Carrier: A Guided Tour of an Aircraft Carrier

It is a matter of historical record that some things on carrier aircraft are terribly simple, and can't be easily replaced. The Curtis biplane that Eugene Ely first landed on the Pennsylvania in 1911 was equipped with many of the same items used by modern carrier aircraft. In particular, it had a small tailhook and a beefed-up tail structure so that the sudden shock of deceleration from the primitive arresting system would not tear the aircraft apart. However, good as these "shade tree" solutions to getting on and off carriers were, they were just a start. Future naval aircraft would have even more systems to adapt them to the unique problems and challenges of the ocean environment. Hard as it is on sailors and ships, the ocean is a terror for pilots and aircraft, and the challenges it offers to airplane designers are unlike anything found on land.

First and most obvious are the problems of moisture and corrosion, which can literally eat a plane or helicopter from the inside out. Then there are the limitations of the ship's confined spaces for operating and storing aircraft, and the need to reduce the aircraft's "footprint" while on the flight deck. These aircraft must also be able to operate in what has to be an "expeditionary" environment, where crews may lack the maintenance and repair facilities of a land base. Then there is the matter of assisting the aircraft into and out of the air without destroying them. And like all military aircraft, these flying machines must be capable of carrying useful payloads an adequate distance with acceptable performance and a good survival rate.

With this in mind, it's not hard to understand why only a handful of companies worldwide have successfully built aircraft for naval service. Carrier aircraft are odd hybrids, combining the qualities of conventional planes that fly off concrete runways with the unique ability to operate off the confined spaces of warships. While naval aircraft perform virtually all the missions that land-based aircraft do, they are also tasked with a number of missions unique to the sea services. For example, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) takes a well-deserved pride in dropping laser-guided bombs (LGBs) down the center of buildings, but the U.S. Navy has aircraft that can do that too. In addition, these same Navy craft can hunt submarines, defend ships against missile attacks, and transfer supplies between vessels. These are just some of the many jobs unique to naval aviation, and Navy aircraft have to be equipped to handle the fullest possible range of roles and missions. This has generally made naval aircraft among the most capable and flexible designs of their design generations. Perhaps the best example of this was the classic F-4 Phantom II, which served not only with the Navy and Marine Corps, but also the USAF and over a dozen foreign countries. Such diversity and capability is not easy, and it comes at a high price.

In general, naval aircraft are both heavier and more complex than equivalent land-based craft. In an era where the cost of new aircraft is directly tied to their weight, USN aircraft generally are more expensive-which usually means smaller production runs and higher financial and technical risks for the manufacturers. Very few companies have been able to meet all of these challenges and turn a profit. For decades, just a few manufacturers have dominated the American naval aviation scene. Airframes made by Grumman, McDonnell Douglas, and Sikorsky were for many years all that you could find on the decks of U.S. carriers. In fact, the rare bird from a company like Lockheed or General Dynamics (traditional USAF contractors) was considered an aberration, a sign that the favored incumbent had made an error during the design competition. As a result, naval aircraft design grew inbred and lacked some of the innovation seen in land-based designs. Back in the 1970's, the Navy was fully briefed on the results of the USAF's Have Blue program. This was the flying prototype of the 1970's that led to the development of the Lockheed F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter. But the USN chose to ignore the new technology in favor of more conventional aircraft-only one example of such lost opportunities. Another lost chance came when Texas Instruments began to develop its third-generation Paveway III LGB and the Navy stuck with the older-generation Paveway II-series bombs. With just these two decisions, the USN denied itself the two most effective weapons of the Gulf War.

By making a string of similar decisions, naval aviation leadership fostered a two-decade-long Dark Age that denied them some of the best that modern aerospace technology had to offer. The result was the near-mortal wounding of naval aviation as a community in the early 1990's, just at the time that they were being forced to find new roles, new missions, and even new enemies in the post-Cold War world. In an era when military power was becoming more "precision" oriented, naval aviation still valued how well a pilot could deliver a "stick" of unguided iron bombs. As of this writing, it has been over fifteen years since the Navy has taken delivery of a completely new tactical aircraft for fleet use. During that same period, over a half-dozen other major aircraft programs have been canceled or terminated. Desert Storm found the fleet ill-equipped for the first major post-Cold War conflict, and the part it did play was poorly publicized to a world hungry for the high-tech images of LGBs hitting their targets with eye-splitting precision.[43]

Even worse, following the Persian Gulf war, it began to appear that the top leadership of U.S. naval aviation could not even buy the aircraft and weapons they would need to fit into the new "littoral warfare" strategy planned for the 21st century. There was even an attempt by the top leaders of the USAF to replace carrier aviation with a concept called "Virtual Presence." This was the notion that long-range bombers based in the continental U.S. and armed with precision weapons could threaten potential enemies enough that forward-based forces like carrier battle groups would not be necessary.[44] "Virtual presence" was a nice idea, especially if you wanted to justify the purchase of additional B-2A Spirit stealth bombers. Unfortunately, it was completely unrealistic in a world where "presence" really is the sight of a gray-painted USN ship near where a crisis is breaking. Clearly, naval aviation had to "get well" so that it could fulfill its essential task in the national security of the U.S.

All Fall Down: Naval Aviation in the 1980s

Earlier (see the third chapter), we saw how the culture of naval aviators has been forced to deal with changes in the society of the nation they serve. Unfortunately, there was more than just a morale problem to be dealt with. Material problems were also at the heart of the questioning of the credibility of naval aviation by the national leadership. Not that these were new problems-they first started over two decades ago. Naval aviation's downward slide really began back in the 1970s, when the administration of President Jimmy Carter cut off the funds for services to upgrade their equipment, an action that was coupled with an almost complete moratorium on the buying of replacement weapons and spare parts for aircraft. Carriers frequently went on cruises short of airplanes with only partially filled magazines, requiring the "cross-decking" of planes, munitions, and equipment from ships headed home. Naval aviation was being forced to eat its "seed corn" to fulfill the missions it had been assigned. Though the Carter Administration did eventually reverse policy and spend some badly needed funds on procurement for the sea services, by then it was too late. The damage had been done.

The next Administration-that of President Ronald Reagan and his Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman-attempted to rebuild naval aviation in the 1980's. Lehman was a smart, energetic man, with a strong sense of purpose. But he could not instantly do everything that needed to be done, so priorities had to be set. His vision of a "600 Ship Navy," for example, meant that since naval vessels had the longest procurement time, the largest portion of early funds from the huge Reagan-era defense expenditures would have to go into shipbuilding. He did find funds to replenish the weapons and spare parts inventories, however, and within a few years, the existing aircraft fleet was flying and healthy. But the question of how to build the right mix of aircraft in adequate numbers was a problem that would defy even Secretary Lehman's formidable powers of organization, persuasion, and influence. Under his "600 Ship" plan, the numbers of carriers and air wings (CVWs) were to be expanded and updated. An active force of fifteen carriers would be built up, with fourteen active and two reserve CVWs to fill their decks. To provide some "depth" to the force, the reserve CVWs would be given new aircraft, so they would have the same makeup and equipment as the active units.

Unfortunately this plan contained the seeds of a disaster. The basic problem was airframes-or more specifically, the shortage of them. Because of financial constraints, the Navy had not bought enough aircraft in the 1970's to flesh out sixteen CVWs. Furthermore, the sea services were already heavily committed to the replacement of their force of F-4 Phantom fighters and A-7 Corsair II attack jets with the new F/A-18 Hornet. Normally, the Navy tries to stagger such buys, so that only one or two aircraft types are being modernized at any given time. Now, however, Secretary Lehman was faced with buying or updating every aircraft type in the fleet virtually simultaneously. Either way, the cost would be astronomical.

During this same time, the Soviet Union, under the new leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, was not quite the "evil empire" it had been under Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Andropov. Meanwhile, the growing federal budget deficits began to take their toll on the defense budget. At a time when the Navy's budget needed to be increasing, the decline of the Soviet Empire and growing domestic problems at home made a continued arms buildup seem unnecessary, and so the Navy was not able to obtain the funding it needed.

When John Lehman left the Administration in 1986 for a career in the private sector, the budget for procuring new aircraft was already being slashed. Far from building sixteen fully stocked CVWs, the Navy's focus now became building just one new type of aircraft for the 1990s. That one airplane, the A-12 Avenger II, came close to destroying naval aviation. Few people outside the military are aware of the A-12 program. Though not actually a "black" program, the shadow of secrecy that shrouded it was at least charcoal gray.[45] The A-12 was designed to replace the aging fleet of A-6 Intruder all-weather attack bombers, but the exact roots of the aircraft are still something of a mystery, though some details have come to light.

Back in the 1980s, the first major arms reduction accord signed between the Reagan and Gorbachev governments was a controversial agreement known as the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. The INF treaty completely eliminated several whole classes of land-based nuclear weapons, and severely restricted others. Under this agreement, both sides would remove land-based nuclear missiles based in Europe, and aircraft capable of nuclear weapons delivery would be limited and monitored. This was a significant reduction in theater nuclear stockpiles, and at least gave the appearance of a reduced threat of regional conflict. The appearance was not quite the reality, however, because both sides wanted to maintain as large a regional nuclear stockpile as possible. As might be imagined, both sides began looking for loopholes.

U.S. defense planners immediately noticed that sea-based nuclear-capable aircraft and cruise missiles were not counted or monitored under the INF accord-which meant that the existing fleet of A-6's and F/A-18's could immediately provide an interim replacement for the lost nuclear missile fleet. As good as that was, it wasn't good enough. What the nuclear planners really wanted was a carrier aircraft that would hold even the "hardest" targets in the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries "at risk," and that would do it with impunity.

The Navy was thus directed by the Department of Defense (DoD) to develop such an aircraft. The DoD wanted an aircraft that could replace a variety of attack bombers, including the A-6 Intruder, F-111 Aardvark, and even newer aircraft like the F-117A Nighthawk and F-15E Strike Eagle. The program would be developed in total secrecy, and would take advantage of the new technology of passive electromagnetic stealth, much like the F-117 Nighthawk and the B-2A Spirit. It would carry a two-man crew, have the same levels of stealth as the B-2A, and carry a new generation of precision munitions (some possibly with nuclear warheads) guided by the new NAVISTAR Global Positioning System (GPS). Plans had the first units being assigned to the Navy and Marine Corps, with the Air Force getting their A-12's later in the production run.

The Navy had problems with the A-12 from the very start. First, thanks to its lack of interest in the Have Blue program, the Navy knew very little about stealth-a problem that was magnified by the strange rules of "Black" programs, which required them to almost reinvent the technology from scratch. USAF contractors were not allowed to transfer their experience with the F-117 and B-2 programs to the Navy and to potential contractors for the A-12. Even companies like Lockheed and Northrop, who already had stealth experience, were restricted from transferring their corporate knowledge to their own teams developing A-12 proposals. Furthermore, the Navy program management lacked experience in taking a small "Black" research project and turning it into a large, multi-billion-dollar production program. From the beginning, progress was slow and costs were high.

The winning entry in the A-12 competition came from the General Dynamics/McDonnell Douglas team, utilizing a strange-looking design that had been under development by General Dynamics since 1975. Because of its triangular flying-wing shape, it was quickly nicknamed "the flying Dorito." Designated the A-12 Avenger II (after the famous World War II torpedo bomber), it was designed to carry up to 10,000 lb/4,535 kg of ordnance in internal weapons bays. It also would have had enough unrefueled range to hit targets in Eastern Europe if launched from a carrier in the Mediterranean Sea. Unfortunately, the A-12 would never make it off the shop floor, much less onto a carrier deck.

From the start of the A-12 engineering and development effort, there were disagreements between the Navy program managers and the contractor team over a number of issues. The plane was too heavy, for one thing, and there were difficulties creating the composite layups that made up the A-12's structure. Costs escalated rapidly. While the Navy has never officially acknowledged this, it appears that every other major Naval aircraft program was either canceled or restructured in order to siphon money to the troubled A-12. What is known is that during the time when the A-12 was suffering its most serious developmental problems, the upgraded versions of the F-14 Tomcat fighter and A-6 attack bomber were canceled outright, and several other programs took severe budget hits. The situation reached the critical point in 1990, when the A-12 and a number of other major aircraft programs were publicly reviewed in light of the recent fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. By this time the Avenger program was a year late and perhaps a billion dollars over budget. Even so, in his major aircraft program review presentation to Congress, then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney declared the A-12 to be a "model" program.

Nine months later, he radically changed his tune. Though what the DoD and Navy were thinking at this time remains something of a mystery, the pending commitment of an additional half-billion dollars to the A-12 program certainly had much to do with the decision. Whatever the reason, Secretary Cheney ordered the program canceled in January of 1991, just as the Desert Storm air campaign was getting under way. So sudden was this action that several thousand General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas employees were simply told to put down their work and go home. All told, the Navy had spent something like $3.8 billion, and did not have a single plane to show for it.[46] Even worse was the total wrecking of the Navy's aircraft acquisition plan, which had seen so many other new aircraft programs canceled to support the A-12.[47]

It did not take long for the fleet to begin suffering the consequences of the A-12 debacle. The Navy tried to make a fresh start with a program called A/FX (Attack/Fighter, Experimental), which was designed to replace the A- 6 and the F-14 fleets, both of which were aging rapidly. A/FX would have made use of the systems developed for the A-12, but would not attempt to achieve the level of stealth planned for the Avenger. Unfortunately, in the tight budget climate of the early 1990's, there was little support or money for the A/FX program, and it died before a prime contractor team was selected. Another blow to the naval aviation community came at the beginning of the Clinton Administration, when Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, as a cost-cutting measure, decided to prematurely retire the entire fleet of A-6E/ KA-6D Intruder attack/refueling aircraft. Within months, the entire medium-attack community was wiped out, leaving the F/A-18 as the Navy's only strike aircraft, and only a single high-performance Naval aircraft was in development: an evolved/growth version of the Hornet. With nothing else on the horizon, Naval aviation was going to have to bet the farm on a machine called the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.

New Paradigms: The Road Back

By late 1995, naval aviation had hit rock bottom. Military analysts were beginning to believe that the Navy had forgotten how to develop and buy new weapons and aircraft. In fact, many were questioning if the Navy should let the USAF buy their aircraft, since they seemed so much better at it. The real doomsayers were projecting the end of naval aviation as we know it sometime in the early 21st century, when the existing aircraft would wear out and have to be retired. But these people did not know the true character of naval aviation leadership. Though the Navy's aviation problems were deadly serious, in 1996 naval aviation took the first steps toward putting itself back on a healthy course.

Even before he became Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson was already working toward this goal. He started by appointing two of his most trusted officers, Rear Admirals Dennis McGinn and "Carlos" Johnson (no relation to the CNO), to key leadership positions as the heads of NAVAIR and the Naval Aviation Office in the Pentagon known as N88. Soon they started to shake things up. They began to promote a new vision for naval aviation, in direct support of the Navy's "Forward from the Sea" doctrine, and to develop a realistic long-range plan for upgrading Naval aviation and developing new capabilities. The two men also saw the need to put a few good naval aviators in key positions within the Pentagon so that the procurement program problems of the past would not be repeated. They knew that people with real talent would need to be in some of the key staff jobs to help get new ideas into naval aviation.

As a consequence of this kind of thinking, the Navy Strike Warfare Directorate (N880-the group that defines future specifications and capabilities for new naval aircraft and weapons systems) came under the inspired leadership of a talented F/A-18 Hornet driver, Captain Chuck Nash. While he probably could have gone on to command his own CVW, he chose the good of the service over his own ambitions, and took charge of N880 in the Pentagon.

It was Chuck Nash who really started to shake things up for naval aviation in 1996. Under his leadership, support from the fleet was focused on the new Super Hornet, in an effort to ensure that there would be at least one new airframe to anchor the carrier air wings of the early 21st century.Storm air campaign was the A-6E Intruder. It could operate at night, deliver LGBs and other PGMs, and had enough fuel capacity to minimize the impact upon the limited tanker resources of the Allied coalition.

At the same time, Nash increased Navy support for other developmental aircraft programs like the V-22 Osprey and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), as well as a new Common Support Aircraft (CSA) to replace the S-3 Viking, E-2 Hawkeye, and C-2 Greyhound airframes.

