The Third World War: August 1985

APPENDIX 2: Gorshkov and the Rise of Soviet Sea Power

‘The flag of the Soviet Union flies over the oceans of the world,’ observed Admiral of the Fleet Sergei G. Gorshkov in 1974. ‘Sooner or later the United States will have to understand that it no longer has mastery of the seas.’ Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, even after Admiral Gorshkov’s retirement from active service, successive Politburos had accepted his well and persistently argued thesis that world peace, that is to say the triumph of Marxism-Leninism throughout the world, must be, and could only be, based upon mastery of the seas.

To gain this it would be necessary to allocate an exceptionally high proportion of Soviet resources of men and material to naval and maritime purposes, and to apply these scientifically. The classical sea power doctrine of Mahan had to be reinterpreted in the light of Marxist-Leninist theory and the socio-political and technical conditions prevailing in the last quarter of the twentieth century. These included the continuing credibility, and therefore necessity, of the submarine-launched strategic nuclear missile system, with matching general-purpose naval and air forces in support, and to counter, as far as possible, the opposing submarine strategic systems. Necessary, also, was the evolution from Mahan’s theory of general command of the sea of a doctrine of local and temporary command appropriate to the support of ‘state interests’. Additional general-purpose naval and air forces would be needed, in consequence, for use in situations involving a limited number of participants, in a limited area, using limited means to realize limited ends.

This line of reasoning was not only persuasive in itself, and accorded almost universal agreement by the naval hierarchies of the non-Soviet world. It also seemed to be fulfilling, when put into effect, the promise of its progenitor. The activities of the new Red Navy began to hit the headlines just after the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War in 1967, when Soviet naval forces entered Port Said and Alexandria ‘ready to co-operate’ with the Egyptians to repel any aggression.

Indeed, the hitherto self-evident asymmetry of the superpower confrontation as it had developed since the end of the Second World War — maritime coalition versus continental colossus — began to be questioned. Between powers of a different nature a modus vivendi could be reached. It did, in fact, exist. When Alexis de Tocqueville predicted of autocratic Russia and democratic America: ‘Their starting-point is different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems to be marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe,’ he did not prophesy war between them. Yet might not the projection of autocracy over the sea, by calling forth the projection of democracy on to the continent, eliminate the differentiation between the respective destiny-swayers upon which their peaceful co-existence, being an agreement to differ, had rested?

Whatever dangers Soviet determinism might hold for the peace of the world, American pragmatism had already compounded the risk by her involvement in the war in Vietnam. The contribution made to her national security by this mistimed, misplaced and misconducted intervention in South-east Asia was almost totally negative. A far more fruitful, less politically sterile and less socially disruptive policy would have been to bring the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean into the orbit of statecraft and naval policy, as urged by Admirals Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, and John S. McCain Jr, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, in the 1950s. Better late than never, Drew Middleton, the military correspondent of the New York Times, wrote on 20 April 1973: ‘… the strategic interests of the United States and global strategy in general will pivot on the Persian Gulf late in this decade as a result of competition for the area’s oil.’

The rapid growth of the Soviet (and satellite) merchant and fishing fleets throughout the 1960s and 1970s, while not directly associated with the Gorshkov naval expansion, coincided with it. Apart from specialized shipping used for oceanographic research, hydrography and space programme support, the Soviet Union sought, as many a nation had in the past, the political, strategic and economic benefits of self-sufficiency in maritime transportation: prestige, conservation of currency, control over shipping, maintenance of employment in the home shipbuilding industry, and, in addition, a specifically Soviet requirement, the ability to carry economic and political warfare into the capitalist camp. Fishing (and whaling) fleets, operated industrially and on a huge scale, also provided protein to help make good deficiencies in agricultural production.

