Billy Ruffian

TWELVE Prelude to Trafalgar 1804-5

In the early hours of Sunday 17 June 1804 the crew of the Bellerophon hoisted in the launch and got up the topsail yards ready for sailing. In the darkness all around them, the shouted commands and curses from other ships, and the creaking of ropes being hauled through wooden blocks, interrupted the insistent background chorus of the tree frogs. When the first rays of sunlight illuminated the upper slopes of the Blue Mountains a breeze sprang up and heavy canvas sails began flapping as the fifty or more merchant ships scattered across the harbour prepared to get under way. By mid-morning all except a few stragglers had weighed anchor and proceeded slowly past the fort at the harbour entrance, past Gun Cay, the rocky islet where the tarred bodies of pirates had hung until pecked clean by the circling vultures, and sailed out into the brilliant blue-green waters of the Caribbean. Once clear of the entrance the convoy headed westward along the southern shores of Jamaica towards Negril Bay. There, off the deserted beach and the mosquito-infested mangrove swamps, they were joined by the merchant ships and escorting vessels from the north side of the island. By the time they left Jamaica there were 172 vessels in the convoy.

They proceeded north through the Windward Passage and by 3 July, when they left behind them the mountains of Cuba and headed out into the Atlantic, the convoy had grown to 178 sail, and extended for nearly 6 miles. In overall command of the convoy was John Loring, captain of the Bellerophon, and to assist him in protecting the convoy were no fewer than seven warships. Apart from the Bellerophon there was only one other ship of the line, the 74-gun Duquesne, the French ship captured off Santo Domingo. The other ships in the escort were the Desirir, 40 guns, and the Renard, 16 guns (both were French prizes captured several years earlier and commissioned into the British Navy); the Echo and the Snake, ship-rigged sloops of 18 guns; the Hunter, a 16-gun brig; and the armed schooner Pickle. This formidable escort was necessary to protect the vulnerable merchant ships from attack by French privateers. Although the ships of the French Navy had been subjected to humiliating defeats on the few occasions they had escaped the British blockade and ventured out to sea, the French privateers had proved a menace to British merchant shipping. Some of the most successful privateer captains, such as Robert Surcouf, had become legendary heroes, and had notched up some spectacular captures in the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean.

Britain, being far more dependent on her overseas trade than France, could not afford to lose valuable cargoes and the 1798 Convoy Act made it compulsory for all merchant ships, except the powerful, armed ships of the East India Company and Hudson's Bay Company, to travel in convoys protected by British warships. The dates for the sailing of the outward-bound convoys were determined by the Admiralty, and the merchantmen usually assembled at the Nore or in the sheltered waters of the Solent. The homeward-bound sailings were determined by the admirals commanding the overseas stations.

Most naval captains hated convoy duty because the merchant ships were so difficult to control. The merchantmen were usually undermanned, varied enormously in speed, and were often commanded by bloody-minded individuals who objected to being bossed around. Thomas Pasley spent several years escorting convoys before commanding the Bellerophon and his journals are full of scathing comments. 'How can I pretend to answer for the safety of ships commanded by such a set of mules,' he wrote on one occasion. But the convoy system proved remarkably successful and in the period of the war against France, from 1793 to the Peace of Amiens in 1801, the losses of merchant shipping amounted to no more than 3.4 per cent of all sailings.

The Bellerophon's convoy took just under five weeks to cross the Atlantic. They sailed up the Channel with a strong south-westerly wind behind them, passed Beachy Head in drizzling rain and dropped anchor in the Downs on the afternoon of 11 August. Having delivered her convoy safely, the Bellerophon returned to Portsmouth for a thorough overhaul following her two-year assignment in the tropics. Her guns and ballast were removed, her masts taken out, and on 5 September she went into dock where she remained until 8 October. For a total cost of £11,914 she was re-coppered, her masts and spars were repaired or replaced, and she was re-rigged and fitted out, ready to rejoin the fleet. Within a week of leaving Portsmouth Harbour she was heading back down the Channel to resume her old task of blockading the French coast off Ushant. Apart from brief return visits to Cawsand Bay, off Plymouth, to repair storm damage and load up with water and provisions, she spent the rest of the winter months and the spring of 1805 with the squadron which was charged with blockading the French naval base at Brest.

