Arctic Gambit

8 DETERMINATION

“… don’t know what the Russian name for the weapon is, but it has been assigned the NATO designation ‘SS-NX-35 Shashka.’ The ‘SS-N’ part means it is fired from a surface ship or submarine against a target on the surface. The ‘X’ means it is an experimental system, not in operational service yet, and ‘Shashka’ is the weapon’s nickname assigned by NATO — a type of Russian sword. NATO names for Russian missiles always begin with an ‘S.’” Defense Secretary Richfield looked up from the one-page press release at a Pentagon briefing room packed with reporters. “I can take a few questions.”

President Hardy and Joanna watched the press briefing together from his private study, just off the Oval Office. They’d reviewed the final draft of Richfield’s statement at breakfast. While a few trusted reporters had been “leaked” early copies of the draft statement last night, the missile’s existence would be news to everyone else in the briefing room, in the country, and the rest of the world. In all probability, most Russians wouldn’t know about the weapon their leaders had created.

Bill Hyland came into the study as Secretary Richfield was answering reporters’ questions. Most were predictable. “When will it enter service? How can it be so fast?” Richfield had rehearsed answers ready.

Patterson silently gestured for Hyland to take a seat as the conference wound up. After Hardy muted the sound but left the screen on, the national security advisor said, “Well, it’s not a secret weapon anymore.” There was a note of resignation in his voice.

“And that’s the entire point of this exercise, Bill,” Hardy answered firmly. Hyland was still trying to come to grips with the president’s decision to release highly classified information to the public. “After all, the Russians know all about it. They can still use it for a first strike, and that’s a real problem, but we’ll know who and how.” He grinned. “Nobody likes having their secrets found out. And now they’ll wonder what else we know. The Russians have been using information as a cudgel for years, I think it’s time we do some thwacking of our own.”

“The Russians use exaggeration, innuendo, and outright lies in their information operations, Mr. President,” countered Hyland. “We are using information derived from highly classified sources, the use of which puts those sources at risk!”

Hardy frowned; they’d had this discussion earlier. “The DNI and DCI both agree that there is minimal risk to the HUMINT source. The Russians already know about other collection methods. Besides, facts are easier to keep track of and can have a greater impact on the intended target.”

The television’s image shifted from a briefing room to a news studio. Joanna grabbed the controller and turned up the sound. “It’s Christine, Lowell.” The CNN commentator had been one of the journalists to receive an early copy and a short briefing “on background.” The story was within Laird’s area of expertise, and the administration knew she’d be leading the coverage at CNN. Laird had evidently used the night and early morning to line up “talent” for her show.

“… is from the Council on Nuclear Weapons, and is an expert on their design and construction. Dr. Ulrich, this not-quite-a-torpedo and not-quite-a-submarine swims incredibly fast and incredibly deep, then launches an equally fantastic missile that can reach hundreds of miles inland. I have to ask, is this really possible?”

Ulrich nodded, black beard framing his smile. “The Russians have built more than a few exotic weapons. The Shkval is a rocket-propelled torpedo that shocked everyone by how fast it traveled. It entered service in 1977. The Lun was a massive aircraft that skimmed the wave tops and carried six huge antiship missiles on its back. We’ve known about the Status-6 torpedo for some time. Putting a missile payload on it is both imaginative and potentially very effective.”

Ulrich had brought a map of the U.S. with the missile’s reach shaded in red. It ranged past Pittsburgh on the east coast, and well past Las Vegas if launched from the Pacific.

“The torpedo vehicle would arrive at the edge of the continental shelf, then rise quickly and eject the missile just below the surface of the water. Because they’ve reportedly made the torpedo quiet, the first detectable sign of an attack would be when missiles leave the water and fly inland. At six times the speed of sound, the missile would take just a few minutes, at most seven, to reach its target. Our military does not have an air defense weapon capable of shooting it down. Actually, it’s questionable whether any nation has a weapon in service or in development that could hit something that fast.”

“It certainly sounds scary, but Russia has had nuclear-armed missiles for decades. Why do you think are people so scared now?” Laird asked. It was a softball question, but that was deliberate on her part.