That a serious contradiction existed near the centre of Soviet maritime policy-making had become apparent during the series of United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which took place during the 1970s. While the Soviet navalists were at one with those of the United States and the other ‘traditional’ maritime states in seeking to maintain the freedom of movement so far enjoyed by ships of all nations upon the high seas, and through the straits that connected them, the Soviet foreign relations experts, hoping for political advantage, favoured the claims of ‘Third World’ nations, some old, some new, who wanted to extend their sovereignty over wide expanses of sea and ocean off their coasts, and the sea-bed beneath, thus severely eroding the whole concept of freedom of the high seas. Of course, historically, the freedom of the seas has always been in the gift of the dominant naval power. The granting or withholding of belligerent status and of the rights of neutrals in war, whether declared or undeclared, remained in 1985 something rather more than a folk memory but less than a governing factor in the determination of national and international responses to hostilities at sea. But the Soviet Navy had conducted itself with propriety as it extended the scope and intensity of its peacetime missions. It was not until the shooting started, and political guidance had to be sought from Moscow, that failure to harmonize the political with the operational requirements in taking account of the international law of the sea began to have its effect.

It can now be seen that to meet a number of pressing requirements, including the need to relieve pressures in the Soviet Union no less than in the satellites, the Soviet leadership had brought to an advanced state contingency plans which, directly or indirectly, would put the Soviet Navy to the test. The time was coming to cash Gorshkov’s cheque. The plans involved in the first instance the use of naval and air forces in support of political operations designed to offset American reaction to savage, repressive measures within the Soviet empire and to secure advantages over the USA while it was still under a new and untried Administration. One of these plans hinged upon upsetting violently the political stability of the Persian Gulf; another on delaying the establishment of a stable political settlement in Southern Africa. Thus, the supply of Middle Eastern oil to the United States would immediately be in jeopardy, both at its source, in the Persian Gulf, and en route in tankers via the Cape of Good Hope.

On 29 December 1984 came news which electrified the world. An Iranian troop transport had been torpedoed and sunk, with heavy loss of life, by a Soviet submarine in the Strait of Hormuz; and an American intelligence ship had been subjected to missile attack off Aden.

Had Fleet Admiral Gorshkov still been in charge of the Soviet Navy it is doubtful whether things would so soon have begun to go wrong for the Russians. In the first place, he would have had sufficient prestige, courage and professional acumen to have demurred when given orders to send a submarine into the Persian Gulf approaches to sink an Iranian troop transport and immediately report the successful attack. The depth of water being insufficient for nuclear-powered submarine operations to be fully effective, the submarine had to be one of the diesel-driven ‘patrol’ type. But the Iranian Navy was known to have been equipped with up-to-date ASW forces, mainly of British origin, and to be well trained in their use. The prospect, therefore, of a successful submarine attack, followed by the safe withdrawal of the submarine and receipt of the all-important attack report, would not be good. By the same token, Gorshkov would have been unlikely to countenance a surprise missile attack upon an American intelligence ship. He would have reasoned that such an attack might invite reprisals against the Soviet Union’s own intelligence-gathering ships upon which so much depended; and that the US Navy could quickly concentrate a powerful force to escort the damaged ship to safety.

These dramatic events, when reported to the Soviet naval high command, had the effect of concentrating the comrades’ minds wonderfully. Despite the careful planning which had preceded the challenge to the United States, there was suddenly a feeling that events might get out of control. It was central to Soviet politico-military doctrine that military measures must directly and effectively serve some chosen political objective, whether on a worldwide or on a regional scale. Operations in the Middle East had been continuing, short of actual shooting by the great powers themselves, for many years — ever since the 1960s, in fact, soon after the failure of British nerve, French colonialism and American leadership became manifest at Suez. The rapid growth of the Soviet Navy under Gorshkov had been in response to two quite separate requirements, reflecting, as do so many aspects of Soviet policy, its dyadic nature. The first of these, as could be deduced from the Peace Programme promulgated at the Twenty-Fourth CPSU Congress, accepted as inevitable a degree of watchful co-operation between the Soviet and the Western blocs. The strategic balance would be maintained, nuclear war averted and detente promoted. The second need was competitive. In the Third World the Soviet Union had to compete strongly with the West for political influence, by supporting its friends and denying to the West any advantage that might be detrimental to the interest of the USSR or its clients. The Soviet Navy had to support both aspects of Soviet state policy. In theory this had seemed not only feasible but the strongest argument for naval expansion. In practice, how was it going to work out?

