War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa 1941-1942

Postscript – ‘Barbarossa’

‘The world will hold its breath,’ announced Adolf Hitler when on 22 June 1941 three million German soldiers and their allies launched a surprise attack across the Russo-German border. Operation ‘Barbarossa’ committed the largest and finest army the German nation had ever fielded. Tempered by success in previous campaigns, the Ostheer had every expectation of victory, yet within four months its fighting power had been irretrievably sapped. Success was degraded to a reckless and rapid advance, driving into an enemy of indeterminate strength, to gain shelter before the onset of a pitiless winter. The final assault on Moscow was more a gamble than a considered operational plan. A number of factors contributed to this eventual débâcle, and these are considered in turn.

Surprise was the paramount feature of this initial campaign of the Russian war. Both populations were stunned at the precipitate nature of the attack. Most German soldiers were informed about the impending assault a mere 24 hours before their relatives at home. The Russian population was at first dismayed, then indignant at this blatant disregard of a Non-Aggression Pact that had promised so much two years before, with a fanfare of political rhetoric. War occasioned mutual surprise. Unlike earlier adversaries, who logically surrendered if outmanoeuvred and encircled, Russian armies fought on to the death. ‘Don’t die without leaving a dead German behind you,’ exhorted hopelessly surrounded Russian soldiers at Brest-Litovsk in June.

Soviet planners, checkmated by their strategic compromise between an offensive and defensive stance on the German border, were stunned by the Blitzkrieg pace of advance forced on their confused armies. They were outwitted at each strategic development by massive encirclements unprecedented in military history, first by the sudden change of direction south into the Ukraine away from Moscow, and then by the timing of Operation ‘Taifun ‘. This was unexpectedly launched at the capital well into the autumn, despite the impending winter. The German General Staff likewise underestimated the extent of the ‘Russian Colossus’. A potential Russian strength of 200 divisions had to be reassessed at 360 within two months of the invasion.⁽¹⁾ ‘Kick in the door and the whole rotten edifice would come crashing down’ was the loose ideological underpinning of the plan to prosecute the campaign approved by Adolf Hitler.

Despite the maligned and shabby workers’ paradise’ portrayed in jeering German newsreels, cinema audiences in the Reich were soon to see film of the massive Dnieper dams and shipyards at Nikolaev on the Black Sea, contrary to the primitive society claimed. German soldiers further experienced a technological shock on encountering hitherto unknown heavy tank types. There was no reliable anti-tank defence against these, other than static, high-velocity anti-aircraft guns hurriedly employed in the ground role. Soviet Katyusha M13 multi-barrelled rocket launchers also had an unprecedented and devastating effectiveness, and on German morale, again demonstrating this opponent was unlike all others that had preceded it.

Surprise impacted in other ways. As well read as the German Army was on the historic invasions of Russia by Charles XII of Sweden in 1707 and Napoleon in 1812, they were still mentally unconditioned for the vastness and extremes of climate in Russia. The fan-shaped German advance widened to 2,800km within four months and was over 1,000km deep. To maintain a conventional continuous front would require 280 divisions. But only 127 divisions participated in the original invasion. Partisan warfare across this wide expanse and in such depth had never been experienced before. German soldiers were unprepared for the physical extent of the undertaking. Phrases used to describe the phenomenon in Feldpost letters reflect this perception of inadequacy. Unit fighting contributions were likened to a drop of water on a hot stove’ or to ‘a stone cast into the sea’.

^{Operation ‘Barbarossa became the longest campaign in the war. Blitzkrieg or ‘lightning war’ had until then offered speedy conclusions to operations. This one was anticipated to last eight to ten weeks. At the six-week (or successful French Armistice of 1940 point) German forces were still battling to close the Smolensk pocket. It also coincided with the period of the heaviest casualties during the war. The final surprise was in not winning. No German Army had been defeated en masse since the beginning of the war. Zhukov’s counter-stroke in front of Moscow may have been primitive in its delivery but it brought the Ostheer to its knees. This should perhaps not have been totally unexpected. Defeat had already been insidiously inflicted in a cumulative manner by the bloody Pyrrhic pocket-battle victories up until September.}

The need to fight encirclements to annihilation had not happened before in this war. It broke the tempo of Blitzkrieg. An ominous portent of the future had been the vicious battle for the citadel at Brest-Litovsk in the first days of the campaign. This action on the border cost the division that fought it more casualties in one week than it lost during the entire operation in France, lasting longer than the western campaign in its entirety. Encirclement battles at Minsk and Smolensk consecutively tied down more than 50% of the offensive potential of Army Group Centre. In the west, creative General Staff planning had split and outmanoeuvred the allied armies, which capitulated. The Russians doggedly fought on, whatever the cost. Inspired manoeuvre alone would not suffice to win battles on the new Eastern Front. The savaged opponent had first to be finished off, a time-consuming and costly affair. German ‘fast’ motorised or Panzer divisions were not configured for this development and were unpractised in defence. They were badly mauled penning their fanatical opponents, waiting for the arrival of the infantry who were to administer the coup de grâce. Infantry will’ became as important as Panzer skill’ in pursuing battles of attrition. Infantry operations required willpower, less appropriate arguably to Panzer formations required to excel in manoeuvre warfare, not the static defensive battles they were involuntarily obliged to fight. Throughout the ‘Barbarossa’ offensive phase, often described as Blitzkrieg, one is struck by the quantity of soldiers’ accounts that describe costly defensive actions, not fast-moving meeting engagements.

Operation ‘Barbarossa was unlike previous campaigns because the Wehrmacht made war on the Russian civilian population. Fighting in the west had, of course, not been prosecuted in a vacuum. Civilian centres had been bombed, such as Rotterdam, and Warsaw and other towns and cities were fought over. But there was a vicious ideological thread within the new campaign that saw operations being actively prosecuted against civilians by certain elements within the armies. During the invasion the Reich population read about developments in their newspapers, listened to the radio or watched Wochenschau newsreels. The Russian population was in the fighting. This was to have an impact upon the moral component of the fighting power of both sides. German infantryman Robert Rupp confessed to his wife:

Whereas the moral seepage occasioned by cruelties was to have a corrosive impact on German motivation and fighting power, it increased the will of the Russian soldier to resist at all costs.

A central theme of this book has been the recognition of the extent to which German fighting power had been degraded by the Pyrrhic victories of summer encirclement battles. September 1941, according to this hypothesis, represents the key watershed of the ‘Barbarossa campaign, rather than the collapse of the Army Group Centre front in the face of the Russian counter-offensive before Moscow in December. ‘General Winter’ was not responsible. Rather the ferocity and doggedness of Russian resistance, despite the hideous human cost, was instrumental in reducing the three components of German ‘fighting power’ to an almost terminal state.

Fighting power according to modern British military doctrine can be crudely broken down into three inter-related aspects: the physical, moral and conceptual. The physical part is concerned with the manpower and resources to execute the mission. The ‘moral’ is the ‘hearts’ aspect, requiring willpower and determination to enact it, while the conceptual aspect is the ‘minds’ or intellectual input. This is the plan or strategy required to achieve the objective. By the end of September the Ostheer, while inflicting three to four million casualties on the enemy, had suffered half a million in so doing itself. This loss represented 30 division equivalents, and a like strength of officers and NCOs to man 37 from 117 divisions. These totals were greater than the sum strength (26 divisions) of Army Group North at the outset of the campaign. Leadership losses, representing probably one-third of the total, were key. Both these and soldier casualties came from the ‘teeth or fighting elements of divisions. They were the cream, the veterans forged in battle. As training times varied from six to 18 months, they were irreplaceable. A typical infantry division was 64% ‘teeth compared with its non-combatant ‘tail’. Panzer division combat elements represented just under half its nevertheless essential ‘specialised’ and logistic ‘tail’, made up of technical experts. Overall, the losses constituted half the fighting element of divisions. Motorised vehicle and Panzer states were in no less parlous a state at the end of September. In general only half were still operating, and much of the remainder were good for only another 200km, barely sufficient to reach Moscow.

Inextricably linked to this equation was a logistic ‘trip-wire impediment. This invisible motor transport shuttle line stretching 500km beyond the Reich frontier meant a rail network had to be quickly established beyond to bring fighting divisions up to their full logistic combat supplements. With half the lorry fleet out of action and no capability quickly to reconfigure Russian railway gauges, an intangible logistic hurdle was created stymieing any further strategic advances on Moscow. Adverse weather – first mud and then sub-arctic temperatures – ensued, preventing practical and sustainable logistic support. An irretrievable breakdown of the Ostheers logistic ability to support an offensive was the result. Wheeled and rail transport was unable to cope.

The physical’ component of fighting power was directly linked to the conceptual’, in that losses rendered the Blitzkrieg mode of war fighting inoperable. Leadership losses by the end of September burned out the nucleus of the veteran capability practically to execute fast-moving and joint operations beyond the breakthrough achieved at the beginning of October. A paucity of reserves robbed the Ostheer of its Auftragstaktik flexibility, reliant upon initiative. It was emasculated by the inability to pass on risks to higher formations, who traditionally influenced the outcome of battle by deciding when reserves should be committed at the right place and moment to win. Lack of reserves necessitated a centralisation of the fewer available assets. Less risk-taking denied tactical flexibility. No one could salvage the daring commander who over-committed himself. It preceded the greater control that Adolf Hitler was later to impose on assuming the mantle of Commander-in-Chief in December. Likewise, the breakdown of ‘teeth to tail’ ratios robbed divisions of their combined arms synergy. Close co-ordination between Panzers, infantry, air and artillery was dependent upon the ‘specialists’ who made it work. Once these technical tradesmen and Panzer and Luftwaffe crews were employed as infantry, current and future professional expertise was squandered, and with it the implicit war-winning superiority of German combat structures. The conclusion of the battle of Kiev at the end of September coincided, therefore, with two watersheds on the Eastern Front. Firstly, it was the point at which German experience began to lose its edge, relative to Russian learning capacity. Secondly, the impetus conferred on German formations by surprise was lost. With Leningrad encircled and Kiev taken, both sides could see that Moscow would be the next objective.

The ‘moral’ component of fighting power – willpower and motivation – lies at its core. At the outset of’Barbarossa the Ostheerwas committed to its duty to the Reich, and confident of achieving its objectives. Large segments were convinced of National Socialist ideals in a loose peer pressure’ sense. Casualties and the morally corrupting influence of officially sanctioned violence against the Russian Army and populace began to erode this core. Momentum was sustained despite losses during the battles at Smolensk and Kiev because the Panzers were always winning up ahead. The infantry instinctively realised from its French experience that heavy casualties may result in the short term, but the long-term result is cheaper if the momentum is sustained.

They fought on. Battles at Kiev and Vyazma and Bryansk during Operation ‘Taifun’ were appreciated for the gambles they were, but the men had faith in their Führer. Those at the top’ had yet to be proven wrong in this war. Cynicism, however, developed in tandem with losses. Domestic pressure increased from anxious relatives at home, questioning the cost and mistrustful of propaganda. A frustrated feeling of betrayal arose after the successful encirclement battles at Vyazma and Bryansk. The German press crowed that Soviet capitulation would follow, but it was not delivered.

It is interesting to observe the extent to which SS Secret Service reports focused on the opinion of women in the Reich. During an era of male dominance, only beginning to change with the increasing employment of women in industry required in Total War’, their opinion was canvassed and accorded immense respect. Their views were totally uncompromising and voiced like lions, as they gradually perceived the extent of the suffering of their menfolk at the front. From Smolensk onwards, women in the Reich expressed concern at casualties and the likely impact of the approaching winter.

Excesses committed by the Einsatzgruppen and other state-sponsored terror committed against Russian prisoners and civilians had a cumulative moral impact on German soldiers. Although orders were not overtly questioned, many became increasingly uncomfortable at the ‘justness’ of their cause. Complicity was variable and depended upon individual standards of human decency. More recent conflicts in Europe, notably the Balkans, reveal the extent to which complicity, viewed through nationalist, UN, NATO and political-ideological filters is not clear-cut. Vernichtungskrieg in Russia was becoming increasingly transparent.

A string of campaign setbacks created further unease. One had lived with the disappointment of the ‘half result at Dunkirk because it had been followed by the French Armistice. They were to be followed, however, by reverses at Leningrad, Rostov and finally the débâcle before Moscow. The totally unexpected Soviet counter-offensive crashed into an Ostheer, which saw the cream of its generals abruptly removed in the throes of a crisis. Faith in the Führer remained, but ‘those at the top’ had badly let the men down. The German General Staff, whatever the political pressure, was equally mesmerised by the ultimate prize to be had at Moscow. Its fall came to symbolise a likely end to the war. With the veterans dead and the chalice of victory snatched dishearteningly from its lips, there was a real crisis of confidence. The Ostheer subsequently fought almost to the death in front of Moscow, not for Hitler or duty, but to survive.

The final theme to emerge is a failure of German command, a lack of OKW perception. This was firstly its misappreciation of the Russian foe, and secondly its inability to recognise the effect the campaign was having on the very fabric of the Ostheer itself. Russian casualties during the first six months, at three to four millions, dwarfed the imagination. Stupendous though they were, they were never sufficient to persuade the Soviet regime to sue for peace. As a consequence, Russia had only to weather the initial shock of invasion to survive. In time it could exploit its superior demographic and economic resources to win. Cities tended to be avoided by the Führer and the General Staff for tactical not ethical reasons. It was decided at Leningrad to starve the metropolis into submission. But they were equally significant as Communist Party centres, the focal points from which it extended its power and influence into the immense interior of the state. They were, therefore, strategic targets. Hitler’s acute perception of what was ideologically important influenced his judgement on objectives such as Leningrad, Moscow and, later, Stalingrad – ‘Stalin’s City’. Russia may not have been militarily defeated, but the Communist Party power base resided in the cities, which were vulnerable to military action but whose vulnerability was not exploited. The consequences of racial war were to prove a salvation for the Communist Party, enabling it to harness Russian nationalism as a panacea to the crisis.

The second failure of German Command was OKW’s inability to recognise the extent to which German fighting power had actually eroded by September. The force fighting on the approaches to Moscow was tangibly different from the one that had crossed the demarcation line in June 1941. Expanding the number of new Panzer divisions using the same number of equipments but with manpower increases diluted the quality of the Wehrmacht instrument that had Blitzkrieged its way through Western Europe. None of the fundamental shortcomings that emerged from the French campaign, notably insufficient motorised vehicles and effective infantry anti-tank defences, were properly addressed during the pause between operations. ‘Mot’, the German military abbreviation for ‘motorised’, was replaced by ‘Hot’, a sardonic Landser label describing the extent to which motor vehicle losses were replaced by horse power.

As the German armies ‘victored’ themselves to death, all the negative aspects of linkage between the three identified components of fighting power came together. The very ‘Verdun’ that von Bock sought to avoid at the gates of Moscow occurred before he arrived. The Ostheers momentum was halted within 20km of the Kremlin. Blind faith in the invincibility of the Wehrmacht, maintained during every campaign in this war to date, was finally shattered in the snow-covered fields and forests of the western approaches to Moscow. They had sacrificed the seed-corn of Blitzkrieg to get this far. Many of those responsible for the planning and conduct of the advance were removed from command as part of the price. The cream of the army the last vestiges of Weimar influence and the majority of World War 1 veterans had disappeared, dead or broken men. The German soldier had now ostensibly to fight for the Führer, the man to whom they swore allegiance as the Head of State and now Commander of the Army. Most, having witnessed the depredations visited on the civilian population and prisoners of war, whether they were accomplices or not, feared an inevitable retribution. They would reap the whirlwind. The war, all sensed, had reached a turning point. They would now have to fight for their comrades, their families and, above all, themselves.

Between 9 and 11 May 1942 the 7th Panzer Division was relieved in the line and sent back to France to recuperate. In June 1941 one of its units, Infantry Regiment 6, had been transported from the Cologne area to East Prussia in 12 trains in preparation for the invasion. One train was sufficient to achieve the move less than one year later.⁽³⁾

Germany’s borders might one day be under threat. Now, it was a matter for survival. This imperative was to become corrupted with further setbacks and the passage of time to a sardonic Landser motto, adopted during the eventual retreat of the German armies. ‘Enjoy the war while you can,’ it enjoined, ‘because the peace will be terrible.’