State Secrets: An Insider's Chronicle of the Russian Chemical Weapons Program

Annex 1

Annex 2

Annex 3

Scientists insist:

§ Our country’s international assurances have been and still are at variance with the real production and testing of chemical weapons.

§ Moscow is threatened with poisoning.

§ Generals of chemical warfare are again running high.

Today it is widely known: for many decades now chemical weapons have been developed in Moscow. True, elegant attempts have sometimes been made to reduce this work merely to the development of chemical agents with plans to use them on the battlefields somewhere “far away” from our borders. But we want to warn right now: we have already stockpiled large amounts of such agents which are said not to be toxic, which have been adopted for service and more often are not in service (existing quietly in experimental consignments) and are nevertheless particularly dangerous. The latter circumstance is also born out by the fact that in “the international talks on banning chemical weapons” (an affair of many years which is so dear to the heart of widely traveling bosses) all these “non-combat” agents figure very prominently as full-fledged objects of discussions.

Not with a vengeance upon the past it is worth recalling a statement made by Soviet scientists on May 8, 1982: “Strictly abiding by the Geneva Protocol of 1925… the USSR has never used chemical weapons and has not transferred them to other countries.” It has used them, only on our own battlefields. The last time this happened in spring 1989 in Tbilisi where CS gas demonstrated its effectiveness. Preparations were also underway to envelop Russia’s White House with noxious smoke in August 1991.

As a matter of fact, politically we have always sought to be “clean”. As early as April 1982, SOMEONE made a statement for Der Spiegel Magazine: “There is no need for the Soviet Union necessarily to counter the escalation of chemical weapons with an escalation in the same field.” That was an official rebuke to the American programme of the development and production of a new variety of chemical weapons (binary weapons). And a decade later, after yet another meeting at Geneva, SOMEONE declared that in 1987 we completely discontinued the production of toxic agents (Izvestia, August 27, 1992).

This sounds like an ode to humanism and common sense. But now let us turn to prose which cannot be done without describing our dirty reality.

A new toxic agent has been developed at a research institute of chemical technologies abbreviated in Russian as GSNIIOKhT. For its perfidy (“performance characteristics”) it has considerably surpassed the well-known VX gas, an injury with it is practically incurable. In any case those who were once affected with this toxic agent have remained disabled for the rest of their lives. The new agent served as the basis on which our own binary weapons have been developed – and not only developed but also successfully completed with the manufacture of a serially produced batch, following which those involved and uninvolved in the project were lavishly decorated with government awards. Our heroes were likewise honored with the diplomas and badges of the Lenin Prize laureates.

This was done in spring 1991 personally by President Mikhail Gorbachev. By that time he had already done all he could to immortalize himself – signed the well-known Bush-Gorbachev agreement on chemical weapons and was honored with the Nobel Peace Prize. Let us recall the names of the two most remarkable recipients of that Lenin Prize: V. Petrunin, Director of GSNIIOKhT, and a certain general, deputy chief of the “chemical troops”, whom we shall designate as SOMEONE (he is among those, who joined up with the project and we shall not speak about real developers because work is work, let alone dangerous work.)

However, that was not the end either. The field tests of the new binary toxic agent were completed in the first quarter of the current year 1992 but not in “exposed” Shikhany (it was too troublesome to dodge American satellites), but at the chemical test range on the Ustyurt Plateau near Nukus. On that range correspondents even met – quite accidentally – General S. Petrov, chief of the “chemical troops”, and heard from the local military chief words, corresponding to the occasion, about phosphorous chemical agents – sarin, soman, and VX – used in the past, of course, whereas nothing was said about the new toxic agent (Trud, April 15, 1992).

And here we come to the inevitable deliberations on the perpetual theme of who is the master in our Russia. The first industrial batch of the new toxic agent was manufactured in Volgograd, whereas the Lenin Prize was awarded in Moscow still BEFORE we had elected Boris Yeltsin the first President. However, the chemical troops carried out the field tests of the toxic agent AFTER this election and his well-known statement of January 29, 1992 (“Russia is committed to the agreement with the USA on the non-production and elimination of chemical weapons signed in 1990.”). Incidentally, those tests were staged in a different state and it is by no means a fact that that state’s President Islam Karimov knew anything about this.

Such is the sad result of the five years we lived through after the proclaimed termination of work in the development of chemical weapons and until the completion of testing their most powerful variety. Today we can boast of an achievement: the Russian binary weapon has proved to be more effective than its American counterpart. So what?

To begin with, let us say that GSNIIOKhT has been literally poisoning Muscovites. Because at this research institute there are practically no filters on ventilation installations and all evaporating toxic agents fly straight into Moscow’s air. The decontamination of modern phosphorous chemical agents, which GSNIIOKhT has worked with until now is not as effective, as some authors of secret theses would like us to believe. Available scientific data unambiguously indicate that it is impossible to completely decontaminate either the new toxic agent – the pride of the generals – or the old ones (sarin, soman and VX). At the level of very small yet unsafe concentrations, they “live” for weeks or even months in the decontaminating solutions. This is what Muscovites have to deal with day in day out.

Incidentally, the practice of waste reclamation, accepted at GSNIIOKhT, is unsafe both for the personnel doing this job and for people in the neighborhood. Waste is kept in the open air in barrels, and then taken out as ordinary cargo by rail to Shikhany (Saratov Region) where their contents are simply emptied into a pit in the open field.

It will not be amiss to look even more deeply into the institute’s history. The point is that the entire vast territory of GSNIIOKhT has been polluted with toxic agents of the yperite (mustard gas) type. All the wastes, and the toxic agents themselves, were poured right onto the ground or dug at random. But they survive for an infinitely long time in soil, slowly migrating under the impact of atmospheric fallout into subsoil waters which then mix up with deeper waters. With a high degree of probability it can be said that artesian waters here have been contaminated. Thus the chromatographic analysis of running water in Block 7, supplied from an artesian well on the institute’s territory, has revealed the presence of a whole bunch of sulfur- and chlorine-containing compounds close to yperite in their structure. The institute’s leadership is perfectly well aware of this, which is why earthwork on the territory is carried out at the level of combat operations with the use of gas masks. All this is being carefully hidden.

In 1990 GSNIIOKhT was visited by the First Vice-Chairman of the Moscow City Council, who was very touched by the sight of guinea pigs, promised every kind of assistance and kept his word. However, it only remains to wonder why the Muscovite’s electee Sergey Stankevich, when visiting the world’s largest organization for development of chemical weapons, did not try to inquire about the quantity of lethal substances which were kept in the depot at that time. Usually there are at least eight to ten kilos here, and this quantity will be enough for Moscow, should a fire or any other accident occur at the institute. Let us say that this was already four years after the Chernobyl tragedy…

Several years ago SOMEONE assured the inhabitants of Chapaevsk on oath that all gaseous waste at the plant dealing with the destruction of chemical weapons would be passed through special filters. One can only admire the courage, prudence and self-preservation instinct of the inhabitants who didn’t believe him. They were right: GSNIIOKhT simply did not even envisage these filters in the project.

So ingloriously we embarked upon the road towards a world without chemical weapons, whose possessors we had become through the graces of our home-grown military-industrial complex. Instead of destroying old ones they will slip onto the development of new weapons, and they are much better in doing this. It looks as if the real masters of the military-industrial complex – generals and directors – will tolerate no stagnation in their doings. Consequently the people of Russia have no reasons whatsoever to entrust the destruction of chemical weapons to those who developed them.

At this point it is worth pondering once again over the purport of the dollar aid for which SOMEONE recently went across the ocean. Knowing our inglorious military-chemical past, it is safe to say that the 25 million dollars which the USA has initially allotted to Russia for the implementation of the chemical-weapon-elimination programme will be spent quite differently – to keep the military-industrial complex afloat, among other things, and even for carrying on the further development and improvement of new types of chemical weapons.

And recently the people of Russia were delighted by the appointment – in the post of head of the Committee on the Conventional Problems of the Chemical and Biological Weapons under the auspices of the President of Russia – of A. Kuntsevich, a “common Soviet person”, a general for whom chemical weapons were developed at GSNIIOKhT, a person who in 1982 promised not to respond to the escalation of American binary weapons, a specialist who assures us that the production of toxic agents was discontinued as early as 1987, a scientist who in 1991 was honored with a Lenin Prize for the development of the world’s most powerful chemical weapon, a government official who deceived the inhabitants of Chapaevsk with respect to the plant meant for the destruction of chemical weapons and, lastly, a politician who brought dollars from the USA for the continuation of chemical business. All of this is about A. Kuntsevich, an Academician and a Hero of Labor, a general and a laureate.

This appointment is not an error, but the restoration of the System. And all of us must know and know and remember this.

Annex 4

Top Secret

Copy 1

To A.I. Tselikovsky,

Head of the Department for Economic Security

of the Security Ministry of the Russian Federation

October 1, 1992 N 1594 ss

The issue N. 38 of September 20, 1992 of the newspaper “Moscow News”, published an article “Poisoned Policies” signed by Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov, Doctors of Chemical Science, which contains information about scientific research and experimental design work (NIOKR) that is carried out in our country in the field of chemical weapons. According to the conclusion of the Permanent Technical Commission (PDTK) at GRNIIOKhT, these publications include pieces of information, which are top secret and constitute a state secret. [The Russian language version of the Moscow News article title translates as “Poisoned Policies”, while the English language edition was published as “A Poisoned Policy.”]

One of the authors, Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov, born in 1935 in the village Stary Kangysh, Djirtjuli Region, Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, a Bashkir, with higher education, Doctor of Chemical Science, was an employee at GSNIIOKhT from 1965 to January of 1992. He served as the head of the Department for Foreign Technical Counterintelligence [PDITR] from September of 1986 to August of 1990, had access through Form 1 to the secret of special importance and to top secret documents of the “Foliant” program.

By virtue of his work responsibilities, Vil S. Mirzayanov was well-informed about the system of the organization, trends, and results of NIOKR work in the field of chemical weapons.

I forward to you the resolution of the PDTK of the institute and the list of functional responsibilities of Vil S. Mirzayanov, as the head of the PD ITR Department to decide whether criminal proceedings should be instituted according to Article 75 of the RSFSR Criminal Code “Disclosing state secrets.”

1. Resolution of the PDTK, mk 1587 ss, copy 1, 2 on three pages each, top secret.

2. List of functional responsibilities of Vil S. Mirzayanov, mk 1572 ss, copy 1, 2 on three pages each, top secret.

Annex 5

Top Secret

Copy 1

The Permanent Technical Commission of the Russian State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GRNIIOKhT) consisting of Yu. I. Baranov (Chairman), Deputy Director, M.S. in Chemistry, V.G. Zoryan, Department Head, M.D., Yu V. Skripkin, Chief Chemist, M.S. in Chemistry, and V.I. Lisitsyna and German M. Mosyakin, Department Heads, following the instructions of the director of the institute, considered the question of the degree of confidentiality of the information set forth in the article “Poisoned Policies” published in Issue N. 38 of September 20, 1992 of the newspaper “Moscow News”.

The commission was guided by:

§ The List of Major Information that constitutes a state secret (hereafter referred to as the LMI) and the statute for establishing the degree of secrecy categories of information and for classifying information to be found in works, documents, and products approved by the Resolution N 1121-387 of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers dated December 3, 1980;

§ The List of information subject to classification by the Office of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Petrochemical Industry, compiled in accordance with the Resolution N 1121-387 of the Council of Ministers dated December 3, 1980 and the Order N 234-19 of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Petrochemical Industry dated May 27, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the List of the Ministry of Petrochemical Industry);

§ The List of information that constitutes a state secret on the “Foliant” program and other information subject to classification by the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Petrochemical Industry, in accordance with the LMI and the announced Order N 144-13 of the USSR Ministry of Petrochemical Industry dated March 25, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the List on the “Foliant” program).

The Commission considers that the article “Poisoned Policies” published in the N 38 issue of the newspaper “Moscow News” on September 20, 1992 and signed by Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov contains the following information that constitutes a state secret.

1. “A new toxic agent has been developed at the State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GOSNIIOKhT). For its perfidy (“combat characteristics”) it has considerably surpassed the well-known gas VX, and injury from it is practically incurable.” (column 2, paragraph 1).

This information is true. GOSNIIOKhT (currently, GRNIIOKhT) did synthesize, studied, and tested a number of new chemical compounds of different classes that are considerably more potent than the VX gas (the substance that the U.S. is armed with) by a complex of combat characteristics, including difficulties of treatment. According to available information, the armies of the countries that possess chemical weapons are not armed with an equivalent of the above-mentioned agent. Equipping chemical ammunition with such compounds considerably increases its effectiveness.

Thus, information was disclosed about one of the latest achievements in the sphere of science and technology, that allows for increasing the potency of existing weapons (ammunition), which according to point 83 paragraph 2 of the LMI and point 5.3 of the List of the Ministry of Petrochemical Industry, is top secret and constitutes a state secret.

2. “…our own binary weapon was developed based on the new chemical agent” (column 2, paragraph 1)

This is also true. GRNIIOKhT developed its own binary weapons based on the new chemical agent and these weapons are currently being tested.

According to our sources, before this article was published, foreign states had no information about our country developing its own binary weapon.

Thus, information was divulged that discloses trends of promising applied research work carried out to strengthen the defense power of the country. According to point 85 from the list of major information and point 5.5 from the list of the Ministry of Petrochemical Industry, this information is top secret and constitutes a state secret.

3. “The State Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology (GOSNIIOKhT) developed a new chemical agent.” (column 2, paragraph 1)

“The first batch of the chemical agent was produced in Volgograd…” (column 3, paragraph 3)

“In the first quarter of the current year 1992, field testing of the new binary weapons was completed. It was not done at the “exposed” test site Shikhany, but at the chemical test site on the Ustyurt Plateau near the city of Nukus.” (column 3, paragraph 2)

This information brought forth discloses the system of organization of the research aimed at developing chemical weapons. The major research Institute-designer is clearly indicated, and the locations of one of the experimental industrial bases (Volgograd) and both test sites (Shikhany and Nukus) are mentioned. That is, the author named major sites of the development of chemical weapons.

Thus, the disclosure of combined information has been revealed that divulges the cooperation of designers and manufacturers of one of the types of weapons, which, according to point 94 from the LMI and point 1.3 from the List on the Foliant program, are top secret and constitute state secrets.

The remaining information revealed in the article by Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov does not contain state secrets.

Annex 6

Top Secret

Copy 1

Ministry of Security

of the Russian Federation

Department for Economic Security

To Major General S.D. Balashov,

Head of the Investigation Department

at the RF Ministry of Security

The Department for Economic Security at the MB RF received materials from the State Russian Science Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology (GRNIIOKhT), which said that the article “Poisoned Policies” published in issue N 38 of September 16, 1992 of the newspaper “Moscow News”, disclosed state secrets.

The article indicated is signed by Lev A. Fedorov and Vil S. Mirzayanov, Doctors of Chemical Science. The latter worked at GRNIIOKhT until January 1992 and therefore was granted access to information presented in the article, from the publication “Moscow News.”

The materials were checked and the information received from GRNIIOKhT was confirmed. At the same time, it was established that the article “Inversion” by Vil S. Mirzayanov, published on October 10, 1991, by the newspaper “Kuranty” also disclosed classified information.

Additionally, as a result of technical operating measures, sanctioned by the RF Attorney General’s Office, reliable information was received showing that Vil S. Mirzayanov and Lev A. Fedorov collected additional confidential information about the military-chemical potential of Russia, in order to pass it along to correspondents of the American newspaper “Baltimore Sun” and to prepare another publication in the mass media.

Mirzayanov and Fedorov also tried to persuade former and current employees of GRNIIOKhT to follow suit and to leak classified information to foreign journalists.

It was established that Edward Lyudvigovich Sarkisyan, born in 1945 in Tbilisi, a senior research scientist at GRNIIOKhT, and the former Head Physician of City Hospital 55 (permanent address: Moscow, Rossoshanky Proezd, 4, korp. 1, kv. 111), gave an interview on September 29, 1992 to the correspondent of the newspaper the “Baltimore Sun” and confirmed information published in the article “Poisoned Policies.”

Taking into account everything mentioned above, that the actions of Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov indicate a criminal offense under Clause 75 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, as well as the fact that it is necessary to prevent even greater damage to the interests of Russia, we send GRNIIOKhT’s materials and results of the check on Mirzayanov for a decision on the question of instituting criminal proceedings on charges of disclosing state secrets.

Appendix:

1. The letter from GRNIIOKhT regarding the publication n/vkh N 6045 dated October 2, 1992, Top Secret, on 7 pages.

2. Non-disclosure agreement signed by Vil S. Mirzayanov n/vkh N 12290 dated January 28, 1992, open, 1 page. [This is a shameless lie! I refused to sign it and because of this it wasn’t included in my case. V.M.]

Annex 7

Top Secret

Moscow

October 22, 1992

Captain of Jusice Shkarin, Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, with the participation of Leonid Grigorievich Belomestnykh, lawyer from Legal Advice Office N 150, who produced Order N 771 dated October 22, 1992, observing requirements stipulated in Articles 123, 150-152 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, interrogated the suspect, Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov, born in 1935 in the Stary Kangysh village, Djirtjuli region, Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, citizen of the Russian Federation, higher education, married, working as head of the Research Department of the joint-stock company Region-Tsentr-Vozrozhdenie, no previous convictions. Permanent address:

Moscow, Stalevarov Ulitsa, 4, korp. 4, kv. 586,

Passport presented XI-MYu N 563326

Issued on November 9, 1977

Before the interrogation began, it was explained to Vil S. Mirzayanov that, according to Articles 52, 64, 66, 70, 76, 141-1, 151, and 152 of the RSFSR Criminal and Procedural Code, the suspect has the right to defend himself; to know what he is suspected of; to give explanations; to get acquainted with transcripts of the investigation carried out with his participation, as well as the materials submitted to the court in order to confirm that he was preemptively taken into custody legally; to reject and complain about the actions and decisions of the interrogator, investigator, and prosecutor; to participate when judges are considering complaints following the procedure stipulated by Article 220-2 of the RSFSR Criminal and Procedural Code; to write testimony, ask that interrogations be recorded, to require additions and amendments be made to the transcript. It was also explained that, according to Article 47 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, the defender is allowed to participate in the case from the moment preemptive arrest was applied to me.

The interrogation started at 12.20 P.M.

The interrogation finished at 3.30 P.M.

Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov was notified that he was suspected of disclosing state secrets, that is of committing a crime stipulated by Article 75, Part 1, of the RSFSR Criminal Code.

Question: What language would you prefer to give your testimony in?

Answer: I speak Russian fluently and don’t require the services of an interpreter. I would prefer to give testimony in the Russian language.

Question: I am in charge of the preliminary investigation, according to instructions given to me, Captain of Justice Shkarin, Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department at the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation. Do you reject the investigator who accepted the case?

Answer: I don’t reject Investigator Shkarin who accepted the case. I have no basis for rejection.

Question: Were you told which crime you are suspected of, and were you informed about the suspect’s rights?

Answer: I understand what crime I am suspected of and the rights of a suspect. At the same time, I claim that I request the presence of a defender at today’s interrogation. I don’t have any defender, so I request any lawyer be invited.

Question: To defend your interests at the preliminary investigation, you are offered the services of Leonid Grigorievich Belomestnykh, lawyer of Legal Advice Office N 150, who has been presented with order N 771 dated October 22, 1992.

Answer: I do not object to having Leonid Grigorievich Belomestnykh defend my interests at today’s interrogation.

Question: What explanations can you give regarding suspicions against you?

Answer: I prepared the article “Poisoned Policies” published in issue N 38 of September 20, 1992 of the weekly “Moscow News” with a co-author Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov, Doctor of Chemical Sciences. In this article I stated the facts, known to me from my work at the State Russian Science Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GRNIIOKhT), that new kinds of chemical agents continued to be developed, produced, and tested, and that binary weapons were developed based on them. I worked at this institute from 1965 until January of 1992, and I was directly involved in the development of the new kinds of chemical agents that the article is talking about. I carried out analyses on them and looked through documentation necessary for conducting this analysis. This means that for the article I used trustworthy information that I knew from my work. In publishing this article, my goal was to expose the hypocrisy of the leaders of the military-chemical complex, who were violating an agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. governments in the field of chemical weapons, and their deception at the Geneva negotiations on concluding the convention on chemical disarmament, because they concealed components of the new weapons by not including them on the list of controlled substances. Additionally, I wanted to draw public attention to this problem. I realized that the Soviet, and later the Russian party, was trying to conceal the facts on the development, production, and testing of new chemical agents from the negotiators in Geneva, as well as the fact that binary weapons were being produced based on them. I knew for a fact that at the institute there was the “Foliant” program on the development of new chemical agents and that the creation of binary weapons based on them was secret; that is, information that I revealed in my article was not to be disclosed. However, I came to the conclusion that in these times concealing the facts of the development of new chemical agents and creation of binary weapons damaged the state interests of Russia, and benefited only the leaders of the military-chemical complex, since it served their narrowly selfish and extremely profitable interests.

I think that by publishing in the article “Poisoned Policies” I gave no specific information that would characterize the composition or properties of the new chemical agents or the binary weapons based on them, the location of the institute-designer, or the site of production and testing of the new chemical agents. I didn’t give any concrete facts about the composition or properties of the new chemical agents. This is why I think that I didn’t disclose any state secret in the above-mentioned article.

Question by the defender, Leonid G. Belomestnykh: Did you realize that by publishing the article you included information not suitable for publication, and do you think that in this way you disclosed state secrets as the investigation claims?

Answer: I presented information in the article that conceptually has to do with the strictly secret topic of the development, testing, and production of a new chemical agent and the creation of binary weapons based on it. I didn’t cite a single line from classified documents in my article. This is why I think that I didn’t disclose any state secrets in the article “Poisoned Policies.”

I have read the interrogation transcript. It appears that my testimony has been transcribed accurately in the report. I don’t want to make any corrections or additions to the report.

