It had been a rough week for Air Force Captain Scott O'Grady. On June 2nd, 1995, while flying Basher 52, a F-16C Fighting Falcon fighter of the 555th Fighter Squadron (FS) of the 31st Fighter Wing out of Aviano Air Force Base, Italy, his aircraft had been hit by an SA-6 Gainful missile from a Bosnian Serb SAM battery. O'Grady had ejected from the dying aircraft as it fell into the cloud base below, denying his wingman any knowledge of whether he had survived or not. Over the next six days, the young Air Force officer had done a textbook job of escape and evasion, while hoping to reach a friendly aircraft on his rescue radio. Then, the night before, another F-16 from Aviano had finally found him and had stayed overhead until just a short time earlier. After authenticating his true identity, the pilot had contacted NATO Allied Forces Southern Region, and told O'Grady to hang tough and there would be someone to get him out soon.
The morning of June 8th, 1995, dawned cool and foggy as O'Grady began his sixth day on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first indication of action came around 6:00 A.M. local time, when a pair of two-seat Marine F/A-18Ds roared over him, fixing his position and setting up top cover for what was about to begin. About this time, the young flyer was probably beginning to wonder just who was coming to get him out. Would it be one of the big MH-53J Pave Low helicopters from the USAF's Special Operations Group escorted by huge AC-13 °Combat Talon gunships? Or would it be a team of Army Rangers, flown in by MH-60K Blackhawks, escorted by AH-60 attack helicopters? Then, the answer came. Through the wet morning fog at around 6:40 A.M. came the familiar "whomp-whomp" sound of twin-bladed helicopters, Marine AH-1W Cobras. Like their menacing namesakes, they surveyed the area around O'Grady, looking for any threat to the rest of the rescue force that was approaching. Overhead, a flight of AV-8B Harrier II attack jets joined the F-18s in covering the operation. Then, after contacting O'Grady on his rapidly dying radio and marking his position with a smoke grenade, they called for the rescue force.
On the ground O'Grady heard the dull roar of helicopters. Big helicopters. Through the wispy ground fog came a pair of Marine CH-53E Super Stallion assault helicopters, loaded with Marines and Navy corpsmen from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit-Special Operations Capable MEU (SOC). As the first CH-53 flared in for a landing, the 3rd Battalion/8th Marine Regiment's mortar platoon dashed off to set up a security perimeter for the rescue force along with their battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Chris Gunther. Then, as the second Super Stallion came into land, O'Grady made his move. Wearing a Day-Glo orange "beanie" cap, and clutching his radio and 9mm pistol, he dashed for the second helicopter, and was pulled aboard by the crew chief, Sergeant Scott Pfister. Several minutes later, after retrieving the mortar platoon, Lieutenant Colonel Gunther ordered the two helicopters to lift off and head home.
Inside the second helicopter, O'Grady was being taken care of by more Marines, including the 24th MEU (SOC)'s commander, Colonel Martin Berndt, and his senior NCO, Sergeant Major Angel Castro, Jr. After O'Grady was given some water, part of an MRE, and Colonel Berndt's Gortex parka, he settled in for the ride home. But even this task was to prove an adventure for the young pilot and his rescuers. As the CH-53s and AH-1Ws passed near a small town, anti-aircraft and small-arms fire erupted, hitting both transport helicopters. And then three man-portable SA-7 Grail SAMs were fired from below, requiring evasive maneuvering by the four choppers. It didn't take long after that for the airborne task force to break clear of the danger and go "feet wet" over the Adriatic, headed for home aboard the USS Kearsarge (LHD-3). Twenty minutes later, all were safely aboard, and another page had been written into Marine history.
What had saved the young Air Force captain was not a special operations force in the traditional sense. From our experience of movies and television, we tend to think of such forces as supermen, rescuing hostages and "taking down" terrorists in their lairs. Built around clandestine units like the Army's Delta Force and the Navy's SEa-Air-Land (SEAL) teams, these units maintain a low profile and tend to keep out of the public view. The MEU (SOC)s are different. While quite capable, they are not special operations forces per se. On the contrary, they are regular Marine units, drawn from around the Corps, which are given special training to make them capable across a limited but important range of conventional and special operations missions. This distinction is the reason why the MEU (SOC)s have remained independent at a time when most American special operations forces are under the unified command of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), located at MacDill AFB near Tampa, Florida.
The story of the MEU (SOC)s is the story of how the Marine Corps has enhanced its ability to make "kickin-the-door" forced entries (i.e. invasions and raids) into enemy territory. This is a lot to ask from just seven battalion-sized units, of which only three or four are deployed on cruise at any particular time. General Krulak likes to call the Marines "the risk force"; the MEU (SOC)s are the diamond-tipped point of that force's spear. As it exists today, the MEU (SOC) can be seen as the evolutionary result of over two millennia of experience in amphibious warfare. More immediately and practically, it is one of the most compact, responsive, and capable military units in the world today, with multiple means of delivering its weapons and personnel onto or even behind an enemy coastline. The MEU (SOC)'s special training gives it versatility across a finite but significant range of possible special missions, including raids, rescues, and security operations. And its ability to plug itself into a variety of "joint" military operations makes it a valuable addition to any military force. Thus, regional CinCs covet a MEU (SOC) whenever they can get one. Finally, because it can be, and usually is, forward-deployed into possible trouble spots along with its own aviation and logistical components, it is fast, mobile, and self-contained. It needs nothing to get the ball rolling on an operation and keep it going for up to fifteen days without external support. So let us look at this unique family of units, and get to know their organizations, missions, and history.
The beginnings of the MEU (SOC) concept date to just after the end of the Second World War. As early as the late 1940s, the need for forces based close to potential trouble spots was already posing a problem for the U.S. and its Cold War allies. One result was the Marine afloat battalion, which became something of a standard unit in the decades ahead. These were created by using some of the vast amphibious shipping tonnage that had been built up in World War II and a few battalions of the dwindling Marine Corps of the time. Quickly, they began to prove their worth. Each one was a typical Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), with ground, air, and logistical units (or components as they are called), matched together into a fighting team. This turned out to be an excellent idea. In the Taiwan Straits (1957), Lebanon (1958), Cuba (1961 and 1962), and the Dominican Republic (1965), the forward-deployed Marine units aboard U.S. Navy ships were to make themselves felt. Even during the height of the Vietnam War, amphibious ready groups (ARGs) with their Marine units aboard prowled the oceans and seas of the world, protecting American interests.
Following the end of the Vietnam war and the rough years of the 1970s, things began to become a bit more regular within the Marine afloat battalions. Redesignated as Marine Amphibious Units (MAUs), they now had a formal headquarters unit, which would then fill out its component parts from regular Marine units from around the Corps. Previously, the units just were thrown together for the duration of their cruise afloat. This move to a formal headquarters structure was more than just cosmetic; it meant that the Corps had begun to consider the MAUs one of their premier MAGTF organizations. Now they would become fully integrated MAGTFs under the command of a full Colonel (O-6), capable of a wider variety of tasks and missions. In fact, with the drawdown of Navy and Marine forces in the late 1970s during the Carter Administration, the compact MAUs aboard their ARGs quickly became the only U.S. military units that could begin to rapidly respond to a crisis around the world.
The coming of the Reagan Administration in 1981 brought the MAUs the opportunity to prove themselves in combat. Initially, the results were decidedly mixed. On the plus side was Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada in October 1982. The 22nd MAU provided much of the combat muscle for that operation. Things unfortunately did not go so well for the 24th MAU. Two days before Urgent Fury hit the beaches of Grenada, while it was on "peacekeeping" duty in the war-torn city of Beirut, Lebanon, an Iranian driving a truck bomb wiped out much of the 24th's ground component. Over two hundred Marines were killed in the explosion, which occurred early on a Sunday morning. It today remains one of the worst disasters in U.S. military history, and had a variety of effects on the Marines and their MAUs.
The Beirut disaster and problems in other operations began to show that the Marines had some problems in their combat doctrine. Much like their sister services, who had seen such difficulties following the Vietnam War, the Corps was beginning to experience some serious shortcomings in its ability to carry out even traditional missions like amphibious invasions and raids. Grenada, while successful, had been costly and poorly coordinated. Luckily, the solution to these shortcomings came in the form of a new senior Marine Corps leader, General Alfred M. Gray, who would eventually become the 29th Commandant in 1987. While he was the commander of Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLANT), General Gray began his campaign to promote "warfighting" as the primary task of the Marine Corps in the 1980s and 1990s. Much like visionary thinkers in the other services, Gray helped promote the idea that combat was the core ability of the Marines (this earned him the nickname "the warfighter"). What made his effort unusual was that he felt it was not enough just to know how to shoot and blow things up. He urged Marines of all ranks, officer and enlisted, to apply intellectual power as a force multiplier for the Marine ethos. This began to pay immediate benefits. He also promoted the use of the word "expeditionary" to describe the inherent characteristics of Marine units of all sizes. In particular, he pushed renaming the MAUs as MEUs (the E obviously standing for "expeditionary"), to reflect the kinds of missions he wanted the Marine Corps to be ready for.