The more recent Soviet naval activities in the Middle East formed part of the grand strategy formulated in 1983, when the probability had been foreseen (in a planning document given strictly limited circulation within the Kremlin) that the necessity would arise ‘to remove, by force if necessary, the NATO threat to the security of the USSR in Europe’. The intention of the Soviet Union to continue to take part, either directly or indirectly (but without inciting conflict with Western forces), in ‘fraternal wars’ had been reaffirmed. This policy, sanctified by Communist Party doctrine, could contribute to the achievement of two complementary strategic aims, one political in nature, the other military. Given the increasing dependence of the USA and her NATO allies on petroleum imported from the Persian Gulf, both its denial at source and its interdiction en route would be of great — perhaps decisive — advantage to the Soviet Union. The ‘fraternal’ aid currently being provided to the new United Arab Republic, and to the ‘People’s Liberation Armies’ in Southern Africa, supported these two objectives. But now the shooting had started. It was essential to retain the initiative. The closest possible co-ordination of diplomatic and naval activity was essential; and the responsibility had to be placed firmly where it belonged — with the Politburo. The Soviet Minister of Defence, Raskolnikov, was in complete accord with the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Starsky. There had to be an immediate plenary meeting of the Main Military Council.

When this meeting took place, twenty-four hours later, it was attended by all the First Deputy and Deputy Ministers of Defence; also by the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces, air forces and strategic rocket forces, and, of course, of the main fleets. The ministers responsible for supplies, production of war materials and transport were present, and the Soviet Foreign Office was represented. Opening the meeting, the Minister of Defence briefly outlined the recent events. He then emphasized the need to keep the Politburo, and especially the Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPSU, fully informed and properly advised. Second, the co-ordination, command and control of diplomatic activity and naval operations had to be fully effective. The balance had to be kept between actively supporting ‘fraternal’ forces and avoiding general war with the imperialists. To this end the Council ordered a number of studies to be made, for presentation within forty-eight hours. One of these studies, to be made by the naval staff, was ‘The Correlation of Naval Forces in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf.

The naval paper, completed two days later, was predictable, not only in its comprehensiveness but also in its complexity. Despite Gorshkov’s single-minded advocacy of Soviet sea power throughout a quarter of a century as commander-in-chief, and the implementation of most of his major proposals, there remained many in high places who had never been fully convinced. Several influential members of the Military Council were civilians, landsmen of Russia to whom sea power remained an alien concept, and one not easily accommodated within Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Nor had the generals, as a body, ever been fully reconciled to what they saw as a disproportionate diversion of resources to naval expansion. The Soviet naval staff, therefore, took nothing for granted in reviewing the naval situation in the Middle East. The summary of facts, conclusions and recommendations which accompanied the paper was commendably terse, but the paper itself was not. It began with some ‘General Considerations’. These affirmed that:

1 The seas and oceans of the world remain, in spite of air, and improved land, transport, the ‘broad highway’ over which 90 per cent of the world’s commodities, minerals, manufactured products and petroleum are moved. In addition, 70 per cent of the population of the world live within thirty miles of the sea coast.

2 Economic necessity has forced the Soviet Union to develop, first, large fishing fleets [whaling fleets, also, until there were no more whales], then a large, and still increasing, merchant fleet. The former provided indispensable protein, the latter foreign currency, essential transportation between widely separated parts of the Soviet Union, and political influence worldwide.

3 Oceanographic research has enabled Soviet scientists to understand the sea and the exploration of the sea bed.

4 National security has demanded, first, naval defence of Soviet territory against the nuclear power of the US carrier strike fleets, together with the capacity to interdict seaborne military reinforcement of Western Europe from North America. Later, the development of submarine-launched strategic nuclear ballistic missiles, both by the Soviet Union and the United States, placed upon the Soviet Navy the main responsibility for the retaliatory and damage-limitation rocket forces, indispensable to the preservation of a strategic nuclear posture that would at least not be unfavourable to the Soviet Union in the event of nuclear war.

