Drone Command

THIRTEEN

It was Lane’s first trip to the Pentagon as president.

Hell, his first trip ever.

The enormous five-sided structure was synonymous with American military power. In reality, the seven-story building was 3.7 million square feet of office space connected by seventeen and a half miles of corridors. Its most important occupant was a civilian bureaucrat, the secretary of defense, who ran the federal government’s oldest and largest bureaucracy, and the country’s single largest employer, with more than two million active-duty and civilian personnel.

Big bureaucracy, big office building.

The most important room in the Pentagon office complex was the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) conference room, long known as the Tank, located on corridor nine in the outermost E ring on the second floor (which is really the main floor) near the river entrance.

The legendary Tank was where the highest ranking flag officers of the U.S. armed services hashed out the most important security issues of the day.

Today was unlike most days in the Tank. In a symbolic gesture, President Lane left the White House and crossed the Potomac in order to meet with the chairman of the JCS and the other service chiefs.

Ironically, despite their supreme military ranks, none of the service chiefs had any operational authority, including the chairman of the JCS. Only the president and, by extension, the secretary of defense, could order troops, ships, and planes into battle. Civilian control of the military was a central tenet of Western liberal democracies. Militaries were by their nature antidemocratic and, presumably, a threat to democratic institutions if left unchecked. Democracies were also peaceful.

Or so the theory went.

In reality, the DoD and the respective military branches were far more risk averse than their elected counterparts, especially since the failure of Vietnam. In recent years, it was usually the Pentagon that had to be dragged into war by presidents, not the other way around. The Pentagon prepared for war but, whenever possible, did everything in its power to avoid it, in part because the politicians often went into war without a clear sense of the goals or conditions for victory. The men and women who did the actual fighting and dying were loyal to the core but had very little interest in sacrificing themselves in unwinnable wars.

Despite their merely advisory role, however, the chiefs carried a great deal of weight with their respective services as well as with Congress. If they spoke, you listened, even if you were the commander in chief. Especially if they spoke with one voice.

Today they did.

The chiefs were concerned. War between China and Japan appeared imminent. And because of America’s de facto treaty obligations and strategic interests, that meant war between China and the United States. A war that must be avoided at all costs. And it could only be avoided, in their opinion, by confronting the PRC with a significant show of force. This they all agreed upon. But that was about it.

Many urgent questions remained. The chiefs wanted answers and time was running out. The president had choices to make.

Now.

This was Lane’s first foreign policy crisis. It would set the tone for the rest of his administration and communicate to America’s friends and enemies around the world what kind of global leader the inexperienced young president would be. Khrushchev’s perception of JFK’s weakness at their first meeting in the 1961 Vienna summit led directly to the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, just a trigger pull away from World War III.

Lane’s problem now was his continued policy of “no new boots on the ground.” His critics feared this sent a clear signal to America’s enemies that the United States was withdrawing from its strategic responsibilities — the moral equivalent of waving a red flag in the bull’s face, if not a white one. But his opponents also knew the American people were tired of war, and “no new boots” was wildly popular.

Lane stared at the constellation of stars as he entered the Tank. As a former air force captain, his first instinct was to salute, but he resisted the ingrained habit. After all, he was the boss now. He was the first president since George H. W. Bush to have served in active-duty combat. But Lane still felt the butterflies in his gut. Nearly two hundred collective years of distinguished and accomplished military service sat in front of him. Four earned doctorates and eight master’s degrees between them, too. Flag officers were notoriously political creatures, but these were also extremely serious people.

His decision to hold the line on the federal budget freeze initiated during the Myers administration didn’t win him any friends in the room, either. Military budgets were frozen in place despite the Pentagon’s endless clamoring for increased funding to meet ever-increasing global threats.

Lane was accompanied by Secretary of State Gaby Wheeler, Secretary of Defense Bren Shafer, and National Security Advisor Jim Garza. These were serious people, too, in their respective spheres. And political.

