mirror-Role of Mother and Family in Child Development,” in Playing and Reality (London: Routledge, 1989), 111.
94. Ibid., 112.
95. Ibid., 114.
96. Quoted in Allan Schore, Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self: The Neurobiology of Emotional Development (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1994), 76.
97. Ibid., 91.
98. Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind, 73. Gallagher is strongly influenced by Merleau-Ponty, who in turn was influenced by Husserl. Husserl argues that we have a subjective conscious sense of our freedom to move, but that “the appearances that are arriving are already prefigured. The appearances form dependent systems. Only as dependent on kinaestheses can they continually pass into one another and constitute a unity of one sense.” The conscious is linked to a kinetic/motor bodily unconsciousness. See “Horizons and the Genesis of Perception” in The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology, ed. Donn Welton (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 227–28.
99. V. Gallese, L. Fadiga, L. Fogassi, and G. Rizzolatti, “Action Recognition in the Premotor Cortex,” Brain 119 (1996): 593–609. Gallese’s ongoing research into the neurobiology of intersubjectivity is an interdisciplinary one that draws from psychology and philosophy as well as science. For an illuminating discussion of his position that intersubjectivity is primarily a pre-rational, embodied reality, also called intercorporeity, see Vittorio Gallese, “The Two Sides of Mimesis: Girard’s Mimetic Theory, Embodied Simulation and Social Identification,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 16, no. 4 (2009), 21–44.
100. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie, 2nd ed. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1949), 232.
101. Merleau-Ponty, “Child’s Relation to Others,” 151.
102. Margarite Sechehaye, Autobiography of a Schizophrenic Girl: The True Story of Renee, trans. Grace Rubin-Rabson (New York: Penguin, 1994), 52–53.
103. Quoted in J. Laplanche and J. B. Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Norton, 1973), 199.
104. Leo Tolstoy, “The Death of Iván Ilých,” in Great Short Works of Leo Tolstoy, trans. Louise Maude and Aylmer Maude (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 280.
105. Ibid., 282.
106. Albertus Magnus, “Commentary on Aristotle,” “On Memory and Recollection,” The Medieval Craft of Memory: An Anthology of Texts and Pictures, ed. Mary Carruthers and Jan M. Ziolkowski (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 153–188.
107. A. R. Luria. The Mind of a Mnemonist: A Little Book About a Vast Memory, trans. Lynn Solotaroff (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987),32.
108. Quoted in Patricia Lynne Duffy, Blue Cats and Chartreuse Kittens: How Synesthetes Color Their World (New York: Henry Holt, 2001), 22.
109. Arthur Rimbaud, Complete Works, trans. Paul Schmidt (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 123.
110. Luria, Mind of a Mnemonist, 31.
111. Jorge Luis Borges, “Funes the Memorious,” Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings (New York: New Directions, 1964), 65–67.
112. Luria, Mind of a Mnemonist, 154.
113. Ibid., 155.
114. Freud used Nachträglichkeit, deferred action, throughout his writing, from 1896, in a letter to his friend Fliess, onward. For a clear account of this complex term and why deferred action might not be the best translation, see Laplanche and Pontalis, Language of Psychoanalysis, 111–14.
115. Joseph LeDoux, Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are (New York: Penguin, 2002), 124.
116. Demis Hassabis, Dharshan Kumaran, Seralynne D. Vann, and Eleanor Maguire, “Patients with Hippocampal Amnesia Cannot Imagine New Experiences,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104 (2007): 1726–31.
117. LeDoux, Synaptic Self, 217.
118. Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 3.
119. LeDoux, Synaptic Self, 94.
120. S. J. Blakemore, D. Bristow, G. Bird, C. Frith, and J. Ward, “Somatosensory Activations Following the Observation of Touch and a Case of Vision Touch Synesthesia,” Brain 128 (2005): 1571–83; and Michael J. Banissy and Jamie Ward, “Mirror Touch Synesthesia Is Linked to Empathy,” Nature Neuro-science 10 (2007): 815–16.