Suspect

Vil S. Mirzayanov

Defender

Leonid G. Belomestnykh

The suspect was interrogated and the transcript was compiled by

Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department

at the MB RF,

Captain of Justice

V. Shkarin

Annex 8

Top Secret

Moscow

October 22, 1992

Investigator of the Investigation Department at the MB RF, Senior Lieutenant of Justice Martynenko and Junior Investigator of the same department, Lieutenant of Justice Zenkov ---------------- with the participation of employees of the MB RF A.T. Svetin, I.V. Belyanin [former employee of GRNIIOKhT—V.M.] and A.A. Dmitriev [my former colleague at GRNIIOKhT who worked with Bogomazov—V.M.] searched the premises of Lev A. Fedorov, Moscow, ul. Profsoyuznaya, d. 8, korp. 2, kv. 83:

1. German Mitrofanovich Mosyakin [he signed the resolution of the Permanent Technical Commission and wrote a letter about my functional responsibilities – V.M.]. Permanent address: Moscow, Orekhovy proezd, d. 39, korp. 2, kv. 342, and

2. Ivan Ivanovich Surinsky [Deputy Chief of the Security Department at GRNIIOKhT—V.M.]. Permanent address: Moscow, ul. Sayanskaya, d. 2, kv. 54. The search was conducted on the basis of the ordinance about conducting searches dated October 20, 1992 following the requirements stipulated in Articles 169-171 of the RSFSR Criminal and Procedural Code. The search was conducted in the presence of Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov and witnesses.

The above mentioned people were informed that they could observe all the actions of the investigator and make statements regarding any of his actions. Witnesses were also advised that Article 135 of the RSFSR Criminal Code stipulates their obligation to attest to the fact, content, and results of the search.

The search started at 7.30 A.M.

Before the search started Lev A. Fedorov was offered the chance to voluntarily submit items and documents pertaining to the case as indicated in the ordinance. After this Lev A. Fedorov produced two manuscripts in blue ink. One document is 7 (seven) pages long. The other document is 6 (six) pages long. Fedorov also produced two copies of the weekly “Moscow News” issues N 38 in Russian and N 39 in English. After this Lev A. Fedorov submitted another document that was 4 (four) pages long, a manuscript in blue ink.

Lev A. Fedorov explained that Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov had given him three manuscripts. Based on these documents, Fedorov and Mirzayanov prepared articles to be published in the weekly “Moscow News.”

After Lev A. Fedorov voluntarily produced the documents and newspapers, his apartment wasn’t searched [underlined by me—V.M.].

Three documents are packed in a paper envelope and sealed with stamp N 2 for documents of the Investigation Department of the KGB of the U.S.S.R., which is attested by signatures of the investigator, Fedorov, and the witnesses.

The search finished at 8.00 A.M. We______ have read the report of the search.

The report is true and accurate.

We have no comments regarding the search and content of the report.

The person whose apartment was searched ___________________

The search was conducted and the report was written by

Investigator of the Investigation Department at the RF Ministry of Security, Senior Lieutenant of Justice S.M. Martynenko ______________________________

Junior Investigator at the same department, Lieutenant of Justice I.E. Zenkov ____________________________________________

Annex 9

Top Secret

Moscow

October 22, 1992

Lieutenant Colonel of Justice Fanin, head of the Investigation Department at the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, in his office of the Investigation Department at the MB RF, observing requirements stipulated in Articles 72-74, 157, 158, and 160 of the RSFSR Criminal and Procedural Code interrogated the witness, Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov, born on June 10, 1936 in Moscow, Chuvash, citizen of the Russian Federation, Doctor of Chemical Sciences, Leading Research Assistant at the Institute for Geochemistry and Analytical Chemistry of the Russian Academy of Sciences (work tel. 137-49-30), married. Permanent address:

Moscow, ul. Profsoyuznaya, 8, korp. 2, kv. 83,

(home tel. 129-05-96)

Passport series XV-MYu N 608591 issued by Police Department 134, Moscow, on July 1, 1978.

It was explained to the witness that, according to Articles 73 and 74 of the RSFSR Criminal and Legal Code, he can be interrogated regarding any circumstances that have been established on the facts of a case and must give truthful evidence: produce all information known to him regarding this case and answer questions. Additionally, I was informed that, according to Articles 141-commentary and 160 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, after testifying I have the right to familiarize myself with the transcript of my testimony, to require insertions and amendments to the transcript, and also to apply to have the interrogation recorded.

I have been advised in advance about the responsibility stipulated by Article 180 of the RSFSR Criminal Code for refusing or evading giving evidence and about the responsibility stipulated by Article 181 of RSFSR Criminal Code for giving deliberately false evidence.

The interrogation started at 9.45 A.M.

The interrogation finished at 1.50 P.M.

Witness Lev A. Fedorov was asked to give a full account of the circumstances about which he was called in for interrogation. He testified the following:

I speak Russian fluently and will testify in this language. I met Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov two months ago. He called me, said that his name was Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov, and asked if I had written an article for the newspaper “Sovershenno Sekretno.” I don’t remember the title of the article. Probably, “Delayed Death.” It discussed chemical weapons the way I, a Doctor of Science, understand the problem. I confirmed that I had written this article. When Mirzayanov called me, I remembered at once that he was the author of the article “Inversion” published in autumn of 1991 in the newspaper “Kuranty.” This article was interesting to me then, so I remembered its author. This is why I agreed to meet with Mirzayanov. I went to his home. When we met, Mirzayanov said that my article was interesting. Since he worked at the State Russian Science Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology, we could have common interests in the area of chemical disarmament. I expressed my satisfaction with the article “Inversion.” From my talk with Mirzayanov I understood that he knew the information revealed in the article “Inversion” from his work in the above-mentioned institute. During the conversation Mirzayanov stressed that the information didn’t constitute state secrets. Additionally, the very fact that the article was published in “Kuranty” was evidence to me that the information written there didn’t appear to be state secrets.

We talked about returning to this topic and publishing a new article, describing the negative consequences of chemical weapons production for Russia. I don’t remember who came up with this suggestion. We agreed that Mirzayanov would write a rough draft and I would review it. In the middle of August of 1992 we arranged a meeting by phone and met at one of the Moscow subway stations where Mirzayanov handed me his manuscripts. From August 23 until 28 of this year I was in Finland at the international congress “Dioxin-92.” At the beginning of September, I returned and started writing with notes received from Mirzayanov. I read the text through and elaborated it in such a way that it could be given to journalists for subsequent publication. I thought through and worked out the structure of the article and Mirzayanov produced the facts for me. Probably he knew this information from his work at GOSNIIOKhT. While working on the article I was certain that information it contained didn’t constitute state secrets. I didn’t show Mirzayanov the article after I had prepared it for publication. Then in September of this year, I gave it to Leonard Nikishin, an acquaintance of mine, a correspondent of “Moscow News”, after which it was published in this newspaper issue 38 on September 20. The newspaper “Moscow News” is a weekly and it came out on Wednesday, September 16. I don’t know if Nikishin changed it in any way because I didn’t keep a copy of my article. If some changes were introduced, they were few and not significant. Despite the fact that I didn’t familiarize Mirzayanov with the article, it had both our signatures because we had an agreement that his signature would come first.

Neither Mirzayanov, nor I have received any royalties for the article up to the present time. Literally, the day before the newspaper “Moscow News” came out, that is, on Tuesday, September 15 of this year, I visited the press center of the “Baltimore Sun” together with Mirzayanov. Knowing that the newspaper with our article would come out on September 16, we gave an interview to a correspondent of the “Baltimore Sun” on the same topic as in the article “Poisoned Policies.” In particular, Mirzayanov said in the interview that a new chemical agent had been developed that surpassed in its attributed characteristics all chemical agents known up until then and that more of this substance had been produced than stipulated by the convention. I don’t know what convention he was talking about. I don’t remember if he said anything else about it. I want to stress that I don’t have access to any state secrets in my job, and I know no secrets, so I couldn’t possibly disclose any such information. [underlined by me—V.M.] If I remember correctly, the name of the correspondent from the “Baltimore Sun” was Will Englund. I had never met him before. We decided to visit the press center of the “Baltimore Sun” a week before the meeting, at which we had planned to discuss the dioxin problem, and then we spontaneously refocused on the article “Poisoned Policies.” I called Mirzayanov and said that I was meeting with a correspondent from the “Baltimore Sun” and suggested he go with me. He agreed. Since the next day the aforementioned article was supposed to come out, we touched upon issues discussed there during the conversation. Mirzayanov and I received no fee for that interview.

Two weeks ago a stranger called and introduced himself as Oleg Voldemarovich Vishnyakov, a correspondent from the magazine “Novoe Vremya.” He expressed interest in the published article “Poisoned Policies” and suggested we meet and talk about this issue. I met with him in the editor’s office, and I found out that he wanted to work on the topic of chemical weapons and publish an article in the magazine. I understand from him, that in the past he had worked with the issue of nuclear weapons and then had developed a parallel interest in chemical weapons. He was busy with the idea of destroying chemical weapons by nuclear explosions. I agreed to help him with an article about chemical weapons. Sometime around October 18 of this year, he called me for the second time and said that he had decided to write an article in the form of an interview. We agreed that I would come to his editor’s office together with Mirzayanov and we would discuss this problem. On or around October 20, Mirzayanov and I went to his editor’s office and gave an interview on the same questions that were discussed in the article “Poisoned Policies.” Vishnyakov recorded the interview and kept the recording [underlined by me—V.M.] Recently some of my acquaintances said that the editor’s office of “Argumenti i Fakty” got interested in the article “Poisoned Policies.” On Friday, October 16 of this year, I called the editor’s office to talk with Starkov. He wasn’t there and I called him at home on October 18. I introduced myself and explained who I was. He became interested in the topic and recommended that I write an article. I started working on a new article using the information presented to me from Mirzayanov’s manuscripts. By Tuesday it was ready. On October 20, after visiting Vishnyakov, I showed this article to Mirzayanov. It was called “Myths and Legends of Chemical Disarmament.” He read it, corrected something, and signed it. After this I brought it to the editor’s office of the newspaper “Argumenti i Fakty” where I handed it to the secretary of the Editor in Chief, Tamara Vasilievna, if I am not mistaken. In this article I used Mirzayanov’s information that a new chemical agent had been developed in our country. All the remaining text is my reflections about the negative consequences of our participation in the development of chemical weapons. On the evening of October 20 this year, an employee of this newspaper called me and suggested we meet to discuss how we could agree to shorten the article. On October 21 I went to the editor’s office and agreed on a new, shorter version of the article “Myths and Legends of Chemical Disarmament” with correspondent Boris Stanishnev. I signed this text. The paragraph about the development of the new chemical agent remained there. Thus, currently there are two versions of the mentioned article in the editor’s office of “Argumenti i Fakty” [Don’t forget this, dear Chekists!—V.M.]

Question: Today during the search in your apartment we confiscated a manuscript starting with the words “chemical sharashka…” and ending with the words “Doctors of Chemical Science Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov;” a manuscript starting with the words “on finishing the second…” and ending with the words “…survival of mankind;” a manuscript starting with the words “Dear editor…” and ending with the words “…all Russians.” Whose manuscripts are these, and under what circumstances did they appear at your apartment?

Answer: All these manuscripts belong to Vil Mirzayanov. He gave them to me so that I could write articles for the press. The notes starting with the words “Chemical sharashka…” were used for the article “Poisoned Policies.” Later Mirzayanov handed me the remaining manuscripts, which we planned to use for writing articles. However, up to this time, it hasn’t been done.

Question: What objective did you and Mirzayanov pursue by publishing the article “Poisoned Policies” and did you take steps towards publishing similar articles?

Answer: My objective was the following. I think that the very fact that chemical weapons are being developed in our country can have grave consequences for the country. Additionally, the system of measures aimed at liberating Russia from chemical weapons adopted by official authorities doesn’t, in my opinion, reflect the potential danger. Thus, I proposed publishing several articles, in which I wanted to express my attitude toward solving problems connected with the destruction of chemical weapons.

Mirzayanov, if his words can be believed [comrades Chekists, you know what conclusions to make, if we don’t—V.M.] pursued the same objective. Mirzayanov reacted positively to the appearance of the article “Poisoned Policies.” He was satisfied that it had been published.

Question: Specify for what publications Mirzayanov had given you the two remaining manuscripts that were confiscated.

Answer: On approximately September 23 of this year, in response to the article “Poisoned Policies”, an article was published by of correspondent Litovkin in the evening edition of the newspaper “Izvestia.” Mirzayanov and I decided to prepare another article in response to the article by Litovkin. In connection with this, Mirzayanov wrote the manuscript starting with the words “Dear editor…” and finishing with the words “…all Russians” and then gave the text to me.

In connection with this, since I had no time for a literary elaboration of Mirzayanov’s text, the article wasn’t prepared for us and wasn’t published [underlined by me—V.M.].

The manuscript beginning with the words “on finishing the second…” and finishing with the words “…survival of mankind” was prepared by Mirzayanov and we planned to publish it in one of the local newspapers in Volgograd, where there is a plant that produces chemical weapons, and there are plans to destroy such existing weapons there. In our opinion, chemical weapons should be destroyed where they are stored, not hauled to the production plants. However, we didn’t have time to publish that article, either. Fedorov wrote: I have read the interrogation report. My testimony has been transcribed accurately in the report. I can’t make any alterations or additions to the report.

Interrogator:

Head of the Section of the Investigation

Department at the MB RF,

Lieutenant Colonel of Justice

N.I. Fanin

Annex 10

Top Secret

Moscow

October 23, 1992

Captain of Justice Shkarin, Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, interrogated the suspect Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov, born on March 9, 1935 in the village Stary Kangysh, Djirtjuli Region, Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (other details are to be found in the case), in his office observing the requirements stipulated in Articles 123, 150-152 of RSFSR of the Criminal Code.

The interrogation started at 2.25 P.M.

The interrogation finished at 4.45 P.M.

Question: Do you request the presence of a lawyer at today’s interrogation?

Answer: I don’t need the presence of a lawyer at today’s interrogation.

Question: During the search of Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov’s apartment a manuscript was confiscated starting with the words “Chemical Sharashka in Moscow is Waiting for Help from America” and finishing with the words “Doctors of Chemical Sciences Vil Mirzayanov, L. Fedorov”, also were confiscated – a manuscript starting with the words “After the end of the Second World War” and finishing with the words “…survival of mankind;” and a manuscript starting with the words “Dear editor…” and finishing with the words “…all Russians.” What clarification can you give regarding these texts?

Answer: I attentively examined the texts that were presented to me and I can say that I wrote all of them in the period from the end of August until the beginning of October of 1992. I wrote the text starting with words “Chemical Sharashka in Moscow is Waiting for Help from America” at the end of August 1992 for publication in the mass media. I wrote it after I read an article by L. A. Fedorov, Doctor of Chemical Science, in the paper “Sovershenno Sekretno.” The article was about the problems of environmental contamination by dioxins and chemical agents. It’s hard for me to remember the name of the article. It seemed to me that the questions Fedorov touched on in this article were pressing and were consistent with my own thoughts. The editor’s office gave me Fedorov’s telephone number. I called him and we agreed to meet. We met at some point a few days later. I wasn’t acquainted with Fedorov before that time. We exchanged opinions and decided to write a joint article, in which we would elaborate on the topics I touched upon in the article “Inversion” in the October 10, 1991 issue of the newspaper “Kuranty”. We agreed that I would write an article and Fedorov would then supplement it with his materials and would arrange for its publication with the editors of one of the newspapers. Over the next week or so, I wrote an article called “Chemical Sharashka in Moscow is Waiting for Help from America.” and took it to Fedorov. This article was published in the newspaper “Moscow News” on September 20, 1992 under the title “Poisoned Policies” with some necessary additions and abridgements made to my version. The changes to the text concerned personal aspects and the technical side connected with the full degasification of chemical agents when they were destroyed. The information, about the creation of a new chemical agent at the Russian State Science Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology, and the development of binary weapons based on it, is presented in the article in full as it was in the manuscript. In my conversation with Fedorov, I gave him the same information about the new agent and binary weapons. I have never given any additional information to anyone about new chemical agents and binary weapons, other than what was presented in the article “Poisoned Policies,” either orally or in writing. I gave two other texts to Fedorov at the beginning of October of this year for further work on publications in the mass media. I did not put any information in them about the new chemical agent or binary weapons.

I read through the transcript of the interrogation. My testimony is written down correctly. I have no additions or amendments.

The suspect was interrogated and the transcript was compiled by

Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department

at the MB RF,

Captain of Justice

V.A. Shkarin

Annex 11

Top Secret

Moscow

October 28, 1992

Captain of Justice Shkarin, Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department at the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, interrogated the suspect, VIL SULTANOVICH MIRZAYANOV, born on March 9, 1935 in the village Stary Kangysh, Djirtjuli region, Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (other personal details are to be found in the case), in his office observing requirements stipulated in Articles 123, 150-152 of the RSFSR Criminal Code.

The interrogation started at 10.40 A.M.

The interrogation finished at 12.40 P.M.

Question: Do you request the presence of a lawyer at today’s interrogation?

Answer: The investigator explained to me that my wife Nuria Khalitovna Mirzayanova made an agreement for my defense with Alexander Yakovlevich Asnis, a lawyer from Legal Advice Office N 10. He didn’t produce a permit to work with classified documents and wasn’t allowed to participate in the case. To the best of my knowledge, there are no other hindrances that prevent Alexander Ya. Asnis from participating in the case. I don’t need a lawyer at today’s interrogation. I decline the services of lawyer Leonid Grigorievich Belomestnykh.

Question: Did you give information about the development of chemical weapons in Russia to the mass media, apart from the editors of the newspaper “Moscow News”?

Answer: I wrote about the fact of the development of new chemical weapons in Russia in the article “Inversion” that was published in October 10, 1991 issue of the newspaper “Kuranty”. I wrote that article and took it to the editor’s office myself. I was under the impression that there was a victory by the Russian people in crushing the coup attempt. I foresaw then that the leaders of the military-industrial complex would continue the development, production, and testing of chemical weapons contrary to the national interests of Russia, despite the agreement concluded that year between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. governments to discontinue the development, production, and testing of chemical weapons, since those leaders didn’t believe then, and don’t believe now, that democratization is possible in our country. The military-chemical complex pursues its entirely selfish and profitable ends; it is still at the helm of power and feeds on the useless expenditure of people. This powerful elite is still using all its strength to try to keep the former structures together, in order to meet their above-mentioned objectives. I knew about the development of new chemical weapons in Russia, at the State Russian Science Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GRNIIOKhT) because I worked at that institute on the problem of the development of new chemical agents. No criminal proceedings were instituted against me because of that article, and I didn’t even receive a disciplinary action. Moreover, at this time two employees of the institute, who had access to even more information about the new chemical weapons, immigrated to the U.S. and to Israel. This means that the relevant authorities and administration of the institute did not protect information about the development of the new chemical weapons in Russia. In 1991 Boris Yakovlevich Libman, former chief engineer of the Volgograd Khimprom Production Association, Deputy Director for Science at the Volgograd branch of GRNIIOKhT, immigrated to the U.S. In 1992 Yefim Lazarevich Galperin, formerly Leading Research Assistant, Doctor of Chemical Science, immigrated to Israel. I don’t know whether or not these people gave away information to foreign states about the development of new chemical weapons in Russia.

On September 15, 1992, I gave an interview to William Englund, a correspondent from the American newspaper “The Baltimore Sun”, in which I told him about almost everything contained in the whole article “Poisoned Policy” as prepared for publication in the newspaper “Moscow News;” that is, I told the correspondent that binary weapons had been developed. In the interview I stated the fact that the new chemical agent was more potent than a similar American chemical agent. I gave this interview together with Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov.

On October 21, 1992, I signed an article for the newspaper “Argumenti i Fakty” together with Lev A. Fedorov, about the issues of production and testing of chemical weapons in Russia, destruction of its stockpiles, as well as the related problems of ecological safety. Fedorov wrote this article himself using my version of an article, which I had given to him at the beginning of September in 1992. On the same day, that is, on October 21, Fedorov and I gave an interview to Oleg Vishnyakov, a correspondent from the magazine “Novoe Vremya”. In this interview I presented my version of the nature of the new chemical agent and my version of the binary weapons that had been developed based on it. In particular, I said that about two years ago scientists from our institute had developed a new chemical agent, which by its characteristics exceeds by 5-8 times the toxicity of the currently existing chemical agents of the VX type. It causes practically incurable lesions, even if only the skin is exposed to it. Binary weapons that proved to be significantly more potent than the American binary weapons, were developed based on the new chemical agent. Each of the components of the American binary weapon taken separately is completely safe. However, one of the components of our weapon is a chemical agent.

An industrial batch of the new chemical agent was produced at the Volgograd plant. My version is based on own my intuition as a scientist who worked at GRNIIOKhT in the field of physical chemical analysis of micro-concentrations of chemical agents in various media. I was never offered and never received royalties for publishing the aforementioned articles.

I have read the interrogation transcript.

My testimony has been transcribed accurately. I don’t want to make any alterations or additions to the report.

The suspect was interrogated and the transcript was compiled by

Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department at

the MB RF,

Captain of Justice

V.A. Shkarin

Annex 12

On November 2, 1992 Kalinin District Court of Moscow consisting of:

Presiding Judge A. S. Schanin, with the participation of Prosecutor V.A. Buivolov and Secretary S.V. Lebedeva considered in a closed court session a complaint about the illegality and groundlessness of the arrest of Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov, who was born on March 9, 1935 in the village of Stary Kangysh, Djirtjuli Region, Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. His permanent address is 4 Stalevarov St., Building 4, Apartment 586, Moscow. He is working as the head of the Research Department of the joint-stock company Region-Tsentr-Vozrozhdenie, Bashkir, has a higher education, married, with two children, no previous convictions, faces charges on Article 75, Part 1, of the RF Criminal Code, it is

The court has established from the complaint of the applicant and materials that have been submitted that on October 22, 1992, V. S. Mirzayanov was detained under Article 122 of RF Criminal and Procedural Code on suspicion of committing a crime stipulated by Article 75 Part 1 of the RF Criminal Code, and on the same day he (Mirzayanov) was taken into custody by RF Attorney General based on Articles 90-92, 96 of the RF Criminal and Procedural Code.