When the Bellerophon returned to Britain in the summer of 1804 the country was facing the most serious threat of invasion since the days of the Spanish Armada. Much had happened on both sides of the English Channel during the two years that the ship had been away. Napoleon was no longer a mere general. In August 1802 he had been proclaimed First Consul for life and had begun the sweeping reforms of French institutions which were to leave a lasting mark on the country. He had reformed the financial and legal systems, revolutionised the educational system, and instituted a major programme of road building and canal construction. In May 1804 he was proclaimed Emperor of the French and before the end of the year crowned himself at Notre-Dame in the presence of the Pope.

Many in Britain had welcomed Napoleon's rise to supreme power. However enthusiasm for the First Consul began to ebb away when news of his ambitious plans for an invasion of England became known. When Napoleon had been put in command of the Army of England back in 1798 he had inspected the troops and ships assembled in the French ports and had wisely decided that they were not capable of mounting a successful invasion. He now had the power and resources to assemble an invasion force on an altogether different scale, and he approached the task with his usual energy and attention to detail. Within days of the resumption of hostilities following the breakdown of the Peace of Amiens, orders were sent out for the building of 150 landing craft, and on 24 May 1803 contracts were placed for a further 1,050 vessels. 'We must have a model of a flat-bottomed boat able to transport 100 men across the Channel,' Bonaparte wrote to Rear-Admiral Decrès, the Minister of Marine, on 29 May. 'There should be a mortar in the bows and stern. Such a boat should not cost more than £200 to £250.' On 5 July Napoleon issued orders for the purchase and construction of 2,410 more vessels, including shallow-draught troop carriers, bomb vessels and fast coastal luggers. Private shipyards all over France and Belgium were engaged in the work and invasion craft were even built on the Quai D'Orsay in the centre of Paris.

To accommodate this armada of invasion craft, Napoleon ordered many French harbours to be enlarged and protected by additional forts. At Boulogne, extensive new quays were built and a large artificial basin was excavated, and less ambitious works were carried out at the smaller ports such as Ambleteuse and Etaples. Ten new gun batteries were built along the Normandy coast in an effort to protect the invasion vessels from the frequent attacks made by British ships. The biggest concentration of troops, the Grand Army of 114,000 men, was assembled on the hills above Boulogne, creating an extended town of military huts, clearly visible in contemporary pictures on the green hills above the port. Napoleon made a number of surprise visits to the various ports and harbours to check on progress, and inspect the troops.

'I went on Friday to visit the harbour at Boulogne, and arrived quite unexpectedly,' he wrote on 5 November 1803. 'I took the greatest interest in inspecting all the works and preparations for the great expedition.' Two days later he was writing, 'On Sunday I spent the day visiting the new ports of Ambleteuse and Wimereux, and making the troops quartered there go through their manoeuvres. The works are progressing satisfactorily.' It was a refreshing change from his administrative duties in Paris and he was in his element. Returning to Boulogne on 12 November he noted, 'I spent the whole of yesterday at the harbour, either on horseback or in a boat, which means that I was soaked the whole of the day. But unless one is prepared to face the rain at this season, one would never do anything; fortunately for me, it suits me perfectly, and I have never been better in my life.'

In addition to assembling his invasion craft he ordered a company of guide-interpreters to be formed to accompany the invading army, and even instructed Chaptal, the Minister for Home Affairs, to get a special song written for the invasion, to be set to the music of the Chant du départ. 'And while you are about it,' he instructed, 'have a number of songs written on the same subject, to go to different tunes.' By May 1804 there were more than a thousand landing craft and gunboats available and he was planning the invasion for the late summer of that year. In July he made another tour of the invasion ports and on this occasion revealed his inability to understand the real problems of mounting an amphibious operation. In addition to his genius as a military commander Napoleon had an extraordinary ability to get things done, but he consistently failed to understand what every sailor and fisherman understood and that was the crucial importance of the weather and the tides in any operation involving sailing ships.

Early on the morning of 20 July he decided to hold a general review of the fleet at Boulogne. He sent orders to Vice-Admiral Bruix, who was in command of the invasion flotilla, to take the fleet to sea and anchor in the roadstead while he went for his daily ride on horseback. A strong south-westerly wind had been blowing the previous day and there was a heavy swell off the harbour entrance but it was evident to any experienced seaman that a strong gale was imminent. Admiral Bruix therefore decided that the review would have to be postponed to another day. When Napoleon returned from his ride to inspect the fleet he was furious to find that his orders had been disobeyed. Bruix explained that there was a storm on the way and he did not wish to risk the lives of his men. Napoleon overruled him and they nearly came to blows. Rear-Admiral Magon took the fleet to sea and anchored offshore.