“We all grew up with the frightening knowledge that America and Russia could blow each other up, and the world along with them. The only thing preventing it was ‘deterrence’—the idea that regardless of whoever launched an attack, the other side would see it coming and have twenty to thirty minutes to respond, firing its missiles in return. Both sides would be destroyed, so nobody wanted to start shooting. Mutually assured destruction was a stable defensive doctrine, and it worked for over sixty years.”

“But now, with this new weapon, there’s little or no warning,” Laird prompted.

“Exactly. Many of our major cities are within its range, including Washington, D.C. and other military command centers. If they were all suddenly knocked out, that confusion would severely delay an organized response.”

Ulrich explained, “It actually takes some time to order a nuclear attack, especially an all-out response. There is no red button, big or small. We should take comfort that weapons that can destroy the world are not on a hair trigger. This is why a ‘decapitation’ strike may actually work.

“It’s likely the first thing anyone would do after hearing Washington had been bombed is ask for confirmation, then ask who’s in charge. In the time it takes us to sort out who’s next in the chain of command and then for that person to decide how to respond, a follow-on attack by Russian nuclear ICBMs could prevent or severely weaken our response. I personally believe it is still impossible to ‘win’ a nuclear war, but the Shashka might make it possible for the Russians to actually survive one. We would not.”

The camera panned back to show two men, one on either side of Laird and Dr. Ulrich the center. The seating was a tactical move by her. Senator Emmers was on the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Congressman Steve Bartek was on the House Armed Services Committee. Both committees had received a classified brief that morning about the Shashka, and come to very different conclusions.

“He’s given away the farm!” Emmers almost shouted. “Hardy’s just admitted that the Russians can take us out anytime they want, and we can’t stop them.”

“President Hardy didn’t create the weapon,” Congressman Steve Bartek, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, argued. “Moscow built this weapon in secret. Hardy’s administration deserves credit for discovering it and warning us that it exists.”

“He doesn’t seem to be doing much about it. This weapon is a gun not just pointed at our head, but with the hammer cocked.” Emmers’s tone was angry. “We have to match their move. Put our bombers back on round the clock airborne alert. Put nuclear warheads back on our Tomahawk missiles…”

“Just because the president hasn’t said anything about a U.S. countermeasure doesn’t mean there isn’t one in the works, Senator. Besides, telling the bad guys what you’re doing to stop him seems less than wise. Ramping up our nuclear forces to Cold War levels would only increase the volatility of the European crisis,” Bartek reminded him.

“And this thing doesn’t?”

“It would give Fedorin exactly what he likes — an outside threat to rail against.”

“That’s enough,” Hardy ordered. “Turn it off.”

Patterson protested, “Lowell, please, Steven’s doing such a good job. After his committee was briefed, I warned him that he might get picked by Christine.”

Hardy’s shocked expression caused her to raise her hands in protest. “Through Bill, of course,” she said, gesturing to the national security advisor. “It’s just that Steven had been on Laird’s show before, so we recommended that he study up, just in case.”

The president surrendered gracefully. “It was a good idea, and Bill, thanks for passing her idea along.” Hardy sighed. “It just sounds too much like our meeting last night.”

“Nobody actually shouted, Mr. President,” Hyland pointed out.

“I may have,” Hardy admitted. “I know we’re taking a domestic hit by not taking the overt steps to counter the…” he paused to check a note on his desk, “Shashka. But I won’t give Fedorin a club to beat us over the head with, and we don’t have the money or the planes to keep bombers aloft twenty-four seven. We can always crank up the DEFCON level later, if we really need to.”

“Everybody agreed not to mention the base off Bolshevik Island, at least for now,” Hyland offered.

Hardy nodded. “No point. And while I want the Russians looking over their shoulder, I don’t want to tip them off we know what they’re doing up there, at least until we know more and have a plan. Until then,” the president ordered, “use every- and anything you can think of to track the activity at that place. If they order out for pizza, I want to know whether it’s thick or thin crust.”

In a follow-up to our earlier report, Ukraine officials have confirmed that the Greek crude oil tanker Xanthos, which suffered an explosion and fire yesterday outside the port of Odessa, was mined. The tanker, fully loaded, was inbound to the port at low speed, in the channel, when an explosion under the hull sent a column of water over a hundred meters into the air. The vessel halted, dead in the water, with a fire in one of the amidships holds.

