Airborne: A Guided Tour of an Airborne Task Force

It had been a long day of talking in the Presidential Palace in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on September 18th, 1994. All day, a trio of envoys from the United States had been trying to defuse a long-simmering dispute over the transition to a democratic government in the bankrupt little island nation. The poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, Haiti was on the brink of invasion if someone did not back off soon. The U.S. delegation, led by former President Jimmy Carter, then-Senator Sam Nunn, and retired General Colin Powell, had been trying to reason with the leadership of the military junta that had taken over the tiny nation many months earlier. The Haitian military leaders had taken this action after Haiti’s first democratic election in history had provided them with a government that they could not tolerate. Unfortunately, this coup had outraged the democratic nations in the hemisphere, with the United States at the top of the list.

What had followed was one of the more miserable exhibitions of international statecraft in U.S. history. Over two separate Administrations, the American response seemed tepid and downright timid at times. The situation became positively humiliating in the fall of 1993 when an American amphibious ship, the USS Barnstable County (LST-1197), loaded with peacekeeping troops to stabilize the situation, was driven off by gun-wielding demonstrators (known as attachés, they were the enforcers of the military junta) at the Port-au-Prince docks. Now, almost a year later, things had finally come to a head. The delegation, sent by President Bill Clinton, had come to tell the junta, led by General Raoul Cedras, to either leave or suffer the consequences — both personal and military.

The exact details of what was said and done that day have never been fully released, but one thing is known. There was no secret that a vast invasion force had been assembled to take Haiti, by force if necessary, to restore the legally elected government of President Jean Betrand Aristide. Then, at the last possible minute, almost too late in fact, General Cedras gave in and agreed to leave peacefully, going into personal exile.

For most Americans, it is enough to know that when the troops of the invasion force arrived the next day, they walked in peacefully, receiving the cheers of a grateful Haitian populace. Or was it that simple? Such coercion had hardly worked against the likes of Manuel Noriega and Saddam Hussein. They had paid the price for their decisions with demonstrations of American arms that had cost one of them his country and freedom, and the other the ability to freely trade and make war on his neighbors. Perhaps General Cedras had been smart enough to watch CNN and learn a few lessons. Perhaps, but it is also likely that he took the time to listen to a few friendly words of advice from General Powell. Now what, you might well ask, could have been said late that Sunday night to make General Cedras give in? Well, how about: “They are already in the air, the entire division is on the way.”

“They” was the 82nd Airborne Division, and when General Powell said the entire division, he was not kidding. For the first time since the Second World War, nearly the entire 82nd Airborne was in the air with all its equipment. Spread among almost 15 °C-130 Hercules and C-141 Starlifter transport aircraft, all three combat brigades were already on the way to drop zones around Port-au-Prince.[48] The division was set to achieve by force what world opinion and United Nations resolutions could never achieve. Perhaps most of all, General Cedras was given a basic choice of his future. Either retire to a plush existence off the coast of Panama, or be taken to the ship’s brig of USS Wasp (LHD-1), already waiting off the coast of Haiti. Cedras was noted for being a smart man, and the reputation of that lead unit, the 82nd, probably was enough to tell him which option held the most pleasant possibilities. In Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf, the 82nd had led the way for American force of arms. In fact, the commitment of the 82nd is usually a sign that the United States is really serious about its commitment to a particular situation. So Cedras left into his self-imposed exile, and the 82nd returned home, to get ready for the next time. They had won Haiti on their reputation alone.

What kind of unit has such power to deter the intentions of dictator or strongman? This is the question that we will attempt to answer as we get to know the 82nd Airborne Division and its supporting units in this chapter. In doing so, I hope that you will come to understand, as I do, why America needs at least one unit like the 82nd. To go, when necessary, where diplomacy and reason have failed and only a show of force will do. But perhaps even more importantly, to make those who oppose the will of the U.S. and our allies think twice before they act. Because in its own way, the 82nd Airborne Division is as much a deterrent force as a thermonuclear warhead on a ballistic missile or an H-bomb dropped from a stealth bomber.

The All-Americans: A Tradition of Battle

You do not forge a reputation overnight; it take years of effort and lots of hard experience. This has been the road for the troopers of the 82nd: hard and bloody. Nevertheless, theirs is a reputation that has been earned the hard way, and it is good enough to scare people into not wanting to fight them. However, to fully understand why folks feel this way, we need to take a quick trip back into the past to look at the history of the 82nd Airborne Division’s “All-Americans.”

The dream of assaulting an enemy strong point “from the clouds”—that is to say, of using the air as a vertical extension of the battlefield — is probably as old as mankind. We are all familiar with the ancient legend of Daedalus, who fashioned a pair of wings so he could launch himself into the air to reach Sicily; nor is it hard to imagine some prehistoric cave dweller watching a bird of prey descend upon an unsuspecting rodent, and wishing he could duplicate that nifty stunt the next time his tribe raided those loutish Neanderthals across the glacier. Unfortunately for our primitive tactician, it would take a hundred centuries of technological advances — specifically, the more or less concurrent development of the warplane and the free-fall parachute during World War I — for his dream to become a reality.

As I related in the first chapter, it was Colonel Billy Mitchell, the colorful head of air operations for the American Expeditionary forces in World War I, who led the way with creative airborne thinking in the latter days of war. The close of the war not only suspended his innovative operations, but also put the idea of developing a permanent air infantry in suspension for a generation — here in the United States, that is.

Europe was a different story though. By 1930 Russia had introduced parachute units into its army and honed their jump techniques in extensive training exercises. In 1935 and 1936 the Red Army conducted a series of spectacular and widely publicized airborne maneuvers, in one demonstration awing an invited audience of European diplomats and military observers by dropping more than five thousand men — a brigade-sized group — in a single simulated air assault. This so impressed the heads of the embryonic German Luftwaffe that they quickly opened a military jump school outside Berlin and began training an elite paratrooper, or Fallschirmjaeger, corps.