During the afternoon the wind swung round to the north-east and rose to gale force, accompanied by thunder and lightning. The fleet was ordered to weigh anchor and seek shelter but the breaking waves at the entrance of Boulogne Harbour made it too dangerous to enter and so most of the ships and boats headed for Etaples. Forty-two of them reached it safely but four gunboats, two shallops and two caiques were driven ashore at Boulogne and wrecked. More than 200 men were drowned. Napoleon insisted on getting into a boat and leading the rescue efforts and was nearly drowned himself. A report sent to the Minister of War two days later by Marshal Soult played down the disaster and made much of Napoleon's rescue attempt. Soult described 'an extremely unfortunate event which caused the loss of a few soldiers and damaged several of the ships . . . His Imperial Majesty himself passed the night on the shore, and in the surf, directing the salvage operations, and his august presence was of the greatest comfort to the unfortunate men on the wrecks.'

By August it was evident that the invasion would have to be delayed to the following year. Napoleon returned to Fontainebleau to embark on negotiations with the Pope and the arrangements for his coronation as emperor. However he remained as determined as ever to land his invincible French soldiers on English soil and march on London: 'With God's help I will put an end to the future and very existence of England.' During the winter of 1804-5 he drew up fresh plans for the invasion. Apart from the weather, and the problem of getting large numbers of vessels out of the various French ports on a single tide, the greatest obstacle was the British Navy. Small sailing vessels loaded with soldiers were extremely vulnerable to attack from patrolling frigates, let alone from a fleet of ships of the line. It was therefore essential that the French gain control of the Channel for at least twenty-four hours while the armada of invasion craft made the crossing. Napoleon's solution was a Grand Strategy which was admirable in theory but fatally over-estimated the capabilities of the French Navy. He planned that the French fleets would break out of their naval bases, cross the Atlantic and recapture from the British a number of West Indian islands, including Martinique, St Lucia and St Dominique. This would cause the British to send a major naval force across the West Indies. While they were away from Europe, the French fleets would combine forces, hurry back across the Atlantic and sail up the English Channel. He believed that their superior numbers would enable them to sweep aside any opposition and provide cover for the invasion flotilla.

The first stage of the strategy was partially successful. On 11 January 1805 a squadron of French ships under the command of Admiral Missiessy slipped out of Rochefort in a snowstorm, crossed the Atlantic, and captured Martinique and the small islands of Nevis, St Kitts and Montserrat. However when they returned to France in May they found Napoleon outraged that they had not also taken Dominica, Barbados and St Lucia. Meanwhile Villeneuve had made a sortie out of Toulon on 14 January with a fleet of eleven ships of the line and several frigates. He had been driven back by storms but on 30 March 1805 he was encouraged by favourable winds to make a second attempt.

He managed to evade Nelson's Mediterranean fleet, which was re-victualling in Majorca, and sailed through the Straits of Gibraltar to Cadiz, where he ordered some of the ships of the Spanish fleet to put to sea and follow him to the West Indies. The French fleet arrived in Martinique on 14 May and the Spanish ships arrived two days later. When Nelson learnt from his watching frigates that Villeneuve and a large French fleet was at sea, he set off in pursuit, just as Napoleon had planned. In the Gulf of Cadiz he found that the enemy fleet had headed out across the Atlantic. Although they had a month's lead on him, Nelson immediately headed west and arrived at Barbados on 4 June He chased from island to island, and off Montserrat he received information that the French were intending to attack Antigua. But when he arrived at Antigua on 12 June there was no sign of them.

Villeneuve and his fleet had set off for France four days earlier. On 8 June his fleet had intercepted and captured a homeward-bound convoy of fifteen British merchant ships. This was a lucky break but when he learnt from the merchantmen that Nelson was in the West Indies, and was searching for him with a fleet of warships, he seems to have lost his nerve. He had received orders from France to capture Antigua, Grenada and other islands but he now abandoned his mission and headed for home. On 22 July in misty conditions off Cape Finisterre he encountered a fleet of fourteen British ships of the line under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder. A confused and inconclusive battle took place which came to be known as Calder's Action. The British captured two ships but failed to prevent the remainder of the French and Spanish ships from escaping in the mist and seeking refuge in the port of Vigo. Calder had to face a court martial later for failing to bring about a decisive action but at least he had successfully prevented the enemy fleet from heading up the Channel.