Ukrainian Coast Guard boats rescued most of the crew, but three are still missing, and may be trapped forward. The captain reported that the explosion knocked out the fire suppression system, but fireboats are trying to contain the blaze while other vessels rig a containment boom. The tanker’s rated capacity is just over three hundred thousand barrels. The authorities are deeply concerned about a spill of this size so close to Ukraine’s largest Black Sea port.

Even more troubling is the likelihood of more mines. All harbor traffic has been halted until the fire is put out, the spill contained, and the channel has been thoroughly swept. Some commercial operators are refusing to tow the crippled vessel away, and other shipping companies have already begun rerouting vessels or simply canceling sailings to the port.

Odessa is the only major port left to Ukraine following Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula. Sevastopol was its major port and the largest naval base. The economic effects of Odessa’s harbor being indefinitely closed are still being calculated, but would certainly be severe. Among other things, Ukraine must import oil to supply much of its energy needs.

The Donbass People’s Militia, a pro-Russian separatist group, claimed responsibility for the attack. An Internet announcement said their underwater commandos had laid “many” mines near the harbor. The Ukrainian Navy and other naval experts doubt this claim, though, because mines large enough to cause such damage cannot be carried or placed by divers. Such mines are typically laid by military aircraft, ships, or submarines, or covertly by merchant ships. While some pro-Russian groups do operate small boats, they do not have submarines or aircraft.

The Ukrainian Navy has one minesweeper, Henischesk. It was at Sevastopol when the Russians annexed the Crimea in 2014. While the vessel, along with many others, was eventually returned to Ukrainian control, much of its operational equipment had been sabotaged. Although still not fully repaired, the minesweeper will sortie sometime tomorrow to begin searching for other mines.

The Turkish Navy has offered to send several minehunters to Odessa to assist in clearing the channel. This gesture was widely praised by the Hardy administration officials and the European Union, while condemned by Moscow as another demonstration of the alliances’ creeping invasion into Russia’s Near Abroad.

Defense Minister General Aleksandr Trusov was President Fedorin’s advisor and emissary. When he spoke, it was as the president’s proxy. Anyone who spoke to him was, in essence, speaking to Fedorin. And when Trusov asked questions, it meant the president had already asked them and was expecting answers.

Admiral Komeyev, chief of the Russian Navy, offered a translated analysis of the American news conference. Trusov waved it off. He’d seen the video and read the analysis. “That’s why I’m here,” Trusov explained as he sat down. “We all know what they said publicly. What else do they know? What could they suspect, but they’re not ready to say in public?” he demanded.

The matters they were discussing were extremely sensitive. Besides Trusov and Komeyev, the only other person in the room was Komeyev’s deputy, Vice Admiral Balakin. He was younger than Komeyev by five years, and taller, thinner. “They’ve been aware of the Tsitrin missile trials at Nyonoska since they started, although the Americans haven’t used that name.”

“Or ‘Drakon,’ thank goodness, but they did link the missile to the new transoceanic torpedo,” Komeyev added. “This announcement was made to upset and distract us. It changes nothing,” he argued.

“It did upset and distract the president,” Trusov remarked sternly. “Project Drakon — all aspects of it — was supposed to be secret, completely hidden, until the base was finished and we were ready to execute the plan. If the Tsitrin land-attack missile’s relationship with the torpedo has been compromised, what else do they know? What can they know about the Drakon’s Lair?”

Komeyev drew a breath; he was unsure of Trusov’s reaction, but forged ahead. “As I reported earlier, sir, we know the Americans are curious about the construction on the island. We suspect their submarine Toledo may have been investigating the island when she was lost.”

Trusov’s expression became thoughtful as he recalled the videoconference several days earlier. Finally, he asked, “You still believe that the minefield was responsible?”

Both admirals nodded. Komeyev explained, “The mines were set up to protect the site from exactly that sort of threat: a creeping first-rank sub.”

“That’s not where the American navy is looking for the wreck,” Trusov countered.

“Our intelligence people have analyzed the submarine Jimmy Carter’s movements, and they only make sense if the Americans were looking for their lost sub near Bolshevik Island.”

