How Hitler Could Have Won World War II

13 THE DRIVE TO EL ALAMEIN

FOR NEARLY TWO YEARS, THE AXIS POWERS HAD SQUANDERED A SPLENDID strategic advantage in the Mediterranean. While British ships had to take a 12,000-mile journey around the Cape of Good Hope, the Italians and Germans had only a 300-mile passage across the Sicilian Narrows between Sicily and Tripoli.

Yet the British had built up a seven-division army in eastern Libya, all motorized, with twice as many tanks as the Axis, and were about to embark on a major offensive with the intention of driving the Axis out of Africa.

The Italians and Germans had not even eliminated the British base of Malta, which lay smack in the middle of the Axis sea lanes between Italy and Tripoli, and from which British planes, ships, and submarines constantly sank Axis supply vessels.

It’s no wonder that Erwin Rommel was so exasperated by the failure to seize Malta that he offered “to have this pleasant task entrusted to my own army.” But he was turned down.

Rommel was also exasperated by the refusal of Adolf Hitler to give him more than three divisions. Mussolini sent only one motorized and two armored divisions, and Italian tanks were so inferior they could not stand up in tank-to-tank battles. All the rest of the Italian forces in Libya were foot-bound infantry who were more a liability in desert warfare than an asset.

Thus, for the want of resolve, not strength, the Axis position in the Mediterranean was on the threshold of being ripped away.

Yet the seemingly inevitable British victory did not come about in the spring and summer of 1942 because of the intervention of a single mind: Erwin Rommel’s. This officer took the poor hand dealt him and played it with such skill that he nearly won a total victory.

The world can be thankful that Adolf Hitler was so preoccupied with his obsessions and hates that he did not see what Rommel was achieving, and did not give him the modest additional forces he needed. If he had, Hitler could have ridden Erwin Rommel’s military genius to a negotiated peace, even in the summer and fall of 1942, when Germany’s position in the Soviet Union was collapsing.

Hitler’s principal concern in the Mediterranean was to keep Mussolini in the war. He sensed that the Italian people were hunting for any excuse to withdraw, and, late in 1941, sent into the Mediterranean 2nd Air Corps from Russia and twenty-three U-boats from the Atlantic. Although his aim was to help Mussolini, they eased Rommel’s supply situation dramatically.

U-81 sank the British aircraft carrier Ark Royal and U-311 the British battleship Barham. Also the Italian submarine Scirè grounded the last two battleships in the Mediterranean Fleet, the Queen Elizabeth and the Valiant.

The 2nd Air Corps and some Italian aircraft commenced heavy bombardment of Malta. Supplies of food, water, and munitions declined. German bombers destroyed aircraft flown in from carriers. The 10th Submarine Flotilla was forced to depart the island. Rommel began to receive adequate supplies.

The Italian supreme commander, General Ugo Cavallero, started planning an air-sea assault on Malta (Operation Hercules). But the Italians were relying on German assistance, and though Hitler approved the idea at first, he soon backed out, suspecting the Italian navy and air force would leave German parachute troops in the lurch if they landed on the island. He moved 2nd Air Corps back to Russia.

By the spring of 1942, the British concentration of seven motorized divisions at Gazala, two of them armored, with about 900 tanks, and more in reserve, added up to a striking force about twice that of Rommel’s Panzer Army. Rommel had 560 tanks, but 50 were Mark IIs and 240 Italian models that could not stand up to British tanks.

Moreover, the British deployed 170 decidedly superior tanks, American Grants, carrying a side-mounted high-velocity 75-millimeter and a turret-mounted 37-millimeter gun and 57 millimeters of armor. The British had 230 more Grants in reserve. The Grant’s disabilities were a high silhouette and a limited traverse of the 75-millimeter gun. The closest German competitors were nineteen new Mark III Specials mounting a long-barreled, high-velocity 50-millimeter gun and 50 millimeters of armor. Older Mark IIIs, armed with a short-barreled 50-millimeter gun, and Mark IVs, mounting a short-barreled 75-millimeter gun, made up the bulk of Rommel’s strength. They could be shattered by the Grant’s gun at ranges beyond either tank’s capacity to penetrate the Grant’s armor.

