Notes

1

General Guderian, who had carefully studied General de Gaulle’s work, ‘The Army of the Future’, was chiefly responsible for the development of the Panzer divisions. Guderian later took the armoured host to the southern approaches of Moscow.

2

Barnes had badly underestimated the position: at this moment the gap torn in the Allied lines by the Wehrmacht was between fifty and sixty miles wide.

3

Meyer was actually referring to the Army Group commander, General von Rundstedt, who personally sent this halt order. The conflict between the two schools of thought – those for advancing nonstop and those who preached caution – raged ferociously through the entire campaign.

4

Barnes underestimated. General von Rundstedt’s Army Group A deployed seven Panzer divisions – over two thousand armoured vehicles.

5

The Allied forces had withdrawn from Arras at 10 pm on Thursday, May 23rd. During their brief counter-attack, I Army Tank Brigade halted the 7th Panzer Division commanded by Major-General Erwin Rommel and caused a panic in the German High Command.

6

Not only sergeants are lucky with documents. Twenty-four hours earlier, Lt-Gen Sir Alan Brooke, commander 11 Corps BEF, was handed a battle order captured from a German staff car which warned of an imminent offensive by Gen von Bock’s Army Group B – just in time for him to move more troops into the threatened area.

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