“Yes, Admiral, I remember your conclusion. However, intelligence reports show the American spy submarine is still at Groton. What I haven’t heard answered is why she’s still there. Doesn’t their slowness suggest another explanation?” Trusov challenged. “Besides, wouldn’t we have heard a mine explode?” He sounded puzzled, but there was an edge to the question, as well.

Balakin replied, “It’s a very noisy acoustic environment. The sound of the explosion could have been masked by the severe ice noise. Also, the ships and submersibles in the area are only fitted with very short-range high-frequency sonars. There is almost no chance they would have heard the blast, some five nautical miles or more distant.”

“Our original plan was to set up the hydroacoustic sensor field first, and once that was operating, then lay the mines,” Komeyev remarked.

“But that would have taken two seasons,” Trusov continued. “I remember the discussion, and Fedorin’s decision, which I supported. I still do, because the longer we take to build the launch facility, the more time the Americans have to find out its purpose.”

The defense minister asked, “What could Toledo have learned? Worst case.”

Komeyev answered easily. “If they put up a periscope, which is risky with all the ice, they could have seen the ships over the construction site. Their sonars are good enough to hear the sounds of work underwater. To gain any knowledge of its nature, they would have to use imaging sonars, which are very short-ranged, meaning they would have to cross the mine barrier, or a camera, which is even shorter-ranged. They have remote vehicles equipped with those sensors, but they would have to enter our waters and approach very close. If that was what Toledo attempted, then the minefield stopped her.

“Besides,” Komeyev continued, “anything Toledo learned went down with her. Communicating requires a submarine to expose a mast or buoy, a precarious venture in the dense, broken ice field.”

“In addition, we haven’t detected any signals from that area,” Balakin added hopefully.

“If the Americans are telling the truth,” countered Trusov. “If they’re lying about the search area, or perhaps the sub is not really lost. I assume you’ve sent vessels to search for the wreck. To confirm her loss.”

“Not yet, unfortunately. Losharik, the only vessel currently in service for that type of work, is in dry dock for reactor and propulsion motor repairs. We’re working to get her back in the water as quickly as possible, but it could take as long as another week.”

Anticipating Trusov’s next question, Komeyev quickly added, “Two attack submarines, Vepr and Kazan, have already sortied. They will arrive in their patrol zones by tomorrow and will remain there until the facility is operational.”

Trusov nodded approval. “And I’m guessing there’s no point in sending surface vessels or aircraft.”

“They’d have to be icebreakers, Minister,” answered Komeyev. “The ice is a problem year-round that far north. Our combatants aren’t built for ice that thick, and their movements would only draw more attention to the area, as would aircraft. And the aircraft would be nearly useless anyway, as it is very difficult to use sonobuoys in those waters — they’d be crushed. I’m hoping the Americans don’t get too suspicious about the two submarines we’ve sent out. We informed the crews they were going on combat maneuvers; it’s likely this information will leak out in social media. However, if the U.S. doesn’t accept this explanation, starts wondering where they’ve gone…”

Trusov gestured. The admiral didn’t need to spell it out. “The risk of additional American interest is worth the security the submarines will provide. The instant the weapons are ready to fire, we win, but until then — for another four weeks, until the facility is finished, we are vulnerable. Secrecy was our greatest strength. With half the secret exposed, we must jealously guard what is left.”

The defense minister sat back in his chair and announced, “I will inform the president that the Americans only have a vague notion that we are building something of a military nature on Bolshevik Island.”

Both admirals nodded their understanding. Trusov continued, “We had hoped the facility would escape notice until it was operational, but as long as they don’t know it is a launch facility for the Drakon torpedo, we are still safe. Even then,” he smiled, “there are very few actions they can take.”

Trusov sighed. “The sinking of the Toledo, if it was caused by the minefield, is unfortunate, but the alternative — the Americans getting close enough to discover its purpose — would have been a disaster. I see no reason to alter our plans on this matter. But now we need to discuss this upcoming countrywide exercise. What is the status of the Northern Fleet? How many units can you put to sea?”