To shore up the existing force of carrier aircraft, he helped start a program to equip the fleet of F-14 Tomcat interceptors with the same AAQ-14 LANTIRN targeting pod used on the USAF F-15E Strike Eagle. LANTIRN pods allow Tomcats to carry out precision strikes with LGBs and other weapons ashore, a completely new mission for them. In order to arm the Tomcats, the Navy was directed to procure a stock of highly accurate Paveway III-SERIES LGBs, as well as the deadly BLU-109/I-2000 penetrating warheads. Nash's office also began to contract for modifications to existing precision weapons like the AGM-84E SLAM, so that their range, lethality, and service lives might be further extended.

Finally, N880 took a leadership position with the other services on a new generation of precision-strike weapons. These would be guided to their targets by GPS navigation systems, and then given final guidance by a new family of self-locking, all-weather seeker systems.

By the time he retired in early 1998, Chuck Nash had done more for Naval aviation as a captain than most admirals. As a result of the programs inspired by the likes of Jay Johnson, Dennis McGinn, "Carlos" Johnson, Chuck Nash, and many others, there is now real hope and drive in naval aviation. A new air wing structure has been defined, and plans for aircraft procurement are now clear for the next quarter century.

Today the climate in the fleet and naval aviation program offices is very different. Much like their counterparts at NAVSEA, the leaders at the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) are now looking toward the future rather than back toward the past. Their goal is to produce the aircraft and weapons that will fly off the new generation of carriers that are due in the middle of the second decade of the next century. For the first time in a generation, Naval aviation leaders are not content to run programs and buy updated versions of old aircraft and weapons. Naval aviation's vision is now on the cutting edge of weapons technology.

To this end, a new aircraft, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, is being tested and headed into the fleet, while existing aircraft like the F-14 Tomcat, EA-6B Prowler, and S-3B Viking have been modified to take on new roles and missions. These will help maintain the credibility of naval aviation until the new aircraft types arrive in a few years. New weapons, with greater precision and utility than those used in Desert Storm, are on their way as well. The sea services, along with the other branches of the U.S. military, are in the early stages of developing the replacement for today's aircraft through the new JSF program. There are even visionary studies for the first generation of Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicles (UCAVs), which will likely be seen in ten to twenty years. What a difference just a few years make!

The Plan: Naval Aviation in the 21st Century

The plan for naval aviation as it heads into the 21st century is designed to take carrier aviation from the current post-Cold War CVW structure to one that reflects the perceived needs of the Navy in 2015. To do this, NAVAIR has put together a three-stage program of procurement and reorganization that relies heavily on the success of the past-and that learns from the mistakes that were made. Back in the early 1970's, the so-called "CV Air Wing" organization was created to reduce the number of carriers and air groups in the fleet. This type of CVW was an all-purpose unit, with capabilities in antiair warfare (AAW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), antisurface warfare (ASUW), and land attack. Its structure is laid out below:

As the table shows, the "CV" air wing had a primary emphasis on defense against air and submarine attack. It could also dish out a great deal of punishment against enemy naval forces, though its ability to strike land targets was more limited. It was this air wing structure that John Lehman tried to flesh out with his aircraft procurement plan in the 1980's. But because of the fallout from the A-12 fiasco, the aircraft necessary to fill out sixteen such units were never purchased, and the fleet made frequent draws on Marine F/A-18 Hornet and EA-6B Prowler squadrons in order to sustain the heavy deployment schedule of the late Cold War years.

After the end of the Cold War, the following air wing organization was created, and is in use today around the fleet:

This CVW structure reflects a number of realities, most importantly the fact that there will only be eleven CVWs (ten active-duty and one reserve) for twelve carriers, greatly reducing the number of new aircraft required to sustain carrier aviation into the 21st century. Also, this 1990's CVW has a new orientation: to project precision-striking power onto targets ashore. Both the F-14's and F/A-18's are equipped with precision-targeting and reconnaissance systems, as well as a wide variety of Desert Storm-era PGMs. All of these systems give the new CVWs much more punch than before, and while the number of fighter/attack aircraft has been greatly reduced, this new air wing actually can strike twice the number of precision targets that a Cold War CVW could hit. It will acquire even greater power when the new generation of GPS-guided PGMs arrives over the next few years.

The next big move will occur in the early years of the 21 st century. Starting somewhere around 2001, the Navy will commission its first combat squadron of F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, replacing the F-14 Tomcat squadron in CVWs. The Navy will then be able to rapidly retire the elderly F-14As, some of which will be over three decades old when they head to the boneyard. During this same period, the SH-60B/F and HH-60G fleet will be remanufactured into a common variant known as the SH-60R. The surviving H-60 airframes will then be consolidated into a single version that can be used either on carriers or escorts. The Navy will also buy a number of CH-60 airframes, which will take over from the old UH-46 Sea Knight in the Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP) mission aboard supply ships, as well as the special operations/combat search and rescue (SO/CSAR) mission of the HH-60G.

Despite all these changes, the dominant airframe of this air wing will continue to be late-model F/A-18C Hornets, which will soldier on well into the 21st century. With these changes, the typical CVW of 2001 to 2015 will probably look like this:

Again, the key attribute of this CVW will be striking power against land-based precision targets. However, with a new generation of self-designating, GPS/INS-guided PGMs, it will be able to dish out truly devastating damage to targets afloat or ashore, and in almost any kind of weather.

The final step in the CVW modernization plan is shown below, and will begin to appear around 2011:

This is an air wing that is almost entirely composed of aircraft that now exist only on paper. Even so, it has several clear advantages over earlier CVW structures, including the fact that this projected CVW has just four basic airframes: the JSF, F/A-18E/F, the CSA, and H-60. This means lower operating and maintenance costs as well as a simpler logistics chain. It will also have the Navy's first true stealth strike fighter (the JSF), a new EW/ SEAD aircraft (the proposed EF-18F Electric Hornet), as well as new sea control, ESM, and AEW aircraft based upon the new CSA airframe. This likely will be what will go aboard the new CVX when it is commissioned around 2015. Once all eleven CVWs have their first squadron of JSFs, the Super Hornets will begin to be retired, and eventually there will be four JSF squadrons aboard each carrier with ten aircraft each.

None of this will come cheaply or overnight. Just maintaining the existing fleet of aircraft is expensive, and buying something like two thousand new F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, JSFs, CSA derivatives, and any other major airframe that comes along will cost between $20 and $30 billion. And that's without even beginning to address the spare parts, engines, weapons, and other necessities that these aircraft will consume in their operational lifetimes. Meanwhile, naval aviators will continue to fly the aircraft they've flown for most of their careers. The designs of not a few of these aircraft, in fact, date from before many of the men and women who fly them were born.

Northrop Grumman F-14 Tomcat: King of the Air Wing

You always know when you see an F-14 Tomcat that it is a fighter. It is a big, noisy, powerful brute of an airplane that lacks any pretense of stealth or subtlety. For over two decades, the F-14 Tomcat has been the king of American carrier flight decks, yet only recently has it realized its full combat potential. It is also one of the most difficult and dangerous of Naval aircraft. As the plane that Tom Cruise "piloted" in the movie Top Gun, it has become the symbol of naval aviation in American popular culture. More tellingly, to date the Tomcat has a perfect air-to-air combat record. Now in the twilight of its career, the F-14 is being asked to buy time for the rest of naval aviation to get its collective act together.

The origins of the F-14 lay back in the 1950's when American intelligence agencies identified a growing family of Soviet air-launched cruise missiles as a potential threat to NATO fleet units. Carried to their launch points by heavy bombers, aircraft like the Tu-16 Badger or Tu-95 Bear, they could be launched well outside the range of enemy SAMs and antiaircraft (AAA) guns. Designated by NATO intelligence analysts as AS-1 "Kennel," AS-2 "Kipper," AS-3 "Kangaroo," AS-4 "Kitchen," AS-5 "Kelt," and AS-6 "Kingfish," these long-ranged, radar-guided pilotless jet- or rocket-powered weapons packed enormous ship-killing power. Armed with 1,000-kg/ 2,200-lb warheads (or high-yield nuclear warheads), they were capable of destroying a destroyer or frigate with a single hit. By way of comparison, the single AM-39 Exocet air-to-surface missile (ASM) that sank the British guided-missile destroyer HMS Sheffield (D 80) in 1982 had a warhead just one tenth that size. Since a single large bomber might carry two or three such monster ASMs, finding a way to defend the fleet against them became a high-level priority.

Experience in World War II against Japanese Kamikaze planes (which were essentially manned ASMs) showed that the best way to protect a fleet was to shoot down the missile-carrying enemy bombers before they could launch their missiles. Thus the response to the ASM threat was the accelerated development of extremely long-range air-to-air missiles (AAMs), which could maintain an outer ring in a layered defense system. Any missiles that "leaked" through the outer ring would then face an inner barrier of patrolling fighters, ship-launched SAMs, and point-defense missiles launched from surface ships. This was supposed to be the U.S. strategy until the end of the Cold War-a scheme that envisioned an extremely high-performance, long-ranged AAM that could be carried by a relatively slow but long-endurance carrier aircraft, the Douglas F6D Missileer. The Missileer would have carried eight long-range Bendix Eagle AAMs, along with powerful airborne radar. The F6Ds would have acted as airborne SAM sites, and would have been placed hundreds of miles ahead of a carrier group to intercept incoming bombers. However, fiscal realities now began to effect the Navy's plans.

The F6D program was canceled in December 1960, mostly due to the fact that it was a single-mission aircraft only for fleet air defense. Even so, the Eagle missile was eventually resurrected as the Hughes AIM-54 Phoenix, which today is carried by the F-14. Already strapped for funds, the Navy decided that its next fighter should do the job of the F6D, as well as provide air superiority and other missions. Then high-level politics stepped in. In the early 1960's, then-Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara, frustrated by seemingly endless inter-service rivalries and hoping to save money, tried to force the Air Force and Navy to procure common types of aircraft. Out of this dream came the TFX (Tactical Fighter, Experimental) program-which became the Air Force's F-111 swing-wing bomber. To meet its fighter missions, the Navy was directed to develop a variant of the F-111 that would be suitable for carrier operations. It was expected that it would accomplish its fleet air defense and air-superiority missions with the planned F-111B, which would replace the classic F-4 Phantom II.

The problem was that the "navalized" F-111B (which was built by Grumman in partnership with General Dynamics, the USAF "prime" contractor) was just too heavy, fragile, and complex for carrier operations, and its landing speed was too high for a safe landing on a carrier deck. Furthermore, the F-111B, with little maneuverability and thrust from its overworked engines, was not much of a fighter. For all of these reasons, the Navy rejected the F-111B, and the program was scrapped, though not without a fight. In those days, one did not go against a man as powerful as Secretary MacNamara without paying a price. The Navy paid in blood. In a scene reminiscent of the 1940's "Revolt of the Admirals" a generation earlier, a senior naval aviator, Rear Admiral Tom "Tomcat" Connelly, sacrificed his own career by standing up to MacNamara in Congressional testimony. He stated flatly in an open session, "Senator, there is not enough thrust in all of Christendom to make a fighter out of the F-111!" With this legendary remark, the F-111B died, and the F-14 Tomcat was born.

Politics aside, the Navy still had the problem of those Soviet ASM armed bombers to deal with. As if to amplify the problem further, the Russians had deployed a new supersonic swing-wing bomber in the late 1960s that caused a near panic in U.S./NATO defense planners: the Tu-22M Backfire. The eventual answer to the Navy's problem came after a series of fighter studies funded by the Navy and run by Grumman. The plan was to wrap a completely new, state-of-the-art airframe around the basic avionics, weapons, and propulsion package that had been intended for the F-111B (including the Phoenix missile system), and then run a series of product improvements upon the new bird. One of the aircraft's most notable features would be a variable geometry "swing-wing" design that would allow it to "redesign" itself in flight. For good slow-speed performance during landing and cruise the wings would be set forward, and be swept back for supersonic dashes.

It was an ambitious design for the late 1960s. The new fighter would not only carry up to six of the massive AIM-54 Phoenix missiles and the AWG-9 radar to guide them, but it would also be a superb dogfighter. In Vietnam the F-4 Phantom II had severe shortcomings during close-in air-to-air engagements. The Phantoms weren't very maneuverable, were easy to see (both big and smoky), and didn't have much range. The new fighter would be very different.

The Request for Proposals went out in 1968, and a number of airframe manufacturers submitted responses to build the new bird. However, with their fighter study and F-111B experience, Grumman had a clear edge, and early in 1969 they won the contract to build what would become known as the F-14. Quickly, Grumman got to work and began to cut metal, and the new bird rapidly came together. The first flight of the F-14A prototype occurred almost a month ahead of schedule, on December 21st, 1970, at Grumman's Calverton plant on Long Island. Though three of the preproduction aircraft were lost in testing (including the prototype on its second flight), the program progressed well. The new fighter moved along on schedule, with the first two fleet squadrons, VF-1 (the "Wolfpack") and VF-2 (the "Bounty Hunters"), standing up in 1974. In honor of Admiral Connelly's role in its creation, the Navy named the new bird the "Tomcat."[48]

The Tomcat is a two-seat, twin-engined fighter that measures 62 feet, 8 inches/19.1 meters in length. Its height to the tip of the vertical stabilizer is 16 feet/4.88 meters. The maximum wingspan is 64 feet, 1.5 inches/19.54 meters at a minimum sweep angle of 20deg. Minimum wingspan in flight is 38 feet, 2.5 inches/11.65 meters at a maximum flight sweep angle of 68deg. For storage in the cramped confines of the flight hangar decks, the wings can "oversweep" (only on deck for stowage) to an angle of 75deg, overlapping the horizontal tail surfaces and reducing the span to only 33 feet, 3.5 inches/ 10.15 meters. The Tomcat's empty weight is 40,150 lb/18,212 kg, with a maximum takeoff weight of 74,500 lb/33,793 kg. The F-14 is by far the heaviest aircraft flying on and off a carrier these days. You can actually feel an aircraft carrier shudder whenever one is catapulted off.

The famous Grumman "Iron Works" has a well-earned reputation for producing the most durable and robust aircraft in the world. Much of the plane's structure, including the critical "wing box" (containing the swing-wing mechanism), is made of titanium, a metal lighter than aluminum, stronger than steel, and notoriously difficult to weld. The Tomcat's horizontal tail surfaces were built from boron-epoxy composite-a very costly and advanced material that was used for the first time on any aircraft.

The F-14 is the Navy's only "variable geometry" aircraft, a trait it inherited from its predecessor, the F-111B. While complex, the swing wing was a valid engineering solution to a difficult design problem for the Navy. The F-14 had to be both a long-range interceptor that could "loiter" (fly slow and wait) and a high-performance fighter for air-superiority missions. If one aircraft was to do both jobs and still be capable of operating off aircraft carriers, it had to be able to literally "redesign" itself in flight. This was the job of the swing wing. The Tomcat's wings sweep forward for increased lift in low-speed flight, particularly the critical takeoff and landing phases of a carrier-based mission, but when the wings sweep back for reduced drag at high speed, the F-14 can move like a scalded cat.

Unlike other variable-geometry aircraft like the F-111 Aardvark and MiG-23/27 Flogger, the F-14's wing sweep is controlled automatically by a computer known as the "Mach Sweep Programmer." This means that the pilot does not have to worry about it-the plane dynamically reconfigures itself from moment to moment for the optimum solution to the complex equations governing lift and drag. The wings then pivot on immensely strong bearings, moved by jackscrews driven by powerful hydraulic motors, giving the flight crew the best possible "design" for any situation they are in. The result is an aircraft that is always being optimized, whether it is making a low-level, high-speed reconnaissance dash, or digging into a cornering turn pulling "lead" on an enemy fighter. Along with the swing wings, the F-14's engineers managed to provide the flight crew with a full array of control surfaces, including full-span flaps along the trailing edge, leading edge slats, and spoilers on the upper surface of the wings. The speed brake is positioned far aft, between the twin vertical stabilizers. In fact, it was the seemingly random movement of these surfaces that caused Landing Signals Officers (LSOs) to dub the F-14 "the Turkey" during tests.

Visually, the F-14 is an imposing aircraft. The topside of the Tomcat's forward fuselage and two huge engine pods blend into a flat structure called the "pancake," which supports the tail surfaces and the tailhook. The pancake itself is a form of "lifting body," and provides a significant amount of the aircraft's total lift. The large canopy offers superb all-around visibility-a great improvement over previous Navy fighters like the F-4 Phantom, which had a deadly blind spot to the rear. This was one of the design criteria that helped make the Tomcat a much better dogfighter than the F-4, or the MiGs that it was designed to kill. The two-person flight crew (a pilot and Radar Intercept Officer or "RIO") enters the cockpit using a retractable boarding ladder and cleverly designed "kick-in" steps. Both positions have Martin-Baker "zero-zero" ejection seats, meaning that they can actually save an air crew if the aircraft is sitting still (zero speed) on the ground (zero altitude). Three rearview mirrors are positioned around the canopy frame to help the pilot with rear visibility.

The design of the pilot's station was quite advanced for the early 1970's, with the most important data being displayed on an integrated "Air Combat Maneuvering panel." The Tomcat was also equipped with the Navy's first heads-up display (HUD) projected into the pilot's forward field of view, and the first use of the "Hands-on-Throttle-and-Stick" (HOTAS) in the cockpit. The control stick and throttles are studded with buttons that govern weapon selection, radar modes, and other functions. HOTAS allows pilots to keep their eyes outside the cockpit during a dogfight. The rest of the cockpit is not so advanced. Since the F-14 was designed a decade ahead of "glass cockpit" aircraft (like the F/A-18 Hornet), most of the control panels are traditional dial-type "steam gauge" indicators. Unlike USAF fighters, though, the RIO's backseat position does not provide flight controls (unless you count the ejection seat). A large circular display screen-the Tactical Information Display-dominates the RIO's position, with a smaller Detail Data Display panel above it. These provide readouts for the AWG-9 radar/ fire control system, as well as weapons control. Again, circular "steam gauges" dominate the RIO's cockpit.

When they arrived upon the aviation scene, the sensor and weapons systems of the Tomcat were a revolution.[49] The heart of the F-14 weapons system (in the — A and — B models) is the Raytheon-Hughes Airborne Weapons Group Model Nine (AWG-9) fire-control system. Composed of powerful radar, weapons-computer, signal-processor, and other components, the AWG- 9 made the F-14 the most powerful fighter in the world. Unfortunately, it never really got a chance to show its awesome capability in combat. Designed for the extremely long-range, multiple-target engagements that were projected for the Cold War at sea, the F-14 spent a generation waiting for a battle that never came. The AWG-9 requirement was to simultaneously track up to two dozen airborne targets (in an environment that might have hundreds), while actually engaging (that's Navy for "shooting") six of them at once. The actual tracking ranges against various-sized targets are highly classified, but the AWG-9 has regularly tracked fighter-sized targets out beyond 100 nm/ 185 km.

Since F-14 operations have always been constrained by strict rules of engagement (ROE) that require visually identifying the target, long-range shots with radar-guided AAMs have been rare. The five enemy air-to-air "kills" that the Tomcat has scored to date were all achieved at fairly short ranges, the killing missile shots all occurring with visual range of the targets. In recognition of these ROE realities, the F-14 carries a pod under the radome holding a television camera system (TCS). The TCS is equipped with a zoom lens that can be used to identify targets visually at fairly long ranges. As an added bonus, it feeds an onboard videotape recorder, which provides the flight crew an excellent visual record of their engagements.

From the very start of its career, the F-14 was intended as an air-to-air killer, with little effort or money expended to give it an air-to-ground capability. The Tomcat's claws were designed to give it the ability to kill at every range, from close in to over 100 nm/185 km, which is still something of a record.

The weapon with the longest range is the mighty Raytheon-Hughes AIM-54 Phoenix AAM. An outgrowth of the original Eagle AAM that was to have armed the F6D, the AIM-54 first flew in the 1960's. With a range in excess of 100 nm/185 km, the AIM-54 was the first deployed AAM equipped with its own active onboard radar-guidance system. This gave it the capability of being launched in a "fire-and-forget" mode, allowing the launching aircraft to turn away to evade or begin another engagement after firing. It also means that up to six AIM-54's can be launched at up to six different targets at once. Once launched, the missile climbs in a high-altitude parabolic trajectory, reaching speeds approaching Mach 5. When a Phoenix gets near a target, a huge 133.5-lb/60.7-kg high-explosive warhead ensures that it dies quickly. It was this capability that Navy planners wanted to utilize had the Soviet bomber/ASM missile threat ever been encountered in wartime. The Phoenix has had several versions, each one designed to keep pace with Soviet improvements in their own weaponry; the AIM-54C is the latest.

Along with the AIM-54, the Tomcat is equipped with three other weapons for killing aerial targets. The first of these, the Raytheon AIM-7M Sparrow, is an updated version of the semiactive radar-guided AAM that has been in service since the 1950's. Weighing some 503 lb/228 kg, this medium-range (out to twenty-plus nm/thirty-seven-plus km) AAM requires continuous "illumination" from the AWG-9 radar to hit its target. Once there, the eighty-eight-pound /forty-kilogram blast-fragmentation warhead can kill any aerial target that it hits. However, the AIM-7 has always been a difficult weapon to employ, because of its need for constant radar illumination of the target. There were plans to replace the Sparrow on the F-14 with the new AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). Unfortunately, budget cuts at the end of the Cold War, combined with the fact that the Tomcat already had a long-range fire-and-forget AAM in the Phoenix, caused this to be canceled.

Shorter-range missile engagements are handled by the classic AIM-9M Sidewinder AAM, which utilizes infrared (heat-seeking) guidance to find its targets. The current AIM-9M version is badly dated, and almost obsolete compared with the Russian R-73/AA-11 Archer, Matra R.550 Magic, or Rafael Python-4. These missiles are not only controlled via helmet-mounted sighting systems, but also can be fired up to 90deg "off-boresight" (i.e., the centerline of the firing aircraft). This shortcoming will be rectified in the early 21st century with the introduction of the new AIM-9X.

The last of the Tomcat's air-to-air weapons was the one that designers of the F-4 Phantom thought unnecessary in the age of AAMs: a 20mm cannon. During the Vietnam War, Navy pilots complained bitterly about the MiG kills that they missed because of the Phantom's lack of a close-in weapon (it was armed only with AIM-7/9 AAMs). When the specification for the F-14 was being written, "Tomcat" Connelly made sure that it had a gun to deal with threats inside the minimum range of AAMs. The gun in the F-14 is the same one in most U.S. fighters, the classic six-barreled 20mm M61 Vulcan. Able to fire up to six thousand 20mm shells per minute, it can literally "chop" an enemy aircraft in half.

With the exception of the internal six-barrel 20mm M61 Gatling gun, all the Tomcat's weapons are carried externally. For mechanical simplicity, there are no weapon pylons on the movable portions of the wings, since these would have to swivel to stay pointed directly into the airflow. Because of this, drop tanks and other external stores must be accommodated under the fuselage and engines, or on the structure of the wing "glove" inside the pivot. Four deep grooves known as "wells," shaped to the contours of AIM-7 Sparrow AAMs, are sculpted into the flat underbelly of the fuselage in the tunnel between the engine pods. When the huge (984-lb/447.5-kg) AIM-54 Phoenix missiles are carried, they are mounted on removable pallets that cover the Sparrow wells. Up to four of the AIM-54's can be carried here, along with another pair on the "glove" pylons. However, these pylons are more normally configured with rails for an AIM-9 Sidewinder and AIM-7 Sparrow AAM.

The reason for this is an arcane number called "bringback weight," which represents the maximum landing weight of an aircraft on a carrier deck. The bringback weight is a combination of the aircraft's "dry" weight with the minimum safe fuel load (for several attempts at landing) and whatever ordnance and stores are being carried. An F-14 loaded with six of the big Phoenix AAMs and a minimum fuel load is above the allowable bringback weight, which means that the largest external stores load allowed are four AIM-54's, two AIM-7's, a pair of AIM-9's, two external fuel tanks, and the internal M-61 20mm Gatling gun. A normal "peacetime" weapons load is composed of two of each kind of missile, the gun, and two fuel tanks. Other kinds of weapons mixes are designed around particular kinds of missions, including air superiority and strike escort.

A fighter lives or dies by its engines, and the F-14 fleet suffered for many years from an inadequate power plant, the Pratt & Whitney TF-30-P-412. This was the first turbofan engine designed specifically for a fighter, and was inherited from the F-111B program. Originally intended for the subsonic F- 6D Missileer and used in the Vought A-7 Corsair II attack bomber, it was augmented with an afterburner (as the TF30-P-100) for the supersonic F-111, and adapted as a "temporary" expedient for the F-14A. Turbofan engines are more fuel-efficient and powerful than turbojets, but are "finicky" about the airflow into their first stage of compressor blades. Turbulent "dirty" air, such as the wake of another aircraft, can cause compressor stalls, flameouts, and, too often, loss of an aircraft. The TF-30's sensitivity to dirty air was well understood by the Grumman designers, who provided the engines with huge inlets and a system of air valves or "ramps." These are a complex system of hydraulically controlled mechanical plates deployed at high speed, creating internal shock waves that slow the incoming air to subsonic velocity.

Though these fixes tamed the TF-30 for the Tomcat's introduction, the Navy had plans for something better. This was to have been the Pratt & Whitney F-401, in what would have been known as the F-14B. Once again, however, developmental problems and escalating costs prevented it from entering service. This left the entire force of F-14A's equipped with the TF-30 engine, which has killed more aircraft and crews than enemy fire ever did.

For over two decades Tomcat crews have tried to get the most out of their finicky TF-30's (even as they lived in dread of them). To feed these huge power plants, the Tomcat carries plenty of fuel, allowing long-range missions or long loiter time on patrol. Internal fuel capacity is 2,385 U.S. gallons/9,029 liters, and two external drop tanks can be mounted under the engine inlets, each with a capacity of 267 U.S. gallons/1,011 liters. To extend its range even further, a NATO-standard retractable refueling probe is fitted on the starboard side of the forward fuselage. Even so, in these days of littoral warfare, the F-14's rarely have to "hit" a tanker to conduct their missions. This is increasingly important, for the retirement of the fleet of KA-6D Intruder tankers means the only remaining refueling aircraft in the carrier air group are the overtaxed S-3 Vikings.

Along with its air-to-air duties, the Tomcat was designed to take on another-and perhaps its most vital-task. This is the dangerous job of photo-reconnaissance for the battle group and local theater commanders. About fifty Tomcats of all models have been specially modified to carry the Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS) pod under the fuselage. This large external store (17 feet/5.2 meters long and about two feet/.6 meters in diameter) contains three different sensors. These include a conventional frame camera that looks forward and down, a "panoramic" camera that captures the ground picture from horizon to horizon on either side of the aircraft, and an infrared line-scanner that sweeps the terrain directly below the aircraft. Normally, four F-14's in each CVW are fitted to carry the TARPS pod (in addition to their normal avionics fit), and at least six crews get special training to fly them.

TARPS is the best low-to-mid-altitude photo-recon system in the world, and is a significant national strategic asset, able to capture imagery at a level of detail much greater than the high-flying U-2 or reconnaissance satellites. During the 1991 Gulf War, TARPS was especially valuable for post-strike battle-damage assessment (BDA), and was much favored over the USAF RF-4C (which has since been retired). Currently, TARPS is being upgraded to provide battle group commanders with a whole new capability: near real-time photo-reconnaissance. By replacing one of the existing film cameras with a digital unit, and tying it into the existing UHF radio system, an airborne F-14 equipped with the new pod can send a picture with good resolution back to the carrier while still in the air. With a delay of only about five minutes from the time the picture is taken to its viewing by intelligence staff, the new system (called Digital TARPS or D/TARPS) can give a battle group commander the necessary information to rapidly hit a mobile target. This is a capability long sought by military leaders of all services, and is being improved all the time.

Even though it has fought in few actual battles, the F-14 has had an active service life. The first operational deployment came in September 1974, with Pacific-based squadrons VF-1 and VF-2 on board Enterprise (CVN-65). The Tomcat's first known combat action came on the morning of August 19th, 1981, when two Libyan Su-22 "Fitter" interceptors made the mistake of engaging a pair of patrolling Tomcats from VF-41 (the "Black Aces") flying from the Nimitz (CVN-68). Using their superb maneuverability, the two Tomcats evaded a Libyan AAM and downed the Fitters with a pair of short-range AIM-9L Sidewinder shots. A few years later, in October 1985, four Tomcats from VF-74 (the "Bedevilers") and VF-103 (the "Sluggers"), embarked on USS Saratoga (CV-60), intercepted an Egyptian 737 airliner carrying the terrorists who had hijacked the Italian passenger ship Achille Lauro. By March of 1986, Tomcats were back on the front lines when Libya fired S-200/SA-5 Gammon SAMs at F-14's from America (CV-66) and Saratoga (CV-60) patrolling over the Gulf of Sidra. In response, the carrier groups attacked the SAM sites and sank a number of threatening Libyan patrol boats. Later that year, F-14's provided cover for Operation Eldorado Canyon, the bombing raids on Tripoli and Benghazi. January 1989 saw another confrontation with the Libyans when a pair of VF-32 Tomcats engaged and destroyed a pair of MiG-23 Flogger-Bs. When the MiG-23's came out and acted in a threatening manner, they were quickly dispatched in a barrage of Sparrow and Sidewinder AAMs.

During the 1990/91 Persian Gulf crisis, most of the duties of the Tomcats embarked on the deployed carriers involved regular Combat Air Patrol (CAP) and reconnaissance missions, with none of the glamor accorded to the land-based USAF F-15's. Day after day, the Tomcats flew cover for the carrier and amphibious groups in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, and supported the embargo of Iraq. Part of the reason they had few opportunities to show their capabilities was the reluctance of the Iraqi Air Force to come out over water and be slaughtered. But the big reason was the Navy's failure to develop the necessary systems and procedures to integrate carrier air groups as part of a joint air component command. Key among these was the ability to conduct Non-Cooperative Target Recognition (NCTR), which utilizes various classified radar techniques to identify enemy aircraft by type. This allows fighters with Beyond Visual Range (BVR) AAMs like the AIM-7 and AIM-54 to fire their missiles at long ranges. Because USAF F-15's had these systems and the Tomcats did not, it was the Eagle fleet that was used against the Iraqi Air Force over their homeland.

The only Tomcat air-to-air kill of the war was scored with a Sidewinder by an F-14A from VF-1 over an unfortunate Iraqi Mi-8 Hip helicopter. The bad news was that an F-14B, from VF-103 on the Saratoga, was downed by an Iraqi V-75/SA-2 Guideline missile on a TARPS reconnaissance run over Wadi Amif. The one bright point throughout Desert Storm for the F-14 community was the timely and accurate battle-damage assessment provided by TARPS-equipped F-14's.

The fall of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact meant that a large part of the threat that the F-14 had been created to defend against was gone. The big Russian bombers and their massive ASMs were rapidly scrapped, and the Tomcat community was left scrambling for a role in the New World Order. Tomcats were not able to perform many of the missions that would make them useful to regional commanders in chief in the new age of "joint" warfare. In particular, the AWG-9's lack of NCTR capabilities made the Tomcats also-rans compared with F-15's.[50] But the biggest drawback for Tomcats was the huge cost of buying and maintaining them. Because it was the most expensive aircraft on a carrier deck to procure, operate, and maintain, the Navy saw cutting the Tomcat population as a way to save money. Ironically, this occurred just as the F-14 was finally getting the engine and systems upgrades it had always needed to make it the fighter it could have been.

Back in the 1980's, John Lehman's original aircraft acquisition plan had included upgrades to the Tomcat fleet. The first phase of this effort was to re-engine a large part of the existing fleet of F-14A's, and upgrade its avionics. This was to be accomplished by modifying the — A model Tomcats to carry a pair of the new General Electric F110-GE-400 advanced turbofan engines. The F110 (also used in the Air Force F-15E and F-16C/D fighters) had greater thrust and none of the vices of the TF-30. It came to the F-14 in 1986. The new F110-equipped Tomcat, designated F-14B (originally the F-14A+), entered service in April of 1988. Some of the — B models were re-engined F-14As, while the rest were newly built. The contrast with the old TF-30-powered Tomcat was spectacular. The F-110-engined Tomcats are the fastest of their breed, with better acceleration and performance in dogfights than most other fighter types.

There is a story about several of the prototype F-14Bs visiting NAS Oceana near Norfolk, Virginia. On the other side of the Chesapeake Bay were the F-15's of the USAF's 1st Fighter Wing at Langley AFB, their premier air-to-air fighter unit. Normally, the F-15's easily defeated the F-14As with their anemic TF-30's; but this time the high-spirited Naval aviators decided to play a trick on their blue brethren and challenge the USAF pilots to an air-to-air "hassle" over an offshore training range. The Naval aviators showed up in the souped-up Tomcats, and left the two Eagle drivers running away screaming, "Who were those guys!" Clearly, the F-110 made the new-generation Tomcats a very different cat. The new bird still had one significant shortcoming, though. It was still equipped with the original 1960's-vintage AWG-9 radar and avionics systems.

The Tomcat community had always dreamed of making a final break with the old F-111B systems and producing an F-14 with a new generation of digital avionics. At one point, an F-14C model with more advanced electronics was proposed, but it was never developed. Finally, in the fall of 1990, the dream was realized in the form of the F-14D. Like the earlier F-14B program, some of the — D-model Tomcats were rebuilds of earlier — A-model aircraft, while the rest were new production airframes. The — D model has the same F110 engines as the — B, but adds a new radar (the Hughes APG-71) and a host of avionic, computer, and software improvements.

The APG-71 is a vast improvement over the earlier AWG-9, and is based upon the APG-63/70-series radars used on versions of the F-15 Eagle. This is a state-of-the-art, multi-mode radar with a variety of capabilities. In addition to the basic air-to-air functions of the AWG-9, the APG-71 is capable of both Low Probability of Intercept (LPI-making it difficult to detect with passive sensors) and Non-Cooperative Target Recognition (NCTR) modes. In addition, the APG-71 has the ability to perform advanced ground mapping in heavy weather, a feature that would come in handy when the Tomcat community got interested in air-to-ground operations in the 1990's.

Though the F-14D is the ultimate Tomcat, equipped with everything that a crew could want in a fighter today, budget cuts meant that less than fifty — Ds were built, just enough for two or three squadrons. When new production and conversions of — B- and — D-model F-14's were terminated, plans were made to phase out the aircraft. It began to look like the Tomcat might go the way of the A-6/KA-6 Intruders-straight to the boneyard-just as the aircraft had finally gotten the engines and avionics that the crews had always dreamed of. The hunger to cut costs within the Department of Defense in the early 1990's meant that a number of valuable aircraft types were retired, regardless of the consequences, and the F-14 almost suffered the same fate.

Fortunately for the Tomcat community, even allowing for the downsizing of post-Cold War CVWs, there was a shortage of tactical carrier aircraft. Meanwhile, new missions were found for the F-14. Now that there were no longer regiments of missile-armed Soviet bombers to defend against, the Navy planned to provide the Tomcat community with a rudimentary capability to drop "iron" (unguided) bombs (called "Bombcat" conversions) and perhaps fire AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs) against enemy radars. At the same time, members of the F-14 community were teaching their old Tomcats a few new tricks. While the majority of the Navy's aviation-procurement dollars were headed toward F/A-18 Hornets, the Tomcat operators found ways to squeeze a few of the scarce greenbacks to preserve their mounts. To better understand what they did, you need to know a bit about how many Tomcats of various models were built. Here is a look at the total production run of the F-14 program:

A total of 712 Tomcats were delivered to the Navy, the first in October 1972 and the last in July 1992.[51] While no USN F-14 has been lost in air-to-air combat, more than 125 have been lost in accidents-mostly engine-related (Iranian losses are unknown, at least in open sources). At the end of 1997 some 250 F-14's remained in U.S. Navy service. Most of the USN F-14As are now between ten and twenty years old, and have only had rudimentary upgrades to their structures and avionics. The two F-14As that shot down the Libyan MiG-23's in 1989 still had the same APR-25 radar-warning receivers (RWRs) that had been installed when they were built in the 1970's. These RWRs were so elderly they could not detect the signals from the MiGs' radars, which also dated back to the early 1970's. Because of their age, NAVAIR has decided to sacrifice the — A-model Tomcats to the boneyard, and preserve the fleet of remaining — B- and — D-model F-14's. It is unlikely that any F-14As will be in service past 2001, when the first F/A- 18E/F Super Hornet squadron stands up. That leaves approximately 130 F- 14Bs and — Ds to flesh out the ten remaining squadrons that will serve into the first decade of the 21st century.

All of these aircraft have F-110 engines, and are being given avionics upgrades such as the installation of new GPS receivers and radios. Tomcat crews have also been provided with Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) to give them improved low-level situational awareness in darkness. But the jewels of the upgrade program are the D/TARPS program (mentioned earlier) and an air-to-ground weapons-delivery system: the AAQ-14 LANTIRN targeting pod. This is a self-contained system equipped with a Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) thermal-imaging system, a laser range finder, laser spot tracker, and laser illuminator. The AAQ-14 pod, one of two used on the USAF's F-15E Strike Eagle, has proven to be the best of its kind in the world today. It can detect targets on the ground from their thermal signatures, and then deliver LGBs and other weapons. The Navy version of the LANTIRN pod has an additional feature: a beer-can-shaped Litton GPS/Inertial Navigation System (INS), which provides the F-14 with the necessary navigational/ positional accuracy to deliver the new generation of PGMs that are coming into service. Carried on the starboard wing "glove" pylon, the LANTIRN is controlled by the RIO, and can deliver LGBs day or night with greater accuracy than any other aircraft in the fleet.

These improvements, however, did not come easily. They cost a great deal of money, which the senior leaders at NAVAIR controlled. Focused on acquiring the F/A-18, the NAVAIR "Hornet Mafia" was sworn to eliminate anything from the budget that might detract from that effort. On the other hand, there was also a "Tomcat Mafia" down at NAS Oceana (where all the F-14 squadrons had been consolidated), which was able to find small parcels of money, as well as support from out in the fleet. Also, contractors like Lockheed Martin, the manufacturer of the AAQ-14 LANTIRN pod, spent their own money to develop systems for use on the Tomcat. They worked better than anyone had imagined. Suddenly, regional Cincs wanted all the Tomcats they could get. The incomparable navigational accuracy of the GPS-EQUIPPED LANTIRN made them excellent "quick-look" reconnaissance birds, especially against mobile targets like SCUD missile launchers. Now, the twenty to thirty F-14's that are deployed at any given time are precious national assets and are doing far more than merely carrying their load until the first squadrons of Super Hornets arrive early next century. They remain the most versatile and powerful aircraft in the fleet. "Tomcat" Connelly would have been proud that his dream has proved so adaptable.

F/A-18 Hornet: The Now and Future Backbone

Originally conceived as a low-cost replacement for two aging naval aircraft (the F-4 Phantom and A-7E Corsair), the F/A-18 Hornet fighter-bomber was designed to fulfill a number of widely different roles. It functions as both the Navy's primary light-strike bomber and as a fighter for the Navy and Marines. Though some think the Hornet does neither job very well, others consider it the finest multi-role aircraft in the world. Some will tell you that the F/A-18 is a short-legged burden on naval aviation, while others will make a case that it is the backbone for all of naval aviation. I would tell you it is all of these things, and many more. The drawback with any multi-role combat aircraft is that it tries to do too much for too many different people. On the other hand, when such a complex beast works, it works out quite well indeed. Read on and I'll explain.

The origins of the Hornet program date back to the mid-1970's, when the Navy was beginning to suffer "sticker shock" from the costs of buying new aircraft for its carrier force. The double-digit inflation of the early 1970's was driving the price of new combat aircraft up at a dangerous rate, bringing about a reassessment of the kinds and numbers of aircraft the U.S. military could afford. After a start was made on the modernization of the F-14, A-6, and S-3, the Navy looked to the problem of replacing the existing force of A-7 light-attack bombers. Since every CVW had two squadrons each of the A-7's (with a dozen aircraft per squadron), this represented a huge aircraft buy. At the same time, the Navy and Marines had to replace about a dozen squadrons of elderly F-4 Phantom fighters, which operated from carriers and bases. From these twin needs came what was known as the VFAX (Navy Fighter/Attack, Experimental) requirement. The hope was that a single aircraft might be designed to fulfill both the fighter and light-strike roles, and thus save money by reducing the number of airframes. About the same time, the USAF was evaluating a pair of "lightweight" fighter designs, and was preparing to procure one of them. Since the USAF was going to use this aircraft as a multi-role fighter-bomber, the Congress and Department of Defense directed that the Navy and Marines should use a version of the same aircraft. That is where the troubles began.

The two competing lightweight fighter designs, the General Dynamics (GD, now part of Lockheed Martin) YF-16 and the Northrop (also now part of Lockheed Martin) YF-17, had a "fly-off" competition at Edwards AFB in California. When it was over, the YF-16 was declared the winner, and has proved to be an outstanding combat aircraft. The USAF and our allies have bought thousands of the little fighters, and continue to do so to this day. Unfortunately, many of the qualities that made the USAF love the F-16 were unacceptable in a carrier-based aircraft. For example, the Navy prefers twin-engined aircraft for their redundancy and ability to accept battle damage. The F-16 has only a single engine, and is too lightly built to carry some of the equipment needed for carrier operations. Since the Navy had been directed to base the VFAX aircraft on the contenders from the USAF lightweight-fighter competition, it chose to run a "paper" competition that would allow it to evaluate and choose the airplane it would buy.

Meanwhile, both GD and Northrop decided that since neither had recent experience building carrier aircraft, they would look for a partnership with an aircraft company that did. Thus GD in Fort Worth teamed up with its crosstown neighbor Vought, while Northrop adopted McDonnell Douglas (MDC) in St. Louis as its partner. At the end of the evaluation process, the Navy chose a derivative of the twin-engined, twin-tailed YF-17, which it judged was better suited to the rigors of duty aboard aircraft carriers. This award to MDC/Northrop provoked a loud protest from the losing Vought/ GD team, which had thought the original DoD/Congressional direction was an ironclad guarantee that they would win. Though it took an inspired campaign of political pressure and technical documentation by the Navy to preserve the decision, the MDC/Northrop team held on to their win. But there is more to the story.

Winning a contract is one thing. Building the aircraft specified is another thing entirely; especially when it is the most advanced of its type ever built. The Navy and Marine Corps were asking a great deal more from the new aircraft than the USAF was of the F-16, and that complicated matters greatly. For instance, the new bird, now designated the F/A-18 Hornet (the F/A stood for Fighter/Attack), would have to carry a great deal more equipment than the USAF bird. This included a multi-mode radar capable of providing guidance for the large AIM-7 Sparrow AAMs and FLIR targeting pods it was to be equipped with. The Hornet would also have to lug around a lot of extra weight in the form of beefed-up structure (representing about 4,000 lb/1,818.2 kg, approximately 20 % of the Hornet's total weight), to allow it to operate on and off carriers. These requirements proved to be far beyond the modest abilities of the YF-17. The Navy was in fact asking not simply for a Navy version of the original Northrop design, but for a brand-new aircraft. Simply scaling up the YF-17 was not going to do.

To further compound the difficulties presented by this design, there was no true prototype of the F/A-18. The first Hornets to fly were preproduction aircraft, which went directly into operational testing at NAS Patuxent River, Maryland. This meant that any normal problems that might have shown up (and been eliminated) in a prototype were now found in the preproduction birds. This proved to be a costly mistake. In fact, some problems (such as structural cracks) did not show up until the Hornet was actually into squadron service with the fleet. There were also troubles with the aerodynamics around the "cobra hood" and leading-edge extensions, which had to be modified fairly late in the development process. Luckily, the ability of the F/A-18's new digital fly-by-wire (FBW-the first ever on a carrier-capable aircraft) flight-control system to be reprogrammed made the fix relatively easy. The worst problem, though, was the scarcity of internal fuel tankage.

One of the most important measures of a combat aircraft's range is expressed by a number called the fuel fraction; that is, the weight of internal fuel expressed as a percentage of an aircraft's takeoff weight. Normally, combat aircraft designers like to build aircraft with a fuel fraction of between.30 and.35. This gives enough gas to fly a decent distance, drop bombs or dogfight, and then return to the base or boat with a minimum of refueling from airborne tankers. In the design of the Hornet, the fuel fraction was woefully low. The origins of this problem dated from the original YF-17 design. That aircraft had been a technology demonstrator that did not require the kind of fuel load a combat aircraft would normally carry. Thus, the Northrop designers had not installed large internal fuselage tanks. In the process of "scaling up" the YF-17 into the Hornet, the MDC designers had failed to take this into account. For some reason that still defies explanation, the F/A-18 was given the same fuel fraction as the original YF-17-around.23. As a result, the Hornet would never be able to fly all of the missions that had been specified in the original VFAX requirement. For example, when operating in a bombing mode, the F/A-18 cannot possibly fly the same weapons loads as far as the A-7E Corsair, which it replaced.

The Hornet's "short legs" came to light just as the Navy was about to make the production decision for the aircraft. It took more than a little hand-wringing and more than a few briefings to Navy, Marine, and Congressional leaders to make the case to put the F/A-18 into production. The NAVAIR rationalization was that since the aircraft had shown such good performance in so many other areas of flight test, the really-long-range-strike-mission requirement could be compromised. For example, the new APG-65 multi-mode radar was quickly hailed as one of the best in the world, and the weapons system integration made the Hornet an ordnance-delivery dream. Besides, the test and fleet pilots loved flying the new bird. They could see its potential, and were willing to accept a few shortcomings to get the Hornet into the fleet. So the decision to buy the first production batch of Hornets was made, and the first deliveries to VFA-125 at NAS Lemore, California, began in 1980. With this part of the story told, let's take a closer look at the F/A-18.

At first glance, the Hornet looks very much like the F-14 (twin engines and tails), but the similarities are only superficial. The F/A-18 is more than a decade ahead of the Tomcat in technology. A sizable percentage of the Hornet's structure, for example, is composed of plastics and composite structures. The twin General Electric F404-GE-400 engines utilize the same engine technology as the F110, and give the Hornet exceptional agility. Aerodynamically, the fixed wing of the F/A-18 is optimized for dogfighting, with six stations on the wings for ordnance (as well as AIM-9 Sidewinder AAMs on the wingtips). At the midpoint of each wing is a folding hinge, which allows the deck crews to reduce the "footprint" of the F/A-18 on the limited space of the flight and hangar decks. On the fuselage are two recessed wells for AIM-7 Sparrow and AIM-120 AMRAAM AAMs, as well as various types of sensor and data-link pods. There also is a centerline station suitable for a small external fuel tank. The nose of the Hornet is a very busy place, with the APG-65 multi-mode radar mounted just ahead of a bay, which houses the M61 20mm Gatling gun. Normally, placing a vibration sensitive instrument like a radar close to a fire-spitting device like a cannon would be suicidal in an aircraft. Unfortunately, the F/A-18's limited internal space gave MDC designers no choice. That this unlikely pairing of systems in the nose actually works speaks volumes about the care that designers gave every component of the Hornet.

The Navy has a real aversion to doing new things, and frequently prefers to let other services pioneer technology and ideas. However, for the F/A-18 to fulfill its missions, the Navy had to try some things that nobody had done before. One of these was to make the Hornet an effective dual-role (fighter and attack) aircraft, with only a single crewman. The only way to make this possible was to use an advanced cockpit design, a generation ahead of any used by any other combat aircraft. Like other fighters of its generation, the F/A-18 has a bubble canopy, with the pilot sitting with his/her shoulders above the cockpit rails in an ACES-series ejection seat, which provides the necessary "zero-zero" capability needed for safety in flight and deck operations. After that, the novelty begins.

To design the Hornet cockpit, MDC brought a unique talent to bear. Engineer Eugene Adam, acknowledged to be the finest cockpit designer in the world, led the MDC cockpit design team that produced the "front office" for the F/A-18. For years, Adam had advocated a "glass" cockpit, composed only of computer screens, which could be configured in any way desired by the pilot. With computer screens, a wide variety of data could be displayed at any time, depending upon what the pilot was doing at a given moment. Such a system was installed in the cockpit of the Hornet, which is made up of a series of square computerized Multi-Function Displays (MFDs) with buttons around the bezels that allow the pilot to select the data they want. To complement the MFDs, there were a second-generation HUD and HOTAS controls on the throttles and control stick. This made it possible for the pilot to switch from "Fighter" to "Attack" mode with just a flick of a switch. So advanced was the Hornet at the time of its introduction that it even included the first onboard GPS receiver seen in the fleet. These systems are backed up by one of the best avionics suites ever installed in a tactical aircraft.

The result was a cockpit still considered to be among the world's finest. Perhaps best of all, it was a cockpit with room for improvements and upgrades. Soon, there will be a new helmet-mounted sighting system, which will allow the pilot to cue the radar and weapons-targeting systems by just looking at a target. The new AIM-9X version of the classic Sidewinder AAM will be the first to use this new feature.

Naval aviators love to tell me how much "fun" the Hornet is to fly, and this has had a positive effect on its image in the fleet. Pilots especially love the responsiveness of the FBW control system and the integrated "glass" cockpit. The F/A-18 can even land itself, using a system called "Mode-1" to automatically fly the bird to a perfect "OK-Three" landing. Maintenance personnel love it too, since its digital electronics are so reliable that aircraft are rarely down for equipment failures. There is a "down" side, though. Because of the F/A-18's small internal fuel fraction, it almost always carries a pair of large fuel tanks under the wings, and frequently another one under the centerline of the fuselage. This leaves just four wing stations for actual weapons carriage. Since the two outer wing stations are load-limited (they are outboard of the wing fold line), these are usually reserved for additional AAMs, leaving just the two middle wing stations for carrying air-to-ground ordnance.[52]

If the Hornet is tasked for a bombing mission, the two fuselage stations will normally be filled with a single AIM-120 AMRAAM, and an AAS-38 Nighthawk FLIR/laser targeting pod. This configuration allows the F/A-18 to pick up targets in darkness or low visibility, and then deliver PGMs (like Paveway-series LGBs) or "iron" ordnance onto them with accuracy. Unlike the LANTIRN system used on the F-14, F-15, and F-16, Nighthawk (built by the Loral Division of Lockheed Martin) is designed to be operated by just a single crewman. This means that a Hornet driver can pick up a target using the Nighthawk FLIR, "lock" it up, and then trust the pod to automatically track the target and handle the release and delivery of the weapon. While early versions of the Nighthawk lacked the laser designator and had some reliability problems, the current version is doing a fine job in the fleet. More than any other piece of equipment, the Nighthawk pod has transformed the image of the F/A-18 around the world. Where once it was seen only as an "iron" bomber, now it carries a reputation for deadly precision.

The Hornet can also employ other PGMs like the AGM-88 HARM antiradar missile, the AGM-65 Maverick tactical ASM, the AGM-84D Harpoon antishipping missile, and the new AGM-84E Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM). SLAM is a relative newcomer to the fleet, having first been introduced and employed during Desert Storm in 1991. Since that time, SLAM has seen action in Bosnia in 1995, and has become one of the finest standoff strike weapons in the world. What makes it such a winner is the use of the basic (and very dependable) AGM-84 Harpoon engine, airframe, and warhead package, which is now married to a new guidance and seeker package. This new system combines a GPS/INS unit, an imaging infrared (IIR) seeker head from an AGM-65 Maverick ASM, and a man-in-the-loop data-link unit from the old Walleye guided bomb.

The result is a weapon that achieved perhaps the most spectacular hit of Desert Storm. On its first combat "shot," run against a heavily defended Iraqi weapons plant near Baghdad, two SLAMs were launched several minutes apart. The first missile, taking its basic guidance from the GPS/INS unit, flew to the target and locked up the desired aimpoint without difficulty. It then flew directly into the building wall, detonated, and made a very large hole. Several minutes later, the second SLAM flew through the hole created by the first missile and destroyed the equipment inside. Further success for the SLAM came during Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia. The outstanding performance of SLAM has made it one of the most feared PGMs in the U.S. arsenal.

In fleet service in its early years, the Hornet showed the shortcomings that had been seen in testing. While the F/A-18's range limitations became obvious at once, for example, this could be improved simply by altering the altitude and speed (called the flight profile) that it flew during missions. Thus, the aircraft's range could be stretched simply by flying it at higher altitudes, where the F404 engines were more efficient. Still, some of the Hornet's original specifications would never be met, especially those of acceleration and range. Still, in the crucible of combat it passed the ultimate test. This first came in 1986, when a number of Hornet squadrons took part in operations against Libya. In ACM engagements against the MiGs and Mirages of the Libyan Air Force, the Hornets had no trouble staying on the tails of the opposing warplanes. They also helped suppress the Libyan air defenses with HARM missiles, another role they took over from the A-7E. The Hornet provided the Navy with one other pleasant surprise: its incredible reliability compared with other Navy aircraft like the F-14 and A-6. This meant that the Hornet was cheaper to operate, and could be flown more often than other comparable aircraft-so often, in fact, that the early F/A-18As wore out faster than expected, and had to be replaced earlier than planned. This led to an improved variant, the F/A-18C/D, which arrived in the fleet during 1986.

The — C/D model gained some weight over the — A/B Hornets, but unfortunately did not carry any more gas. The radar, avionics, engines, and other systems were significantly improved, however, including provisions to carry the AIM-120 AAM and IIR version of the AGM-65 Maverick ASM. The new Hornet also had a new-generation monitoring system that allowed maintenance crews to diagnose problems automatically and even predict when individual components and "black boxes" might fail. There were also provisions for the new Hornet to be operated at night with night-vision goggles (NVGs), and a new radar: the APG-73 (planned for the new F/A-18E/F Super Hornet).

The F/A-18C/D was the Hornet that the Navy and Marines had wanted all along; and the Marine Corps bought six squadrons of modified — D models as night-attack aircraft to replace their force of retired A-6's. The Hornet was also becoming something of a success in the export market. The first foreign customer was Canada, which bought 138 CF-18's to conduct continental air defense as part of the North American Air Defense (NORAD) Command. Australia (seventy-five), Kuwait (forty), Spain (seventy-two), Switzerland (thirty-four), Finland (sixty-four), Thailand (eight), and Malaysia (eight) also bought various models of the F/A-18 to upgrade their air forces. All told, around 1,500 Hornets have been built to date.

By the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Hornet had been in service for almost a decade and was ready for its biggest combat challenge. Almost as soon as the U.S. began to react to the invasion, F/A-18 units were in the front lines of Desert Shield. Eventually, five carrier groups and an entire Marine Air Wing with Hornets as their backbone deployed into the theater. The Canadians also contributed a squadron of their CF-18's to the effort. In Desert Storm the F/A-18 proved to be a deadly air-to-air killer. On January 17th, a pair of VF-81 Hornets from the USS Saratoga (CV-60) downed a pair of Iraqi F-7's (Chinese MiG-21 clones) with a salvo of "in-your-face" AAM shots. The two F/A-18's were loaded for a bombing mission at the time, but quickly switched to the air-to-air mode, shot down the enemy fighters, then went on to complete their bombing mission. The rest of the war was mainly spent delivering "iron" bombs onto battlefield targets in Kuwait and Iraq. In this mission, the success of the Hornets was something less than total.

Part of the problem was the weather, which was the worst on record in the region. Because many of the bombing sorties required visual identification of the targets, some of these had to be aborted due to the cloud cover. There was also a requirement that bombs be delivered from medium altitude (above 10,000 feet/3,048 meters), making the accuracy of the results uncertain. Had the Hornet been armed with LGBs and other precision weapons, this problem would not have arisen. Unfortunately, the new version of the Nighthawk pod (with the laser designator and tracker) had not yet come into service.

There also was the fuel problem. Since most of the Hornets were based on carriers in the Red Sea, they required several in-flight refuelings in order to reach their targets in Iraq and Kuwait. This placed a severe burden on the limited airborne tanker resources of General Horner's Central Command Air Force (CENTAF). This meant that the F/A-18's were sometimes left off the daily Air Tasking Order (ATO) in favor of other aircraft, like USAF F-16's, which were based closer to their targets. Eventually, the Navy moved a total of four carrier groups into the Persian Gulf itself, to bring the Hornets close enough to their targets to do some real good.

By the time Hornets next went into combat (in Bosnia in 1995), a number of improvements had been made. The — C/D-model Hornets had been rearmed with new AIM-120 AMRAAM AAMs, SLAM ASMs, and Paveway LGBs guided by their new Nighthawk targeting pods. And this time, their carrier, the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), operated closer to shore than was the practice in Desert Storm and they were given adequate tanker support from NATO/USAF resources. Now that they were properly supported and armed, the PGM-armed Hornets (including a squadron of Marine F/A-18D Night Attack variants) were the heart of Operation Deliberate Force in 1995, and did all that was asked of them. In fact, Navy and Marine Corps Hornets dropped and launched the bulk of the PGMs that were used during the Bosnia strikes.

Today the Hornet is the backbone of U.S. carrier aviation, and will remain that way for at least the next decade. Every CVW is being equipped with three F/A-18 squadrons (each with twelve aircraft), which means that fully half of the aircraft on U.S. carrier decks today are Hornets. There will soon be significant Hornet upgrades, with the introduction of new PGMs, as well as a new version of the classic AIM-9 Sidewinder. Even so, there can be little doubt that the F/A-18's short legs, limited weapons load, and design compromises will continue to be a lightning rod for critics. Still, the folks who fly the Hornet love their mounts. Though it's a flying compromise, it's easy to fly, forgiving for new pilots, and capable of many different missions.

EA-6B Prowler: The Electric Beast

Looking like a flying metal tadpole, the EA-6B Prowler will probably be the last survivor of a long line of Grumman carrier aircraft that date back to before the Second World War. Its mission is electronic warfare (EW), which explains why the aircraft looks like a flying antenna farm. As many as thirty (or more) antennas are smoothly faired into the fuselage or packed into the "football" (actually, it looks more like a Brazil nut), a fiberglass radome at the top of the vertical stabilizer. These devices allow the Prowler to throw an invisible veil of protection over the aircraft and ships of the carrier battle group. They detect, classify, and locate enemy radar, electronic data links, and communications, then jam them with precisely crafted and targeted interference. And as an added bonus, since 1986 Prowlers have also been capable of making "hard kills" using the AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM), which homes in on radar transmitters and shreds them with a blast-fragmentation warhead.[53]

Today, the Prowler is the finest tactical EW aircraft in the world. It's so good that the USAF is quietly retiring its own fleet of EF-111 Raven EW aircraft and employing EA-6Bs in joint (USN/USAF) squadrons. All this is even more impressive when you consider that the thirty-year-old Prowler design has been around for almost half of the six decades that radar has been used in military operations; and with regular updates, it has at least another ten or fifteen years to go.

Electronic warfare (intercepting and jamming enemy signals) began with the first military use of radio in the Russo-Japanese War (1905), and reached a high degree of sophistication during the Second World War, as Axis and Allied scientists and technicians fought for control of the electromagnetic spectrum. EW aircraft have been in use since World War II, with modified USN TBF/TBM Avengers being among the first such aircraft. The start of the Vietnam War saw two carrier-capable EW birds in service with the Navy, though both were already getting old. The EA-1E was a modification of the classic Douglas AD-1 Skyraider, while the EKA-3B "Electric Whale" (which also served as a tanker aircraft) was a development of the Cold War-era A-3 Skywarrior attack bomber. As American aircraft began to fall to radar-controlled AAA guns, SAMs, and MiGs over Vietnam, the need for a third-generation EW aircraft became almost desperate. Out of this need came the development of what would become the EA-6 Prowler.

The original airframe of the Prowler was derived from the A-6 Intruder, which was the Navy's first true all-weather, day or night, low-level medium-strike aircraft. The Intruder saw extensive combat in Vietnam, the Cold War, and Desert Storm, and was immortalized in Stephen Coonts's 1986 novel, Flight of the Intruder. The Prowler's immediate ancestor, the EA-6A, was a modified two-seat "Electric Intruder" developed to fill a Marine Corps requirement for a jammer aircraft that could escort strike missions into the high-intensity threat of North Vietnam's integrated air defense system. Hard-won experience showed that what was really needed for such missions were more EW operators and jammers aboard the aircraft. From this came the all-new EA-6B Prowler, which is an all-weather, twin-engine aircraft manufactured by Northrop Grumman Aerospace Corporation as a modification of the basic A-6 Intruder airframe. The first flight of the EA-6B was on May 25th, 1968, and it entered operational service in July of 1971. Just a few months later, the Prowler entered combat over Vietnam with VAQ-132, based on aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin.

The Prowler is big for a "tactical" aircraft. The overall length is 59 feet, 10 inches/17.7 meters. It has a wingspan (with the wings unfolded) of 53 feet/15.9 meters, and sits 16 feet, 3 inches/4.9 meters high on the deck. It is also quite heavy, with a maximum gross takeoff weight of 61,000 lb/ 27,450 kg, much of which is fuel. The Prowler has a cruising speed of just over 500 knots/575 mph/920 kph, an unrefueled range of over 1,000 nm/ 1,150 mi/1,840 km, and a service ceiling of 37,600 feet/11,460 meters.

The EA-6B can hardly be called a "high performance" tactical aircraft. Although it is quite stable in flight and relatively easy to fly, the Prowler is somewhat underpowered. The two non-afterburning Pratt & Whitney J52-P408 turbojet engines lack the kind of thrust available to F-14 or F-18 crews (11,200 lb/5,080 kg of thrust each), which presents the pilot with a number of challenges during every mission (especially on takeoff and landing). Due to the complexity of its systems, the EA-6B is also a relatively high-maintenance aircraft-about one mission in three returns with a "squawk" or malfunction requiring unscheduled maintenance. On the plus side, the side-by-side twin cockpit arrangement gives maximum efficiency, visibility, and comfort for the four-person crew. This is important during long missions, which can last up to six hours with in-flight refueling. The canopies are coated with a microscopically thin (and very expensive) transparent layer of gold leaf, which reflects microwave energy and protects the crew from getting cooked by their own high-energy jammers.

The Prowler's crew includes a pilot and up to three Electronic Countermeasures Officers (ECMOs). The senior officer on board-either the pilot or one of the ECMOs-is normally the mission commander. In fact, a Prowler squadron commander is often an ECMO rather than a pilot. ECMO-1, who mans the position to the pilot's right, handles navigation and communications, while ECMO-2 and -3 (they sit in the rear cockpit) manage the offensive and defensive EW systems. Within the squadron, there are normally more crews than aircraft, due to the workload of flying, administration, and mission planning. In a low-threat environment, a crew of three is considered sufficient-with one ECMO remaining behind on the boat to plan the next mission, catch up on paperwork, or perform any of the countless additional duties that Naval aviators must juggle when they are deployed.

The Prowler's EW capabilities depend largely on the ALQ-99 electronic countermeasures system. This is not a single piece of equipment, but a complex and ever-changing mix of computers, jammers, controls and displays, receivers, and transmitters. Some of these components are built into the airframe, while others are packaged in pods. All are externally identical, but each is optimized for specific frequency bands. Up to five such pods can be carried-two under each wing and one under the fuselage. A more typical mission configuration is two or three pods, with the other stations occupied by fuel tanks or AGM-88 HARM missiles. Each pod generates its own electrical power, using a "ram air turbine" or RAT (a compact generator spun by a small propeller). To generate full power for jamming, the aircraft must fly above a minimum speed (225 knots). Using the RATs brings a slight drag penalty; the Prowler loses about 1 % of its maximum combat radius for each pod carried. Still, the pods and missiles are the reason why the Prowler exists. Without the electronic smoke screen provided by the EA-6B's jamming pods, losses to enemy defensive systems would be many times greater than they have been.

Normally, the EA-6B is used to provide a combination of services for strike packages inbound to a target area. If active SAM sites are nearby, the ECMOs will use the ALQ-99 to provide targeting for the HARMs, which are deadly accurate when fired from a Prowler. Once the HARMs are gone, the EA-6B orbits away from the target area and uses the ALQ-99 jammer pods to "knock back" enemy radars and other sensors that might engage the strike group. Other missions include electronic surveillance, as the ALQ-99 is a formidable collection system for electronic intelligence (ELINT). Because they are considered "high value units" by enemy defenders, one or two fighters usually provide them with an escort, just in case the locals get nosey. In fact, no Prowler has ever been lost in combat, though about forty have been destroyed in accidents. The worst of these was a horrific crash while landing aboard the Nimitz (CVN-74) back in 1979, which killed the entire crew as well as a number of deck personnel in the ensuing fire.