5 The Soviet Navy must also play its part in the combined armed forces of the Soviet Union by supporting the seaward flank of the ground forces with amphibious operations, defence against attack from seaward, and supply.

6 ‘State interests’ frequently require the support of the Soviet Navy in peacetime. The historical mission of Marxist-Leninist theory calls for the projection of Soviet power beyond the confines of the Eurasian land mass. To this end, it is necessary to contend with, and eventually overcome, the sea power of the United States and her imperialist allies, so that the supremacy of the Soviet Union, at sea as on land, will be acknowledged.

The next section of the Soviet naval staff paper was headed ‘The Comparison of Naval Force’. Pointing out that navies were not in themselves to be regarded as synonymous with sea power, but rather as the instruments of sea power, it went on to give the historical context. Shortly after the end of the Great Patriotic War in 1945, it had been objectively true to say that the Soviet Union was predominantly a continental power, facing a predominantly maritime coalition, in which the United States and Great Britain provided the main naval elements. In addition, the vast majority of the world’s shipping was owned and operated by the maritime coalition, which also occupied or controlled almost all the main ports, harbours and sea routes throughout the world.

During the past three decades this asymmetry had been transformed, by the forces of history and the peace-loving exertions of the Soviet Union, in three ways. First, the Soviet Navy had grown, both actually and relatively, so that it was now in many respects ‘second to none’; second, the Soviet Union had provided itself with a large ocean-going merchant fleet, as well as fishing fleets of great capacity; and third, the failure of the imperialists and colonialists to retain political authority over their subject peoples had led to a large increase in the number of independent states, and these states between them now possessed navies of their own, and many of the ports and harbours which formerly were controlled by the old maritime coalition. Fortunately, the Soviet Union, as the friend of all liberated peoples, now had access to their ports; could utilize their naval forces in the struggle for peace; and could in some cases deny their use to the imperialists. The Soviet Union was now, therefore, a maritime as well as a continental power.

It was still true, however, that in comparing the two blocs, geography, so important a factor in sea power, did impose constraints. The advantage of unified political control enjoyed by the Soviet Union, as compared with the autonomy of the countries comprising the Western coalition, was offset by the continued existence of four major threats to the freedom of Soviet movement by sea. The British Isles could act as an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the north-west approaches to Europe. The exits from Murmansk to the Atlantic, and from the Baltic to the North Sea, could not be regarded as secure. Nor could the Dardanelles, so long as Turkey was imprisoned in the capitalist camp. In the Far East, Japan was so placed as to be able to impose serious limitations on the use of Vladivostok. Soviet policy would sooner or later have to eliminate these four constraints upon her sea power.

Turning now to the comparison of actual naval forces, the paper first referred to the criteria of relative capabilities which had been used in determining the shape and size of the Soviet Navy in accordance with its various missions. Formerly, ‘like fought like’ at sea; a direct comparison of the numbers of similarly armed ships which could be brought into action at a given place and time had always formed the basis both of strategy and of tactics. Now, the balance of naval capability had to be calculated by mathematical systems analysis, solving multi-criteria problems for various adversary situations and different combinations of heterogeneous forces and means. Objective analysis of this kind permitted determination of the necessary and sufficient composition of forces and their combination into balanced groups. Because the application of such methodical, indeed scientific, analysis was indispensable to a proper assessment of the naval-air situation in the Middle East, it was deemed essential to explain it in some detail.

The central concept in modern naval force comparison, the paper affirmed, was the weapon system, not the ship, the submarine or the aircraft, though these were considered as targets for the various weapon systems. In defining a weapon system a choice had to be made. At one end of the spectrum, a club in the hand of a caveman could be called a weapon system; at the other, a ballistic missile submarine. In the present context, the elements of a weapon system were:

1 A means of detecting and identifying a possible target.

2 A warhead capable of destroying or neutralizing that target.

3 A vehicle to carry the warhead to the target.

4 A launcher for the vehicle.

5 A means of controlling the vehicle so that it will hit the target.

6 Protection for the vehicle and warhead against counter-measures designed to prevent either or both from hitting the target.