Around the same time, the French and Italian armies began experimenting with their own airborne units as well. Of all the major nations that would fight the Second World War in Europe, only the Americans and British lagged behind in developing parachute infantry units. However, their efforts were jolted into high gear by Hitler’s Blitzkrieg conquests of Norway and Holland in the spring of 1940, in which his paratroop corps was a critical element. By the following year, German parachute and air-landing units were able to take the entire island of Crete from Commonwealth forces with almost no assistance.

This is where Bill Lee, who I described in the third chapter, came into play. Lee had been gently but persistently been nudging the War Department to initiate its own airborne program. He had seen combat in France during World War I, and while serving as a military attaché in Germany, had observed the early demonstrations of its Fallshirmjaeger units firsthand. After he returned to the States, Lee served as an instructor at Fort Benning, and then was transferred to the Chief of Infantry’s office in Washington. There he finally convinced his superiors to establish an all-volunteer test platoon of paratroopers. Equipped by the Air Corps and earning flying pay of thirty dollars per month (the average enlisted man made half that), they would be stationed at Lee’s old home base, Fort Benning.

The small cadre of jumpers was so tremendously successful that — again with some arm-twisting from Lee — it was expanded to battalion size by the fall of 1940 and christened the 501st Parachute Infantry Battalion. As the conflict in Europe escalated and America began to mobilize for possible involvement, Lee was given authorization to create three more paratroop battalions, the 502nd, 503rd and 504th, which rapidly grew into six regiments after Pearl Harbor. In June of 1942, now-Brigadier General Lee returned from a trip to England with word that the British Army was manning and readying an airborne division for action, and strongly recommended that the United States do the same. Shortly afterward, not one, but two existing regular infantry divisions would be reshaped into airborne divisions — the 101 st and the 82nd. In keeping with the concept that paratroop units were best employed as a quick-strike assault force, these would be stripped-down divisions of 8,300 men each, not quite half the size of a normal “leg” infantry division. They would be made up of three infantry regiments (initially two glider and one parachute, a mix that would soon be reversed) in addition to antiaircraft, antitank, artillery, and other support units.

Command of the 101st went to Bill Lee, the irrepressible prime mover behind the airborne program. Though the 101 st had seen little action in the Great War, and was not yet fully reactivated, it had, in Lee’s own words, “no history, but a rendezvous with destiny.” The 82nd, by contrast, was already something of a military legend, having been involved in some of the roughest combat in the First World War. The 82nd Infantry Division had spent more time on the front lines than any other American division during the Great War. Known as the “All-American” Division because its fighting men were drawn from all states of the Union, the 82nd had given our country one of its most renowned war heroes, Sergeant Alvin C. York. This pacifist Tennessee gunslinger had received the Medal of Honor for single-handedly defeating an entire German battalion, and was portrayed by Gary Cooper in the famous film Sergeant York. Deactivated after the Treaty of Versailles, the 82nd was reactivated after Pearl Harbor. By the summer of 1942, the 82nd was stationed in murky, mosquito-ridden Camp Claiborne, Louisiana. It was there that the division, still nicknamed the All-American (though it was now almost entirely manned by volunteers from Southern National Guard units), completed basic training under the eye of its newly appointed commanding officer, General Matthew Ridgway, a straight-at-you, chin-out patriot and former West Pointer who was himself to become a towering figure in the history of America’s armed services.

By the first chill of autumn, the 82nd had been shifted over from Camp Claiborne to Fort Bragg, near Fayetteville, North Carolina, where it remains based to the present day. Fort Bragg was marginally more hospitable than the unit’s previous home, and located near Pope Field, where its assigned air transport unit, the 52nd Troop Carrier Wing, was based. After a rough adjustment period during which the exacting Ridgway fixed a number of organizational problems and shuffled a number of key personnel, advanced jump training got underway for the fully assembled division. Over the next several months two parachute infantry regiments, the 504th and, shortly afterward, the younger 505th, were moved from Fort Benning in Georgia to Fort Bragg. Command of the 504th went to Lieutenant Colonel Reuben H. Tucker, while Colonel (later General) James M. Gavin, Bill Lee’s former plans and training officer, was made CO of the 505th.

Like Ridgway, these men would become famous for their dynamic personalities and heroic exploits during the war. In fact, the independent, steel-backboned, Brooklyn-born “Jumpin’ Jim” Gavin would instill such a powerful esprit de corps in his troops that they would have a tough time integrating with the rest of the 82nd. The 505th had a reputation for being as rowdily arrogant as they were courageous and superbly trained. Though an intense rivalry would develop between their units, Tucker and Gavin shared the conviction that a good commanding officer had to place himself at the center of the action with his men. Both did exactly that time and again as the war ground on, beginning with the 82nd’s chaotic trial by fire during the invasion of Sicily in June 1943, code-named Operation Husky.

After a great deal of wrangling among high-level planners, many of whom were enormously skeptical of the untested airborne and its strategic value in combat, the 82nd had been relegated to a supporting role in the overall scheme of the invasion: blocking any counterattack upon the flanks of amphibious U.S. forces as they made their beach landings in the Gulf of Gela, and then linking up with elements of Terry Allen’s 1st Infantry Division (the “Big Red One”) to await further orders.

The paratroopers found themselves plagued with difficulties from the get-go. The division’s training exercises in North Africa were rushed and disorganized. Its pre-staging base in Oujda, French Morocco, was a hellish oven, where the tent camps were besieged with aggressive black flies the size of cherries and scouring windblown dust that caked in the eyes, nose, and throat of every man. During one of the training jumps, the desert siroccos had whipped up to over 30 mph/48 kph and scattered the troopers across the desert. Dozens of the troopers suffered multiple injuries and fractures. Their situation did not improve when the division was shipped to a makeshift airbase in Kairoun, Tunisia, in preparation for the assault. In that Muslim city, where thousands of the devoted were interred in tombs barely two feet underground, the air stank of centuries-old human rot, and morale began to falter. Also, the dysentery many of the troopers contracted from drinking tainted water hardly improved their situation. Only the start of the Sicilian invasion improved things.

