Where the Iron Crosses Grow: The Crimea 1941-44

CHAPTER 6 The German Conquest, May–July 1942

As spring arrived, Hitler began issuing orders for the upcoming summer offensive with which he intended to knock the Soviet Union out of the war. This time, the main effort would be made in the south with Heeresgruppe Süd, toward the Caucasus oil fields and the Volga, while Heeresgruppen Nord and Mitte remained on the defensive. Yet Hitler and the OKH recognized that it would be necessary to clear up the Soviet Barvenkovo Salient south of Kharkov and to finish off Soviet resistance in the Crimea before embarking upon the larger task. By eliminating Soviet resistance in the Crimea, Manstein’s AOK 11 would be free to support the advance into the Caucasus. In accordance with Führer Directive 41 issued on April 5, Manstein was directed to eliminate Kozlov’s forces in the Kerch Peninsula first, then Heeresgruppe Süd would deal with the Barvenkovo Salient with Operation Fridericus, and then, afterwards, Manstein would complete operations in the Crimea by capturing the fortress of Sevastopol. Manstein flew to Rastenburg in East Prussia to discuss his future plans with Hitler, and stated that substantial Luftwaffe air support was an essential requirement for rapid success in the Crimea. Hitler agreed, and promised to send the elite Fliegerkorps VIII to support his attacks. However, unlike Barbarossa, Hitler stressed that the Luftwaffe no longer had the resources to conduct simultaneous major offensives, but instead would have to shuttle its resources between the Crimea and the other armies of Heeresgruppe Süd, meaning that Manstein’s attacks would have to stick to tight schedules.

Even before Kozlov’s fourth offensive ended, Manstein and his staff began developing an operational plan to crush all three armies of the Crimean Front in one bold stroke. The offensive was named Operation Trappenjagd (“Bustard Hunt”) and would begin in early May, once the ground had hardened. Unusually, Hitler granted Manstein considerable autonomy on how he conducted his offensive, as long as it was completed on time. A key part of the plan relied upon the transfer of Fliegerkorps VIII to the Crimea prior to Trappenjagd in order to seize air superiority at the outset of the offensive. Manstein believed that if the Luftwaffe could gain air superiority over the Crimea he could then mass enough combat power to smash in Kozlov’s weaker left wing, comprising General-Lieutenant Stepan I. Cherniak’s 44th Army, then exploit the situation before Kozlov could react. The plan was typical of Manstein’s philosophy of war, based upon risk, maneuver, and concentration of force at the decisive point. By normal principles of military science, success was unlikely, since Manstein was able to assemble only the 22. Panzer-Division, five German infantry divisions, and two and a half Romanian divisions to attack a total of 19 Soviet divisions and four tank brigades. Outnumbered by more than 2-1, Manstein’s forces seemed better suited for defense, but he counted on this disparity to lull Kozlov into a false sense of security.

Kozlov’s forces certainly appeared formidable. In the north, Lvov’s 51st Army defended a 5½-mile-long front with eight rifle divisions, three rifle brigades, and two tank brigades. In the south, Cherniak’s 44th Army defended a much shorter sector with five rifle divisions and two tank brigades. Although both first-echelon armies had prepared three lines of defense, including an antitank ditch that bisected the entire width of the Parpach Narrows, almost all the rifle units were deployed within 2 miles of the front line. Tank brigades and cavalry were deployed further back in reserve. In the second echelon, General-Major Konstantin S. Kolganov’s 47th Army was deployed in reserve with four rifle and one cavalry division. Under pressure from Stalin to mount another offensive, Kozlov intended once again to use Lvov’s 51st Army as his battering ram and had massed the bulk of his forces in the northern salient to support this concept. Kozlov was confident that General-Major Yevgeniy M. Nikolaenko’s VVS-Crimean Front, which had 176 fighters and 225 bombers available, would continue to maintain air superiority over the eastern Crimea and that this would deter any attempt by Manstein to go on the offensive.[1] However, Kozlov failed to appreciate that Nikolaenko’s air strength was based on quantity, not quality, and that the bulk of his units were intended for close-air-support roles, not air superiority. Only the three fighter squadrons in the 72nd Fighter Division (72 IAD) were equipped with modern Yak-1 or LaGG-3 fighters; the other six fighter regiments were equipped with obsolescent I-16 fighters or I-153 fighter-bombers. Another serious but subtle weakness was that Nikolaenko had only three reconnaissance squadrons equipped with a dozen SB bombers and U-2 or R-5 biplanes.

Not surprisingly, Nikolaenko’s limited reconnaissance assets failed to note that Generaloberst Wolfram von Richthofen, commander of the elite Fliegerkorps VIII, established his headquarters at Kischlaw, west of Feodosiya, on May 1. Over the next five days, Fliegerkorps VIII brought over 400 more aircraft into the Crimean theater, thereby radically altering the air balance in favor of the Luftwaffe. In particular, the Luftwaffe fighter strength in the Crimea swelled from one Jagdgruppe with 45 Bf-109F fighters to four Jagdgruppen with 166 Bf-109E/F fighters. Many of these fighters were based at newly built airfields south of Simferopol and west of Feodosiya, which had not previously been used by the Luftwaffe. A number of Soviet reconnaissance aircraft disappeared over the Crimea in early May – the first victims of Fliegerkorps VIII in this sector – but it did not cause any undue alarm in Kozlov’s headquarters. In addition, Richthofen’s command brought German bomber strength in the Crimea up to five Kampfgruppen, with 160 bombers and all of StG 77 with 106 Ju-87 Stukas. Sarabus, the main German airbase in the Crimea, swelled from hosting about 70 aircraft to over 250 in a few days. On May 6, two Gruppen from Schlachtgeschwader 1 (SchG 1) began to arrive at an airstrip near Feodosiya; I./SchG 1 was equipped with Bf-109E-7 fighter-bombers and II./SchG 1 was equipped with 43 of the new Hs 129 B-1 ground-attack planes. These heavily armored aircraft were intended as tank destroyers and equipped with two 20mm and one 30mm cannon, as well as antipersonnel fragmentation bombs. By May 7, Richthofen had quietly assembled 555 combat aircraft in the Crimea to support Operation Trappenjagd.[2]

Manstein had learned from his experience in developing his version of the Fall Gelb plan for the attack through the Ardennes in 1940 that significant operational-level surprise could be achieved by attacking in places that the enemy did not expect and by using methods they had not considered. He deliberately chose to place his Schwerpunkt in the least favorable terrain: the swampy southern sector held by Cherniak’s 44th Army. He intended to use three infantry divisions from Generalleutnant Fretter-Pico’s XXX Armeekorps in the first echelon to breach the Soviet lines, then, once a breach was achieved, to push the 22. Panzer-Division to exploit the hole in Cherniak’s front. It is apparent that Manstein learned from the debacle with 22. Panzer-Division in March, and this time he intended to hold his armor back until Fretter-Pico’s infantry breached the enemy’s defenses. Instead of using paratroopers – which were not available – Manstein intended to conduct a small-scale amphibious landing behind Cherniak’s front, using the assault boats from the 902. Sturmboote-Kommando. This was a high-risk operation – if Fretter-Pico’s troops did not break through quickly, the amphibious force would be isolated and destroyed. Based upon his experience from the December offensive at Sevastopol, Manstein had also developed new tactics for breaking through enemy fortified lines, based upon the close cooperation of infantry Stossgruppen, assault guns, pioneers, Panzerjägers, and flak troops. Consequently, Manstein provided Fretter-Pico with the tools to unlock Cherniak’s defense: a total of 57 StuG III assault guns from the 190., 197., and 249. Sturmgeschütz-Abteilungen, two batteries of 8.8cm flak guns, and plentiful engineer support. Furthermore, at least a dozen of the StuG IIIs were equipped with the new L/48 long 7.5cm cannon, which greatly improved their antitank capability. Manstein also integrated deception into the Trappenjagd plan by having Mattenklott’s XXXXII Armeekorps conduct feints against the 51st Army, which made it look as though any German counterattack would occur in the northern sector, while Fretter-Pico’s troops did not occupy assault positions until the night before the attack. In fact, Mattenklott’s northern sector was seriously denuded of troops in order to strengthen Fretter-Pico’s corps, leaving just the 46. Infanterie-Division and the Romanian Mountain Corps to keep the 51st Army at bay. For once, Axis operational-security measures worked, and AOK 11 was able to conceal the fact that more than half of its combat forces were massed against the southernmost point of the Soviet line and that the rest of the front was only lightly held.

General-Major Yevgeniy M. Nikolaenko, commander of the VVS-Crimean Front, was a 36-year-old fighter pilot who had earned an HSU decoration in a fighter melee over China in August 1938. He was an up-and-coming star of the VVS, but it all vanished on the morning of May 8, 1942, when Operation Trappenjagd kicked off. Fliegerkorps VIII mounted a maximum effort, flying over 2,100 sorties during the course of the day, beginning with attacks on Nikolaenko’s forward airfields at Bagerovo and Marfovka. It was like June 1941 all over again, with the VVS caught flat-footed as Luftwaffe bombers swept in and destroyed parked aircraft on the ground. Richthofen then allowed his four Jagdgruppen to conduct fighter sweeps across the Kerch Peninsula during the day, resulting in a claim of 57 air-to-air “kills” on the first day of the offensive. By noon, Nikolaenko had lost perhaps one-quarter of his aircraft and had clearly lost control of the air over the Kerch Peninsula. During the first two days of Trappenjagd, Fliegerkorps VIII flew 3,800 sorties and shattered the VVS-Crimean Front; the Luftwaffe admitted losing 23 of their own aircraft against over 100 Soviet aircraft.

Cherniak, born into a Belarusian peasant family, was a 41-year-old career infantryman who had served as an advisor in the Spanish Civil War and had later been awarded the HSU for his performance as a division commander during the Russo-Finnish War. He had an admirable record for a Soviet commander, having dodged the purges and managed to avoid suffering any notable reverses in the field. Like Nikolaenko, Cherniak’s heretofore-laudable reputation was wrecked in the opening hours of Trappenjagd. Three minutes before sunrise, XXX Armeekorps’ artillery began a ten-minute artillery preparation on Cherniak’s forward units at 0415hrs. Four Nebelwerfer batteries poured smoke and high-explosive on the identified Soviet positions. The 44th Army had two divisions – the 63rd Mountain Rifle and the 276th Rifle Division – holding a 4-mile stretch of front line, then an antitank ditch located 2 miles further back, guarded by the 157th and 404th Rifle Divisions. Cherniak’s reserve consisted of the 39th and 56th Tank Brigades, located near Arma-Eli.

At 0425hrs, German infantry from the three lead divisions began moving forward. Although the Soviet 251st Rifle Regiment (63rd Mountain) held a very strong position on the 40m high “Tatar Hill” north of the Feodosiya–Kerch road, the unit was not completely tied in with the neighboring 346th Regiment to the south. Stukas from StG 77 blasted the top of the hill just as troops from Generalleutnant Johann Sinnhuber’s 28. leichte Infanterie-Division crossed the line of departure. The dust from the air raid had barely settled when Stossgruppen from Jäger-Regiment 49 of Sinnhuber’s division, supported by 21 assault guns and a company of 18 captured Soviet tanks, was able to first bypass then overwhelm the isolated 346th Rifle Regiment. Less than 2 miles to the south, the 132. Infanterie-Division’s two lead regiments and 22 assault guns were able to overwhelm the 291st Rifle Regiment’s strongpoints on the coast by 0445hrs, and by 0540hrs IR 438 had reached the west side of the antitank ditch. After “Tatar Hill” was overrun, the Jäger-Regiment 49 spearhead pushed rapidly up the 1½-mile stretch of road to reach the west side of the antitank ditch. Despite the fact that the 11-yard-wide antitank ditch was protected by a minefield and barbed wire, as well as steel girders to stop tanks, Jäger-Regiment 49 was able to overcome the stunned Soviet defenders and to secure a bridgehead across the ditch by 0755hrs. In only three and a half hours, the 63rd Mountain Rifle Division’s frontline regiments had been shattered, and the Soviet second line of defense had been pierced. Soviet tanks appeared to contest the crossing, but a one-sided duel with Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190 resulted in the loss of 24 Soviet tanks in exchange for the loss of just one StuG III.[3] The only sector where Fretter-Pico’s XXX Armeekorps encountered difficulties was south of Koi-Asan, when the 50. Infanterie-Division, supported by 14 assault guns, attacked the 276th Rifle Division. The German infantrymen from the 50. Infanterie-Division had to cross very swampy terrain and then attack through three rows of obstacles before reaching the antitank ditch late in the day.

The collapse of Cherniak’s 44th Army was accelerated by a coordinated attack upon the second-echelon defenses as well. Shortly after the initial artillery bombardment, one infantry company from Infanterie-Regiment 436 (132 ID) and a pioneer platoon were moved by a flotilla of assault boats from the 902. Sturmboote-Kommando from Feodosiya to land 1,500 yards behind the antitank ditch. Amazingly, not a single vessel of the Black Sea Fleet interfered with this German amphibious operation, although one or two small warships would have annihilated the flimsy speedboats. Some Soviet mortars and light artillery did engage the assault boats as they approached the shore, but they failed to hit any. This attack was an extremely bold move, and it helped to unhinge the Soviet second line of defense. The German infantrymen quickly overwhelmed two bunkers covering this stretch of coast and then radioed for the next wave to come in. During the day, the 902. Sturmboote-Kommando ferried in most of the rest of the infantrymen of IR 436, which proceeded to overrun the antitank-ditch defenders from behind. Very effective Luftwaffe close-air support kept any Soviet counterattacks away during the early hours of the landing, although Soviet artillery and mortar fire succeeded in destroying 13 assault boats. The two second-echelon formations from the 44th Army – the 157th and 404th Rifle Divisions – were hard hit by Stuka and Hs 129 B attacks during the day and failed to redeploy in time to either deal with the amphibious landing or the penetration up the center by the 28. leichte Infanterie-Division. Once the antitank ditch was breached, Manstein committed his only mobile unit – the Groddeck Brigade – to move through the gap, and its units soon linked up with the IR 436 beachhead and pushed 2 miles further east. Fretter-Pico’s XXX Armeekorps had suffered only 104 killed and 284 wounded on the first day of Trappenjagd, but it had captured 4,514 prisoners and ripped open the 44th Army’s left flank.

Based upon the experience gained with Brigade Ziegler during the pursuit operations in November 1941, Manstein decided to assemble an even larger and more capable motorized Kampfgruppe for the pursuit phase of Trappenjagd. Oberst Karl Albrecht von Groddeck, an experienced commander of motorized infantry, was brought to AOK 11 to take command of an ad hoc brigade comprised of Aufklärungs-Abteilung (mot.) 22, I./ Infanterie-Regiment 391, Panzerjäger-Abteilung 560, schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 154 (12x 149mm s.FH 37(t)), the 6./ Artillerie-Regiment 818 (4x 10cm s.K 18), one battery of six StuG III assault guns from Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 197, a special-forces company from z.b.V. 800 “Brandenburg,” one Nebelwerfer battery, two flak batteries, one company from Pionier-Bataillon 173, and the Romanian 3rd Motorized Cavalry Regiment. In addition, Gruppe Müller was attached to Brigade Groddeck, with truck-mounted Infanterie-Regiment 401, I./Infanterie-Regiment 105, Panzer-Abteilung 223, a panzer company with 18 captured-Soviet tanks, two Romanian 15cm batteries, a battery from Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190, and more pioneers and Panzerjägers. Altogether, Groddeck had a division-size task with five infantry battalions, 30 armored fighting vehicles, and 30 artillery pieces.[4] Every truck, car, and motorcycle that could be temporarily spared in the Crimea was given to Groddeck’s brigade to motorize as many sub-units as possible, but some of the infantry still rode on bicycles, pulled on ropes behind trucks.

Belatedly, Cherniak committed his 56th Tank Brigade and 126th Separate Tank Battalion (OTB) with 98 tanks, including seven KV-1, to attack the 28. leichte Infanterie-Division’s breakthrough. However, by the time that the Soviet armor assembled on the open steppe, Stukas from StG 77 and Hs 129 Bs from SchG 1 arrived and blasted them to pieces in a hail of bombs and cannon fire; 48 tanks were knocked out, including all seven KV-1.[5] Kozlov did not realize how badly the 44th Army’s front had been breached until German pioneers had almost completed bridging the antitank ditch, thereby opening the way for Brigade Groddeck to begin rushing eastward toward Kerch.

The day of decision for Operation Trappenjagd was May 9, and it quickly went badly for Kozlov’s Crimean Front. Soviet command and control was apparently badly disrupted in the initial Luftwaffe raids – the 51st Army commander, General-Lieutenant Lvov, was mortally wounded in one raid, and Kozlov still failed to comprehend the extent of the German breakthrough in the 44th Army sector – he merely ordered Cherniak to clear it up with local counterattacks. He did give Cherniak one rifle division from the 47th Army reserve, but this was too little and too late. German pioneers had spent the night of May 8/9 filling in the 12-yard-wide antitank ditch and removing mines, wire, and steel beams in order to clear a path for the 22. Panzer-Division, but pockets of bypassed Soviet troops prevented this task from being accomplished until midday on May 9. In the interim, the 28. leichte Infanterie-Division boldly moved northeast and seized Arma-Eli, while the 132. Infanterie-Division and Brigade Groddeck continued to advance eastward against light resistance. Cherniak continued counterattacking with his remaining forces, but these uncoordinated regiment-size operations were easily defeated by XXX Armeekorps. The Stukas of StG 77 and the Hs 129Bs of SchG 1 also eliminated most of Cherniak’s armor, and Bf 109 fighters shot down 25 Soviet aircraft attempting to support the 44th Army counterattack. Cherniak’s counterattack was a dismal failure.

During the fighting around Arma-Eli, Brigade Groddeck managed to skirt around the 44th Army’s shattered left flank and to boldly advance over 15 miles into the Soviet rear areas. Kozlov had left only the 11th NKVD Division and the depleted 72nd Cavalry Division in the rear to secure the final defensive line along the so-called “Turkish Rampart,” another example of ancient fortifications in the Crimea, but in reality little more than a time-worn berm and ditch fieldwork. Unfortunately, Soviet command and control was so disrupted that neither unit was aware that German forces were approaching their positions. Suddenly, a motorized raiding party of the Groddeck Brigade descended upon Marfovka airfield on the afternoon of May 9 and destroyed some 35 I-153 fighter-bombers on the ground. Kozlov was shocked when he heard this, and the growing fear that the Germans were running amok in the rear areas helped to shatter Soviet morale.

Manstein was finally able to commit the 22. Panzer-Division and its 200 tanks in the late afternoon of May 9, but the unit had barely crossed the antitank ditch and begun moving north when a drenching rain began to fall. The heavy rains created mud that temporarily slowed the panzers and grounded the Luftwaffe, which gave the Soviets a brief respite. Despite Lvov’s death, Kozlov tried to block the 22. Panzer-Division by shifting the 40th Tank Brigade and 229th OTB, with 53 tanks including 21 KV-1s. Yet when the rain stopped the next morning, the Luftwaffe easily spotted the Soviet heavy tanks and pulverized them – 11 KV-1s were destroyed and others immobilized. With the Soviet armor knocked out, the 22. Panzer-Division resumed its advance and quickly reached the Sea of Azov, cutting off the entire 51st Army by midday on May 10. The 28. leichte Infanterie-Division followed hard on the heels of the panzers, and with the help of the 50. and 170. Infanterie-Divisionen, they sealed off the Kessel pinned against the Sea of Azov.

By this point, the Stavka began to realize that the Crimean Front was in serious trouble, and ordered Kolganov’s 47th Army – which was not inside the Kessel – to counterattack, but his handful of second-rate infantry units had little artillery or tank support and could not even form a new front line. There were still five intact RVGK artillery regiments, but communication with these critical fire-support assets was lost on the first day of the German offensive and no effort was made to restore it, so they sat inactive and without orders to support either counterattack or defense.[6] It was not long before Kozlov realized that the only viable course of action was to order an immediate retreat to the Turkish Rampart, but it was too late. Brigade Groddeck’s vanguard captured several crossings over the southern part of the virtually unguarded “Turkish Rampart” on the morning of May 10. Manstein also increased the pressure on the trapped 51st Army by ordering the German XXXXII Armeekorps and Romanian 7th Corps to begin attacking the western side of the pocket. Once this happened, Soviet command and control completely collapsed and Kolganov’s 47th Army began a disorganized stampede to the rear, with all units not already encircled attempting to reach the imagined safety of Kerch. There was only one main paved road running from Feodosiya to Kerch and the Luftwaffe had a field day, conducting merciless low-level strafing and bombing runs on the retreating Soviet columns. However, Soviet antiaircraft units were still operational, and when KG 55 proved overly bold, they lost eight He-111s to ground fire on May 10.[7]

Less than 24 hours elapsed before the eight divisions of the encircled 51st Army realized that their situation was hopeless and surrendered, which quickly released XXX Armeekorps to pursue the retreating Soviet fragments. Once through the “Turkish Rampart,” the only unit between Brigade Groddeck and the southern approaches to Kerch was the Soviet 11th NKVD Division, a well-equipped and full-strength formation assigned to rear-security duties. On May 11 the NKVD troops managed to ambush the German vanguard, and Groddeck himself was badly wounded. However, once the NKVD troops realized that the German brigade had armor and artillery, they broke contact and fell back toward Kerch, intent only upon saving themselves. Once it became clear that his front was collapsing, Kozlov began organizing an evacuation from Kerch by calling upon Gorshkov’s Azov Flotilla and about 80 local fishing craft. However, Fliegerkorps VIII concentrated its bombers on interdicting the Kerch Strait and sank three transports with 900 wounded aboard between May 10 and May 12, as well as sinking a gunboat, six patrol boats, and various other craft. The decimated VVS-Crimean Front put up a better effort over the straits and managed to inflict some losses on Fliegerkorps VIII, but could not stop Richthofen’s bombers from savaging the evacuation flotilla. Richthofen’s forces dropped 1,780 bombs around Kerch in one day, setting the city aflame.[8]

By May 13 the Germans were across the “Turkish Rampart” in strength and quickly shoved the small Soviet rearguards out of the way. Curiously, Oktyabrsky and his Black Sea Fleet remained aloof from the Kerch evacuation, and he sent some of his destroyers on meaningless night bombardment missions against German positions near Feodosiya, which had no impact upon Trappenjagd. On May 14, the 132. and 170. Infanterie-Divisionen had fought their way into the west side of Kerch. One Stossgruppe from IR 391, supported by four assault guns from Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190, got too far ahead and found itself encircled by Soviet troops and attacked at close quarters. Soviet infantry swarmed over the assault guns, trying to knock them out with grenades and explosive charges. In desperation, the Germans fought their way out of the encirclement, but every member of the assault-gun platoon that escaped was wounded.[9] Warily, German troops entered the shattered port the next day, clearing out stragglers, and then set up 2cm and 8.8cm flak guns on the piers to engage fleeing Soviet vessels with direct fire.