The British also armed their motorized infantry with the new six-pounder (57-millimeter) antitank gun, possessing 30 percent more penetration than the German 50-millimeter AT gun. The German 88-millimeter AA gun remained the most formidable tank killer on either side, but Rommel had only forty-eight of them.

The Germans assembled 542 aircraft, the RAF assembled 604. But, with improved Me-109 fighters that outclassed the British Hurricanes and American-built P-40E Kittyhawks, the Luftwaffe was dominant in the early stages of the campaign.

The British position rested on a heavily mined fifty-mile-long defensive line of 13th Corps, now commanded by Lieutenant General W.H.E. “Strafer” Gott. It ran from Gazala on the Mediterranean to Bir Hacheim, where the 1st Free French Brigade of 4,000 men, plus a small Jewish Brigade, held a strongly fortified “box,” or defensive “hedgehog” perimeter.

For ten miles on the north the 1st South African Division manned a firm sector. Below it, however, the three brigades of the British 50th Division occupied widely separated defensive boxes, flanked only by minefields. Two boxes were most exposed: the division’s 150th Brigade at Got el Ualeb, half a dozen miles south of the east-west Arab caravan route Trigh Capuzzo, and, sixteen miles farther south, the Free French box at Bir Hacheim.

Some thirty miles southeast of Gazala and twelve miles east of the 150th Brigade box was Knightsbridge box, held by the 201st Guards Brigade, at the junction of the Trigh Capuzzo and a north-south Arab trail. About twenty miles east of Knightsbridge and seventeen miles south of Tobruk was the El Adem box, garrisoned by parts of 5th Indian Division.

The Gazala line evoked memories of powerful defensive positions along the western front in World War I. It was a product of the close association of British generals with infantry, not mobile, warfare. But a static defensive line was bound to lead to disaster in desert warfare. As Rommel pointed out, any position in North Africa had an open desert flank on the south and could always be turned. To be successful, defense in the desert had to be conducted offensively.

The boxes also might be bypassed or surrounded and forced to surrender. An added problem was that the new British forward railhead and supply base was only forty-five miles east of the Gazala line at Belhamed. The vast supplies there made British commanders hesitant to maneuver armor in any way that might uncover Belhamed.

Behind the Gazala line the British had a mobile reserve: the 1st and 7th Armored Divisions in 30th Corps, still under Lieutenant General C. W. M. Norrie, with three brigades of cruiser tanks (including the Grants). However, the British continued to divide their armor, leaving two brigades of “I” (infantry) tanks (mostly Matildas) posted in support of the 1st South African and 50th Divisions.

German intelligence had clear signs that the British were building up for an offensive. Since the southern flank lay wide open, a bold British armored strike around it into the rear against the Axis supply line could force Rommel’s army to abandon the field. Retreat would be fraught with difficulties, because most of the Italian divisions were nonmotorized.

“But the British were not to have the chance of exploiting their opportunities,” Rommel wrote, “for I had decided to strike first.”

Generals Auchinleck and Sir Neil Ritchie, commanding 8th Army, were not ready to commence their offensive, and posted their armor defensively in case Rommel did attack. Oddly, Auchinleck thought Rommel was not likely to strike around the undefended southern flank, but would drive into the center along the Trigh Capuzzo. He advised Ritchie to concentrate his two armored divisions along this trail, so that he could move against a thrust along it or meet a turning move around the flank if it did come.

Ritchie, instead, kept 1st Armored (with the 2nd and 22nd Armored Brigades) around the Trigh Capuzzo, and sent 7th Armored, with its single 4th Armored Brigade, southward to support the French at Bir Hacheim and the 3rd Indian Motorized Brigade holding a guarding position a few miles east. Thus, as the battle opened, British armor was split into three segments: two “I” brigades (the 1st and 32nd) in the north, 1st Armored in the center, and 7th Armored in the south.