The assault commenced on the night of June 10th, 1943. Bolstered by a single battalion of the 504th, Gavin’s 505th led off for the 82nd on D-Day, while the remaining two battalions of the 504th cooled their heels in Kairun. There they awaited word that they could jump into so-called “friendly territory” already seized by the 505th. However, things quickly began to go wrong for Gavin and his men. Entire squadrons of the troop transports missed their landmarks and took incorrect headings to their targets. This was in large part because their transport crews lacked night-flying experience. In addition, high winds caused other planes to break formation and overshoot their DZs, scattering the troopers all over Sicily. Some of them — including Gavin himself — wound up well behind enemy lines. Lost, out of contact with their officers, little groups of paratroopers (the LGOPs that we talked about earlier) wandered around the island for days, conducting improvised commando-style raids as they searched for the Allied front lines. Amazingly, they probably did more damage to the Axis effort in Sicily by these raids than taking their original planned objectives would have done.

Bad as the initial drop had been, even greater catastrophe befell Tucker’s 504 on the night of D-Day+1. While Ridgway had argued for the regiment’s C-47 transport planes to fly a course that would take them around the ground and naval forces massed at the beachhead, he was overruled, and the long aerial column was instead routed over the two thousand vessels of the invasion fleet. To ensure a safe corridor for the paratroop drop, Allied units were ordered to refrain from firing at aircraft under any circumstances. But Luftwaffe airstrikes had been harassing American and British troops since early that morning, pounding the beaches and scoring hits on the transport and supply vessels. Nerves were on edge, and as the 504th approached the beach slightly ahead of schedule, somebody down below opened fire. Within seconds, antiaircraft batteries everywhere were letting loose with everything they had. Reuben Tucker’s own C-47 transport took over one thousand direct hits, and the paratroopers aboard were forced to bail out into hellish, swirling constellations of AAA fire. Tucker miraculously survived — along with most of his troopers. Others did not fare as well. Nearly half the planes that launched from North Africa were hit, twenty-three of them never making it back to base. Thirty-seven others sustained serious damage. The combined casualties among the paratroopers and airmen numbered in excess of 300. Three days after the two disastrous drops, only 3,024 of the 5,307 troops the 82nd took into Sicily were accounted for. The tragic failure of these operations not only devastated the division’s already sagging morale, but cast a shadow over its future viability in combat. Things were soon to change, though.

Once the division had returned to its base in North Africa, Ridgway rapidly began to apply the hard-won lessons of Operation Husky. Transport and coordination procedures were changed so that drop accuracy would be improved and the disastrous “friendly fire” incident on D+1 would not be repeated. Pathfinder units were created and equipped to help guide the transport aircraft to their drop zones (DZs). Equipment was also improved, particularly antitank weapons. British 6-pounder/57mm antitank guns were added to the division’s equipment, though the anemic American “bazooka” would be a continued failure for another year. One thing that had gone right for the paratroops was their performance once they had hit the ground. No less an authority than General George Patton was full of praise for their fighting abilities and spirit. They would need it for the coming invasion of the Italian mainland, Operation Avalanche.

A number of different staff proposals were made for the employment of the division, but in the end the 82nd would be used to close a dangerous 10-mile/16-kilometer gap between British and American ground forces at Salerno. Three regiments (the 504th, 505th, and 509th) with all their gear were dropped on the night of September 14th, 1943, with excellent results. The lessons from Sicily had been rapidly applied, and the 82nd took all of its assigned objectives. Unfortunately, various units of the 82nd wound up paying for their excellent performance by being held on the line in Italy long after their airborne missions had been completed. As a result, many superbly trained paratroops wound up being killed in worthless firefights.

Even more disturbing was the use of the 504th as an assault infantry unit during the disastrous Anzio invasion near Rome in early 1944. Once again, the paratroops of the 82nd were used in a role that regular infantry units would have been perfectly adequate for. Other than a number of needless casualties, the only effect of the Anzio campaign on the 82nd was to deny the division the use of the 504th for the upcoming invasion of France.

The invasion of Normandy in June of 1944 was to be the formal validation of airborne warfare for the Allies. Three full divisions of airborne troops (the American 82nd and 101st, as well as the British 6th) would be dropped behind the Normandy beachhead in the hours just before and after the landings. The idea was that the airborne units would block the advance of counterattacking German forces into the vulnerable Allied units on the five landing beaches while they gathered their strength. Some Allied leaders, especially the testy British Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory, tried to have the drop canceled for fear of the heavy casualties that might occur. Fortunately, General Eisenhower realized the need to get maximum combat power on the ground as quickly as possible, and the drops were on.

For the Normandy invasion, the 82nd was assigned the tough job of taking and holding a series of roads and crossroads behind the Utah beachhead. It was going to be a tough target. The famous German “Desert Fox,” Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, had personally supervised the anti-invasion measures, and numerous obstacles had been laid to specifically defeat airborne operations. Large numbers of low-lying fields had been flooded to drown heavily laden paratroops when they landed, and “Rommel’s Asparagus” (thick poles topped with barbed wire and/or mines) had been planted in fields to destroy gliders. Despite all these enemy preparations, the drop plans went forward, and were ready by early June.