Napoleon had hoped to launch his invasion between 10 June and 10 July and was getting impatient. On 3 August he arrived at Boulogne to supervise the embarkation of the troops, and sent increasingly urgent letters to his admirals. He urged Villeneuve to 'sweep everything before you, and arrive in the Channel, where we are anxiously awaiting you ... If you are here for three days, indeed if you are here only for twenty-four hours, your mission will be accomplished.' And to Admiral Ganteaume at Brest he wrote, 'I wish you to put to sea at once, for the fulfilment of your mission, and to proceed with all your forces to the Channel . . . Start at once, and come here. We shall have avenged the insults of six centuries. Never have my soldiers and sailors risked their lives in a nobler cause.'

The British took the invasion threat extremely seriously, particularly in the southern counties which were most vulnerable to attack. Their cruising frigates could see the enemy's vast encampment on the hills above Boulogne, and from the cliffs at Dover and Folkestone the people watched the comings and goings of brigs and luggers and gunboats as the invasion flotilla was assembled. The countermeasures undertaken in Britain were impressive and would have made it extremely difficult for the French forces to effect a landing; without massive loss of life. Lord St Vincent, who had been appointed First Lord of the Admiralty in 1803, was responsible for the sea defences of the kingdom. He established a triple line of maritime defences. The first line consisted of frigates and gun-vessels which were deployed along the French coast to blockade all French shipping in port, including merchantmen and fishing boats. The second and most formidable line of defence was a squadron of warships based in the Downs whose job it was to intercept and attack the invasion forces if and when they escaped the blockading ships and put to sea. The third line of defence consisted of gunboats and armed fishing vessels stationed in all the harbours, estuaries and inlets along the south and east coast of Britain. They were manned by the Sea Fencibles, the body of volunteer sailors and fishermen set up by Lord Keith during the previous emergency in 1798 and re-established following the end of the Peace of Amiens. To protect the Thames a line of old warships was anchored across the lower reaches with orders to link up and form a continuous barrier in the event of an impending invasion.

Behind the sea defences were the land defences. The most visible of these were the Martello towers. These were based on the design of a fort at Cape Mortella in Corsica which had impressed the navy and army engineers by standing up to prolonged bombardment from ship and shore in 1794. More than a hundred of them were built between Seaford in Sussex and Aldeburgh in Suffolk; some forty of them remain today as the most visible reminder of the Napoleonic threat to Britain.

In addition to the Martello towers there were batteries of guns established overlooking beaches and landing places. Existing forts and castles, like those at Dover and Walmer, were strengthened and manned with troops. If and when the invasion was imminent the news would be spread by the lighting of beacons on hilltops and the ringing of church bells; details would be transmitted by the chain of wooden shutter telegraph stations which linked the Admiralty with the dockyards at Chatham and Portsmouth. The regular army had around 80,000 men stationed in Britain at the resumption of hostilities and this was augmented by the militia and by volunteer regiments. Recruiting offices were inundated with men and boys wishing to join up. Although large numbers had to be rejected because they were too old, too young or hopelessly unfit, it was reckoned that by 1804 some 380,000 men, or 7 per cent of the adult male population, had joined the militia.

The descriptions of the army manoeuvres which took place on the hills and valleys of Kent, Surrey and Sussex suggest that they were a source of entertainment to the local population as well as those who took part. Sham fights were particularly popular. On 2 August 1805, for instance, several regiments took part in a fight under the orders of the Earl of Harrington. The main body of the troops was stationed at Dulwich with small groups of men on Denmark Hill, on the village green in Half Moon Lane and at the cross roads by the Half Moon public house. After the fight the men marched past and saluted the Earl of Harrington and then settled down for a picnic. According to The Times, 'The Earl and Countess of Harrington, and other ladies and gentlemen partook of a cold collation in a large marquee pitched at the entrance of the common. Great numbers of spectators were present.' The royal family meanwhile were going about their usual business. The King, the Queen and the princesses were staying in Weymouth where they attended the theatre, and went for cruises on the royal yacht. The Prince Regent was in Brighton attending the races. On 30 July his horse won the Egremont Stakes by a neck, and afterwards he went to a ball with his mistress, Mrs Fitzherbert. Three weeks later he was still in Brighton and, together with a number of noblemen and gentlemen, he watched 6,000 troops from Lewes, Shoreham and the surrounding area skirmish across the South Downs.