EW is an unusual facet in the spectrum of warfare. For every measure there is a countermeasure, and the useful life span of a system in actual combat is often only a few months. Because a new "generation" of electronic warfare technology emerges every few years, if you fall a generation behind you are "out of the game." This helps to explain the bewildering variety of upgrades and variants that mark the Prowler's long career. Production of new-built Prowlers ended several years ago, but about 125 remain in active service today. This is just enough for twelve Navy, four Marine Corps, and four "joint" squadrons of EA-6Bs. Normally, each deploys with four aircraft. Navy and joint USAF/USN Prowler squadrons are home-based at NAS Whidbey Island, Washington, while the Marine units live at MCAS Cherry Point, North Carolina. The joint EA-6B squadrons are a new phenomenon in the post-Cold War world, an expression of budget realities that no longer allow the services to duplicate aircraft types with the same mission. Although the Navy and USAF developed very different EW concepts and doctrine over the years, the Air Force has agreed to retire its only tactical jammer aircraft, the EF-111 Raven. Now the two services will "share" five joint "expeditionary" Prowler squadrons, which will operate with mixed Navy and Air Force ground and flight crews. Despite the predictable concerns about USAF officers commanding Navy squadrons (or vice versa), this program is well under way and looks to be a real winner.

Like their brethren in the Tomcat community, EA-6B crews have learned some new tricks in recent years, like shooting AGM-88 HARM missiles at enemy radars. Prowlers have even been used as command and control aircraft, functioning as strike leaders for other planes on bombing missions. Other improvements include plans to start another upgrade program known as ICAP (Improved Capability) III. This will take the basic EA-6B package as it currently exists (known as Block 89) and add improved computers, signal processors, and jammers, as well as a GPS receiver, new radios and data links, and other new avionic systems. ICAP III-equipped Prowlers should begin to appear in a few years. As for future EW aircraft on carriers, long-range plans have been developed for a two-seat EW version of the new F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. A highly automated follow-on version of ALQ-99 would be fitted to this bird, as well as more advanced HARMs and other systems. However, since there is no money for this bird in the current budget, the old Prowlers will have to soldier on for at least another decade or two.

E-2C Hawkeye: Eyes of the Fleet

Put a sensor of sufficient resolution high enough, and you will see enemy forces before they can harm you. This is the guiding principal behind most early warning systems, from reconnaissance satellites to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). For naval leaders, there is no more important "high ground" than that occupied by Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft. The first U.S. Navy AEW birds date back to World War II, when converted TBF/ TBM Avengers were modified to carry a small airborne radar and operator for the purpose of detecting incoming Japanese Kamikaze aircraft far enough out for fighters to be vectored to intercept them. After the war, special purpose-built AEW aircraft were developed. These were designed to deal with the new generation of jets and ASMs faced by Cold War-era Naval forces. The first of these was the Grumman E-1 Tracer, a development of the S-2F Tracker ASW aircraft. For almost a decade the E-1 worked as the primary carrier-based AEW aircraft for the USN; but the operational conditions of the Vietnam conflict showed the numerous shortcomings of the Tracer, including poor overland radar performance and limited endurance and service altitude. Though they served aboard modified Essex-class (SCB-27C/CV-9) carriers until 1976, there was a clear need for a more advanced AEW aircraft for the fleet. That aircraft was the E-2 Hawkeye.

One of the last propeller-driven aircraft in the CVW, the E-2C Hawkeye is the Navy's all-weather, carrier-based tactical AEW aircraft. The E-2C uses computerized sensors for early warning, threat analysis, and control against air and surface targets. It provides the carrier battle group with all-weather AEW services, as well as command, control, and communications (C) functions for the carrier battle group. Additional missions include surface surveillance, strike and interceptor control, Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) guidance, Over-the-Horizon (OTH) targeting, and communications relay. Designed to a 1955 specification, and upgraded through at least six generations of electronic technology, the Hawkeye remains in production today. The E-2C has also been adopted by the French Navy, and at least five other countries that do not even have aircraft carriers. This is a tribute to the cost-effective mix of robust airframe, compact sensor and avionics suite, and turboprop power plants. Unit cost: $51 million-cheap for the protection it provides. Before you gag on that number, consider that a new F/A-18E/F Super Hornet will cost you even more per copy, and I don't know any battle group commander who would not like a few more of the precious E-2Cs.

One thing all that money does not buy is beauty. As you walk up to a Hawkeye, pieces of it seem to be going everywhere. Wings are folded back on the fuselage, with the big radar rotodome perched up top like a tethered flying saucer. Though it is not gorgeous to look at, the E-2C has a functional elegance, doing the same kind of mission as its larger USAF cousin, the Boeing E-3 Sentry. That it does this on an airframe a fifth the size, and off a carrier deck, is a measure of its sophistication and value. When the Grumman engineers designed the E-2, they started with a perfect cylinder. Into this they packed all the electronics, fuel, two pilots, and three radar controllers. The finishing touch came when they mounted the rotating radar dome (called a "rotodome") on top, and attached a pair of long wings mounting a pair of Allison T-56-A427 turboprop engines with five thousand shaft horsepower each.

Dimensionally, the Hawkeye is 57 feet, 6 inches/17.5 meters long, with a wingspan of 80 feet, 7 inches/28 meters, and a height of 18 feet, 3 inches/ 5.6 meters to the top of the radar dome. Though it is the largest aircraft flying on and off carriers today, it is not the heaviest. At a maximum gross takeoff weight of 53,000 lb/23,850 kg (40,200 lb/18,090 kg "dry"), the E-2C is actually lighter than the F-14 Tomcat. The wings have the longest wingspan of any carrier aircraft in the world; and when folded, they use the classic Grumman "Stow-Wing" concept, which has them folding against the fuselage. The tail is composed of a horizontal stabilizer with four vertical stabilizers to give the Hawkeye the necessary "bite" to move the heavy bird around the sky. Though it has only ten thousand horsepower behind the twin props, the Hawkeye is capable of speeds over 300 knots/345 mph/552 kph, and can operate at altitudes of 30,000 feet/9,144 meters. Because Hawkeyes are unarmed, no battle group commander would be considered sane if there were less than two fighters protecting his E-2C. Hawkeyes are true "high value units" and are always a target for enemy fighters.

On board, the crew of five is busy, for they're doing a job that on the larger E-3 Sentry takes several dozen personnel. The pilot and copilot fly precisely positioned and timed racetrack-shaped patterns, designed to optimize the performance of the E-2C's sensors. In back, the three radar-systems operators are tasked with tracking and sorting the contacts detected by the Hawkeye's APS-145 radar. This Westinghouse-built system is optimized for operations over water and can detect both aircraft and surface contacts out to a range of up to 300 nm/345 mi/552 km. To off-load as much of the workload as possible, a great deal of the raw data is sent back to the task force's ships via a digital data link. With this off-board support, the three console operators are able to control a number of duties, including intercepts, strike and tanker operations, air traffic control, search and rescue missions, and even surface surveillance and OTH targeting.

Along with the 141 E-2Cs produced for the USN, the Hawkeye has had considerable export success. No less than six foreign governments have bought them: Israel (four), Egypt (six), France (two for their new carrier Charles de Gaulle), Japan (thirteen), Singapore (four), and Taiwan (four). There are more Hawkeyes in use throughout the world than any other AEW aircraft ever built.

There also has been one major variant of the Hawkeye, a transport version known as the C-2A Greyhound. Basically an E-2 airframe with a broader fuselage and the radar rotodome deleted, it can deliver cargo and passengers hundreds of miles/kilometers out to sea. Known as a COD (for Carrier Onboard Delivery) aircraft, it replaced the elderly C-1 Trader, which is itself a variant of the earlier E-1 Tracker. With its broad rear loading ramp and fuselage, the C-2 can carry up to twenty-eight passengers, twenty stretcher cases, or cargo up to the size of an F-110 engine for the F-14.

The Hawkeye has had a long run in USN service. The original — A model was first flown in October 1960, to provide early warning services for the new generation of supercarriers then coming into service. In January 1964, the first of fifty-nine E-2As were delivered to their squadrons, and were shortly headed into combat in Southeast Asia. These were later updated to the E-2B standard, which remained in use until replaced by the E-2C in the 1970's. The first E-2Cs entered USN service with Airborne Early Warning Squadron (VAW) 123 at NAS Norfolk, Virginia, in November of 1973. The — C-model Hawkeye was produced in order to provide the F-14 Tomcat with an AEW platform matched to the new fighter's capabilities. Though visually identical to the earlier models, the E-2C was equipped with new-technology digital computers that provided a greatly increased capability for the new Hawkeye. These gave the operators the ability to track and intercept the dozens of Soviet bombers and hundreds of ASMs and SSMs that were expected to be fired at CVBGs if the Cold War ever turned "hot."

In any event, the E-2Cs never directed the massive air battles they had been designed for. Instead, the Hawkeye crews spent the declining years of the Cold War flying their racetrack patterns over the fleets, maintaining their lonely vigil for a threat that never came. Carrier-based Hawkeyes were not strangers to combat, however. E-2Cs guided F-14 Tomcat fighters flying combat air patrols during the 1981 and 1989 air-to-air encounters with the Libyan Air Force, as well as the joint USN/USAF strike against terrorist-related Libyan targets in 1986. Israeli E-2Cs provided AEW support during their strikes into Lebanon in 1982, and again during the larger invasion the following year. More recently, E-2Cs provided the command and control for successful operations during the Persian Gulf War, directing both land strike and CAP missions over Iraq and providing control for the shoot-down of the two Iraqi F-7/MiG-21 fighters by carrier-based F/A-18's. E-2 aircraft have also worked extremely effectively with U.S. law enforcement agencies in drug interdictions.

Today the entire Hawkeye fleet is being upgraded under what is called the Group II program. Along with thirty-six new-production aircraft, the entire USN E-2C fleet is being given the improved APS-145 radar, new computers, avionics, data links, and a GPS/INS system to improve flight path and targeting accuracy. This means that a single Hawkeye can now track up to two thousand targets at once in a volume of six million cubic miles of airspace and 150,000 square miles of territory. Current plans have the Hawkeye/ Greyhound fleet serving until at least the year 2020, when a new airframe known as the Common Support Aircraft (CSA) will be built in an AEW version. By that time, the basic E-2 airframe will have served for almost six decades!

Lockheed Martin S-3B Viking: The Vital "Hoover"

Antisubmarine warfare (ASW) is probably the most complex, frustrating, operationally challenging, and technically secretive mission that any aircraft can be called upon to perform. To locate, track, classify, and destroy a target as elusive as a nuclear submarine in the open ocean often seems virtually impossible. And against a quiet modern diesel boat in noisy coastal waters, the odds are even worse. In fact, the ASW mission doesn't have to be that successful. It has succeeded as long as enemy subs are forced to go deep, run quiet, and keep their distance from a Naval task force or convoy. It is a matter of record that the most effective weapon against submarines during the Second World War was the ASW patrol aircraft. Such aircraft have continued to do this job ever since.

Today, the USN operates two fixed-wing ASW aircraft. One is the venerable four engined P-3C Orion, which operates from land bases. The other is its "little brother" from the Lockheed Martin stable, the S-3B Viking, which is carrier-capable. Airborne ASW has long been a Lockheed specialty. Their land-based Hudson and Ventura patrol bombers played a key role in World War II against German U-boats. More recently, their P-2V Neptune and P-3 Orions have kept vigil over the world's oceans, watching for everything from submarines to drug-running speedboats. The so-called "sea control" mission is thankless work, with nearly day-long missions, most of which are flown over inhospitable and empty seas. The boredom arising from these missions in no way reduces their importance. A maritime nation that cannot monitor and control the sea-lanes it uses is destined to sail at the whims of other powers.

Early on, carrier aviators knew that they too needed the services of such aircraft, and began to build specially configured ASW/patrol aircraft shortly after the end of World War II. The first modern carrier-based ASW aircraft was Grumman's twin-engine S-2 Tracker, which entered service in 1954 and remained in the fleet for over twenty-five years with more than six hundred built.[54] In 1967, the growing sophistication of the Soviet submarine threat led the Navy to launch a competition for a radically new generation of carrier ASW aircraft. Known as the VSX program, it was designed both to replace the Tracker and to provide a utility airframe for other applications. In 1969, the design submitted by Lockheed and Vought was declared the winner and designated S-3. The prototype S-3A first flew on January 21 st, 1971, and the type entered service in 1974 with VS-41 at NAS North Island, California. By the time S-3A production ended in 1978, 179 had been delivered.

The S-3 Viking is a compact aircraft, with prominent engine pods for its twin TF-34-GE-2 engines. This is the same basic non-afterburning turbofan used on the Air Force's A-10 "Warthog," and its relatively quiet "vacuum-cleaner" sound gives the Viking its nickname: the "Hoover." The crew of four sits on individual ejection seats, with the pilot and copilot in front, and the tactical coordinator (TACCO) and sensor operator (SENSO) in back. A retractable aerial refueling probe is fitted in the top of the fuselage, and all S-3B aircraft are capable of carrying an in-flight refueling "buddy" store. This allows the transfer of fuel from the Viking aircraft to other Naval aircraft. Because ASW is a time-consuming business that requires a lot of patience and equipment, the Viking is relatively slow, with a long range and loiter time. This means the S-3 is pretty much a "truck" for the array of sensors, computers, weapons, and other gear necessary to find and hunt submarines. But don't think that the Viking is a sitting duck for anyone with a gun or AAM. The S-3 is surprisingly nimble, and it's able to survive even in areas where AAW threats exist.

There are three primary ways to find a submarine that does not want to be found. You can listen for sounds, you can find it magnetically (something like the way compass needles find north), or you can locate a surfaced sub with radar. Since sound waves can travel a long way underwater, a sub's most important "signature" is acoustic. But how can an aircraft noisily zooming through the sky listen for a submarine gliding beneath the waves? The answer, developed during World War II, is the sonobuoy. This is an expendable float with a battery-powered radio and a super-sensitive microphone. "Passive" sonobuoys simply listen. "Active" sonobuoys add a noise-makerthat sends out sound waves in hope of creating an echo. By dropping a pattern of sonobuoys and monitoring them, an ASW aircraft can spread a wide net to catch the faint sounds of the sub's machinery, or even the terrifying "transient" of a torpedo or missile launch.

Another detectable submarine signature is magnetism. Since most submarines are made of steel, they create a tiny distortion of the earth's magnetic field as they move.[55] The distortion is very small, but it is detectable. A "magnetic anomaly detector" (MAD) can sense this signature, but it is so weak that the aircraft must practically fly directly over the sub at low altitude to do so.[56] In order to isolate the MAD from the plane's own electromagnetic field, it is mounted on the end of a long, retractable "stinger" at the tail of the aircraft.

Eventually, every submarine must come to periscope depth to communicate, snorkel, or just take a quick look around. Although periscope, snorkel, and communications masts are usually treated with radar-absorbing material, at close range sufficiently powerful and sensitive radar may obtain a fleeting detection. Finally, there are more conventional means of detection. For example, an airborne receiver and direction finder may pick up a sub's radio signals, if it is foolish or unlucky enough to transmit when an enemy is listening. And sometimes the telltale "feather" from a mast can be seen visually or through an FLIR system.

The integrated ASW package of the initial version of the Viking, the S-3A, was designed to exploit all of these possible detection signatures. Sixty launch tubes for sonobuoys are located in the underside of the rear fuselage. In addition, the designers provided the ASQ-81 MAD system, an APS-116 surface search radar, a FLIR system, a passive ALR-47 ESM system to detect enemy radars, and the computer systems that tie all of these together. Once a submarine has been found, it is essential that all efforts be made to kill it. To this end, the S-3 was not designed to be just be a hunter; it was also a killer. An internal weapons bay can accommodate up to four Mk. 46 torpedoes or a variety of bombs, depth charges, and mines. Two wing pylons can also be fitted to carry additional weapons, rocket pods, flare launchers, auxiliary fuel tanks, or a refueling "buddy store."

All this made the S-3A one of the best sub-hunting aircraft in the world, which was good enough in its first decade of service. By 1981, though, the — A model Viking clearly needed improvement in light of the growth in numbers and capabilities of the Soviet submarine fleet. In particular, the improved quieting of the Russian boats made hunting even more of a challenge. In order to improve the S-3's avionics, sonobuoy, ESM and radar data processing, and weapons, a conversion program was started. The result was the S-3B, which upgraded basic — A model airframes to the new standard. The first S-3Bs began to arrive in the fleet in 1987, and they quickly showed both their new sea control abilities and capability to fire AGM-84 Harpoon antiship missiles. This is the version that serves today.

One of the original hopes for the S-3 was to provide a basic airframe for a number of other aircraft types. Unfortunately, the small production run of the Viking has limited its opportunities for other roles. A small number of early S-3As were modified by removing all the ASW equipment and fittings for armament, allowing them to carry urgent cargo and mail and providing seats for a crew of three and up to six passengers (with minimal comfort). Designated US-3A and possessing a much longer range than the normal C-2A Greyhound COD aircraft, a total of five served in the Pacific fleet until they were recently retired. A dedicated tanker version, the KS-3A, was tested in 1980, but never went into production.

The single most important variant was the ES-3A "Shadow," an electronic surveillance (ESM) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) platform, which replaced the venerable EKA-3B "Electric Whale." Externally, the Shadow is quite distinctive, with a prominent dorsal hump and a retractable radome. About 3,000 lb/1,360 kg of ASW gear was removed and 6,000 lb/2,721 kg of electronics were packed into the weapons bay. While the Shadow is unarmed, it can also carry external fuel tanks and "buddy" refueling stores. Sixteen of these aircraft are split between two squadrons: VQ-5 (the "Sea Shadows") in the Pacific Fleet and VQ-6 (the "Ravens") in the Atlantic. Detachments of two or three aircraft normally deploy with every carrier air group, providing ESM, SIGINT, and OTH support for the CVBG. Unfortunately, recent budget cuts have targeted the shadow community which appears to be headed for disestablishment. Plan on seeing the ES-3 head for the boneyard in 1999.

The S-3 community has changed a great deal since the end of the Cold War. As long as the Soviet Union maintained the world's largest submarine fleet, the ASW squadron was an integral part of the carrier air group. But today, that "blue-water" submarine threat has receded. This hardly means that the S-3's can be retired and their crews given pink slips. On the contrary, the VS squadrons have taken on a whole new set of roles and missions, making them more valuable than ever. After the premature retirement of the KA-6D fleet in 1993, they took on still another role, becoming the primary aerial refueling tanker for the CVW. This has not proved to be the best solution to the aerial refueling problem, since an S-3B can only off-load about 8,000 lb/3,628 kg of fuel, as compared to over 24,000 lb/10,886 kg for the KA-6D. With the thirsty F/A-18's needing at least 4,000 lb/1,814 kg every time they go on a long CAP or strike mission, even the ES-3 Shadows are being used as tankers! To reflect all this, the previous ASW designation of their squadrons has been changed to "Sea Control," which uses the "VS" nomenclature.

The S-3B community currently includes ten operational squadrons, administratively divided between two Sea Control Wings: one for the Atlantic Fleet and one for the Pacific. A single Fleet Replacement Squadron, VS-41, based at North Island NAS, California, serves as the advanced training unit. During Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, S-3 squadrons flew maritime patrols to help enforce sanctions against Iraq. In fact, the only complaint I've ever heard about this wonderful aircraft is that the Navy bought too few of them. Another two hundred would have been invaluable today, but the poor choices on the part of naval aviation leaders scuttled that idea. At the end of 1997, about 120 S-3's remained in service. Eventually, all of their tasks will be taken over by the future Common Support Aircraft that is scheduled to enter service around 2015.

Sikorsky H-60 Seahawk: A Family of Winners

Fixed-wing aircraft that hunt submarines on the prowl have one major vice: They move too fast. One solution is to use an aircraft that can stand still, dip a sonar into the water, and just listen for a while, the way a surface ship or submarine can. Then, if needed, it can rapidly dash to another spot, and do it all again. In other words, you need ASW helicopters. The Germans were the first to use helicopters for this purpose. During World War II they used them to hunt Russian submarines in the Baltic Sea. Following the war, it was only a matter of time and technological development until a true ASW helicopter was developed. After several false starts in the 1950's, Sikorsky developed the SH-3 Sea King. One of the finest helicopters ever built, it was equipped with a dipping sonar and homing torpedoes, and had plenty of range and power. However, by the mid-1970's it was clear that the old SH-3 was heading into its last legs as the USN's premier sub-hunting helicopter.

Meanwhile, the USN had operated another fleet of ASW choppers, so-called "light" helicopters, which can operate off small platforms on escort ships. Starting in the late-1960's, this mission was filled by the Kaman SH-2 Seasprite LAMPS I (Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System). For three decades,SH-2's have operated off the Navy's smallest ships (such as the now-retired Knox-class (FF-1052) frigates), and are still being produced for foreign navies. While the SH-2 was a good start, it lacked the range and payload to hunt front-line Soviet submarines. The Navy wanted a LAMPS helicopter that could hunt the new generation of Soviet submarines coming into service, and began development in the early 1970s.

In 1977, the Navy awarded a contract to IBM Federal Systems and Sikorsky to build a new light ASW helicopter system called Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System-Mark III (LAMPS III).[57] The helicopter itself was called the SH-60B Seahawk. The SH-60B was developed from Sikorsky's UH-60 Blackhawk transport helicopter, which had recently won the Army's competition to replace the venerable UH-1 "Huey."[58] This saved a lot of development money for the Navy and gave them an airframe with excellent growth potential.

Equipped with sonobuoys, MAD, radar, and other detection gear, the SH-60B would be the helicopter equivalent of the S-3B for escort ships. The LAMPS III birds would be based aboard the new generation of Ticonderoga-class (CG-47) Aegis cruisers, Spruance (DD-963) and Kidd-class (DDG-993) destroyers, and Oliver Hazard Perry-class (FFG-7) frigates. These ships were being designed with enlarged helicopter hangars and landing platforms, and a combat center with two-way data links to process information from the SH- 60's onboard sensors. When they first deployed in 1984, the LAMPS III–CAPABLE ships were the most powerful ASW escorts in the world. In a task force or convoy, they would form an "outer zone" barrier against any submarines trying to attack.

Meanwhile, it was time to replace the SH-3, the protectors of the "inner zone" of ASW defenses for the CVBG. Once the SH-60Bs had been well launched, it was a logical jump to build a Sea King replacement from the existing Seahawk airframe. In 1985 the USN contracted with Sikorsky for development and production of seventy-four "CV-Helo" versions of the H-60. They would be equipped with a new lightweight dipping sonar and some avionics improvements over the earlier-B-model Seahawks. These improvements came at a price, however: the loss of most of the LAMPS equipment, including the sonobuoy launchers and data links. The new SH-60F came into service in 1989, and began to replace the elderly SH-3's aboard the carriers. At this same time, in response to- an ongoing initiative to expand the special warfare capabilities of the USN, another H-60 variant went into development. The HH-60H version of the Seahawk provided a whole new range of capabilities for battle groups commanders, including Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) and the covert insertion and retrieval of Special Forces like the famous Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams.

Having three aircraft all based upon the same H-60 airframe has saved lots of scarce naval aviation dollars. All share the same 1,690-horsepower General Electric T700 turboshaft engines, as well as a common rotor system (with a diameter of 53 feet, 8 inches/16.4 meters) and transmission. In fact, the primary differences between the — B, — F, and — H versions are in the various mission-equipment packages. With an overall length of 64 feet, 10 inches/ 19.75 meters, height of 17 feet/5.2 meters, and maximum gross weight of 21, 884 lb/9,908 kg, the Seahawk is a compact and nimble aircraft. It handles well on wet, rolling decks, even those of small escort ships. To assist ships' crews in handling, Seahawks have a cable system called RAST (Recovery, Assist, Secure, and Traversing), allowing ships' crews to haul it down safely in heavy seas. Developed from the Canadian "Beartrap" system, RAST has a tracked receiver on the helicopter platform, which "captures" a small cable hanging from the bottom of the helicopter. Once the receiver has snagged the cable, the helicopter is hauled down, and then towed into the ship's hangar.

The armament of the Seahawks, while limited, is well tailored for their assigned missions. The normal weapons load for the ASW versions is a pair of Mk. 46 or Mk. 50 lightweight torpedoes. Extra fuel tanks can also be carried to extend the Seahawk's range. The — B model is also equipped to fire the Norwegian-built AGM-119 Penguin Mk. 2 Mod. 7 ASM. With a range of up to 18 nm/33 km and a passive infrared seeker, it can take out a patrol boat or small escort ship, even in close proximity to a shoreline or neutral shipping traffic. All the variants of the Seahawk can be fitted with light machine guns, and have rescue hoists for hauling in downed air crews or other personnel.

The various models of Seahawk have helped maintain the sometimes-dicey peace in the post-Cold War world. In the Persian Gulf, for instance, LAMPS III birds have been monitoring maritime traffic and the maritime embargo of military materials into Iraq. At the same time, the — F models have kept a wary eye on the three Project 877/Kilo-class diesel boats of the Iranian Navy, and — H model Seahawks have been transporting inspection teams to ships and conducting CSAR missions. Seahawks have been active in supporting our operations in Bosnia as well. In fact, you probably could not even operate a modern USN task force without Seahawks. This is emphasized by the continuing popularity of the H-60 to export customers around the world. So far, Spain, Japan, Australia, and Taiwan have all bought their own versions of the Seahawk to operate off various classes of escort.

The future of the Seahawk community is looking decidedly upbeat these days, mostly due to the modernization plan that has recently been announced. Shortly, the two hundred or so surviving — B, — F, and — H-model Seahawks will be sent back to the Sikorsky factory in Stratford, Connecticut, to be remanufactured to a common SH-60R standard. All Seahawks will now carry the LAMPS III and — F sensor packages (both sonobuoys and dipping sonar), as well as improved engines and avionics. This upgrade should make it possible for the — R Seahawks to last into the 21 st century until the next generation of sea control helicopter is designed.

Unfortunately, the use of the HH-60H airframes to produce — R-model birds will create a shortfall for the CSAR/special operations force. At the same time, the elderly fleet of UH-46 Sea Knight Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP) helicopters is about to fall out of the sky from wear and tear. Recognizing this, the Navy has ordered the development and production of an entirely new model of Seahawk, the CH-60, which will take over the CSAR/special operations duties previously assigned to the — H model, as well as the VERTREP mission of the Sea Knight. The first prototype is currently flying, and low-rate production has been approved for up to two hundred of the CH-60 variants. First deliveries to the fleet will begin in FY-1999.

Raytheon BGM-109 Tomahawk: The "Other" Strike Aircraft

Not all the aircraft that fly from the CVBG are manned. Another strike weapon available to battle group commanders for hitting targets ashore is the BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missile. The Tomahawk is an all-weather submarine- or ship-launched land-attack cruise missile, with a variety of warheads. Stowed in vertical launch tubes or containers, it can be launched from long range, and can strike with pinpoint precision (less than three meters/ten feet from the aimpoint). In the U.S. Fleet, everyone calls it the TLAM (pronounced "tea-lamb"), which is an acronym for Tomahawk Land Attack Missile, to distinguish it from the discontinued TASM, or Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile. Conceived in the 1970's for a nuclear "Doomsday" scenario, TLAM has been reborn in the '90's as the big stick of U.S. policy.

TLAM looks rather like a cigar with stubby pop-out wings and tail fins. A solid-fuel booster rocket (which is attached to the rear of the missile and looks like an oversized coffee can) hurls the missile out of its launch canister/ container. TLAM is 18 feet, 3 inches/5.6 meters long (20 feet, 6 inches/6.25 meters with the booster), 20.4 inches/51.8 cm in diameter (it fits inside a standard 21-in/533mm torpedo tube), has a deployed wingspan of 8 feet, 9 inches/2.7 meters, and weighs 2,650 lb/1,192.5 kg (3,200 1b/1,440 kg with the booster). It flies at a speed of approximately Mach.75/550 kn/880 kph, and has a range of 870 nm/1,000 mi/1,610 km for the basic land-attack version. The standard payload for a TLAM is a 1,000-lb/454-kg-class "unitary" warhead that has blast, fragmentary, and penetration effects. There are also versions with other types of warheads, including small submunitions for use on area targets like SAM sites and airfields. TLAMs are not as stealthy as F-117's or B-2's, but they are still almost undetectable by an enemy, thanks to the missile's small radar cross-section and low-altitude flight path.[59] And because the turbofan engine emits very little heat energy, infrared detection is no easier.

The current TLAM inventory has a complex family tree of variants and modifications, extending through three distinct generations or "Blocks." These are distinguished mainly by the different guidance and warhead systems shown in the table below:

The nuclear-armed TLAM-N was taken out of service by a Presidential executive order shortly after the end of the Cold War in 1991. Similarly, the collapse of the Soviet Fleet at the end of that conflict meant that the long-range (greater than 300 nm/555 km) antishipping capabilities of the TASM were no longer required. Following their withdrawal from service, the TLAM-N and TASM airframes were remanufactured into new Block III missiles (the Navy often does this with so-called "legacy" systems). The Block III missiles have been recently given the new BDU-36B penetrating warhead, with a case composed of highly reactive titanium for penetrating a good thickness of reinforced concrete, as well as exceptional incendiary effects. In about a hundred of the Block IIIs, there is also a one-way satellite data link that at various times during the flight sends updates on the missile's status and position back to the firing units and command centers. The Block III's precision navigational systems use a combination of guidance modes to give them the same kind of accuracy (less than three meters/ten feet from the aim point) as an LGB.

When a Tomahawk is launched, the Mk. 111 rocket booster fires, thrusting it vertically into the air (after burnout, the booster is discarded). The wings and guidance fins are then deployed and a cover plate is blown off the inlet duct of the tiny Williams International F107-WR-402 turbofan engine. The F107 burns a special high-energy, high-density liquid fuel called JP-8, which gives it more range per gallon than normal JP-5. As soon as the missile has stabilized, it begins to fly a preprogrammed route to its first navigational waypoint just prior to landfall. Once over land, the missile flies along its programmed flight path to the target. Most of the time, the flight path is monitored by an inertial guidance system, which senses the drift from winds and small flight errors. In order to compensate for any "drift" in the inertial system itself, the TLAM utilizes a system called Terrain Contour Mapping (TERCOM) to match the terrain below with data from pre-surveyed strips of land stored in the missile's computer. Should the flight path deviate from the planned course, it will be corrected, and the missile will continue to the next TERCOM strip.[60]

When the missile reaches the target area, the precision Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC) system takes control. This utilizes a downward-looking infrared camera with an infrared illumination system (for consistent lighting at night) that matches up features on the ground and makes any necessary corrections to the missile's flight path. Though the DSMAC system does not actually "home" onto the target, it does provide enough accuracy to fly a TLAM through the goalpost uprights on a football field. In order to improve the existing Inertial/TERCOM/DSMAC guidance package, a GPS receiver has been installed in the new Block III missiles. In the event of a rapidly planned strike, GPS eliminates the need for TERCOM maps; and with GPS, the atomic clocks aboard the satellites provide a precision Time-of-Arrival (TOA) control capability. Using this, the missile's arrival at the target can be timed to the second. Once the TLAM is over the target area, the missile's job is to put the payload onto the desired target. It can fly or dive into the impact point (a bunker or building), explode over a "soft" target (such as an aircraft or radar), or spread a load of submunitions over a desired area.

While the existing stockpile of Block II and III TLAMs are capable of doing a fine job, there are plans to make them even better. Admiral Johnson would like to drive the cost of TLAM strike missiles down, and the way to manufacture them more cheaply is to re-engineer the design to take advantage of new structures, materials, and computer/software advances. This proposed TLAM variant is the so-called "Tactical Tomahawk," which would probably cost around $575,000 a copy. Tactical Tomahawk would be equipped with a two-way satellite data link, which would allow it to be re-targeted in flight. The new TLAM will also be equipped with a camera system, allowing the missiles to conduct their own damage assessments. Expect to see this new variant in the a few years.

Once upon a time, the TLAM filled naval aviators with anxieties. They feared that the Tomahawk had "This machine wants your job!" written on the side. But their fears have faded, and today most of them view the TLAM the way a hunter sees his favorite hunting dog-good and faithful beasts that are willing to go places where human beings should not go, and do things that human beings really should not do. Still, naval aviators like to joke that in the next war no more Navy Crosses will be handed out; the cruise missiles will have hit the really difficult targets! Every bomb carries a political message. Today, TLAM is probably America's most effective bomb-carrying political messenger. The "Gunboat Diplomacy" of the 19th century has become "Tomahawk Diplomacy" in the 20th and 21st.

The Future: Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet

The shortcomings of the existing F/A-18 Hornet are well understood, and have long caused Naval aviators to wish for their resolution. Meanwhile, the 1993 retirement of the A-6E/KA-6D fleet and the failure to produce a replacement for it have meant that NAVAIR has been hard pressed to get any kind of new aircraft onto U.S. carrier decks. At one point the feeling seemed to be that since the Navy was unable to produce new aircraft, perhaps it might be able to field a highly modified one. Back in 1991, the Navy leadership decided to build an upgraded version of the Hornet, which would replace the F-14 and early versions of the F/A-18. This redesigned F/A-18 would (hopefully!) resolve the Hornet's fuel-fraction problem as well as other shortcomings and provide an interim aircraft until a more advanced and suitable long-term solution to the Navy's aircraft procurement need could be developed. Thus was born the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, the key to the Navy's current naval aviation upgrade plan.

As planned, the F/A-18E (single seat) and — F (two-seat trainer) are more than just — C/D models with minor improvements. They are in fact brand-new airframes, with less than 30 % commonality with the older Hornets. The airframe itself has been enlarged to accommodate the internal fuel load that was lacking in the earlier F/A-18's. With a fuel fraction of around.3 (as opposed to the.23 of the earlier Hornets), much of the range/endurance problems of the earlier birds should be resolved. The twin engines are new General Electric F414-GE-400's, which will each now deliver 22,000 lb/9,979 kg of thrust in afterburner. There is also a new wing, with enough room for an extra weapons pylon inboard of the wing fold line on each side, which should help resolve some of the complaints about the Hornet's weapons load. To ensure that the Super Hornet can land safely with a heavier fuel/weapons load than earlier F/A-18's, the airframe structure and landing gear have also been strengthened. Since most of the-E/F's weapons load is planned to be expensive PGMs, which must be brought back if not expended, this is essential.

The Super Hornet will also be the first USN aircraft to make use of radar and infrared signature-reduction technologies. Most of the work in this area can be seen in the modified engine inlets, which have been squared off to reduce their signature and coated with radar-absorbing material. This should greatly increase the survivability and penetration capabilities of the new bird.

Finally, the Super Hornet will be the first naval aircraft to carry a new generation of electronic-countermeasures gear including the ALE-50, a towed decoy system that is proving highly effective in tests against the newest threats in the arsenals of our potential enemies.

To back up the new airframe and engines, the avionics of the new Hornet will be among the best in the world. The radar will be the same APG- 73 fitted to the late-production models of the F/A-18C/D. An even newer radar, based on the same fixed-phased-array technology as the APG-77 on the USAF's F-22A Raptor, is under development as well. To replace the sometimes troublesome Nighthawk pod, Hughes has recently been selected to develop a third-generation FLIR/targeting system for the Super Hornet, which will give it the best targeting resolution of any strike aircraft in the world.

The cockpit, designed again by the incomparable Eugene Adam and his team, will have a mix of "glass" MFDs (in full color!), and an improved user interface for the pilot. One part of this will be a helmet-mounted sighting system for use with the new AIM-9X version of the Sidewinder AAM. Other weapons will include the current array of iron ordnance and PGMs, as well as the new GBU-29/30/31/32 JDAMS, AGM-154 JSOW, and AGM-84E SLAM-ER cruise missile.

There will also be provisions for the Super Hornet to carry larger external drop tanks as well as the same "buddy" refueling store used by the S-3/ES-3 to tank other aircraft.

All this capability comes at a cost, though. At a maximum gross weight of some 66,000 lb/29,937 kg, the Super Hornet will weigh more than any other aircraft on a flight deck, including the F-14 Tomcat.

When McDonnell Douglas (now part of Boeing Military Aircraft) was given the contract to develop the Super Hornet, they set out to have a high level of commonality with the existing F/A-18 fleet. Early on in the design process, though, it became apparent that only a small percentage of the parts and systems could be carried over to the new bird. Despite this lack of true commonality, the Super Hornet was the only new tactical aircraft in the Navy pipeline, and so the Navy went forward with its development.

Today, the aircraft is well into its test program, with low-rate production approved by Congress.[61] At around $58 million a copy (when full production is reached), the Super Hornet will hardly be a bargain (-C/-D-model Hornets cost about half that). On the other hand, when stacked next to the estimated $158-million-dollar-per-unit cost of the USAF's new F-22A Raptor stealth fighter, the Super Hornet looks like quite a deal! Considering the current budget problems within the Department of Defense, there is a real possibility that one program or the other might be canceled. Since the Super Hornet is already in production (the F-22A has just begun flight tests), it may have an edge in the funding battles ahead.

If the Super Hornet survives the budget wars, current plans have the Navy buying at least five hundred of them in the next decade. This means they will begin to replace early model F-14As when the first fleet squadron stands up and goes to sea in 2001. Meanwhile, there is advanced work on several Super Hornet derivatives, including a two-seat all-weather strike version (that would restore the lost capabilities of the A-6 Intruder) and an electronic combat version of the F/A-18F (the so-called "Electric Hornet") that would replace the EA-6B Prowler.

The Future: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)

Airmen and other warfighters often get testy when they hear somebody trying to sell them a "joint" project. All too often, "joint" has meant, "Let's pretend to cooperate, so the damned bean-counters and politicians won't slash our pet projects again." One of the longest-running of these joint dreams has looked to find a common airframe that all the services could use to satisfy their tactical fighter and strike requirements. The newest incarnation of this dream is called the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The lure of potential multi-billion-dollar savings from such a program is the basis for the JSF program, which is an attempt to reverse the historic trend of escalating unit cost for combat aircraft. Taxpayer "sticker shock" at the price of aircraft like the F-22 Raptor and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is threatening to unleash a political backlash against the entire military aerospace complex. Thus the JSF program is aiming for a flyaway cost in the $30-to-$40-million range, for the first time emphasizing affordability rather than maximum performance.

The contracting battle for JSF will pit Lockheed Martin against Boeing (newly merged with McDonnell Douglas), with the winner possibly becoming the builder of the last manned tactical aircraft of all time. With a planned buy of some two thousand aircraft, it certainly will be the most expensive combat aircraft program in history. Meanwhile, for this program to succeed, it will have to satisfy four demanding customers-the USAF, the USN, the USMC, and the British Royal Navy. To satisfy these customers, the JSF Program Office envisions a family of three closely related but not totally identical airframes.

The USAF sees JSF as a conventional, multi-role strike fighter to replace the F-16. With many foreign air forces planning to retire their F-16 fleets around 2020, there is a huge potential export market for such an aircraft. In addition, the Marine Corps needs some six hundred STOVL (Short Takeoff/ Vertical Landing) aircraft to replace both the F/A-18C/D Hornet and the AV-8B Harrier. The similar Royal Navy requirement is for just sixty STOVL aircraft to replace the FRS.2 Sea Harriers embarked on their small Invincible-class (R 05) aircraft carriers. In December of 1995, the United Kingdom signed a memorandum of understanding as a collaborative partner in developing the aircraft with the United States, and is contributing $200 million toward the program. The Royal Navy plans to replace the aging V/STOL Sea Harrier with a short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing version of the JSF.

The U.S. Navy's requirement is for three hundred "highly survivable" (meaning "stealthy"), carrier-based strike fighters to replace early-model F/A-18's and the last of the F-14 Tomcats. Its version of the aircraft will have a number of differences with the other variants. For instance, the landing gear will have a longer stroke and higher load capacity than the USAF and USMC versions. To help during low-speed approaches, the Navy version will have a larger wing and larger tail control surfaces than the other JSF variants. The larger wing also means increased range and payload capability for the Navy variant, with almost twice the range of an F-18C on internal fuel.

As you would expect, the internal structure of the Navy variant will be strengthened in order to handle the loads associated with catapult launches and arrested landings. There will be a carrier-suitable tailhook, though this may not have to be as strong as on previous naval aircraft, because the JSF will be powered by the same Pratt & Whitney F119-PW-100 turbofan planned for use on the USAF F-22A Raptor. This engine has a "2-Dimensional" nozzle (it will rotate in the vertical plane), which will allow it to have much lower landing approach speeds than current carrier aircraft, and may allow the next generation of carriers (CVX) to do away with catapults altogether.

The Navy's need for survivability means that the JSF design will have a level of stealth technology comparable with the F-22 or B-2 stealth designs, which are the current gold standard in that area. All ordnance will be internally carried, and plans are for it to carry two 2,000-lb/909.1-kg-class weapons in addition to an internal gun and AAMs

Boeing and Lockheed Martin are scheduled to conduct a fly-off of their competing JSF designs in the year 2000, with a contract award the following year. The Boeing model is known as the X-32, while the Lockheed Martin design has been designated X-35. The winning entry should become operational sometime around 2010, at which time it will begin to replace the remaining F/A-18C/D aircraft in service. This is a make-or-break program for all the armed services of the United States. If it works, then the U.S. and our allies will have the pre-eminent strike fighter of the 21st century at their command.

The Future: Common Support Aircraft

While fighters and strike aircraft are important, the various support aircraft like the S-3 Viking and E-2 Hawkeye play equally vital roles in a CVW. And like fighters, they will someday have to be replaced. While this is not going to happen soon, planning for what will be known as the Common Support Aircraft (CSA) is already underway. This aircraft will take over the AEW, COD, ESM/SIGINT, and perhaps even tanker roles currently handled by no less than three different airframes. As always, funding is a problem. Right now, there is very little money available for the development of a new medium-lift airframe that could be made carrier-capable. In current-year dollars, it would probably cost something like $3 billion just to design and develop the airframe. And the price of the various mission equipment packages for each role is anybody's guess.

One likely way around this dilemma might involve adapting for the Navy the new V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor transport currently entering production for the USMC and USAF. A V-22-based CSA could eliminate much of the airframe development costs and allow the design of state-of-the-art mission-equipment packages. It might even replace the SH-60Rs and CH-60's when they begin to wear out.

The Future: Bombs and Missiles

AGM-84E SLAM Expanded Response Missile

^{An artist's concept of an AGM-84 SLAM-ER cruise missile. The SLAM-ER is headed into production, and will be the long-range strike weapon for naval aviation into the 21st century.}

^{BOEING MISSILE SYSTEMS}

As mentioned earlier, the engineers at Boeing Missile Systems have been working on an improved version of the AGM-84E SLAM missile, which they call SLAM Expanded Response (SLAM-ER). SLAM-ER is designed to add a new generation of technology to the solid foundation laid by Harpoon and SLAM. This new missile will give the Navy a standoff strike weapon with unprecedented lethal power and accuracy. Improvements to the basic SLAM include a pair of "pop-out" wings (similar to those on the TLAM), which will give it more range (out to 150 nm/278 km) and better maneuverability. A new warhead utilizes the same kind of reactive titanium casing used on the Block III TLAM, while its nose has been modified with a new seeker window to give the seeker a better field-of-view. The guidance system of SLAM-ER incorporates a new software technology developed by Boeing and the labs at Naval Weapons Center at China Lake, California. Known as Automatic Target Acquisition (ATA, also known as Direct Attack Munition Affordable Seeker-DAMASK), it allows the SLAM-ER seeker to automatically pick out a target from the background clutter. The seeker then "locks" it up and flies the missile to a precise hit (within three meters/ten feet of the planned aimpoint). The SLAM-ER is already in low-rate production and has passed all of its tests with flying colors. In fact, this program has become so successful that the Navy has deleted its funding for the planned Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSAM), since SLAM-ER completely meets the requirements for that. Current plans have SLAM-ER entering the fleet in 1999.

^{A testing version of the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guided bomb. JDAM utilizes GPS technology to guide it within just a few yards/meters of the aimpoint.}

^{BOEING MISSILE SYSTEMS}

GBU-29/30/31/32 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) Guided Bomb Family

One key limitation of the current generation of LGBs and Imaging Infrared (IIR)-guided PGMs is that they do not perform well in poor weather. Water vapor and cloud cover are the enemies of these weapons and targeting systems, and have proven to be significant roadblocks to their employment. What airpower planners need is a family of true, all-weather PGMs. Creating this is the goal of the joint USAF/USN/USMC Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) program, which will go into service in 1999.

Now being developed by Boeing Missile Systems (formerly McDonnell Douglas Missile Systems), JDAM is designed to be a "strap-on" guidance kit, compatible with a variety of different bomb warheads. JDAM will be equipped with a GPS guidance system and control fins, which can fit around a conventional Mk. 83 (1,000-lb/454 kg), Mk. 84 (2,000-lb/909-kg), or BLU-109 (2,000 lb/909 kg) bomb. Since the JDAM will take its guidance from the constellation of GPS satellites in orbit around the earth, all you'll need to designate a target will be the sixteen-digit numeric code that represents the target's geographic location on the earth's surface.

As currently planned, there will be four separate versions of the Phase I JDAM family. They include:

^{An F/A-18C Hornet armed with four AGM-154A Joint Standoff Weapons (JSOWs) during a test flight. JSOW is one of a family of precision-strike weapons guided by the NAVISTAR GPS satellite navigation system.}

^{RAYTHEON STRIKE SYSTEMS}

The majority of the JDAM acquisition will be composed of kits for the GBU-31 and -32 versions. These are sized to fit around both Mk. 83/84 general-purpose bombs, as well as BLU-109/110 penetration warheads. So far, the program is proceeding well in tests, and has proved to be quite accurate. The specified thirteen-meter/forty-three foot-accuracy (six meters/ twenty feet when the new Block IIR GPS satellites are put into service) is regularly being beaten in drop tests, and JDAM should come into service on schedule. At a price of only about $15,000 over the price of the bomb, JDAM is going to be quite a bargain. It needs to be, since current plans have the American military alone buying over 87,000 JDAM kits over the next decade or so. One intriguing question about JDAM is whether or not it will be fitted with an ATA-type seeker to enable it to hit really precise targets. While an ATA seeker would only add another $15,000 to the cost of each kit, the accuracy would narrow to less than three meters/ten feet-as good as the Paveway III LGBs in service today. I would expect that you would see an ATA-based seeker deployed on JDAM by 2003.

The Real Future: Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles

Even as the JSF designs are being finalized and the eventual winner selected, it is important to remember that Lockheed Martin and Boeing can't engineer out the nature of the humans that will fly it. Right now, combat aircraft require their air crews to endure dynamic forces that are nothing less than physical torture. At times these stresses can turn deadly. The rapid onset of G-forces in sharp turns literally drains the blood from pilots' heads, causing a sudden "G-Induced Loss-of-Consciousness," or G-LOC. This means that there is a limit to the performance engineers can put into new aircraft-the physical limitations of the human pilots.

With this in mind, it is likely that the generation of combat aircraft after JSF will be unmanned. Today, in roles like photo-reconnaissance and wide-area surveillance, a great deal is already being done with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Back in the 1970's there were even trials with armed drones, though the threat to pilot billets put short work to that idea. Even so, they make a lot of sense-if not today, then tomorrow. What will be known as Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles, or UCAVs for short, will probably start out as modified existing designs (such as leftover F-16's or F/A-18's) whose cockpits will be filled with sensors and data links back to the operators on the ground. In fact, a modified F/A-18C would make an excellent first-generation UCAV, since it already can conduct automatic carrier landings.

The aircraft would fly and operate conventionally, with the exception that when high-G maneuvers are needed, the 9-G limit in the flight-control software could be disabled and the UCAV flown to the actual structural limits of the design. Since we already have in service AAMs that make thirty-G turns, we could easily produce combat aircraft with performances that would make manned aircraft obsolete overnight. UCAVs would doubtless also be much cheaper than current designs, since so much of the money in a manned aircraft design goes into making it safe for the pilot and crew to operate. Keep an eye on this emerging technology. It will be exciting!