State Secrets: An Insider's Chronicle of the Russian Chemical Weapons Program

The Expert Commission

Asnis participated in my interrogation process for the first time on November 24, 1992. Investigator Shkarin tried to create the impression that everything now depended on the decision that the qualified specialists of the “expertise” (an appointed commission of experts) would make after examining my case. Naturally, fundamental questions about the goals of the expertise arose, because everything that I “had committed” was out in the open – written on paper and published, and there was no need for technical experts to look over and to analyze my writings.

In any case, the examination came down to a legal analysis of published articles – a comparison of the texts of my publications and rough drafts with the existing sub-legal norms pertaining to the regime of secrecy, of the institute rules for internal security, and others, which were top secret documents that no one had ever seen with their own eyes. That is why when Shkarin showed us a resolution about the appointment of the “expertise” with a list of instructions for the experts, Asnis and I started to seriously doubt that this commission could objectively carry through with this procedure.

We immediately wrote a petition asking that we be allowed to see all the sub legal acts and lists of secrets, which the “expertise” was supposed to base its work on. Naturally, Shkarin refused to do this, because he understood that if he showed us these lists, he would cut off the branch he was sitting on. He only agreed to show us individual bits and pieces from these acts, which he considered necessary for the work of the expertise. I reminded him that I couldn’t agree to play the role of the illiterate monk Varlaam, who was forced to rely on an imposter who could read and write, in the immortal Pushkin drama “Boris Godunov.” However, when he was faced with the threat of arrest, even that monk suddenly remembered how to read, and then he understood that it was not he who was mentioned in the Tsar’s decree, but Grishka Otrepyev, who was only trying to make a fool out of him and the ignorant policemen.

Understandably, we sent an appeal about Shkarin’s decision to the RF (Russian Federation) Attorney General’s Office. Another problem was that the expertise commission was composed almost exclusively of people who had conflicts of interest, since they were representatives of the military-chemical complex. Moreover, several of them were personally interested in the outcome of my case, because I had harshly criticized them in my articles. For example, in the manuscript that Fedorov voluntarily gave to Chekists, I had mentioned Igor Gabov, the former head of Workshop 34 of the Volgograd Industrial Association VPO Khimprom, and I had pointed out Gabov’s dishonesty in fulfilling his job responsibilities. This man was on the list of experts, so he got the chance to even the score with me for my criticism.

I also mentioned another expert, Boris Kuznetsov, in one of my articles. In “Inversion” I wrote that specialists on questions of chemical weapons did not go to the Geneva negotiations, but instead some proxies of the military-chemical complex were sent there, and these were people who were a long way from understanding the heart of the matter. At that time Kuznetsov was the only representative from GOSNIIOKhT who went to Geneva as an expert for the Soviet delegation. Even though he was extremely obtuse, he could not fail to understand that I was writing about him.

Another expert I rejected was Yuri Karmishin, who I had also criticized in writing. He was a shady character who had spent all of his adult life working in the First Department of the Volsk branch of GOSNIIOKhT, and he also gave out passes. When I went on business trips to Shikhany, I received my passes from him. He had graduated from some kind of institute with great difficulty, and all of a sudden he was given the right to solve the expert-level problems of my case. But Karmishin didn’t have the slightest inkling about chemistry or about our specialty! How could he possibly be an expert? That is why I wrote a request to reject this secret KGB agent. Obviously, my objection was ignored. Later, after his “successful” work on the expert commission, Karmishin was appointed Deputy Director for the Regime at his institute. That meant that he was no longer was just an undercover agent; he openly became an official KGB employee.

After all of this, I was somewhat surprised to see Petr Kirpichev on the list of experts, because he was in fact a highly qualified scientist. However, it was even more amazing that he actually agreed to participate in this doubtful expertise. Later, he wrote a refusal to participate in the commission’s work, for family reasons, because his son was seriously ill.

Meanwhile, the investigation and the prosecutor’s office were energetically searching for new “evidence” of my guilt, because what they had was clearly inadequate. Mayor General Balashov urgently asked for help from the main eavesdropping service of Russia – the Federal Agency for Government Communications & Information (FAPSI).[109]

FAPSI faithfully fulfilled the request of their colleagues at the KGB and sent the transcripts of 35 intercepted transmissions about my case from the radio stations The Voice of America, Freedom, BBC, and others in many languages. I simply didn’t have the time to copy all these reports. The recordings were professional and were thoroughly edited. I couldn’t detect a single grammatical or stylistic error there, which shows that the level of radio monitoring and specialists involved was very high. As usual, the state spared nothing for total control over its citizens.

At the same time, Senior Prosecutor V. Buivolov without any requests was sending copies of published articles to Investigation Department.[110] After that, the investigation entered into entirely uncharted waters by divulging state secrets itself, with just with one goal – to indict and punish me and anyone else who chose to follow my example. I don’t know exactly why the investigators supposed it could help them, but they started making requests of GOSNIIOKhT for information about the cornerstones of the modern chemical weapons development program in the USSR.[111]

The response was stunning.[112] For first time in the history of Russia one of its sacred secrets was revealed: that a new chemical agent

My lawyer continued to actively seek permission to see all the lists of secrets, which the expert commission would be basing its work on. I was also busy writing petitions necessary for my case. In particular, I asked for a report about the fire at GOSNIIOKhT, in which almost 800 grams of Substance 33 were “lost.” Either it burned up or it was carried away into the atmosphere with the smoke. Furthermore, we wrote petitions so that we could obtain copies of documentation about the stockpiling and expenditure of chemical agents at the special warehouse of the institute, in order to get information about cases of poisoning of employees at their workplaces, in laboratories, and in experimental units. We also requested a copy of my scientific technical report with the research about the extent of successful degasification of chemical agents, and other documents.