Having checked over the materials, and listened to the applicant and prosecutor, I consider it necessary to satisfy the complaint of V. S. Mirzayanov because, according to Article 89 of the RF Criminal and Procedural Code, there are no sufficient grounds to suppose that he will hide from the preliminary investigation or court, or hinder the restoration of the truth in the criminal case, or get involved in criminal activity. Additionally, he has a permanent place of residence in Moscow, has no previous convictions, has juvenile children dependent on him, and the deed he is charged with doesn’t qualify as a serious crime.

Based on the statement above and being guided by Articles 11, 220-1, 220-2, and 331 of the RF Criminal and Procedural Code, it is

To satisfy the complaint of Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov and release him from custody into the court hall. To secure a written statement from V. S. Mirzayanov not to leave his permanent place of residence.

The resolution is final, not subject to appeal or protest.

Signatures of the judge and the secretary.

Annex 13

Top Secret

GENERAL ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

of the Russian Federation

To: Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation

For Major General S.D. Balashov,

Head of the Investigation Department

October 30, 1992 N 13/2-1040-92

Moscow

The lawyer A. Ya. Asnis has appealed to the Attorney General’s Office of the Russian Federation with a complaint about the decision of V. A. Shkarin, Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, according to which he wasn’t allowed to participate as the defender in the criminal proceedings instituted against V. S. Mirzayanov, because he had no clearance to work with secret documents.

We think that there are no reasons to disallow A. Ya. Asnis to act as a defender in this case because, according to the criminal and procedural law, the absence of a permit to work with classified documents is not on the list of circumstances that make it possible to exclude a particular defender from taking part in the case.

At the same time, measures stipulated by Article 139 of the RSFSR Criminal and Procedural Code should be taken to prevent disclosure of secret and top secret information.

Head of the Department for Supervision of

the Implementation of the Laws on Federal Security

and International Relations,

State Justice Counselor of the Third Class

Leonid M. Syukasev

Annex 14

Top Secret

To The Head of the Department for Supervising

Implementation of the Laws on

Federal Security and International Relations

State Justice Counselor of the Third Class

Leonid M. Syukasev

November 4, 19926/2753

Dear Leonid Mikhailovich!

The Investigation Department of the MB RF has considered your letter N 13/2-1040-92 of October 30, 1992,. The Investigation Committee can’t support the suggestion to allow the lawyer A. Ya. Asnis to act as the defender in the case of V. S. Mirzayanov for disclosing state secrets, because it contradicts the current law.

The question of allowing an individual to work with classified documents and, most of all, with documents that contain information constituting state secrets is outside the realm of the criminal and procedural law, which only determines the procedure for conducting criminal cases. The existing rules for allowing individuals to work with secrets are directed at maintaining state secrets in the interest of the national security. This is why individuals are given clearance to work with documents containing state secrets in accordance with “Instruction for maintaining the regime of secrecy in ministries, register lists, at enterprises, at institutions, and organizations of the USSR” approved by the Resolution o N 556-126 of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers dated May 12, 1987.

The requirements of the above-mentioned resolution are binding in Russia, according to Resolution N 51 of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet “Ratification of the Agreement on Establishing the Independent States” dated December 12, 1991, and Decree N 20 of the president of the Russian Federation “About Protecting State Secrets” dated January 14, 1992. In keeping with the above-mentioned [resolutions], the lawyer Asnis is obligated to get an appropriate permit to work with documents containing state secrets. There are conditions for this in the Moscow City Bar Association, of which he is a member.

In our opinion, if we let Asnis take part in the case without observing established requirements, the investigation will find itself in a situation where it will have to disclose information that constitutes a state secret.

Head of the Department

Major General

S.D. Balashov

Annex 15

Top Secret

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

December 10, 1992 N 13/2-1040-92

Moscow

to Deputy Minister of the MB RF

Major General A.E. Safonov,

The notification is written by hand:

To Comrade S.D. Balashov: Please prepare a response to the Attorney General’s Office and stop violating the Law.

Signature of Safonov is correct

Dear Anatoly Efimovich!

The Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation investigating the criminal case, in which V. S. Mirzayanov is charged with committing a crime stipulated by Article 75, Part 1, of the RSFSR Criminal Code.

The lawyer A. Ya. Asnis has appealed to the RF Attorney General’s Office with a complaint about the decision of Investigator V. A. Shkarin, saying that he wasn’t allowed to work as the defender in this criminal case, because he had no clearance to work with classified documents.

This decision was taken in contradiction to criminal and procedural law because on the list of the circumstances excluding the participation of a certain defender in a case there is no such basis for rejecting a lawyer [underlined by Safonov—V.M.].

On October 30, 1992 the head of the Department for Supervising the Implementation of Laws on Federal Security and International Relations at the RF Attorney General’s Office sent a corresponding letter to the head of the Investigation Department at the Ministry of Security of Russia, in which, in particular, it is suggested to take measures stipulated by Article 139 of the RSFSR Criminal and Procedural Code to prevent the disclosure of secret and top secret information. Investigation officers were given similar oral explanations. However, the position of the investigation remains unchanged until now, which caused well-grounded appeals of the lawyer (underlined by Safonov—V.M.) and his client to different authorities, resulting in the delay of the investigation. Please consider this question without delay, settle it according to the appropriate legal requirements, and report the results to the Attorney General’s Office of the Russian Federation.

Handwritten Notation: for Comrade A.A. Shabunin

Handwritten Notation: for Comrade V. A. Shkarin

Please consider the question in keeping with the Criminal and Procedural Code. Signature of Balashov is correct. November 13, 1992.

Please ensure that the implementation of the instructions of the RF Attorney General’s Office, in keeping with the Criminal and Procedural Code.

Annex 16

Secret

MINISTRY OF SECURITY

OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Investigation Department

October 17, 1992 N 6/2801

To: First Deputy Attorney General

of the Russian Federation

State Counselor of Justice

of the 2^nd class I.S. Zemlyanushin,

We are giving notice that, according to your instructions, on November 16, 1992 the lawyer from the Legal Advice Office, Alexander Yakovlevich Asnis, was allowed to act as the defender of the accused Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov in the criminal case without presenting a permit to work with top secret documents [italicized by me—V.M.].

Head of the department,

Major General

S.D. Balashov

Correct. Senior Investigator of the Investigation

Department of the RF Ministry of Security, Captain of Justice

V. A. Shkarin

Annex 17

Secret

Copy N 2

MINISTRY OF SECURITY

OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Investigation Department

To Major General V.N. Markomenko

Head of the Third Chief Department

at the Federal Agency for Government

Communications & Information (FAPSI)

under the President of Russia

November 5, 1992 N 6/02778

The Investigation Department at the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation is investigating the criminal case filed against an employee of the State Russian Science Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GRNIIOKhT), Doctor of Chemical Science, Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov, who disclosed information to the mass media that constitutes a state secret about research work that was carried out in Russia in the field of chemical weapons.

In connection with that, we are asking for your instructions to check and report if FAPSI has any information about transmissions of foreign radio stations regarding Mirzayanov and the information he disclosed. If the answer is affirmative, we ask you to send us all materials that are available on this issue.

Head of the Department

Major General

S.D. Balashov

Annex 18

Secret

Copy 1

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE

OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The Ministry of Security

of the Russian Federation

Investigation Department

To Colonel A.A. Shabunin

Head of the Department

November 6, 1992 N 13/2-1040-92

Moscow

I am sending you a Xerox copy of the article “We Waged Chemical War on Our Own Territory” published in “Nezavisimaya Gazetta” on October 30, 1992, to check and evaluate it in the course of the preliminary investigation of the criminal case against Vil S. Mirzayanov.

Enclosure: on one page.

Senior Prosecutor of the Department for Supervising

The Implementation of Laws on Federal Security

and International Relations,

Junior Counselor of Justice

V.A. Buivolov

Annex 19

Secret

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE

OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Ministry of Security

Of the Russian Federation

Investigation Department

To Captain of Justice V.A. Shkarin

Senior Investigator

103793 GSP, Moscow, K-9

Pushkinskaya, 15-a

According to the instructions of the leadership of the RF Attorney General’s Office, we are sending xeroxed copies of the article “Poison” published on January 29, 1993 in the newspaper “Trud” with an interview of V. S. Mirzayanov to be added to the materials of the criminal case against V. S. Mirzayanov and to carry out its further legal evaluation.

Senior Prosecutor of the Department for Supervising

Implementation of the Laws on Federal Security

and International Relations,

Junior Counselor of Justice

V.A. Buivolov

Annex 20

Secret

THE RF MINISTRY OF SECURITY

Investigation Department

To V.A. Petrunin

Director of the State Russian Science

Research Institute for Organic

Chemistry and Technology

November 12, 1992 N 6/2835

The Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation is investigating the following criminal case, in which Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov, a former employee of GRNIIOKhT, is charged with a crime under Article 75, Part 1, of the RSFSR Criminal Code, of disclosing the information that our country conducts scientific research work in the area of chemical weapons, in his article “Poisoned Policies” (Issue N 38 of the weekly “Moscow News” of September 20, 1992).

In connection with this, please check and inform us whether the information revealed by Mirzayanov in his article, about GRNIIOKhT being involved in the above-mentioned research, is authentic.

If the answer is affirmative, according to what normative acts was it carried out and from what sources did Mirzayanov learn this information (reading documents, taking part in meetings, etc.)?

We also ask you to send us V. S. Mirzayanov’s personal file and character references.

Head of the section at the Department

A.A. Shabunin

Verified. Senior Investigator of the

Investigation Department at the MB RF,

Captain of Justice

Victor A. Shkarin

Annex 21

Top Secret

Copy 1

STATE RUSSIAN SCIENCE RESEARCH

INSTITUTE OF ORGANIC

CHEMISTRY AND TECHNOLOGY

To A.A. Shabunin,

Head of the section of the

Investigation Department at the

RF Ministry of Security

Moscow

November 24, 1992

N 1846 ss

In response to your inquiry N 6/2835 of November 12, 1992 we inform you that the information that Vil S. Mirzayanov, a former employee of the institute, included in his article “Poisoned Policies” about the scientific research work conducted at GRNIIOKhT aimed at the development of chemical weapons, is authentic.

Work on the creation of a new chemical agent was referred to in the above-mentioned article as follows: “The State Science Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GRNIIOKhT) developed a new chemical agent. It significantly surpassed the well known VX by its toxicity (“battle characteristics”) from which it is practically impossible to be cured…”, and was developed at GRNIIOKhT in pursuance to Resolution N 3509-123 dated April 24, 1977 by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and the Council of Ministers.

Also, the information that Mirzayanov reveals in the same article about the development of binary weapons at GRNIIOKhT: “…binary weapons were developed based on a new chemical agent” is true. Work on the creation of a binary weapon was carried out at GRNIIOKhT, in pursuance to Resolutions N 1584-434 of December 31, 1986 and N 844—186 of October 6, 1989 by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and the Council of Ministers.

Mirzayanov knew this information through reading classified documents, participation in closed meetings, etc., in keeping with his functional duties first as Senior Research Scientist at Laboratory 29 and since 1986 as the head of the branch Department Foreign Technical Counterintelligence.

We are sending you Mirzayanov’s personal files which include his character references.

Attachment: the personal file of V. S. Mirzayanov

N 10650 on 131 pages, non-confidential, to the addressee only

Deputy Director

A.V. Martynov

Annex 22

Top Secret

Copy N 1

THE MINISTRY OF SECURITY

OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Investigation Department

To Lieutenant General V.N. Zemlyanitsyn,

Head of the 8^th Department at the

General Staff Headquarters of the Armed Forces

of the Russian Federation

The Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation is investigating criminal case # 62, regarding Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov for disclosing information to the mass media about scientific research in the area of chemical weapons.

An expert commission was appointed to determine the authenticity and degree of secrecy of the information divulged by Mirzayanov. The 8^th Department at the General Staff Headquarters of the RF Armed Forces is entrusted with conducting the expertise.

We are sending the resolution dated November 10, 1992 and ask you to take charge of the expert investigation.

Appendix: -resolution dated November 10, 1992 on 6 pages, not classified

-package with the objects of research, top secret

Head of the Department,

Major General of Justice

S.D. Balashov

Annex 23

Top Secret

THE RF MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

GENERAL STAFF HEADQUARTERS

OF THE ARMED FORCES

8^th Department

To Major General S.D. Balashov,

Head of the Investigation Department,

of the Ministry of Security

of the Russian Federation

Moscow

December 8, 1992

N 317/5/836

Moscow K-160

In Response to the letter N 6/003088 from December 1, 1992

After the 8^th Department at the General Staff Headquarters of the RF Intelligence Service was re-organized, there were no specialists left who had access to [classified] works and documents on the indicated topic and who could, according to their area of specialty, evaluate the authenticity of the information presented in the materials produced, and for this reason the department can’t act as an expert enterprise for conducting the expertise on this criminal case.

ACTING HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT

Colonel

G.I. Funygin

Annex 24

Secret

Copy N 2

THE MINISTRY OF SECURITY

OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Investigation Department

To E.M. Primakov,

Director of the Russian Foreign

Intelligence Service

of the Russian Federation

December 10, 1992 N 6/03240

The Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation is investigating the criminal case of the former employee of the State Russian Science Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology, Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov, who was disclosing information about scientific research in the area of chemical weapons to the mass media.

An expert commission was appointed for determining the authenticity and degree of secrecy of the information divulged by Mirzayanov.

The accused Mirzayanov wrote a petition asking to include Reserve Major General Oleg Danilovich Kalugin, a former employee of Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, in the expert commission.

In connection with this, please inform us if job responsibilities of O. D. Kalugin entailed any kind of involvement with scientific research in the area of chemical weapons. Is he a specialist in the technology of special substances or the protection of secrets in the area of scientific research aimed at the development of chemical weapons?

Head of the Department,

Major General

S.D. Balashov

Annex 25

Secret

Copy 1.

OFFICE OF THE FOREIGN

INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

To Major General S.D. Balashov,

Head of the Investigation Department

of the Ministry of Security of Russia

December 17, 1992 N 153/5-13265

In response to N 6/03240 of December 10, 1992

Oleg Danilovich Kalugin, was born in 1934, has a higher humanitarian education, and has served in the Foreign Intelligence Services as a soldier and commander from 1958 until 1979. He was working in political intelligence, counterintelligence and supporting individuals and institutions abroad. His job responsibilities didn’t entail any kind of involvement with scientific research in the sphere of chemical weapons.

Deputy Director of the RF SVR [Foreign Intelligence Service]

of the Russian Federation

Major General

V.M. Rozhkov

Annex 26

Secret

THE MINISTRY OF SECURITY

OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Investigation Department

To Major General Yu. N. Lukonin,

Head of the Personnel Department

at the Ministry of Security

of the Russian Federation

December 10, 1992 N 6/03238

The Investigation Department of the RF Ministry of Security is investigating the criminal case of a former employee of the State Russian Science Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology, Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov, who was disclosing to the mass media information about scientific research in the field of chemical weapons.

An expert commission has been appointed to determine the authenticity and the degree of secrecy of the information divulged by Mirzayanov.

The accused Mirzayanov wrote a petition asking to include Reserve Major General O. D. Kalugin, a former employee of the KGB, in the expert commission.

In connection with this, please inform us if the job responsibilities of Oleg D. Kalugin entailed any kind of involvement with scientific research in the sphere of chemical weapons, if he was a specialist in the technology of special substances or the protection of secrets in the area of scientific research aimed at the development of chemical weapons.

Head of the Department,

Major General

S.D. Balashov

(For some reason there are two copies of this masterpiece of the KGB in my case. On the first there are the following official handwritten notations – V.M.):

For Comrade V.N. Kazakov

Comrade Yu. V. Novoselov

Comrade Yu. I. Smirnov

E.B. Soloviev

Please prepare a response,

Lukonin

December 11, 1992

Please work through this question with the Department of the MB [Ministry of Security] for St. Petersburg and Leningrad Region and with the Foreign Intelligence Service and prepare a response.

To A.V. Ilyakov

Please talk it over

Soloviev

December 15

It was discussed Ilyakov December 16, 1992

To A. Kuvshinov

Annex 27

Secret

To Major General S.D. Balashov,

Head of the Investigation Department

of the Ministry of Security

of the Russian Federation

We are reporting that as a result of studying the personal file of Reserve Major General O. D. Kalugin, which is kept in the Military-Mobilization Department of the MB of Russia for Moscow and the Moscow Region, it was established that he graduated in 1956 from the Leningrad Institute of Foreign Languages at the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers; his major was consultant-interpreter.

There is no information that his responsibilities during this period entailed involvement with scientific research in the field of chemical weapons. The Department of the MB of Russia confirms this information for St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region during the period of time when Oleg D. Kalugin worked at that department.

Deputy Head of the Personnel Department

of the MB of Russia.

Colonel

E. Soloviev

December 29, 1992

Annex 28

Secret

Copy N 1

THE MINISTRY OF SECURITY

OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Investigation Department

To Major General A.I. Gurov,

Head of NII [the Research Institute] for

the Problems of Security

of the Russian Federation

December 10, 1992 N 6/03239

The Investigation Department of the RF Ministry of Security is investigating the criminal case of the former employee of the State Russian Science Research Institute for Chemistry and Technology, Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov, who was disclosing information to the mass media about scientific research in the area of chemical weapons.

An expert commission has been appointed to determine the authenticity and degree of secrecy of the information divulged by Mirzayanov.

The accused Mirzayanov wrote a petition asking to include Colonel of Justice Petr Segreevich Nikulin, Deputy Head of NII for Problems of Security at the MB RF, in the expert commission.

In connection with this, please inform us if the job responsibilities of Petr S. Nikulin entailed any kind of involvement with scientific research in the area of chemical weapons. Is he a specialist in the technology of special substances or a specialist in the protection of state secrets in the area of scientific research aimed at the development of chemical weapons?

Head of the Department,

Major General

S.D. Balashov

Annex 29

Secret

Copy 1

THE MINISTRY OF SECURITY

OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The Research Institute for

Matters of Security

To Major General S.D. Balashov,

Head of the Investigation Department, of

the Ministry of Security

of the Russian Federation

December 16, 1992 N 5/NII/76

Moscow

In response to your inquiry regarding the former Deputy Head of the Research Institute for Matters of Security at the RF Ministry of Security, we are giving notice that during his work at the institute, Petr Sergeevich Nikulin never performed any work in the area of chemical weapons. He is neither a specialist in the technologies of special substances, nor a specialist in protecting state secrets in the area of scientific research aimed at the development of chemical weapons. Since January 24 of this year, Nikulin has been at the disposal of the Staff Headquarters of the RF Ministry of Security and currently he is retired from active service.

Head of the Institute,

Major General

A.I. Gurov

executed by S. A. Knut

Tel. 388-91-64

N 5/NII /76

Annex 30

Secret

Moscow February 24, 1993

Captain of Justice Shkarin, Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department at the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, in the presence of Nikolai Aleksandrovich Kuznetsov, Deputy Director for Science of the State Russian Science Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GRNIIOKhT), and witnesses: Valentina Ivanovna Lisitsyna, permanent address: Moscow, Ozernaya Street, Bldg. 38, and Galina Vyacheslavovna Mikhailovskaya, permanent address: Moscow, Magnitogorskaya Street, Bldg. 27, Apt. 43, being guided by the requirements stipulated in Articles 141, 178, 179, and 182 of the RSFSR Criminal and Procedural Code, in the office of the First Department of GRNIIOKhT examined Case N 73-3. The people listed above were advised that according to Article 169 of the RSFSR Criminal and Procedural Code, they have the right to observe all the actions of the investigator and to make statements to be included in the transcript of the report.

Witnesses Valentina I. Lisistyna and Galina V. Mikhailovskaya were also informed that, according to Article 13 of the RSFSR Criminal and Procedural Code, they were obliged to witness the fact, content, and outcome of the inspection.

Case N 73-3, inventory number 6291, in one volume, on 260 numbered pages in the dark-blue cardboard folder. In this case there is a document on pages 160-165 with the title “Technical order for a part of the experimental and design work of “Agent A-232” based on the system of components” and the cipher “Novichok-5,” stamp “Top Secret,” number 2187 ss/khf. The document contains 9 clauses. (Further, all the clauses are enumerated.)

[At the bottom of the last page of the original document there is a signature and the date, April 20, 1990, in blue ink.]

During the inspection, Kuznetsov explained that Agent A-232 mentioned in the technical order was the new chemical agent in its binary version, created at GRNIIOKhT. He said Agent A-208 is a known chemical agent of the VX type; Military Unit 36382 was deployed at the chemical test site in the Nukus area; signature and date, April 20, 1990. The official stamp on the document was executed by Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov, and this means that Mirzayanov, as head of the Foreign Technical Counterintelligence Department, was responsible for the research division which concerned itself with implementation of the requirements on maintaining state and military secrecy. It also meant that Mirzayanov read this technical order and agreed with the stipulated requirements on maintaining the state and military secrecy, while carrying out experimental and design work with the new chemical agent. (Signed by the participants of the inspection.)

Annex 31

Top Secret

Copy No 2

Series “F”

According to p. 4.7 of the List

AGREED UPON Confirmed by

Chief of 4984 VP MO

E.A. Umbliya

April 27, 1990

ACCORDED

with the notes from 1244-60/chf/2T-575

Chief of 458 VP MO

N.G. Ragulin

05.16.1990

Director of GOSNIIOKhT

V. A. Petrunin

05.04. 1990

ACCORDED

with the notes from 1244-60/chf/2T-575 ss

General director of NPO “Bazalt”

A. S. Obuchov

05.16. 1990

2187 ss/khf

1. THE DENOMINATION, CODE AND JUSTIFICATION FOR PERFORMING THE COMPOUND OF THE OKR [“OKR” stands for experimental design work – V.M.]

The OKR’s compound part Substance “A-232” based on a system of the components, the “Novichok-5” code, “The development, manufacture and delivery of bodies of the special products (models) of the Explosion Operation Mode for Field Tests of the System of components of the substance “A-232” is being carried out following the resolution of the Authority No 844-186, adopted on 10.06.89 [The Authority means Central Committee CPSU and the signature of it’s First Secretary General M. Gorbachev this time – V. M.], and tactical and technical assignment for the OKR.

(initial No 0076 khf of 12.07.89 of Military Unit 64518 – [a Special Unit of Ministry of Defense on the Special Weapons – V. M.]

2. GOAL OF CONDUCTING THE COMPOUND PART OF OKR

The provision of field tests of the system of the components of the substance “A-232” by bodies of special products (models)* of the explosive operation mode.

3. THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE COMPOUND PART OF OKR

3.1 To manufacture and deliver models of the explosion operation mode for conducting field tests of the system of components of Substance “A-232” in comparison with Substance “A-208”.

3.2 To participate in field tests in Military Unit v/ch 26382. [next to the city of Nukus –V.M.]

4. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR PERFORMING THE COMPOUND PART OF OKR

4.1 A quantity of models of the explosive operation mode of complement bundles (units) for conducting field tests must be manufactured, as a result of the work necessary, and also the technical documentation for them must be presented.

Cylinders for the system of components of the substance “A-232” and the substance “A- 208” must be delivered to the equipment charging place, and also bodies and completing units must be delivered to the test polygon [test site].

4.3 The effectiveness of the mixing mechanism and functioning of the models must be confirmed by the conclusion of NPO “Bazalt” in accordance with test results.

-Tests are being conducted in simulating equipment, within the temperature interval – 30 +50 Degrees on Celsius with the application of simulators, used by NPO “Bazalt” during the development of models of drawings 243.5.586.087 and 243.5.585.820 in 1987-1988. –I-3-6(BK)

4.4 The manufacture, delivery of models with completing units and participation in field tests are being realized in accordance with the agreement at GOSNIIOKhT.

Within a month after the approval of this Technical Order (TZ), NPO “Bazalt” drafts and complies with the GOSNIIOKhT project-timetable for completing this work.

*Bodies of special products (models) – further referred to as models.

5. TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS

5.1 285 models of the explosion operation mode must be manufactured, among them:

models of draw. 243.5.586.087-02 -133 pcs

models of draw. 243.5.586.087-12 -82 pcs

models of draw. 243.5.585.820-02 -50 pcs

models of draw. 243.5.585.820.12 -20 pcs

Models should have all the necessary completing parts, corresponding to drawings for each type of model, including pressure and temperature detectors, samplers and ejection valves.

5.2 The necessary number of containers must be developed and manufactured for transportation of filled and non-filled cylinders, for sets and assembled parts, as well as for bodies of all types of models. Containers should ensure the safety of their contents during shipment by rail transport to a distance up to 4,000 km, and by auto transport up to 1,000 km. The inspection can be allowed in accordance with the normative and technical documentation in effect.

5.3 Models must function properly within the range of temperature -30 +50 Degrees on Celsius.

5.4 All the necessary data on components, their mass (mass of the reaction mixture) contained in one model, and the parameters of the reaction and final substance must be provided by GOSNIIOKhT, following the request of NPO “Bazalt”.

5.5 The technical description of models with the assembly manual must be delivered to Military Unit v/ch 26382 for the assembly of filled models.

5.6 Model sets should contain tackles for assembly in field conditions.

2187 ss/khf

6. STAGES OF WORK

6.1 The provision of technical documentation to GOSNIIOKhT, VF GOSNIIOKhT [Volgograd branch of GOSNIIOKhT – V.M.] and Military Unit 26382 sufficient for the equipment, assembly and maintenance, and conducting of field tests.

Term – the IIIrd quarter of 1990.

6.2 The manufacturing of 44 models, including

models of draw.243.5.586.087-02 - 32 pcs

models of draw.242.5.585.820-02 – 8 pcs

models of draw.243.5.585.820-12 – 4 pcs

The delivery of all types of models to VF GOSNIIOKhT, the delivery of completing units and shells of models to Military Unit v/ch 26382

Term – the IVth quarter of 1990.

6.3 The participation in field tests in accordance with the Program.

Term – Ist quarter of 1991 – IInd quarter of 1992.

6.4 The manufacturing of 241 models, including

models of draw.243.5.586.087-02 – 101 pcs

models of draw.243.5.586.087-12 – 82 pcs

models of draw.243.5.585.820-02 – 42 pcs

models of draw.243.5.585.820-12 – 16 pcs

The delivery of cylinders – of all types to VF GOSNIIOKhT, the delivery of completing units and shells of models – to Military Unit v/ch 26382.

Term – May 1991

6.5 The summarization of the results of the work. The provision of a report with the results of the compound part of the OKR to GOSNIIOKhT.

Term – September 1992

6.6 The acceptance of the compound part of the OKR.

Term – October 1992

2187 ss/khf

7. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DOCUMENTATION

7.1 In the work process, the technical documentation for all types of models and completing units sufficient for the charge of models in factory and field conditions, assembly and field testing must be sent to GOSNIIOKhT, VF GOSNIIOKhT, v/ch 26382:

protocols of tests and the conclusion of the operation capability – to the address of GOSNIIOKhT;

drawings of models – to the addresses of GOSNIIOKhT, VF GOSNIIOKhT and Military Unit v/ch 26382;

technical description of the models with manuals on their assembly and maintenance –

to the address of GOSNIIOKhT and Military Unit v/ch 26382;

model cards – to the addresses of GOSNIIOKhT, VF GOSNIIOKhT and Military Unit v/ch 26382.

7.2 Report on the results of work must be printed in 4 copies, in accordance with requirements of GOST B15.110-81 and must contain:

- construction schemes of models;

- basic parameters of models;

- results of tests of operation capability.

8. ORDER OF THE ACCEPTANCE PF THE COMPOUND PART OF OKR

8.1 The consideration and acceptance of the compound part of OKR is carried out in accordance with requirements of GOST B15.204-79.

9. REQUIREMENTS ON THE PROVISIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF STATE AND MILITARY SECRECY DURING THE EXECUTION OF THE COMPOUND PART OF OKR

9.1 Requirements on the provision of secrecy.

9.1.1 The goal and purpose of the provisions of secrecy are to conceal the fact of the test and the goals of the work from an adversary and all unauthorized persons, including employees.

9.1.2 The provision of secrecy is conducted in accordance with the instruction 1026-87, Regulations on the Foliant Problem, and other normative documents.

9.1.3 The following information is subject to the protection by the organizational and regime means:

2187 ss/khf

- the fact of conducting of the compound part of OKR on systems of components, including the concrete enterprise;

- the goal of the compound part of OKR the composition of the system of components; properties of substances; test results.

9.1.4 The access to the present TZ must be strictly limited and carried out in accordance with the permission system, functioning at the enterprise (permission lists. 9.1.5 ). The level of secrecy of concrete data:

the theme on the whole – top secret, series “F”;

the fact of conducting OKR on the system of components,

including the concrete enterprise-

top secret, Series “F”;

the real name of Substance “A-232”, “A-208” – top secret, Series “F”;

the real name of Substance “A-255” – secret, Series “F”;

the fact of conducting the work with Substances “A-232”, “A-208” and “A-255”,

their physical-chemical and toxicological characteristics – top secret, Series “F”;

unequipped models, cylinders – not classified;

samples of imitators for the evaluation of the operation capability of models – not classified;

model, filled by imitator, after experiments in polygons of Industry and Defense Ministry – not classified.

The level of secrecy of other information and materials is being conducted in accordance with the legend “The development of models of ammunition of smoke character.”

9.2 Requirements on the Technical Counterintelligence.

9.2.1 There are no requirements on the Technical Counterintelligence on the stages of the manufacturing, evaluation of operational capability in the imitating mode and delivery of models.

The present OKR is not a subject for the state register.

Head of the laboratory N. P. Fedorov

Senior researcher A.A. Savkin

Researcher N.N. Andreev

Visas (signatures)

Mosyakin

Mirzayanov

04.23.90 04.19.90

04.20.90

2187 ss/khf

Annex 32

Top secret

from “ List of Major Information Constituting State Secrets”, confirmed by resolution N 1121-387 of USSR Counsel of Ministers on December 3, 1980.

Item 83. Information of the latest achievements in the area of science and technology (including discoveries, inventions, scientific and scientific technological solutions) which can be used for military purposes and have principal significance in bringing a new level of high-quality to the capabilities of arms and military machinery.

The same information allowing for the enhancement of capabilities or improving existing arms and military machinery, indicated in Item 1 and in paragraph 2 of this List.

Item 1. Information about the capacity or the creation and increase of capacities separately for the production of nuclear arms, strategic rockets, space units, units of anti-missile defense, arms with nuclear energetic units, and also for the main complete products for them disclosing the aforementioned capabilities, in the whole in the USSR, a Ministry or Departments, special important enterprise [factory].

Item 2 (paragraph 1). Information about the mobilization capabilities or the creation and increase of these capacities separately for the production of planes, helicopters, combat ships and rocket, artillery, armored, mortar-torpedo, anti-submarine arms, radio-technical units, units of hydro-location communications, infra red units, units of automatic systems of guidance, units of chemical and bacteriological defense, munitions, powders, explosive substances, liquid or solid rocket fuels, warm emitting elements for arms on the whole in the USSR, Union Republics, Ministry or Department.

Item 85. Information disclosing the significance, direction [trend], initial scientific technological ideas, applicability (realization capabilities) of perspective, to be planned or conducted fundamental or applied scientific research work in the interests of country’s defense.

The Extract is true. Senior investigator of

the MB RF Investigation Department

Captain of Justice

V. Shkarin

(v. 3, pp. 215, 216 of Case 62)

Annex 33

Top Secret

from the “List of Information to be Qualified as Secret by the USSR Ministry of the Petrochemical Industry” confirmed by order N 234-19 of the USSR Ministry of Petrochemical Industry on May 27 1991.

Item 5.3. Information enhancing capabilities or leading to improvement of existing arms and military machinery for classes of strategic rockets, space units, units of anti-rocket and anti-space defense, planes, helicopters, combat ships and rocket, artillery, armored, mortar-torpedo, and anti-submarine arms.

Item 5.5. Information disclosing the significance, trend, initial scientific research ideas, application capability (realization quality) of future perspective planned or conducted fundamental or applied scientific-technical work in interests of country’s defense.

The Excerpt is true.

Senior investigator of

MB RF Investigation Department

Captain of Justice

V. Shkarin

(v. 3, p. 217 of the Case 62).

Annex 34

Top Secret

Copy 1

Moscow

March 16, 1993

The commission of experts consisting of Chairman Yuri Mikhailovich Karmishin, head of a department at the State Institute for Technology of Organic Synthesis; members of the commission: Rim Kuzmich Balchenko, M.S. in Chemical Science and Deputy Director for Science at the State Institute for Technology of Organic Synthesis, Anatoly Mikhailovich Kochetkov, chief specialist of the joint-stock company “Tyazhorgsintez,” Igor Mikhailovich Gabov, leading specialist of the joint-stock company “Tyazhorgsintez,” Boris Alexseevich Kuznetsov, M.S. in Chemical Science and head of the laboratory at the State Russian Science Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GRNIIOKhT), Boris Petrovich Kosmynin, M.S. in Physical Chemistry and former senior research assistant at GRNIIOKhT, Colonel Yuri Alexeevich Klimentiev, M.S in Technical Science, military chemical engineer and chemist and head of a department at Military Unit 61469, Lieutenant Colonel Nikolai Grigorievich Pechenenko, Deputy Commander at the Military Unit 61469 for the Regime of Secrecy and Special Communications, Vadim Vasilievich Smirnitsky, engineer and chemist, head of the Representative Office on the Committee of Industrial Policy at the RF Ministry of Defense, Reserve Colonel Nikolai Iosifovich Chugunov, M.S. in Technical Science, engineer and chemist, and Reserve Colonel Arkady Egorovich Kordyukov, head of a department at Military Unit 52688; based on a resolution dated January 11, 1993, prepared by Captain of Justice Victor A. Shkarin, Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department at the MB RF, conducted an expertise commission to determine the authenticity and degree of secrecy of the information in criminal case N 62, according to Article 191 of the RSFSR Criminal and Procedural Code. The commission arrived at the following conclusion.

According to the instructions in carbon copy the following materials were at the disposal of the experts:

The materials are listed here.

[Also, my manuscripts and published articles are enumerated and the following two articles were also added – V.M.]:

- the article “The Binary Bomb has Exploded” published in the N 44 issue of the magazine “Novoe Vremya” in October 1992;

- the article “We Waged Chemical War on our own Territory” published in the N 210 issue of the newspaper “Nezavisimaya Gazetta” on October 30, 1992.

The decision of the experts was established based on the following questions:

a) What specific information about the research and works in the area of the development of chemical weapons did Mirzayanov disclose in his publications and interviews?

b) Does the information about the development of chemical weapons that can be found in the publications [all my manuscripts and articles are enumerated – V.M.] correspond to reality by volume and nature?

c) Is the information about the research and works in the area of the development of chemical weapons included by Mirzayanov in his articles, interviews, and manuscripts, factual? If the answer is affirmative, what is the degree of secrecy of this information? Does it constitute a state or work-related secret?

d) Did Mirzayanov’s actions have any negative consequences? If yes, specifically what consequences?

1. The texts of the examined documents contain information about the development of the new chemical agents in our country… The indicated information is true. In GOSNIIOKhT (now GRNIIOKhT) a new chemical compound has really been synthesized, studied, and tested that significantly surpasses the agent VX (a chemical agent adopted by the U.S. Army) by a complex of battle characteristics, including difficulties in curing.

According to the facts available, the armies of the countries that possess chemical weapons are not armed with any compounds analogous to the above-mentioned compound.

In 1992 this information was top secret and constituted a state secret, and it does so presently.

2. The texts of the documents examined contain information about the direction and results of the special purpose program in the area of the development of chemical weapons… The indicated information is true. GOSNIIOKhT has developed experimental batches of binary weapons based on the new chemical agents, which were successfully tested at the test site. According to the information available, foreign countries haven’t possessed this information before.

Clauses 2.1-2.6 contain information about the direction and resulting perspectives of long-term applied scientific research work on the development of binary weapons conducted in the interests of the defense of the country.

In 1992 this information was top secret and constituted a state secret, and it does so today.

The commission has no information (documents) at its disposal at this time about any negative consequences that Mirzayanov’s actions caused.

As a result of conducting the expert investigation, the commission has arrived at the following conclusions.

The excerpts from the manuscripts, publications, and interviews cited in the research part of the experts’ conclusion contain information about:

1. The latest achievements in the area of science and technology (results of the scientific research in the interests of the defense of the country) that allow the increase the potential of existing weapons (ammunition).

In 1992 this information was top secret and constituted a state secret, and it is still the case at the present time.

2. The direction and the resulting perspectives of long-term applied scientific research work on the creation of binary weapons carried out in the interests of the defense of the country. In 1992 this information was top secret and constituted a state secret, and it is still so today.

The signatures of the experts follow.

Experts V. V. Smirnitsky and

N. I. Chugunov didn’t sign.

Annex 35

Top secret

Moscow

March 18, 1993

The expert Nikolai Iosifovich Chugunov, Master of Technical Science, based on the resolution dated January 11, 1993, prepared by Captain of Justice Victor A. Shkarin, Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department at the MB RF, conducted an expertise to determine the authenticity and degree of secrecy of the information in criminal case N 62, according to Article 191 of the RSFSR Criminal and Procedural Code and came to this conclusion:

According to the instructions in carbon copy the following materials were at the disposal of the expert:

- The article “Inversion” published in “Kuranty” October 10, 1991;

- The taped manuscript of “Inversion”;

- The article “Poisoned Policy” published in “Moscow News” September 20, 1992;

There were listed 13 carbon copies of manuscripts and articles.

Further listed were the questions to be clarified by the expert:

The decision of the experts was established based on the following questions:

e) What specific information about the research and works in the area of the development of chemical weapons did Mirzayanov disclose in his publications and interviews?

f) Does the information about the development of chemical weapons that can be found in the publications [all my manuscripts and articles are enumerated – V.M.] correspond to reality by volume and nature?

g) Is the information about the research and works in the area of the development of chemical weapons included by Mirzayanov in his articles, interviews, and manuscripts, factual? If the answer is affirmative, what is the degree of secrecy of this information? Does it constitute a state or a work-related secret?

h) Did Mirzayanov’s actions have any negative consequences? If so, specifically what consequences?

- The Expert conducted the investigation and established there is information about research work in the field of the development of chemical weapons.

- Further, fragments from articles and manuscripts are listed containing information about chemical weapons development.

I can not determine whether the information listed above corresponds to reality, because I haven’t had any connection with scientific research work in the field of chemical weapons since 1988, and I don’t have any knowledge about the latest achievements in this area.

If the information stated is real, it can not be a state secret or a confidential business secret, because it doesn’t contain any data about the structure of a new chemical agent, and revealing information about it by this way can not cause negative consequences for the military-economical potential of the country or cause other severe results for the defense capability, state security or serious damage to the state’s political interests or any other damage to interests of state.

Expert

N.I. Chugunov

Annex 36

Top secret

Moscow

April 8, 1993

Captain of Justice Shkarin, Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, in accordance with the requirements of Article 192 of UPK RSFSR questioned the expert Nikolai Iosifovich Chugunov in his office …..

Interrogation started at 5:10 PM

Interrogation ended at 7:15 PM

Question: In the process of the Expertise examination of the credibility and the degree of secrecy of the information set forth in the Case N 62, you came to different conclusions than those of the majority of experts, and on March 18 1993 you wrote a separate conclusion in which you pointed out that there are no state secrets in field of research work on the development of chemical weapons in the materials brought to the Expertise. Clarify, why did you come to this conclusion?

Answer: From 1959 until 1988 I was involved in work connected with the testing of new chemical agents and munitions in their charged state, research work in the field of substantiation of their major trend and the program of development of chemical weapons, and also with the substantiation of tactical-technical requirements for new chemical agents. I was also a member of all the scientific-technical and coordination counsels in the field of the creation of chemical weapons.

From 1976 up to 1982 I was an expert and later an advisor at the Soviet-American negotiations and the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. In the last years I was working with the development of the basic direction of advancement of chemical weapons in the Defense Ministry of the USSR.

During the process of the Expertise, I analyzed all the materials presented and chose from them information which is related, as I supposed, to the field of chemical weapons. I pointed out this information in my conclusion. After evaluating this information, I concluded that it is impossible to actually derive anything about the achievements made in this area. The mention of a binary weapon, without giving the concrete components of this weapon, doesn’t lend itself to judgments about its specifications of construction, of its munitions and its effectiveness. The mention of a new chemical agent without its chemical name or formula doesn’t permit judgments to be made about the level of results achieved during the investigation of this kind of substance. Indicating the superiority of such a substance as 5-8 times that of a known analog is subject to a range of experimental error during the evaluation of the toxicity of all the analogs. I couldn’t determinate anything about the real chemical agent created at GOSNIIOKhT because of the lack of published chemical formulas and chemical names. Proceeding from this point, I came to the conclusion that the materials presented to the Expertise don’t contain state secrets in the field of chemical weapons.

Q: Does the information presented to the Expertise include materials about a new chemical agent created at GOSNIIOKhT and development of a binary weapon on its basis – information about the achievement of the results of scientific research work for the defense of the country?

A: I believe that this information is not information about the results of scientific research achieved in the interests of the country’s defense, because there is no information in the publications about whether this substance and its binary weapon passed through the stages of state tests with positive results.

Q: In Article 56 of “The Temporary List of Information Constituting State Secrets”, of N 733-55, confirmed on September 18 1992 stated that information about results achieved in the area scientific research, conducted in the interests of country’s defense is top secret and constitutes a state secret. In this article they pointed out the results, but didn’t specify whether they are positive or negative. What kind of explanation could you give in connection with this?

A: I don’t understand what kind of substance is discussed in the materials presented for the Expertise, what stage of testing it passed through or what kind of result was achieved. I know from experience that if the results of the state tests are positive, the degree of secrecy increases during the adoption of a tested example, and if the results are negative the degree of secrecy remains unchanged.

Q: You concluded in your conclusion of March 18 1993 that there is no work-related secret in the materials presented to the Expertise. Can you clarify this?

A: Yes. I’d like to clarify that all information which I indicated is information which constitutes a confidential business secret. I came to this conclusion on the basis of the abovementioned considerations. In my opinion it doesn’t represent a state secret and the government should not protect it.

Interrogated and conducted this transcript

Senior investigator of Investigation Department of

MB RF Captain of Justice

V.A. Shkarin

Annex 37

Top secret

Moscow

April 23, 1993

Captain of Justice Shkarin, Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, in accordance with the requirements of the Article 192 of UPK RSFSR questioned the expert Nikolai Iosifovich Chugunov in his office…..

Q: In connection with the petition by the indicted, V.S. Mirzayanov, I would ask you what will be included in “the goal-oriented program of scientific research work”, and is it possible to state that Mirzayanov revealed the results achieved by some concrete program of scientific research work?

A: It is necessary to understand that under the title of the goal-oriented program of scientific research would include work including the list of scientific research works confirmed by the decision of the government over the last 10 years, and the list of scientific research works each to be performed during 3-5 year periods of time. The timeframe for the completion of the concrete work doesn’t have any significance. Otherwise the common goal-oriented program of scientific research work is subdivided into several separate concrete programs of scientific research work concerning the direction and problems with definition of concrete goals to be achieved as a result of fulfilling each of these programs.

It’s difficult for me to answer the question as to whether Mirzayanov revealed the results of some kind of concrete program of scientific research work, because the materials presented to the Expertise don’t contain any information about a concrete program of scientific research and its elements. It is mentioned that they created “a new chemical agent and on its basis a binary weapon was developed” in GOSNIIOKhT. On the basis of this, it is possible to suppose that scientific research work was performed in this institute which probably had the goal of creating new chemical agents, and on their basis developing binary systems.

Mirzayanov’s reference in publications to the creation of a new chemical agent and the development of a binary system on its basis is evidence that he gave information about the generally achieved results of a program of scientific research work.

Interrogated and performed transcript:

Senior investigator of Investigation Department

Of MB RF captain of justice

V.A. Shkarin

Annex 38

Top secret

Moscow

March 17, 1993

The expert Vadim Vasilievich Smirnitsky, the chief representative of the Defense Ministry RF to the Committee of Industrial Policy of the Government of Russian Federation, according to a resolution dated January 11, 1993, prepared by Captain of Justice Victor A. Shkarin, Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department at the MB RF, conducted an expertise to determine the authenticity and degree of secrecy of the information in criminal case N 62, according to Article 191 of the RSFSR Criminal and Procedural Code and came to this conclusion.