Along with these intellectual developments, General Gray began to think about the kinds of units that the Marines had formed over the years, and just what kinds of missions each was capable of. One particular kind of mission which had come to be vital in the 1980s was special operations. The failed Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980 had forced all of the services to look at their capabilities in this area. Out of this came a 1983 study that examined what the Marine Corps would need to become a credible player in future low-intensity ("short-of-war") conflicts. Unlike the other services, there was no drive within the USMC to create new and separate special operations units. Instead, it was decided that regular units within the Corps would be given special training prior to a deployment. This would make them "special operations capable" (SOC) across a fixed range of missions and tasks.
In 1984, Marine Corps Headquarters ordered FMFLANT (at the time commanded by General Gray) to put together a program to create a special-operations-capable Marine unit, and deploy it on an ARG for an overseas cruise of some six months duration. General Gray and then-Colonel James Myatt (who eventually rose to the rank of Major General and commanded the 1st Marine Division during Desert Storm), came up with a list of special missions and equipment that they wanted to put into the unit assembled. Along the way, Gray and Myatt made several key decisions. These included:
• FMFLANT would modify one of the MEUs to produce a battalion-sized SOC-capable MAGTF that could carry out the special missions that they had in mind.
• They made plans to establish a training and certification program to make sure that every unit would go through a standardized curriculum.
• The actual unit, to be called a MEU (SOC), would be given an extra infusion of equipment and personnel to support its expanded mission.
The units for the first MEU (SOC) were taken from a regular MEU, the 26th, preparing for a deployment to the Mediterranean. Personally selected to command the first MEU (SOC) deployment, Colonel Myatt took the 26th out for a six-month cruise in 1986.
Now it should be said that this first MEU (SOC) cruise did not shake the world. The 26th did support the Navy carrier groups that were operating against Libya at the time, and these actions were generally successful. But more importantly, that first MEU (SOC) deployment brought home valuable lessons that were immediately applied to the next cruise, and all the others that followed. Even though actual combat eluded them for the next few years, MEU (SOC)s were nevertheless very active. First combat by a MEU (SOC) occurred on April 18th, 1989, when a strike force of Marines from the 22nd MEU (SOC), was tasked to take part in Operation Preying Mantis. Preying Mantis was a rapid response to the mining, several days earlier, of the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) by Iranian forces in the Persian Gulf. The operation was designed to take out several Iranian oil platforms that were being used as targeting bases for attacks against tankers coming down the Gulf. The 22nd, along with several surface-action groups (SAGs) of U.S. warships, was tasked to capture and then demolish the platforms, while aircraft from Carrier Air Wing Ten (CVW-10) embarked on USS Enterprise (CVN-65) provided cover against Iranian aircraft and ships. The results were startling. By the end of the day, the oil platforms had been destroyed, and most of the Iranian Navy had either been sunk or disabled. The MEU (SOC) lost one AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter with both of its crew, but it was an impressive combat debut for the new unit, and it went almost unnoticed by the world.
Just fourteen months later, the MEU (SOC)s hit their stride, thanks to a rash of crisis situations that erupted in the summer and fall of 1990. The trouble started when a civil war in Liberia escalated. Initially, the 26th MEU (SOC) was sent to handle any possible evacuation of U.S. nationals and embassy personnel. It had been planned to relieve the 26th with the 22nd MEU (SOC), but the eruption of hostilities in the Persian Gulf in August meant that both units had to stay out to cover both problems. Eventually, the 22nd handled the evacuation, and the 26th went on to support operations in the Mediterranean. At the same time, the 13th MEU (SOC) from the West Coast was rapidly moving into position in the Persian Gulf, supporting maritime embargo operations and acting as a floating reserve for the 1st MEF in Saudi Arabia. Then, in December of 1990, with the eruption of the civil war in Somalia, heliborne Marines from the amphibious group in the Persian Gulf conducted an evacuation from the American embassy in Mogadishu.
The period following Desert Storm has been a busy one for the MEU (SOC)s. In Somalia, Haiti, and now Bosnia, they have led the way for American efforts and forces. In the case of our pullout from Mogadishu, they have even covered our withdrawal from a dangerous and risky situation. Given their level of activity over the past ten years, it is amazing that it took the O'Grady rescue to bring them any sort of public notice. Despite the lack of public credit, the MEU (SOC) deployments are going along like clockwork. Originally, the MEU (SOC) effort was limited to just one such unit on each coast, but no more. Because of the desires of the regional CinCs to have at least one of them available for any crisis that might arise, all the MEUs are being given SOC certification before they are deployed on cruise. The O'Grady rescue just highlights the many desirable qualities of these unique units, and provides a jumping off point for our own explorations of them. So follow us, and we'll show you how they work, and are put together.
From early raids on British forts during the Revolutionary War to the embassy evacuations and rescues of today, when you have trouble that needs to be taken care of good and fast, you call the Marines. Every branch of the military has special operations forces, and these sometimes overlap. So how does a small and underfunded service like the Marine Corps justify such a capability, both from a financial as well as institutional point of view? The Marines' answer: a hybrid, dual-purpose special operations/amphibious unit, the MEU (SOC). To repeat, the MEU (SOC) is based upon the concept that given special training and equipment, regular units can be made capable of accomplishing both their normal duties and extraordinary missions. This notion runs contrary to the "snake-eater" tradition of the many special operations units around the world. For most of these, including the British Special Air Service (SAS), the U.S. Army Delta Force, and the German GSG-9, selection is limited to the physical and mental elite of a particular service. These are highly specialized units, lavishly expensive to create and operate, with a strong focus on hostage rescue and counter-insurgency warfare. Consequently, the leaders of their nations tend to view special operations units with the same kind of restraint and reserve they might have toward nuclear weapons. You only use them when you really need to, and when you do, you open yourself up to an extreme level of political risk. This is the reason why you see such limited use of special operations units, and why so many of them tend to hang around inside their compounds, practicing and waiting.
As a matter of fact, several of the most significant and remarkable special operations missions in history did not involve actual, purpose-built special operations forces. During World War II, for example, the famous bombing mission on Tokyo by then-Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle and his raiders was accomplished by personnel and aircraft drawn from regular Army Air Corps bomber units. Thanks to several months of special training, as well as special modifications to their B-25 Mitchell bombers, they made history on April 18th, 1942, as the first force to bomb Japan during the war. Also in World War II, a regular British unit, given special training and equipment, was responsible for the less well known but equally valorous action at Pegasus Bridge on D-Day. On the night of June 5th/6th, 1944, a specially trained gliderborne unit, Company "D," drawn from the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry (the "Ox and Bucks") of the 6th Airborne Division, conducted a coup de main on a pair of vital bridges over the Orne River and Caen Canal. The tiny force, led by the charismatic Major John Howard, took the bridges and held them until relieved by British commandos coming inland on D-Day. Finally, there was the Entebbe Raid. A Palestinian terrorist group held a number of hostages from a hijacked French Airbus in a terminal at the Entebbe Airport in Uganda. The raid was designed to release and retrieve them. As soon as the crisis started, the Israeli Defense Force formed an ad hoc rescue force out of various regular paratroop units. On July 4th, 1976, after a long flight on a picked force of C-130 Hercules transports, the rescuers assaulted the terminal and freed the hostages with minimal losses — in the process killing most of the terrorists. Again, a clearly defined goal, supported by extremely strong leadership, led to success in a special operation by "pick up" units with special training. Such units, given the time and training, can achieve wonders. And because they are drawn from regular units, they are cheaper to run and less expensive to risk.
The MEU (SOC) joins the responsiveness and professionalism of a task-specific special operations force with the costs and success records of specially trained, ad hoc special operations units. Composed of regular units from around the Marine Corps, the MEU (SOC) is a MAGTF based around a reinforced rifle battalion, with the special training and equipment that makes it capable of a limited number of special operations missions. One of the interesting characteristics of MEU (SOC)s is that they are not composed of the same units every time they go out on a cruise. Since they are formed from battalion landing teams (BLTs), medium Marine helicopter squadrons (HMMs), MEU service support groups (MSSGs), and ARGs, the various components can be mixed and matched as required. And since their special operations capability is layered on top of their existing conventional amphibious/heliborne capabilities, the MEU (SOC)s are actually quite a bargain for the taxpayers. Finally, and this may be the greatest benefit of all, they can be forward-deployed and based aboard their own ARG, requiring little or no approval from foreign governments or allies for their use. Given the frustrations that such foreign interference has caused in the past, this probably provides the American national command authorities all the justification required to continue operating and maintaining the seven MEU (SOC)s.