Colonel M. Yagunov, a staff officer from the Crimean Front, had been assigned the task of conducting the rearguard during the evacuation. He gathered a motley crew of naval infantrymen, rear-area troops, and aviation cadets for his rearguard and they succeeded in holding the Germans back from the port area for a time, but ultimately found themselves cut off. Unable to reach the embarkation areas and with German artillery and air attacks pounding the entire port area, Yagunov made the decision to pull his rearguard force back to the Adzhimushkay Quarry, 2½ miles northeast of the port. The Soviets did manage to evacuate a multiple rocket-launcher battalion and some artillery, but the majority of the Crimean Front’s equipment was abandoned to the enemy. In the end, Gorshkov’s vessels were able to evacuate somewhere between 37,000 and 73,000 troops from the Crimean Front to the Taman Peninsula, of whom at least 20 percent were wounded.[10]

For several days after the fall of the port, small Soviet armed groups held out in various positions around Kerch. One group of about 2,000 troops made a stand in the 1890s-vintage Fort Totleben south of Kerch, while a somewhat larger number held a position near Yenikale. These forces were finally annihilated by May 20 through the use of massed German artillery and bomber attacks. Yagunov’s group in the Adzhimushkay Quarry held out for 170 days before being eliminated.

In one of the more astonishing victories of World War II, Manstein’s outnumbered AOK 11 had smashed Kozlov’s Crimean Front in less than two weeks. The three Soviet armies suffered about 28,000 dead and 147,000 captured out of 250,000 troops engaged, with nine out of 18 divisions completely destroyed and the others reduced to combat-ineffective fragments. All the Soviet tanks and artillery in the Kerch Peninsula had been lost and the VVS-Crimean Front and VVS-ChF lost 417 aircraft. German losses were light for a success of this magnitude, with a total of 7,588 casualties in XXX and XXXXII Armeekorps (including 1,703 dead or missing), as well as 12 tanks, three assault guns, and nine artillery pieces.[11] More significant was the expenditure of 6,230 tons of ammunition, which was more than Manstein had expended in his December attack upon Sevastopol and which would require two weeks for AOK 11 to replenish. Operation Trappenjagd was an exquisitely executed set-piece offensive, with near-perfect use of a combined-arms Schwerpunkt to quickly achieve decisive results. Although Manstein had to return the 22. Panzer-Division and some of the Luftwaffe units to Heeresgruppe Süd for the counterattacks at Kharkov, which began even before Trappenjagd had finished, for the first time he could now turn to deal exclusively with fortress Sevastopol.

On the Soviet side, Stalin was quick to punish failure of this magnitude. Kozlov was demoted to general-major and given secondary assignments for the next year, before finally being shuffled off to the Trans-Baykal military district for the rest of the war. Mekhlis tried to deflect the blame upon others but Stalin saw through this and reduced him two ranks – in the Red Army, commissars were more culpable than commanders for defeats. Lvov had the good sense to die of his wounds, but Nikolaenko, Cherniak, and Kolganov were all relieved of command and reduced in rank to Colonel; Nikolaenko and Cherniak served in secondary roles for the rest of the war, but Kolganov managed to shine in the final East Prussian campaign of 1945 and retire as a general-lieutenant. Thousands of bypassed Soviet troops went to ground in the Kerch Peninsula, in quarries and other isolated places. Most would surrender or be captured in days, but for a few determined stalwarts, surrender was not in their vocabulary.

In order to capture Sevastopol, Manstein knew that he would need an unprecedented amount of firepower to break through Petrov’s multiple lines of defense. Recognizing that his previous offensives had lacked sufficient air and artillery support, Manstein was determined that his next attack would have as many combat multipliers in his favor as possible. While executing Trappenjagd, he and his staff drafted Operation Störfang (Sturgeon Haul) for the final offensive against fortress Sevastopol. Before sending his combined-arms Stossgruppen into the attack, he wanted a massive five-day air and artillery bombardment to neutralize as much of Petrov’s defenses as possible.

Traditionally, the German Army relied upon 10.5cm and 15cm howitzers to provide the backbone for its division-level medium artillery in both World War I and II. Heavier artillery of various calibers, including rail artillery, fell under control of the Heeresartillerie, which reinforced army and army group-size operations. Corps-level artillery usually consisted of pieces between 15cm and 21cm caliber weapons, although it did include the 10.5cm s.K 18 cannon. In 1940, the Wehrmacht began fielding Nebelwerfer units equipped with multiple rocket launchers, which also fell under the Heeresartillerie. Although German armies had a reputation for possessing powerful heavy artillery, they actually had very little of it, and most of the weapons they had were not of German origin. Since German operational-level doctrine was based upon the concept of Bewegungskrieg, or maneuver warfare, greater emphasis had been placed upon medium-artillery weapons that could support mobile operations, not heavy artillery intended to break through heavily fortified lines or to conduct siege warfare. Consequently, the German preference was to go around fortified areas like the French Maginot Line, and if forced to mount a siege, as at places like Warsaw or Leningrad, to rely upon the Luftwaffe to pound the enemy into submission. However, at Sevastopol in 1942, Manstein did not have this luxury, since he was under tight time constraints to release Fliegerkorps VIII back to Heeresgruppe Süd in time for the main German summer offensive – Fall Blau – set to begin on June 28.

Yet as war approached in the mid-1930s, the Wehrmacht’s leadership became concerned about its limited ability to overcome either the French or Czech border fortifications. The German Heereswaffenamt (Army Weapon’s Office) issued requirements to Krupp and Rheinmetall-Borsig in 1936 to develop a variety of heavy-artillery pieces. Ideally, these two companies would have cooperated in developing a few practical weapons for the Wehrmacht that could be produced in quantity. In reality, both companies took different directions and allowed their engineers to present to the Heereswaffenamt a wide variety of often-impractical artillery prototypes with non-standardized calibers. Little or no thought was given to ease of manufacturing, ammunition logistics, or deployment issues – instead, the bigger the gun, the better. When war came sooner than expected in 1939, the Wehrmacht was forced to accept a number of these prototypes into service, even though they were expensive and available in only token numbers. Krupp had begun simply enough by rebuilding its original 1906-vintage 42cm howitzer into the “Gamma” howitzer, of which only one was provided to the Wehrmacht in 1940. However, Krupp engineers endeavored to show off their talent in building a new generation of 28cm rail artillery as well as a massive 80cm cannon that would be named “Dora.” Building a small number of 28cm railroad guns made sense since they were inherently mobile and could easily achieve ranges of 20 miles with a 284kg shell. On the other hand, the 80cm Dora became an iconic weapon during the assault on Sevastopol in June 1942 – just as Nazi propagandists had intended – but it was inherently impractical as a weapon due to its huge size, low rate of fire, and exorbitant requirements for personnel and other resources. Rheinmetall initially took a similar direction as Krupp and developed the 35.5cm M1 howitzer; the Wehrmacht accepted one M1 in July 1940 and it arrived at AOK 11 in late October 1941. Yet Rheinmetall’s engineers became very interested in the benefits of plunging fire provided by heavy mortars and began developing the 60cm “Karl” series of super-heavy mortars. While the 124-ton Karl was semi-mobile on tracks and could fire an impressive 1,700kg or 2,170kg concrete-piercing shell, it had an effective range of only 3–4 miles, which required it to fire from practically the front line, and exposed it to enemy counterfire.

Generalleutnant Johannes Zuckertort’s HArko 306 (Higher Artillery Command) began assembling its artillery park for Störfang in mid-May 1942. Except for the sole M1 howitzer in AOK 11, most of the super-heavy weapons such as “Dora,” “Karl,” the “Gamma” howitzer, and the pair of 28cm “schwere Bruno” railroad guns did not arrive at Sevastopol until late May 1942. In fact, the Wehrmacht had difficulty assembling an adequate siege train for Sevastopol, and much of Zuckertort’s heaviest artillery was of Czech origin, including a 42cm M17 Skoda howitzer, 16 30.5cm Mörser M17 L/12s, four 24cm H39 howitzers, and 16 14.9cm s.FH 37(t) howitzers. Including the corps- and division-level artillery, Zuckertort’s artillery had 20 different types of calibers at Sevastopol, which greatly exacerbated the logistic situation. While Zuckertort had amassed 183,750 10.5cm and 47,300 15cm rounds for the medium artillery, as well as over 23,000 Nebelwerfer rockets, his German-built heavy guns had very little ammunition to shoot. When schwere Artillerie-Abteilung (E) 672 arrived with Dora on May 26 it possessed only 48 rounds, and schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 833 brought only 122 60cm rounds for its three Karl mortars. The two 42cm howitzers had 276 rounds between the two of them and the M1 had just 352 rounds of 35.5cm ammunition.[12] Rather than the photogenic Dora and Karl, Zuckertort’s real heavy firepower would reside with the Czech-built 30.5cm mortars and 14.9cm s.FH 37(t) howitzers and their large stockpiles of ammunition. That did not fit the propaganda ideal of German engineering prowess.

In preparation for the artillery bombardment, Zuckertort had directed his three Beobachtungs-Abteilungen (Observation Battalions), to conduct a thorough survey of all visible Soviet fortifications and fieldworks. During April–May, the survey platoons from these invaluable units developed very detailed maps of the enemy’s defenses, which were registered in a grid system. Essentially, each grid became a “kill box,” with every bunker and enemy position assigned a unique number. These maps became the basis for Zuckertort’s artillery fire plan and Richthofen’s Fliegerkorps VIII bombardment plan. Zuckertort’s HArko 306 would direct all of AOK 11’s Heeresartillerie during the bombardment, as well as LIV Armeekorps’ subordinate corps- and divisional-level artillery batteries. The XXX Armeekorps artillery would be directed by General der Artillerie Robert Martinek’s Arko 110, while the Romanian Mountain Corps artillery was semi-autonomous but was also worked into the fire-support plan. Richthofen would direct the concurrent Luftwaffe air strikes on Sevastopol. Although often described as “the heaviest German artillery barrage” or “the most intense barrage” ever laid down on the Eastern Front, Zuckertort’s artillery preparation was not based upon massed, continuous bombardment as in World War I. Rather, it was based upon methodical shoot-observe-shoot tactics that would sweep the targets in each grid until they were damaged or destroyed. Once this was achieved, the infantry would go in.

At 0540hrs on June 2, the Czech-built 14.9cm s.FH 37(t) howitzers of schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 737 fired the opening rounds of Operation Störfang. Manstein observed the bombardment through Zeiss-made Scnfernrohr (scissors binoculars). The shelling started slowly, while registration fire gradually zeroed in on Soviet positions in the main defensive belt around Mekenzievy Mountain. Then the division-level 10.5cm and 15cm howitzers joined in at 0600hrs, firing three-round missions against specific targets in the enemy security belt. However, most medium guns fired no more than six to 12 rounds on the first day. German forward observers would then wait for the dust to settle and assess the effect on targets – either ordering a repeat fire mission or recommending moving on to the next target on the list. Overhead, the Hs 126Bs of 3.(H)/13 also passed on spotting reports to HArko 306. The two 60cm Karl mortars – “Odin” and “Thor” – each fired one test round, then remained silent for the next four days. Most of the other heavy artillery fired a few rounds each, but the two 28cm “schwere Bruno” railroad guns fired 104 rounds and two batteries of obsolete 28cm howitzers fired 330 rounds. At 1100hrs, the corps-level artillery joined in with 21cm mortars firing at forward Soviet positions. Zuckertort was hoping to provoke Petrov’s artillery into responding so that they could be targeted and destroyed, but most of the Soviet batteries remained silent on the first day.

Richthofen’s Fliegerkorps VIII actually dropped more high explosive on Sevastopol on the first day of Störfang than Zuckertort’s gunners. Since most of the bombers were based less than 60 miles from the city, they could fly three or more sorties a day with maximum bomb loads. On day one, Fliegerkorps VIII dropped 525 tons of bombs on Sevastopol. Major Werner Hoffmann’s I./KG 100 specialized in dropping the Luftwaffe’s largest bombs against critical targets like Morgunov’s coastal batteries. On June 2, Hoffmann’s He-111H-6 bombers dropped one 1,700kg SD 1700 “Sigismund” semi-armor-piercing bomb and seven 1,400kg PC 1400 “Fritz” armor-piercing bombs.[13] Initially, Richthofen concentrated his effort against the harbor area and the two VVS-ChF airbases, which were under constant observation. Captain Konstantin S. Alekseyev, who commanded the 1st Squadron of the 6th Guards Fighter Regiment, was stationed at the Chersonese airfield. Alekseyev was the top-scoring ace in the VVS-ChF with about eight “kills” by the start of Störfang, and his squadron, equipped with Yak-1 fighters, was badly outnumbered by Fliegerkorps VIII, but gamely took to the skies every day to attempt to intercept German bombers.[14]

On June 3–4, Zuckertort’s gunners fired less ammunition and mostly medium artillery, with only minor contributions from the 30.5cm mortars. Much of the bombardment was focused on a few key hills on the right flank of Sector IV, which is where LIV Armeekorps intended to make its main effort. Haccius Ridge and the Ölberg – as designated by the Germans – were held by the Soviet 3rd Battalion, 514th Rifle Regiment, and offered a commanding view of the Bel’bek River valley. The Gamma mortar fired 30 42cm rounds against the Ölberg, while Haccius Ridge was pummeled by 24cm howitzers rounds. Nevertheless, the 514th Rifle Regiment reported only 32 casualties during the five-day bombardment. On their right, the 79th Naval Infantry Brigade held a trio of hills at the junction of the Bel’bek River and Kamyschly Ravine, which the Germans dubbed the Bunkerberg, the Stellenberg, and the Eisenbahnberg. Zuckertort’s artillery pounded these hills daily, and the Eisenbahnberg was singled out for attention with 20 “Gamma” rounds, 30 30.5cm rounds, and 40 28cm rounds, but only managed to kill or wound about 20 percent of the dug-in Soviet naval infantrymen. Most of Zuckertort’s artillery was focused against Petrov’s III and IV Defensive Sectors, with only a single battery of 30.5cm mortars supporting the XXX Armeekorps barrage in the south.

On the other side, Petrov had expected a German offensive, but the Stavka did not believe that it could last for more than two weeks and thus had not provided him with the means to sustain a longer battle. Instead, they had put the bulk of available resources into Kozlov’s Crimean Front, which now no longer existed. In fact, Petrov’s artillery was unprepared for a protracted slugging match against Zuckertort’s guns. His artillery commander, General-Major of Artillery Nikolai K. Ryzhi, had direct control over six army-level artillery regiments: three medium and three light. These units possessed a total of about 156 artillery pieces: 36 152mm ML-20 howitzers, 12 155mm Schneider M1917 howitzers, four 122mm A-19 guns, 40 107mm M1910/30 guns, and about 60 76.2mm F-22 guns. While the ML-20s had better range than the German s.FH 18 15cm howitzers, many of Ryzhi’s guns were in poor condition after more than ten months of continuous use; in the 18th Guards Artillery Regiment, for example, the ML-20s had used 80–90 percent of their barrel life and the 107mm guns had used 90–100 percent. Firing guns with worn-out barrels greatly decreased their accuracy and increased the chance of malfunctions, including burst barrels that could injure the crew. Ammunition was also in short supply; the ML-20s were in decent shape with 390 rounds per gun, but the 155mm howitzers only had 75 rounds per gun, the 122mm had 100, and the 107mm 158. This meant that Petrov’s heaviest artillery had to conserve its fire and that there was insufficient ammunition for a long battle. Even if the Black Sea Fleet brought in more ammunition, most of the guns were so worn out that many were operating in a degraded condition. The 76mm guns were in much better technical shape and had about 300 rounds per gun, plus another 900 rounds per gun stored in warehouses in Sevastopol, making them the most reliable – if not most effective – Soviet artillery during the final battle for Sevastopol. In addition, there was a single multiple rocket-launcher unit – Major Dmitri D. Kush-Zharko’s 53rd Guards Mortar Battalion, with 12 BM-8 82mm launchers. In contrast to Petrov’s impoverished artillery ammunition supply, most of Manstein’s medium artillery started the battle with five or six basic loads of ammunition, with more en route.

Meanwhile, Fliegerkorps VIII continued to make the greatest impression on the Soviet defenders, particularly as the Stuka attacks became more accurate. Although most of the bombs dropped were 50kg, 250kg, or 500kg general-purpose bombs, Hoffmann’s I./KG 100 continued delivering heavy bombs of 1,000–2,500 kg against targets in Sevastopol. Meanwhile, Richthofen’s fighters laid waste to the Soviet naval pilots attempting to defend the city. A young German Bf-109F pilot in 5./JG 77, Oberleutnant Anton Hackl, claimed a LaGG-3 fighter and a Yak-3 fighter on June 3–4; he was to become the top-scoring Luftwaffe pilot during Störfang, with 11 kills claimed over Sevastopol in June. Nevertheless, the outnumbered VVS-ChF’s 3 OAG put up a very tough fight over Sevastopol, and it had gained considerable combat experience against some of the Luftwaffe’s best pilots. Nor was it only fighter pilots who built their reputations at Sevastopol; Feldwebel Herbert Dawedeit, a Stuka pilot from 8./StG 77, would fly 120 combat missions over the city – up to eight per day. Dawedeit enjoyed great success against both ground and naval targets and would eventually complete 806 combat missions; he was later awarded the Ritterkreuz, and he survived the war.

There were a number of targets that Manstein wanted destroyed or neutralized before beginning his ground offensive, but, amazingly, Aleksandr’s Coastal Battery No. 30 (dubbed “Fort Maxim Gorky I” by the Germans) did not have a particularly high priority since it was assumed that the 305mm guns were no longer operational. The Soviets had successfully managed to conceal the repair of these guns during the spring, and Petrov wanted them to remain silent until the German ground assault began. Thus, when the men of schwere Artillerie-Abteilung (E) 672, along with hundreds of Organization Todt engineers, were finally able to emplace the 80cm Dora railroad gun in a position near Bakhchisaray, it was not directed to fire at this most obvious target. Instead, at 0535hrs on June 5, Dora fired a single round against the abandoned military barracks near the Mekenzievy Mountain station. Zuckertort then instructed Dora to fire at Coastal Battery No. 2, equipped with four 100mm guns, near the harbor. Eight rounds were wasted on this pathetic target, which was not even armored. Meanwhile, Aleksandr’s Coastal Battery No. 30 suddenly opened fire, lobbing five rounds at a German observation post – and missed. In all likelihood, the hasty field repairs had probably failed to boresight the turrets correctly, and they were no longer capable of accurate shooting.

Although Zuckertort now knew that Coastal Battery No. 30 was still operational, he did not commit Dora against this target. Instead, on June 6, Dora fired six rounds at “Fort Stalin” – which was simply an antiaircraft battery – with one round falling within 40 yards of the target. Another eight 80cm rounds were fired at “Fort Molotov,” which was just another fortified hilltop. Major Hoffmann’s I./KG 100 dropped ten 2,500kg “Max” and four 1,800kg SC 1800 “Satan” bombs around Aleksandr’s battery on June 5, but scored no direct hits.[15] Finally, Major Freiherr Rüdt von Collenberg, commander of schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 833, was ordered to silence Aleksandr’s battery. During the night of June 5/6, the “Thor” mortar was sluggishly maneuvered onto a hillside north of the Bel’bek less than 4,000 yards from Aleksandr’s battery. At 1700hrs on June 6, “Thor” began firing the first of 16 60cm concrete-piercing shells, and its seventh shot scored a direct hit on the eastern 305mm turret. A great chunk of the armor plate was torn off the top of the turret and one gun barrel was damaged. In addition, a fire started in the turret and the ventilation system caused smoke to spread throughout the underground battery complex. Aleksandr himself was still secure inside his command post, known as “Bastion I” to the Germans, but the bombardment also knocked out his internal communications lines. Although Coastal Battery No. 30 continued to fire occasionally from its other turret – which was damaged by a bomb the next day – its active role in the defense of Sevastopol was nearing an end.

On June 6, Dora continued to waste its limited ammunition against a variety of mundane targets. Zuckertort wasted “Dora’s” ammunition on too many secondary targets, instead of concentrating it against a single target. Furthermore, Dora was a very fragile weapons system and suffered from technical defects after a few rounds. Dora fired 25 of its 48 rounds before the actual assault on Sevastopol began, and it appears that the biggest gun ever built achieved virtually nothing, aside from making some very large craters. In contrast to the complete inaccuracy of Dora, Manstein relied upon Oberst Friedrich-Franz Rittner’s Flak-Regiment 18 for precision fire against the numerous Soviet bunkers. Rittner had four mixed flak battalions with a total of 48 8.8cm flak guns and deployed single guns in forward areas as bunker busters. It turned out that many of the Soviet bunkers hastily built during the winter of 1941/42 could not withstand direct hits from rounds larger than 7.5cm, and the high-velocity rounds from 8.8cm flak guns proved adept at cracking them open. Rittner’s flak gunners would fire a total of 181,787 rounds during Störfang and inflicted far more damage upon Petrov’s defenses than Dora.

By the end of the fifth day of the bombardment, Zuckertort’s artillery had fired 42,595 rounds of ammunition at Sevastopol, equivalent to 2,449 tons of munitions. Rather than the popularly depicted super-heavy weapons like Dora and Karl, it was the ubiquitous 10cm s.K 18 cannon, 15cm s.FH 37 howitzer, and 21cm Mörser that were the predominant weapons used in this phase. During these five days, Fliegerkorps VIII dropped over 2,264 tons of bombs on Sevastopol, including 14 2,500kg, five 1,800kg, three 1,700kg, and seven 1,400kg heavy bombs.[16] How successful was five days of sustained air and artillery attacks upon Petrov’s defenses? Many frontline bunkers were destroyed or damaged, but the trench works and underground shelters were more resistant to artillery fire, as well as the railroad tunnel on the south side of Mekenzievy Mountain. Soviet personnel losses were relatively light. For example, the 514th Regiment defending on Haccius Ridge suffered only 12 dead and 20 wounded during June 2–6, less than 3 percent losses, despite being the target of daily heavy-artillery fire and Luftwaffe attacks.[17] Given the level of effort put into the German artillery preparation, AOK 11’s infantry realized little actual benefit. Despite five days of pounding, the Soviet infantrymen waited in their bunkers and dugouts, filled with grim determination to hold the line. Political officers spent the time haranguing the troops about fulfilling their duty to the Motherland, and the penalty of failure.