While the regular army and the volunteer soldiers carried out military exercises, and the Sea Fencibles kept watch from every signal station, clifftop and harbour entrance, the British Navy continued to blockade the French ports and guard the entrance of the Channel. It was the vigilance and constant presence of the warships cruising off the coasts of France and Spain which was the greatest obstacle to Napoleon's plans. This was the period when the ships truly earned the title of 'the wooden walls of England'. On her return from the West Indies in the late summer of 1804 the Bellerophon once again became part of those wooden walls. She joined the squadron blockading the port of Brest, and for seven months she endured the familiar hardships and perils of the rock-strewn coast of Brittany with its fierce tidal streams, overfalls and breaking seas. On 24 April 1805, while she was back in Plymouth taking on water and provisions in between cruises out to Ushant, Captain Loring was replaced by Captain John Cooke, the man who would command her at Trafalgar. Cooke was forty-two and had been in the navy since the age of eleven. He had seen action in the East Indies and then in the West Indies where he had fought at the Battle of the Saints. Later, when captain of the Nymphe, a 36-gunner, he had taken part in the daring capture of two French frigates within sight of the French fleet at Brest, an action commemorated in a sparkling painting by Nicholas Pocock.

Cooke's first lieutenant was William Pryce Cumby. He was thirty-four and, unlike his captain, he had no previous experience of enemy action. He had served in frigates and ships of the line, and spent several years with the Mediterranean fleet under St Vincent engaged in the blockade of Cadiz. Before joining the Bellerophon in November 1804 he had commanded a naval cutter on the east coast and served briefly with the Sea Fencibles at King's Lynn. He was to prove heroic under fire at Trafalgar when he had to take over command of the ship from the captain, and his account of the action (written at the request of his son Anthony) is one of the most vivid and personal of the many eye-witness descriptions.

When the news reached England in May 1805 that Villeneuve had escaped from Toulon, Captain Cooke and the Bellerophon were despatched to the Straits of Gibraltar with a squadron led by Vice-Admiral Collingwood. They arrived off Cadiz on 31 May only to learn that Villeneuve had set off for the West Indies, taking with him several of the Spanish ships from Cadiz. While Nelson set off in pursuit of the enemy fleet, Collingwood and his squadron took up a position off the port to keep watch on the remaining Spanish warships in the harbour. They were there when Villeneuve returned from the West Indies, fought Admiral Calder off Finisterre and retreated into Ferrol. They were still there on 20 July when Nelson came back exhausted after his fruitless pursuit of the enemy fleet and stepped ashore at Gibraltar. He had been at sea without a break for two years and returned to England to recuperate, leaving Collingwood to take charge of the fleet.

In mid-August Villeneuve again managed to evade the blockading squadrons. He led his fleet out of Ferrol and headed south to join his forces with the Spanish ships in Cadiz Harbour. The Bellerophon and several other ships of the squadron were in Gibraltar and others were scattered along the coast when Collingwood, with only three ships of the line, a frigate and a bomb vessel under his command, round thirty enemy warships bearing down on him. He had no option but to make a hasty withdrawal but as soon as Villeneuve's fleet had entered Cadiz Harbour he resumed his position off the entrance. He sent a message back to England to warn the Admiralty of the current position of the Combined Fleet and proceeded to make signals to an imaginary fleet on the horizon to encourage Villeneuve to remain in harbour until reinforcements arrived.

The Bellerophon sailed from Gibraltar early on the morning of 23 August and rejoined Collingwood's squadron off Cadiz later the same day. By the time Nelson came out from England on 28 September the squadron had grown to a fleet of twenty-seven ships of the line. Nelson had orders from the Prime Minister and the Admiralty to engage and destroy the Combined Fleet of France and Spain. 'It is, as Mr Pitt, knows, annihilation that the country wants - not merely a splendid victory.' The only problem was luring the enemy fleet out of Cadiz Harbour. The problem was solved by Napoleon, who became so impatient with Villeneuve's failure to head north and support his planned invasion of England that he despatched Vice-Admiral Francis Rosily to replace him. When news of this reached Villeneuve he decided that he had no option but to take his fleet to sea and face the consequences.