According to the instructions in carbon copy the following materials were at the disposal of the expert:

- The article “Inversion” published in “Kuranty” October 10, 1991;

- The taped manuscript of “Inversion”;

- The article “Poisoned Policy” published in “Moscow News” September 20, 1992;

There altogether were listed 13 carbon copies of manuscripts and articles.

Further listed were the questions to clarify by the expert:

The decision of the experts was established based on the following questions:

i) What specific information about the research and works in the area of the development of chemical weapons did Mirzayanov disclose in his publications and interviews?

j) Does the information about the development of chemical weapons that can be found in the publications [all my manuscripts and articles are enumerated – V.M.] correspond to reality by volume and nature?

k) Is the information about the research and works in the area of the development of chemical weapons included by Mirzayanov in his articles, interviews, and manuscripts, factual? If the answer is affirmative, what is the degree of secrecy of this information? Does it constitute a state or a work-related secret?

l) Did Mirzayanov’s actions have any negative consequences? If so, specifically what consequences?

- The Expert conducted the investigation and established there is information about the research work in the field of development of chemical weapons.

- Further, fragments from articles and manuscripts are listed containing information about chemical weapons development.

1. I can not determine if it truly does constitute information that is a state secret about research work in the area of the development of chemical weapons listed in items 1-6, because I haven’t had any connection with scientific research works in the area of chemical weapons since 1980.

2. Divulging the information mentioned didn’t cause any damage to the defense capabilities of the Russian Army because:

a. the information about a newly synthesized chemical agent doesn’t reveal:

• the chemical or conventional name of the newly synthesized chemical agent;

• its physical or chemical properties, which are indispensable characteristics of any synthesized product;

• the name and quantitative ratio of the components of the binary system;

• information about what types of ammunition the new chemical agent was intended for; or,

• information about whether the Army adopted the chemical agent as a weapon.

b. Information doesn’t clarify the evaluation of toxicity in comparison with the chemical agent VX-gas (inhalation or resorption toxicity, reaction time, stability on the ground, sensitivity of indication, insured time of storage etc.).

c. The mention of the Polygon at Shikhany and in the Ustjurt Plateau isn’t new information because at an early time these places were revealed in the mass-media, including in the article by Birjukov and Karpov “To beat swords into ploughshares” in Trud, N64 April 15, 1992.

Expert

V.V. Smirnitsky

Annex 39

Top secret

Moscow

March 22, 1993

Captain of Justice Shkarin, Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation in accordance with the requirements of Article 192 UPK RSFSR questioned the expert Vadim Vasilievich Smirnitsky in his office ….. who showed his identification card N … of retired Major General.

Interrogation started at 10:25 PM

Q: In the process of the Expertise examination of the credibility and degree of secrecy of the information set forth in Case N 62, you came to different conclusions than those from the majority of experts and on March 18 1993 you executed a separate conclusion in which you pointed out that you couldn’t determine the authenticity and degree of secrecy of the information of materials in area of chemical weapons, represented to the Expertise. Clarify, why did you come to this conclusion?

A: I couldn’t determine the authenticity and degree of secrecy of the information, i.e. whether it constitutes a state secret or a work-related secret, because I don’t have any information about work conducted in GOSNIIOKhT after 1980 in the area of chemical weapons.

Q: Without determining the authenticity and degree of secrecy of the information, you did nevertheless reach the conclusion that its revelation didn’t cause any damage to the defense capabilities of Russian Army. How it is possible to speak out about causing damage through the revelation of information without determining its authenticity?

A: I’ve evaluated the damage from the perspective of causing damage to the defense capabilities of the Army.

Q: Judging by your experience, you don’t assume that this information can not be authenticated?

A: No, I can not suppose so because I have no idea about it since 1980, as I pointed out.

Q: But if, let us assume, this information can not be authenticated, i.e. the mentioned works were not carried out and no new chemical agents were created, how it is possible to state no damage was caused by the revelation of information which could not be authenticated?

A: I gave a common military scientific evaluation of information related to chemical agents which could cause damage for the defense capabilities of our Army. The materials presented to the Expertise don’t contain this information.

Q: There are questions to be answered, as presented in the resolution on the designation of the Expert Commission from January 11 1993, about the authenticity and degree of secrecy of information about the research work in area of chemical weapons including the question about damage caused by revelation of this information. You are speaking about a common military scientific approach for evaluating damage.

A: I am answering the concrete question of the resolution – “Did the actions of Mirzayanov cause any negative consequences? If so what are they really?”

Interrogation finished at 12:05 PM.

Interrogated and composed transcript

Senior investigator of Investigation

Department of MB RF

Captain of Justice

V.A. Shkarin

Annex 40

Top secret

Moscow

March 30, 1993

Captain of Justice Shkarin, Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation in accordance with the requirements of the Article 192 UPK RSFSR in his office questioned the expert Anatoly Mikhailovich Kochetkov… (following personal data).

Interrogation started at 5:15 PM

Interrogation finished at 6:35 PM

Q: You came to the conclusion in Findings of the Expertise on March 16, 1993 that the materials presented to the Expertise contain state secrets about the latest achievements in the area of science and technology (results of scientific research work in the interests of the country’s defense) capable of upgrading the capabilities of existing weaponry (munitions) and also about the trend and the results perspective scientific research work on the creation of binary weapons. On what basis did you make this conclusion?

A: Since 1986 I have been a chief of the Special Technical Department of the Main Administration (GlavK) of the Heavy Organic Synthesis of the Ministry of the Chemical Industry (Minkhimprom) for the coordination of problems in area of the development and production of chemical weapons.

From the content of the materials presented to the Expertise, it follows that they mention a chemical nerve agent developed at GOSNIIOKhT which is superior in its “combat characteristics” to the known VX-gas and the development of a binary system on its basis. On the basis of this data, and proceeding from my special knowledge in the specific area of the development of chemical weapons, I came to the conclusion that in this particular case the issue is about chemical agent “A-232”, created at GOSNIIOKhT by order of the USSR Defense Ministry. This substance has had a stronger toxicity than VX-gas and it is difficult to cure people poisoned with it. Because of that, I developed the conclusion that the creation of this substance was the latest achievement in field of science.

There is information in the presented materials about the development of a binary version on the basis of the new chemical agent. This information discloses the trend and the results of perspective scientific research work conducted on the creation of a binary chemical weapon. These works are perspective because they allow for the simplification of the production of the weapon and problems of its storage.

Q: What about information other than that presented in the findings?

A: Like the other members of the Expert Commission, I came to the conclusion that it doesn’t constitute a state secret.

Q: Has the secrecy of scientific research work in area of the creation of chemical weapons been downgraded to a degree, due to the signing by Russian Federation of the CWC on January 13 1993?

A: From 1989 up to the present time, I have been an expert on the problems of the prohibition of chemical weapons from the chemical industry at the bilateral Russian-American negotiations and I was participating in the preparation of the Expert Conclusions for texts of the CWC. The CWC doesn’t have provisions for publications of the results of scientific research work in the area of creation of chemical weapons.

In our country information about scientific research in the area of development of chemical weapons from 1974 up to the current time is a specifically protected state secret. The CWC has provisions only for the declaration of establishments where mostly the works on the creation of chemical weapons were carried out. I’d like to remind everyone that the CWC will enter into force no earlier than January 13 1995.

Interrogated and composed transcript

Senior investigator Investigation

Department of MB RF

Captain of Justice

V.A. Shkarin

Annex 41

Top secret

Moscow

April 8, 1993

Captain of Justice Shkarin, Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation in accordance with the requirements of Article 192 UPK RSFSR in his office questioned the expert Boris Alekseevich Kuznetsov… working in GOSNIIOKhT as chief of laboratory…

Interrogation started at 3:10 PM

Interrogation finished at 5:35 PM

Question: In the conclusion of March 16 1993, you concluded that there is information which contains state secrets in the materials presented to the Expertise about new achievements in the area of science and technology (results of scientific research work in the interests of the defense of the country), and also about the direction and the results of perspective scientific research work for the creation of binary weapons being conducted in interests of the country’s defense.

On what basis did you deduce your conclusion?

A: I have been working at GOSNIIOKhT since 1971, from 1986 on I have been the chief of a laboratory at this institute, and I was directly working on the development of the technology of production for the new chemical agents.

During the expert investigations of materials presented to the Expertise and on the basis of the fact that the production in recent years of a nerve-paralytic chemical agent which exceeds in its “combat characteristics” the well-known VX-gas as well as the development of a binary system on its basis were mentioned, I came to the conclusion that in this case the topic under discussion is the chemical agent “A-232” which was created by GOSNIIOKhT. I was directly working with this substance and I know the whole list of its properties including the difficulty of curing poisoning, which exceeds that of the known chemical agent VX-gas. They issued patents in the course of the scientific studies of it and the technology of its production, which is evidence that it is a matter of the newest achievement in the area of science and technology, in particular, in chemistry and the technology of chemical agents. Moreover up to the present time, Russian specialists don’t know whether similar substances were developed in the USA or in other countries conducting research work in area of chemical weapons. I can insist on that because I have clearance for informative materials coming to our institute and other related organizations. These research works were conducted in the interests of the defense of the country. By presenting to the Expert Conclusion proofs other than these, about the fact that the creation of this substance as the newest achievement, additional components of information about this agent could be disclosed which constitute a state secret.

There are in the materials presented to the Expertise information about the development of a new chemical agent of a binary system and its production. This information is disclosing the direction and results of perspective scientific work on the creation of a binary weapon conducted in the interests of the country’s defense. These are perspective works because the binary technology of production of any chemical agent is a new step in the development of chemical weapons.

Q: What about information related to the development of chemical weapons other than information pointed out in materials presented to the Expertise?

A: During the expertise I came to the conclusion that other kinds of information about chemical weapons in materials presented to expertise doesn’t constitute a state secret.

Q: Hasn’t the degree of secrecy of the information about scientific research work conducted earlier in the area of the creation of chemical weapons been downgraded, due to the signing on January 13 1993 by Russian Federation of the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling and se of Chemical Weapons and of their Destruction?

A: I was involved from 1985 on by the Ministry of Chemical Industry in the expert work on the development of the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention. From 1988 up to 1991, I was directly participating in the negotiations on chemical weapons in Geneva, in the staff of the Soviet delegation. Because of this I declare that information which constitutes a state secret in the materials presented to the Expertise are related to information on the development of chemical weapons. Disclosure of such information on the development of chemical weapons is not foreseen by provisions of the Convention. So, this information is a property of the state and can be divulged only with its consent.

I know exactly as a participant of the negotiations that at the state level this information was not transmitted to other states.

A: During the investigation indicted Mirzayanov declared that after the publication in the 1991 article “Inversion” in “Kuranty”, an unpleasant relationship developed between him and you. How you can comment on this statement?

Q: I didn’t have a relationship with Mirzayanov, due to my duties of scientific and service activities. So, we didn’t have any relationship, and we were simply acquaintances. I am not accepting Mirzayanov’s accusations of Soviet experts working at the negotiations as directed towards me, because he didn’t mention my last name in this publication and there were many other experts. Personally I don’t have any enmity toward him.

Interrogated and composed transcript

Senior investigator of Investigation

Department of MB RF

Captain of Justice

V.A. Shkarin

Annex 42

Top secret

Moscow

April 29, 1993

Captain of Justice Shkarin, Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation in accordance with the requirements of Article 192 UPK RSFSR questioned the expert Igor Michailovich Gabov in his office.

Interrogation started at 3:05 PM

Interrogation finished at 4:55 PM

Question: In connection with the indicted Mirzayanov’s petition I’d ask you to clarify whether the conclusions of Expert Commission from March 16 conform to the formulation of Article 56 of the Temporary List of Information Constituting State Secrets?

A: During the course of the Expert examination, I came to the conclusion that materials presented to the Expertise do contain information on the results achieved of scientific research work conducted within the framework of a goal-oriented program of scientific research in interests of the country’s defense.

Q: You are presented the excerpt of Resolution of the government of Russian Federation March 30 1993 N 256-16 “On making amendments and additions to the Temporary List of Information of state secrecy”, in accordance with it the Temporary List of information constituting state secrets agrees with Clause 122 “Information that discloses the content of former or current works in the area of chemical or biological weapons, or the essence of those works, the results achieved, as well as information on the protocols of synthesis, production technologies, or articles of production equipment.” What kind of clarification can you give us in connection with this?

A: After being familiarized with the Resolution of the Government presented, I came to the conclusion that it is directed particularly for the protection of previously achieved results of completed works in the area of chemical weapons and it is a confirmation of correctness of the conclusion of the Experts who signed a common resolution.

Interrogated and composed transcript

Senior investigator of Investigation

Department of MB RF

Captain of Justice

V.A. Shkarin

Annex 43

Top Secret

The Council of Ministers

Government of the Russian Federation

Moscow

March 30, 1993 N 256-16

On making amendments and additions to the Temporary List of Information of state secrecy.

The Council of Ministers – the Government of the Russian Federation resolves:

1. To introduce the following amendments and additions to the Temporary List of Information of state secrecy approved on September 18, 1992 by Resolution N 733-55 of the Government of the Russian Federation:

a) To use the following wording for Sub-clause “a” of Clause 1:

“a) nuclear ammunition, strategic missiles, rocket launching devices, military purpose space vehicles, rocket carriers for them, anti-missile and anti-space defense facilities, weapons based on new physical or other new principles or special facilities of defense from them, arms with nuclear power plants, systems for warning of a missile attack, systems of space control, military deep-water technical facilities, strategic aviation, as well as its major components within the Russian Federation on the whole, its republics, ministries, departments, enterprises with a special regime or of special importance;”

b) To add Clause 122 that reads as follows to Section IX “Miscellaneous information”:

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is giving notice that these amendments and additions are to be brought to the notice of the ministries and departments of the Russian Federation, the executive bodies of the republics within the Russian Federation, the territories, regions, autonomous districts, the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

2. To the heads of the ministries and departments of the Russian Federation, to take into consideration the amendments and additions stipulated by this resolution, while developing temporary departmental lists of information subject to security classification.

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation should provide the required assistance in this work.

V. Chernomyrdin,

Chairman of the Council of Ministers

Government of the Russian Federation

Annex 44

Top Secret

Copy 2

To V. A. Petrunin, Director of the State Russian Science

Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology

April 22, 1993 6/001580

111024, Moscow, 23 Shosse Entuziastov

The Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation is investigating the criminal case of Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov, who in 1992 disclosed information to the mass media about the results of scientific research conducted at GRNIIOKhT on the creation of a new chemical agent and the development of a binary weapon based on it.

In connection with this, we ask you to inform us if the research on the creation of Chemical Agent A-232 was conducted within the framework of some specific special goal-oriented program, and if so, is the creation of the new chemical agent and the development of a binary system based on it the result of scientific research work conducted within the scope of this program? Is such research being carried out presently, and if it has been discontinued, when and on the basis of what normative act was this decision based?

We also ask you to check if this appointed program for scientific research and experimental and design work on the aforementioned chemical agent has a state standard, and if so, please tell us about it.

Head of the section at the Department

A.A. Shabunin

Annex 45

Top Secret

Copy 1

STATE RUSSIAN SCIENCE

RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR

ORGANIC CHEMISTRY AND

TECHNOLOGY

To A.A. Shabunin, head of the

Section of the Investigation Department

at the Ministry of Security

of the Russian Federation

In response to N 6/001580 of April 22, 1993

In response to your request, we inform you that the research on the development of Agent A-232 was conducted within the framework of a special goal-oriented program under Resolution N 103-43 of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers dated January 31, 1983, and declared by Decree N 131-27 of the Ministry of Chemical Industry of the USSR dated March 25, 1983.

The research work aimed at the creation of a binary system based on Agent A-232 was conducted within the framework of the special goal-oriented program under Resolution N 844-186 of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers on October 6, 1989, and was declared by the Decree N 22-2 of the Ministry of Chemical Industry of the USSR dated September 11, 1989.

The development and thorough screening of the new chemical agent and the creation of a binary system based on it was the result of scientific research conducted within the framework of the indicated program.

Currently this research has concluded. Generally speaking, all scientific research work on the development of chemical weapons (works of the Foliant program) stopped on January 1, 1993, in compliance with Resolution N 518-33 of the Russian Federation dated July 24, 1992, and declared by Decree N D/12-11 of the Ministry of Industry of the Russian Federation dated September 18, 1992. The same decree prescribed that all participants of the above mentioned works take measures to protect state secrets under the Foliant program.

As a rule, the direction of the special purpose program mentioned above includes few research, experimental, and design works.

The Ministry of Defense develops a tactical-technical task specification, compiled in accordance with the State Standards V 15.101-79 for scientific research work or with State Standard V 15.201-83 for experimental and design work, for each separate work from those that are included in the program.

Deputy Director

N.A. Kuznetsov

Annex 46

Secret

Copy N 2

To Colonel General M.P. Kolesnikov,

Head of the General Staff of the

Armed Forces of the

Russian Federation

April 22, 1993 6/01584

The Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation is investigating the criminal case of V. S. Mirzayanov, who disclosed information to the mass media about scientific research in the area of chemical weapons. In connection with this development we are asking for the following necessary information.

1. Is the Temporary List of Information of state secrecy, approved by the government of the Russian Federation on September 18, 1992, by Decree N 733-55 on the whole and by Clause 56 of this list in particular, aimed at the protection of information about scientific research in the area of the development of chemical weapons in our country? Does the term “ammunition” indicated in the Sub-clause “C” of Clause 1 of the List cover ammunition equipped with military chemical agents?

2. Is the List of the Main Information of state secrecy approved by the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers on December 3, 1980 in Resolution N 1121-387 on the whole and in Paragraph 2 of Clause 83 and Clause 85 of this List in particular, aimed at the protection of information about scientific research in the area of the development of chemical weapons in our country? Does the term “ammunition” indicated in Paragraph 1 of Clause 2 of the List cover ammunition equipped with military chemical agents?

Head of the Department,

Major General

S.D. Balashov

Annex 47

Secret

Copy N 1

GENERAL STAFF HEADQUARTERS

OF THE ARMED FORCES

OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Eighth Department

To Major General S.D. Balashov,

Head of the Investigation Department, of

the Ministry of Security

of the Russian Federation

May 12, 1993

N 317/5/0 397 in response to N 6/01584

We have considered your letter regarding the clarifications of the clauses of the Lists of Information of state secrecy. Clause 56 of the Temporary List of Information of state secrecy, approved by the government of the Russian Federation on September 18, 1992, in Decree N 733-55, provides for the determination of the degree of secrecy of the information about the goal-oriented programs, scientific research decisions or the achievements of scientific research, and experimental design work in the interests of the defense and the security of the country, including the development of weapons. The term “ammunition” covers different kinds of ammunition including ammunition equipped with military chemical agents. Additionally, Clauses 54, 55, 61, and 63 of this Temporary List are aimed at protecting the information about scientific research, including a qualitatively new level of potential for arms and military technology.

While defining the degree of secrecy of information in the area of scientific research, including the development of armaments, you can extend the explanations mentioned above to the List of the Major Information of state secrecy approved by the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers dated December 3, 1980, in Resolution N 1121-387 and in particular by Paragraph 2 of Clause 83 and Clause 85 of this list; it was expedient to use the clarifications which are indicated above. For a more detailed interpretation of the terms and notions mentioned in the List of the Major Information of state secrecy, it is necessary to look for it from those who compiled in 1980, the MB RF.

Annex 48

Secret

Copy N 2

6/01341/April 5, 1993

To Colonel General M.P. Kolesnikov,

Head of the General Staff Headquarters

of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

The Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation is investigating the criminal case, in which Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov, a former employee at the State Russian Science Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GRNIIOKhT), is accused of committing a crime stipulated by Article 75, Part 1, of the RSFSR Criminal Code.

It was established during the investigation, that in 1992 Mirzayanov disclosed information to the mass media that constitutes a state secret, about the creation of a new chemical agent and the development of a binary system based on it being created at GRNIIOKhT by order of the Ministry of Defense. In connection with this please inform us if the General Staff Headquarters of the VSRF [Armed Forces of the Russian Federation] has any information about any negative consequences to the defense capability of Russia created by Mirzayanov’s actions indicated above.

Head of the Department

Major General

S.D. Balashov

Annex 49

Secret

Copy N. 1

General Headquarters

of the Armed Forces

of the Russian Federation

To Major General S.D. Balashov,

Head of the Investigation Department

at the Ministry of Security

of the Russian Federation

April 29, 1993

N 312/10/053

In response to N 6 01341 of April 5, 1993

The Ministry of Defense has considered your request for information about any kind of negative consequences for the defense capability of Russia that resulted from V. Mirzayanov’s disclosure of information that constitutes a state secret.

In his publications and interviews V. Mirzayanov discloses information about the results of our research and development work in the field of chemical weapons, which is currently not prohibited by any of the existing international agreements.

Additionally, in V. Mirzayanov’s publications information is presented in such detail, which is not stipulated either by the multilateral Convention for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or in the bilateral agreements on chemical weapons between Russia and the U.S. After the international agreements mentioned above come into effect, each state-participant will be required only to report “the location, character and general sphere of activity” of the sites for the development [of chemical weapons].

In this way, not one of the other countries which developed (and continue at the present time in the absence of international bans) the development of new kinds of chemical weapons will declare any such detailed information about the results of their research and development in this area, including the names of specific substances and their properties based on the results of testing.