Rommel had planned all along to swing around the southern flank. But to disguise this move, he ordered trucks and tanks driven in circles behind the Gazala line to deceive the British into thinking he was assembling armor. In daylight just before the attack, he sent all motorized forces toward the Italian infantry divisions detailed to demonstrate along the Gazala line, then brought them to their assembly points after nightfall.

Rommel’s striking force consisted of Africa Corps (15th and 21st Panzer Divisions), the 20th Italian Motorized Corps (Ariete Armored and Trieste Motorized Divisions), and 90th Light Division. The whole force was to circle around Bir Hacheim. The Italians were to storm and take Bir Hacheim in a coup de main, thus opening a shorter supply corridor, while Africa Corps was to strike directly for Acroma and the coast, cutting off and destroying the armor and troops along the Gazala line. At the same time 90th Light, with trucks mounting aircraft engines to simulate dust clouds raised by advancing tanks, was to push into the El Adem–Belhamed area, about fifteen miles southeast of Tobruk, and cut off the British from their supplies and reinforcements.

On the night of May 26, 1942, after Italian infantry under German General Ludwig Cruewell made a diversionary frontal assault against the Gazala line, Rommel’s mobile forces in 10,000 vehicles struck out in moonlight through swirling dust and sand. Luftwaffe planes dropped flares on Bir Hacheim to show the drivers the limit of the British lines. By daybreak, having encountered no opposition, the force was east of Bir Hacheim and the Germans set out at full speed for the British rear. The Italians turned back to storm Bir Hacheim, but were stopped by mines and French antitank fire.

By 10 A.M. on May 27, 90th Light seized El Adem and numerous supply dumps, but stirred up a furious battle with British forces in the area.

At the same time, Africa Corps, now under General Walter Nehring, collided with 4th Armored Brigade fifteen miles northeast of Bir Hacheim near Bir el Harmat. In violation of Rommel’s orders, Nehring’s panzers attacked without artillery support. They were stunned by the long-range penetrating power of the 75-millimeter Grant gun. Tank after tank burst into flames or was disabled. Only after they had brought up antitank guns and 88s were the Germans able to make headway. Tanks now worked around the enemy flanks, finally shattering the British brigade, whose remnants fell back toward El Adem.

As 4th Armored Brigade drew away, 21st Panzer drove northward, overwhelmed 3rd Indian Motorized Brigade in a forty-minute fight, and shattered 7th Motorized Brigade trying to hold a position a few miles on.

In the late morning the British 22nd Armored Brigade arrived from the north. An officer with an advance element wrote: “On topping a rise we could see on the eastern skyline a solid mass of vehicles stretching southward into the haze as far as the eye could see.” This was Africa Corps moving toward the Trigh Capuzzo.

The 22nd Brigade, caught isolated, was mauled in a concentric attack by both panzer divisions and also forced to withdraw. Africa Corps advanced to the Trigh Capuzzo and met the third British armored brigade, the 2nd, which attacked from the west but didn’t coordinate with the 1st Army Tank Brigade that charged recklessly from the east.

There was a period of panic when sixty Matildas and Grants smashed into the midst of the German forces, and overran a motorized infantry battalion. Nehring threw in his headquarters defense unit, a battery of 88s, a few tanks, and a company of light antiaircraft guns. Joined by sixteen additional 88s, the defenders formed a solid gun line, destroyed twelve enemy tanks, and forced the remainder to withdraw. The assaults cut off supply columns trying to bring up fuel and ammunition, and forced Africa Corps to close into a hedgehog perimeter for the night about three miles north of the Trigh Capuzzo.

The Axis forces had been forced to halt in a highly dangerous position with British forces blocking their movement north. Moreover, the only way the Germans and Italians could be supplied was by way of a wide detour around Bir Hacheim.