Even before Zuckertort’s artillery opened fire on June 2, Petrov and Oktyabrsky knew that a German assault upon Sevastopol was imminent after the destruction of Kozlov’s Crimean Front, and they began pleading for reinforcements from the North Caucasus Military District. Kozlov had repeatedly short-changed Sevastopol for replacements and supplies during the spring of 1942, but now the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet requested 15,000 replacements, 50 brand-new Yak-1 fighters, more fuel for 3 OAG to maintain a high sortie rate, and triple the amount of ammunition allocated to the SOR. Amazingly, Petrov requested 10,000 rifles and 1,500 light machine guns, indicating that many of his troops were poorly armed. In addition, Petrov wanted to evacuate as many of the remaining civilians and naval-base personnel as possible in order to reduce the need for food, so that naval convoys could concentrate on bringing in replacements and ammunition. On May 25, the evacuation of civilians began in earnest. Thus far, the Luftwaffe units based in the Crimea had enjoyed only limited success, and against stationary naval targets in Sevastopol’s harbors and slow-moving and unescorted merchant ships in coastal waters. Soviet convoys to Sevastopol had successfully delivered 35,000 reinforcements and evacuated 9,000 wounded from January to May, without excessive losses.

Oktyabrsky committed the cruisers Molotov and Krasny Krym, six destroyers (Tashkent, Bezuprechny, Bditelny, Kharkov, Soobrazitel’ny, and Svobodnyi) and eight Tral-class coastal minesweepers to the June supply runs. Except for the elderly Krasny Krym, these vessels were relatively fast and capable of 30 knots or better, and the Italian-built Tashkent was a greyhound that could conduct 39-knot dashes. The Luftwaffe pilots simply could not hit a warship that was maneuvering at these speeds. Yet while the destroyers could bring in 300–400 troops each and a cruiser 1,000–2,000, the warships were ill-suited for carrying and offloading heavy cargo such as vehicles and palletized ammunition. The Soviet merchant marine contributed three cargo/passenger vessels (Abkhazia, Belostok, and Gruziya) and the tanker Mikhail Gromov to the Sevastopol run. None of these vessels could move faster than 12 knots, so the fast Soviet escorting warships were chained to slow-moving targets. This is where the Achilles Heel of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet became apparent: a lack of air-warning radar and inadequate antiaircraft ammunition. The heavy cruiser Molotov was the only one of Oktyabrsky’s fleet to carry an air-search radar, and it was a primitive set at that. Almost all of Oktyabrsky’s warships relied upon the obsolescent 45mm 21-K antiaircraft gun in single mounts as their primary antiaircraft weapon, but this weapon was inadequate for dealing with multi-aircraft attacks. The Molotov and the Type-7 (Gnevnyi-class) destroyers carried the 21-K, which had a very low rate of fire and ammunition unsuited for engaging aerial targets. The Tashkent and new Type 7U destroyers received the 37mm 70-K gun just before the start of the war; this weapon was similar to the Swedish 40mm Bofors gun and combined a high rate of fire with improved HE-Frag rounds. Despite the lack of up-to-date antiaircraft weaponry, Soviet convoys to Sevastopol during the spring were often aided by morning fog, which could rise 100 yards or more and make it difficult for aircraft to spot vessels.[18] Thus, Oktyabrsky believed that his warships would continue to be able to run the Luftwaffe’s aerial gauntlet into Sevastopol at acceptable cost.

During the night of May 27/28, the heavy cruiser Molotov and two destroyers delivered Colonel Nikolai V. Blagoveshchensky’s 9th Naval Infantry Brigade from Novorossiysk. Instead of providing the 15,000 replacements that Petrov had requested, the Stavka sent a single brigade with 3,017 troops. Blagoveshchensky’s brigade consisted of survivors from the fighting in the Kerch Peninsula and had a high percentage of recently wounded men, released from hospital and sent right back to the front. As Störfang began on June 2, the destroyers Tashkent and Bezuprechny, plus the passenger ship Abkhazia, brought 2,785 replacements right into Sevastopol harbor without much interference from Richthofen’s Fliegerkorps IV. Captain Vasily N. Eroshenko was fond of using the 39-knot speed of his Tashkent to evade German bombers, and when a trawler instructed him to slow to 14 knots while moving through a lane in the outer harbor minefields, he ignored this and swept into Severnaya Bay at maximum speed:

Once in Severnaya Bay, the ships unloaded during the night and left before daylight. German artillery would fire on the harbor area when ships were sighted, inflicting some shrapnel damage, but it was too inaccurate to sink any shipping. However, the tanker Mikhail Gromov, sailing with two minesweepers, was less fortunate and was pounced on 37 miles south of Yalta by the He-111 torpedo-bombers of Major Horst Beyling’s II./KG 26. One torpedo struck the tanker’s bow at 2055hrs and set her ablaze, which caused her destruction. After this, Oktyabrsky decided not to send any more tankers to Sevastopol and instead submarines would be used to bring in small quantities of aviation fuel. Yet the loss of the Mikhail Gromov seemed like something of a fluke, since the Black Sea Fleet continued to enjoy success with using high-speed supply runs with destroyers on June 3, 5, and 6, which brought 2,500 more troops into Sevastopol without loss. Even the 4,857-ton passenger ship Gruziya, built by Krupp at Kiel in 1928, managed to slip into the port unescorted on June 7, with another 750 troops. During the first week of June, the Black Sea Fleet also managed to evacuate 1,612 wounded and 3,434 civilians. But time was running out.

Unknown to Oktyabrsky, the Axis had decided in January 1942 to transfer light naval forces to the Black Sea to assist in interdicting Soviet naval convoys. The Italian Regia Marina created a composite unit designated as the 101st Squadron with four 24-ton MAS boats and six 35-ton mini-submarines under the command of Capitano di Fregata Francesco Mimbelli. The German Kriesgmarine also decided to send the 1. Schnellbootsflottille under Kapitänleutnant Karl-Heinz Birnbacher, but his 92-ton boats were considerably more difficult to transport and had to be disassembled, then sent by barge down the Danube to Romania, so Mimbelli’s squadron arrived in theater first. Mimbelli established his squadron at Yalta and Feodosiya in mid-May, and his MAS boats and mini-submarines commenced patrolling activities off the Crimea just as Störfang was beginning.[20] The first two of Birnbacher’s S-Boats did not arrive at the Romanian port of Constanta until May 26, and they did not begin patrols off Sevastopol until June 6.[21]

Meanwhile, the air battle over Sevastopol rapidly turned against the VVS-ChF’s 3 OAG. Richthofen’s fighters, which now had a 3-1 numerical superiority over Sevastopol, ripped into the 3 OAG on June 7, claiming 17 “kills.” Even Captain Konstantin S. Alekseyev, the VVS-ChF’s top ace was shot down and badly wounded on June 8. His 6th Guards Fighter Regiment lost a number of other experienced pilots in the opening days of June. One German ace, Oberleutnant Anton Hackl claimed five Soviet fighters and four Il-2 Sturmoviks over Sevastopol in the first nine days of Störfang. On June 10, the 45th Fighter Regiment arrived in Sevastopol from the Caucasus with 20 brand-new Yak-1 fighters, but the pilots were mostly inexperienced, and nine were shot down in their first two days of combat. During the period June 7–12, the three Gruppen of JG 77 inflicted crippling losses on 3 OAG, which lost the ability to protect the port or shipping against large-scale Luftwaffe attacks. By mid-June, Fliegerkorps VIII was dominant over Sevastopol and the sea lines of communication were now at great risk.

As the battle for air superiority over Sevastopol was being decided, Fliegerkorps VIII began to shift its focus to severing Sevastopol’s sea lines of communications. On the evening of June 9, the destroyers Svobodnyi and Bditelny and two minesweepers were escorting the 4,727-ton transport Abkhazia into Sevastopol when they came under attack from the He-111H-6 bombers from Beyling’s II./KG 26. Over the course of two hours, the German bombers launched 24 torpedoes against the convoy, but none hit, and the ships reached Severnaya Bay intact. Normally, the convoys unloaded during the night and left before dawn to avoid becoming stationary targets for the Luftwaffe. Captain 3rd Rank P. I. Shevchenko’s destroyer Svobodnyi had unloaded its cargo of ammunition by 0430hrs, but as the sun rose on the horizon the transport Abkhazia had only begun to unload a cargo that included new trucks for Petrov’s army. Shortly thereafter, the first He-111 bombers began appearing over the port and the Soviets activated a smokescreen system used to obscure the port area.

Shevchenko’s Svobodnyi was the newest destroyer in the Black Sea Fleet and had only entered service in January 1942. Consequently, the Svobodnyi had received five of the improved 37mm 70-K antiaircraft guns, rather than the obsolescent 45mm 21-K gun. The smokescreen helped to conceal the vessels in Severnaya Bay, and Shevchenko’s antiaircraft gunners were able to fend off a number of attacks by individual He-111 bombers. Then – for reasons never explained – Oktyabrsky personally ordered the smoke screen turned off around 0640hrs. Most likely, Oktyabrsky wanted to conserve the limited supply of diesel fuel for the smoke generators when the ships were not under serious air attack, but the generators remained off even as Fliegerkorps VIII began to appear in strength around 0800hrs. Shevchenko moved the Svobodnyi into Korabelnaya Bay and moored alongside the long wharf. At 0915hrs, a group of He-111s from Major Bätcher’s I./KG 100 attacked the Abkhazia and scored a direct hit that set the transport on fire. Ten minutes later, Ju-87 Stukas from StG-77 scored more hits on the burning Abkhazia, which heeled over against a pier. Although Shevchenko’s destroyer had suffered light hull damage from two near-misses, it was still operational, and it is not clear why he decided to remain in Sevastopol after the Abkhazia was sunk. At any rate, the Svobodnyi was still moored along the wharf when a full Stuka Gruppen launched a multi-directional “hammer and anvil” attack against the destroyer at 1315hrs, which overwhelmed its antiaircraft gunners. A 50kg bomb hit the gun shield of the second 130mm gun, then two bombs hit the bridge and wounded Shevchenko, then six more bombs ripped her apart from stem to stern, killing 67 of the crew. The wounded Shevchenko ordered the remaining crew to abandon ship, and the survivors assembled on the wharf to watch their burning destroyer heel over and sink. Nearby, the Abkhazia burned all day, and its vital cargo of ammunition finally exploded around 2200hrs. It had been a bad day for the Black Sea Fleet.

Neither of the Soviet antiaircraft batteries, nor the 3 OAG, had been able to save the Svobodnyi and the Abkhazia, because they were both becoming rapidly combat-ineffective. The flak batteries were running short of ammunition and their barrels were worn out. Replacement pilots and aircraft continued to arrive from the Caucasus, but 3 OAG was reduced to the role of a guerilla air force. As the amount of air-to-air combat declined, the Luftwaffe transferred I./JG 77 out of the Crimea.

On the night of June 11/12, the heavy cruiser Molotov and destroyer Bditelny conducted a high-speed run into Sevastopol that successfully delivered 3,341 troops from the 138th Naval Rifle Brigade, as well as 190 tons of ammunition. However, when the German-built transport Gruziya tried to make it into Sevastopol with the minesweeper T-413 and an MOIV-class patrol boat on June 13, it was spotted. The Gruziya was carrying an enormous load of 1,300 tons of ammunition, including artillery shells filled with Mustard Gas and Lewisite, a chemical weapon that acts as a blister agent (this was confirmed by post-war divers on the wreck). The convoy was spotted by German aircraft at first light and a single bomb hit the Gruziya’s aft cargo hold, detonating the ammunition. A massive explosion broke the ship in two, leaving no survivors. The T-413 and the patrol boat survived this air attack, but both were sunk at 1145hrs off Cape Fiolent. It is uncertain why the Soviets were shipping chemical weapons into Sevastopol, but most likely it was based upon the fear that AOK 11 would use chemical weapons to reduce the fortress.

After mid-June, the Black Sea Fleet’s convoys became increasingly at risk from both Axis air and naval attacks. The cruisers Molotov and Bezuprechny made another high-speed run into Sevastopol on June 15/16, which delivered 3,855 troops and 442 tons of ammunition, but on June 18 the flotilla leader Kharkov was damaged en route to Sevastopol by German aircraft and forced to turn back. The 2,048-ton passenger vessel Belostok succeeded in making it to Sevastopol and, although damaged by artillery fire, left by 2130hrs with the minesweeper T-408 as escort. On its return trip, the Belostok carried 375 wounded and 43 civilians. Off Cape Fiolent, the small convoy was approached by unidentified craft. It was two of Kapitänleutnant Karl-Heinz Birnbacher’s S-Boats – the S-72 and the S-102. The Kriesgmarine had finally arrived in the Black Sea. Kapitänleutnant Werner Töniges, captain of the S-102, had started his career in the merchant marine before transferring to the Kriesgmarine. By the summer of 1942 Töniges was an accomplished ship-killer and had already been awarded the Ritterkreuz. The two S-Boats attacked individually, and the Soviet escorts failed to react in time, which enabled the two boats to fire off five torpedoes. One of Töniges’ struck the Belostok at 0148hrs, and the ex-Spanish passenger vessel sank quickly, taking 388 souls down with her.[22] This was the first Kriesgmarine victory in the Black Sea and the last attempt to run slow-moving merchant ships into Sevastopol.

On June 24 the destroyers Tashkent, Bezuprechny, and Bditelny managed to bring 1,871 troops from the 142nd Naval Rifle Brigade into Sevastopol. Encouraged by this success, the Soviet destroyers quickly returned to Novorossiysk to bring the rest of the naval brigade to Sevastopol. Captain 3rd Rank Petr M. Buriak loaded 320 troops and 16 medical personnel onto his destroyer Bezuprechny and started back to Sevastopol on the morning of June 26. Eroshenko’s Tashkent followed soon after, overloaded with 944 troops. Initially, the VVS provided fighter cover over the destroyers, but by late afternoon the destroyers were on their own. Buriak’s Bezuprechny was still equipped with the obsolescent 45mm 21-K antiaircraft guns, but managed to fend off two small-scale air attacks. However, a large group of Ju-87 Stukas from II./StG 77 attacked the Bezuprechny 37 miles off the Crimean coast at 1857hrs. Oberfeldwebel Werner Haugk of 5./StG 77 scored a direct hit on the destroyer, which broke it in two.[23] Hit by two more bombs, the Bezuprechny sank in two minutes, but dozens of men made it into the water. Soon, the Tashkent appeared on the horizon. Eroshenko witnessed a huge plume of black smoke hanging over Bezuprechny’s grave and bobbing heads amidst a floating lake of fuel oil. Now the Ju-88s turned their attention to Eroshenko’s Tashkent, and he was only able to survive by high-speed turning and furiously firing off one-third of his antiaircraft ammunition. Under these conditions, he could not stop to rescue survivors. On the way into Sevastopol, Italian MAS boats ambushed the Tashkent off Cap Fiolent, but Eroshenko’s luck held, as two torpedoes passed under his bow without exploding. Eroshenko made it into Sevastopol, but only three out of 572 aboard the Bezuprechny were eventually rescued.[24]

On the return trip, a German reconnaissance plane spotted the Tashkent at 0415hrs, and a large force of He-111s from I./KG 100 arrived overhead around 0600hrs, followed by Ju-87s from III./StG 77. The He-111 bombers employed a new tactic, attacking one after another in a shallow diving attack, rather than with intervals of several minutes between each attack. Eroshenko’s ship weaved from side to side, avoiding bombs, but his antiaircraft gunners were running out of ammunition. After more than three hours of dodging, and after avoiding 355 bombs, Eroshenko’s luck finally ran out when Feldwebel Herbert Dawedeit of 8./StG 77 dived on his ship and dropped a 250kg bomb close to the stern of the Tashkent, which disabled the destroyer’s steering and caused massive flooding.[25] Unable to maneuver and with speed dropping off to 14 knots, the Tashkent suffered two more near-misses and 1,900 tons of seawater poured into her ruptured hull. Amazingly, Eroshenko’s crew made emergency repairs that enabled the destroyer to keep limping eastward and survive further attacks. Eventually, Soviet fighters from Novorossiysk appeared and the attacks stopped, while other ships were sent to tow the damaged Tashkent into port. Yet the fact that even the high-speed Tashkent was no longer invulnerable indicated that Richthofen’s Fliegerkorps VIII had finally achieved their goal of isolating Sevastopol.[26]

The air battle over Sevastopol was also finished. On June 25 the Stavka ordered the survivors of the 6th Guards Fighter to evacuate to the Caucasus, while a dozen Yak-1 fighters from the 9th and 45th Fighter Regiments conducted a last-ditch stand over Sevastopol’s air space for another week, until their airfields were in danger of being overrun. Richthofen left to participate in the opening phase of the main Fall Blau summer offensive and took III./JG 77 with him. By late June, only II./JG 77 remained in the Crimea, but it was enough.

In one last desperate gesture, Oktyabrsky sent two minesweepers on June 28 to deliver the last 330 troops from the 142nd NIB, and they managed to survive constant air attacks on the way out. Another 300 wounded and civilians were evacuated. Yet this was the end. During June, the Black Sea Fleet had delivered over 17,600 reinforcements into Sevastopol, but had lost two destroyers, a minesweeper, and five merchant ships sunk and most of the other warships had suffered damage from near-misses. As June ended, the last 31 operational VVS-ChF aircraft in Sevastopol flew to the Caucasus, while all damaged aircraft were destroyed. Without even a token amount of air cover, the Black Sea Fleet was no longer willing to send surface ships to certain death off the Crimea, and resorted to using only submarines for supply runs to Sevastopol in its final days.

The Kamyschly Ravine ran for 2 miles diagonally from the southern side of the Bel’bek River. It was less than 400 yards wide at its narrow northern neck, but widened out to over 600 yards as it moved south toward the village of Kamyschly. Both sides of the ravine were bounded by steep hills, studded with small trees and brush. The hill on the western side – known as Hill 124 to the Russians or the “Stellenberg” to the Germans – was a key piece of terrain that controlled the northern half of the ravine and provided excellent observation over the Bel’bek River valley to its front. The Stellenberg sat atop a large, rolling ridge, which provided ample concealment, and to its left the so-called “Haccius Ridge” ran almost all the way to Coastal Battery No. 30. The bottom of the Kamyschly Ravine was often wet and marshy, with drainage from the nearby river or hills. The ravine formed a perfect moat and an excellent natural defensive position.

During the December offensive, the 132. Infanterie-Division had captured the western side of the Kamyschly Ravine, but had been forced to withdraw from this terrain after Manstein called off the offensive. In January, Colonel Aleksei S. Potapov’s 79th Naval Infantry Brigade entrenched themselves on the western side of the Kamyschly Ravine, stretching along a 2-mile front from Hill 124 in the north to a fortified position known as the “Trapeze” in the south. During the spring, Major Vladimir V. Shaslo’s 747th Rifle Regiment from the 172nd Rifle Division took over defensive positions west of the “Stellenberg” along “Haccius Ridge.” The key position on this ridge was a hilltop known as the “Ölberg,” which overlooked the rail line that ran up the escarpment to the Mekenzievy Mountain station. Potapov’s brigade had taken heavy losses in the December 1941 fighting but still had three battalions with a total of over 3,500 veteran troops by the start of Störfang; he placed his 1st Battalion and the 5th Company around Hill 124, his 3rd Battalion around the Trapeze, and kept two companies from the 2nd Battalion in reserve.[27] In contrast, Colonel Ivan A. Laskin’s 172nd Rifle Division had been badly gutted in the retreat from Ishun in November 1941 and barely 1,000 of its troops reached Sevastopol; due to these losses, both the 383rd and 747th Rifle Regiments had been disbanded. Eventually, sufficient replacements reached Sevastopol by sea to enable Laskin to reform the 747th Rifle Regiment in March and the 383rd Rifle Regiment in May. Filled with fresh conscripts, most with no previous battle experience, these units took over positions on the escarpment overlooking the Bel’bek River. Laskin assigned his only veteran outfit, the 514th Rifle Regiment, to defend forward combat outposts around the town of Bel’bek. The boundary between Sevastopol’s Sector III (commanded by General-Major Trofim K. Kolomiets of the 25th Rifle Division) and Sector IV (commanded by Colonel Aleksandr G. Kapitokhin of the 95th Rifle Division) lay between the Stellenberg and the Ölberg, which is precisely where Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps intended to make its main effort.

By early June, the entire western side of the Kamyschly Ravine was densely entrenched, and Zuckertort’s artillery preparation (Vorbereitungsfeuer) inflicted only moderate to light damage on the fieldworks and barbed-wire obstacles that lay at the base of the steep slope of the Stellenberg. Hansen’s assault plan for his LIV Armeekorps was to cross the Kamyschly Ravine with all three regiments of the 22. Infanterie-Division and two regiments each from the 50. and 24. Infanterie-Divisionen. A total of seven German infantry regiments with more than 10,000 troops would attack across the 2-mile-long Kamyschly Ravine; in contrast, the US Army landed just two infantry regiments on a 5-mile-wide front in the first wave at Omaha Beach in June 1944. This was the Schwerpunkt, where Manstein would mass all his resources on a narrow front to smash through the hard outer core of Petrov’s defenses.

Across from Hill 124, Generalmajor Ludwig Wolff’s 22. Infanterie-Division had assembled two battalions from Oberstleutnant Rudolf Buhse’s IR 47 and two battalions from Oberst Dietrich von Choltitz’s IR 16 on Hill 191.8 on the eastern side of the Kamyschly Ravine, overlooking the Soviet positions. This was a very dangerous space, as both sides regularly traded sniper and mortar fire across the 400-yard-wide ravine, so neither could move troops around much in the daylight. Nevertheless, the Germans managed to manhandle three batteries of 28/32cm Nebelwerfer 41 multiple rocket launchers from III./schweres Werfer-Regiment 1 up onto their hill during Zuckertort’s five-day artillery preparation – apparently without being noticed.[28] Petrov expected that an attack against Sectors III and IV was imminent, and on the night of June 6/7 he ordered all frontline units to conduct counterfire against suspected German assembly areas at 0255hrs on June 7. Potapov’s brigade had limited organic artillery – just four 122mm howitzers and 8 76.2mm field guns – so it relied heavily upon artillery support from Laskin’s neighboring division. Laskin’s division was supported by Colonel Josef F. Shmelkov’s 134th Howitzer Regiment, equipped with a rather obsolescent collection of ten 152mm M1909/30 howitzers and about 20 122mm M1910 howitzers. Shmelkov’s artillery fired against positions held by the 22. Infanterie-Division for 20 minutes, but achieved little since they had to conserve their ammunition.[29]

At 0315hrs on June 7, Zuckertort’s artillery opened fire again, but this day was different. This day was “X-Day” – the beginning of the German ground assault. The Heeresartillerie fired with everything they had, attempting to lay waste to the Soviet frontline positions in a crushing artillery barrage.[30] The Stellenberg, currently occupied by the 5th Company from Potapov’s brigade, was hammered by sustained fire from 30.5cm howitzers for nearly an hour, but worse was to come.[31] Without warning, the 18 Nebelwerfer 41 multiple rocket launchers began to hurl over 100 incendiary and high-explosive rockets onto the “Stellenberg,” setting underbrush afire and filling the Soviet trenches with dense, choking smoke. The blast affect was horrific even for troops in trenches, and the overpressure likely left many Soviet troops unconscious or shell-shocked. Even before the Nebelwerfers had finished launching their first volley, a red flare ascended into the morning sky, signaling the beginning of the ground assault. Stossgruppen from the 22. Infanterie-Division began to emerge from their assault positions and rush into the Kamyschly Ravine.