The night of the June 5th/6th, 1944, was a nightmarish one for both the troopers of the 82nd and their German opponents. Bad weather had delayed the start of D-Day twenty-four hours until just after midnight of the 5th. Even with the delay, the weather conditions were barely adequate for the invasion to begin. The worst effects were reserved for the troopers of the airborne assault, whose aircraft became hopelessly mixed and lost over Normandy. It was the nightmare of Sicily all over again as all three regiments of the 82nd (the 505th, 507th, and 508th) were scattered in the darkness. Some of the transport crews flew all the way across Normandy, dumping their loads of paratroops into the sea to drown. The worst disaster was to befall a company of the 505th, which overshot its drop zone and landed in the middle of the town square in Sainte-Mère-Eglise. German troops, coincidentally fighting a fire there, massacred the American troopers in their chutes. The next day, the 505th fought not only to take the town, but to recover the bodies of their dead comrades.

All around Normandy, mixed LGOPs, sometimes containing troopers from both the 82nd and 101st, fought to take objectives, and hold the line while the invasion troops fought their way off the Utah and Omaha beach-heads. By afternoon, though, help was on the way in the form of the 325th Glider Infantry Regiment, which swooped in to reinforce the division. Despite some heavy losses of gliders to obstacles, most of the regiment made it down safely, and began to help in the gathering fight. The 82nd would be in continuous deployment for the next thirty-three days, sustaining casualties equal to 46 percent of the troopers who had been dispatched to France. Once again, the division had found that success was rewarded with more combat. Their unrivaled tactical skill on the battlefield kept them committed to battle long after they should have been returned to England for training and refitting. However, they had done their job well, and the fears of those like Leigh-Mallory had been proven groundless, in spite of the problems during the drop.

By the time the 82nd and 101st had made good their losses and had regained their combat edge, it was midsummer. By now, General Patton’s Third Army had finally broken out of the Normandy bridgehead, and was racing, along with other British and American armies, to the pre-war borders of Nazi Germany. During this time, there were almost a dozen separate plans to use the airborne forces, now formed into the First Airborne Army, to assist in the effort to finish off Germany. Unfortunately, the Allied forces were driving so fast that none of the plans could be executed in time. Opportunity awaited, though, in the polder country of Holland.

In September 1944, the 82nd played a crucial part in Operation Market Garden, a joint American-British attempt to penetrate the Siegfried Line along a narrow front extending through Belgium, Holland, and the North German plains. The plan was ambitious not only in its aim of driving the war to Berlin in a single decisive attack, but also in concept: It was to be the first true strategic use of airborne troops by the Allied military, calling for parachute and glider troops to land deep behind enemy lines and seize five major bridges (and a number of other objectives) in Holland, laying a “carpet” of paratroops across the Rhine for the rapidly advancing units of the British XXX Corps. Unfortunately, the Market Garden plan was terribly flawed, resulting in a tragic setback for Allied hopes of ending the war in 1944. Some of the flaws resulted from an overly ambitious schedule for the ground forces, which were to go over 60 miles/97 kilometers in just two to four days over a single exposed road. Also, the operation was conceived and launched in just seven days, allowing a number of oversights to slip into the final details of the Market Garden plan. Then the British staff of Field Marshal Montgomery, which was planning Market Garden, ignored a number of intelligence reports from underground and Signal sources that the planned invasion route was a rest area for German units being refitted. When Market Garden started, it turned into a bloodbath for the three airborne divisions involved (the 82nd, 101st, and British 1st, along with a brigade of Polish paratroops).

While the initial drops on September 17th went well, things began to go quickly wrong. Several of the key bridges in the south near Eindhoven (covered by the 101st) were demolished, requiring the ground forces to rebuild them, causing delays. Then the paratroops of the British 1st Para Division in the north at Arnheim found that they had dropped right on top of a pair of Waffen SS Panzer divisions (the 9th and 10th) which had been refitting. Only a single battalion made it to the Rhine bridges, where it was destroyed several days later. In the middle section around Nijmegen and Grave, things went a bit better for the 82nd, commanded by now-General Gavin. The division took most of the objectives assigned, though it failed to take the bridge over the lower Rhine near Nijmegen. Finally, in a desperate bid to take the bridge and clear the way for XXX Corps to relieve the besieged British 1 st Paras at Arnheim, Gavin took a bold gamble on September 20th. Borrowing boats from XXX Corps, he ordered Colonel Tucker’s 504th Regiment to make a crossing of the river, so that the bridge could be taken from both ends at once. Led by Major Julian Cook, several companies of the 504th made the crossing under a murderous fire, linking up with British tanks from XXX Corps, taking the bridge intact. Unfortunately, it was all for naught. XXX Corps was unable to get to Arnheim, and the remnants of the British 1st Paras were evacuated.

Thousands of Allied paratroops had been shot down for an operation that would never have been attempted had better staff planning been present. The 82nd, though, had done an outstanding job, and Gavin was clearly the rising star of the American airborne community. After holding the area around Nijmegen for a few weeks, the 82nd, along with the 101st, returned to new bases near Paris for a well-deserved refit and rest. Though Market Garden had resulted in heavy losses for the airborne corps and fallen well short of its goal, the operation had left no doubt about the 82nd’s combat efficiency. As General Gavin pointed out, the valiant men of the division accomplished all of their major tactical objectives, held firm against every counteroffensive the enemy threw at them, secured the key Nijmegen bridge in one of the war’s legendary battles, and liberated a chunk of the Netherlands that would eventually become the staging ground for the Allies’ final strikes into Germany. The airborne had at last gotten the vindication it deserved. There would be one more battle for the 82nd, though.