121. Luria, Mind of a Mnemonist, 82.
122. Duffy, Blue Cats, 33.
123. See Peter Brugger, “Reflective Mirrors: Perspective-Taking in Autoscopic Phenomenon,” Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 7 (2002): 188.
124. K. Hitomi, “ ‘Transitional Subject’ in Two Cases of Psychotherapy of Schizophrenia,” Schweizer Archiv für Neurologie und Psychiatrie 153, no. 1 (2002), 39–41.
125. Ibid., 40.
126. Winnicott, Playing and Reality, 2.
127. Freud, Mourning and Melancholia, Standard Edition, vol. 14, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1957).
128. After reading the manuscript of this book, a friend of mine who is also a psychoanalyst pointed out that to have a lump in one’s throat means sadness.
129. Theodore Roethke, “Silence,” Collected Poems (New York: Doubleday, 1966).
130. Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, Standard Edition, vol. 4, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1953, 1971), 279.
131. Cited in Mark Solms, “Dreaming and REM Sleep Are Controlled by Different Brain Mechanisms,” Sleep and Dreaming: Scientific Advances and Reconsiderations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 52.
132. J. Allan Hobson, Dreaming: An Introduction to the Science of Sleep (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 155–56.
133. Antti Revonsuo, “The Reinterpretation of Dreams: An Evolutionary Hypothesis of the Function of Dreaming,” Sleep and Dreaming, 89.
134. Ibid., 94.
135. Solms, Sleep and Dreaming, 56.
136. Dream Debate: Hobson vs. Solms — Should Freud’s Dream Theory Be Abandoned? DVD, NetiNeti Media, 2006. For another view that disagrees with both Hobson and Solms, see G. W. Domhoff, “Refocusing the Neurocognitive Approach to Dreams: A Critique of the Hobson Versus Solms Debate,” Dreaming 15 (2005): 3–20.
137. William James, Pragmatism. In Writings 1902–1910 (New York: Library of America, 1987), 491.
138. For a brief discussion of color as a prereflective phenomenon, see Kym Maclaren, “Embodied Perceptions of Others as a Condition of Selfhood,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 15, no. 8 (2008): 75.
139. The Mary story has been told and retold in many different papers, books, and lectures. For an argument against the Mary story as a proof of qualia, see Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991), 398–401.
140. Ned Block’s interview is in Susan Blakemore, Conversations on Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 24–35.
141. Peter Carruthers’s paper, published in the Journal of Philosophy, was sent to me by the “sympathetic” philosopher Ned Block after I had heard the lecture on theories of consciousness he gave in February 2009 at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute in New York City. “Brute Experience,” Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989): 258–69.
142. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), 151.
143. Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, ed. Margaret A. Simons (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 159.
144. For a useful introduction to Patricia Churchland’s view of the mind, as well as those of several other prominent neuroscientists and philosophers, see Blakemore, Conversations on Consciousness.
145. Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and the Human Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993).
146. The physicist Erwin Schrodinger offers a view of consciousness that draws insights from the Upanishads and Schopenhauer in a remarkable, if neglected little book published after his death. Erwin Schrodinger,My View of the World, trans. Cecily Hastings (Woodbridge, Conn: Ox Bow Press, 1983). On page 88 he gives us the colors he associates with vowels, writing about his synesthesia as a common phenomenon: “For me they are a — pale mid-brown, e — white, i — intense, brilliant blue, o — black, u — chocolate brown.”
147. Jan-Markus Schwindt, “Mind as Hardware and Matter as Software,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 15, no. 4 (2008): 22–23.
148. George Berkeley, The Principles of Human Knowledge, pt. 1, Berkeley’s Philosophical Writings, ed. David M. Armstrong (New York: Collier, 1965), 63.
149. Schwindt, “Mind as Hardware,” 25.
150. Imants Baruss, “Beliefs About Consciousness and Reality,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 15, no. 10–11 (2008): 287.
151. D. Berman and W. Lyons, “J. B. Watson’s Rejection of Mental Images,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 14, no. 11 (2007): 24.
152. Steven C. Schachter, Gregory Holmes, and Dorthée G. A. Kasteleijn-Nolst Trenité, Behavioral Aspects of Epilepsy: Principles and Practice (New York: Demos, 2008), 471.