Though the 26th was the first MEU (SOC) to go out on cruise in 1985—it was known then as a MAU (SOC) — the luck of the draw has not been kind to it…if luck means getting involved like other MEU (SOC)s in something flashy. Nevertheless, in the years since it first took the concept out for its first test, the 26th has done yeo-man work. Over the last decade, the 26th has supported evacuation operations from Liberia and been stationed off the coast of Somalia.
As the 26th was headed into its training and workup cycle in the winter of 1994/95, it acquired a new commanding officer (CO) to act as its brain, father, and caretaker. The new CO, Colonel James R. Battaglini, is an imposing figure; his mere presence in a room, on a deck, or in a landing zone (LZ) is enough to tell you that the boss has arrived and is in charge. A tall, lean man with a hard look in his eyes, Colonel Battaglini loves his Marines more than almost anything else in his life. A native of Washington, D.C., a graduate of Mount Saint Mary's College, and a holder of two master's degrees (in management and national security studies), he can talk about the merits of satellite communications systems at one moment, and tell you his opinions of nonlethal weapons doctrine in the next. As he rose up the chain in the Corps, he commanded virtually every kind of Marine unit from a reconnaissance platoon to the 1st Battalion of the 8th Marine Regiment (1/8), during its 1991/92 deployment with the 22nd MEU (SOC). Along the way, he picked up a Bronze Star for valor in combat during Desert Storm. Backing up Colonel Battaglini is his senior enlisted advisor, Sergeant Major W. R. Creech, himself a veteran of over twenty years in the Corps.
What Battaglini and Creech were putting together for a six-month Mediterranean cruise in 1995 was a team built of many interlocking components. Like all other deployed Marine forces, the MEU (SOC) is built along the classic MAGTF structure. And like all expeditionary units deployed by the Corps, it has ground, aviation, and logistical components. The essential parts of this structure are:
• Command Element (CE)—This is a company-sized (28 officers, 186 enlisted) unit which provides the leadership, command, control, and communications for the entire MEU (SOC). The 26th MEU (SOC) CE is based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
• Ground Combat Element (GCE)—The GCE is a reinforced battalion landing team (BLT—54 officers, 1,178 enlisted), designed to fit in the limited space aboard a three-ship ARG. For the 1995/96 26th MEU (SOC) deployment, the GCE was built around the 2nd BLT of the 6th Marine Regiment (2/6). This unit is part of the 2nd Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
• Aviation Combat Element (ACE)—A MEU (SOC) ACE is composed of a reinforced medium Marine helicopter squadron (HMM—55 officers, 263 enlisted), made up of a mix of CH-46 Sea Knights, CH-53E Super Stallions, AH-1W Cobras, UH-1N Iroquois, and AV-8B Harrier IIs. In addition, the MEU (SOC) can be reinforced with a land-based force of KC-130 Hercules airborne tankers. The 26th MEU (SOC)'s ACE is built around HMM-264, which is based at the Marine Corps Air Station at New River, North Carolina (adjacent to Camp Lejeune). The Harrier detachment is drawn from Marine Corps Attack Squadron 231 (VMA-231) at MACS Cherry Point, North Carolina.
• Combat Service Support Element (CSSE)—The CSSE is a company-sized unit (13 officers, 234 enlisted), composed of a series of eight platoons covering areas such as supply, engineering, transport, maintenance, and medical services. The 26th MEU (SOC)'s CSSE is MEU Service Support Group 26 (MSSG-26), which is also based at Camp Lejeune.
These four elements, the CE, GCE, ACE, and CSSE, make up an MEU (SOC) MAGTF like the 26th. In addition, each MEU (SOC) commander gets to tailor the unit's structure to match the planned mission and his own operational style. Frequently, these modifications and additions are based upon suggestions and lessons learned from the MEU (SOC)s ahead of them in the rotation schedule. For example, while the 26th was working up in the summer of 1995, they were taking to heart the lessons from the 22nd MEU (SOC), which had just returned, and Marty Berndt's 24th MEU (SOC), which was then on cruise out in the Mediterranean. Out of the 24th's experiences (such as the O'Grady rescue) came the suggestion that the 26th's ACE be enlarged with additional CH-53E Super Stallion and AH-1W Cobra helicopters, to support possible evacuation operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now let us take a look at each of the 26th MEU (SOC)'s individual complements and see what gives this little unit such a big bite.
The Command Element of the 26th MEU (SOC), headed by Colonel Battaglini, is composed of a traditional U.S. military executive staff structure. The Executive Officer, or XO, Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher "Fletch" W. Ferguson, Jr., coordinates and supervises the executive staff. In the 26th MEU (SOC), he is also the Commanding Officer of Troops aboard the ARG flagship, and is the Officer in Charge of the Forward Command Element. The MEU (SOC) Sergeant Major, Sergeant Major William Creech, performs those duties which generally pertain to discipline, welfare, conduct, morale, and leadership of the enlisted personnel. The rest breaks down like this:
• S-1-Adjutant: This is the personnel and administrative section, and is headed by Captain Daniel McDyre.
• S-2-Intelligence: Headed by Major Phil Gentile, the MEU (SOC) intelligence section has staff responsibility for matters pertaining to weather, enemy, and terrain within the MEU (SOC)'s area of operations. It determines the intelligence requirements and directs the effort for collection of information. It then processes information into intelligence and disseminates it to those who need to know. It is augmented with the following detachments:
• An Interrogator Translator Team detachment that provides enhanced human intelligence support through the interrogation, debriefing, and screening of those personnel with intelligence value.
• A Force Imagery Interpreter Unit detachment that provides limited imagery interpretation support.
• A Counterintelligence Team detachment that provides counterintelligence support.
• A Topographic Platoon detachment that provides limited cartography and terrain-model-building capability.
• A Radio Battalion detachment that provides an enhanced capability for signal intelligence collection, analysis, and electronic warfare. A radio reconnaissance team capability is included for advanced tactical employment during selected operations.
• S-3—Training and Operations: When augmented with the attachments joining the MEU (SOC), this is the largest section in the Command Element. Headed by Lieutenant Colonel Steve Lauer, the S-3 has the responsibility for matters pertaining to organization, training, and tactical operations. The S-3 operates the Landing Force Operations Center (LFOC) aboard the ARG flagship. Upon activation of the MEU, it is augmented with the following attachments:
• A Force Reconnaissance Company detachment.
• An Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) detachment consisting of two supporting arms liaison teams and a firepower control team.
• A detachment from the Marine Air Control Group with a Marine Air Support Squadron detachment and the Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) Battery detachment that provides low-level, close-in air defense. The LAAD battery is composed of two of the new Avenger SAM vehicles. Composed of an HMMWV chassis with eight Stinger SAMs and a .50-caliber machine gun, it is a potent point-defense asset. In addition, there are three manpack Stinger teams, each of which is transported by an HMMWV.
• S-4—Logistics: This is the section responsible for all logistics matters and the combat service support functions of supply, maintenance, embarkation, medical/dental care, passenger and freight transportation, landing support, material handling, food services, and financial management. The S-4, headed by Major Dennis Arinello, operates the Tactical Logistics Center (TACLOG) aboard the ARG flagship.
• S-6—Communications: This section plans, coordinates, and operates the communications and automated data-processing systems for the MEU (SOC). Headed by Captain James Dillon, the S-6 supervises cryptographic operations, operates the Landing Force Communications center, provides radio operators for the LFOC, and publishes and disseminates the Communications Electronics Operating Instruction(s) for the MEU (SOC). It includes a Communications Battalion detachment that provides command and control communications for execution of all operations.
As might be imagined, the MEU (SOC) staff is a fairly "lean and mean" type of organization. Thus, the jobs listed above have to be accomplished by highly motivated officers and enlisted personnel. For example, the MEU (SOC) S-4 officer, Major Dennis Arinello, operates the entire logistic effort of the MAGTF with a staff of about a dozen Marines, armed only with a battery of computers, phones, and a seemingly endless supply of coffee. In addition to the formal branch structure, there are several special staff officers who perform a variety of duties not specifically assigned to one of the "S" sections. These include the staff judge advocate, disbursing officer, and chaplain. The MEU (SOC) commander also has a small unit known as the Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF). The MSPF is task-organized from MEU (SOC) assets to provide a special-operations-capable force that can be quickly tailored to accomplish a specific mission and employed either as a complement to conventional naval operations or in the execution of a directed maritime special mission operation. Command of the MSPF remains under the control of the MEU (SOC) commander.