V. Mirzayanov published ahead of the time agreed, information about the sites where chemical weapons were developed and described the nature of their activity, (In other countries this has been kept a secret up to the present time, and the question being discussed is what sites were “mainly” involved in the development and must be declared after the Convention enters into force) and he also revealed information in such detail that is not stipulated in the terms of the Convention – a comparison of the toxic characteristics and battle properties of the samples developed, the sites of their development, the accumulation of experimental batches and tests, and conventional names of these new substances and the overall development programs [italicized by me—V.M.]. The published information caused a negative reaction from the U.S. during the bilateral negotiations for banning chemical weapons in Geneva. This is confirmed by the fact that the American delegation accused Russia of failing to provide information at the first stage of the Wyoming Memorandum on chemical weapons, about the alleged development production and storage of a significant quantity of chemical agents (CA) in Russia, as were mentioned in Vil Mirzayanov’s publications, although there are no such stockpiles of such chemical agents. At the same negotiations the American side (referring to V. Mirzayanov’s indicated publications) took steps to introduce additional commitments, according to which Russia should unilaterally disclose the results of its research and development work in the field of chemical weapons. Additionally, these publications created a precedent for requesting similar commitments from Russia within the framework of the multilateral Convention, while other countries that keep such information a secret will declare only very general information regarding the nature of their activities on the development of chemical weapons after the Convention enters into force. These publications caused real political harm to Russia and undermined its authority in the international arena. A false impression was created that Russia allegedly doesn’t comply with existing commitments in the area of the prohibition of chemical weapons. Thus, V. Mirzayanov’s publications are currently causing military damage by unilaterally disclosing information about the results of our research and development work in the field of chemical weapons in such detail, which is not stipulated for other countries within the framework of future disclosures after the Convention for the Prohibiting of Chemical Weapons and other international agreements in this area enter into force. Additionally, a precedent was created for other countries to raise demands for Russia after the Convention enters into effect, to unilaterally give even more detailed information about the full names and detailed properties of the samples that were developed, which could be used by the states of the “third world” to meet their ends and facilitate the spread of chemical weapons.

Head of the General Staff,

Colonel General

M. Kolesnikov

Annex 50

Secret

Copy N 2

To V.P. Ivanov,

Chairman of the RF Committee for

Chemical and Petrochemical Industry

6/01342 April 5, 1993

The Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation is investigating the criminal case of Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov, a former employee at the State Russian Science Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GRNIIOKhT), who is charged with committing a crime under Article 75, Part 1, of the RSFSR Criminal Code. It was established during the investigation that in 1992 Mirzayanov disclosed information to the mass media that constitutes a state secret about the creation of a new chemical agent and the development of a binary system based on it being created at GRNIIOKhT, by order of the Ministry of Defense.

In connection with this, please inform us if the General Staff Headquarters of the RF Armed Forces has any information at its disposal (underlined by me—V.M.) about Mirzayanov’s above-mentioned actions having any negative consequences for the defensive capabilities of Russia.

Head of the Department

Major General

S.D. Balashov

Annex 51

Secret

Copy N. 1

Russian Federation

Committee for

Chemical and Petrochemical Industry

To S.D. Balashov, Head of the

Investigation Department at the

Ministry of Security of

The Russian Federation

10185

Tsentr, ul. Myasnitskaya, 20

April 13, 1993, N 629 s in response to N 6/ 01342 of April 5, 1993

According to the evaluation of the specialists from the Committee for Chemical and Petrochemical Industry, V. S. Mirzayanov’s publications in the mass media caused moral and economic damage, along with disclosing top secret information. After these publications, part of the world and the Russian public started to doubt that the production of chemical weapons had been discontinued in Russia as our government had claimed in 1987. Since the people who live in the regions where the plants are located that produced chemical weapons in the past were misinformed, it is creating a tense situation around these enterprises; in particular an example of this is the rejection of the proposal to carry out the destruction of chemical weapons on the premises of the Cheboksary PO Khimprom. As a result, this [suggested] placement threatens to disrupt Russia’s fulfillment of its international agreements on the destruction of the stockpiles of chemical weapons, and also the program for the destruction of chemical weapons will entail sharply higher costs because the Cheboksary PO Khimprom can’t be used for this purpose.

Concerning, evaluating the negative consequences of Mirzayanov’s actions for the defensive capability of Russia, this question is outside the competence of the Committee for Chemical and Petrochemical Industry.

Chairman

V.P. Ivanov

Annex 52

Secret

Copy N 2

To G.V. Berdennikov,

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the

Russian Federation

6/01343/April 5, 1993

The Investigation Department of the RF Ministry of Security is investigating the criminal case in which Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov, a former employee at the State Russian Science Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GRNIIOKhT), is charged with committing a crime stipulated by Article 75, Part 1, of the RSFSR Criminal Code. It was established during the investigation that in 1992 Mirzayanov disclosed information to the mass media that constitutes a state secret about the creation of a new chemical agent and the development of a binary system based on it at GRNIIOKhT at request of the Ministry of Defense. In connection with this, please inform us if the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] of Russia has any information about any kind of negative consequences to the political or any other interests of the Russian Federation that resulted from Mirzayanov’s above-mentioned actions.

Head of the Department

S.D. Balashov

Annex 53

Secret

Copy N 1

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Of the Russian Federation

121200, Moscow, G-200

32/34 Smolensko-Sennaya Pl.

Tel. 244-16-06

May 11, 1993 N 61/drk

To S.D. Balashov, Head of the

Investigation Department at the RF

Ministry of Security

In response to 6/01343 of April 5, 1993

In connection with your inquiry into the case of V. S. Mirzayanov, the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs can respond in the following way.

Currently it has become impossible to determine what generated a greater resonance in the country and abroad – the publications of Vil S. Mirzayanov or the fact that criminal proceedings were instituted against him on charges of disclosure of state secrets, since it was the latter that was perceived as confirmation of the information contained in these publications.

The RF MID has no information at its disposal about the authenticity of the information mentioned in the articles or about what the extent of the damage was to our national security as a consequence of the investigation of the disclosure of information about the development of binary chemical weapons.

Nevertheless, we can verify that the campaign in the Russian and foreign mass media that developed in connection with V. S. Mirzayanov’s case served as the basis of the expression of concern on the part of the U.S., and requests arose for clarification of the situation. The U.S. National Academy of Sciences appealed personally to the RF President on this issue. However, no one has observed that our relations with the U.S. and other countries have become complicated so far. During the top-level Russian-American meeting in Vancouver it was noted that progress was achieved at the bilateral negotiations between Russian and U.S. on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

With respect,

Deputy Minister

G. Berdennikov

Annex 54

We are distributing the text of the statement of President B. N. Yeltsin of the Russian Federation on the issue of chemical weapons.

Statement made by the President of the Russian

Federation on the issue of the destruction of chemical weapons

In the past few months the public in a number of regions has been seriously concerned about the issue of the destruction of chemical weapons.

In the preceding decades, tens of thousands of tons of military chemical agents have been produced and stockpiled in Russia. The world has changed, and Russia’s position in the world has changed: we are not going to attack anybody. The time has come to rid ourselves of chemical weapons which we have inherited from the past legacy. This is not only Russia’s view, but also the opinion shared by the one hundred and thirty eight countries which have signed the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons this year in Paris.

We must begin the destruction of chemical weapons, proceeding from the requirements not only of international, but also of national security; as the shells and containers are steadily deteriorating and can’t be stored indefinitely. These weapons were produced over the course of many years at several plants. The destruction process will be difficult and a substantial period of time will be required for its implementation. However, it has to be started. A government program for the destruction of chemical weapons is currently being prepared. It will be based upon the following principles:

- Unconditional guarantee of the safety of the life and health of the population, as well as of the condition of the surrounding natural environment;

- Unconditional fulfillment of all the social needs of the population living in the zone of influence of the chemical weapons destruction facilities;

- Use of the latest technologies, making it possible to minimize the risk and also, in cases where feasible, to extract valuable chemical substances as a result of the destruction;

- Reduction to the minimum of the volume of transportation of chemical agents, within the Russian territory.

The work on the destruction of chemical weapons will begin only after positive conclusions [have been reached] by state environmental-protection experts regarding the Program as a whole and at each individual facility. Such an expert evaluation will definitely involve the participation not only of scientists and specialists, but also of representatives of public organizations, including environmental organizations, on both the all-Russian and regional levels.

I am requesting the executive bodies of Udmurtiya, Chuvashiya, and the Saratov Region to ensure their active involvement in development of this program, in the determination of the priorities and terms of its preparation and in carrying out the work of the destruction of chemical weapons. Such participation will help transform this endeavor – an unavoidable step for Russia – into a powerful lever for the socio-economic development of significant territories of the country, while strictly ensuring the observance of guarantees for the safety of the population. A substantial part of the funds under this program will be channeled towards solving regional issues of public health protection, the protection of motherhood and childcare, as well as towards the construction of housing accommodations, social and community services, roads, and other infrastructure.

The mountains of now useless and dangerous weapons are a heavy burden inherited from the legacy of our past. Russia must be saved from it, in the interests of its own security and in the interests of the security of the whole world.

Annex 55

Top Secret

Indictment

C O N F I R M A T I O N

Deputy Attorney General

of the Russian Federation

3^d Class State Councilor

E.G. Denisov

“25” November 1993

Concerning Criminal Case N 62, about the indictment of Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov for committing a crime according to Part 1 of Clause 75 of the Criminal Code (UK) of the RSFSR.

This criminal case was initiated by the Investigation Department of the Security Ministry of the Russian Federation on October 19, 1992, on the basis of materials received from the Department of Economic Security of the MB RF about divulging state secrets in the article “Poisoned Policies” published in the N 38 issue of the newspaper Moscow News on September 16, 1992.

v. 1, p.p. 1, 18-27

On October 22, 1992 Mirzayanov was detained according to Clause 122 of the Criminal and Procedural Code (UPK); on October 24 the status was changed to that of an arrest. On November 2, 1992 by resolution of the Kalinin District Court of Moscow, his preventative arrest was changed into non-departure status.

v. 1, p.p. 166-167, 181-182, 189-190

On October 30, 1992 criminal procedures were instituted against Mirzayanov for divulging information constituting a state secret, i.e., for committing a crime according to Part 1 of Clause 75 UK of the RSFSR.

v. 1, p.p. 191-193, 229-232

V.S. Mirzayanov was working during the period from 1965 up until January 1992 at different positions in GOSNIIOKhT, including the position of Head of the branch Foreign Technical Counterintelligence Department, and because of his duties he was knowledgeable about information of state secrecy concerning research work in area of development of chemical weapons.

After he was fired from the institute, in August 1992 in Moscow Mirzayanov prepared for publication in the press a manuscript titled “The Chemical Sharashka is Waiting for American Assistance” in which he included information known to him in connection his duties and constituting state secrets about the latest achievements in area of science and technology (results of research work in interest of country’s defense) that allowed enhancement of the capabilities of existing arms (munitions), the direction and the results of perspective scientific research work conducted in the interest of the country’s defense, the applied scientific research work on the creation of binary weapons, and familiarized the leading scientist of the Institute Geochemistry and Analytical Chemistry L.A. Fedorov with them, and disclosed them by joint publication together with Fedorov in N 38 issue of the newspaper Moscow News on September 1992 in the article titled “Poisoned Policies”.

Mirzayanov disclosed the same information, in September 1992 in Moscow, to a reporter from the newspaper the Baltimore Sun William Englund through whom he published it on September 16, 1992 in the aforementioned newspaper in the article “Former Scientist Says that Gorbachev’s Regime Created a New Nerve Gas in 91”, and in October of 1992 – to the reporter from the magazine Novoe Vremya O.V. Vishnyakov, and with his help it was published in the same month in the N 44 issue of that magazine in the article “’The Binary Bomb” has Exploded”.

V.S. Mirzayanov refused to plead guilty to the crime as charged, because in his opinion disclosure of information about development in area of chemical weapons doesn’t constitute a state secret. At the same time during the preliminary investigation, Mirzayanov pointed out that assuming GOSNIIOKhT is conducting scientific research work in the area of the development of chemical weapons in violation of Russia’s international obligations, in order to focus the public attention on this problem in August-September 1992, he wrote and gave the leading scientist at the Institute Geochemistry and Analytical Chemistry, L.A. Fedorov, the text titled “The Chemical Sharashka in Moscow is waiting for American Assistance” for him to become familiarized with it and then for publication in press. In this article he presented information known to him because of his work in GOSNIIOKhT about the synthesis of a new chemical agent and the development of a binary weapon on its basis, and it was published later in the article “Poisoned Policies” in the N 38 issue of the newspaper Moscow News in September of 1992. The information was the same as the indicted explained, and for the same purposes he reported to the correspondent of the newspaper the Baltimore Sun, William Englund for the publication in September 1992, and in October 1992 – in an interview with the reporter O.V. Vishnyakov of the magazine Novoe Vremya.

v. 1, p.p. 169-172, 174-180, 195-200, 229-234

The guilt of Mirzayanov in committing the crime he is charged with, except for his admission of the factual circumstances of the crime, is also corroborated by:

L.A. Fedorov, the leading scientist of the Institute Geochemistry and Analytical Chemistry of Russian Academy of Sciences, who stated that in August of 1992 in Moscow V.S. Mirzayanov had familiarized him with and gave him the manuscript about the development and production of chemical weapons in Russia titled “The Chemical Sharashka in Moscow is Waiting for American Assistance” for publication, and on the basis of which he (Fedorov) prepared the article, including in it information reported to him by Mirzayanov about a new chemical agent created in GOSNIIOKhT, gave this article to the reporter L.A. Nikishin and it was published in the N 38 issue of the newspaper Moscow News on September 20, 1992 under the title “Poisoned Policies”. Moreover, as the witness pointed out, V.S. Mirzayanov reported information about the new chemical agent created in GOSNIIOKhT in his presence, in September of 1992 in Moscow in the office of the newspaper the Baltimore Sun to reporter William Englund, and in October 1992 in the office of the Editorial Board of the magazine Novoe Vremya – to the reporter O.V. Vishnyakov.

v. 1, p.p. 235-241

L.N. Nikishin, reporter for the newspaper Moscow News, stated that in September of 1992 L.A. Fedorov gave him an article prepared jointly with V.S. Mirzayanov for publication about the problems connected with the development of chemical weapons, which was published in the N 38 issue of the newspaper Moscow News on September 20 1992 under the title of “Poisoned Policies”.

v.1, p.p. 267-270

O.V. Vishnyakov, reporter from the magazine Novoe Vremya, stated that on October 20 1992 in the building of the Editorial Office he recorded an interview with Mirzayanov in which he reported to him information about a chemical agent created in GOSNIIOKhT, after which he typed out the text and published it in the N 44 issue of the magazine Novoe Vremya on October 1992 as the article titled “The Binary Bomb has Exploded”.

v.1, p.p. 251-253

William Englund, reporter from American newspaper the Baltimore Sun stated that his article “Ex Soviet Scientist Says Gorbachev’s Regime Created a New Nerve Gas in 1991” which was published on September 16 1992, is written on the basis of an interview given to him on September 15 1992 by V.S. Mirzayanov and L.A. Fedorov, during which information about the creation of a new chemical agent in the USSR was reported to him by V.S. Mirzayanov.

v. 1, p.p. 292-296

A.E. Riskal who was working from 1989 until 1991 in the Foreign Technical Counterintelligence Department of GOSNIIOKhT stated that in this period of time procedures were developed in the department for the determination of the presence of the new chemical agents on objects in the environment and V.S. Mirzayanov as head of this department and as Scientific Leader was working with these substances and knew their physical chemical characteristics.

v.1, p. 262

S.S. Sokolov who has been working since 1987 in the Foreign Technical Counterintelligence Department of GOSNIIOKhT stated that during 1987-89 this Department was working on the development of procedures for control of the presence of chemical agents in waste water, air and solid waste and was controlling them in those media. V.S. Mirzayanov, as head of the department and its Scientific Leader, was working directly with those substances and he knew their toxicity characteristics.

v. 1, p.p. 271-275

- the typed text of the article “Poisoned Policies” handed over by L.V. Karpinsky, the Editor in Chief of the newspaper Moscow News, during the seizure in the Editorial Office of the newspaper, in which information is presented about the creation of a new chemical agent and the development of a binary weapon on its basis, in GOSNIIOKhT.

v.1, p.p. 97-105, v.2., p.p. 303-312

- two manuscripts titled “The Chemical Sharashka in Moscow is Waiting for American Assistance” seized during the search V.S. Mirzayanov’s and L.A. Fedorov’s apartments, and also the N 38 issue of the newspaper Moscow News on September 20 1992. They were seized from Fedorov, and in them there is information about the creation of a new chemical agent in GOSNIIOKhT and the development of a binary weapon on its basis.

v.1, p.p. 134-153, v.2, p.p. 198-219

v.1, p.p. 29-34, 48-53, v.2, p.p. 1-9, 92-97

- the typed text of an interview given by V.S. Mirzayanov and L.A. Fedorov, given to the investigation by A.B. Pumpyansky the Editor in Chief of the magazine Novoe Vremya, during the seizure in the Editorial Board of the magazine, from which it follows that Mirzayanov, while answering the reporter’s questions, told him about the creation of a new chemical agent in GOSNIIOKhT and the development of a binary weapon on its basis.

v.1, p.p. 116-131, v.2, 287-302

- a carbon copy of the article “Ex Soviet Scientist Says Gorbachev’s Regime Created a New Nerve Gas in 91” published in the newspaper the Baltimore Sun, seized during the search V.S. Mirzayanov’s and L.A. Fedorov’s apartments which contains information about the highest level secret highly lethal chemical nerve agent created in the USSR in a binary form.

v.1, p.p. 29-34, 57-62, v.2, p.p. 1-9, 101-104

– the Technical Order for the compound part of the system of components N 2187 ss/khf, delivered from GOSNIIOKhT as evidence of conducting field tests of the new chemical agent. As established by the Investigation, Mirzayanov was familiarized with this document on April 20 1990.

v.3, p.p. 272-277, v.2, p.p. 262-264

- the compact cassette with a recording of part of Mirzayanov’s interview published in the N 44 issue of the magazine Novoe Vremya on October 1992 as the article “The Binary Bomb has Exploded” presented by the witness O.V. Vishnyakov on October 22, 1992, in which he reported to the reporter of that magazine information about a new chemical agent created in GOSNIIOKhT.

v.1, p.p. 254-257, v.6, p.p. 55-57,

v.2, p.p. 250-261, v.5

Transcripts of the survey of material evidence:

- of the N 44 issue of the magazine Novoe Vremya on October 1992 from which it follows that in this magazine the interview of Mirzayanov titled “The Binary Bomb has Exploded” is published. In this interview Mirzayanov answered a question of the reporter, giving information about the new chemical agent and the development of the binary weapon on its basis created in GOSNIIOKhT.

v.2, p.p. 287-302

- the personnel file of V.S. Mirzayanov from which it follows that Mirzayanov was an employee of GOSNIIOKhT from 1965 up until January of 1992, and from September 1986 up until August 1990 he performed the duties of the Chief of the Foreign Technical Counterintelligence Department (Department 11) of the Branch.

v.3, p.p. 1-140

- A report (N 1494 ss) from October 1 1992 and reference (N 1572 ss) from GOSNIIOKhT about the functional duties of the Chief of the Foreign Technical Counterintelligence Department on September 29, 1992 which shows that Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov was well-informed about the system of organization, the trend and the results of scientific research and experiment design work (NIOKR) in the area of chemical weapons.

v.1, p.p. 20-21, 25-26

- The signed obligation of V.S. Mirzayanov dated August 23, 1976 not to disclose information constituting state secrets and secret information entrusted to him or which became known to him in connection with his work.

v.1, p. 27

- Reports of GOSNIIOKhT (N 1846ss from 11.14.92 and N 357ss from 04.27.93) showing that this institute had conducted scientific research works on the creation of new chemical weapons and the development of binary systems on their basis in accordance with resolutions of the USSR Counsel of Ministers.

v.3, p.p. 268-269, 279-280

- A report of the General Staff of Russian Federation Defense Ministry (N 312/10/053 from 04.29.93) that the scientific research work in the area of the development chemical weapons is not prohibited by any acting international agreements, which refutes the reasons claimed by Mirzayanov for his publications of the abovementioned information in mass media.

v. 3, p.p. 262-264

- N 120 from April 12, 1993, that the signature and the date on page 6 of the Technical Order for the Compound Part of the Experimental Design Work on the basis of the system of the components N 2187ss/khf were executed by V.S. Mirzayanov.

v.3, p.p. 149-151

- N 31 from February 9, 1993, that the two manuscripts seized in the apartments of L.A. Fedorov and V.S. Mirzayanov titled “The Chemical Sharashka in Moscow is Waiting for American Assistance” were executed by V.S. Mirzayanov.

- N 6/00999 from March16, 1993, that in the manuscripts titled as “The Chemical Sharashka in Moscow is waiting for American Assistance” seized in the apartments of V.S. Mirzayanov and L.A. Fedorov, in the typed text of the article “Poisoned Policies” seized during the seizure in the Editorial Office of the newspaper Moscow News, in the article “Poisoned Policies” published in the newspaper Moscow News N38 on September 20, in the interview of V.S. Mirzayanov and L.A. Fedorov seized in the Editorial Office of the magazine Novoe Vremya, in the article “Binary Bomb has exploded” published in the N44 issue of the magazine Novoe Vremya on October 1992, in the article “Ex Soviet Scientist Says that Gorbachev’s Regime Created a New Nerve Gas in 91” published in newspaper the Baltimore Sun on September 16, 1992, disclosed top secret information constituting state secrets about the latest achievements in the area of science and technology (the results of scientific research work in interests of country’s defense), which permits the enhancement of the capabilities of existing arms (munitions), the direction and the results of perspective works, conducted in the interests of the country’s defense – applied scientific research work on the creation of a binary weapon.

v.3, p.p. 206-237

Mirzayanov’s illegal actions are qualified according to Part 1 of Clause 75 UK of the RSFSR.

No aggravating or mitigating circumstances are found in the amenability of Mirzayanov.

On the basis of all that is here expressed, the following is indicted:

Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov, DOB 1935, native of village Stary Kangish of Djurtjuli District Bashkir ASSR, Bashkir, citizen of the Russian Federation, higher education, married, with two dependent children with DOBs 1980 and 1988, pensioner, permanent resident at: Moscow, Stalevarov Street, House 4, Bldg. 4, Apt. 586,

that he: when he was working at GOSNIIOKhT from 1965 until 1992 including from 1986 until 1990 in the capacity of Chief of the branch’s Foreign Technical Counterintelligence Department, he had clearance for top secret information constituting a state secret about research works conducted in the institute in the area of development of chemical weapons.