153. Ibid., 472.
154. Oliver Sacks, Migraine: Understanding a Common Disorder (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 104.
155. Ibid., 104.
156. Alan B. Ettinger and Andres M. Kanner, Psychiatric Issues in Epilepsy: A Practical Guide to Diagnosis and Treatment, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Williams & Wilkens, 2007), 286–88.
157. Schacter, Holmes, and Kasteleijn-Nolst Trenité, Behavioral Aspects of Epilepsy, 210.
158. Steve Connor, “ ‘God Spot’ Is Found in Brain,” Los Angeles Times, Oct. 29, 1997; and “Doubt Cast over Brain God Spot,” BBC News, Aug. 30, 2006. Two studies about religion and the brain resulted in wide media attention. The first, conducted at the University of California, San Diego, in 1997 (by V. S. Ramachandran et al.), was done on people with temporal lobe epilepsy, people who admitted to being highly religious, and normal controls. The scientists tested their subjects’ galvanic skin response (GSR) and found strong emotional responses to spiritual words in the epileptics and the religious but not the normals. Ramachandran speculated that temporal lobe as well as limbic activity creates greater religiosity. See V. S. Ramachandran and Sandra Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain: Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind (New York: William Morrow, 1997), 174–98. The second study, done in Canada by Mario Beauregard, gave fMRIs to fifteen Carmelite nuns and found no such localization: “Mystical experiences are mediated by several brain regions.” The researchers did find, however, that “right medial temporal activation was related to a subjective experience of contacting a spiritual reality.” M. Beauregard and V. Paquette, “Neural Correlates of Mystical Experiences in Carmelite Nuns,” Neuroscience Letters 405 (2006): 186–90. It is only fair to point out that the scientists involved are more circumspect about their findings than the journalists who report on them. Nevertheless, philosophical confusion is often rampant. Michael A. Persinger has worked extensively in the field of mystical experience and temporal lobe activation, but he also links these transcendent experiences to early child-parent relations. See his book Neuropsychological Bases of God Beliefs (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987).
159. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, Standard Edition, vol. 21, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1957), 64.
160. S. G. Waxman and N. Geschwind, “The Interictal Behavior Syndrome in Temporal Lobe Epilepsy,” Archives of General Psychiatry 32 (1975): 1580–86.
161. Many books contain speculative diagnoses of the famous. See J. Bogousslavsky and F. Boller, eds., Neurological Disorders in Famous Artists, vol. 19 (Lausanne: Karger, 2005); and Frank Clifford Rose, ed., Neurology of the Arts: Painting, Music, Literature (London: Imperial College Press, 2004). For a popular account that liberally identifies innumerable notables of the recent and distant past as temporal lobe epileptics, see Eve LaPlante, Seized: Temporal Lobe Epilepsy as a Medical, Historical, and Artistic Phenomenon (Lincoln, NE: Authors Guild Backinprint.com, 1993).
162. Gershom Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (New York: Schocken, 1961), 151.
163. William James, Varieties of Religious Experience (1902; repr., New York: Library of America, 1987), 23.
164. Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Idiot, trans. David Magarshack (New York: Penguin, 1955), 258–59.
165. Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 152.
166. Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976).
167. Marcel Kuijsten, ed., Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness: Julian Jaynes’s Bicameral Mind Theory Revisited (Henderson, NV: Julian Jaynes Society, 2006), 119–21.
168. Schore, Affect Regulation, 488.
169. Cited in Kristen I. Taylor and Marianne Regard, “Language in the Right Cerebral hemisphere: Contributions from Reading Studies,” News in Physiological Sciences 18, no. 6 (2003): 258.
170. Julia Kane, “Poetry as Right-Hemispheric Language,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 11, no. 5–6 (2004), 21–59.
171. Daniel Smith, Muses, Madmen and Prophets: Rethinking the History, Science, and Meaning of Auditory Hallucinations (New York: Penguin, 2007), 136–140.
172. Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, trans. Arthur Wills (1952; repr., Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 51.
173. Patrick Wall, Pain: The Science of Suffering (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 63.
174. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1958), 102e.