The JCS agreed to meet privately, without the usual crowd of vice chairmen, staff officers, and other “horse holders” in attendance. Introductions were dismissed, formalities set aside. Stout navy coffee was served along with tea and bottled water as the chairman took his customary seat at the head of the enormous blond conference table. The other chiefs sat in their flanking positions. President Lane took the seat on the far end, flanked by his civilian coterie.

Secretary Wheeler played video clips of subtitled Japanese newscasts, along with shaky handheld Internet video of the Chinese trawler’s attack on the Japanese dive boat. Everyone had already seen them, but Wheeler wanted the events fresh in their minds. The Chinese had kicked the hornet’s nest. Hundreds of Japanese marched in angry protests throughout the nation, among the largest and most violent demonstrations in the postwar period.

“The Chinese claim the Japanese attacked them first, earlier in the day. Claim the Japanese tried to ram them, drive them away from one of their prime fishing grounds,” Wheeler said. “It’s all bullshit, of course. Including the official protest they’ve sent to Tokyo.”

“The CIA analyzed the video and identified at least two of the so-called Chinese fishermen as members of the Ministry of State Security,” Garza said. “A boatload of bad-ass leg breakers sending a message.”

“It’s a helluva message,” Chairman Onstot said. He was a four-star air force general with a chest full of combat medals, badges, and ribbons, all earned the hard way. “The Chinese have staked out a claim and they intend to defend it.”

“No one was killed, thank God,” Wheeler said. She didn’t add that the diver was still in critical but stable condition at a local hospital.

“It was an act of violence nonetheless. And probably the last one without bloodshed. The next step will be escalation,” Shafer said. He’d already been through the ringer with the JCS earlier as they laid out their frank concerns over recent Chinese actions. The SecDef largely agreed with their assessment, but even the chiefs weren’t entirely unanimous on a course of action, which was why he insisted the president meet with them today.

Shafer was a former chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the perfect person to bridge Lane’s political and experiential gap. Lane was viewed by establishment Washington as a country rube from Texas despite his six years in Congress, armed only with boyish good looks, a second-rate state university degree, and an excellent combat record.

But it was the four-leaf clover shoved in Lane’s pocket the old hands most deeply resented. Dumb luck had won him the presidency in their opinion.

If Senator Fiero’s campaign hadn’t been sunk by the mysterious and incriminating Bath leaks, she’d be the one sitting in the Oval Office today, not Lane. Fiero was a known commodity. Easy to work with. She understood how the game was played.

Likewise, his presidential predecessor, Robert Greyhill, whose reelection campaign was doomed from the start thanks to the self-serving betrayal of his vice president, who was caught on tape recommending the execution of the American war hero Troy Pearce. Pleading ignorance of Gary Diele’s crimes only made former president Greyhill appear even more incompetent and out of touch than he was commonly portrayed.

That left Lane, a genuine outsider, as the last man standing. He beat Greyhill handily despite the hundreds of millions of dollars of soft money poured into Greyhill’s campaign coffers, but Lane won with less than half of eligible voters participating.

Shafer’s role was to groom and guide the new president into a prudent course of action. The power players behind the known faces in Washington — the money men from Wall Street, Silicon Valley, Hollywood, and even overseas — needed to be sure that Lane could be counted on. Shafer all but guaranteed it.

Shafer genuinely liked Lane and was charmed by his clumsy campaign rhetoric, even when he stole the line from JFK’s famous inaugural, “Ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country.” It was a hateful message for the rabid left wing of his party — the social-justice warriors, fourth-generation welfare moms, and Occupy Wall Street progressives — but centrist Democrats and moderate Republicans loved it.

Lane was worried. China was, without a doubt, a regional threat and increasingly a global one as well. The conventional solutions to the China problem didn’t interest him — ignoring or provoking them would only lead to an escalation of the crisis, if not war. That’s why he turned to Pearce and Myers for a private brainstorming session months ago, and that’s how the three of them came up with their current plan. Huge payoff, low risk — except for Pearce and Myers. Both of them understood the risk. Accepted it without flinching.

Lane turned to Chairman Onstot. “Okay, General. Let’s lay this thing out.”

The chairman flashed a digital projector. A regional map appeared. He highlighted features with a laser pointer.

“The Chinese are clearly becoming more aggressive, not only in the East China Sea, but in the South China Sea as well, pushing out to the so-called nine-dash line. The nine-dash line—”

“—is the Chinese historical claim to the waters and territories in the region,” Lane interrupted. “Disputed by every other nation in the area.” He wasn’t about to let the chairman treat him like a junior officer at an ROTC luncheon. “Move on.”

“It’s also part of the First Island Chain Doctrine,” the chairman continued, somewhat humbled. He ran the laser pointer from the Malay Peninsula in the south to the Kamchatka Peninsula in the north, touching on Taiwan, the Philippines, and the Japanese islands in between. “In the event of war with the United States, Chinese military doctrine calls for preemptive strikes on all of our naval and air bases and other significant assets, including carrier groups, in this geographic chain of archipelagos in order to secure the Chinese mainland from American attack.”

“The strategic importance of the East China Sea to Chinese military doctrine can’t be overstated.” This from the marine corps commandant.

“Beyond expanding its nuclear capabilities, the primary emphasis of China’s massive military buildup over the last ten years has been to develop weapons and assets that will enable them to carry out the First Island Chain Doctrine,” the admiral said. “That’s the primary reason they’ve acquired their first aircraft carrier and pushed their conventional ballistic-missile programs forward. As I’m sure you’re well aware, Mr. President, the Chinese have been increasing their annual defense spending by double digits over the last decade, even as we’ve been cutting back, both in terms of spending, but also in actual force reductions, especially in naval assets. They’re getting stronger even as we weaken.”

“But President Sun is a reformer, not a hardliner,” Wheeler said. “Our ambassador has met with him several times. Assures me he’s a reasonable man.”

“I’m sure he is, but like you said, he’s a reformer. He’s had to pick and choose his battles. In order to wage his domestic anticorruption campaign, he’s given a freer hand to the PLA and the foreign policy hawks. The Chinese economy has its own problems, and securing ECS resources for themselves will go a long way to sort those out.”

“So why not let the Chinese secure the ECS?” Garza asked. “How is our national security threatened by this move?”

Lane picked Garza to be his NSA because the former Green Beret was unafraid to ask the hard questions.

“Because Japan will feel forced to respond,” Wheeler said, nodding at the silent looping Japanese video on the screen. “Imagine if China suddenly claimed the Gulf of Mexico and all of its natural resources as sovereign Chinese territory. We’d feel compelled to respond vigorously, especially if Chinese warships suddenly turned up outside Houston or New Orleans.”

The marine corps commandant nodded in agreement. “And if the Chinese grab the ECS, they’ll feel emboldened to grab the South China Sea as well. Maybe even Taiwan.”

“Okay, Taiwan, the Philippines, the Spratlys — let China take it all. How does that actually threaten us?”

“Don’t you know the history of Red China? Murdering tens of millions of their own in the Cultural Revolution? Their ground war against us in Korea, their proxy war against us in Vietnam?” The marine general’s voice seethed. “China is our greatest geopolitical challenger. A world dominated by Communist China is a world that none of us in this room want to live in.”

“Ever heard of Tibet?” Wheeler asked, sarcasm dripping.

“So, I’m hearing domino theory 2.0, is that it?” Garza was throwing Vietnam right back in their faces. “You’re fucking kidding me, right? Next thing you’ll tell us is that we have to win their hearts and minds.”

Lane tried not to laugh. The Tank was famous for its frank discussions. Garza was laying it on thick, but Lane had told him to. He needed to see where the chiefs really stood.

The chief of naval operations leaned forward, clasping his hands together. “Fifty percent of global merchant fleet traffic passes through the South China Sea, much of it making its way north to the ECS. Oil tanker traffic in these disputed waters is three times greater than the Suez Canal and more than five times greater than the Panama Canal. We’re talking about China seizing control of the majority of global commerce. Does that sound like the Chinese are fucking kidding, Mr. Garza?”

Garza raised a hand in mock surrender. “Okay, just checking. If we’re going to war with the Chinese, I just wanted to be sure it was for a damn good reason.”

So did Lane. Good job, Jim.

“So we’re back to sending the Chinese our own message,” Shafer said. “And we’re running out of time. I spoke with my counterpart in Tokyo earlier this morning. He says Prime Minister Ito’s hand is being forced by this video. Their cabinet is moving into crisis mode. He said if we don’t act forcefully and immediately, they will.”

Wheeler countered. “I say we make a strong public statement, explicitly condemning the Chinese actions yesterday. Pledge our support to the Japanese.”

“Words won’t be enough for the Japanese or our other allies,” the marine general said. “And the Chinese might just laugh us out of the room. This whole conflict is about naval presence. Force.”

The chairman was as grim as a hanging judge. “The Vietnamese have a saying, ‘You can’t put out a nearby fire from a distant well.’ If we don’t show up in force in the area immediately, we’ll shake the confidence of all our allies in the Pacific. Even NATO. Hell, maybe the whole world.”

The room quieted as everyone processed the implications of the chairman’s statement.

Lane was lost in his own thoughts. He was the commander in chief of the most powerful military in all of human history. He wasn’t nearly as qualified as any of the men in this room on defense and security matters, and yet the Constitution vested him, the president, with the authority to wage war. If the chairman was right, maybe a global war really was possible. Sounded crazy to even think that. But Lane had read his history, and few heads of state in Europe in either 1914 or 1939 were prepared to think about the unthinkable before it happened. Two global wars resulted.

“And that’s why you want a show of force as soon as possible?” Lane said.

“Yes, sir,” the chairman said.

“And what are the options?” Lane asked.

“We’re divided, Mr. President. I believe sending the George Washington carrier battle group to the area is the wisest course of action. The George Washington is based in Yokosuka, Japan.”

Lane saw the marine corps and air force chiefs nodding in agreement.

“But the navy has its reservations,” the chairman added. He turned to the chief of naval operations.

“The Chinese have pursued an aggressive A2AD antiaccess/area denial capability. We believe they’ve achieved a significant breakthrough in their antiship missile technologies. The DF-21D and YJ-12 missiles are proven and reliable conventional antiship systems capable of taking out an aircraft carrier. However, we have our own antimissile defense systems in place that we believe can deal with those threats — provided the Chinese don’t overwhelm us with sheer numbers.”

“Is that likely?” Lane asked.

“Not at the moment, especially in the northern reaches we’re talking about. Down south toward Taiwan, well, that’s a different matter.”

“But the admiral has other concerns,” Shafer said.

“Our biggest concern is the Chinese deployment of the Wu-14, a hypersonic, maneuverable, conventional missile warhead. Not only is it fully capable of taking out an aircraft carrier, but it travels at such a high rate of speed we have no means to defend against it at the present time. My concern is that if you send the George Washington into harm’s way we might just lose it. That would send an even stronger message to our allies than doing nothing at all.”

“Of course, the DIA doesn’t believe the Wu-14 is actually operational,” the marine commandant said.

“The CIA hasn’t confirmed it, either,” Shafer added. “Nor have any other national intelligence agencies.”

Lane sighed. “Why the hell not?” It wasn’t really a question. Lane had heard all the excuses before in his PDBs. He also agreed that China was America’s most challenging strategic threat and the Wu-14—if it actually existed — the most dangerous conventional weapon in their arsenal.

“We don’t have HUMINT near it, and their cyberdefenses are impenetrable,” Shafer said.

The air force general wasn’t through carpet bombing the navy’s argument. “It’s just not feasible that the Chinese have it, at least not an operational version. We’ve been trying to crack the HGV nut since the ’80s and still can’t make the damn thing work. The physics behind it are just too hard to engineer around.”

“That doesn’t mean the Chinese haven’t figured it out,” the admiral said. “They say they have. They’ve even leaked the videos of their tests.”

The marine general scoffed. “Pure propaganda. They’re at least five years away. Think about it. What a coup for their intelligence service if they can make us believe they have the Wu-14 when they actually don’t? They could scare us out of the Pacific for the cost of a porno movie.”

“I’m not willing to bet the lives of five thousand sailors on your theory,” the admiral snapped. He turned to Lane. “Are you?”

“What about a preemptive strike against their DF-21 platforms?” the army general asked. “Seems like the easiest way to defeat the Wu-14 system.”

“But those are mobile missiles,” the air force chief said. “Besides, the DF-21s have almost twice the combat range of our F-35Cs. You’ll need to use longer-range assets like sub-launched cruise missiles to effect the strike.”

“The Chi-coms would start crapping golf balls if we lit up their radar screens with cruise missiles. They’d think we were launching a preemptive nuclear strike,” Garza said.

“Not to mention that a preemptive strike without just cause is illegal under international law,” Wheeler said.

“And that would start a war, which, according to our Constitution, you explicitly don’t have the authority to do,” Garza said. “Unless you consider the Chinese an imminent threat to the United States.”

“Which it isn’t,” Wheeler added. “Technically, it’s Japan that’s in imminent danger, not us.”

“There are other options,” the marine commandant said. “The Wu-14 relies on satellite systems for guidance and navigation. We could launch ASAT missiles and take out their satellites.”

“And start a space war with the Chinese, who would take out our satellites,” the air force general said, shaking his head. “We’re far more dependent on space assets than they are.”

“Or disrupt the kill chain,” the army general said. “Disrupt the links between the satellites and the missile.”

“How?” Lane asked.

“Cripple their command and control systems through conventional or cyber attacks.”

“And you’re confident we can do that?” Lane asked.

“Technically, yes, I believe it’s entirely possible.”

“And you’re confident enough that you’re willing to risk one of our carriers and the lives of the sailors on board?”

The army general hesitated, weighing the evidence in his mind. “Frankly, no. The Chinese would know these were points of vulnerability and would have probably prepared defenses against them in advance. We wouldn’t know if our efforts were successful until after they launched the vehicle.”

“Not acceptable,” the admiral said.

Lane took a sip of coffee, processing the conversation. He leaned toward the chairman. “So what you’re telling me is that the best way to prevent a war with China is to threaten war with China?”

“Yes.” The irony wasn’t lost on the chairman or anyone else in the room.

Lane turned back to the admiral. “But the only way we can safely deploy the George Washington is to first launch a preemptive strike against the Wu-14?”

“That’s my assessment, sir.”

“If you can find it,” the army general added.

“So we have to start a war to prevent it,” Garza said, shaking his head. “Or roll the dice and hope the Chinese are just bluffing.”

Lane turned back to Shafer. “And we’re talking about provoking a regime that’s already proven itself recklessly aggressive?”

The secretary of defense nodded grimly.

“And yet, backing down or doing nothing would only embolden them in their recklessness? Threaten our existing alliances?”

The secretary of state nodded in agreement.

Wheeler added, “And if we don’t act quickly and decisively, the Japanese will start their own war, dragging us into it anyway.”

Lane addressed the whole room. “In other words, we’re damned if we do and damned if we don’t.”

“That’s about the shape of it,” the chairman said. “A Texas longhorn — size dilemma.”

“So my options really are war on Chinese terms or war on our terms. Push the George Washington into harm’s way and see if the Chinese strike — or launch a massive preemptive cruise-missile strike without cause to protect our carrier from a missile that may or may not actually exist?”

“And then there’s the North Koreans and their MIRV missile testing,” Garza said, grinning. “Who knows what those batshit crazies will do.”

Lane tented his hands, calculating.

“Your decision, Mr. President?” the chairman finally asked.

Lane wasn’t exactly sure. He’d already cast his lot with Pearce and Myers. With nothing but two bad choices in front of him, they were his only hope of avoiding either. But if they failed, it looked like World War III was all but certain.

He prayed they wouldn’t. But they needed time.

Time he didn’t have.