Putin’s appointment at the head of the FSB took place on June 25th 1998. Finally he got a job in his specialization. After eight years of being on management posts. Well actually, as I already noted, a good number of people who have explored his life think that even in the KGB in 1975-1990, especially in the last five years in the GDR, Putin was mostly doing management work.
Putin’s arrival coincided with the downsizing of the FSB central staff. From six thousand to four thousand. It does not mean that the Lubyanka was emptied. New structures were created under Putin: the Department on the work with the regions (apparently Putin grew to like this thing after working with the regions in the president’s administration), the Department on the defense of the constitutional order (that was the department that started to spy on political parties and repress the activists of political organizations) and the Department on computer security. Putin also started to transfer his former colleagues from Saint Petersburg to leading posts in the FSB.
It should be said that since Putin had close ties with the worst enemy of the Russian special services Anatoly Sobchak (he is accused of slandering the KGB and the army in the period when he was the chairman of the Commission investigating the Tbilissi events), the corporation of special services agents received Putin with displeasure. And since the downsizing of the FSB staff was executed rather wildly – everybody who had the right to a pension because of their seniority was fired – it turned out that the most experienced specialists were fired. In the first place, those who had a real work experience in combat situations, since there the seniority was calculated two years for one. This did not add popularity to Putin among the agents. And of course, the agents’ corporation, like any other corporation would have preferred someone from their ranks, a worthy person, standing high in the FSB hierarchy. In their opinion they were disgraced with a parvenu, a lieutenant colonel.
Simultaneously with the staff downsizing Putin managed to enlarge the staff of the FSB Board up to seventeen people. Putin did not forget the Petersburger general-lieutenant Alexandr Grigoriev, formerly the first deputy of the FSB head in Saint Petersburg. He appointed him on the post of director of the FSB Department of economic security. It was Grigoriev who helped bring Sobchak in France. One good turn deserves another.
As for the former head of the FSB department in Saint Petersburg, the general lieutenant Viktor Cherkesov, he was appointed the first deputy of the FSB director Putin. (Later he became the RF president’s plenipotentiary in the Northwest federal district and a bit later – the head of the State Drugs Control.)
The general-major Sergey Ivanov was appointed the head of the FSB Department of analysis, prognosis and strategic planning; he was transferred from the foreign intelligence Service. Ivanov is an old friend of Putin’s still from Leningrad’s University. (Later Ivanov became (at the end of November 1999) the head of the RF Security Council, then minister of defense. Experts see him as Putin’s potential successor in 2008.)
Actually, a part of the FSB old-timers kept their posts. The general-colonel Valentin Sobolev kept his post as the FSB deputy director. Just as Valery Pechenkin, general colonel, and head of the Counter-intelligence Department.
It is interesting that Putin’s post, head of the Central Department of Control, was later occupied by a person from the FSB – Nikolay Patrushev, Putin’s close friend. When Putin went ahead, Patrushev took the post of FSB director.
On the post of FSB director Putin hushed up a big scandal and contributed to the development of another big scandal. This was the “Litvinenko case” and the “Prosecutor General Skuratov case”. I remind what the “Litvinenko case” was about: on November 17th 1998 there was a press conference, on which a group of FB officers (among them Trepashkin, recently released from prison and Litvinenko) affirmed that the management of the FSB counterintelligence ordered them to kill the businessman Boris Berezovsky. The officers present on the conference were A. Litvinenko, Shebalin, A. Ponkin, G. Sheglov, Latishenok (two lieutenant colonels, one colonel, major and a senior lieutenant). There was also an ex KGB investigator, an employee of the tax police M. Trepashkin. Litvinenko testifies in his book “Lubyanka’s criminal organization”: “Our goal was to address the parliament, the president and the public and tell them what is happening in the FSB and that with such special services it is inevitable that we will roll back to a totalitarian society… But on the following day I read in the newspapers that this is a provocation from Berezovsky…”
The order to kill Berezovsky was given to Litvinenko on December 27th 1997 by A. P. Kapishnikov, deputy director of the FSB Department of organized crime, 1st rank captain, on an operative meeting in the presence of other people. On April 15th 1998 Berezovsky addressed the deputy manager of Yeltsin’s administration E. V. Savostyanov, demanding him to investigate the case. On October 2nd the central military prosecutors’ office replied to Berezovsky (document number 29/00/0008-98): “It was established that in 1997-1998 the management and the employees of the indicated Department did not plan or execute any illegal actions against you /…/ concerning A. P. Kamishnikov’s thoughtless remarks in your address made on December 27th in the presence of the subordinates Litvinenko, Shebalin, Ponkin and Latishenko, these remarks discredit him as a leader, however this does not indicate the intention to organize a murder”. This is what the prosecutor’s office writes about a man who said to Litvinenko: “Since you know Berezovsky you will be the one to get rid of him”.