If the British had not wasted their strength in uncoordinated isolated fights by individual brigades, they might have converged on Rommel’s armor and ended the campaign in North Africa then and there. Rommel was especially astonished at the sacrifice of 7th Armored Brigade south of Bir el Harmat. “It was all the same to the British whether my armor was engaged there or on the Trigh Capuzzo,” he wrote. “The full motorization of their units would have enabled them to cross the battlefield at great speed to wherever danger threatened.”

Despite the failure on May 27, General Ritchie possessed another great opportunity to destroy Africa Corps on May 28 by a concentric attack, using the armor he already had in place, and bringing up the 32nd Tank Brigade, which had not been committed. But Ritchie took no such action, and Rommel had time to reorganize.

On May 28, Rommel intended for 90th Light to withdraw from the El Adem area and join Africa Corps for a concerted attack northward. But the division could not extricate itself from an attack by 4th Armored Brigade. As a result, Ariete Division and Africa Corps fought a confused series of engagements with British armor, which once more came in piecemeal. By the end of the day, Africa Corps had 150 tanks left fit for action, the Italians 90, while the British still had 420.

The 90th Light was able to withdraw during the night to Bir el Harmat, and early on May 29 Rommel himself led a supply column to replenish Axis forces with fuel and ammunition. On this day the British again launched one uncoordinated attack after another. The Germans were little affected and remained in a strong position.

But Rommel realized he could not continue northward until his supply line was secure, since trucks coming around south of Bir Hacheim were being attacked by British motorized forces.

He then made a bold decision that saved the campaign. While the rest of his forces went over to the defensive, Rommel ordered 90th Light to drive west while Italian infantry advanced east along the Trigh Capuzzo. In this way, he broke a supply line directly through the Gazala line minefields.

The 150th Brigade box at Got el Ualeb and the Free French box at Bir Hacheim were now isolated, and Rommel decided to destroy both. Their capture would eliminate all danger to the south and give him freedom of action.

Nevertheless, the plan posed enormous danger. Axis armor was still stymied deep in the British rear and could do nothing until an avenue of advance opened. Yet Ritchie had a clear path to victory. He could use his infantry and artillery to break a hole through the weak Italian divisions manning the Gazala line on the coast and drive west to sever the Axis supply line. Rommel had little to stop him. Such a move would leave Rommel’s panzers without fuel and endanger his whole position in Africa.

Rommel saw the peril clearly. But he had judged his opponents accurately. He knew the British generals would not think so much of opportunity as of danger. If they drove west along the northern coast road with part of their armor, they feared Rommel would rush north and cut their supply line. Yet the British had 400 tanks, plus AT guns, and—with the rest of their tanks—could have blocked Rommel’s remaining 130 German and 130 Italian tanks until their fuel ran out. Rommel was confident that the British would fix their attention on the Axis armor and “continue to run their heads against our well-organized defensive front and use up their strength.”

This is what happened. On May 30 British armor made sporadic, uncoordinated attacks broken up by German 88s and AT guns. By the end of the day, Axis forces had shattered fifty-seven tanks and established a firm front on the east-west Sidra Ridge, a mile north of the Trigh Capuzzo, and on Aslagh Ridge, about five miles south, enclosing an area the British named the Caldron.

Rommel thus had the time to assault the Allied boxes. On May 31 he personally led 90th Light, Trieste, and elements of Africa Corps against the 150th Brigade box. Aided by a regiment of Matildas, the British resisted stubbornly, but their situation was hopeless, and the next day, after a heavy attack by Stuka dive-bombers, out of ammunition and water, they gave up 3,000 men.

On June 2, 90th Light and Trieste assaulted the Bir Hacheim box. The fight turned into one of the fiercest in the war, lasting ten days. The French and Jewish defenders fought skillfully from field positions, machine-gun and AT nests, and slit trenches. They endured intense dive-bombing: 1,300 Stuka sorties in nine days. The Luftwaffe suffered, for RAF fighters shot down forty Stukas on a single day.

On June 5, the British tried once more to destroy Axis armor in the Caldron, but they still made direct, obvious, piecemeal attacks.

To the north, slow, heavy Matilda and Valentine infantry tanks lumbered forward in daylight, unsupported by artillery fire, and provided perfect targets for AT guns of 21st Panzer on Sidra Ridge. The British armor ended in a minefield and were shot to pieces, losing fifty of seventy tanks engaged.

To the southeast the 10th Indian Brigade drove Ariete Division off Aslagh Ridge. The 22nd Armored Brigade then passed into the Caldron, followed by the 9th Infantry Brigade. The British tanks received tremendous fire from German AT guns and artillery, and withdrew to Bir el Tamar, between Aslagh and Sidra Ridges. At midday, Rommel launched one of his most brilliant counterstrokes. While 21st Panzer thrust southeast toward Bir el Tamar, 15th Panzer emerged from a gap in the minefields south of Aslagh Ridge and struck the flank and rear of the Indian troops holding the ridge. By nightfall the Axis had shattered 9th Infantry Brigade and formed a ring around 10th Indian Brigade on Aslagh, as well as the armored division’s Support Group and four field artillery regiments to the north.

Rommel predicted that the British generals would draw no forces from the Gazala line or from the Tobruk garrison to exert pressure against the Germans ringing the British in the Caldron. They did not, though this was the only way to rescue the trapped soldiers.

“In a moment so decisive, they should have thrown in all the strength they could muster,” Rommel wrote. “What is the use of having overall superiority if one allows one’s formations to be smashed piece by piece by an enemy who, in each separate action, is able to concentrate superior strength at the decisive point?”

By the end of the day on June 6, Africa Corps had destroyed a hundred tanks, wiped out 10th Brigade, and captured 3,100 men, ninety-six cannons, and thirty-seven antitank guns. Total British tank strength had fallen to 170.

This defensive fight broke the British barrier at the Caldron and opened the way for rapid movement. But Rommel decided first to eliminate Bir Hacheim before bursting forward.

On June 8, elements of 15th Panzer joined other Axis forces in a coordinated attack of extreme violence from all directions against the Free French brigade, under the inspired leadership of Pierre Koenig. A German Kampfgruppe finally cracked the main position on June 10, but the greater part of the garrison broke out during the night and was picked up by the 7th British Motor Brigade. This demonstrated how difficult it is to contain a determined force. Only 500 soldiers fell into German hands, most of them wounded.

The way was now open for Rommel to drive into the British vitals, though Ritchie had brought up reinforcements and now had 330 tanks, twice the remaining strength of Africa Corps. But the Germans were smelling victory, while the British had been badly shaken.

On June 11, 1942, 15th Panzer turned northeast toward El Adem, with 90th Light, now down to 1,000 men, on its right, and Trieste Division on the left. By nightfall the force was south and west of El Adem, facing the 2nd and 4th Armored Brigades.

Rommel ordered 21st Panzer to swing around to the northeast the next day and attack the enemy armor in the rear. The British tank units, not realizing they could not remain stationary while the whole Axis army was on the move, was trapped. German AT guns moved forward and began a systematic execution. When 22nd Armored Brigade came down from the north to help, it was too late, caught by 21st Panzer and Trieste, and suffered heavy losses.

The two cornered brigades tried to flee, the 2nd withdrawing in some order with 22nd Brigade toward Knightsbridge box, a few miles north, but the 4th’s retreat turned into a rout, and it lost most of its force, 120 tanks.

The next day Rommel turned north, aiming at the Knightsbridge box. But the British had finally realized that defensive boxes in the open desert were prisons not bastions, and they withdrew, with the panzers harrying the fleeing armor. By nightfall Ritchie had barely 100 tanks left, and Rommel enjoyed tank superiority for the first time. He also was in possession of the battlefield and recovered many tanks.