The GCE of the 26th MEU (SOC) is the heavy combat element of the MAGTF. Composed of a reinforced BLT, it is designed to provide Colonel Battaglini and his CE with the necessary personnel and equipment for anything from making a forced-entry amphibious assault, to attempting a non-combatant evacuation of an embassy or other facility. The 26th MEU (SOC)'s GCE is made up of BLT 2/6 out of Camp Lejeune. It is a proud unit, with a long history of service to the nation. The 2/6's combat record dates back to Belleau Wood in World War I, and includes service in such varied actions as Shanghai, Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Beirut. The 2/6 is currently commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John R. Allen, a Naval Academy graduate of the Class of 1976, who also carries around a pair of master's degrees in government and strategic intelligence studies. A native of Fort Belvoir, Virginia, he has the distinction of having served on the very first MEU (SOC) deployment by the 26th back in 1985. It almost killed him. Injured in a CH-46 crash during the unit's workup, he recovered and has stayed with the Corps. Colonel Allen is a cerebral sort of Marine who is always considering new ways to use the force that the Corps has given him to command. Whether it's exploring the use of AAV-7A1 amphibious tractors as gunboats for riverine warfare, or figuring out new means of deception to help cover his reconnaissance elements in the field, John Allen is thinking all the time. His senior enlisted advisor is Sergeant Major James Rogers, who looks after the enlisted personnel of the BLT.
BLT 2/6 is a standard Marine rifle battalion, with some extras added to help conduct landing operations. To understand this, we need to have a look at the building blocks of the BLT. As mentioned earlier, the basic Marines combat unit is the four-man fire team. The team leader (usually a corporal equipped with an M16A2 with a clip-on M203 grenade launcher), is assigned two riflemen (also with M16A2s) and an automatic rifleman (with a M249 Squad Automatic Weapon — SAW). By matching up three fire teams with a sergeant, you get a squad. Three squads, with a second lieutenant and platoon (staff) sergeant in command, make up a platoon. From here things get a bit more complicated. By combining three infantry platoons with a heavy weapons platoon (M240G machine guns, M224 60mm mortars, and Mk 153 SRAWs), you get a Marine rifle company, under the command of a captain and his first sergeant. These company and platoon-sized units are the basic elements of the BLT, and are combined as follows:
• BLT Headquarters and Headquarters & Service Company— The BLT headquarters is structured much like that of the MEU (SOC), with "S"-style staff branches to support administration, operations, intelligence, etc.
• Rifle Companies (3)—There are three of the companies, each with about 150 personnel. Each company is designated by a phonetic letter name, based upon its order within the regiment that it is assigned to. For example, the 1/6 BLT is assigned Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie as their infantry companies. Thus, the 2nd BLT's three infantry companies are designated Echo, Fox, and Golf.
• Heavy Weapons Company (1)—This is the very lethal big brother of the weapons platoons organic to the infantry companies. This company is composed of three platoons: the 81mm Mortar Platoon (eight M252 81mm mortars), the Heavy Weapons Platoon (eight TOW II launchers, six Mk 19 40mm automatic grenade launchers, and six M2 .50-caliber machine guns on armored HMMWVs), and the Anti-Armor Platoon (eight M-47 Dragon launchers). The Heavy Weapons Platoon is organized in three Combined Anti-Armor Teams (CAAT) which combine the high mobility of the HMMWV with the effects and capabilities of the three weapons. In a pinch, these weapons can be mounted on the BLT's six Fast Attack Vehicles (FAVs-black-painted "dune buggies") which can be carried internally and inserted by the MEU's heavy lift helicopters.
• Artillery Battery (1)—This is a battery of six M 198 towed howitzers, with 5-ton trucks as their prime movers. Additional trucks provide support and ammunition carriage for the battery.
• Light Armored Reconnaissance Platoon (1)—Also known as Task Force Mosby (after the famous Confederate guerrilla fighter) when combined with armed HMMWVs from the heavy weapons company in the 2/6, this is a mixed platoon of wheeled Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs), which are used as an armored reconnaissance and trip-wire force. It usually includes four LAV-25s (with 25mm Bushmaster cannons), two LAV-ATs (with TOW anti-tank missiles), and a LAV-R recovery vehicle.
• Assault Amphibian (AAV) Platoon (1)—The AAV platoon consists of thirteen AAV-7 amphibious assault tractors, along with one each of the recovery and command versions of the AAV-7.
• Surface Rubber Boat Raid and Cliff Assault Company (1)—In addition to the LCACs, LCUs, and AAVs, the BLT can use twenty F470 Zodiac combat rubber raiding craft to support landings, riverine operations, or special insertions into enemy territory.
• Tank Platoon (1)—For the first time in many years, a heavy tank platoon has been included in a MEU (SOC). Composed of four M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks and an M88A1 tank recovery vehicle, it is designed to provide a heavy direct-fire punch for the BLT.
• Combat Engineer (Sapper) Platoon (1)—To support breaching of obstacles, building of causeways, emplacements, and bunkers, as well as other civil engineering functions, BLT 2/6 has been assigned a small but capable combat engineering platoon. Equipped with a bulldozer and other equipment, the sappers provide a variety of engineering and construction services for Lieutenant Colonel Allen and his Marines.
• Reconnaissance Platoon (1)—In addition to the other Force Reconnaissance units that are part of the 26th MEU (SOC), the BLT has its own reconnaissance platoon, which can be combined with the scout/sniper platoon from the BLT headquarters. This concentration of reconnaissance assets is no coincidence, but a planned inclusion. It is based upon the hard-won knowledge that you can never have too many eyes on the battlefield.
• Shore Fire Control Party (1)—This is a small, but vital unit which controls the critical task of planning and executing naval gunfire support. Composed of Marines and sailors, this platoon is capable of rapidly calling for fire, even during the confusing first moments of an amphibious assault
All of these assets make BLT 2/6 a highly mobile and compact striking force, with the ability to do a variety of exciting things. For example, by combining the tanks, LAVs, and AAVs, you can rapidly assemble a reinforced armored infantry task force, which can be used for everything from assault operations to rapid response in peacekeeping operations. At the same time, the Marines of BLT 2/6 can be delivered any number of ways to its targets. They can ride on helicopters, LCACs, LCUs, AAVs, or rubber raider boats to get ashore. Maybe more importantly, the ARG and MEU (SOC) have the necessary lift to bring all of the combat power of the BLT ashore nearly simultaneously. This means that BLT 2/6 can hit in many different ways, all at the same time. If there is a weakness, it is that the BLT is mostly composed of "leg" infantry; it is short on vehicles to help it move about the battlefield. It is also only a single battalion. So Colonel Allen and his staff must carefully pick their fights, maneuvering for position and opportunity to get the most of their limited resources.
The 26th MEU (SOC)'s ACE is a composite organization, much like the 366th Wing that we visited in Fighter Wing. But unlike that unit, the primary mission of this ACE is the transport and support of operations by the 26th's GCE, BLT 2/6. The 26th's ACE is commanded by Lieutenant Colonel David T. "Peso" Kerrick, who also commands HMM-264, the core unit in the air component. A native of Elizabeth, Kentucky, and a 1976 Naval Academy graduate, he has spent his career in the Corps as a CH-46 Sea Knight pilot, moving up to command of the squadron in 1995. He is supported by Sergeant Major Ronald Trombley, who looks out for the well-being of his enlisted Marines.
The HMM-264 "Black Knights" are one of the original helicopter transport units in the Marine Corps, with service in the Dominican Republic, Beirut, Liberia, and northern Iraq. As configured when it left on its 1995/96 deployment in September of 1995, HMM-264 and its attachments looked like this:
• CH-46E Sea Knights (12)—The core of HMM-264 is its dozen CH-46E medium lift helicopters. Though decidedly elderly and quite limited in both carrying capacity and range, the Sea Knight is still the prime mover for the 26th MEU (SOC), and will be until the introduction of the MV-22B Osprey in the early 21st century.
• CH-53E Super Stallions (8)—The heavy haulers of HMM-264 are eight of the big CH-53E Super Stallion transport helicopters. Normally an MEU (SOC) ACE only has four CH-53s. But following the suggestions of the 24th MEU (SOC), the number was doubled for this deployment, given the distances and payloads that might need to be handled in the event of an evacuation of U.S./UN personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
• AH-1W Cobras (8)—Like their CH-53E brethren, HMM-264's normal complement of AH-1W Cobras was doubled from four to eight. This decision was also based upon experience from the 24th MEU (SOC) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the need for additional firepower and helicopter escorts became clear in 1995. Initially, it had been hoped that the upgraded version of the AH-1W with the new Night Targeting System (NTS) would be available to take on the cruise. Unfortunately, spares shortages meant that the first deployment of the NTS-equipped Cobras would have to wait until 1996.