This story began when N. D. Kovalev was the director. When Putin became the director Litvinenko went to see the new director on Berezovsky’s advice. “Putin agreed with everything I said, he kept the list (a corruption list brought by Litvinenko), he took my notice about the Uzbek criminal organization. He asked for my home telephone number. He promised to call me, but didn’t do it. Later, after reading the materials of my criminal case I realized that right after our meeting Putin ordered to continue spying on me,” - testifies A. Litvinenko in his book “Lubyanka’s criminal organization”, page 107. On the day following Putin’s appointment, says Litvinenko, the general colonel A. V. Trofimov, deputy director of the FSB, “called me and said: “Tell Berezovsky: did they lose their minds in the Kremlin?! Why did they appoint him? Don’t they understand what is happening in Saint Petersburg? These are bandits. ” Later Litvinenko spent eight months of detention in Lubyanka and finally escaped to London.
In spring 1999 took place one of the biggest scandals in modern Russia: “Suratov’s case”. The central channels aired a videotape showing “a man looking like the Prosecutor General” in a bed with two prostitutes. On April 7th 1999 Putin spoke on television and said that a preliminary evaluation of FSB and police experts has confirmed the authenticity of the videotape, while in the press (Kommersant 4. 8. 99) he spoke in favor of Skuratov’s voluntary resignation. He also said that the videotaped “activity” was paid by “individuals presently under criminal charges” and declared that it was necessary to reunite the materials of both criminal cases – article 285 of the Criminal Code (“Abuse of official functions”) regarding Skuratov and article 137 (“Infringement on private life”) regarding the individuals who have illegally spied on the Prosecutor General. One would have thought that this is a Solomon’s decision from a wise and just FSB director. However if one is to remember that president Yeltsin wanted to obtain the dismissal of Prosecutor General Skuratov, then Skuratov’s case looks differently, like the “dirty” elimination of a big functionary who had fallen out of favor. Therefore it is not surprising that the individuals who have made the scandalous videotape remained undiscovered and that the identity of the “man looking like the Prosecutor General” was not legally confirmed as Skuratov’s. But the videotape had for result that Skuratov was discharged from his functions. The Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov, the terrible weapon of the power and of Putin in particular, has now become odious.
Thus, in Lubyanka Putin’s name is linked with the downsizing hated by the agents, with two enormous “dirty” scandals (one of them discrediting the FSB), but also with a positive change. In fact Putin managed to obtain that the officers from Lubyanka receive their paychecks on time. A real manager! Before paychecks to Lubyanka were sent irregularly, like to the rest of the country. “I must say that anywhere Putin worked, his employees started to receive their paychecks regularly,” notes Alexey Mukhin from the Center of political information. Well, he is the manager.
During his service as FSB director, lasting one year and fifteen days, Putin was continuously appointed to all sorts of other posts: he was joined to the commission on the optimization of the State defense order and included in the international fund of protection against discrimination. He was even the secretary of the RF Security Council. There is no information available as to what he had achieved on these posts or did he achieve anything at all.