On December 16th, 1944, the Germans counterattacked in the Ardennes Forest in Luxembourg, trying to drive to Antwerp and split the Allied forces in half.[49] Thinly held, the Ardennes was covered by low cloud and fog, making Allied airpower useless. Unfortunately, General Eisenhower, the supreme Allied commander, had only two divisions in reserve to commit to the battle: the 82nd and 101st. With most of the Allied airborne leadership away on Christmas leave, it fell on General Gavin to command the two divisions, and get the most out of them. Moving into Luxembourg in trucks, Gavin emplaced the 101st in a town at the junction of a number of roads: Bastogne. Under the command of the 101st Division’s artillery commander, Brigadier General Tony McAuliffe, they were to make a legendary stand against the Germans. At one point, when ordered to surrender, McAuliffe replied with a uniquely American response: “Nuts!” Eventually, Bastogne and the 101st were relieved by General Patton’s Third Army on December 26th.

Famous as the fight of the 101st was, it fell to the 82nd to stop the really powerful wing of the German offensive. Gavin moved the All-Americans to the northern shoulder of the German penetration. There, around the Belgian town of Werbomont, Gavin deployed his four regiments into a “fortified goose egg,” ordering them to dig in and hold the Germans at all costs. Equipped with a new weapon, a captured supply of German-made Panzerfaust antitank rockets, the division held off the attacks of four Waffen SS Panzer divisions, blunting their attacks long enough for reinforcements to arrive and the weather to clear so that Allied airpower could destroy the German forces. The 82nd would spend a total of two months fighting in the worst winter weather on record, but it stopped the Germans cold when it counted.

Now, having fought its fifth major battle in just eighteen months, the division was again pulled back to refit. Though there was a plan to drop the 82nd into Berlin, the war ended before the plan, Operation Eclipse, could be executed. At the end of World War II, all but two of America’s airborne divisions, the 11th and the 82nd, were deactivated, with the former remaining on occupation duty in Japan, and the All-Americans coming home to American soil, and a heroes’ welcome, in the summer of 1945. It had been a hard war for the All-Americans, but they had forged a reputation for battle that still shines today.

Although airborne operations played only a limited role in the Korean War, it was during that period that the concept of airmobility—the idea that aircraft could deliver, support, and evacuate ground troops in remote and inhospitable terrain — began to evolve. This evolution took a giant leap forward with the development of rotary-wing aircraft (helicopters) and their extensive use in the steamy jungles of Vietnam. By 1963, CH-21 Shawnee transport helicopters and their successors, the famed UH-1B “Hueys,” had already conducted numerous missions in Southeast Asia, but it would take another year before the Army’s upper-echelon strategists grew to have full confidence in the airmobile concept — and then only because of the determination of two men: Jim Gavin and General Harry Kinnard.

A seasoned World War II veteran and airborne commander, Kinnard had dropped as a lieutenant colonel with the 101st, served as the Division operations officer for the defense of Bastogne, earned the Distinguished Service Cross for his valor, and attained the rank of full colonel while still under the age of thirty. During the 1950s he and Gavin became strong proponents of the helicopter as a tactical and logistical combat aircraft.

In 1963, Kinnard was chosen to head the experimental 11th Air Assault Division and determine whether his airmobile theories would hold up in practice. The test came with a grueling, month-long series of war games with the 82nd Airborne — whose soldiers were matched against the 11th’s and its UH-1 troop carriers and gunships — that were conducted across three states and nearly five million acres of ground. In virtually every mock conflict with its crack opposition force, the trial 11th Division came out on top. Airmobility had finally gained acceptance among the top brass. As a result, the 11th AAD (Test) was redesignated the 1st Air Cavalry Division and quickly deployed to Vietnam. The 82nd’s 3rd Brigade and other units soon followed — as airmobile rather than airborne troops.

Unlike the rest of the Army, however, the 82nd stubbornly upheld its traditions, remaining the only U.S. military organization to insist that all its personnel be jump-qualified: a capability that has served the division well in recent times. This has been evidenced with its successful performance in several airborne operations, including Operation Just Cause (the December 1989 mission to oust General Manuel Antonio Noriega from Panama).

Along with maintaining its airborne tradition, the 82nd has also remained the U.S. Army’s premier infantry force on the ground. Although no parachutes were seen over the skies of the Persian Gulf region during the 82nd’s hasty deployment during Desert Shield in 1990, its elite attitude served it well while holding the “line in the sand” at the vanguard of massing Coalition troops. While many of the veterans of the division’s 2nd Brigade (built around the 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment) considered themselves just “speed bumps” for Saddam Hussein’s T-72 tanks, they held the line while the rest of the Allied coalition came together. Later, they went along with the rest of XVIII Airborne Corps into Iraq, guarding the left flank of the coalition.

Finally, there was the drop that almost happened: Operation Uphold Democracy. This was to have been the three-brigade drop into Haiti which I described at the beginning of this chapter. Had it gone off, it would have been the biggest airborne operation since Market Garden. However you look at it, the 82nd is still ready to do whatever they are asked.

Currently the 82nd is designated as America’s quick-response ground force, and continues to be headquartered at Fort Bragg. It is prepared to be self-sustaining for seventy-two hours after crisis deployment, and has its own artillery, engineer, signal, intelligence, and military police aviation. With the proliferation of regional conflicts on the post-Cold War map, and the emergence of AirLand Battle doctrines synchronizing tactical air-ground operations, it is certain that the 82nd will be an indispensable component of our military presence well into the next century. Now, let’s get to know the All-Americans as they are today.

The 82nd Airborne Division: America’s Fire Brigade

Down the road from the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters at Fort Bragg is an even bigger and more ornate building. Here, on a hill overlooking the rest of the base, is the nerve center of America’s own fire brigade, the 82nd Airborne Division. Security is tight here, perhaps even more than at the Corps headquarters. However, once you are passed through the security desk, you arrive in a world where the history and tradition wash over you like a tide. Everywhere, there are memories of the 82nd’s many battles and actions. Battle streamers hang from flags, and combat photos and prints are on every wall. This is an impressive place because, while every military unit has a headquarters, few have a tradition like the All Americans of the 82nd Airborne Division. The 82nd is a division that has done it all. From fighting in both World Wars, to having been involved in almost every U.S. military contingency and confrontation since VJ Day.

Up on the second floor is the office of the commanding general and divisional sergeant major, the leaders of this most elite of American ground units. Interestingly, my first visit here found their offices unoccupied. This is hardly unusual, though. The leadership of the 82nd is unique in the Army for its lack of ruffles and flourishes. There is also an image to uphold. The 82nd is famous for never having lost a battle or given up an inch of ground, whatever the cost. One of the prices of this reputation has been the extremely high casualty rate among senior officers within the division. Another is that every officer who can walk, and some who cannot, is expected to lead the fight from the front. During the D-Day invasion, the commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 505th Parachute Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Ben Vandervoot, broke his leg on landing. Riding in a commandeered pushcart, he led his regiment for weeks before admitting himself for treatment. Similarly, the division commander during Operation Market Garden, the immortal General James Gavin, fought the entire battle with a cracked spine, which he fractured upon landing the first day.

These heroics are not just bravado, though. The nature of airborne warfare requires that leadership during the initial phases come from the front. For this reason, you always find the division commander being the first one out of the jump door during a parachute assault. As a matter of fact, this was how I came to meet the division’s commanding general (CG) in mid- 1996. Late one afternoon, while touring Fort Bragg, I was informed that “the CG wishes to have the pleasure of your company at dinner tonight.” After making sure that I was not the planned entrée, I quickly RSVP’d, and continued my tour. This was how I came to be seated in the rear of a C-130E Hercules cargo aircraft of the 23rd Wing over at Pope AFB early that evening. Wondering what was up, I found my curiosity rewarded a few minutes later when about fifty paratroopers in full gear started marching aboard, moving past me to sit down along the four rows of folding red-cloth-covered seats. Once they were seated, a HMMWV rolled up, and out came the CG of the 82nd Airborne Division, Major General George A. Crocker, USA. As soon as he strode up the ramp and sat down next to me, the flight crew started engines and we headed into the air, followed by several other C-130s. Once airborne, we began to talk over the noise of the four big turboprops, and I got to know something about this lean and lanky man.

Born in 1943, George Allen Crocker is a native of Russelville, Arkansas. A graduate of West Point, with a master’s degree in education from Duke University, he looks and sounds like a very serious man. With eyes like an eagle and a voice like a truck full of gravel, he is one of the current generation of division and corps commanders whose Vietnam experience came to them as young lieutenants and captains. Along the way, he managed to pick up a Silver Star, three Bronze Stars, and a Purple Heart for his service in combat. Prior to joining the 82nd as the CG in March of 1995, he had done numerous tours all around the Army, with an emphasis on airborne operations.

His tour at Fort Bragg has been a busy one, though not necessarily for the reasons that he would like. During his tenure, he has been forced to deal with a storm of publicity about racial problems within his division. Nevertheless, General Crocker is no rookie in dealing with such problems, and has gone a long way towards healing the wounds with the public and the country that the 82nd serves. He also is a man who loves to lead by example. I found this out about twenty minutes into our flight when he got up and said, “See you at dinner!” Then, donning his own parachute rig, he led the paratroops (yes, he was first out of the door!) in a mock assault onto a Fort Bragg drop zone for a delegation of community and business leaders watching on the ground. The amazing thing was that he did this with about as much concern for his safety as I might have getting into my car and driving to the market for groceries! Later that evening over dinner in a tent on the DZ, when I asked him how many such jumps he had made in his career, he pulled a notebook from his pocket and calmly commented, “Oh… about two hundred and fifty… and could you pass me the steak sauce, please?”

The 82nd Today: A Guided Tour

The 82nd Airborne is currently configured as a normal “triangular” military force, which means that the major units are designed to break down into threes. For example, the division can break into three equally powerful brigade task forces. In turn, each of these brigades can further divide into a trio of reinforced battalions. This triangular system has been standard in the U.S. Army since the Second World War. It provides a maximum of flexibility for the division and corps commanders, as well as the National Command Authorities (NCAs). However, before we get too deeply em-broiled in organization charts and unit designations, it is important that you understand some of the standard building blocks that make up a standard U.S. Army infantry unit.

The primary building block of any airborne unit is the fire team. This is a four-man unit which provides the basic maneuver unit for the airborne, and all the other infantry units in the Army. A fire team is composed of two troopers armed with basic M16A2 combat rifles, another with an M16A2 equipped with an M203 40mm grenade launcher, and a fourth with an M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW). Mines, hand grenades, and AT-4 rocket launchers would also be carried, depending upon the mission and the established rules of engagement (ROE). Usually led by a sergeant (E-5), the fire team is the result of over two centuries of infantry tactical development in the U.S., and is the most powerful unit of its kind in the world today. With three combat rifles, a light machine gun, and a grenade launcher, the fire team can generate an incredible amount of lethal firepower, and still be both mobile and agile. Perhaps even more importantly, every team member has a weapon firing common NATO-standard 5.56mm ammunition, which greatly simplifies the logistics chain all the way up to Corps. When deployed, the fire team tends to work in pairs (much like fighter planes in combat), with one M16A2-armed trooper being paired with the SAW gunner, and the other being paired with the grenadier.

If you pair up two fire teams and give them a command element consisting of a staff sergeant (E-6—known as a squad leader), then you have an infantry squad. Now things begin to get a little more involved. If you combine three squads and a weapons squad under a lieutenant (O-½) and first sergeant (E-5), along with a radio operator and forward observer, you get an infantry platoon. The weapons squad is normally made up of two M240G 7.62mm medium machine gun teams, as well as a pair of Javelin (starting in 1997 these will begin to replace the old Dragon) anti-tank/bunker missile teams. This gives the platoon the ability to engage armor, lay down suppressive fire, or to engage targets at good ranges. This is the smallest unit that would normally have a radio and GPS receiver, as well as some sort of transport like a HMMWV to act as a command/resupply vehicle.

Take three infantry platoons and give them a command element composed of a captain (O-3), command sergeant (E-8), a pair of 60mm mortar teams, and a small command staff, and you get an infantry company. Properly laid out, a company might hold a line between 500—1,000 meters/550—1,100 yards in length.

The next step is to build an infantry battalion, which is composed of three of the aforementioned infantry companies (usually designated “A” through “C”), and an anti-armor, or “Delta” (“D”) company. The Delta company is usually composed of five platoon-sized units, each of which has a mix of weapons mounted on HMMWVs. These include M2.50-caliber machine guns, Mk 19 40mm automatic grenade launchers, and TOW antitank missile launchers. The anti-armor company is also equipped with four 81mm mortars to provide organic fire support for the battalion. This unit (with about 600+ troopers) would be commanded by a lieutenant colonel, and he would be assisted by a battle staff equipped for round-the-clock operations, as well as the necessary communications to work as part of a brigade task force. Along with the personnel and their weapons would be a handful of vehicles (HMMWVs and five-ton trucks), as well as the staff and equipment needed to establish a small tactical operations center (TOC). Usually a brigade is made up of three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, a support battalion, an aviation element, as well as some other attached units. More on this later. With our lesson in infantry building blocks completed, it is time for us to begin our tour of the 82nd Airborne Division.

We’ll start our tour with the command section of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC). This is the nerve center for the division, and the primary source of tasking for the various units in the “All-Americans.” Normally based at the division headquarters, the HHC forms the staff for the 82nd’s TOC when deployed to the field. The HHC is formed into a typical staff structure of numbered sections. These include:

G-1-Personnel

G-2-Intelligence

G-3-Operations, Planning, and Training

G-4-Logistics and Support

The core of the division’s combat power is resident in the three organic infantry regiments assigned to the 82nd. These are the 504th and 505th Parachute Infantry Regiments (PIRs), and the 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment (AIR). All share a common heritage dating back to the massive airborne operations of World War II. By the way, if you are wondering about the difference in the names, there is a story behind that. The 504th and 505th have always been parachute infantry units. The 325th, though, was originally formed as one of the glider infantry units that went into battle with the 82nd and 101st. Therefore, in spite of the fact that all three regiments are jump-qualified, the 325th is called an airborne, not parachute, regiment. There is a bit of resentment in the 325th about this, and troopers of the 504th and 505th like to kid them about “riding” into combat. Such is the mystique of the 82nd that two words, “airborne” and “parachute,” can still arouse emotions five decades after the last combat glider landing.

An infantry regiment (with about twenty-two hundred troopers) is composed of three infantry battalions. Each regiment is headed by a colonel (O-6), who is assisted by a command sergeant major (E-8/9) as well as an HHC staff. They also provide the brigade task forces with the bulk of their HHC staff when those are deployed for action. This is why each regimental commander is “dual hatted” with the extra job of commanding a brigade task force as well. Currently, the 1st Brigade of the 82nd (1/82) contains the 504th PIR, the 2/82 the 325th AIR, and the 2/82 the 505th PIR.

The three infantry regiments provide the core of the brigades. In addition, the division has a number of other organic units that can be used to provide additional combat power and capability to the brigades. Some of these include:

• 82nd Airborne Divisional Artillery (DIVARTY): This unit provides artillery support for the three brigade task forces. The 82nd DIVARTY is composed of the 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment (319 AFAR) an HHC and three artillery battalions: 1/319, 2/319, and 3/319, each composed of three battery (with six guns per battery) of M119 105mm towed howitzers. In addition, each battalion is equipped with a TPQ-36 Fire-finder counterbattery radars. Each brigade is normally assigned one battalion of M 119s.

• 82nd Aviation Brigade: The aviation brigade provides the division with a base of aviation support that also can be parceled out to the brigades. Currently, the aviation brigade of the 82nd is composed of the following units:

1st Squadron of the 17th Cavalry Regiment (1/17): This is a unit of OH-58D Kiowa Warrior scout/light-attack helicopters assigned to provide the division with reconnaissance services. Composed of three troops each with eight aircraft, the 1/17 is a tiny but powerful unit that can either act as the division’s eyes (by using its onboard Mast Mounted Sight and target-hand-off systems), or claws (with Hellfire and Stinger missiles, as well as rockets and machine guns). 1st Battalion of the 82nd Aviation Brigade (1/82): Also composed of three troops of OH-58D Kiowa Warriors (each with eight aircraft), the 1/82 is primarily an attack unit. It was only recently converted over to the OH-58D, having previously flown the now-obsolete AH-1F Cobra attack helicopter. 2nd Battalion of the 82nd Aviation Brigade (2/82): This is a utility unit composed of three aviation companies. Companies A and B are each equipped with fifteen UH-60L Blackhawk utility/transport helicopters. Company C is a “pickup” unit, equipped with six UH-60Ls set up for general support and casualty evacuation, three other UH-60Ls configured with special radio gear to act as command and control aircraft for the division and brigade commanders, and three EH-60 Quick Fix electronic warfare helicopters.

When the division breaks up into brigades, the aviation brigade can be broken down to provide an aviation component for each. Since it is rare for the division to deploy more than two brigade task forces at a time, the aviation brigade usually gives each one battalion/squadron of OH-58Ds, and a company of UH-60Ls, along with a split of the aircraft of 2/82’s Company C.

• 82nd Airborne Division Support Command (DISCOM): The 82nd DISCOM is a brigade-sized element that provides the division with logistical, medical, and maintenance support. The 82nd DISCOM can be spit into three equally sized and matched brigade support elements, each assigned to one of the brigade task forces.

• 82nd Signal Battalion: The 82nd’s signal battalion provides the division with communications equipment and services (including cryptographic and satellite communications). Along with being able to support a divisional command post (CP), the unit can create three task organized signals companies, one of which is assigned to each brigade task force.

• 307th Engineer Battalion: The 307th provides the 82nd with a variety of combat engineering services and capabilities. In addition to being able to construct revetments, berms, and defensive positions, the 307th can deploy and clear minefields, repair runways, build bridges and bunkers, and provide specialized combat demolitions services, such as clearing obstacles with bangalore torpedoes and other explosive devices.

• 313th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion: The 313th is the division’s organic MI asset. It is equipped with links to all the major national intelligence services (Central Intelligence Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, National Security Agency, etc.). This allows the 313th to act as an all-source supplier for the entire division, or the various brigade task forces. In addition to having access to national sources, the 313th contains significant signals and communications intelligence assets, including EH-60 Quick Fix helicopters, ground-based sensors, and other equipment. Within several years, the 313th will also be able to control the new family of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

• 3rd Battalion of the 4th Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Regiment: The 3/4th provides air defense and early warning services for the division. Based around the Stinger weapons system (with both Avenger and MANPAD fire units), the 3/4th is composed of three ADA companies. One ADA company is assigned to each brigade task force, as well as a pair of air-defense/surveillance radars.

• 82nd Military Police (MP) Company: To provide traffic control, prisoner of war (POW) handling, and security services for the brigades, the 82nd MP Company can split into four MP platoons.

• 82nd Chemical Company: With the threat of chemical and biological attack on our troops growing every day, the 82nd has been assigned an organic chemical warfare company. Equipped with chemical warfare vehicles, as well as laboratory and decontamination equipment, this company can also be broken into platoons for assignment to the brigade task forces.

Now some of you who might be familiar with the history of the 82nd Airborne are probably saying, “Clancy, you forgot the tanks!” Well, actually, I have not, and this leads us to one of the unpleasant developments in the structure of the division. The tanks that I am referring to are, of course, the three-decade-old M551 Sheridans that have equipped the 3rd Battalion of the 73rd Armored Regiment (3/73), the only airborne armored unit in the U.S. Army. Unfortunately, by the time you are reading this, the 3/73 will likely be no more. As of July 1st, 1997, the Army will disestablish the 3/73, and armored support for the troopers of the 82nd will be no more. Frankly, this decision is just downright stupid.

It had been planned that the 3/73 would be equipped with the new M8 Armored Gun System (AGS). Armed with a superb 105mm automatic cannon and clad with a new generation of composite armor, the AGS was to have become the backbone of the 3/73 Armored and the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light) (ACR [L]). The contractor, United Defense Systems, was on schedule and cost, and the 3/73 was due to stand up with the new systems on October 1st, 1997. Unfortunately, the need to support the expensive peacekeeping operations in places like Bosnia, Haiti, and Rwanda caused the top leadership of the Army to cancel the AGS program, and reprogram the funds. Frankly, given the small size of the AGS program, this was a bad decision. Unfortunately, without any replacement for the M551, the same Army leaders moved from bad decision-making to outright stupidity when they decided to stand down the 3/73 Armored, thus denying the 82nd even the services of 66 thirty-year-old obsolete light tanks.

Allegedly, there is an HMMWV-mounted version of the hypervelocity Line-Of-Sight Anti-Tank (LOSAT) antiarmor system. It will be years, though, until LOSAT becomes operational, and there are rumors that those same Army leaders may cancel this system as well. Right now, the only plan to get armor to the 82nd when it deploys is to fly it in with C-17 Globemaster IIIs. More on this later. Frankly, though, someone near the office of the Army’s Chief of Staff needs to take a hard look at how much is being spent on systems that don’t directly support infantry units, and think about being a bit more even-handed. It would take a minimal amount of money (by Department of Defense standards) to restart the AGS program. I will close this commentary by simply saying that the cost of not doing so may be a lot of dead paratroops. Enough said.

Getting There: Supporting Units

Building the All-American Team

Now that I’ve shown you all the building blocks of an airborne task force, let’s put one together, just the way the folks at the 82nd Airborne do it. The troopers of the 82nd, like most other units in the U.S. Army, fight in brigade task forces. These are units with between three thousand and forty-five hundred personnel, as well as the necessary equipment to accomplish their missions. The 82nd has the necessary units to form three such brigades, and this is how the division forms to fight. Normally, each airborne brigade task force is composed of the following component units:

• A brigade HHC.

• A parachute or airborne infantry regiment.

• A brigade support element composed of a forward support battalion.

• A battalion of M119 105mm howitzers.

• A battery of eight M 198 155mm howitzers from the XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery.

• An aviation component of two troops of OH-58D Kiowa Warriors, a company of UH-60L Blackhawks, and one or two EH- 60 Quick Fix helicopters.

• One company each of signals, engineering, military intelligence, and air defense personnel and equipment.

• Platoons of both military police and chemical troops.

• Other attached fire support and special operations units.

Each brigade is commanded by the colonel who runs the core airborne /parachute regiment. Put all these pieces together in the time-tested 82nd method, and you have a force capable of taking down and holding a variety of different targets. Some of these include:

• International airports and military air bases.

• Port, rail, and other transportation facilities.

• Oil drilling and production facilities.

• Bridges, viaducts, and road routes.

• Ballistic-missile, chemical, biological, or other weapons facilities.

• Refugee camps and other areas requiring peacekeeping and/or protection forces.

These are just a few of the things that airborne forces can take and hold until they are relieved by more conventional forces. More likely, though, is something that has not even been imagined yet. This is because the inherent flexibility of airborne forces to rapidly get into an area and take control is very high. This point alone gives the airborne a lot of deterrence value against the bad guys around the world.

The 82nd Way of War: Operation Royal Dragon