• UH-1N Iroquois (3)—To help provide command and control for the 26th MEU (SOC) and its various components, the HMM-264 is equipped with three UH-1N Iroquois helicopters. Better known as "Hueys," they are assigned to command elements of the MEU (SOC) components to provide transport around the units AOR. One of the Hueys is equipped with a Nite Eagle laser targeting system. Originally designed for use on the now-defunct U.S. Army Aquila UAV, Nite Eagle is composed of an FLIR and laser-designation system mounted in a turret under the nose of a UH-1N. It was highly successful during Desert Storm. There are three of these systems around the Marine Corps, and each deployed MEU (SOC) usually gets one to provide designation for the AGM-114 Hellfire missiles fired from the AH-1W Cobras.
• AV-8B Harrier II (6)—In addition to the helicopters, HMM-264 contains a small six-aircraft detachment of AV-8B Harrier II attack jets. Drawn from VMA-231 (known as the "Ace of Spades" squadron), these are older-model Harriers that were produced in the early 1980s. Like the NTS-Cobras, the 26th MEU (SOC) ACE just missed being the first unit to deploy the new AV-8B Plus Harrier II operationally. The relative newness of the birds in squadron service meant that the first radar Harrier deployment would have to wait until 1996. However, the AV-8Bs that VMA-231 deployed with the 26th MEU (SOC) in 1995 were quite capable, able to employ 25mm GAU-12 cannon, iron and cluster bombs, 2.75-in./70mm rockets, as well as AIM-9 Sidewinder and AGM-65 Maverick missiles.
• KC-130 Hercules (2)—While an aircraft the size of a KC-130F Hercules aerial tanker obviously cannot take off or land aboard the Wasp (LHD-1), the 26th MEU (SOC) ACE retains the services of two such aircraft, operated from nearby land bases if available. Both the CH-53E and AV-8B have in-flight refueling probes, and can take fuel from the KC-130. These are deployed from Marine Air Group 14 (MAG-14) at MCAS Cherry Point, North Carolina, at the request of the MEU (SOC) commander. MAG-14 operates two Marine Refueling and Transport squadrons of KC-130Fs, VMGR-252 and VMGR(T)-253. Should there be a requirement for airborne fuel (the receiving aircrews call it "Texaco"), MAG-14 can rapidly dispatch a pair of the big four-engined tankers to support the MEU (SOC).
• Helicopter Expeditionary Refueling System (HERS)—This is a system that allows the MEU (SOC) ACE to deploy a mobile refueling system ashore. Either flown or landed ashore, it is used to establish a Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) for the ACE's helicopters to refuel, without having to return to the ships of the ARG.
When you put all of these pieces together, the 26th's ACE becomes a highly potent and capable composite air unit. Capable of delivering personnel and firepower on a moment's notice, HMM-264 represents a vital capability to Colonel Battaglini and his staff. If the ACE has a weakness, it is to be found in the CH-46Es. These elderly birds are headed into their fourth decade of service, and are only capable of hauling eight to twelve loaded Marines, depending on the range to the target. When the MV-22B Osprey arrives, it will be able to carry up to twenty-four combat-loaded troops out to many times the range of the Sea Knight, with much greater speed and survivability. But until the first of these new birds arrives in 2001, the old Bullfrogs will have to do.
No military unit anywhere does anything without a steady supply of food, fuel, water, ammunition, and all the other things that keep them going. The Marine Corps recognizes this, and has given each MAGTF its own Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) to keep it supplied and ready for action. The logistical component of the 26th MEU (SOC) is the MSSG-26, and is commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Donald K. Cooper of Greensboro, Maryland (he is a 1971 graduate of Wake Forest), and his senior enlisted advisor, First Sergeant Ralph Drake. It is composed of approximately 275 personnel in eight platoon-sized units that break down like this:
• Headquarters Platoon—Like the other components of the MEU (SOC), MSSG-26 has a headquarters unit, with the appropriate "S"-coded sections.
• Communications Platoon—Because of their heavy inventory-control requirements, the MSSG-26 communications platoon has somewhat more robust communications and computer capability than other such units in the MEU (SOC).
• Landing Support Platoon—The Landing Support Platoon might best be described as the receiving and inventory-control agency for the MEU (SOC) either on the beach landing site (BLS) or in a helicopter landing zone (HLZ). Utilizing a computerized bar-code system, they scan every item coming ashore, and then monitor and track its position until it leaves the BLS or HLZ.
• Engineer Support Platoon—This platoon provides deliberate engineering support. The platoon can produce potable water with its Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPU), provide mobile electric power via an assortment of generators, store and distribute bulk fuel, and provide material-handling support with its own forklifts and bulldozer.
• Supply Platoon—The Supply Platoon is just that, the central repository and distribution point for most of the supply line items used by the MEU (SOC). This includes repair parts, packaged fuel, rations, clothing, etc., and is controlled through a computerized asset-tracking system.
• Motor Transport Platoon — The job of the Motor Transport Platoon is to distribute what the Supply Platoon issues to the units of the MEU (SOC) as well as transporting troops. To this end, they are equipped with 5-ton trucks, HMMWVs, fuel and water tankers, and several Logistics Vehicle Systems (LVSs).
• Maintenance Platoon—This unit provides maintenance services and support for all of the other units within the MEU (SOC), except for elements of the ACE. To this end, they repair and maintain everything from wheeled and tracked vehicles, howitzers, individual and crew-served weapons, and other powered equipment, to computers and other communications/electronics equipment.
• Medical Platoon—Though most of the medical services for the MEU (SOC) are provided by Navy doctors and corpsmen aboard ship, the MSSG has a small medical platoon staffed with Navy personnel to provide field support. It consists of one doctor and twenty Navy corpsmen, who provide a forward-aid-station function for the MEU (SOC), where they can resuscitate and stabilize the patients and then evacuate them back to the ships of the ARG for more definitive care.
Through the efforts of the MSSG and the resources of the ARG offshore, the MEU (SOC) is designed to sustain an operation of up to fifteen days duration. Beyond that, follow-on logistical support such as that of a MPSRON would be required to sustain further operations. Nevertheless, this makes the MEU (SOC) a highly capable and independent unit for short-duration operations. In fact, because of their relatively robust logistics capability compared to the units of other services, they are quite capable. For example, during a joint exercise during the summer of 1995, the 26th MEU (SOC) provided food (MREs) and water to a battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division that was taking part in an assault on an airfield. This is why folks like Lieutenant General Tony Zinni (the commander of I MEF) like to call units like the 26th MEU (SOC) "self-licking ice cream cones!"
In Chapter 6, we looked at the ships that make up the ARGs that carry MEU (SOC)s around the oceans of the world. The three ships of the ARG that carry the 26th MEU (SOC) around these days are assigned to Amphibious Squadron Four (PHIBRON 4), which is based out of the amphibious base at Little Creek, Virginia. Home-ported there are the USS Whidbey Island (LSD-41) and USS Shreveport (LPD-12). Because of her large size, the other ship of PHIBRON 4, USS Wasp (LHD-1), is based over at the main naval base at Norfolk, Virginia, next to the wharf where the supercarriers are berthed. PHIBRON 4 is commanded by Captain C. C. "Skip" Buchanan. Skip Buchanan, another Naval Academy graduate (Class of 1967), is a sunny, well-rounded man. You can usually recognize him from his faded blue jumpsuit coveralls. He prefers to wear these whenever possible, rather than the more customary khaki uniforms. Short and stout, he is a quiet man who keeps to himself, and who likes to watch and listen before he speaks his mind. But when he does, people listen! The 1995/96 cruise of PHIBRON 4 was going to be his last, as he planned to retire in 1997. It was to be the end of a long and productive career, and he planned to end it in style with a highly successful cruise with the 26th MEU (SOC). The Navy ARG is commanded by an officer of the same rank as the MEU (SOC) it carries. This means that Skip Buchanan and Jim Battaglini work as a team, sharing both the powers and responsibilities that their jobs demand. Both commanders try to make things work as well as possible for the roughly five thousand personnel under their joint commands.
Today PHIBRON 4 is made up of just three ships, where just a few years ago there might have been five. The retirement of the LSTs and the great size and capacity of the Wasp (LHD-1) and Whidbey Island (LSD-41) have made this smaller ARG possible. Composed of only three amphibious ships (an LHD or LHA, an LSD, and an LPD), this is the kind of force that you will see as the Navy goes into the 21st century. Interestingly, if you add up the total of the various ship footprints, you will actually find that the three ships of today's ARGs provide an embarked Marine unit with a great deal more space than the earlier five-ship group.
In addition to the embarked MEU (SOC), there are some small units and equipment that are specific to the ARG. These include:
• HC-8—While technically not part of the 26th MEU (SOC)'s ACE, there is a two-aircraft detachment of UH-46D Sea Knight vertical-replenishment (VERTREP) helicopters from Navy Helicopter Combat Support Squadron Eight (HC-8—the "Dragon Whales") out of NAS Norfolk, Virginia. Normally controlled by the ARG commander, these Navy Bullfrogs are used to support utility, replenishment, and "Angel" search and rescue duties around the ships.
• VC-6, Detachment H—The ARG controls a detachment of U.S. Navy Pioneer UAVs. The five UAVs with their supporting equipment and personnel belong to Detachment H, fleet Composite Squadron Six (VC-6). While the Marines have two UAV companies operating their force of Pioneers, the Navy continues to have the two detachments which used to be based aboard the retired battleships Missouri (BB- 63) and Wisconsin (BB-64). One of these is based aboard the Shreveport (LPD-12) and provides the ARG/MEU (SOC) force with their own limited reconnaissance capability.
• SEAL Team—Organic to the ARG is a detachment from one of the U.S. Navy's Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) special-warfare teams. Their job is to provide physical security for the ships of the ARG when visiting foreign ports, as well as giving the ARG/MEU (SOC) team an additional reconnaissance and covert-action asset.
• Assault Craft Unit Two (ACU-2)—To provide ship-to-shore transport for the MEU (SOC), Captain Buchanan controls two LCUs from ACU-2 at the amphibious base located at Little Creek, Virginia. One is based aboard the USS Whidbey Island (LSD-41), while the other one operates from the USS Shreveport (LPD-12).
• Assault Craft Unit Four (ACU-4)—In addition to the LCUs, the ARG commander also controls three LCACs from ACU-4, also headquartered at the amphibious base in Little Creek, Virginia. These are based aboard USS Wasp (LHD-1).
• Beach Control Party—These are the famous "Beachmasters" who run the receiving end of an amphibious landing. These parties, along with their Marine counterparts in the CSSE, have the job of getting personnel, vehicles, equipment, and supplies off the landing craft and into action.
Since you don't fit a unit like the 26th on to just one ship, even one like USS Wasp (LHD-1), you have to break it into pieces and load it carefully aboard the various ships of the ARG. This is the job of the combat cargo shops on each of the ships, as well as the MEU (SOC)'s S-4 section led by Major Arinello. These organizations work to pack everything and everyone aboard as tightly as possible, while still accessing it when the time for its use arrives.
Let's look at how the 26th MEU (SOC) was loaded into the ships of PHIBRON 4 when they embarked at Camp Lejeune and Moorehead City, North Carolina, in late August of 1995:
• USS Wasp (LHD-1)—Commanded by Captain Raymond Duffy (Villanova, Class of 1970), the Wasp carries almost half of the personnel and equipment of the 26th, as well as the vast majority of the aircraft and support equipment. The breakdown looks something like this:
• ARG—The entire PHIBRON 4 staff and their supporting equipment is carried aboard the Wasp. In addition, the two HC-8 helicopters are based aboard, as well as the three embarked LCACs from ACU-4.
• CE—Almost the entire 26th MEU (SOC) headquarters and its supporting units are based aboard the Wasp.
• GCE—the Wasp carries roughly half of the embarked BLT, including the Battle Staff, Headquarters and Service Company, one rifle company, the heavy weapons company, the artillery battery, and Task Force Mosby, which consists of the Light Armored Vehicle detachment (four LAV 25s, two TOW, one logistics variant) and the sixteen hardbacked HMMWVs (eight with TOW II launchers and eight equipped with either Mk 19 40mm grenade launchers or .50-cal. machine guns).
• ACE—The entire ACE is carried aboard the Wasp.
• CSSE—A small detachment of MSSG 26 is loaded aboard the Wasp.
• USS Whidbey Island (LSD-41)—Commanded by Commander T. E. McKnight (VMI, Class of 1978), the Whidbey Island carries the following 26th MEU (SOC) assets:
• ARG—The Whidbey Island operates one of the ACU-2 LCUs.
• GCE—One rifle company, the AAV Platoon, and the tank platoon are embarked on the LSD.
• CSSE—Small detachments of various MSSG platoons also reside aboard the Whidbey Island.
Because of her rather limited vehicle space (cargo) compared to the Wasp and Shreveport, the Whidbey Island (LSD-41) is loaded with extremely high density cargo, such as armored vehicles and their supporting infantry.
• USS Shreveport (LPD-12)—Shreveport is commanded by Captain John M. Carter (University of Missouri, Class of 1969). Despite her advanced age, this old lady of the ARG represents the ability for Captain Buchanan to split the ARG into several parts and conduct operations separately. In 1995, she carried the following:
• ARG—PHIBRON 4 had several important components embarked on the Shreveport. In addition to the VC-6 UAV detachment, one of the HC-8 UH-46Ds is based aboard, as well, a LCU from ACU-2. She also carries the ARG SEAL team.
• GCE—Shreveport carries the BLT Reconnaissance Platoon, and one rifle company, which serves as the surface rubber boat raid and cliff-assault force.
• ACE—While none of the ACE aircraft are normally carried aboard, the Shreveport is set up to provide a mobile FARP for the helicopters of the HMM-264.
• CSSE—Shreveport has small detachments of various 26th MSSG platoons loaded on board, including the headquarters platoon.
While the loadouts of the ships that we have shown you above is representative, the staffs of PHIBRON 4 and the 26th MEU (SOC) are always trying to improve things. All the time, they are modifying the mix of units and equipment on each ship, based upon the requirements of a particular mission.
Though more self-contained than most military units, the 26th MEU (SOC) and PHIBRON 4 are far too small and exposed to operate without some sort of escort and supporting forces. While the number of units that might be involved in the operations of a MEU (SOC) is almost limitless, a number of the units commonly associated with the 26th while they are out on cruise include the following:
• Carrier Battle Group—One of the interesting side effects of the drawdown of U.S. military forces over the last few years has been the wholesale retirement of whole classes of surface escorts. The same drawdown has reduced the number of aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs) to eleven. The result of all this has been the decision to "team" CVBGs and ARGs/MEU (SOC)s, so they might share the available escorts and work more closely together. This meant that for their 1995/96 cruise, PHIBRON 4 and the 26th MEU (SOC) was teamed with the battle group of the supercarrier USS America (CV-66). In addition to America, the battle group is made up of Destroyer Squadron 14 (DESRON 14), as well as several submarines and support ships. The group included the nuclear cruiser South Carolina (CGN-37), the Aegis cruisers Normandy (CG-60) and Monterey (CG-61), the guided-missile destroyer Scott (DDG-995), the guided-missile frigates DeWert (FFG-45) and Boone (FFG-28), the nuclear attack submarines Hampton (SSN-767) and Oklahoma City (SSN-723), the ammunition ship Butte (AE-27), and the fleet oiler Monongahela (AO-178).
As for the carrier America, her embarked Carrier Air Wing One (CVW-1) is composed of fourteen F-14As (VF-102, the Diamondbacks), thirty-six F/A-18Cs (VFA-82, the Marauders; VFA-86, the Sidewinders; and VMFA-251, the Thunderbolts), four EA-6B Prowlers (VMAQ-3), four E-2C Hawkeyes (VAW-123, the Screwtops), eight S-3B Vikings (VS-32, the Maulers), eight SH-60F and four HH-60H Seahawks (HS-11, the Dragon Slayers), and a pair of ES-3A Shadow surveillance aircraft. By teaming a CVBG/CVW with an ARG/MEU (SOC), the American national command authorities have a force of immense power, flexibility, and balance. Also, when the CVBG and ARG operate separately, the ARG takes several of the battle group's ships to act as escorts. During the 1995/96 cruise, the Normandy (CG-60) and Scott (DDG-995) were usually teamed with PHIBRON 4 to provide naval gunfire and SAM support.
• MPSRONs—One of the key missions for the MEU (SOC) is to open up a beachhead for follow-on forces to exploit. Current U.S. plans have these forces centered around one of the three Navy/Marine MPSRONs. These ships can be used in a variety of ways. For beginners, the MPSRON can provide additional logistical support to extend the life of a MEU (SOC) operation beyond the fifteen days of supplies carried by the ARG. In addition, the MPF follow-on brigade can be used to expand a forced entry by a MEU (SOC) into an enemy territory. Finally, because they can be rapidly deployed to help out in a crisis, the MPF ships represent an excellent means of supporting humanitarian and/or peacekeeping operations.
• Airborne Units—A really exciting inter-service partnership has developed in the past few years: Long-range airborne assault is combined with an amphibious assault by a MEU (SOC). Now, this is not exactly a new idea: The Allies did it several times in World War II. What's new is that the airborne unit, from the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg/Pope AFB, North Carolina, can fly the unit directly to the target area, anywhere in the world. Thanks to in-flight refueling, strategic airlift aircraft like C-141s, C-5s, and C-17s can make the trip non-stop. The way it works: Airborne troopers from the 82nd drop onto something like an airport or other transportation facility, so that other follow-on units can be flown in. While they are doing this, the MEU (SOC) takes a nearby port or beach and drives inland to link up with the airborne unit. Once this is done, the airborne unit draws its support and sustenance from the MEU (SOC) until follow-on units join the operation. This particular scenario is practiced regularly by the 82nd Airborne in joint maneuvers with the Navy, Air Force, and Marines.
• Land-Based Air Support—There are provisions for the MEU (SOC) to take advantage of land-based air support in the form of a detachment of KC-130 airborne tankers, should an air base be close enough to be useful. This has been the case in the Adriatic, during Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition to tankers, land-based air support could likely include units such as the following:
• Marine Fighter Support—Along with tanker support, the Corps can deploy squadrons of two-seat F/A-18D Hornet all-weather strike fighters to support MEU (SOC) operations. Equipped with a Night Hawk laser targeting pod for LGBs, as well as AIM-120 AMRAAM and AGM-65 Maverick missiles, the F/A-18Ds are highly capable strike fighters.
• Tanker Support—In addition to the tanker support already mentioned, there are other tanker assets that can make the life of the MEU (SOC) ACE easier. The AV-8Bs with their refueling probes can make use of almost any Air Force, Navy, or NATO tanker aircraft available. This becomes especially easy if the aircraft is one of the big KC-10A Extenders, which can refuel aircraft with either boom or probe refueling systems. There also are Air Force HC-130 Hercules tanker aircraft that are assigned to search and rescue, as well as special operations units, and these can refuel either the Harriers or the CH-53E Super Stallions.
• Airborne Early Warning (AEW) Support—If there was any lesson that came out of the 1982 Falklands War, it was the overriding need for surface ships to have proper AEW coverage. Lack of a decent AEW platform for cuing of their limited force of Sea Harrier FRS.1 fighters probably cost the British several of the ships that they lost to Argentine air attack. Unfortunately, the Marine Corps has no such capability to augment their ACE aboard the Wasp (LHD-1), so they must make use of any AEW capability they can get. If they are near a CVBG, they can make use of AEW- information-data-linked E-2C Hawkeyes. In addition, data links on the ships of the ARG, as well as those on the new AV-8B Plus Harrier IIs, are compatible with a number of other such systems, including the force of E-3 Sentry AEW aircraft operated by the Air Force, NATO, and some of our other allies.
• Composite Wings—One of the important capabilities of the MEU (SOC) ACE is the ability to work jointly with air units of other services, or even other countries. As a result, don't be surprised if you don't someday see the use of Air Force composite wings like the 366th at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, or the 23rd Wing at Pope AFB, North Carolina, with one of the MEU (SOC)s to support landing operations or provide cover for the ARG.
As you can see, it's easy for other units to team with or "plug into" the 26th MEU (SOC). Thanks to a robust series of command and control links aboard the ARG, the MEU (SOC) can provide connectivity for anything from an Air Force AEW aircraft to an airborne unit. Meanwhile, the staff of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico, Virginia, is working hard to find new units and ways for the MEU (SOC) to play in the ever-growing world of joint operations.
• Reconnaissance Support—If there is anything that Colonel Battaglini wants more of on-cruise, it is high-quality, up-to-the-minute imagery of their AOR. If the imagery is satellite-based, it will come from the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), with their fleet or orbital imaging satellites, and the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO), which manages UAVs and other airborne imaging programs. Both agencies are working hard to supply more imagery to an ever-expanding user base. In particular, plans are progressing to create a super-agency called the National Imaging Agency (NIMA), which will stand up on October 1st, 1996. NIMA will combine the services of NRO, DARO, the Central Imaging Office (CIO), the National Photographic Center (NPIC), and the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), all under a single roof. In this way, the users of their products can more rapidly and efficiently obtain the wealth of assets they provide — everything from maps to real-time photography — when they need it.
The products themselves are growing in both variety and quality. As always, the NRO's satellite systems are producing a large volume of high-quality imagery, though efforts are under way to look at smaller, less expensive collection systems in the late 1990s.
Meanwhile DARO is making giant strides towards their vision of an integrated airborne reconnaissance architecture that does its job within today's limited budgets. The Pioneer UAV will continue in service for a few years. Because the Hunter UAV system that was designed to replace it has been terminated over high life-cycle costs, DARO has decided to move onto what is called the "Maneuver UAV," which is designed to provide Army and Marine unit commanders with a capability to obtain real-time video and other imagery.
In addition, the Predator program described in Fighter Wing is going great guns. The Air Force stood up its first Predator unit (the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron) at Nellis AFB, Nevada, just recently (these are roughly the same as the Gnat 750-series UAVs that did so well in their CIA-sponsored trials in Bosnia). The program is so successful that DARO is looking at buying and fielding more Predator systems to users.
In addition to the Predator and Pioneer programs, excellent progress is being made on longer endurance systems, like the Lockheed-Martin "Skunk Works"-produced Dark Star system. And even longer-range systems are being developed, as well as the data links, common control stations, and other equipment that will be needed to make the various UAV systems available to the widest possible base of users. DARO is also working on more traditional manned reconnaissance systems, including the introduction in 1997 of the new RF-18D Hornet equipped with the new Advanced Tactical Reconnaissance System (ATARS), and a new F-16-mounted recon pod system being introduced by the Virginia Air National Guard. The expectations are that by the year 2001, DARO's plans for completely remaking the airborne reconnaissance architecture of the U.S. military will be close to completion.
• Intelligence Support — In addition to the support provided by the various photographic and mapping agencies within the intelligence community, the 26th MEU (SOC) makes use of intelligence from several other agencies and organizations:
• National Security Agency (NSA)— The NSA, which controls electronic and signals intelligence, is a significant supporting agency for an amphibious unit like the 26th MEU (SOC). Through the Ships Signals Exploitation Space (SSES), the ARG and MEU (SOC) commanders can tap into a variety of different signals and electronic intelligence sources, among these: RC-135 Rivet Joint, ES-3 Shadow, and EP-3 Orion electronic intelligence aircraft and ferret satellites. Ground- and ship-based sensors (like the Classic Outboard ESM system) can also tap into all variety of different electronic signals, from SAM and air traffic radars to cellular phones and television signals.
• U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM)—Based at Falcon AFB, Colorado, USSPACECOM provides space-based systems to support combat operations for all the military services. In addition to providing GPS navigation signals, communications support, weather reporting, and ballistic missile-warning, there are a whole range of new capabilities that will emerge in the next few years. These include integrated designation/communications/navigation /transponder systems, which will "net" individual Marines together on the digital battlefield of the 21 st century.
• U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)—Strange as it may sound, the U.S. DOJ and its assorted agencies are excellent sources of information for a variety of missions that might involve a MEU (SOC). The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the U.S. Marshals Service, and other agencies offer useful information on everything from terrorist organizations to smuggling techniques. As a result, you frequently see DOJ and other government agencies (the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, etc.) supporting unconventional operations by the Marines, as well as USSOCOM.
• Cable News Network (CNN)—Okay, let's all tell the truth here. Right now, CNN is the finest real-time intelligence-gathering service in the world. If you walk into the office of anyone who is really on the inside, you will inevitably find the television tuned to CNN. In the twenty years since Ted Turner launched his twenty-four-hour news network, CNN has brought most decision makers their first news of vital events as they are breaking. This kind of topical and timely coverage is the reason why intelligence staffs aboard ships are fighting so hard to obtain the stabilized satellite dishes needed to receive CNN. In this way, they can get the same real-time information as any other cable television subscriber!
Now let's look at how a MEU (SOC)/ARG operates. Returning to the rescue of our downed Air Force Captain, the dauntless Scott O'Grady, just how did that come together, and why did it work? To understand this is to understand how the MEU (SOC)/PHIBRON team works.
For Colonel Berndt and the personnel of the 24th, the rescue process started almost as soon as the young man was shot down in northwest Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the time, the 24th MEU (SOC) was embarked aboard PHIBRON 8—the Kearsarge (LHD-3), Pensacola (LSD-38), and Nashville (LPD-13), under the command of Captain Jerry E. Schill. The group's job was to act as an offshore ready reserve force for the NATO forces that were enforcing the air and maritime embargo of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 24th's duties also included combat search and rescue (CSAR), in the event that such a mission was required.
In the Marines, a CSAR mission is called a Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel, or TRAP. TRAP missions are something of an MEU (SOC) specialty, and are practiced regularly. The key to carrying out a TRAP, or any other MEU (SOC) special mission, is training and planning. Really fast planning. As for Scott O'Grady, on the night of June 2nd, 1995, the 24th MEU (SOC) was aware that Basher 52 was down, and that there was no confirmation that O'Grady was alive. All the staff of the 24th knew was that a rescue mission might be required. The commander of the 24th's GCE (the 3/8 BLT), Lieutenant Colonel Gunther (who was assigned the job of TRAP mission commander), quickly convened a crisis action team to begin the advance planning for a TRAP package of aircraft and personnel, should it be required. This done, the 24th waited and listened.