Komeyev knew this was going to be brought up, and slid a sheet of paper across the table to the defense minister. “Here is the Navy’s status, with details of all the ships currently in refit. We were adhering closely to the original schedule, but it is impossible that we’ll be able to have our major units ready for this last-minute exercise. The best I can do in the Northern Fleet is to have the main surface task force led by Admiral Nahkimov. Peter the Great and Kuznetsov still need two more weeks in dry dock to complete their refits.”

“I understand your frustration, Admiral,” Trusov retorted. “But President Fedorin and the rest of the General Staff believe we need to ramp up our military readiness in preparation for the restoration offensive. The president also believes the exercise will rattle the NATO alliance, make them take a step backwards, force them to consider if they truly want to go to war over the Baltic States, Georgia, and Ukraine.”

“I’m all for improved readiness, Defense Minister, but you know as well as I that a high tempo exercise has a price in materiel readiness. Ships, aircraft, and tanks often break down during these multi-theater wargames, and we’ll have precious little time to make any necessary repairs.” Komeyev’s protest earned him a glare from Trusov. But the hard look melted away quickly, and the older general nodded his understanding.

“We’ve kept the Navy’s portion of the exercise to a set of coastal defense vignettes to husband our assets. Your ships and submarines won’t have to travel more than fifty kilometers from the coast.” Trusov leaned forward to emphasize what he was going to say next.

“The vast majority of operational commands have no knowledge about Project Drakon, and President Fedorin believes that putting on a nationwide show of our military prowess will distract the Americans temporarily, force them to allocate resources to observe the massive exercise. We’ll still get some useful training out of this, but what we really want to happen is to have NATO and the U.S. focus on our demonstrations of capability.

“This will pull some of their attention from our activities to the north, but, also, as you so wisely pointed out, Admiral, our adversaries will believe that we’ve worn ourselves out a bit with the size and speed of this exercise. They won’t expect we’ll transition into a two-front offensive within two weeks of this feint.”

“I understand, sir. We’ll give the Americans something worth watching. Perhaps I can find a dilapidated ship or two that we can sink during the live-fire portion of the exercise. As for Project Drakon, we should begin loading the launch tubes in two to three weeks. If all goes well, we’ll be ready by the time the first ground units step off.” Komeyev tried to look and sound confident. He’d glossed over a lot of things that could still go wrong. Things the defense minister wouldn’t want to hear, nor would it have any impact on what Fedorin wanted the armed services to do.

“Good. Some in Moscow argued that the Americans already knew too much, and that the operations should be delayed, or even canceled.” Trusov smiled broadly. “The president let them have their say, then argued we should continue as planned, that this was our best, and maybe last, chance to restore our nation. If only you could have heard him! By the time he was done, the doubters apologized for worrying. With President Fedorin leading us, we are unstoppable!”

Balakin’s face showed he shared Trusov’s unbridled optimism. Komeyev merely smiled politely; he hadn’t been seduced by the confident prediction of victory. He knew there was a lot beyond their control, and whether the General Staff liked it or not, the Americans had a vote as well. Still, if the Americans could be tricked into looking elsewhere, it might be just enough time to get the launch facility finished. And given the key role Project Drakon played, it had to be operational.

Black puffs of smoke shot up from the stacks of two red tugs as they pushed and prodded Jimmy Carter into the dry dock. Ballasted down, USS Shippingport looked like two short gray walls projecting out of the water alongside Pier 15. The tugs held Carter steady as the submarine was slowly pulled into the flooded pontoon. The local newspapers had a small article in the business section announcing a contract had been awarded to General Dynamics to effect repairs on USS Jimmy Carter’s propulsion shaft bearings. The submarine was expected to be in dry dock for about a week.

Across the Thames River, a man stood on a small boat pier watching the docking proceed with great interest. While he had an unobstructed view of Pier 15, he was still over seven hundred meters away and it was difficult to watch for long periods of time through binoculars without getting noticed. He would have preferred being closer, but it wasn’t easy to get out on Mamacoke Hill without getting wet or seen. Silently, he hoped the American spy submarine would finally do something; it had been four days since he drove up from the Russian embassy in Washington, D.C., and those days had been filled with boredom. He’d wait until Carter was in the dry dock, then he’d head back to his hotel room and report before finding a place to eat that had decent vodka.