With the Germans overflowing the rear, the British along the Gazala line were in danger of being cut off and, on Ritchie’s orders, withdrew on the morning of June 14. The same morning Rommel sent Africa Corps past Acroma with urgent orders to seal off the Via Balbia during the night and intercept the fleeing enemy.

But the German tank crews were so exhausted they dropped down short of the highway at the end of the day. During the night most of the South Africans escaped, moving back fast to the Egyptian frontier. The survivors of the British 50th Division broke out west through the Italian front, and moved in a long circuit south, then back east to the frontier.

The shattered British armored brigades were now no match for the panzers, and they withdrew into Egypt. Africa Corps swept around the Tobruk perimeter, garrisoned by 2nd South African Division and other forces, and seized airfields at Gambut, thirty-five miles east of Tobruk. This forced British aircraft to withdraw farther east, beyond easy range of Tobruk. The panzers then turned back on Tobruk.

This fortress was a symbol of British resistance, and Rommel was determined to have it. The British, seeing the panzers go past, did not expect an attack, but Rommel mounted one quickly, cracked a hole in the southeast perimeter on June 20 with artillery and dive-bombers, and widened the gap with infantry. Panzers now poured through, drove straight into the heart of the town and overcame the dazed defenders. Tobruk surrendered the next day, giving up 35,000 prisoners. The loss was second only to the capture of Singapore by the Japanese as the greatest British disaster of the war. Hitler was so impressed he promoted Rommel to field marshal. But Rommel wrote his wife: “I would rather he had given me one more division.”

The unexpected loss of Tobruk shocked General Ritchie to such a degree that he gave up potentially strong positions at Sollum and Halfaya Gap on the frontier. This shows how the actions of a commander can affect the will of the general opposing him. Ritchie had three times as many tanks as Rommel in reserve, and three almost intact infantry divisions there, with a fourth on the way up.

But Ritchie decided to make his stand at Mersa Matruh, 130 miles farther to the east. Auchinleck, who saw Ritchie no longer had the confidence to lead the 8th Army, took over direct command on June 25 and decided to withdraw all the way to El Alamein, 110 miles farther east, and only 60 miles from Alexandria, the Royal Navy’s vital Mediterranean base.

El Alamein was literally the last-ditch defense line for Egypt and the Middle East. If Rommel threatened Alexandria, the British fleet would have to abandon the Mediterranean, severing the main supply line to Malta, assuring its abandonment, and turning the sea into an Axis lake. Rommel then could get ample supplies with which to seize the Egyptian Delta, Palestine, and Syria.

Auchinleck’s decision raised a fearful storm in London, but his choice was shrewd and strategically brilliant. Auchinleck knew Rommel was at the end of his strength. He had only a few dozen tanks, and his infantry force was only a shadow of its original size. El Alamein could counter Rommel’s only remaining advantage, his ability to maneuver. This was because the immense Qattara Depression was only thirty-five miles to the south and its salt marshes and soft sand formed an impassable barrier for tanks. With British armor, infantry, and artillery deployed along the short El Alamein front in emplaced fortifications, Auchinleck could stop Rommel’s few remaining tanks and force him to fight the static, set-piece battle of attrition in which the British excelled.

If Rommel could once be stopped, the Axis position would rapidly become hopeless. The British were close to their supply sources, and had many more tanks, airplanes, guns, and troops to draw on in any case. Rommel was at the tag end of an immensely long supply line, and the guns, tanks, and troops he needed would not arrive. The Italians would not dare send in convoys to Mersa Matruh for fear of challenging the Royal Navy. The only ports the Italians would use were Benghazi and Tripoli, requiring road transport of 750 or 1,400 miles to El Alamein.

In other words, Rommel had to seize El Alamein at once, or he had lost the campaign.