After being fired from the institute in August-October 1992 in Moscow for disclosure in the mass media information reported to a number of people and published in the press information known to him through his work in GOSNIIOKhT about the creation in this institute of a new chemical agent and the development of a binary weapon on its basis, disclosed by this top secret information constituting a state secret about latest achievement in the area of science and technology (the results of scientific work in the interest of the country’s defense), which permitted the enhancement of the capabilities of existing arms (munitions), and also about the trend and the results of applied scientific research work on the creation of a binary weapon in interest of country’s defense:

- in August 1992 – to leading the scientist at the Institute of Geochemistry and Analytical Chemistry of Russian Academy of Sciences L.A. Fedorov, published jointly with him this information on September 16 1992 in the N 38 issue of the weekly newspaper Moscow News in the article “Poisoned Policies”;

- in October 1992 – to the reporter O.V. Vishnyakov from the magazine Novoe Vremya and with his assistance published in the N 44 issue of his magazine Novoe Vremya the article “The Binary Bomb has Exploded”;

- in September 1992 – to the reporter William Englund of the American newspaper the Baltimore Sun and through him published this information in that paper on September 16, 1992 in the article “Ex Soviet Scientist Says Gorbachev’s Regime Created a New Nerve Gas in 1991” , that is to say this is the commission of a crime stipulated for Part 1, Clause 75 UK RSFSR.

The Indictment was composed November 17, 1993 in Moscow.

Senior investigator of

MB RF Investigation Department

Major of Justice

V.A. Shkarin

Annex 56

Letter of U.S. Senator Bill Bradley to Strobe Talbot the Ambassador Plenipotentiary to Russia and Special Advisor on issues of the Newly Independent States, October 14, 1993.

Dear Strobe:

I am writing regarding the case of Vil Mirzayanov, the Russian chemist charged with divulging state secrets for disclosing the existence of a secret Russian chemical weapons production plant.

I am concerned by reports that Dr. Mirzayanov has been charged according to an unpublished list of state secrets drawn up after the publication of Dr. Mirzayanov’s articles, in Moscow News, in violation of Article 66 of the Russian criminal code. I am also concerned that he has not had access to the prosecutor’s evidence, some of which may have been falsified. It is also important that Dr. Mirzayanov’s trial be open to the public, in accordance with Russian law.

Dr. Mirzayanov’s allegations also have important implications for Russia’s adherence to its chemical weapons commitments. It is important that the Administration follow up on the information Dr. Mirzayanov has provided.

I would encourage you to raise these concerns with the Russian government at a senior level. It is important for the development of Russia’s democratic institutions that it respect the human and legal rights of people like Dr. Mirzayanov.

I look forward to your prompt response.

Sincerely,

Bill Bradley

Annex 57

Letter of John Conyers, Jr., Chairman of the Congressional Legislation and National Security Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, to Warren Christopher, the U.S. Secretary of State, October 19, 1993.

“Dear Mr. Secretary,

I am writing today regarding Dr. Vil Mirzayanov, former researcher at the State Union Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology in Moscow, Russia, who was arrested in October 1992 and charged with divulging state secrets. Dr. Mirzayanov recently received a Special Recognition Award for Moral Courage from the Cavallo Foundation, and his case has been the concern of numerous human rights committees.

Dr. Mirzayanov’s arrest resulted from an article he co-authored which discussed a secret institute for research and development of a new generation of powerful binary chemical weapons, and the danger posed to the public from leakage of toxic chemicals by the institute into the environment. Concerned that the Institute’s activities created serious health dangers to Moscow’s civilian population, Dr. Mirzayanov courageously revealed that the Russian government’s public call for the elimination of chemical weapons was deceptive, since new chemical weapons research was being secretly funded.

I am concerned about the charges brought against Dr. Mirzayanov — the first person to be accused of violating Communist-era secrecy laws since the August 1991 coup — and the actions of the Yeltsin administration. As you know, Soviet law covering state secrets became invalid when Russia became an independent state. Yet, it appears that Russian security forces continue to suppress public discussion of vital government policies.

Thus, the arrest of Dr. Mirzayanov appears to serve as a warning to other reform-minded individuals who may be contemplating exercising their newly established “democratic rights” of freedom of expression. Additionally, Dr. Mirzayanov’s detention without access to an attorney and the restrictions placed on his access to evidence violate internationally accepted standards of due process.

The persecution of Dr. Mirzayanov stands in direct contradiction of the Clinton Administration’s commitment to strengthen democratization efforts in the former Soviet Union, and halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I am confident that you share my deep concern over the treatment of this courageous scientist, and I call on you to personally appeal for his release.

As the only remaining super power and the leading proponent of democracy in the world, the United States is in a unique position of influence. With Dr. Mirzayanov’s trial likely to begin in November, time is growing short. Please have your staff contact Ms. Randy Katsoyannis at 225-5147 to schedule a briefing on the State Department’s plan to assist Dr. Mirzayanov.

I appreciate your attention to this vital matter.

Sincerely,

John Conyers, Jr.

Chairman

Legislation and National Security Subcommittee”

Annex 58

Letter of U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan to the Secretary of State Warren Christopher, December 23, 1993.

Dear Chris:

I am writing to express my deep concern regarding Dr. Vil Mirzayanov, a Russian chemist who has been arrested for publishing an article in Moskovski Novosti (Moscow News) alleging that the Soviet Union developed and that Russia subsequently tested a new class of organophosphorous nerve gases, which are highly toxic and when are absorbed through the skin or lungs shut down the nervous system, for use as chemical weapons. This matter was brought to my attention by David Wise, a journalist of distinction and friend of thirty years, who met with Mirzayanov last month while in Moscow researching a documentary program for FRONTLINE.

In the September 16, 1992 article, Dr. Mirzayanov asserts the new nerve gasses, gas known as Novichok (Newcomer) were developed at the State Union Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology in Moscow between 1987 and 1991. Dr. Mirzayanov also asserts that the chemicals have been weaponized and that they were tested in 1992. Recent articles by Vladimir Uglev, a senior researcher from the Institute have corroborated Dr. Mirzayanov’s account.

As a result of his article, Dr. Mirzayanov was arrested on October 22, 1992. He has since been released but is awaiting trial on charges of divulging state secrets. However, I am informed that his work on chemical weapons was not classified until after his arrest. Specifically, I understand that on March 30, 1993 the Council of Ministers issued a decree signed by Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin to classify all previous work on chemical and biological weapons.

This case is particularly disturbing because the administration has just sent the Chemical Weapons Convention to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for its ratification. Agreement was reached on this treaty on September 3, 1992, less than two weeks before Dr. Mirzayanov’s article was published. His allegations are serious. If true, it means Russia may have disingenuously negotiated and signed a treaty on chemical weapons which does not prohibit its newly developed weapon because it is not listed on the detailed schedules appended to the convention.

Before the Chemical Weapons Convention is considered by the committee I think it would be appropriate for the administration to make its position on this matter clearly known to us and to report on any efforts it has made, both with regard to Dr. Mirzayanov’s case and the broader more serious allegations concerning Russia’s chemical weapons program. In particular, it would be important to know on what legal grounds the United States or the international community could take action to address this problem, if Dr. Mirzayanov’s assertions are found to be credible.

President Clinton will be meeting with President Yeltsin in January. Would you not think it appropriate to raise this issue at that time? I look forward to hearing your views.

Sincerely,

Daniel Patrick Moynihan”

Annex 59

Letter of Dr. Wolfgang Hirschwald a professor of Berlin Free University, on behalf of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (INES), the largest association of scientists in Germany and Western countries to Frederico Mayor, the Director General of UNESCO, December 27, 1993.

Dear Mr. Mayor,

On behalf of the German Scientists Initiative “Responsibility for the Peace” e.V. I should like to inform you about the situation of a russian colleague. It is the chemist, Dr. Vil Mirzayanov, who worked for the Government Research Center for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GOSNIIOKhT) in Moscow until end of January this year. Dr. Mirzayanov informed in 1991 the Lord Mayor of Moscow and thereafter in 1992 the russian public (via the journal Moscow News) about research on and development of highly toxic binary chemical weapons (8 to 10 times more toxic than the US nerve-poison VX!) in his institute and about testing of these weapons in two test areas (Saratov and Uzbekistan). Dr. M. also pointed out in his publication, that the amount of this supertoxic nerve-poison stored in his institute constituted a high danger for the environment and for the citizens of Moscow.

In October 1992 Dr. M. was arrested by the Russian Ministry of Security (former KGB), imprisoned for 11 days in the Lefortovo-Prison in Moscow and interrogated there all the time. On November 1^st, 1992 Dr. M. was released from the Lefortovo-Prison, but since he has to report to the Ministry of Security frequently, he is not allowed to leave the City of Moscow, criminal proceedings are initiated against him – being charged with “divulging state secrets” – and he is examined since then nearly every day. At the end of January this year, Dr. M. was dismissed from his job at the Moscow Institute.

The trial will probably start in December 1993 or in January 1994. It will be, most probably, a closed trial. But what is even more severe is the fact, that the judgment and accusation will be based on an ordinance, issued on March 30, 1993, i.e. five months after the prosecution was initiated! (see enclosure I).

This is in contradiction to any legal procedure in democratic states. From both facts one must expect, that this trial will not be a fair and legal trial based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

So, we ask the UNESCO and its Commission on Human Rights to send a protest to the Russian Government and to the General Prosecutor of Russia, Mr. Alexei Kazannik (address: see enclosure II) with respect to the procedure and ask them to quash the whole trial.

Furthermore we want to stress, that Dr. M. did not publish any chemical or technical details concerning the composition of the new chemical weapons nor the production process. So, he did not divulge any state secrets!

In view of the UN Convention on Chemical Weapons (CWC), signed in Paris January of 1993, Dr. M. informed the international public, that in Moscow research is still performed on super-toxic binary chemical weapons (these facts were denied by the Russian Government) and that the CW’s as well as and their precursors are not listed in any of the three schedules of chemicals attached to the final draft of the Chemical Weapons Convention, nor are they included in the list of chemicals prohibited for export from Russia (again, he gave no chemical or technical details!).

From these facts one must question the seriousness of the Russian Government to fulfill the CWC, and two dangerous developments of international dimension and importance arise:

1) the possibility to circumvent the CWC,

2) the enhanced probability of CW proliferation.

We, nearly one thousand scientists of the Initiative in Germany and more than one hundred thousand international colleagues of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (INES) are deeply concerned about this situation. We are firmly convinced, that Dr. Mirzayanov acted highly responsible and in full agreement with the UNESCO-Recommendations on the Status (in jail) would constitute a severe violation of human rights.

So, again we ask you to observe the development and to intervene in favor of Dr. Vil Mirzayanov and in order to consolidate of the CWC.

Thank you!

Sincerely,

Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Hirschwald

P.s. Facts and details submitted here do not only stem from the press, but were confirmed by Dr. Mirzayanov and his wife personally. Members of the Initiative visited Dr. M. three times this year in Moscow and his wife stayed in Germany for one week with our Initiative in October this year.

Annex 60

Letter of the American Association for the Advancement of Science to the President Boris Yeltsin, March 30, 1993

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), I am writing to express our deep concern about the situation of Russian chemist Vil Mirzayanov. Dr. Vil Mirzayanov and a colleague, Lev Fedorov, also a chemist, wrote an article, which was published in Moscow News on 20 September 1992, revealing information about the development of chemical weapons in Moscow and the possible environmental hazards posed to the local population by such research. The two men also participated in an interview published in the Baltimore Sun, a U.S. newspaper. Following these events the two men were arrested and their apartments were searched. Although Dr. Fedorov was released after questioning, Dr. Mirzayanov faces prosecution for allegedly divulging state secrets and violating an agreement not to reveal secret information that he signed at his place of employment, the State Union Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology.

According to information the Committee has received, neither Dr. Mirzayanov nor his lawyer has been allowed to see the formal charges against Dr. Mirzayanov. This appears to violate Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that “Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.”

Our Committee believes that Dr. Mirzayanov, as a scientist with special knowledge about the hazards of chemicals released into the environment, has acted in a manner consistent with his professional responsibility to bring forth information about the potential or real dangers of such research. Furthermore, given the Russian participation in negotiations for a Chemical Weapons Convention, the prosecution of Dr. Mirzayanov for revealing information about the development of a binary nerve gas would appear to contradict the spirit of the Convention. The recent corroboration of another chemist, Vladimir Uglev, of Dr. Mirzayanov’s account lends weight to the seriousness of Dr. Mirzayanov’s report.

We urge your government to consider carefully the merits of Dr. Mirzayanov’s case and Russia’s obligations under the Convention. In the event that this matter cannot be resolved without bringing Dr. Mirzayanov to trial, we ask that foreign observers be allowed to attend the trial and that all legal safeguards are accorded Dr. Mirzayanov, as provided under international human rights law.

The AAAS, with 296 affilated scientific societies and 134,000 individual members, is the largest organization of natural and social scientists in the United States and the world’s largest federation of scientific associations. The AAAS publishes Science magazine and concerns itself not only with substantive issues of science but also with the role of science in the world and the rights and responsibilities of scientists. The AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, formed in 1976, focuses on this latter concern and seeks to defend the professional and human rights of scientists everywhere.

Sincerely,

C.K. Gunsalus

Chair, AAAS Committee on Scientific

Freedom and Responsibility

cc: His Excellency Vladimir Petrovich Lukin

Mr. James F. Collins, Charge d’Affaires

Matt Bryza, Department of State

Eric Schultz, Department of State

Annex 61

Letter of the Committee of Concerned Scientists in the U.S to President of Russia Boris Yeltsin, October 25, 1993.

Dear Mr. President,

Troubled by word that the chemist Vil Mirzayanov is still slated for trial on charges of revealing state secrets, we appeal to you once again to intervene so that the case may be dismissed.

As we stated in our July 16 letter to you, the charges against Mirzayanov are based on a new list of state secrets decreed by the Council of Ministers on March 30, 1993. This list includes chemical weapons previously not so categorized. But, Mirzayanov’s alleged offense stems from an article he co-authored six months earlier in Moscow News of September 16, 1992, concerning an on-going chemical weapons development program and its impending environmental danger. Evidently, this decree is being applied retroactively in Mirzayanov’s case.

We firmly believe that the positive resolution of this case is crucial to the development of the democratic society you are laboring to achieve. We therefore urge you in the strongest possible terms to see that the case is dismissed without further delay.

With best wishes for your success in establishing democracy in the Russian Federation and in contributing to world peace,

Sincerely yours,

Co-chairman Joel L. Lebowitz

Co-chairman Paul H. Plotz

Annex 62

Letter of New York Academy of Science to President of Russia Boris Yeltsin, August 25, 1993.

Dear Mr. President,

On behalf of the 39,000 members of this Academy, we are writing to express our concern for the chemist Vil Mirzayanov, who has been indicted for allegedly divulging information about “the overall thrust of research in the interests of the country’s defenses” (the development of binary weapons). These charges were initiated as a result of an article he co-authored with Dr. Lev Fedorov in Moscow News of September 16, 1992, about an ongoing chemical weapons development program and its impending environmental danger.

The accusation is reported based on a new list of “state secrets” drawn up on March 30, 1993 and signed by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. This new list includes chemical weapons previously not so categorized, and efforts have been made to make the list apply retroactively to the case. Thus it appears that his accusers are attempting to make our colleague’s action retroactively illegal.

We call upon you to intervene so that the charges against Dr. Mirzayanov may be dropped and his diplomas be restored in order for him to continue his professional employment so that he may again contribute to the advancement of the human condition.

The speedy termination of this case should be looked upon at this time as an opportunity to bring about improved international and internal relations. Mutual trust between the U.S. and Russia and increasing openness will be an essential part of the disarmament and verification process.

Thank you for giving this matter your attention.

Sincerely,

Dr. Cyril Harris

cc: Procurator General of Russia V.G. Stepankov, Chairman of the Human Rights Committee Dr. Sergei Kovalev

Annex 63

Letter of the president of the Academy, Nobel Prize Laureate Joshua Lederberg to the Executive Director of the newspaper “The New York Times” Max Frankel. December 6, 1993

Dear Mr. Frankel,

Michael Gordon’s December 1 article referred briefly to the arrest of Russian scientists who maintain that Russia developed a new class of deadly nerve gases.

I would like to call your attention to the central importance of the case of one of these scientists, Dr. Vil Mirzayanov, a chemist and a whistleblower who was arrested in October of 1992 presumably for allegedly revealing state secrets. At that time, no Russian law existed which had any legal bearing on his case. There was no basis for his prosecution: a secret decree was passed by the Council of Ministers on March 30, 1993, which classified all previous work on chemical and biological weapons a state secret. This decree is being used to prosecute the case retroactively, and the case was assigned to the Russian Supreme Court on Nov. 25^th.

Since it is doubtful that Mirzayanov revealed any state secrets by merely mentioning this program and, furthermore, that unpublished legal norms have no legal standing, it is highly advisable that the case be promptly dismissed by either the General Procurator’s office or the judge assigned to the case by the Supreme Court.

Otherwise we must conclude that Mirzayanov was telling the truth and a whole new class of deadly binary chemical weapons was created and that the Russian government is reverting to the old Soviet-style practice of persecuting dissident scientists.

Best regards,

Dr. Joshua Lederberg

President of the New York Academy of Sciences

University Professor, the Rockefeller University

Annex 64

The statement of the Andrei Sakharov Foundation in the United States on September 15, 1993.

On January 24 the trial of Dr. Mirzayanov will start in Moscow. In a throwback to old discredited practices the trial will be a closed one without independent observers allowed. Dr. Mirzayanov will be tried for disclosing information about a dangerous type of chemical weapons. The charges against him are based on law applied retroactively to cover his actions, and it seems the law was specifically designed for the purpose. These and other extremely questionable decisions by the prosecution should be sufficient for dismissal of the case for procedural grounds. But there are also important human rights principles involved.

Dr. Mirzayanov followed his conscience in making public important information. He did not pursue personal gain. The information that he released about chemical weapons was, possibly damaging to the state or, at least, to the image of some powerful governmental bodies. His actions were not illegal at the time (hence, retroactive application of the law) but they certainly pushed the envelope of things discussed publicly in Russia. If Russia is to become a fully democratic open society, there will be many other instances when the public will have a vested interest in open discussion of problems. If Dr. Mirzayanov is convicted would it mean that every time the state agencies find it unpleasant to have certain issues raised, there will be a new law adopted to retroactively punish disseminators of information? It seems that the intent of forces pushing for the prosecution of Dr. Mirzayanov is to intimidate the public and possible future dissenters. These forces within the Russian “power ministries” are afraid that they will be obligated to change their practices to more open forms suitable for democratic society, and hence relinquish old privileges that allowed, back in the days of the Soviet Union, the power structures to pursue their objectives and administrative policies free from any interference from the public or supervision by the law.

In many respects, Dr. Mirzayanov’s case is a test of the ability of the “old guard” to check the democratization of Russian society and institutions. The Andrei Sakharov Foundation (USA) hopes that the legitimate interest of the state in protecting state secrets will not be used as an excuse to stifle freedom of information which is of such paramount importance in the development of Russian democracy. We urge the court to act as a truly independent branch of the Russian government and not to succumb to pressure. We hope Dr. Mirzayanov will be cleared of all charges.

signed by Alexey Semyonov [son of Elena Bonner]

Annex 65

Sergei Alexeev, Georgi Arbatov, Yuri Afansiev, Vitali Goldansky, Tatiana Zaslavskaya, Len Karpinsky, Viktor Loshak, Alexander Pumpyansky, and Grigory Yavlinsky, Mirzayanov will Face a Secret Trial, Moscow News, January 2, 1993.

In Moscow a closed trial process is beginning for the scientist and chemist Vil Mirzayanov. He is charged with disclosing state secrets, connected with the creation of a new kind of chemical weapon in the former USSR, to the mass media (for example, to MN and the magazine Novoe Vremya.)

During the whole period of the investigation the public was trying to stop the persecution of Vil Mirzayanov, who was saying nothing at all in the press about the technical or other secrets of the new weapons, though he only spoke out about the danger posed to the world by the double standards which were involved in their development, which has continued, even after the Soviet and Russian politicians were mouthing off that work in this area had been terminated.

It seems as though the international convention that Russia signed in January of 1993, that bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons should mean that all of the charges against Mirzayanov, which are based on “sub-legal and departmental norms” and were adopted under a different regime, would automatically be dropped. However, this never happened.

The April 20, 1993 statement of the Russian Federation president reads, “The mountains of now useless and dangerous weapons are a heavy burden inherited from the legacy of our past”. Then what will Vil Mirzayanov be prosecuted for?

Bitterness and bewilderment are aroused, not only by the fact of such a trial process, but also because it will be a closed one, in a country which was establishing the principles of democracy.

Far-fetched charges and a secret trial – these are the symbols of an epoch that has passed. Silence in such a situation will mean supporting lawlessness. We demand that the persecution of Vil Mirzayanov be stopped. It would be natural for the Attorney General’s Office to drop the charges and thus put a full stop to the dishonest game of the groups that still yearn for their omnipotence of the past.

Annex 66

The Statement the Chairman of the U.S. Congress Committee on Government Operations, John Conyers, January 4, 1994.

“I am deeply troubled by reports that the Russian government intends to proceed with a closed trial this week in the case of Dr. Vil Mirzayanov.

Dr. Mirzayanov was a researcher who worked in the State Union Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology in Russia who was arrested for divulging state secrets. His arrest resulted from an article he co-authored, which revealed that the Russian government’s public call for the elimination of chemical weapons was deceptive, since new chemical weapons research was being secretly funded. Recently, he received a Special Recognition Award for Moral Courage from the Cavallo Foundation.

Secret Star Chamber proceedings are completely inconsistent with the open democratic society that Russia claims it is in the process of building. The continuation of closed and secret trials in Russia is very disturbing, especially on the eve of the upcoming Summit. Indeed, the treatment of Dr. Mirzayanov stands in stark contrast to the most important purpose of the upcoming summit – the strengthening of Russia’s democratic institutions…I have asked Secretary of State Christopher to personally appeal for the release of Dr. Mirzayanov. Whistleblowers on both sides of the now defunct Iron Curtain deserve protection, not prosecution.

I have asked Secretary of State Christopher to personally appeal for the release of Dr. Mirzayanov. Whistleblowers on both sides of the now defunct Iron Curtain deserve protection, not prosecution. I know that the Clinton Administration shares my concern, and is working to see that justice is served in the Mirzayanov case.”

Annex 67

Letter of the the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) to the Attorney General of Russia, Aleksei Kazannik, January 13, 1994.