In the lead was I./IR 47, led by Major Gustav Alvermann, who had been awarded the Ritterkreuz for leading an air assault into Holland in 1940. Close behind was III./IR 16. The German Stossgruppen did not attack in large units, but advanced using infiltration-type tactics, in small, well-armed groups. Each group comprised a mix of infantry and pioneers, the latter of which were essential for breaching the enemy obstacles. Rushing across the bottom of the ravine, which was swampy in places, the assault troops came under sporadic automatic-weapons and mortar fire, but the enemy was firing blindly into the smoke created by the Nebelwerfer barrage, so casualties were initially light. Hearts pounding, the first assault teams approached the base of the western side of the ravine and began to suffer casualties from Soviet PMD wooden antipersonnel mines. The pioneers began marking lanes through the minefield, while the rest of the assault troops covered them from prone firing positions. After this tedious task was completed, with more casualties from enemy shrapnel, the pioneers began cutting through the barbed-wire obstacles, some of which had probably been smashed about by the German artillery preparation. At this point, members of the 9th Company of Potapov’s brigade, deployed in combat outposts along the edge of the Kamyschly Ravine, began to engage the German troops attempting to breach the obstacle belt. The Germans were prepared for this and a 2cm flak platoon had moved forward in direct support of the Stossgruppen; the flak gunners engaged flashes from Soviet automatic weapons with 150 large-caliber rounds per minute, which quickly suppressed them. Awed by the firepower display, many Soviet infantrymen did not fire, but simply made themselves as small as possible at the bottom of their trenches. As the pioneers cut through the wire, some troops threw smoke grenades to cover them while others hurled Stielgranaten to suppress enemy troops on the far side. Then they were through – a thin corridor at first – but as more Stossgruppen reached the wire and began to breach it, the penetration widened. After a brief fight for the forward trenches, the Germans began to climb up the western side of the ravine.

Off on the left flank of the 22. Infanterie-Division, troops from Generalleutnant Friedrich Schmidt’s 50. Infanterie-Division’s IR 121 and IR 123, supported by Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 197, were crossing the ravine further south, heading toward the village of Kamyschly and the “Trapeze.” Oberleutnant Erich Bärenfänger, who had performed so well during pursuit operations in November 1941, had been partly in charge of leading the assault elements from III./IR 123. Bärenfänger led a Stossgruppe from the front, racing across the open terrain of the valley floor toward the Soviet trenches. He and his troops hurled a barrage of a dozen Stielgranaten before leaping into the trench and engaging in close-quarter combat with the naval infantrymen of Potapov’s brigade. After clearing the frontline trenches, Bärenfänger boldly pushed up a trail toward the heights, and his battalion was soon 1,000 yards ahead of the rest of his regiment. Small groups of naval infantrymen attacked his open flanks, forcing Bärenfänger to stop and deploy his machine guns to prevent the Soviets from encircling him.[32]

Simply moving up the steep, cratered sides of the “Stellenberg” in full combat gear was very difficult for Alvermann’s soldiers, and it was virtually a job for the Gebirgsjäger. Nevertheless, Alvermann led the I./IR 47 up the southeast corner of the hill while the III./IR 16 climbed the northeast corner. Atop the Stellenberg, the 5th Company was apparently stunned by the German artillery barrage and initially put up relatively little resistance until the Germans were at close quarters. Then a few troops rallied around Chief Petty Officer Bel’tikov, who manned a machine-gun position – his fire repulsed the first effort by III./IR 16 to rush to the top.[33] However, Alvermann led his battalion south of the Stellenberg, overran trenches held by Potapov’s 3rd Company, and managed to isolate the 5th Company and other troops from Potapov’s 2nd Battalion by 0550hrs. Potapov’s intent to reduce casualties from the artillery bombardment resulted in too few troops deployed on the forward key positions at the critical moment, and his limited reserves could not move quickly enough to reinforce threatened sectors in broad daylight under artillery and air bombardment. Schmidt’s 50. Infanterie-Division’s IR 123 had quickly overrun the village of Kamyschly, while IR 31 from the 24. Infanterie-Division was attempting to advance west toward the Trapeze. Potapov was faced with a typical dilemma of battlefield command – based upon limited information from his forward units, where should he send his limited reserves and direct his brigade fire support? Due to loss of contact with their forward observers, Potapov’s 120mm mortars and 76mm guns could only fire against pre-plotted engagement areas.

While all this was happening, two battalions of Oberst Ernst Haccius’s IR 65 began advancing west along the Bel’bek valley in front of the Stellenberg in an effort to attack the position from all sides, but they were held up by heavy enemy fire from the Ölberg and the “Bunkerberg,” both held by Major Shaslo’s 747th Rifle Regiment. Automatic weapons fire was also coming from an abandoned industrial building known as “the Tomato Factory” on the south side of the Bel’bek River. The Tomato Factory was another key position since it controlled the railroad cut that led up the ridge to the Ölberg, and blocked east–west movement along the Bel’bek River. The bombed-out facility itself was held by Lieutenant Vasil’kov’s machine gunners and 78 soldiers of the 5th Company of the 514th Rifle Regiment, while the 4th and 6th Companies were deployed in combat outposts north of the river. Captain Ivan A. Sharov also commanded a battery of entrenched 45mm antitank guns near the Tomato Factory. Haccius’s IR 65 had the unenviable task of clearing this obstacle with little or no cover, and while under enemy fire from several directions. Once again, the Nebelwerfers proved to be the deciding factor; III./ Werfer-Regiment 54 with 18 15cm Nebelwerfer 41s was brought onto the escarpment on the north side of the Bel’bek River, and Haccius’s forward observers directed fire against the Tomato Factory and the Bunkerberg.[34] Both targets were plastered with volley after volley of point-blank rocket fire. Haccius’s infantry then moved in, supported by assault guns from Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190. This incident highlights one of the key differences between the attackers and the defenders in the third battle of Sevastopol; the Germans could generally call in timely artillery or air support to reduce strong enemy positions, but Soviet artillery was hindered by inadequate command and control, resulting in long response times and poorly directed fire missions.

Nevertheless, Sharov’s antitank gunners hit four of the German assault guns, but lost six of their guns in an unequal duel. Sharov was an ideal junior officer in the Red Army: coming from a peasant background, he was a veteran of the Russo-Finnish War and a Communist Party member. The fighting around the Tomato Factory soon involved close-quarter infantry combat, but Sharov and a few others managed to make it back to the Soviet lines.[35] It proved to be a bad day for Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190, which had three more StuG IIIs knocked out by mines near Bel’bek, and the commander of 1. Kompanie was killed by a Soviet sniper.[36]

Choltitz’s IR 16 was not stopped by the fire from the top of the Stellenberg for very long, and by 0700hrs part of the hill was secured by III./IR 16. Some naval infantrymen from the 5th Company held out for a while on top of the hill, but organized resistance was broken. Later, a few survivors from the Stellenberg managed to evade to the south and reach Soviet lines. While Choltitz continued to advance west across the top of the escarpment toward the Bunkerberg, to help IR 65, two battalions of IR 47 boldly pushed toward Potapov’s second line of defense at the Eisenbahnburg. III./IR 16 soon encountered dense minefields that stopped them cold, but Major Alvermann’s I./IR 47 found a gap in the Soviet defenses and managed to reach the Eisenbahnburg by 0755hrs. Alvermann’s advance was assisted by at least a platoon of StuG IIIs that had crossed the Kamyschly Ravine and made it up the western escarpment and through the minefields – an amazing achievement in less than four hours. Potapov’s mortar battalion was located in this area, plus two reserve rifle companies, but they were apparently stunned by the sudden appearance of German infantry and assault guns at the second line of resistance, and Alvermann’s battalion succeeded in capturing the Eisenbahnburg after just 20 minutes of fighting. In the process, the 9th Battery of Smelkov’s 134th Howitzer Regiment was overrun, along with an observation post with several staff officers.[37] Although only a 2-mile advance, Alvermann had cleaved Potapov’s 79th NIB in two.[38]

After four hours of non-stop attacking, the 22. Infanterie-Division’s regiments paused to regroup before tackling the Ölberg and the Bunkerberg, which controlled both sides of the railroad cut. Haccius’s IR 65 was still tangled up in reducing the 514th Rifle Regiment strongpoint at the Tomato Factory, while IR 437 from the 132. Infanterie-Division conducted a supporting attack against the adjacent Soviet positions in the town of Bel’bek. When the German advance paused, Potapov launched a local counterattack against I./IR 47 on the Eisenbahnburg with two companies of his second battalion, but failed to recover any lost ground.[39] At 1200hrs, II./IR 65 and two battalions from Choltitz’s IR 16 conducted a probing attack against the Bunkerberg, which consisted of three bunkers surrounded by a large minefield. Initially, the German infantry had difficulty breaching the minefields, and enemy sniper fire made movement difficult. Nevertheless, IR 16 secured the Bunkerberg by 1330hrs.[40]

In the early afternoon, the Soviet artillery and VVS-ChF began to intervene in the battle. Pairs of Il-2 Sturmoviks from the 18th Ground Attack Aviation Regiment began low-level strafing runs against German troops south of the Bel’bek River. Around 1315hrs, two Il-2s tried to strafe IR 47’s positions at the Eisenbahnburg, but Oberfeldwebel Herbert Kaiser of 8./JG 77 pounced on them and shot both down. However, another pair of Il-2s found one of the 28cm “Schwere Bruno” railroad guns of the Eisenbahn-Artillerie-Batterie 688 and scored a direct bomb-hit on its ammunition wagon; the explosion of 22 rounds of 28cm ammunition damaged the rail gun and caused casualties among the crew.[41] Soviet artillery was also becoming increasingly effective as forward observers came back on line and directed effective fire missions into the Kamyschly Ravine, which hindered German supply columns trying to push ammunition across to their assault battalions. Aleksandr’s Coastal Battery No. 30 managed to fire several 30.5mm rounds during the day, but Major von Collenberg’s two Karl mortars kept lobbing 60cm rounds at the two turrets throughout the afternoon.

Hitler was keenly following the attack from his headquarters near Rastenburg and received regular updates, particularly about the activities of Dora. On X-Day, Dora fired ten 80cm rounds, including seven at a Soviet ammunition depot on the north side of Severnaya Bay known as “White Cliff.” The White Cliff naval depot – so named because of the chalky cliffs – had a series of tunnel adits built into the side of the escarpment and had a number of separate munitions bunkers buried deep underground. It is often claimed that Dora scored a direct hit on White Cliff and detonated the entire storage of ammunition, but this is unlikely. Most rounds from Dora tended to be “over” the target, which meant that they landed harmlessly in Severnaya Bay. Furthermore, the depot was on a reverse slope and would have required a very high-angle plunging round or dive-bombing to hit; rounds from Dora would have been more likely to impact on the escarpment above the depot. Based upon the terrain, if the White Cliff depot was hit – and this is not confirmed by Soviet or German sources – then it was more likely from air attack than Dora. At any rate, at 1300hrs Manstein received a message relayed from Heeresgruppe Süd that, “the Führer was much upset because Dora fired at the ammunition dump ‘White Cliff’. The Führer stated that this gun is only intended to fire at concrete emplacements.” Oddly, the LIV Armeekorps claimed that it did not have any information about Dora firing against White Cliff and the journal indicated that someone had sent this report directly to the OKH in Berlin. Manstein told Hansen, “please determine who sent it.”[42] Hitler was right to be upset that the heaviest weapon provided to AOK 11 was firing at an obscure target instead of supporting the Schwerpunkt, but the accuracy of Dora was so poor that it made little sense to dump 80cm projectiles on targets that were so close to German troops.

In the southern part of the Kamyschly Ravine, the German attack had not gone as well. Coming out of the Melzer ravine on the eastern side of the Kamyschly Ravine, Oberstleutnant Erich Reuter’s IR 122 from the 50. Infanterie-Division had both assault battalions badly shot up by an artillery concentration from Colonel Shmelkov’s 134th Howitzer Regiment. The 50. Infanterie-Division’s other regiment, Oberst Albert Ringler’s IR 121, had difficulty reaching the escarpment on the western side of the ravine, and the terrain was too rough for its attached assault guns to help much. Bärenfänger’s III./IR 123 had made a mile-deep advance onto the escarpment but was isolated for part of the day. It was not until the late afternoon that the 50. Infanterie-Division could mount a serious attack against the Trapeze position. After heavy casualties, IR 121 captured the Trapeze at 1615hrs. However, the 24. Infanterie-Division had failed to get across the Kamyschly Ravine at all during the morning due to heavy Soviet fire and was forced to follow in the tracks of the 50. Infanterie-Division.[43] While the 50. Infanterie-Division succeeded in advancing a mile into the Soviet defensive positions on June 7 and protecting the 22. Infanterie-Division’s left flank, the 24. Infanterie-Division only succeeded in capturing one minor enemy position at the cost of over 600 casualties.

Hansen was determined to capture the Ölberg on the first day of the ground offensive, but the assault battalions were tired and running short on ammunition, so the attack was put off until the late afternoon. In addition to the eight operational StuG IIIs still with Haccius’s IR 65, Hansen sent Panzer-Abteilung (FL) 300 to reinforce the assault troops. This unit had 14 Pz IIIJ tanks, six KV-1 tanks captured during Trappenjagd, and the untried B IV and Goliath radio-controlled demolition vehicles.[44] In addition, the 132. Infanterie-Division, which had been clearing up the Soviet combat outposts along the southern side of the Bel’bek River, sent two battalions from IR 436 to reinforce Haccius’s attack. At 1455hrs, Zuckertort’s artillery began pounding the Ölberg for 30 minutes, followed by rolling Stuka attacks, but the infantry was not ready to move until 1730hrs. Just as the infantry assault with I./IR 65 and II./IR 65 was beginning, Zuckertort reported to Hansen that “ammunition was scarce” and that his artillery could not fully support the attack.[45] Despite a heavy pounding, the heretofore-inexperienced conscripts of the 1st Battalion, 747th Rifle Regiment, put up a good fight for the Ölberg. Although Haccius’s soldiers secured a toehold on the hill by 1835hrs, fighting continued on the position until after 2100hrs. The 1st Battalion, 747th Rifle Regiment, virtually fought to the death, with most of its officers killed and two companies obliterated.[46]

Just as this German tactical success was occurring, the Soviets launched a battalion-size counterattack against IR 47’s position at the Eisenbahnburg at 1805hrs. This Soviet counterattack was better planned and received strong supporting fires from division-level artillery and Morgunov’s coastal batteries. After heavy fighting, the counterattack was repulsed, but Major Alvermann was killed. As night descended, the fighting tapered off as both sides began to reorganize for the next day’s fight. The assault across the Kamyschly Ravine cost Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps over 2,000 casualties, including 423 dead or missing. Wolff’s 22. Infanterie-Division had achieved the most and bled the most, having suffered 801 casualties – equal to about a third of its assault troops. Thanks to strong artillery and air support, the 22. Infanterie-Division succeeded in breaking through the outer Soviet defenses and capturing four important fortified positions: the Stellenberg, the Bunkerberg, the Eisenbahnburg, and the Ölberg. The 22. Infanterie-Division Kriegstagebuch (war journal) noted that, “the day’s fighting was characterized by extraordinary violence. The enemy showed extraordinary cunning in the division’s attack on the high ground. Enemy snipers and small groups of stragglers, that had kept themselves hidden behind our lines, shot individual troops.”[47]

Soviet losses in Sector III were also very heavy on the first day of the German ground offensive, with Potapov’s brigade suffering about 30 percent casualties, and Laskin’s 172nd Rifle Division had at least two battalions decimated. The 22. Infanterie-Division captured 153 Soviet prisoners on the first day, while overall Soviet casualties in this sector were roughly 2,000–3,000. On X-Day, Zuckertort’s artillery had fired 3,939 tons of artillery ammunition – 60 percent more than that fired during the entire five-day preparation.[48] In addition, Richthofen’s Fliegerkorps VIII made a maximum effort and dropped 1,300 tons of bombs on Soviet positions. Altogether, over 5,000 tons of high explosives were employed on the first day of the German ground assault, and mostly against Sevastopol’s Sector III. By day’s end, Hansen had begun to split the seam between Sectors III and IV. The successful assault across the Kamyschly Ravine was an impressive German tactical success that gave LIV Armeekorps the initiative and set the stage for the advance upon Severnaya Bay.

By nightfall on June 7, Petrov realized that the Germans had captured at least half of the critical high ground on the boundary of Sectors III and IV and that the enemy was now within 4½ miles of Severnaya Bay. Having had six months to prepare for this German offensive, Petrov should have had a contingency plan and the resources to mount a major counterattack against the German assault divisions, which had suffered heavy casualties and were low on ammunition. Yet ironically, Petrov had neither the plan nor the resources to deliver a timely riposte when it might have made the most difference. On paper, there were a total of 101,238 Soviet military personnel within the Sevastopol Defensive Region (SOR) at the beginning of Störfang.[49] Petrov’s Coastal Army had seven rifle divisions with a total of 68,360 personnel, including just over 50,000 combat troops. Of Petrov’s seven rifle divisions, six were already assigned to defend sectors of the outer defensive perimeter, but he managed to position Colonel Nikolai Guz’s 345th Rifle Division in reserve at Mekenzievy Mountain station behind Sectors III and IV. The Black Sea Fleet contributed another 15,000 combat troops in its six naval infantry units, with the newly arrived 9th Naval Infantry Brigade assigned as the reserve for Sectors I and II in the south. This meant that Petrov started the battle with about 65,000 combat troops holding a 23-mile front, with roughly 15 percent of these deployed in sector reserve. However, Petrov had almost no reserve units under his direct control. Within Sevastopol, there were another 18,000 rear-area support and naval-base personnel, some of whom would eventually be drafted as infantry replacements, but not until the very end of the fighting. Yet it is clear that Petrov was attempting to hold too large a perimeter with insufficient forces and that he could not sustain a protracted battle with heavy casualties unless the Black Sea Fleet regularly delivered replacement units.

Nor did Petrov set a good example with his own headquarters, which was bloated with over 200 officers, many of whom should have been leading troops at the front. Before Störfang began, Petrov relocated his headquarters to an abandoned coastal battery on the Chersonese Peninsula south of Sevastopol – which kept him out of range of most of the German artillery, but exacerbated his already poor communications with his frontline units. Due to the limited number of tactical radios in Soviet frontline combat units, Petrov was almost totally dependent upon field telephones for command and control, which greatly delayed his reaction time to any German initiative. Most of the landlines were not buried very deep, so Zuckertort’s heavy bombardment disrupted much of Petrov’s connections with his frontline units. During the night of June 7/8, Petrov ordered General-Major Kolomiets, commander of Sector III, to organize a counterattack against LIV Armeekorps with the reserves located around the Mekenzievy Mountain station, but the fallacy of delegating control over the reserves to the sector commanders was revealed. Instead of using Guz’s 345th Rifle Division to mount a major counterstrike, Kolomiets decided to leave Guz’s division in place and commit only small forces to a counterattack, without significant artillery support. Consequently, the Soviet counterattack at dawn on June 8 was little more than a pathetic gesture, consisting only of the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Perekop Naval Infantry Regiment and six T-26 light tanks from the 81st Separate Tank Battalion. Furthermore, rather than attempting to recover any of the heights overlooking the Bel’bek River, Kolomiets misdirected this counterattack toward the Trapeze position in order to relieve some of the units from his own 25th Rifle Division that had been encircled. This puny effort struck II./IR 32 and accomplished nothing.[50] It is also a good example of how Soviet commanders tended to make decisions that benefited their own command, rather than their overall objectives. Often, Soviet commanders assumed that “someone else” would deal with German breakthroughs, and selfishly conserved their own resources.

Hansen waited until 1000hrs before resuming his offensive, allowing his forward troops time to receive ammunition and rations. Zuckertort’s HArko 306 provided a 30-minute artillery preparation, focused on the Mekenzievy Mountain station area and the western end of Haccius Ridge. The German attack on July 8 was more narrowly focused than on the previous day, relying once again upon Wolff’s 22. Infanterie-Division as the Schwerpunkt, reinforced by IR 437 from the 132. Infanterie-Division. The battered regiments of Laskin’s 172nd Rifle Division still held good ground in front of them, but no longer had a continuous front, and were defeated in detail. IR 437 pushed west from the Ölberg along Haccius Ridge, rolling up the 514th Rifle Regiment’s positions, while Wolff’s three infantry regiments and a battalion’s worth of assault guns smashed through the remnants of the 383rd Rifle Regiment and advanced 1¼ miles southward from the Ölberg. The lead German battalions advanced to within 600 yards of the Mekenzievy Mountain station and were not stopped until they ran into the second line of defense held by Guz’s division, which was situated behind a 2-mile-long antitank ditch. However, Guz could do nothing for the collapsing right flank of Colonel Aleksandr G. Kapitokhin’s Sector IV. Kapitokhin’s troops had been little engaged on the first day of the German offensive and he still had the bulk of his 95th Rifle Division defending positions north of the Bel’bek River. With German infantry advancing deeply into his right flank and heading toward Coastal Battery No. 30, Kapitokhin was forced to pull a battalion from his 241st Rifle Regiment to block IR 437’s advance. Altogether the 22. Infanterie-Division took 232 prisoners on June 8, mostly from Laskin’s 172nd Rifle Division.[51] Meanwhile, the German 50. and 24. Infanterie-Divisionen continued to push back Potapov’s 79th NIB and the 25th Rifle Division on Kolomiets’s right flank. At the cost of another 1,745 casualties, Hansen had gained a firm foothold in Sevastopol’s outer defenses.

Oddly, Guz had only his 1163rd Rifle Regiment on the line, defending behind the antitank ditch and centered upon the Mekenzievy Mountain station, while he kept the 1165th and 1167th Rifle Regiments further south, near the position known as Fort Stalin. Although many Russian officers were prejudiced against the ethnic Caucasian troops in this unit, the division had performed well in stopping the German offensive in December 1941. Since then, Guz’s riflemen had transformed the bombed-out artillery barracks west of the train station into a fortified strongpoint, and they manned a half-dozen bunkers overlooking the antitank ditch. Another key position – called the “Forsthaus” by the Germans – was located on the boundary of Guz’s 345th Rifle Division and Potapov’s depleted 79th NIB, but held by the 2nd Perekop Naval Infantry Regiment. Most of the Soviet artillery in this sector was still intact, even though Smelkov’s 134th Howitzer Regiment had lost one battery and Soviet artillerymen were told to “fire sparingly.”[52]

On June 9, Hansen kept up the pressure, beginning with a bombardment of the Mekenzievy Mountain station area with 60cm, 42cm, 35.5cm, and 24cm heavy-artillery fire from Zuckertort’s Heeresartillerie. Most of the Soviet bunkers were made of timber and stones and could not withstand a direct hit from large-caliber rounds. Then, instead of using Wolff’s 22. Infanterie-Division as his main effort, as in the previous two days, Hansen brought up the relatively fresh IR 438 from Generalmajor Fritz Lindemann’s 132. Infanterie-Division to mount a deliberate attack across the western end of the antitank ditch. Guz had been expecting Choltitz’s IR 16 and Buhse’s IR 47 to continue their direct advance down the rail line toward the station, and was caught by surprise by the German tactical flexibility in switching the Schwerpunkt from one unit to another. Infanterie-Regiment 438 attacked the antitank ditch near the boundary between the 95th and 345th Rifle Divisions – a typical German effort to exploit the weaknesses of Soviet inter-unit coordination. Two German battalions crossed the ditch and quickly overwhelmed the Soviet infantrymen from the 1163rd Regiment, who were still reeling from the effects of heavy artillery. Using rolling Stuka attacks that lasted for over an hour, Richthofen’s Fliegerkorps VIII also disrupted Guz’s ability to shift his reserves to deal with the German breakthrough on his left flank. Once the Germans were across the antitank ditch, they began spreading out laterally to roll up Guz’s forward defense, while pioneers began filling in the ditch. Once this was accomplished, assault guns moved up to support the soldiers. With the Soviet defensive line tottering, Wolff attacked with his 22. Infanterie-Division, and Guz’s entire line began to give way. Choltitz’s IR 16 surged across the antitank ditch and overran the Mekenzievy Mountain station and the artillery barracks, despite the presence there of a battery of four 76.2mm antitank guns from the 674th Anti-Tank Regiment. The German advance was so rapid that a number of Russian artillery officers were captured near the train station. Under interrogation, they revealed a great deal about the location and condition of the Soviet artillery to the 22. Infanterie-Division’s Ic (intelligence officer).[53] On Choltitz’s left flank, Buhse’s IR 47 advanced, pushing back the 2nd Perekop NIR. The 50. Infanterie-Division mounted a supported attack that captured the Forsthaus from the 79th NIB. Between the train station and the Forsthaus, German troops encountered Soviet Coastal Battery 704, which was equipped with two 130mm turrets from the sunken cruiser Chervona Ukraina. Commanded by Lieutenant V. I. Durikov, the battery put up a good fight against the German infantry and assault guns, but it was eventually overrun and Pavlov was killed.[54]

The third day of the German ground offensive ended as another stunning tactical success everywhere except on the flanks. In the west, the 95th Rifle Division stood like a rock atop the “Neuhaus” hill and its 241st Rifle Regiment repulsed efforts by the 132. Infanterie-Division to reach Coastal Battery No. 30. Hansen’s main effort had broken through a portion of the Soviet second defense line and captured 381 prisoners at the relatively low cost of 961 casualties, including 216 dead or missing.[55]

Hansen’s corps had achieved remarkable success in the first three days of the ground offensive. The only really discordant note came from the 24. Infanterie-Division, which had consistently underperformed, while suffering excessive casualties. Generalleutnant Hans von Tettau’s 24. Infanterie-Division had fought a nearly private battle with Kolomiets’ ostensibly elite 25th Rifle Division Chapaevskaya. The terrain in this sector was very hilly and wooded, which made tactical movements slow and costly, and greatly aided the defense. Nor had Tettau’s division been allocated as much artillery or air support, since they were assigned only a supporting role. Yet there was little doubt that the Chapaevskaya had given Tettau’s division a bloody nose.

What was the condition of the frontline infantry units on each side after three days of intensive combat? Most infantrymen had got by on only a few hours of sleep in the past 72 hours, and poor-quality sleep at that, although experienced troops could sleep in the bottom of trenches or bunkers despite ongoing bombardments. As Obergefreiter Gottlob Bidermann in IR 437 remembered, “one lived only on cigarettes, cold coffee, tea, and the sparse battle rations that were issued daily to those in the foremost lines. It was impossible to wash regularly or to shave.”[56] Thus, filthy, sleep-deprived, and underfed troops were expected to continue expending enormous amounts of energy and maintain combat alertness, day after day. A battle like Sevastopol became an endurance contest, won by the side with the best stamina. While Guz’s 345th Rifle Division had not yet suffered heavy losses, Laskin’s 172nd Rifle Division had been broken into pieces and was only fighting as uncoordinated company and battalion-size battle groups. Potapov’s 79th NIB had lost roughly half its strength but was still holding the line near the Forsthaus, along with a battalion from the 2nd Perekop NIR. In Sector IV, the 95th Rifle Division had been forced to reform its flank into an L-shaped defense, but was still solid despite the destruction of one of its battalions. Soviet troops were still fighting tenaciously and the Germans had taken only 1,509 prisoners in this area. On the German side, some accounts have attempted to depict the German infantry as burnt-out after a few days of combat, but their losses – while heavy – were not unexpected. Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps suffered 6,024 casualties, including 1,383 dead or missing, or about 13 percent losses from its starting strength of 45,500 combat troops.[57] Wolff’s 22. Infanterie-Division, which had been rebuilt to nearly full strength before the battle, still had over 11,600 troops in the line. Hansen’s main concern was with the understrength 132. Infanterie-Division, which was unable to break through the 95th Rifle Division’s defenses in front of Coastal Battery No. 30. In order to reinvigorate this effort, Hansen brought up Oberst Otto Hitzfeld’s Infanterie-Regiment 213 from reserve; once again, Hitzfeld would be employed to spearhead a critical attack. Despite heavy casualties, both sides’ troops still had plenty of fight left in them.

The battle slowed down on June 10 as Hansen redistributed and reorganized his forces, but Buhse’s IR 47 was able to gain some ground in conjunction with the 50. Infanterie-Division near the Forsthaus. Hansen adopted an economy-of-force stance against the Soviet Sector IV, bringing the entire 132. Infanterie-Division and Hitzfeld’s regiment to crush the 95th Rifle Division’s forces south of the Bel’bek River while leaving only reconnaissance troops to screen the 2-mile-wide front against the Soviet positions still north of the river. It would have been prudent for Petrov to order Kapitokhin to pull his 95th Rifle Division back toward Coastal Battery No. 30 and abandon the positions north of the river, which now served no purpose, but he was unwilling to voluntarily cede ground to the enemy. Instead, Petrov believed that Hansen’s divisions were spent and overextended and that a major counterattack could retake much of the lost ground. Soviet tactical reporting was often flagrantly dishonest at this stage of the war, in an effort to conceal setbacks from superiors, and Petrov apparently accepted exaggerated reports from his frontline divisions. Whereas Hansen and Manstein were observing the battlefield every day from observation posts like the “Eagle’s Nest,” Petrov was out of touch in his distant bunker.

On the morning of June 11, a series of Soviet counterattacks did develop against Hansen’s frontline divisions. Potapov’s 79th NIB attacked the 50. Infanterie-Division’s positions near the Forsthaus and some naval infantrymen managed to penetrate 600 yards before being stopped by German artillery fire and the assault guns from Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190. Although the armored train Zhelezniakov supported the attack with its three 76mm guns, coordination with two artillery regiments assigned to support the attack was ineffective because the naval infantrymen lacked tactical radios. Guz committed two battalions from his reserve regiments, the 1165th and 1167th Rifle Regiments, but their efforts to advance toward the Mekenzievy Mountain station were repulsed. Kapitokhin staged a two-battalion counterattack against the 132. Infanterie-Division’s IR 437, which gained a little ground, but otherwise changed little. However, the main result of the disjointed Soviet counterattacks – none of which were properly coordinated – was that Soviet infantrymen emerging out in the open were exposed to German air attacks and artillery fire. Richthofen’s pilots scattered antipersonnel bombs over attacking Soviet units, causing heavy casualties. Once the Soviet counterattacks were spent, Hansen ordered Wolff to hit Guz’s reeling division, and Buhse’s IR 47 managed to advance nearly half a mile, while Choltitz’s IR 16 got close to Fort Stalin. Buhse’s forward units were now about a mile from the northern shore of Severnaya Bay and even closer to the railroad tunnel next to a road loop known as the Serpentine; inside the tunnel were a number of headquarters units, artillerymen, engineers, and supply troops. At great cost, Hansen had succeeded in driving a deep wedge into Petrov’s Sector III.

Despite much talk of “fortress Sevastopol” for propaganda purposes, Petrov’s remaining defenses north of Severnaya Bay were really just a ramshackle collection of fortified hilltops, badly knocked-about coastal batteries, and archaic forts left over from the Crimean War. Guz’s 345th Rifle Division’s defense was now based upon a bevy of positions known as “Stalin,” “Volga,” “Siberia,” “Molotov,” “GPU,” and “Ural.” Virtually none of these positions were designed to repel ground attacks, and certainly not from the north. Choltitz’s IR 16 had attacked the so-called “Fort Stalin” in December 1941 and failed, but that was due to fading German strength rather than the strength of the position itself. Hansen’s next step was to eliminate Fort Stalin, from which Soviet observers were directing fire on the train station below, and then to move against Coastal Battery No. 30.

Ironically, Lieutenant Nikolai A. Vorobyev, the heroic commander of the 365th Antiaircraft Battery atop the 60-yard-high hill known by the Germans as Fort Stalin, was seriously wounded by artillery fragments on the first day of the German ground offensive and evacuated. He was replaced by Lieutenant Ivan S. Pyanzin. The battery consisted of four 76mm antiaircraft guns, mounted on concrete pads, but without overhead cover. The battery had been fortified with a small concrete command bunker in the center of a circular perimeter and three concrete pillboxes with machine guns on its eastern and southern perimeter, while its 60 personnel were provided with underground shelters and slit trenches. Furthermore, the troops were almost all veterans, and deliberately included a number of handpicked communists. A 4-yard-wide barbed-wire obstacle belt surrounded the position, as well as some wooden antipersonnel mines. For close support, Guz assigned the 1st Battalion/1165th Rifle Regiment to defend the approaches to the battery. While the 365th Antiaircraft Battery was fortified, it certainly was no fort, since it did not have allround protection. Dorahad fired six 80cm rounds at the battery but without much effect; one round fell within 38 yards of one of the flak-gun positions, but the others missed by 140–280 yards.[58]

Hansen began “softening up” Fort Stalin on the afternoon of June 12 with a series of Stuka attacks, followed by 11 42cm rounds – which knocked out three of the four antiaircraft guns. In the evening, the 22. Infanterie-Division concentrated all its guns against Fort Stalin, supplemented by a battery each of 30.5cm and 21cm mortars. The bombardment also struck Fort Volga, a Soviet antiaircraft machine-gun position located further south on the same hill as Fort Stalin. Wolff selected Choltitz’s IR 16 to assault Fort Stalin since this regiment had consistently displayed great tactical aggressiveness and ingenuity in overcoming fortified positions since the fighting at Perekop nine months before. Despite the loss of five company commanders since June 7, Choltitz still had 813 combat-ready troops available and his men had been given a brief rest in reserve. However, Choltitz decided not to employ all his troops for this attack, but only the best leaders and troops, in two carefully tailored assault battalions. He selected Major Johannes Arndt’s I./IR 16 as his main effort; in addition to 105 infantrymen in three companies, Arndt was provided with five StuG III assault guns from Hauptmann Cäsar’s 1./Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190, 35 engineers from Oberleutnant Heyer’s 3./Pionier-Bataillon 744, and a Panzerjäger team with two 3.7cm Pak guns. Hauptmann Hermann-Albert Schrader’s III./IR 16 would follow and support Arndt’s battalion with two infantry companies and one machine-gun company, totaling 89 infantrymen and 20 engineers. Thus the assault force comprised only 194 infantrymen and 55 engineers.[59] Choltitz also formed a fire-support Kampfgruppe with the machine gunners of Oberleutnant Nahrwold’s 14. Kompanie and regimental 7.5cm and 15cm infantry guns to suppress the enemy mortars suspected to be located in the so-called Wolf’s Ravine southeast of Fort Stalin. After briefing Arndt and Schrader on the attack plan, Choltitz moved with two of his battalions to an assembly area near the train station, while the heavy artillery was pounding Fort Stalin during the afternoon of July 12.

German artillery continued to pound Fort Stalin during the night of June 12/13. At 0300hrs on June 13, Choltitz ordered his two assault battalions to begin moving toward the hill. The plan was for Arndt’s battalion to infiltrate up the hillside in small groups, but soldiers from 1st Battalion/1165th Rifle Regiment were alert, and detected them. The Red Army soldiers responded with flares, then automatic-weapons fire at the intruders. Under the glare of the dangling pyrotechnics, they also called for mortar fire from the battery hidden in the Wolf’s Ravine. Arndt’s soldiers began to suffer heavy casualties – including his two lead company commanders – so he shifted westward to avoid the worst of the enemy fire, but ran into Schrader’s battalion in the dark. The two battalions became mixed up, as often happens in a night attack, and the situation became very confused. Via radio, Arndt requested that Choltitz use Nahrwold’s fire-support group to suppress the enemy mortars and machine gunners, but they were not successful. Yet this was one of those critical moments where the training of the German small-unit leaders really paid off. Sorting out the two battalions while under fire, the remaining officers and sergeants reorganized assault groups and closed in on the antiaircraft battery at the top of the hill. Cäsar’s assault guns moved up the hill too, with infantry moving alongside and behind. The Soviet troops bravely defended their positions, but rather passively, letting the Germans come to them.

Once the German Stossgruppen reached the northern perimeter of Fort Stalin, Heyer’s pioneers took over and began to blast holes in the barbed wire. The three machine-gun bunkers could not cover this angle, so the obstacle was only defended by small-arms fire. By 0400hrs several groups of German infantry had entered the perimeter and begun to assault each bunker with hand grenades and satchel charges. It turned out that the Soviets had reinforced their positions with tree trunks, which absorbed a great amount of any blast. In one case, soldiers from Schrader’s battalion simply piled large stones against a bunker door, sealing the occupants within. German pioneers had some success using smoke grenades to flush Soviet troops out of underground shelters, who were mostly shot down as they emerged. Only 14 prisoners were taken on Fort Stalin.[60] The assault guns were able to approach and engage some of the outer timber fighting positions and blast them with 7.5cm high-explosive rounds, but they could not reach the three inner machine-gun bunkers. Instead, the Germans brought up their Panzerjäger team, who dragged a 3.7cm Pak gun up the hill and through one of the breaches. Using the new Stielgranate 41 hollow-charge round, they attacked each bunker from behind at a range of only 15 yards and blew their back doors off. Close combat and hand-to-hand fighting continued within Fort Stalin’s small perimeter for 90 minutes, but by 0530 Soviet resistance was broken. A few Soviet positions, including Pyanzin’s command bunker, held out for another ten hours. Pyanzin maintained a tenuous radio link with his battalion headquarters and he requested artillery fire on his own position, for which he later received the Hero of the Soviet Union. However, Heyer’s pioneers gradually moved in and blew in the sides of his bunker around 1530hrs, silencing Pyanzin forever.

The assault troops had suffered heavily, and every officer in Major Arndt’s battalion was either dead or wounded, so Choltitz sent the battalion adjutant, Oberleutnant Bringewatt, up the hill to reorganize the survivors. It is axiomatic that after seizing a well-defended position, the attackers must immediately prepare a hasty defense and reorganize their depleted forces, lest an enemy counterattack retake the position before the victors have regained their composure. It was not long before the Soviets realized that Fort Stalin had fallen. Fort Volga, located 465 yards southwest of Stalin, began to fire mortars and antitank fire at the Germans, who were now visible in the light of dawn. Three assault guns were quickly hit – one being destroyed – and the others were obliged to withdraw back down the hill. Yet the 2nd Battalion/1165th Rifle Regiment, which was located at Fort Volga, made no effort to intervene in the fight for Fort Stalin. Around 0630hrs a small Soviet counterattack was launched out of the “Wolf’s Ravine” on the east side of Stalin, but was repulsed with machine-gun fire from Nahrwold’s support group. Soviet divisional artillery batteries also began to pound Fort Stalin, and this fire killed Hauptmann Schrader, who had previously been awarded the Ritterkreuz. Choltitz declared Fort Stalin secured around 0700hrs although mopping-up continued for the rest of the day. The assault had cost his regiment 32 killed, 136 wounded, and two missing – about half of the infantry committed. Virtually all of the German infantry officers in the attack had become casualties, including Arndt. By noon, Arndt’s I./IR 16 had only 45 infantrymen still combatready on the objective out of the 105 that began the attack. Companies were reduced to just 15–17 soldiers, led by a Feldwebel.[61] Surprisingly, Generalmajor Wolff made his way to the top of the exposed hill in order to congratulate the assault troops and to personally hand out iron crosses to the survivors, including Hauptmann Cäsar.[62] In contrast, Petrov was so far removed from this critical point that he failed to realize how weak the Germans were on Fort Stalin, and thus failed to launch even a battalion-size counterattack from nearby positions, even though Guz’s 345th Rifle Division still had plenty of troops in the area. It is apparent that German senior leadership at Sevastopol was more “hands-on” than on the Soviet side, and that this contributed to the outcome.

With Fort Stalin taken, Hansen turned to deal with Sector IV and the stubborn 95th Rifle Division, as well as Coastal Battery No. 30. Kapitokhin’s 95th Rifle Division had built strong defensive positions atop a prominent ridge just 600 yards east of Captain Aleksandr’s fortified command post known as Bastion I. Soviet troops still held the north–south stretch of antitank ditch in this sector and they had an advantage in terms of holding the high ground – any German movement brought instant fire. Nor did the introduction of Hitzfeld’s IR 213 improve the German situation in this sector, and the regiment suffered over 400 casualties between June 11 and June 13, which was half as much as they lost at Perekop in September 1941. Indeed, the Soviet 90th and 161st Rifle Regiments kept repeatedly counterattacking Hitzfeld’s positions atop Haccius Ridge and even succeeded in pushing them back several hundred yards on June 13. In response, II. and III./IR 437 from the 132. Infanterie-Division mounted a night attack on June 14 that succeeded in capturing the Neuhaus Heights from the 241st Rifle Regiment and threatened to outflank the ridge defenses protecting Aleksandr’s Coastal Battery No. 30. Obergefreiter Gottlob H. Bidermann, serving as a Panzerjäger in IR 437, was part of this push against the 95th Rifle Division’s flank and described how “each foot of ground was hotly contested in attempts to capture the commanding Neuhaus heights.” He also mentioned that, “the dead from both sides lay thick in the ravines and due to the danger from enemy snipers they could not be removed or recovered for burial. The oppressive heat soon bore with it the sickly sweet smell of decaying flesh.”[63] Military historians rarely mention how a battlefield smells, but to the infantrymen on both sides at Sevastopol, the stench of unburied corpses was certainly one of their most poignant memories.

Once the Neuhaus Hill was captured, the 132. Infanterie-Division committed elements of IR 436 to exploit this success by pushing further west toward the next ridgeline. Oberfeldwebel Popp, from 10./IR 436, was in the lead assault squad and he encountered a deeply entrenched position with 13 concrete-and-earth bunkers. Initially, the Soviets were surprised by this sudden appearance of German troops and their resistance was ineffective. It was a confused pre-dawn action, fought at close quarters, and Popp soon found himself isolated from his company and in the middle of an alerted Soviet position. Gathering up a mixed unit of German troops who had fought their way into the Soviet trench system, including Obergefreiter Mersch from 2./IR 436, Popp tried to hold the position until German reinforcements arrived, but the Soviets counterattacked in force and overwhelmed them. Both Popp and Mersch were reported missing in action.[64] During the course of Operation Störfang, AOK 11 reported over 1,500 of its troops as missing in action.

Although most Soviet troops were still fighting tenaciously, there was an increasing number of Red Army soldiers deserting to the enemy after the fall of Fort Stalin. German intelligence officers were quick to note that many of the Ukrainians, Georgians, Chechens, and other minority recruits from the Caucasus were less than enthusiastic to serve in the Red Army or sacrifice themselves for Sevastopol. On the night of June 14/15, Serzhant Nikolai Voroshun, a flak soldier, crossed the lines and provided a great deal of information about the location of the remaining Soviet artillery in the sector, which assisted LIV Armeekorps in preparing its push westward toward Coastal Battery No. 30.[65] Kapitokhin had responded to Lindemann’s economy-of-force move of withdrawing all but his reconnaissance troops from the positions north of the Bel’bek River by doing exactly the same – which allowed him to concentrate all his infantry south of the river. If Manstein had another regiment available, this would have been an excellent time to strike the thinned-out left flank of Sector IV, but he did not. Instead, it was Petrov who sent some of his last reserves – the half-strength 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 7th Naval Infantry Brigade – to reinforce the weakened front line near the Neuhaus. By June 15, Kapitokhin had six battalions deployed on a 1¼-mile-wide north–south front, from the bombed-out artillery barracks to the Bel’bek River, against Hansen’s nine battalions.

After a week of intense ground combat, Hansen’s strength was beginning to fade. Zuckertort’s artillery was still providing daily artillery bombardments, but the heaviest weapons such as the 60cm Karl mortars and the pair of 42cm howitzers had expended all their ammunition by June 13. The Soviet troops in Sectors III and IV had taken hard knocks, but were still holding their ground. Manstein was concerned that the German offensive might culminate before reaching Severnaya Bay due to heavy casualties, so he ordered Hansen to reinvigorate his main effort by stripping forces from less essential areas. Since the 24. Infanterie-Division was achieving little in its sector, Hansen shifted Tettau’s division onto the defense and transferred battalions from IR 31 and IR 102 to reinforce the 132. Infanterie-Division’s front. Manstein directed the Romanian 4th Mountain Division to take over the front line formerly held by these troops. In addition, Manstein transferred I. and III./IR 97 from the idle 46. Infanterie-Division, which was once again guarding Kerch. Thus, Lindemann’s 132. Infanterie-Division would have 12 or more infantry battalions to use against the flank of Kapitokhin’s division. On June 15, Hansen pulled some of his battalions out of the line briefly to refit and prepare for the next offensive pulse. He intended to mount an all-out attack with both the 22. and 132. Infanterie-Divisionen and all the support he could muster in order to reach Severnaya Bay.

Despite ferocious resistance for over a week, Kapitokhin’s troops were in worse shape than Hansen’s, and he barely had 1,000 troops in the five battalions guarding the approaches to Coastal Battery No. 30. Hundreds of his wounded had been brought inside the reinforced concrete block of Bastion I, which was proof against virtually all the German artillery. Kapitokhin’s division was bleeding to death, and he was now holding too much frontage with too few men. The real weak spot in the defense lay south of the Neuhaus Heights, where the remnants of Laskin’s 172nd Division held the positions known as Molotov, GPU, Siberia and Volga. Guz’s 345th Rifle Division had suffered significant losses but was still the strongest Soviet unit on the north side of Severnaya Bay – unfortunately, it was in the wrong place. Most of Guz’s division was focused on opposing the slow advance of the 50. Infanterie-Division toward the railroad tunnels near the Serpentine (a section of the main road that consisted of several hairpin turns), but this area was not a priority for the Germans. Petrov also committed his only fresh unit – Major Petr Zielinski’s 138th Naval Infantry Brigade – to this sector as well. Zielinski’s brigade had been brought to Sevastopol by two convoys between June 12 and June 15 and was not ready to be sent to the front until June 16. On paper, 138 NIB was a very strong formation, with four 716-man rifle battalions, a battalion of 16 76mm guns, two mortar battalions, and an antitank battalion. However, many of the ethnic Caucasian troops in the unit were not particularly loyal to the Soviet regime, and morale was a problem from the moment they arrived in Sevastopol.

Instead of beginning his all-out assault with the usual artillery bombardment from Zuckertort’s Heeresartillerie, Hansen opted for the subtlety of infiltration tactics. At 0200hrs on June 17, Stossgruppen from II. and III./IR 213 and Pionier-Bataillon 132 began infiltrating through the 95th Rifle Division’s thinly held front and headed straight for Bastion I. Infantrymen moving stealthily at night move very slowly, often pausing if contact with the enemy appears possible, and it took these assault troops over five hours to move 600 yards. Nevertheless, as the sun began to rise, the troops were within sight of their objective. Meanwhile, the rest of the 132. Infanterie-Division mounted a full-scale attack at 0700hrs with artillery support that kept the rest of the 95th Rifle Division’s frontline units occupied. Four battalions from Tettau’s 24. Infanterie-Division attacked the 172nd Rifle Division’s front, along with IR 65 and IR 16 from 22. Infanterie-Division, and quickly overwhelmed Laskin’s paperthin defenses. Hansen provided these Stossgruppen with considerable armored support: 19 StuG III assault guns from Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190, a similar number from Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 197, and two companies of Pz IIIJ tanks from Panzer-Abteilung (FL) 300. Fort Siberia, which was originally an earthen redoubt built by the Russians during the Crimean War, was taken by surprise and overrun by an infiltration attack by III./IR 65 at 0710hrs. The neighboring Fort GPU was overrun by I./IR 31, with some help from Panzer-Abteilung (FL) 300 and a Kampfgruppe of Brandenburg infiltrators, at 0700hrs. For the first time, German pioneers used the new BIV remote-control demolition vehicles in combat, but with disappointing results; one exploded prematurely and two were lost on mines. Two of the control Pz IIIJ tanks were also destroyed on mines. Fort Molotov, which was an antiaircraft command post built in the early 1930s, consisted of an octagonal perimeter with a dense barbed-wire obstacle belt and some concrete bunkers, but no heavy weapons. I./IR 102 overran Molotov at 0945hrs, then pressed on to take Battery “Cheka.” Once Laskin’s front was shattered, the German advance surged toward Bartenyevka and Severnaya Bay. The 22. Infanterie-Division also began rolling up the 345th Rifle Division’s open left flank, enabling IR 16 to capture the antiaircraft position at Fort Volga by 1930hrs.

Around 1100hrs, three battalions from IR 436 and 437 broke through the 95th Rifle Division’s right flank, overran the forward trenches of the 514th Rifle Regiment, and advanced boldly toward the sea. By 1200hrs, Kapitokhin’s entire flank had given way, and he ordered the remnants of his division to fall back toward Coastal Battery No. 12 (also known as Battery Schishkovka). However, 21 soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 90th Rifle Regiment fell back toward Bastion I. Altogether there were about 200 Soviet troops, including Aleksandr’s remaining battery personnel and a medical team with six female medics, sheltered in or around his fortified command post.[66] In addition to the command post, Bastion I included the battery’s large rangefinder and a transformer substation, both of which had been knocked out by the shelling. Bastion I was equipped with an electrical elevator and stairs that led 40 yards below ground to an underground tunnel, which connected it to the gun block 710 yards away. In between the Bastion I and the gun block, there was a large underground air-raid shelter. Aside from the two 305mm gun turrets, most of the gun block was buried underground and protected by a thick layer of dirt and concrete that even “Thor’s” 60cm shells could not penetrate. According to Soviet accounts, at least one turret under the command of Chief Petty Officer F. P. Dovbysh was still operational and firing as the battle surged toward it, but even if correct, the turrets were designed to engage enemy battleships miles away, not small groups of infantrymen 100 yards away. Furthermore, the battery was almost out of ammunition.[67]

Initially, the two battalions of IR 213 that had broken through to Coastal Battery No. 30 focused on mopping up the outlying enemy infantry positions around Bastion I. Gradually, the Soviet troops fell back into the underground complex, ceding the surface to the Germans by mid-afternoon on June 17. The Germans requested an airstrike to neutralize any remaining resistance nests, and at 1530hrs 27 Ju-87 Stukas attacked the battery; one bomb scored a direct hit on the eastern turret and disabled it. Once the surface of the battery was secure, Hitzfeld’s infantrymen turned to 1./Pionier-Bataillon 173 to reduce the trapped Soviet troops inside the battery. Initial attempts with flamethrowers and satchel charges proved ineffective against the thick concrete hide of the Bastion, and the pioneers settled in for a long siege. One group focused on breaking into Aleksandr’s command post in Bastion I, while another group worked to attack the turrets themselves. Inside the battery, Aleksandr and his men could do little, since all four exits were covered by enemy machine-gun teams.[68] Furthermore, a large proportion of his men were either wounded or had no close-combat experience. By the end of June 17, Hansen had achieved another dramatic success and virtually demolished the Soviet forces in Sector IV. His corps had suffered another 836 casualties, but the battle on the north side of Severnaya Bay had been decided.

The Germans knew that a Soviet naval convoy had recently brought the fresh 138th Naval Infantry Brigade into Sevastopol, and Hansen moved quickly to mop up resistance on the north side of Severnaya Bay before Petrov could introduce these reinforcements. His first order of business was to eliminate Coastal Battery No. 12 (Battery Schishkovka) and the remnants of Kapitokhin’s 95th Division, which were dug in around the battery. It consisted of four 152mm coastal guns mounted on-line in open-air pedestal mounts, but by the time German troops approached all four were inoperative. Instead, the strength of the position lay in its reinforced concrete casemates and underground shelters, which had been reinforced with trenches, earthworks, and belts of barbed wire. The combined force of naval gunners and infantrymen was armed with five heavy and 18 light machine guns. Lindemann’s 132. Infanterie-Division planned a deliberate assault against the battery with IR 436 and two pioneer companies. The German after-action report describes the assault in vivid detail:

Wack’s pioneers were unable to complete the conquest of the battery by nightfall and spent the night involved in close combat. At dawn, Wack led a platoon-size raid that overwhelmed the remaining defenders and captured the battery. Most of the garrison fought to the death, but 36 naval gunners emerged from an underground shelter and surrendered. Wack’s company had suffered eight dead or missing and 14 wounded in the assault, but demonstrated the kind of small-unit leadership and aggressiveness that wins battles. Immediately after the fall of the battery, both IR 436 and IR 437 were pulled out of the line to refit. Gottlob Bidermann noted that by this point his division was spent, and that one company was reduced to only two NCOs and a few enlisted men.[70] While the 132. Infanterie-Division eliminated Coastal Battery No. 12 and the remnants of the 95th Rifle Division, the 24. Infanterie-Division cleared the town of Bartenyevka and closed in on the final cluster of Soviet-held fortifications on the north side of Severnaya Bay.

Meanwhile, the engineers of 1./Pionier-Bataillon 173 spent June 18 trying to demolish Coastal Battery No. 30’s two damaged 305mm turrets with fuel drums and satchel charges, but they succeeded only in causing cracks in the armored plates on the turrets. Unable to force their way into Bastion I, even with flamethrowers, the German engineers did succeed in damaging the air-handling system, and the underground bunkers soon filled with smoke. At first a few soot-covered Soviet soldiers emerged from an exit, then more, until 108 had surrendered. However, Aleksandr remained inside with about 90 more that refused to surrender.

Petrov did commit Major Petr P. Zelinsky’s 138th Naval Infantry Brigade to try and regain some ground on the northern side of Severnaya Bay on June 18, but in typical fashion the counterattack was poorly planned. Only three of Zelinsky’s four rifle battalions had arrived near the Serpentine when the attack was ordered and almost none of his artillery. His infantrymen attacked the 22. Infanterie-Division’s combat outposts, which simply pulled back to their main line of resistance (known as the Hauptkampflinie, or HKL) and called in copious amounts of artillery fire upon Zelinsky’s naval infantrymen. All three attacking battalions were decimated and forced to retreat, leaving 400 prisoners for the Germans. This ill-advised and hasty attack crippled Petrov’s last major intact unit on the northern side of Severnaya Bay.

On June 19, two battalions from IR 97 moved southwest from Coastal Battery No. 12, with their right flank on the Black Sea. Enemy resistance was fairly light, but the German troops were increasingly wary of mines by this point and the infantry was unwilling to advance too far without engineer support. Engineers were still busy reducing Coastal Battery No. 30 as well as mopping up Battery No. 12, so only 1./Pionier-Bataillon 132 was initially available to support the advance of IR 97. By the afternoon of June 19 the German infantry came within sight of the North Fort, a large octagonal fort that was built before the Crimean War. Adjoining the west side of the North Fort was the position known as Lenin (a fortified antiaircraft battalion command post) and Coastal Battery No. 2 (equipped with four 100mm guns). Although the idea of a hasty attack was considered, the Germans decided to wait until they had sufficient artillery and engineer support to mount a proper deliberate attack on the morning of June 20. The attack began at 0900hrs, with two pioneer companies in the lead. Howitzer batteries were brought up to fire directly at the fort. It took nine hours of fighting to break into Lenin and the North Fort, but it took until 1030hrs on June 21 before these objectives were secure. The pioneers and assault guns were the key players in these mop-up battles, which tended to resemble urban warfare. Another result of these actions was that a good portion of Sevastopol’s air-defense umbrella was overrun at Lenin, Molotov, Volga, and Stalin, which allowed Fliegerkorps VIII to completely dominate the skies over the battlefield.

Once the North Fort fell, Petrov ordered all remaining Soviet troops to evacuate the north side of Severnaya Bay, and German troops reached the shoreline on June 22, more than two weeks after beginning the ground offensive. The final action was fought at Fort Konstantinovsky, another archaic relic built in 1840 that guarded the entrance to Severnaya Bay. Major Ivan P. Datsko, commander of the 161st Rifle Regiment, made it to the fort with a handful of his men, and joined up with a motley collection of sailors, engineers, and political staff for a dramatic three-day last stand against IR 97. A naval officer, Captain 3rd Rank Mikhail E. Yevseyev, was nominally in charge of the fort. The defenders did have one advantage: the fort was located at the end of a small peninsula and the Germans could only approach across a narrow 100-yard strip of land, which was covered by a ravelin. The Germans methodically brought up artillery to knock down the fort’s walls, and Stuka attacks ruined the barracks in the interior. Yevseyev’s men eventually ran out of ammunition, and the last 26 men surrendered on the morning of June 23. Sevastopol’s Sector IV had been eliminated and all that remained of Sector III was Guz’s 345th Rifle Division and the 138th NIB holding on to the Serpentine tunnel and the Martynovski Ravine at the northeast corner of Severnaya Bay. German artillery now had a clear view to shell any target in the city or harbor.

Wolff’s intelligence officers learned from prisoner interrogations that the 138th Naval Infantry Brigade’s command post and two to three battalions of Soviet troops were located in the railroad tunnel a mile south of the Mekenzievy Mountain train station. Hansen ordered Wolff to eliminate the Soviet forces in the tunnel as a prelude to moving against the remnants of the Sector III forces. On the evening of June 21, pioneers from 3./Pionier-Bataillon 22 accompanied a Stossgruppe that would attack the west end of the tunnel. Prisoners had noted that the entrance to the 400-yard-long tunnel was barricaded and protected by bunkers and trenches, so the pioneers came loaded with flamethrowers, grenades, and 50kg hollow charges. At 0230hrs on June 22 the attack on the western end of the tunnel began, but the pioneers were surprised to find the entrance unguarded. The pioneers then began moving cautiously into the dark tunnel, expecting to find hundreds of armed Soviet soldiers:

Eventually, a few Soviets remaining in the tunnel appeared and surrendered. They informed the pioneers that the Soviet troops had abandoned the tunnel and retreated toward the Martynovski Ravine. The German troops were relieved that they did not have to fight a point-blank battle in the darkened tunnel with a large enemy force.

As a postscript to the fighting on Mekenzievy Mountain, Aleksandr’s group trapped underground in Coastal Battery No. 30 died a slow death. The German engineers continued to try and burn or blast them out for three days, but the battery’s demise was precipitated by a commissar who detonated one of the underground ammunition rooms in an effort to destroy both the garrison and the besieging Germans. The blast killed many and wrecked the interior of the battery. A few survivors emerged, and the Germans believed that no one else was left alive inside. In fact, Aleksandr and 20 of his men were still inside, and they waited until June 25 before exiting the battery through a drainage pipe on the side facing the Bel’bek River. Aleksandr may have been dressed in civilian clothing – his interrogation report does not mention it – but they broke into small groups and tried to infiltrate east along Haccius Ridge. They did not get far – Aleksandr was captured by German pioneers on the morning of June 26 and thoroughly interrogated.[72] The interrogation makes no mention of his fate, but Manstein was angry that Coastal Battery No. 30 had proven so obstinate, and ordered Aleksandr turned over to the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), who executed him. Later, when Aleksandr was lionized as a hero of Sevastopol’s defense, Manstein lamely claimed that he had been “shot while trying to escape.”

Sevastopol’s fate was decided in the two-week slugfest for the high ground around Mekenzievy Mountain. Both sides suffered thousands of casualties, but the Germans had triumphed due to superior small-unit leadership and plentiful air and artillery support. For the most part, the Soviet soldiers fought well and died well on Mekenzievy Mountain – there was no shortage of heroes in their ranks, either. Hundreds simply disappeared, buried in shell craters and rubble. Even in recent years, diggers in Sevastopol continue to unearth dozens of remains of fallen Red Army soldiers on the mountain.

Whereas the fighting on Sevastopol’s northern front was often characterized by extreme violence and significant gain or loss of terrain, the fighting on the southern front was a war of position. Since December 1941, the front line in Sevastopol’s Sectors I and II had been a revisit to the trench warfare of World War I, with advances measured in yards. There was little glory to be had here for either side – no Ritterkreuz or Red Star – since it was a sideshow to the main fight on Mekenzievy Mountain. The inclusion of the Romanian Mountain Corps further highlighted that fact for General der Artillerie Maximilian Fretter-Pico’s XXX Armeekorps. Fought atop the same soil where some of the most dramatic moments of the Crimean War of 1854–55 had transpired, the fight between XXX Armeekorps and two Soviet divisions entered obscurity even as it was occurring. Yet the three weeks of fighting on the Balaklava front was very much a soldier’s battle, where the mettle of each side was sorely tested.

Manstein assigned a supporting role to Fretter-Pico’s XXX Armeekorps and the Romanians, with the intent of preventing Petrov from transferring any units from Sector I or II to reinforce the fight for Mekenzievy Mountain. Unlike Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps, Fretter-Pico had to make do with significantly less air and artillery support, and Manstein made it clear that he would get no reinforcements. Fretter-Pico had taken over XXX Armeekorps just after the culmination of the December 1941 offensive and had not yet commanded a multi-division offensive. Now he would command three infantry divisions: General der Infanterie Johann Sinnhuber’s 28. leichte-Infanterie-Division, Generalleutnant Philipp Müller-Gebhard 72. Infanterie-Division, and Generalleutnant Erwin Sander’s 170. Infanterie-Division. In addition to Fretter-Pico, two of his three infantry division commanders (Sinnhuber and Sander) were career artillery officers and relatively new to maneuvering infantry on a battlefield. By nature, artillerymen are very by-the-book and checklist oriented, rather than the risk-taking style of a born maneuver soldier, and this attitude was very evident in the methodical manner that XXX Armeekorps fought its battle.

While Manstein had not allowed the Romanians to play much of a role in his first two attempts to take Sevastopol, he was now forced to include General-Major Gheorghe Avramescu’s Mountain Corps in Störfang. Avramescu had been working with AOK 11 since the beginning of Barbarossa and was well acquainted both with German operational methods and arrogance. He knew that the Germans were quick to blame the Romanians for any mistakes and to treat their troops in a condescending manner. Yet in order for Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps to mass AOK 11’s best forces against Sectors III and IV, and for Fretter-Pico to mass his lesser forces against Sector I, the Romanians would have to deal with Sector II with only limited German help. Avramescu’s corps was a mixed bag: the 1st Mountain Division was a good unit, well suited to the terrain and mission, and the Corps artillery was quite good by Crimean standards. The Romanian mountain-infantry battalions had proven themselves to be aggressive and reliable in the December fighting, and were capable of capturing fortified positions if decently supported. On the other hand, Avramescu’s other formation – the 18th Infantry Division – had negligible combat experience, and its reservist infantrymen were better suited for static defensive missions. The 4th Mountain Division was still dealing with remaining pockets of resistance from the Sudak landing and partisans, but would be sent to join Avramescu’s corps in mid-June.

Fretter-Pico’s main opponent was General-Major Petr G. Novikov, commander of the 109th Rifle Division and the SOR’s Sector I, which ran from Balaklava to the Yalta–Sevastopol road, north of Kamary. Novikov was no rookie: he had commanded an infantry battalion in the Spanish Civil War, a rifle regiment in the Russo-Finnish War, and then a rifle division during Barbarossa. His 109th Rifle Division had been formed in Sevastopol in January 1942 from remnants of the 2nd Cavalry Division, NKVD border troops, and reservists. All three of his rifle regiments were in the front line and holding the high ground that blocked German entry into Balaklava. Colonel Nikolai A. Shvarev’s 388th Rifle Division had two regiments protecting the sector around the destroyed village of Kamary, while his 782nd Rifle Regiment was in reserve on the Sapun Heights. Like Novikov, Shvarev was an experienced veteran, having been an NCO in the Tsarist Army during 1915–17, then having joined the Red Guards after the Bolshevik Revolution. During the Russo-Finnish War, he commanded a rifle regiment involved in breaching the Mannerheim Line. The 388th Rifle Division was a typical Caucasian outfit, with its Armenian, Azeri, and Georgian troops organized in segregated companies with Russian officers. Novikov was essentially a rifle-corps commander, but he did not have the resources of a corps commander. His artillery support was limited to two artillery regiments with 27 guns (eight 152mm, six 122mm, and 13 76.2mm), along with some help from Morgunov’s local batteries. Blagoveshchensky’s 9th Naval Infantry Brigade was assigned as a reserve for Novikov’s sector, but most of its battalions were deployed in coastal-defense duties, due to Petrov’s fear that the Germans would attempt an amphibious landing to get behind Balaklava.

The Germans had seized some, but not all, of the high ground overlooking Balaklava harbor on November 17. The most important position was Hill 212, on which the old Balaklava North Fort sat, and which gave the Germans excellent observation of Balaklava and the vicinity. Adjacent to Hill 212, Lieutenant-Colonel Gerasimos A. Rubtsov’s 456th Rifle Regiment (NKVD) held a craggy, boulder-strewn ridge known to the Germans as “Sulzbacher Hill” protecting the harbor mouth, located near the old Genoese Cembalo fortress. Rubtsov’s troops were atop the same area where the 93rd (Highland) Regiment made its famous “Thin Red Line” stand to defend Balaklava harbor from Russian cavalry in October 1854. Another key Soviet position was Fort Kuppe, atop a hill that had been Redoubt 1 in 1854; this position was heavily fortified behind a thick barrier of mines and barbed wire. At the boundary between Novikov’s Sector I and Colonel Nikolai F. Stutel’nik’s Sector II, Colonel Zhidilov’s 7th Naval Infantry Brigade held the same ground where Russian artillery had repulsed the Charge of the Light Brigade in 1854. In this sector, Zhidilov’s defense was based on holding Chapel Hill, an important point with a ruined church that overlooked the Yalta–Sevastopol road. Stutel’nik also had his own 386th Rifle Division to defend the Chernaya River valley.

When the artillery preparation for Störfang began on June 2, XXX Armeekorps’ fire was directed by General der Artillerie Robert Martinek’s Arko 110. His heavy firepower was limited to two Czech 30.5cm mortars, six 21cm mortars, and 12 Czech-made 14.9cm s.FH 37(t) howitzers from schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 154. He also had 36 Nebelwerfers from Werfer-Regiment 70. The Romanian Mountain Corps contributed its corps-level artillery: three battalions with 33 Czech-made M1934 15cm howitzers. Martinek could not afford to be extravagant with his artillery preparation, as Zuckertort had done, so he massed his fires against a few of the most important positions, such as “Sulzbacher Hill” and Fort Kuppe. Novikov’s artillery remained silent during Martinek’s preparation bombardment, so it was impossible for Fretter-Pico to determine if the enemy’s defense had been weakened.