TRAP packages come in various shapes and sizes, with a variety of options available to the MEU (SOC) staff. For example, let's say that a helicopter from the ACE goes down as a result of a mechanical problem in neutral territory. And let's say that the aircraft is not too badly damaged, so it would be possible to repair the helicopter and fly it out. In that case, a small security team from the GCE, together with some maintenance personnel from the ACE, would fly out and establish a security perimeter around the downed aircraft. The TRAP force would then repair the aircraft and fly it home to fight another day.
The downing of Basher 52 was an entirely different problem. In that case, the shootdown was in an isolated area, over 30 nm/55 km from the coast, and in generally rough and mountainous terrain, well within reach of hostile Bosnian Serb forces. Given these parameters, and the expected threat level (there might still be an active SA-6 battery in the area), Gunther and Berndt decided to lay on what they call a "D" package. This was the largest of the five TRAP packages available to the 24th, and involved sending a pair of big CH-53E Super Stallions loaded with the mortar platoon from the 3/8 BLT's headquarters company. When I later asked why the mortar platoon was chosen for this duty, Chris Gunther answered, "They were available, and they did it during the workup." In other words, given the variety of tasks that the 24th was being tasked with at that time (possible evacuation of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia-Herzegovina, etc.), these personnel were not tasked for other duties, and they had trained specifically for the job. The CH-53Es from HMM-263 (the 24th's ACE unit) were chosen over the elderly CH-46Es Bullfrogs because of their greater range, speed, and lifting capability. In addition to the cargo helicopters, there would be an escort of AH-1 W Cobras, and AV-8B Harrier IIs. All told, the rescue force, if it were ever needed, would have fifty-seven Marines and four Navy Corpsmen. By the morning of June 3rd, the personnel for the TRAP package had been alerted and the aircraft readied. The planned TRAP package looked something like this:
• CH-53E Super Stallion Flight (2)—The lead CH-53E was flown by Major William Tarbutton (the air mission commander) and Captain Paul Oldenburg. This helicopter would carry half of the mortar platoon commanded by First Lieutenant Martin Wetterauer, Lieutenant Colonel Chris Gunther (the BLT CO and mission commander), and two Navy corpsmen. The second Super Stallion was to be flown by Captain Paul Fortunato and Captain James Wright. This aircraft would carry the rest of the mortar platoon, two Navy corpsmen, Colonel Martin Berndt — the 24th MEU (SOC) CO, and Command Sergeant Major Angel Castro, Jr.
• AH-1W Cobra Flight (2)—The lead Cobra was to be flown by Major Nicholas Hall and Captain James Jenkins II. The second helicopter by Major Scott Mykleby (the escort flight leader) and Captain Ian Walsh.
• AV-8B Harrier II Flight (4)—This flight was led by Major Michael Ogden of VMA-231, and was made up of four aircraft, so that at least two would be available over the recovery site.
In addition to these forces, there would be mission spares (called "bump" aircraft) readied, as well as reinforcement units (known as Sparrowhawk and Bald Eagle), should the TRAP package encounter problems.
For the next six days, the situation remained quiet, as the pilots of the 31st FW flew over northwest Bosnia-Herzegovina, hoping to hear something from Basher 52. During this time, the TRAP package stayed on Alert 60 (an hour's notice), eating and sleeping on alert, hoping for the chance to go in and snatch the young Air Force officer out of harm's way. Down in the 24th's LFOC on the Kearsarge (LHD-3), the plan was refined, based upon the minimal information that was available at the time. On the night of June 7th/8th, O'Grady was located. Out on the Kearsarge, the staff of the 24th monitored the transmissions and began to get ready, even before the execution order arrived at 0300. Once this was given, Captain Schill tightened up the formation of PHIBRON 8's ships, and headed towards the Dalmatian Coast to be ready to launch the TRAP force. Immediately, the Kearsarge's CO, Captain Chris Cole, ordered the ship to Flight Quarters, and things began to happen. Realizing that the TRAP team might be headed into an area where SAMs had recently been active, the MEU (SOC) requested, and Admiral Leighton Smith (the commander of NATO Forces, South) ordered, a support package of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft to be launched. This included F-15s, an E-3 AEW aircraft, and Marine F/A- 18Ds with AGM-88 HARM missiles, just in case the Serbian SAMs decided to engage. As it turned out, organizing this force took longer than expected, causing the TRAP force to remain airborne over the ARG until just before daybreak
Down in the 24th's LFOC, the decision to use the "D"- size TRAP package was reaffirmed, and the final steps necessary to ready the force were under way. Aircraft were fueled and armed. Weapons were test-fired and checked. And then they had what's called a "confirmation briefing." This took place down in the Kearsarge's war room on the 02 Level just prior to the loading of the aircraft; and it's the final piece of what the Marines call "the rapid response planning process" — a planning sequence that allows a MEU (SOC) to commence the execution any of its preplanned special operations missions within just six hours of the reception of an execution order.
The confirmation briefing is the final coordination meeting for the officer and enlisted personnel of the ARG and MEU (SOC). And it is an amazing thing to watch. Taking only about fifteen to twenty minutes, it covers more than twenty different subjects — from weather and intelligence to radio call signs and aircraft weapons loadouts. The briefing can proceed so quickly because every movement and action of the TRAP mission has been practiced many times in training back in the U.S. and while afloat. In the confirmation briefing, the speakers execute what is called "briefing by exception": A speaker walks (rapidly!) to the front of the wardroom, slaps down a briefing transparency just long enough for the assembled crowd to see it, and speaks only about those operations that are not normal or running to plan. In short, you brief a particular topic in between thirty and sixty seconds. This procedure is not designed to be hasty or frivolous. Rather, it's done only when time can kill a mission. This was one of those times.
Following the briefing, the Marines moved up the ramp from the hanger deck to the flight deck. Each "stick" of Marines was led to their aircraft by Combat Cargo personnel from the ship and trooped aboard. When the loading was completed, the order was given for the helicopters to start engines. By 0505 hours, all of the helicopters were airborne, waiting for the word that the NATO support package was airborne and in position. At 0545, the "go" order was given. And at 0549, the TRAP force went "feet dry." At 0640 the lead Cobra, code named "Bolt," made contact with O'Grady, and ordered him to pop a smoke flare. Sighting the smoke, the Cobra crew dropped a flare of their own, and began to coach the lead CH-53E into a small clearing adjacent to the young pilot's position on the side of a hilly, rock-strewn pasture. Heavy fog blanketed the area, and caution was required to get the big choppers down. As soon as they hit the ground, Lieutenant Wetterauer and his mortarmen exited the helicopter to set up a defense perimeter and commence the search for O'Grady. The standard TRAP mission plan assumes that the person to be rescued is injured, so a security perimeter was established, just in case extra time was needed to carry O'Grady out. As it turned out, this was not required.
As the lead helicopter was unloading, and the second CH-53E was coming in to land, there was a small problem. A small fence was in the LZ, and the second chopper came down on top of it. This only caused a moment's delay, however. Moving forward a bit to clear the fence, Captains Fortunato and Wright set the CH-53E down and dropped the rear loading ramp. Before they could unload the chopper, though, Captain O'Grady came sprinting out of the underbrush, brandishing his radio and pistol as he headed into the CH-53E. After he was relieved of these items (for safety's sake!), the helicopter lifted off. Captain Fortunato then notified the air mission commander that O'Grady was safely aboard. This done, the four helicopters, with their Harrier escorts flying above, headed back to the coast at full speed and minimum altitude. Even during the burst of AAA and SAM fire, their planned procedures worked well. When the Cobras sighted the ground fire and SAMs, they immediately ordered an SAM break from the CH-53Es (an evasive turn while firing flares and chaff decoys) and continued on to the coast. With the rescue completed, TRAP rules advise that you avoid a fight in enemy territory, so the rescue force continued on with only a few return shots fired by a door gunner. By 0730, the TRAP force was back over the Kearsarge and safely home.
Captain O'Grady was then escorted from the flight deck down to the medical department, where it quickly became apparent he was in pretty good shape: He had a minor case of dehydration, his feet were a little beat up, and he had minor friction burns on his neck and face. Meanwhile, the Marines from the TRAP force turned in their unused ammunition, cleaned their weapons, went through debriefing, and headed down to breakfast. At the same time, the after-action reports were started…along with the preparations for the inevitable surge of press personnel. All before Colonel Berndt had his morning coffee!