Certain features of the operational environment profoundly affected weapon systems, the paper went on. If the target was under water the system would be dependent upon the acoustic properties of seawater; if it was above water, it would be dependent upon electro-magnetic radiation. Weapon systems which required a homing device of any kind for target acquisition could always be decoyed or otherwise countered. Those guided by radio command were susceptible to electronic jamming. The tactics used in bringing weapon systems to bear were governed by their characteristics. The principle of concentration of force required continuous reinterpretation in the light of complex and varied weapon systems.

Taking the targets in turn, studies had shown that:

1 Surface ships are vulnerable to surface-skimming, submarine-launched, horizon-range missiles; to tactical surface-to-surface missiles; to air-to-surface missiles; and to torpedoes and mines.

2 Submarines are vulnerable to submarine-launched, wire-guided torpedoes; to aircraft-launched torpedoes and nuclear depth charges; and to ship-launched torpedoes.

3 Aircraft are vulnerable to surface-to-air short-range missiles; to surface-to-air medium- or long-range missiles; and to aircraft-launched missiles.

It had been established, the paper continued, that the latest Soviet weapon systems performed as well, if not better, than their equivalents in service in the US Navy. Soviet strategic deployments and tactical dispositions, therefore, must always aim at bringing to bear a superior concentration of appropriate weapon systems, while denying to the enemy the opportunity to do so. In the field of underwater warfare, two special factors had to be borne in mind. First, owing to the relatively low speed of sound waves in water, it was not feasible for submarines to operate in close formation with each other in order to bring to bear a concentration of weapon systems upon a hostile submarine or surface target. In a submarine versus submarine action, therefore, victory was likely to go to the one which first detected the other. And because noise levels depended mainly upon speed, the submarine whose mission required it to move rapidly would be at greater risk of being surprised. Second, mines could be used with great effect in certain circumstances.

A reminder was then given of the effect upon naval operations of the almost continuous reconnaissance, by satellite or aircraft, now available. The movements of all major surface ships, whether naval or merchant, were now known, and could, if required, be shown direct on TV screens anywhere in the world. Only the submarine forces remained secure from observation, and even in their case good estimates could often be made of the number and types at sea in various areas. But one very serious constraint remained in regard to submarine operations: the need to avoid mutual interference between friendly submarine and anti-submarine forces.

The final section of the Soviet naval staff paper reviewed the situation in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. In comparing the naval and air forces, it assessed the available weapon systems on both sides as approximately equivalent. The Soviet naval object was to support Soviet foreign policy, in exerting pressure on the United States forces in the area, and assisting the fraternal United Arab Republic forces to deny full control of the Persian Gulf to Iran. The course of action recommended was to reinforce the Soviet naval air squadron re-established at Aden with an additional squadron of Backfire bombers, and one of Foxbat fighters. The task group based on a Kiev-class, anti-submarine carrier, now visiting Mauritius, should proceed to the Red Sea, preparatory to the declaration of a War Zone there, should this become necessary. Under the heading ‘Command Communications and Control’, the naval staff advised the establishment forthwith of a Flag Officer Soviet Middle East Forces (FOSMEF), with headquarters ashore at Aden. The agreement of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) government should not be difficult to obtain. FOSMEF would require a full operational staff, an air deputy and a political adviser. A communications echelon would be set up, with an organization appropriate to the major operational task envisaged. FOSMEF would, for the time being, be responsible administratively to the Commander-in-Chief Soviet Black Sea Fleet, at Sevastopol. Operationally, he would be directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief Soviet Fleet.

When the Soviet naval staff paper was taken by the Main Military Council, together with several other important papers, the Conclusions and Recommendations were approved.