The expertise was supposed to be carried out at the General Staff Headquarters of the Armed Forces;[113] however, my lawyer rejected the General Staff Headquarters because it wasn’t an expert establishment. The investigator then passed a resolution rejecting Asnis’ petition, referring to an injunction of the U.S.S.R. Minister of Defense dated August 7, 1990. Ultimately the General Staff refused to participate in this investigation.[114]

Naturally, Asnis requested that we be shown the text of the injunction, but as usual, we were stonewalled with a refusal. Frankly speaking, I had no illusions about the work or the conclusions of the expert commission. While I was sure about the trustworthiness of my information, an official confirmation in the form of answers to the petition, would be additional evidence that everything written in my article was true. The investigator didn’t allow Yevgeni Chizhov and German Dmitriev, former employees of GOSNIIOKhT, to work on the expert commission under the pretext that their qualifications were allegedly not sufficient. Certainly my friends Chizhov and Dmitriev had enough knowledge to handle that job honestly and professionally. On the other hand, the KGB knew about my good relations with them, and obviously they didn’t want them to look into the matter professionally and objectively.

I didn’t quite understand why Boris Kosmynin, a former GOSNIIOKhT employee, had earned the trust of the KGB and was allowed to act as an expert. I had known Boris for a long time, and together we had founded the local organization of the Democratic Russia Movement at GOSNIIOKhT. Kosmynin was noted for his appeals that never clashed with the management of the institute; he just approached them with requests. Boris was not an advocate of any kind of concrete action, and it was often extraordinarily difficult for us (the remaining members of the Coordination Committee of the Democratic Russia Movement) to make any progress in situations when Boris almost always blocked all of our suggestions. Still, we patiently argued and tried to come to a consensus.

My lawyer Asnis suggested that famous Russian democratic figures should be members of the expert commission – such as Georgi Arbatov, Oleg Kalugin, and Peter Nikulin. He had contacted these people and asked for and received their consent before we proposed them.

A real legal battle broke out around the last two candidates, because they were people from the KGB, though they openly struggled against its anti-national activities. This outraged all the powerful chiefs of the Chekists. It was really obvious from the correspondence between different sections of the KGB.[115]^, [116]^, [117]^, [118]^, [119]^, [120]

The Investigation Department rejected both of them, but one year later Peter Sergeevich Nikulin became the Deputy Chairman of the Commission for the Reorganization of the KGB, and the lives of those who had dismissed him from the expert commission with a mocking reply came to depend on him greatly. What can you say? Sometimes our fate suddenly takes some very sharp and unexpected turns.

Later I met Peter Sergeevich several times at different press conferences. He made a strong impression on me. It was obvious that he was an intelligent and reasoning person, deeply devoted to democratic ideals. This was extremely rare for someone from the KGB. Apparently that was the reason why he, like Kalugin, became such an embarrassment to the old Chekists. As a member of the working group of the Committee on the Problems of Defense and Security at the RF Supreme Soviet, Nikulin gave an interview to the magazine Novoe Vremya in which he broached the fundamental questions of keeping state secrets. He didn’t leave a stone unturned, when it came to the old outdated system of “keeping” secrets, in which each department prepared its own lists of secrets and included in the lists whatever popped into their minds “from the health of the general secretary to the buttons on the soldier’s overcoat.”[121] This system proved to be much worse than simply ineffective, incurring serious losses to the state, on the level of something like 60 billion rubles annually. So, the program “Secret” was developed, which stipulated changes in the regime of secrecy and the preparation of a law about state secrets, on the initiative of the NII (scientific research institute) for Problems of Security of the KGB.

In his interview Nikulin reminded his readers, that on November 29, 1989 he had acted as an expert at a session of the Committee of Constitutional Supervision, and after that all unpublished “sub-legal norms” became invalid.

Nikulin openly criticized the decree Yeltsin signed, which reinstated and made these acts valid again, because this document didn’t take into consideration the changes that had taken place in the country. Many of Nikulin’s statements later became the basis of a law about state secrets, which the Supreme Soviet had adopted shortly before it was dissolved in 1993.

Later I also had a chance to meet General Kalugin. I never managed to have a good talk with him, but his statements in the press and on TV made a strong impression on me. I am certain that he is an outstanding individual.

I think that I was resolute and decisive in my struggle against the hypocritical policy of the leaders of the military-chemical complex, because to a great extent I was influenced by the actions of this courageous and resolute man. Actions of such individuals are precious little seeds that later grow in the minds of thoughtful rational people, encouraging them to take resolute actions against the old system that hinders the democratic development of Russia and prevents it from joining the civilized world community. Academician Georgi Arbatov was not accepted as an expert on the pretext that he already expressed his opinion in his publication.[122]