Manstein did not want Fretter-Pico to launch an all-out ground offensive until Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps had made progress, but apparently he did not exercise sufficient supervision over XXX Armeekorps’ planning for Störfang. Uncertain of the enemy’s strength, Fretter-Pico timidly began his ground offensive by making two separate single-battalion probing attacks by Sinnhuber’s 28. leichte-Infanterie-Division. Just after dawn on June 7, III./Jäger-Regiment 83 attacked Rubtsov’s NKVD troops atop the Sulzbacher Hill, which meant crossing hundreds of yards of steep, open ground. The men were surprised when the NKVD troops opened up with direct fire with flak guns that had been brought onto the hill during the spring; the attack was repulsed with heavy losses. Ivan I. Bogatir’, a renowned NKVD sniper in the 456th Rifle Regiment, inflicted numerous casualties upon the enemy before he himself was wounded and evacuated.

Meanwhile, III./ Jäger-Regiment 49 used a more stealthy approach to push north toward the fortified Blagodat State Farm, which was held by 2nd Battalion, 381st Rifle Regiment. In this case, they were able to seize a small hillock overlooking the farm and begin to fortify it before the Soviets noticed what was going on. Yet once the German infiltration was detected, the 381st Rifle Regiment acted energetically to repel the enemy intrusion. Lieutenant Nikolai I. Spirin’s machine-gun company laid down heavy fire upon the Germans, supplemented by mortar and artillery fire, which inflicted heavy casualties. It turned out that Martinek’s artillery preparation had failed, and now Novikov used his own artillery to break up the German attacks, as well as to inflict painful losses on Martinek’s artillery. After a day of being pounded in no man’s land, the Germans withdrew after suffering 500 casualties for no gain. Two of the hardest-hit companies in JR 49 had been reduced to just 20–30 survivors each.[73] The Romanian 1st Mountain Division also began an effort to seize two hilltops known as “North Nose” and “Sugarloaf,” which controlled a crossing site over the Chernaya River valley. The initial small-scale attack was repulsed, but the Romanians were determined to contribute to the fall of Sevastopol.

When he learned about the lack of success by XXX Armeekorps and the heavy losses suffered by the 28. leichte-Infanterie-Division, Manstein ordered Fretter-Pico to cease any further such piecemeal attacks and to concentrate his forces to seize limited objectives. Yet Fretter-Pico failed to form a Schwerpunkt in any one sector and spent the next three days committing the 28. leichte-Infanterie-Division to probing attacks against the 381st Rifle Regiment’s positions around the Blagodat State Farm. Meanwhile, Fretter-Pico’s other two infantry divisions sat on their hands for the first four days of Störfang. After four days of indecisive fighting, XXX Armeekorps had suffered over 1,000 casualties and seized none of its objectives. Novikov’s troops had stood up very well during these opening days, inflicting heavy losses and mounting spirited counterattacks that knocked the Germans back on their heels.

However, by June 11, Manstein reckoned that it was time for Fretter-Pico’s corps to begin larger-scale offensive operations. Thus, Fretter-Pico attacked the center of Novikov’s front near Kamary with three battalions (I. and III./IR 401 from Sander’s 170. Infanterie-Division and I./IR 266 from Müller-Gebhard’s 72. Infanterie-Division), supported by eight assault guns from 2./Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 249 and 13 Pz IIIJ tanks from Panzer-Abteilung (FL) 300. The attack on the right by I./IR 401 near Chapel Hill went surprisingly well and succeeded in capturing Ruin Hill from the 602nd Rifle Regiment. The two-battalion attack further south gained a few hundred yards before being stopped by counterattacks from the 782nd Rifle Regiment. By day’s end, the Germans had formed two small salients north and south of the fortified town of Kamary, which was held by two battalions from the 778th Rifle Regiment. The next day, Müller-Gebhard added in fresh troops from his IR 124 to reinforce the concentric attack against Kamary, which was being attacked from the east and the south. Martinek also focused most of XXX Armeekorps’ artillery against Kamary, which inflicted significant losses on the 778th Rifle Regiment.

Novikov decided that the 778th Rifle Regiment was in poor shape and was uncertain that they could hold Kamary. This may have been one of those cases where ethnic prejudices against the combat capabilities of Caucasian troops helped to shape tactical decisions. In any case, Novikov decided upon the risky maneuver of a relief-in-place: he would pull out the 778th Rifle Regiment during the night of June 12/13 and replace them with steadier troops from his flank regiments. This was a difficult task for even veteran troops, and it did not go well in this case. The Germans detected movement around Kamary, and Müller-Gebhard immediately launched an attack at 0430hrs with his IR 124. The Soviets had emplaced a dense obstacle belt in front of Kamary, consisting of barbed wire and mines, but an obstacle’s value is greatly reduced if it is not covered by fire. For reasons unclear, the 778th Rifle Regiment did not leave sufficient rearguards to cover the obstacles, and the pioneers attached to IR 124 were able to create lanes through the obstacles by 0700hrs. German artillery fire pounded the town, disrupting the Soviet relief-in-place. Jäger-Regiment 49 also launched a supporting attack against the 381st Rifle Regiment positions on Vermillion Hill, southwest of Kamary, which prevented them from transferring troops to help the 782nd Rifle Regiment. Under great pressure, the center of Novikov’s line began to buckle.

Fretter-Pico requested Fliegerkorps VIII to make a concerted effort against Novikov’s reserve positions at Fort Kuppe, which made it difficult for the Soviets to reinforce the threatened sector. The Germans knew from prisoner interrogations that the command posts of both the 602nd and 782nd Rifle Regiments were located at Fort Kuppe, which was about 1,300 yards behind the frontline. By late afternoon on June 13, with the Soviet defenses greatly weakened and their command and control disrupted, Fretter-Pico put all his cards on the table. North of Kamary, Sanders massed all three battalions of IR 401 against the 602nd Rifle Regiment defending the causeway road, just west of Ruin Hill. IR 401 was supplemented with assault guns, Pz IIIJ tanks, and a small mobile group comprised of bicycle infantry and a few armored cars. At 1600hrs he began his attack. Even though the 602nd Rifle Regiment was a veteran unit on good defensive terrain, it was quickly overwhelmed and forced to fall back. At this point, chaos and confusion took over the battle. Novikov probably tried to get his defeated regiments to withdraw to their secondary positions and form a new front, but troops were moving rearward with little direction. Sanders’s mobile group aggravated the situation by aggressively pushing over half a mile down the causeway road, which turned the retreat of the 602nd Rifle Regiment into a stampede. Sensing a breakthrough, Sanders committed his reserve – II./IR 266 – to pursue the broken enemy. Adding to the Soviet discomfiture, the 28. leichte-Infanterie-Division and the Romanian mountain troops mounted supporting attacks against the flanks of the breakthrough zone. Amazingly, II./IR 266 reached the outskirts of Fort Kuppe by 1745hrs and began to methodically clear the position.[74] Novikov’s requested air support and the VVS-ChF flew some strafing runs against the Germans, but it was too late. By nightfall, both Kamary and Fort Kuppe had fallen and Fretter-Pico’s assault troops had created a deep salient in Novikov’s lines. Hundreds of Soviet troops were captured in this debacle.

Novikov could take solace in the fact that his flanks still held firm: the 381st Rifle Regiment on Rose Hill and the Blagodat State Farm in the south, and Zhidilov’s 7th Naval Infantry Brigade on the high ground overlooking the Chernaya River valley in the north. Despite the temporary blowout in the center, most of the Soviet defenses were still solid and full of fight. Fretter-Pico decided to keep up the pressure on the weakened Soviet center, while continuing fixing attacks on the flanks. On June 14, Sanders committed part of Oberstleutnant Richard Daniel’s IR 391 from reserve to reinforce the push westward, which now included elements of two regiments each from the 72. and 170. Infanterie-Divisionen. At the forefront of this advance was Oberleutnant der Reserve Georg Bittlingmaier, commander of I./IR 391; it was unusual for a junior reserve officer to be leading an infantry battalion at this stage of the war, but Bittlingmaier was an unusual officer. No scion of Prussian gentry, Bittlingmaier had enlisted in the Reichswehr in 1921 and worked his way up to the NCO ranks. After the French campaign, he was awarded a reserve commission for his outstanding leadership qualities and then given command of a battalion in April 1942 when the previous officer was relieved. Photos show Bittlingmaier wearing a steel helmet instead of an officer’s usual soft cap, and he had a scraggly beard – here was a former NCO and “trench rat” that the troops respected and believed in. Bittlingmaier’s own 18-year-old son also served in his battalion – another rarity in the Wehrmacht.

Slowly, the Germans advanced another 1,420 yards and reached the outskirts of the town of Kadykovka by the next day. Novikov’s line was bent back sharply, and the 381st Rifle Regiment in the Blagodat State Farm was nearly encircled. Although Novikov’s troops dug in their heels on June 15, they could not maintain this front line and they lacked the resources for a major counterattack. On June 16, Novikov finally bowed to the inevitable and evacuated the farm and Rose Hill, and he pulled his forces back 1,000–1,500 yards to create a shortened line that was centered on Kadykovka. Meanwhile, Stutel’nik continued to hold on to his original frontline positions in Sector II against small-scale Romanian attacks.

Fretter-Pico’s forces pursued slowly, cautiously winding their way through minefields and mopping up small pockets of resistance. The main German advance was up the elevated causeway road, with troops in both the north and south valleys as well. On June 18, Radfahr-Abteilung 72 – an ad-hoc mounted unit under Major Karl Baake – was able to exploit a gap in Novikov’s front and reach a position known as the “Eagle’s Perch,” only half a mile from the Sapun Heights. However, Fretter-Pico’s troops were spent after incurring 5,235 casualties between June 7 and June 20, including 1,010 dead or missing. Fretter-Pico decided to revert to the defense on June 22 until he could gather sufficient strength to assault the Sapun Heights. Novikov’s losses were probably heavier, and the 388th Rifle Division was virtually demolished in the fighting withdrawal. At least 1,800 Soviet troops from Sector I were captured in this period.[75] The heroic Colonel Pavel P. Gorpishchenko, commander of the 8th Naval Infantry Brigade, was seriously wounded during this phase of the fighting and was evacuated; Regimental Commissar Prokofiev I. Silant’ev took over the brigade.

The Romanian Mountain Corps finally made a major attack against Sector II’s defenses in the lower Chernaya River valley on June 18. The 1st Mountain Division struggled mightily for three days to gain control of two hilltops – “North Nose” and “Sugar Loaf” – with the battle swinging back and forth as Zhidilov’s 7th Naval Infantry Brigade and the 386th Rifle Division counterattacked regularly to retake any lost ground. Eventually, the Romanians were able to capture and hold both hills by June 20, which helped to secure XXX Armeekorps’ right flank. Lacking assault guns or extensive air support, the Romanians suffered thousands of casualties for these two small objectives. On June 21, Fretter-Pico was able to gain two battalions of IR 420, which were temporarily loaned from Heeresgruppe Süd, to mount a sudden night attack on the Fedyukhiny Heights in conjunction with the Romanian 1st Mountain Division. Before Skutel’nik could react his single regiment on the heights was overwhelmed; the Axis had won a cheap tactical victory that put them one step closer to gaining the Sapun Heights.

While XXX Armeekorps rested on June 22–28, Avramescu’s Mountain Corps mounted a major effort to clear the Chernaya River valley northeast of the Fedyukhiny Heights. This was the first time in the battle of Sevastopol that the Romanians employed all their forces, and they gradually eliminated several Soviet positions and forced the rest of Skutel’nik’s Sector II forces to retreat. Indeed, the Romanians made an important contribution at this point, in mopping up positions that the Germans no longer had the forces to reduce themselves. By late June, Novikov’s Sector I had been pushed back about 3 miles in the center, but he still had a firm grip on Balaklava in the south, while Skutel’nik’s troops held the Sapun Heights. During the fighting in the south Soviet soldiers and small-unit leaders had demonstrated great resiliency in positional warfare, and the German infantry had been able to make significant advances only when they had assault guns and air support. On the other hand, German regiment and division-level leaders had proven adept at exploiting fleeting opportunities made by enemy mistakes. This kind of combat dynamic shaped a battle that was characterized by heavy casualties and sudden spasms of maneuver.

A brief lull settled over most sectors of the Sevastopol battlefield in late June, as both sides prepared for the final act. Both XXX and LIV Armeekorps temporarily shifted to the defense as they reorganized their decimated assault troops. Richthofen and his Fliegerkorps VIII staff had already left the Crimea on June 23, and some of the Luftwaffe units were departing as well, although the VVS-ChF was no longer able to contest air superiority over the city. The remaining Luftwaffe units were running out of bombs, meaning that bomber sorties were no longer flown with full loads. Zuckertort’s largest artillery pieces, including Dora, the two Karl mortars, and the 42cm howitzers were no longer in the fight, having expended all their ammunition. Petrov’s gunners were also running out of ammunition for their medium artillery, but there was still plenty of 76mm and 82mm ammunition. Hitler wanted Störfang completed by the end of June, as his main summer offensive, Fall Blau, was about to begin and he wanted Manstein’s AOK 11 to be available soon for employment outside the Crimea. For the frontline soldiers, most were appreciative still to be on their feet and have all their limbs after three weeks of intense combat. Victory or defeat was now within their grasp, but one more blood deposit was required.

After the collapse of Sector IV, all forces that remained from Sector III fell back into the Martynovski Ravine, southeast of the Serpentine tunnel. The strongest unit – the 138th Naval Infantry Brigade – held the two railroad tunnels located on either side of the Serpentine and the western flank of Kolomiets’ perimeter. In the center, the 2nd Perekop and 79th Naval Infantry Brigade were both reduced to about 20 percent of their authorized strength. On the eastern end, the 25th Rifle Division still had two depleted rifle regiments and most of its artillery, but its right flank was open. Altogether, these forces amounted to perhaps 6,000 combat troops, and they blocked the direct path into Sevastopol from the north. Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps was in desperate need of rest and replacements, but he was still able to assemble some troops to keep the pressure on Kolomiets’ forces. Schmidt’s 50. Infanterie-Division was in the best shape of Hansen’s four divisions, so he deployed that unit to clear the Serpentine and the Martynovski Ravine, assisted by part of the 132. Infanterie-Division and the Romanian 4th Mountain Division.

By chance, two platoon leaders from the 138th Naval Infantry Brigade – Lieutenants Sultan Sultanov and Filip Onelytschenko – deserted to the Germans and provided the Ic of the 22. Infanterie-Division with the strength and dispositions of the remaining Soviet troops around the Martynovski Ravine.[76] At 0530hrs on June 22 Hansen used this information to mount a carefully planned attack with the 50. Infanterie-Division, which overran the Serpentine and reached the railroad tunnel. German pioneers cleared out the tunnel with flamethrowers. Another German Stossgruppe from the 132. Infanterie-Division, assisted by assault guns from Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190, turned the 25th Rifle Division’s open flank and advanced 1¼ miles. Heavy fighting raged around the Martynovski Ravine on June 23, but the disorganized Soviet units were defeated piecemeal, with at least 725 captured.[77] The equivalent of four battalions’ worth of troops escaped southward to Inkerman, but the 345th Rifle Division was trapped on the north side of the bay and overrun. Much of the Soviet divisional artillery was lost in the retreat to the Inkerman position, due to a lack of prime movers. As a result of this defeat, Petrov massed what little infantry and artillery he had left to hold Inkerman, with almost nothing in reserve. In the south, the defense was dependent upon holding the Sapun Heights.

During June 24–28 both sides licked their wounds and prepared for the final round. Three Black Sea Fleet destroyers succeeded in bringing in Major Sergei E. Kovalev’s 142nd Naval Infantry Brigade over the course of two nights – the last reinforcements to reach Sevastopol. However, Kovalev’s 3,550 troops were not intended to reinforce the front line but to establish a defensive perimeter around the port in case an evacuation became necessary. The Stavka was already beginning to consider an evacuation if Petrov could not hold the city, and wanted to salvage troops for use in the Caucasus. Yet Petrov was now so short of troops that he committed five construction battalions to reinforce the defenses at Inkerman. Thousands of his troops were wounded and in the 47th Medical Battalion’s hospital, which was located in the champagne factory and catacombs at Inkerman. Now this hospital was on the front line, and there was no way to move large numbers of wounded. Most of his divisions no longer existed as such, and were reduced to regimental-size battle groups. Furthermore, Petrov’s air and artillery support was now minimal and it was clear that no more reinforcements would make it through the Luftwaffe’s blockade.

Although Manstein had gradually destroyed Petrov’s defenses piece by piece in the first three weeks of Störfang, the offensive was rapidly approaching a culminating point where it would no longer have the strength to overwhelm the final defenses. Ironically, the Soviet defensive position at Inkerman was a natural fortress – far stronger than anything that LIV Armeekorps had overcome yet. Inkerman had very steep, rocky cliffs that overlooked both the road and rail bridges over the upper Chernaya River. Remnants of the 25th Rifle Division still held the Gaytani Heights, just across the river from Inkerman, which acted as a ravelin. Any attacking troops would have to cross 500 yards of open ground, most of which was marsh-like and laced with antipersonnel mines, then cross an 80-yard-wide river under fire. Even if the Germans could cross the Chernaya River, the cliffs at Inkerman were up to 100 yards higher than the river valley and consisted of vertical rock faces, making rapid ascent impossible. If anything, Inkerman was a mission for glider troops – but Manstein did not have any. Faced with a tough enemy defensive position, Manstein adopted his standard solutions to such intractable problems: risk and maneuver.

Manstein knew that Petrov’s forces were in bad shape as well, and that the Soviet commander would mass everything he had left to hold Inkerman and the Gaytani Heights. However, Petrov could not possibly protect the entire length of the southern side of Severnaya Bay, and Manstein believed that an assault crossing of the bay might catch the Soviets flat-footed and cause the defense at Inkerman to collapse, just as had occurred during Operation Trappenjagd. When Manstein raised this idea with Hansen and Wolff, whose 22. Infanterie-Division would have to mount the crossing, they were aghast. Wolff’s division was completely spent, with fewer than 400 infantrymen still combat-ready. Even the energetic Choltitz was badly wounded in the arm. Hitzfeld’s IR 213 was attached to the 22. Infanterie-Division, but, having suffered 70 percent losses, it too was judged “unsuitable for attack missions.”[78] Nevertheless, the 902 and 905 Sturmboote-Kommando assembled a total of 130 assault boats, which were enough to move one battalion across the bay at a time, each crossing taking at least 20 minutes. Hansen and Wolff believed it highly likely that the Soviets would detect a night crossing, and even a few machine guns and mortars would be enough to decimate the single assault battalion. Or worse, one battalion might make it across, then find itself isolated and overwhelmed once the Soviets reacted to the landing. Yet Manstein knew that he had neither the time nor the resources to blast his way through Inkerman, so he ordered Hansen and Wolff to begin preparations for a crossing. In order to further increase the chances of a Soviet collapse, he ordered Hansen to prepare an assault upon Inkerman with the 50. Infanterie-Division when the time was right and for Fretter-Pico’s entire XXX Armeekorps and the Romanians to simultaneously attack Novikov’s forces on the Sapun Heights. Manstein reckoned that one last all-out attack by AOK 11 would break Petrov’s defenses. If it did not, AOK 11 would be fought out and unable to complete its mission.

Petrov and Oktyabrsky were aware of the possibility of enemy landings, but did not expect them in Sevastopol. Instead, they were worried about an effort to outflank the defenses at Balaklava, and Manstein fed this fear by ordering Mimbelli’s MAS boats to demonstrate off Cape Fiolent on the night of June 27/28. Italian naval activity near Balaklava was duly reported to Petrov and Oktyabrsky, who then alerted Morgunov’s coastal defenses in that area. However, the southern shore of Severnaya Bay was guarded only by the survivors of Potapov’s 79th Naval Infantry Brigade and the 2nd Perekop Naval Infantry Regiment, which together numbered no more than 600–800 troops. At 0200hrs on the night of June 28/29, German pioneers began to lay a smoke screen on the north side of Severnaya Bay to conceal the activity of the assault boats being brought to the water’s edge and the troop loading. Overhead, German aircraft noisily attacked the area around Inkerman to further distract the defenders. On the northern side of the bay, 380 troops from Kampfgruppe Buhse (Choltitz had been wounded in the arm and Buhse temporarily took over the assault elements of IR 16, while Choltitz remained on the north side of the bay) loaded into the assault boats and started across.[79] No artillery preparation was made, in order to avoid alerting the Soviets on the southern side of the bay. It must have been a very tense and weird experience as the first wave of German troops made their way across the bay, threading their way through half-sunken ships and wreckage in the water, and expecting enemy flares and automatic-weapons fire at any moment. Yet Potapov’s sailors – who were spread very thinly along the coast, were not terribly alert and did not detect the crossing until it was too late. Around 0220hrs the first German assault troops landed on the southern side of Severnaya Bay and quickly scrambled up the heights above the beach. One of Potapov’s positions overlooked the landing site, but the troops – exhausted after weeks of combat – were apparently asleep, and the Germans stealthily approached and then eliminated the outpost before it could raise an alarm. The assault boats then turned around and went back for the second wave, which consisted of Kampfgruppe Schitting (IR 65), and then a third wave consisting of Kampfgruppe Hitzfeld. It was not until 0300hrs, by which point over 700 German troops were on the south side of Severnaya Bay, that Potapov became aware of the landings, when several of his outposts began firing red flares. The Soviet naval infantrymen began firing at boats in the water as well as troops on the shore, but the Germans had already seized a viable beachhead. Once Potapov’s men were driven off the high ground overlooking the beaches, they could no longer bring direct fire upon the crossing sites. Soviet artillery fire damaged a quarter of the assault boats, but the crossing had cost the German pioneers only two boats destroyed, four men killed, and 29 wounded. In a major coup, the German assault troops succeeding in capturing Sevastopol’s power plant, which brought an end to electrical power in the city. The next morning, the wounded Choltitz crossed the bay at 1000hrs in order to lead his regiment in the final fight for Sevastopol.[80]

Off to the south, flashes began lining the eastern horizon as Fretter-Pico’s XXX Armeekorps began its assault on Sapun Ridge. When Martinek began his 60-minute artillery preparation he had an advantage: prisoner interrogations had revealed the exact location of Skutel’nik’s 386th Rifle Division command post on the heights. The opening salvoes landed squarely atop Skutel’nik’s command post, severely wounding him and his commissar, as well as disrupting Soviet command and control on the Sapun Heights. Next, Werfer-Regiment 70 laid a blanket of high-explosive and smoke rockets on the Sapun Heights, focusing on the area held by the 775th Rifle Regiment and the 7th Naval Infantry Brigade. Fretter-Pico had assigned Sanders the mission of storming the heights, and he had formed a special assault force consisting of three infantry battalions (I., and III./IR 399, and II./IR 420), supported by the assault guns of 2./Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 249, a company of Pz III tanks, pioneers, and flak guns. While Martinek’s barrage was still impacting on the ridge, the three assault battalions began to move forward, but they suffered casualties from unsuppressed Soviet mortars and machine gunners on the ridgeline. However, the assault troops moved in rapidly and infiltrated through weak points in the defenses. By 0340hrs, the German troops had reached the Soviet trenches on top of the Sapun Heights and began close-quarter fighting in the positions of the 7th Naval Infantry Brigade. Adding to the Soviet discomfiture, the Romanian 1st Mountain Division simultaneously launched a five-battalion attack against the left flank of Skutel’nik’s 386th Rifle Division at the village of Novo Shuli. The Romanian mountain troops engaged in house-to-house fighting in Novo Shuli and cleared the objective by 0730hrs.[81]

Once both Petrov’s flanks were reeling from simultaneous blows, Manstein ordered Schmidt’s 50. Infanterie-Division to begin its attack at Inkerman at 0400hrs. Initially, Schmidt began by committing his IR 121 to clear the open areas north of Inkerman held by the combat outposts of the 138th Naval Infantry Brigade. Surprisingly, Soviet resistance began to melt away, so at 0505hrs Schmidt brought Kampfgruppe Walter (IR 32 and IR 122) and IR 123 into the fight to clear the Gaytani Heights and prepare to assault across the Chernaya River. Oberleutnant Erich Bärenfänger continued to aggressively lead III./IR 123, despite being wounded for the third time, but it was Major Willy Marienfeld’s II./IR 123 that was the first to cross from Gaytani to Inkerman. The 47-year-old Marienfeld was an unusual battalion commander: he had fought at Verdun in 1916 and was twice awarded the Iron Cross, but had left the Wehrmacht after World War I and became a teacher. Returning in 1939, Marienfeld proved himself again in Poland, France, and the Balkans. As Schmidt was moving against Inkerman, Fretter-Pico sensed that Sander’s three assault battalions were creating a breakthrough on the Sapun Heights, so he committed his reserve – IR 105 – to exploit this success. Far away in his command post, Petrov could not ascertain exactly what was going on, but he knew that his troops were under attack virtually everywhere. These were critical moments for Petrov, but he was uncertain what to do or where to commit his meager reserves. There were six T-26 light tanks from the 81st Separate Tank Battalion near the Severnaya Bay landings, but perhaps Potapov exaggerated the scale of the German landings. Some reports suggested that only a handful of enemy paratroopers had landed near the bay. Petrov decided to wait for daylight and more information.

As the sun came up, the Luftwaffe arrived in force to blast the Soviet positions at Inkerman and the artillery atop the Sapun Heights. Sander’s assault units, reinforced by IR 105 and then IR 391, were tearing a wide breach in the now-leaderless 386th Rifle Division. Many troops from the 386th Rifle Division simply abandoned their positions and ran as the Germans closed in. The former NCO-turned-battalion-commander, Oberleutnant der Reserve Georg Bittlingmaier, led his I./IR 391 onto the Sapun Heights and succeeded in capturing a large bunker, but he was mortally wounded during the climax of the battle. Manstein unveiled another trick at 0605hrs: he had brought up IR 42 and IR 72 from the 46. Infanterie-Division at Kerch – another calculated risk – to mount an attack across the middle section of the Chernaya River between Inkerman and the Sapun Heights. This sector was held by the 8th Naval Infantry Brigade. Despite some intense defensive fire, the two German regiments were able to cross the river and begin enveloping the 8th NIB. Once Soviet resistance along the river was revealed to be weaker than expected, Schmidt sent the III./IR 123 across the river, and this battalion was able to seize an old Crimean War-era fort south of Inkerman by 0700hrs. By 0715hrs, Soviet resistance on the Sapun Heights was broken, and Sander’s units fanned out to roll up the entire Soviet southern defensive line. Petrov’s defenses began to crumble everywhere, all at once, as troops realized that German troops had broken through the final line of defense and were advancing upon the city. All thought now turned from fight to flight.

Despite the presence of nearly 5,000 Soviet troops around Inkerman, Schmidt’s 50. Infanterie-Division seized the Chernaya River bridges and the heights overlooking them by noon on June 29. Thousands of Soviet troops remained isolated in pockets of resistance, but Hansen ordered Schmidt to ignore them for the moment, and, instead, send Kampfgruppe Walter to link up with the beachhead on Severnaya Bay. Potapov’s naval infantrymen failed to seriously interfere with the German beachhead, which had grown to four regimental Kampfgruppen, reinforced with Panzerjägers and flak by the time that Kampfgruppe Walter reached them around 1700hrs.[82] At this point, Manstein directed Hansen and Fretter-Pico to spend the rest of the day mopping up isolated Soviet units, before moving toward the city itself. Fretter-Pico did send Jäger-Regiment 49 in pursuit, and they reached the old English cemetery by nightfall. The day had been a debacle for Petrov and a triumph for Manstein. Over 4,700 prisoners had been taken and, aside from the uncommitted 142nd Naval Infantry Brigade which might have played a significant role if used to counterattack the landing in Severnaya Bay, and Petrov had no formed units left near the city. Novikov’s 109th Rifle Division was still relatively intact, but concentrated around Balaklava. German losses for June 29 had totaled 1,227, including 135 dead, between both corps.

During the night of June 29/30, many Soviet troops who had been cut off by the German breakthroughs tried to reach the city, resulting in a night of sporadic skirmishing. The entire staff of the 25th Rifle Division was still in the cellar of the champagne factory at Inkerman, collocated near the 47th Medical Battalion’s hospital, which had 2,000 wounded soldiers inside. Kolomiets and his staff succeeded in exfiltrating in the darkness through the German lines to reach Sevastopol, abandoning their troops and the wounded. However, Lieutenant-Colonel Sergei R. Gusarov, commander of the 3rd Naval Infantry Regiment, made an incredible decision before leaving the champagne factory – he ordered his sappers to detonate stores of ammunition hidden in the catacombs so that they would not fall into German hands. Gusarov made this decision without any thought for the wounded in the hospital, and when the ammunition detonated, an entire section of the cliff face collapsed, burying the Soviet hospital under the rubble. By happenstance, a German reconnaissance team from Aufklärungs-Abteilung 132 that was approaching the champagne factory was also killed by the explosion.[83] On the neighboring Gaytani Heights, German observers were shocked to see the massive explosions, and prisoners soon revealed Gusarov’s complicity in this gruesome incident. The destruction of the Inkerman depot eliminated much of the Maritime Army’s last ammunition reserves. Gusarov also ordered a group of 50 soldiers to drag howitzers that had been abandoned near Inkerman; when they refused, he had them executed.

By 1800hrs on June 29 it was apparent that Sevastopol’s defenses had been breached and that the city could no longer be held. Petrov and Oktyabrsky ordered most of the division and brigade commanders to report to Coastal Battery No. 35 – which left their units without senior leadership. Then they updated the Stavka on the day’s events. After some deliberation, at 0950hrs the next morning the Stavka authorized the evacuation of Sevastopol. Stalin personally ordered all senior military and political leaders to leave the city as soon as possible. Once word of the evacuation got out, Petrov later admitted that panic began to spread among the officers, and chaos took over. No more food or ammunition reached the frontline troops, so many began to abandon their positions. Some units began to sabotage equipment in order to prevent it from falling into enemy hands; at Cape Fiolent, air-defense troops pushed two RUS-2 radars off a cliff into the sea. On the Sapun Heights, Fretter-Pico’s XXX Armeekorps completed mopping-up operations and began to push toward Sevastopol’s outskirts with both the 28. leichte-Infanterie-Division and Sanders’ 170. Infanterie-Division. The 28. leichte-Infanterie-Division succeeded in capturing the English cemetery, which had been converted into a Soviet artillery position.[84] Realizing that he was about to be cut off, Novikov abandoned Balaklava and forced-marched his 109th Rifle Division toward Coastal Battery No. 35 on the Chersonese Peninsula. Novikov was able to form a tenuous perimeter near the battery, protecting the airstrip at Chersonese, which was the last link with Novorossiysk. Amazingly, a few Li-2 (license-built copies of the American DC-3) transports made it through to the airstrip, delivering 12 tons of ammunition and some food, but this was a drop in the ocean. The last 17 operational aircraft from 3 OAG, including six Yak-1 fighters and seven Il-2 Sturmoviks, flew out of the airstrip that afternoon to the Caucasus, leaving Sevastopol without any air defense. Meanwhile, Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps spent the day mopping up around Inkerman, but was pushing into the outskirts of Sevastopol by nightfall. Prisoners were now falling into Axis hands in large numbers, as Soviet resistance crumbled.

At 2000hrs on June 30, the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet held its last meeting in Sevastopol in a casemate at Coastal Battery No. 35. Oktyabrsky, Petrov, and Morgunov voted to evacuate the city as soon as transport arrived. Senior military and political leaders, including Boris A. Borisov and his KOS, would be included, but the council decided that the Black Sea Fleet would be unable to evacuate any of the troops or the wounded. Oddly, no effort was made to use the 142nd NIB for its intended purpose of securing an evacuation site, and Oktyabrsky ruled out any large-scale evacuation as unfeasible. Petrov designated Novikov as the new commander of the Maritime Army, which was clearly being abandoned by its leadership. A group of Li-2 transports flew in from the Caucasus after midnight, but their appearance caused a mad scramble for the planes. A VVS Major put in charge of organizing the airlift was one of the first onboard, and groups of sailors appeared, using their fists to fight their way on to the aircraft. Oktyabrsky and General-Major Aleksei P. Ermilov, chief of rear services, managed to get on one transport, and all the aircraft flew out by 0130hrs on July 1. Once the aircraft left, Petrov and the rest of the senior leadership had to make their way through a crowd of nearly 10,000 soldiers, sailors, and civilians that had gathered around Battery No. 35. After more pushing and shoving – and one can imagine the faces of men watching their leaders abandon them – Petrov and his leadership cadre went through a tunnel in the battery to reach a jetty at the base of the cliff. There, small boats took them out to two submarines that had surfaced. The Shch-209 was the first to arrive and departed with 63 personnel at 0259hrs, followed by the L-23 at 0847hrs with 117 men. Altogether, about 200 senior leaders escaped Sevastopol, including Petrov, Morgunov, Kolomiets (25 RD), Kapitokhin (95 RD), Laskin (172 RD), Shvarev (388 RD), Zhidilov (7 NIB), and Potapov (79 NIB).[85]

Shortly after the Soviet leadership fled, German infantry from Oberst Ernst Maisel’s IR 42 began advancing into the shattered and burning ruins of Sevastopol, followed by IR 72. Captain-Lieutenant Aleksei P. Matyukhin’s battery of two 130mm guns located on the edge of the city on the Malakhov Hill fired as long as they could against advancing German troops, but was overrun when it ran out of ammunition. Matyukhin was captured. Nearby, the armored train Zhelezniakov was found abandoned in a tunnel. There was negligible resistance inside the city. By 1313hrs a German flag was flying over the southern part of the city, and by 1400hrs Axis troops were pouring in. Major Willy Marienfeld, commander of II./IR 123, reached the center of the city and radioed his division command post that, “the target was reached.” In an awkward moment for Axis cooperation, Manstein tried to prevent the Romanians from participating in this photo moment – he wanted the fall of Sevastopol to be seen as a purely German victory – but a column from the 4th Mountain Division ignored German orders, made its way into the city, and hoisted a Romanian flag on the prominent Nakhimov Monument. Over 12,000 Soviet prisoners were taken on July 1, and by the end of the day most of the city was in Axis hands. At 2100hrs Berlin radio announced the fall of Sevastopol to the world.

As the Germans moved into Sevastopol they encountered numerous Soviet wounded, as well as civilians. The treatment of these individuals depended upon the unit. Choltitz, having won a splendid reputation as commander of IR 16 throughout the Crimean campaign, was not about to spoil that reputation with war crimes against a vanquished foe. He ordered his troops to ignore the standing order to execute commissars, and directed his medical personnel to treat Soviet wounded. However, other German units were less chivalrous, and treated Soviet wounded in expedient fashion – with a bullet. Later, Choltitz recalled that 30,000 Jews were executed after the fall of Sevastopol, although most of these were probably Soviet POWs and local communist officials.[86]

Novikov retreated into the Chersonese Peninsula with about 50,000 troops from the Maritime Army and the naval base, intent upon making a last stand. The peninsula, which was about 5 miles long and a mile wide, was very heavily fortified, but Coastal Battery No. 35 had expended its last rounds on July 1. The only reasonably intact Soviet units were Major Nikulshin’s 1st Battalion from 9 NIB, which had been assigned to defend the Chersonese airstrip, and a VVS-ChF security battalion. As Sanders’ 170. Infanterie-Division approached the Chersonese they did not expect much resistance, but were astounded when the survivors of the 386th and 388th Rifle Divisions mounted a powerful counterattack at 1700hrs against the vanguard of IR 399 and IR 401, which inflicted 600 casualties. Thereafter, Fretter-Pico resolved to simply seal off the Soviet forces in the Chersonese and rely upon artillery and aerial bombardment to finish them off. Yet the Soviet mood for a suicidal last-stand evaporated quickly. Captain Aleksandr Leshchenko, commander of Coastal Battery No. 35, decided to detonate the powder magazines on the night of July 1/2, which completely demolished the battery and its turrets.

Could the Black Sea Fleet have conducted a “Dunkirk-style” evacuation from the Chersonese Peninsula and saved thousands of Soviet troops? If Oktyabrsky had committed the entire fleet, it is likely that a sizeable number of troops could have been evacuated over several nights, although the fleet would have suffered damage. Yet Oktyabrsky was unwilling to lose more warships, and rejected the idea of an evacuation. Nevertheless, a number of small craft from Gorshkov’s Azov Flotilla made runs to the Chersonese at night to try and extract some survivors. At least two minesweepers, a survey vessel, three trawlers, and ten MO-IV type subchasers made runs to Cape Chersonese during July 2–4, saving several hundred members of the garrison. When the MO-IV sub-chaser SKA-112 arrived around 0100hrs on July 2, Novikov decided that discretion was the better part of valor and boarded it in an attempt to escape, but he had no luck. Off Yalta, SKA-112 was intercepted by Birnbacher’s S-Boats and, after a running fight, the Soviet vessel was sunk and Novikov was captured. However, Nikolai Blagoveshchensky, commander of the 9th NIB, succeeded in evading the Axis dragnet aboard another MO-IV boat and made it to Novorossiysk. Several small craft were sunk or damaged by German air attacks, but the Axis blockade was not effective in stopping many of these vessels. A tugboat loaded with 77 troops made for the Turkish coast; under Soviet diplomatic pressure, the Turks allowed the vessel to proceed through their coastal waters to Batumi.

The remnants of the Coastal Army died a slow death in the Chersonese Peninsula, clustered around the airstrip and the lighthouse. One of those lost in this final stand was Lieutenant-Colonel Sergei R. Gusarov, commander of 3 NIR, whose orders had resulted in the death of many Soviet wounded at Inkerman just four days before. When German troops finally broke into the Chersonese, the last Soviet survivors huddled beneath the cliffs, while the Germans tossed hand grenades at them. Another Soviet group, formed around Lieutenant-Colonel Gerasimos A. Rubtsov’s 456th Rifle Regiment (NKVD), made a last stand around Coastal Battery No. 18, but were finally eliminated. By the evening of July 4, all Soviet organized resistance in the Crimea was finished. The next day, Manstein presided over an Axis victory parade at Livadiya to commemorate the conquest of the Crimea. Major Nikulshin and 11 of his naval infantrymen managed to escape the Chersonese in a small boat, and rowed across the Black Sea to internment in Turkey.

The fall of Sevastopol released AOK 11 for reassignment to other fronts – the only occasion in the Russo-German War where a complete German army became available, which was a unique opportunity – but AOK 11 was in no condition to accomplish any follow-on missions. The 33-day battle of Sevastopol had cost AOK 11 a total of 35,866 German casualties, including 5,786 dead or missing, or about 18 percent of its starting strength. All four infantry divisions in Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps had suffered at least 30 percent casualties and their infantry battalions were almost all reduced to combat-ineffective status. Losses among officers and NCOs were particularly severe, with over 200 officers killed and 570 wounded – it would take months to replace these small-unit leaders. In Choltitz’s IR 16 – one of the best regiments in AOK 11 – there were only 347 troops still fit for duty from an original strength of 3,000 men in June 1941. Oberleutnant Erich Bärenfänger’s III./IR 123 was reduced to only 169 troops after the battle, and I./IR 121, which suffered over 70 percent casualties, was reduced to a battle strength of just 70 men.[87] Unable to replace these of losses, most of the German infantry divisions were forced to eliminate one battalion from each regiment and transfer the survivors to the two remaining battalions, which made for less-capable divisions. Indeed, the divisions that Hitler received back from the Crimea were not the same ones that he had sent there in September 1941.

Even among the troops who were not wounded, the effects of a month of sustained, close-quarter fighting in terrain strewn with corpses, rotting in the hot Crimean sun, was catastrophic. Many, such as Bärenfänger, came down with the “Wolhynian Fever” or “Trench Fever,” which laid them up for one or two months.[88] Among the few soldiers still on their feet, they were granted local leave to enjoy the beaches at Yalta – no longer under regular nightly bombardment from Soviet destroyers – and to swill captured Crimean wine. A few, such as Gottlob Bidermann, were granted furloughs to return to Germany.[89] As was customary after a big, costly battle, the surviving victorious troops went on a week-long binge to forget their experiences. Manstein excused himself from the Crimea, first to collect his Generalfeldmarschall’s baton from a grateful Führer, then to go on holiday in Romania.

Hitler hoped that once AOK 11 had rested and received replacements it could be employed either to reinforce the advance into the Caucasus by Heeresgruppe A or to reinforce Heeresgruppe Nord for Operation Georg to capture Leningrad. Yet it took far longer to rehabilitate these divisions than expected, and none were ready to redeploy until late August. Then, inexplicably, AOK 11’s component formations were split up: the 24., and 28. leichte, 132., and 170. Infanterie-Divisionen were sent with Manstein to Leningrad, but Georg was cancelled and they were used to block a Soviet offensive that sought to open a corridor to the besieged city. The 72. Infanterie-Division was diverted to reinforce AOK 9 at Rzhev and the 46. and 50. Infanterie-Divisionen were kept in the Crimea unril October 1942, then sent to the Caucasus just as the advance there was sputtering out. Amazingly, Wolff’s 22. Infanterie-Division was sent to garrison Crete – a complete waste of a fine infantry unit, but probably also an indication that heavy losses had made the unit unsuited for further offensive use. Thus, instead of being used en masse to achieve some operationally significant task, AOK 11 was broken up and its veteran divisions scattered. Yet, if instead AOK 11 had been compltely rebuilt and kept together, it would have provided Hitler and the OKH with a very powerful strategic reserve – this could have been a real game-changer when the crisis at Stalingrad developed in November 1942.

The fact that the Romanian Army had also bled considerably for Sevastopol – suffering a total of 8,454 casualties, including 1,874 dead or missing during Störfang – received considerably less attention from the German propaganda machine, which sought to portray the victory at Sevastopol as primarily a German triumph. The Romanian troops were afforded less opportunity to enjoy the fruits of victory. Instead, they were assigned to hunt down any of Petrov’s troops who had escaped through the ring around Sevastopol before it fell in an effort to reach the partisans in the mountains, or to guard the long coastlines. German officers turned a blind eye to the post-battle drunkenness and looting of their own soldiers, but loudly complained if Romanian troops were caught doing the same. Sevastopol itself was a burning, smashed ruin when the Axis entered the city, with gas mains shattered, no electricity, and rubble preventing vehicles from driving down streets. It would take a tremendous clean-up effort to restore even minimal functions to the city.

On the Soviet side, the entire Maritime Army had been destroyed, with seven rifle divisions and six naval infantry units lost. Altogether, German sources indicate that they captured 97,000 Soviet prisoners, of which about one-third were wounded, which would suggest that about 18,000 Soviet soldiers and sailors died in the final battle for Sevastopol. What exactly happened to these prisoners is not exactly clear, but the survival rate for Soviet prisoners captured in 1941–42 was very low. Data from AOK 11 records for July indicate that 36,000 prisoners were transported to Dnepropetrovsk, 76,000 remained in AOK 11’s POW cages (likely including some left over from Trappenjagd), and 5,000 were Hilfswilliger, who volunteered to serve as laborers to repair infrastructure in the Crimea.[90] Many of the Hiwis were Ukrainians or Caucasian troops, who had little loyalty for the Soviet regime. However, it appears that many Soviet prisoners such as commissars and other designated enemies of the Reich were turned over to the SD for summary execution, and their bodies buried in the antitank ditches on Mekenzievy Mountain or in the numerous bomb craters scarring the local landscape.

The loss of the Crimea was a bitter blow for Stalin, who had believed reports that Sevastopol was impregnable. Coming so soon after the stunning defeat at Kerch, he was dumbfounded that Manstein’s AOK 11 had captured the entire region so quickly. In Stalin’s mind, this kind of defeat could be explained only by criminal negligence, treachery, or both, but recriminations could wait. Foremost in his mind was the necessity of concealing from the Soviet people the fact that Sevastopol’s troops and civilians had been abandoned by their military and party leadership – that could hurt morale – so that the truth would be carefully whitewashed from history for many decades to come. Instead, Stalin mandated that revenge was the order of the day and that the liberation of the Crimea would be a priority when the Soviet counteroffensive began. Despite losing his enire army, Petrov was given command of the survivors of the 44th Army that had escaped from Kerch in May, and he was instructed to prepare the defenses of the northern Caucasus. Oktyabrtsky remained as commander of the Black Sea Fleet, although his star was much diminished, while Gorshkov’s was beginning to rise.

Altogether the conquest of the Crimea from the attack at Perekop to the fall of Sevastopol cost AOK 11 over 96,000 casualties, including 21,600 dead or missing. When the Romanian Army’s 19,000 casualties are added in, it is clear that the Axis suffered at least 115,000 casualties in the Crimea in 1941–42. However, a far more important cost to the Axis cause was the loss of valuable time and resources poured into securing what amounted to a secondary objective. The diversion of so much Luftwaffe and artillery firepower to reduce Sevastopol was a luxury that the Wehrmacht in Russia could ill afford. Soviet losses in the Crimea in 1941–42 were catastrophic: five armies destroyed and with overall casualties aproaching 500,000. Even worse, the Soviets failed to achieve any of their operational-level objectives in the Crimea in 1941–42, and that theater proved to be a bottomless pit for resources. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union could better afford the manpower and resources wasted in pursuit of holding the Crimea than the Third Reich could afford the cost of seizing it. The German conquest of the Crimea would prove to be both expensive and, ultimately, empty.