Rommel recognized the merciless equation as well as Auchinleck and pushed his men and vehicles forward in hopes of getting past El Alamein before the British could organize a defense. But now he had only forty tanks and 2,500 motorized German infantry, while his 6,000 remaining Italian infantry were much less mobile and slower coming forward.

Despite Auchinleck’s decision, British forces tried to defend Mersa Matruh. Rommel knew that everything now depended on audacity, speed, and the moral effect of his aura of victory. He parlayed this psychological advantage into a bold attack with his three extremely weak German divisions on June 26.

While 90th Light reached the coast road east of Matruh on the evening of June 27, blocking the direct line of retreat, 21st Panzer made a deep penetration south of Matruh, threatening the line of retreat of 13th Corps’s mobile forces posted in the Matruh area. The corps commander, General Gott, ordered withdrawal, but failed to inform the two divisions holding Mersa Matruh perimeter until the next morning. Nearly two-thirds of the garrison escaped the following night in small groups, but 6,000 fell prisoner, a number larger than Rommel’s entire striking force.

Rommel now sent the panzers all out for Alamein. They reached it on June 30. Auchinleck had established four boxes along the thirty-five miles from the sea to the Qattara Depression. But the intervals between them were covered only by small mobile columns. Rommel, however, believed Auchinleck had concentrated his tanks north of the depression, not realizing they were still in the desert to the southwest, trying desperately to get to Alamein.

Fearing the tanks, Rommel paused briefly to work out an attack. It was a fatal delay. It gave the British armor just enough time to get behind Alamein and form a defensive force. Rommel had had just one chance to break through at Alamein. If he had struck at once, he could have rushed on to Alexandria and the Delta. He did not. This was the moment Rommel lost the war in Africa.

Rommel attacked the next day, Wednesday, July 1, 1942. His reputation was so awesome that the news terrified the British. The fleet withdrew through Suez into the Red Sea. In Cairo, headquarters hastily burned files. Commanders frantically planned to evacuate Cairo and the Delta.

Africa Corps’s assault went in about twelve miles south of the sea at Deir el Shein and hit a box Rommel didn’t know was there. Defended by the 18th Indian Brigade, the box held till evening, when the Germans smashed it and captured most of the defenders. British armor arrived too late to save the brigade, but in time to check Rommel’s efforts during the night to penetrate to the rear.

From this point on, Axis presence in Africa was doomed. Rommel renewed the attack the next day, but he had fewer than forty tanks now and was forced to halt when he saw British tanks blocking their way, as well as others moving around their flank. Rommel tried again on July 3. By now he had only twenty-six tanks, yet he advanced nine miles before British fire halted them. During the day a New Zealand battalion captured nearly all of Ariete Division’s artillery in a flank attack, while the remaining Italians took to their heels. It was clear evidence of exhaustion and overstrain.

Rommel, at last recognizing reality, broke off the attack. Auchinleck had at last gained the initiative. He counterattacked on July 4. The Axis troops held, and both sides soon stopped out of exhaustion. Now the two opponents slowly built their strength. In the following weeks they exchanged savage attempts to crack the other’s line. The tactical situation altered little. But the strategic situation had been transformed. The Axis had no hope of matching the huge buildup that had begun apace on the British side.

Churchill flew out to Cairo on August 4 and changed commanders when he found Auchinleck strongly resisting his insistence on renewing the offensive. Auchinleck wanted to wait until September so newly arrived troops could learn desert warfare. Churchill handed over the Middle East command to General Sir Harold Alexander and brought out General Sir Bernard Montgomery from England to run the 8th Army. Montgomery turned out to be more insistent than any officer in the army in meticulously tidying up his forces before doing anything. He took even longer than Auchinleck, but Churchill couldn’t admit he’d been wrong, and gave way.

Rommel launched one more desperate offensive on August 30. It had to go in on a less-fortified stretch to the south, but 8th Army had mined the region, and German mobility was limited by shortage of fuel. Rommel at last had to pull back, defeated. From this point on, the Axis forces simply hung on, waiting for the British blow to fall.