175. According to one source, there have been about three thousand studies conducted on the relative effectiveness of psychotherapy and medication for clinical depression. Early research that paved the way for following investigations was done by the National Institute of Mental Health’s Treatment of Depression Collaborative Research Program (Elkin et al., 1985, 1989; Weisman et al., 1986), which demonstrated that various kinds of psychological therapies were as effective in treating depression as antidepressants. This has been borne out by many studies since, especially in cases of mild and moderate depression. In one, the authors found considerable improvement in people who used either a drug or some form of psychotherapy for depression, but their research also concluded that combining antidepressants with psychotherapy had a lower rate of treatment failure than either drugs or therapy alone and resulted in fewer hospitalizations and better work adjustment among the patients. Burnand et al., “Psychodynamic Psychotherapy and Clomipramine in the Treatment of Major Depression,” Psychiatric Services 53, no. 5 (2002): 585–90. For more recent research comparing drugs and psychotherapies, see Cuijpers et al., “Are Psychological and Pharmacological Interventions Equally Effective in the Treatment of Adult Depressive Disorders? A Meta-analysis of Comparative Studies,” Journal of Clinical Psychiatry 69, no. 11 (2008): 1675–85. There is also growing research on neurobiological changes induced by psychotherapy. See Etkin et al., “Toward a Neurobiology of Psychotherapy,” Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 17 (2005): 145–58; as well as Henn et al., “Psychotherapy and Antidepressant Treatment: Evidence for Similar Neurobiological Mechanisms,” World Psychiatry 1, no. 2 (2002).
176. Merleau-Ponty, “Child’s Relation to Others,” 163.
177. Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), 95.
178. Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 123.
179. For a good introduction to Habermas, see The Philosophical Discourses of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990). Habermas does not believe that we can jump out of our own heads and become objective observers of the world. He does believe in reason and reasonable discourse as a way to arrive at consensus. His view of science and technology is complex. He argues that human beings can apply what he calls “Technical Cognitive Interest,” technical rules of understanding, which, through their use, extend human control over nature. See Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 142–69.
180. G. Alacón et al., “Is It Worth Pursuing Surgery for Epilepsy in Patients with Normal Neuroimaging?” Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 77 (2006): 474–80.
181. Oliver Sacks, “Witty Ticky Ray,” The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat (New York: Summit Books, 1995), 92–101.
182. Alice W. Flaherty, The Midnight Disease: The Drive to Write, Writer’s Block, and the Creative Brain (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004), 234.
183. Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience, 311–13.
184. Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (San Diego: Harvest Harcourt, 1999), 134–43.
185. Michael S. Gazzaniga, Nature’s Mind: The Biological Roots of Thinking, Emotions, Sexuality, Language and Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 2.
186. Stephen Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature (New York: Viking, 2002).
187. For an intelligent discussion of innateness versus learning, see LeDoux’s comments on the subject in Synaptic Self, 82–93. There is a vast body of scientific literature on the effects of maternal nurture, as well as maternal separation, on offspring that is not cited by Pinker. The subjects of these studies run the gamut from rats and mice to primates and human beings. For a collection of eighty-two papers from researchers in various but related disciplines, see John T. Cacioppo et al., eds., Foundations in Social Neuroscience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002). Included are neurobiological studies on rats that specifically address the question of genetic and environmental interaction: Liu et al., “Maternal Care, Hippocampal Glucocortoid Receptors, and Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Andrenal Response to Stress”; and Francis et al., “Nongenomic Transmission Across Generations of Maternal Behavior and Stress Response in the Rat.” See also Jaak Panksepp’s discussion of the brain systems for social attachment and separation distress in Affective Neuro-science. There is a burgeoning literature of research on infant and child attachment, a field pioneered by John Bowlby in his three-volume master-work Attachment and Loss (New York: Basic Books, 1969).
188. D. W. Winnicott, “Ego Distortion in Terms of True and False Self,” in The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment (London: Karnac, 1990), 140–52.
189. Henry James, What Maisie Knew (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 22–23.
190. William James, The Principles of Psychology (1892; repr., Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952), 194.
191. Ibid., 201.
192. Ibid., 202.