As Putin started to occupy bigger posts in the hierarchy of the RF functionaries, obviously he made himself a lot of enemies among the big functionaries or even entire clans of functionaries competing with him. In spring 1999, right after Putin’s appointment as the secretary of the RF Security Council, rumors appeared in the press that there is a videotape showing Putin, similar to Skuratov’s. However nothing concrete was presented. Also at that time appeared information that the Stasi archives still keep compromising information about Putin. (Many FSB officers were of the opinion that this blow was made from Primakov’s side, since Putin was one of the few in the special services, on whom Primakov did not have an influence.) In April 1999 Moskovsky Komsomoletz published the information that Putin was discharged from the post of FSB director. Nezavisimaya Gazeta of 30th March 1999 published a testimony of a CIA officer in Brussels (he was serving in NATO’s headquarters) that the American special services tried to gather a compromising file on Putin but supposedly they did not succeed. According to the newspaper that testimony proves the contrary – that such a file does exist.
In issue 31 of 1999 the Versia newspaper published a “Reference about V. V. Putin”. The origin of the reference is unknown. In the reference Putin is characterized very negatively.
In 1999, right after Putin became prime minister (after august 16th 1999) Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service checked a certain SPAG company headed by the lawyer Rudolph Ritter. I will explain in the next chapter what is the link between Putin and SPAG, now I will only decipher the company’s full name: Sankt Peterburg Immobilien und Beteilgungen Aktiengesellshaft, i.e. Saint Petersburg’s real estate.
In these years Edward Limonov was writing hundreds of letters to the regions, articles in the Limonka, painstakingly creating National-Bolshevik Party’s organizations in the regions. In April 1998 the Party split. Alexander Dugin left with twelve supporters. For some time he tried to fight for the NBP brand, and then he abandoned the fight. As a result of Dugin’s departure the Party shifted to the left. In these years I was meeting a lot of people with the goal of party building. On October 1st and 2nd these efforts were rewarded with the First All-Russian Congress of the National-Bolshevik Party. It took place in the Almaz Movie Theater near the Shabolovka subway station. About 600 delegates from 47 RF regions were present on the Congress. After the Congress we sent documents to the Justice Ministry for our registration as the National-Bolshevik Party. Just before November 7th the Justice Ministry refused to register us. Mr. Krashennikov, a puffy blond looking like a plumper Nicolas II, has put his hand to that decision. At that time he was a member of the Union of Rightist Forces, later conjectural considerations forced him to join United Russia, the party in power. On November 14th we have called a special congress in Saint Petersburg in order to modify the official documents (this is what the Justice Ministry formally required from us, although the reasons for the refusal were different – fear of the young growing Party uncontrolled by the Kremlin) and we have modified them according to the requirements. Why were we in such a hurry? The State Duma has adopted a law, according to which only those political parties could be allowed to run for the elections that have been registered as all-Russian a year before the elections. And the elections were supposed to be held in December 1999. The ministry headed by Krashennikov refused to register the NBP the second time as well. Then we sued the Ministry but the Taganski Court took its side.
The position of the Justice ministry was justified in an original way by an old alcoholic functionary, gray-headed and red-faced: “They are over five thousand, they are all young, we don’t know what to expect from them”. Already there State violence was used against us. The lies of the official people who have blocked the young Party’s access to the elector was obvious.
Already in 1999 the Party switched to direct actions. Since we were not given access to the elector and into State Duma’s political space we started to make political space for ourselves wherever we wanted. In February and March 1999 the NBP confronted Nikita Mikhalkov. We learned that this apology for a nationalist has campaigned for the reelection of president Nazarbaev in Kazakhstan in January 1999. This is why the NBP published the leaflet “A butcher’s friend”, in which all Nazarbaev’s crimes were listed and our leaflet was scattered on a presentation of a Mikhalkov’s movie. Our activists were then beaten by the police and almost on the same day somebody tried to throw a box of bottles with an explosive mix into our headquarters. A police and FSB team burst into the headquarters twenty minutes later and although they did not find anything illegal (the guys had already transported the box to the local police station), the headquarters were sealed. Actually two days later we obtained its reopening. And in March the nazbols Bakhur and Gorshkov took vengeance on Mikhalkov for the raid. On Mikhalkov’s master-course in the Kino House they threw eggs at the phony nationalist. For which they were beaten and thrown in jail. This is how gradually the relationship of the authorities and the National-Bolshevik Party were worsening by the fault of the power.