Dear Attorney General Kazannik,

We understand that the trial of Dr. Vil Mirzayanov on criminal charges of having revealed state secrets has been scheduled to begin on the Moscow City Court on the morning of January 24, 1994. We further understand that an initial determination has been made that these proceedings will not be open to the public.

As the largest scientific organization in the United States, with 138,000 individual members and 296 affiliated scientific groups, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) wishes to express serious concern about the charges that have been brought against Dr. Mirzayanov, and to strongly encourage you to permit foreign observers to witness his trial.

Our concerns are based on the fact that Dr. Mirzayanov, in making public information on chemical weapons development, storage and leakage in the Moscow region, was acting pursuant to his professional and ethical responsibilities as a scientist, and under the protection of international treaty standards regarding human rights and the regulation of chemical weapons production. Under the terms of a number of international instruments to which Russia is a party, including the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxic Weapons, the Declaration on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and the bilateral Agreement Between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons, the production and storage of the chemical agents in question may well have been in violation of international law. This fact, plus the very real environmental and health hazards posed by the production and storage of these chemical agents near Moscow, placed a clear obligation on Dr. Mirzayanov to make public the information available to him on this matter, consistent with his ethical and professional responsibilities as a scientist working on the project.

Russia also is bound by a number of international human rights instruments whose provisions would apply to the Mirzayanov case, including assurances against arbitrary arrest and prosecutions, and the guarantee of a fair and public hearing, in Articles 9 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Articles 9 through 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

The fact, thankfully, that Russia and the nations of the West are no longer in a state of “cold war” adds a powerful practical reason why “state secret” laws should not be applied in this case. Holding the criminal proceedings against Dr. Mirzayanov in secret only adds to the concern that standards of international human rights and justice are not being properly observed. The criminal prosecution and the holding of the trial with closed proceedings are inconsistent with the new spirit of openness and cooperation between our two countries that most recently is demonstrated by the visit of President Clinton to Russia that is taking place this week. Nothing would be a more appropriate follow-up to this visit, and the cordial meetings between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin that are now taking place, than to permit U.S. observers at the trial, or better still, dropping all charges against Dr. Mirzayanov. Over the past few years, Russia has made substantial forward strides in releasing its political prisoners and eliminating the past practice of secret trials. The Mirzayanov prosecution and secret trial is an unfortunate and very surprising throwback to past practices under the totalitarian regime.

We would appreciate any efforts and assistance you can provide in bringing this petition and the guarantees to a public trial in the Universal Declaration and the Civil and Political Rights Covenant to the attention of the appropriate prosecutors and judges dealing with the Mirzayanov case. Please let us know as soon as possible if it is decided to open the trial to foreign observers, so that we can make the necessary arrangements for a representative to attend.

Sincerely,

C.K. Gunsalus, Chair

AAAS Committee on Scientific

Freedom and Responsibility

Annex 68

Letter of the Federation of American Scientists to the Attorney General of Russia, Aleksei Kazannik, January 14, 1994

Dear Sir:

As the attached resolution shows, the Federation of American Scientists, founded in 1945 by Manhattan Project atomic scientists, has been concerned about the Mirzayanov case for more than a year.

We appeal to you to ensure that he receives a fair trial. Our letter is prompted by our learning that the trial would be a closed one. And we have been advised that the statute under which he is to be tried is one that did not exist at the time the crime is alleged.

The Mirzayanov case is a famous one now in the American scientific community and has been discussed, as we understand it, at the highest levels of our two Governments. For these reasons, we do hope that it can be resolved in a way that maintains the respect of all concerned.

Thank you in advance for any help or advice you can provide to Mirzayanov or to us.

Sincerely,

Jeremy J. Stone

President

Annex 69

Letter of the U.S. National Academy of Science to President Yeltsin, January 19, 1994.

Excellency:

We write to you on behalf of the Committee on Human Rights of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences which is deeply concerned about the plight of scientific colleague Vil Mirzayanov, a Russian chemist who will reportedly be brought to trial on January 24, 1994, in a closed session at the Moscow City Court. Dr. Mirzayanov has been charged with violating state secrets by making public statements about ongoing research and development of chemical weapons in Russia.

According to information available to the committee, Dr. Mirzayanov revealed only nontechnical information about chemical weapons, and he took such action in an effort to inform the Russian people and others about a clear danger. The committee also understands that revealing information about chemical weapons research and development was not illegal at the time that Dr. Mirzayanov made his public statements. The Russian Federation added chemical weapons research and development to its unpublished list of state secrets on March 30, 1993 --more than five months after charges had been brought against Dr. Mirzayanov. The new of Russian Constitution does not permit laws to be used retroactively.

We appeal to the Russian government to drop the charges against Dr. Mirzayanov because they are in clear violation of the Russian Constitution.

If the charge is not dropped, we would expect the Russian government to grant Dr. Mirzayanov a fair trial, and we would appeal that it be open in accordance with the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Dr. Mirzayanov acted on the dictates of his conscience and, if accorded due process, he would be exonerated on the grounds that he exercised his right to the free speech and did not reveal information that was, at the time, officially recognized as a state secret.

Sincerely yours,

Bruce Alberts

President

James B. Wyngaarden

Foreign Secretary

Annex 70

Letter of the President of New York Academy of Science Joshua Lederberg to the Attorney General of the Russian Federation Alexei Kazannik, January 20, 1994.

The New York Academy of Sciences has received notification that Dr. Vil Mirzayanov will be brought to trial for actions protected under international agreements and required under ethical standards of scientific responsibility.

We ask that charges against Dr. Mirzayanov be dropped and that international observers be permitted to attend the trial on January 24, 1994.

The freedom of scientists to call the attention of the world to possible transgressions by elements of their government is an elementary part of the scientific freedom. The abuse of that freedom undermines the foundations of confidence in the trustworthiness of governments in their international relations.

Joshua Lederberg, Ph.D.

President

New York Academy of Sciences

Annex 71

Letter of the Committee of Concerned Scientists appealed to Attorney General Alexei Kazannik, January 19, 1994.

Dear Sir:

As an organization dedicated to the protection and advancement of the human rights and scientific freedom of colleagues around the world, we are dismayed to learn that a closed trial beginning January 24 is planned in the case of the chemist Vil Mirzayanov.

We ask you to do all in your power to avert it. A closed trial only compounds the injustice of the fact that this case is being prosecuted retroactively based on a new list of state secrets.

If this trial takes place in camera, it will suggest that Russia has indeed created a new group of binary chemical weapons. We therefore urge in the strongest possible terms to stop this prosecution lest it cast a pall on your country’s declared intent to join with other nations in banning the development of chemical weaponry.

Sincerely yours

Co-chairman

Joel L. Lebowitz

Co-chairman

Paul H. Plotz

Annex 72

Letter of Academician Roald Sagdeev to the Attorney General of Russia Aleksei Kazannik. January 21, 1993 to Mr. Alexei Kazannik, Procurator General of Russia

(copy to Academician Y. Osipov, President of the Russian Academy of Sciences.)

Esteemed General Procurator:

Let me appeal to You, as Your colleague from the Congress of Peoples Deputies of the former USSR. As one of the most memorable episodes of that time, I remember your noble act, which enabled Boris Yeltsin to become a leader of Democrats in the Supreme Soviet.

Now, when democracy seems to be a winner, Your urgent intervention is needed again, -this time in a different case – in a trial against the scientist-chemist Vil Mirzayanov.

I would not go into details of allegations against Mirzayanov, who is accused in the breach of secrecy. If we were able to defeat the cold war and start the complete destruction of chemical weapons what kind of secrets should be hidden from the world public? The very fact of continuation of further research and development of new types of chemical warfare?

In the eyes of the international community, the trial of Mirzayanov can only bring irreparable damage to the politics of Russian leadership and to the very cause of peace.

It is not so much a guilt, but a tragedy of a whole generation of scientists and engineers forced to spend their talents in making the weapons of mass destruction. The voice of Mirzayanov – the voice of the conscience of a whole generation – must be heard and not strangled.

Academician Roald Sagdeev,

University of Maryland

Annex 73

Letter of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights of the U.S. to the President of Russia.

January 21, 1994

Dear President Yeltsin,

The trial of Dr. Vil Mirzayanov, a former researcher with the State Union Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology in Russia, is scheduled to begin on January 24th. The Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights is concerned by the conditions and procedures surrounding the upcoming trial.

First, according to information we have received, Mr. Mirzayanov’s arrest resulted from an article he co-authored, which asserted that the Russian government continues to fund chemical weapons research.

Mr. Mirzayanov will be tried for disclosing information about Russian chemical weapons production. These charges are based upon a law that did not exist at the time he wrote the article. He is charged with a violation of resolution # 256-16 of March 30, 1993. Under that provision the Council of Ministers made changes to the “Temporary List of Categories of Data Considered State Secrets,” which was adopted by the Government of the Russian Federation on September 18, 1992 in resolution # 733-55.

Hence, the law is being applied retroactively, denying Mr. Mirzayanov the basic right to be notified and adequately informed of the charges against him. Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, of which Russia is a signatory, states that: “No one shall be held guilty of a criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed.”

Ex post fact prosecution is also prohibited by Article 15 of the Russian Constitution. In paragraph 3 stated that, “Unpublished laws shall not be applicable.” Additionally, Article 54, paragraph 1 of the new Constitution stated: “The law instituting or aggravating the liability of a person shall have no retroactive force.”

We are disturbed to learn of the Russian government’s intention to hold a secret trial closed to all observers. Secret proceedings are inherently inconsistent with the open democratic society Russia is ostensibly committed to building. We request therefore that the Russian government permit independent Russian and international observers to attend the trial.

Mr. Mirzayanov’s case is an important test of the Russian government’s commitment to respect human rights and build just legal institutions. We urge you to ensure that the courts act as a truly independent branch of government, according to the rule of law and free from government pressure.

Sincerely,

Michael Posner

Executive director

Annex 74

Letter of the Physicians for Social Responsibility to the Alexsei Kazannik, General Procurator of the Russian Federation. January 21, 1994

Dear Procurator General,

I understand that the closed trial of Dr. Vil Mirzayanov is scheduled to begin on Monday, 24 January in Moscow City Court.

During my visit to your country last year, I was fortunate to be able to meet with Dr. Mirzayanov and we had a number of long talks together. At the time I made his acquaintance, I was very impressed by his sincerity, his integrity and his strong love of his country. It was not selfish motivation, but Dr. Mirzayanov’s deep patriotism and his true concern for the welfare of his fellow Muscovites that prompted him to act, to try to draw attention to and to correct environment environmentally dangerous practices of his institute and the chemical-military complex. I personally feel a strong common bond with this courageous man, recognizing that his motives are the same as those that led me to release the Pentagon Papers.

Fortunately for all of us, we are living in different times now, the beginning of a post-Cold War Era. We must recognize however, that for the arms control agreements we are forging to have any real meaning, it is essential that they be verifiable by citizens. In Stalinist times, Dr. Mirzayanov would have been considered an enemy of the state. Now he should be recognized for what he is, a pioneer in creating a new, needed international norm of citizen responsibility, a man on the cutting edge of reform and democracy in your country. Silencing Mirzayanov and others like him will not help your country solve environmental problems or reduce the threat posed by chemical accidents that could happen at any time. Silencing them will serve to reduce the world’s confidence in Russia’s stated intentions to comply with international accords. And it will reduce Russian citizen’s confidence in their government’s ability to change or be honest about mistakes of the past which directly threatened the lives of many people.

One of your officials has mentioned to some people in our country that the Mirzayanov trial is a small thing, something of little importance. Instead, I think you will find that the Mirzayanov case is of critical importance to us, at the center of much that we value and honor most in our culture – freedom of speech, the of the scientist to disclose information to prevent a greater danger, the official who recognizes a loyalty to the constitution and to his countrymen that is more important than the rules of his agency, the ecologist against the polluters, anyone who rallies against weapons of mass destruction, a man who has exposed the corruption and incompetence of more powerful people.

The Mirzayanov case is an immediate legal litmus test of emerging Russian democracy. He is an individual in the true tradition of Andrei Sakharov, a man persecuted under the former regime for telling the truth, but now, rightfully, universally honored. I urge you to take the high road and use your authority to have the case dismissed immediately. There a number of statutes of the new Russian Constitution that can be referenced as grounds for dismissal. Furthermore, I would urge you to call for an intensive investigation by your office into the allegations Dr. Mirzayanov and others have made about secret chemical weapons programs and unsafe practices in the chemical military.

With respect,

Daniel Ellsberg

Annex 75

Letter of the American Physical Society to the President of Russia, Boris Nikoloyevich Yeltsin.

January 24, 1994

Dear President Yeltsin:

The Committee on the International Freedom of Scientists (CIFS) at the American Physical Society, a 43,000 member organization of physicists, is charged with monitoring the human rights situation of physicists and other scientists around the world, and advocating for those requiring assistance.

It has come to our attention that Dr. Vil Mirzayanov, a Russian chemist who publicized information concerning production of binary nerve gases in the Moscow vicinity, will be brought to trial on criminal charges concerning this publicity on January 26, 1994. Further, it is our understanding that Dr. Mirzayanov’s trial will not be open to foreign observers.

It is troubling that Dr. Mirzayanov will be brought to trial for acting in accordance with at least two international treaties to which the Russian Federation is a signatory nation, the Convention on Chemical Disarmament and the Declaration on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which both specifically prohibit chemical weapons production. We respectfully request that Dr. Mirzayanov’s trial be open to international observers and that the charges against him be dropped.

Thank you for your attention to this matter. We look forward to your reply.

Sincerely yours,

Fang Lizhi,

Chair

Committee on the International Freedom of Scientists

Annex 76

The Extract from the Congressional Record – Senate. (February 1, 1994. S.S.543-544). Library of Congress. http: //thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin

Mr. DeConcini: Mr. President, I would like to call to the attention of my colleagues today a closed trial that opened in Moscow last Monday, January 24. A Russian scientist named Vil Mirzayanov is being tried on charges of exposing state secrets.

As chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I most assuredly believe a nation has a right to preserve certain secrets related to national security. But let’s look at the particulars of this case.

Dr. Mirzayanov is a Moscow scientist and chemist who in 1992, on the basis of his work in a secret laboratory in Moscow, disclosed in the Russian and Western press that Russia was continuing to test chemical weapons despite having signed international agreements banning such tests. Subsequently, Dr. Mirzayanov was arrested and briefly held in custody in October 1992. He was then kept under house arrest until January 24, 1994, when his trial convened.

What Dr. Mirzayanov did must have infuriated some influential members of the Russian military-industrial complex, although it was apparently not illegal under Russian law at that time. Therefore, authorities prevailed upon Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to sign a retroactive secret decree in March 1993 to make Mirzayanov’s allegations a crime. It hardly seems likely that a government supposedly commited to rule of law would hold a citizen liable for violating a decree not made public. Incidentally, the new Russian Constitution quite sensibly forbids using secret decrees as basis for criminal charges.

Human rights activists and members of the scientific community have come to Dr. Mirzayanov’s defense, both in terms of the legality of his trial and with respect to the substance of Dr. Mirzayanov’s allegations that Russia is continuing chemical weapons testing. Dr. Joshua Lederberg, president of the New York Academy, has called for the charges against Dr. Mirzayanov to be dropped. “Otherwise”, he notes, “we must conclude that Mirzayanov was telling the truth and a whole new class of deadly binary chemical weapons was created and that the Russian Government is reverting to the old Soviet-style practice of presecuting dissident scientists.” I would note also that the respected Russian scientist and academic Roald Sagdeev has written that “the trial of Mirzayanov can only bring irreparable moral harm to the policies of the Russian Government and indeed the entire cause of peace.”

The administration has also been following this case closely. Ambassodor Pickering in Moscow has called it “more than strange and more than usual that someone could be either prosecuted or persecuted for telling the truth about an activity which is contrary to a treaty obligation of a foreign government.” I’d say that’s putting it mildly, considering the nature of the treaty obligations.

The Mirzayanov trial involves more than the fate of one man. It is foreboding indication of the direction toward which Russia may be heading in the post-cold war era. Who is in charge here, civilians operating under the rule of law, or a military-industrial complex that can pull secret regulations out of a hat when challenged?

I hope that good will, common sense, and the rule of law prevail in Moscow. Many conscientious Russians, in and out of government, are seeking justice for Dr. Mirzayanov. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, of which I am pleased to serve as chairman, is proud to join in their efforts. Along with Commission co-chairman Representative Steny Hoyer, I have written to Ambassador Lukin and asked him to convey our deepest concerns about the Mirzayanov trial to President Yeltsin. I hope that others will join us. Library of Congress. http://www.thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin

Annex 77

Moscow

March 11, 1994

A.N. Ilyushenko Acting Attorney General of the Russian Federation has considered the materials of criminal case No 62-92 that were sent from the Moscow City Court for conducting an additional investigation,

From 1965 until January 1992 V. S. Mirzayanov held various scientific positions at the State Russian Science Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GRNIIOKhT), and from 1986 until 1990 he was head of the Department for Foreign Technical Counterintelligence. According to his job responsibilities he was informed about the system of organization, the major trends, and some of the results of the scientific-research and the experimental-design work in the area of the development of chemical weapons.

After he was dismissed from the institute in January 1992 due to staff reductions, Mirzayanov made an attempt to draw the attention of the public to the possible ecological danger of the utilization of chemical agents. With this goal in mind, he prepared materials for publication and gave interviews to the various members of the mass media about the problems of the development of toxic chemicals in Russia.

According to the materials of the criminal case, on September 16, 1992 issue 38 of the weekly newspaper Moscow News and the American newspaper the Baltimore Sun, as well as issue 44 of October 1992 of the magazine Novoe Vremya published articles and the interview of Mirzayanov “Poisoned Policies,” “Former Soviet Scientist Says that the Regime of Gorbachev Created a New Paralytic-Nerve Agent in 1991,” and “The Binary Bomb has Exploded,” in which it was reported that a new chemical agent had been created in the former Soviet Union and new binary weapons had been developed based on it.

These articles served as a basis for criminal proceedings charging Mirzayanov with a crime stipulated by Part 1, Article 75 of the RSFSR Criminal Code.

During the preliminary and court investigations Mirzayanov pleaded not guilty to disclosing state secrets and explained that he had only intended to warn the public, by way of a general outline, of the threat and possible consequences of the creation of chemical weapons.

According to the conclusion of the expert commission-specialists dated March 16, 1993, which was presented in the preliminary investigation, information published in the articles constituted state secrets, according to “List of Major Information of state secrecy” approved by the Resolution No 1121-387 of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers dated December 3, 1980.

At the same time, during the repeated examination in court, the specialists V.V. Smirnitsky and N.I. Chugunov explained that the analysis of normative documents allowed these questions to be studied in more detail. In the opinion of these experts, not one of the publications based on the materials presented by Mirzayanov or his interview contained specific information that constituted state secrets. Concepts and terms: chemical weapons, chemical agents, binary weapons, their development and production were excluded from the list of state secrets in 1984. In the publications nothing specific was disclosed about the newest achievements in this area of science and technology, or the factual data about the results of scientific research, experimental-design work, or field testing of the samples of chemical weapons, information which really constitutes state secrets, according to the above-mentioned “List…”

Thus, Mirzayanov appeared as a bearer of secret information, but didn’t disclose specific information of state secrecy and can’t be criminally responsible, according to Part 1, Article 75 of the RSFSR Criminal Code.

Moreover, according to Articles 15 and 29 of the Constitution of Russia, unpublished normative acts, which “The List…” refers to, and due to the absence of federal law “about the lists of information of state secrecy” the legal basis for Mirzayanov’s possible criminal responsibility for communicating information about the development of new chemical weapons is precluded.

Under such circumstances, the resolution of the panel of judges for criminal cases at the Moscow City Court dated February 14, 1994 about returning the current criminal case for conducting an additional investigation doesn’t entail the necessity of fulfilling any additional investigation procedures, because the absence of grounds for attaching criminal responsibility to V. S. Mirzayanov has been established with sufficient completeness by the preliminary and court investigations.

Based on the aforementioned and being guided by Clause 2, Article 5, Part 1, Article 208, and Article 209 of the RSFSR Criminal and Procedrual Code,

1. To dismiss the criminal case, according to which Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov born on March 9, 1935 was charged with committing a crime stipulated by Part 1 Article 75 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, because of the absence of corpus delicti in his actions and to inform the interested people.

2. To cancel the preventive detention [house arrest] – a written pledge not to leave Moscow – executed by the Kalinin District People’s Court of Moscow on November 2, 1992.

3. To return the passport of Vil S. Mirzayanov to its owner.

Acting Attorney General

of the Russian Federation A. N. Ilyushenko

Annex 78

U.S. Senate (Congressional Record. Proceedings and Debates of the 103d Congress, First Session. Vol.140, No. 28. Washington, Tuesday, March 15, 1994.) Senator Patrick Moynihan read as follows:

“Mr. Moynihan: Madam President, on March 11, good news was heard from Moscow. All charges were dropped against a courageous Russian scientist, Dr. Vil Mirzayanov who, 2 years ago in a Moscow News article, revealed to the world that the Soviet Union had secretly developed a powerful binary nerve gas. For this, Dr. Mirzayanov was jailed twice, and placed on trial.

David Wise, who brought this case to my attention, is a noted and respected author who has written extensively about the dangers of excessive secrecy and about the operations of intelligence agencies. Mr. Wise spoke at great length with Dr. Mirzayanov in Moscow last November. Upon his return he contacted me. I was proud to add my voice to that of the many scientific and human rights organizations that have worked to free Dr. Mirzayanov. In particular, I would like to commend the efforts of two individuals, Gale M. Colby and Irene Goldman.

As Mr. Wise points out, although Dr. Mirzayanov no longer faces criminal charges, important questions remain about Russia’s intentions in the field of nerve gas production. This case is particularly disturbing because agreement was reached on the chemical weapons convention in Geneva less than 2 weeks before Dr. Mirzayanov published his article.

In his article, David Wise wrote that it was a moral realization that gave Dr. Mirzayanov the courage to speak out. We can do no less. I trust that these questions will continue to be carefully pursued by our Government and the Senate as ratification of the chemical weapons convention is considered.

Madam President, at this time I ask that David Wise’s article from the March 12, 1994, New York Times be placed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows.