The Marine Corps reserves a special trust for the officers that pass through its ranks. Each of them is charged with responsibilities and obligations that frequently exceed those of their counterparts in the other military services. Every few years, one of these officers, after a lifetime of commitment and devotion to the Corps and its personnel, takes on a trust that goes beyond even that and is given a title unlike that of any other military officer — Commandant. Just the name sounds like responsibility incarnate. It is. The position of Commandant of the Marine Corps has traditionally been awarded to a leader of unique qualifications; and to look at the list of those who have held the job is to see the history, direction, and ethos of the Corps embodied. There are peaks and valleys on the list, as there are in the history of any great organization; many of those on the list were not even generals — no Marine of that rank even existed until after the close of the American Civil War. Yet every one of them has reflected the culture and direction of the Corps, for it is their leadership that should, and does, set the pace for the Marines during their tenure and beyond.
Now, it should be said that the Marines have been blessed during the past few years with what has to be considered both inspired and timely leadership. Since the early 1980s in particular, the Corps has known a string of truly great Commandants, each of them with significant gifts and strengths that have made the Corps into the highly ready and capable force that it is today. They took a force demoralized and battered by the experiences of the Vietnam War, and made it into an organization that Americans and our allies trust and our enemies fear. The road back actually started in the 1970s when the 26th Commandant, General Louis H. Wilson, told the Corps to look to itself to solve the problems that Vietnam created. Then there was General Paul X. Kelley, the 28th Commandant, who rebuilt the material capabilities of the Corps during the early 1980s. To General Kelley, himself the first commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (the precursor of the present Central Command, CENTCOM), fell the job of getting the resources to buy the equipment, munitions, and supplies that the Marine Corps eventually used to succeed in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and elsewhere. Following him was General Alfred M. Gray, the 29th Commandant of the Corps. Known as "the Warfighter" and possessing a voice like the ghost of "Chesty" Puller (gravelly with a distinct Southern drawl), General Gray will always be remembered as the Commandant who reestablished the concept of combat as the core mission of the Marine Corps. He did this through a renewed emphasis on warfighting basics and professional military education and a program of new manuals. The wisdom of this was proven by the performance of Marines in the field, especially in the Persian Gulf during 1990 and 1991. He further demonstrated his creative powers by conceiving and designing the unit we will explore later, the Marine Expeditionary Unit — Special Operations Capable, MEU (SOC). Following General Gray came General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., the 30th Commandant of the Corps. General Mundy's greatest achievement was reestablishing the preeminence of the Marines in joint operations and holding the active strength of the Corps at 174,000 (216,000 with reserves) during the so-called "Bottom-Up Review" in 1993. The latter effort was particularly impressive as the other services suffered substantially deeper cuts, proportionately, during this era of the massive Federal budget reductions that have been a hallmark of the 1990s.
In early 1995, with General Mundy's tenure as Commandant was coming to an end, there was great speculation among members of the Corps over who would be his replacement. There were many excellent candidates, but within the Marines there was a favorite, a man whose name was whispered with a voice of hope and respect. Then in February 1995, on the fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of Iwo Jima, the announcement came down from the White House that this man, General Charles "Chuck" Krulak, the son of one of the Corps' most famous Marines, was to be nominated. It was a job, some would say, which he was not only qualified for, but born for. A warrior prince of the Marine Corps was arriving to take up the post that his father had come so tantalizingly close to holding some three decades earlier. The story of these two men, the most outstanding father and son combination in Marine Corps history, is worth looking at more closely, and thus we shall.
In 1934, when Victor "Brute" Krulak graduated from the Naval Academy to become a Marine (the nickname was from his days as a coxswain at Annapolis), it is doubtful that he ever considered the family odyssey he was beginning. A veteran of prewar service as a China Marine and battle in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, he is in many ways a living symbol of the Corps — much like his former commander and mentor, the legendary General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. It was Brute Krulak who took the photos of Japanese landing barges in China and urged the creation of the early U.S. landing craft that would be so important to Marine amphibious operations in the Second World War. He would also personally command the first unit of amphibian tractors, as well as write influential reports on tactics and doctrine that are still important today. Later in World War II, the elder Krulak led Marines in raids and assaults on numerous Japanese-held islands. After the war, as a full colonel, he was influential in the development of the first vertical assault experiments using helicopters. He played a key role in shaping the National Security Act of 1947, which established the Marine Corps as a separate service. And he was instrumental in the creation of Public Law 416, which established the size of the Marine Corps as not less than three combat divisions and air wings and which accorded the Commandant of the Marine Corps coequal status with the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when considering matters that directly concern the Marine Corps.
The senior Krulak's service continued into the 1960s, by which time he was generally considered one of the nation's leading experts on the new science of guerrilla warfare. In early 1964, now a Major General (two stars), he helped plan raids into North Vietnam, even before active United States involvement started. He was later promoted to Lieutenant General and was placed in command of the Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific (FMFPAC), where he commanded the Marines in Vietnam through much of that ill-starred effort. He also came tortuously close to the post of Commandant of the Marine Corps: He was actually promised the post when the appointment was given to another Marine officer. Since that time, he has gone on to write his own book on the Corps, First to Fight, which many see as a classic work on the Marines and warfare. Yet despite his many personal achievements, it will be, perhaps, the achievements of his son that will go down as his single most lasting contribution to the Marine Corps. For when Chuck Krulak entered the Marines, Brute Krulak gave the institution a unique gift, a warrior around whom they could rally in a time of need. Let's talk to Chuck Krulak about it.
Tom Clancy: When did you first decide you wanted to be a Marine?
General Krulak: I decided that I wanted to be a Marine between the ages of eight and ten. It was the period when my dad was in Korea and immediately after his return. During that time he was involved in the fight to save the Marine Corps, which resulted in the amendment to the National Security Act of 1947. I could-n' t help being impressed by his efforts and by those of other senior officers and politicians [involved in the legislative fight that ensued] who came in and out of our house at that tremendously important time in the history of the Marine Corps. These men were involved in great efforts the results of which are reflected in the Corps we have today.
Tom Clancy: Did you have a sense of just who your father was, and how important he was in the history of the Marine Corps?
General Krulak: I didn't understand at the time. I knew that during the National Security Act struggle — during the second session of the 82nd Congress — he was doing something important; he was gone a lot, and my mother would just tell me that he was doing "important work." It was not until much later, however, that I realized how critical and pivotal these events were for the Marine Corps.
Tom Clancy: Let's talk about your career. It began at the Naval Academy, what years were you there?
General Krulak: 1960 to 1964. My class [of '64] had some very special people in it. The current Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command [Admiral Joe Preuher] was my classmate, as was Secretary of the Navy John Dalton, plus a whole group of Navy admirals that are currently on active duty. It was a very special class in the sense of what has transpired for all of us and the Naval Service since graduation.
Following graduation from the Naval Academy and commissioning as a 2nd Lieutenant, General Krulak went to serve in South Vietnam. The experience was a defining moment for the young Krulak, and is best described by his own words.
Tom Clancy: What units did you serve with in Vietnam?
General Krulak: Immediately after attending the Basic School, I joined the 1st Marine Division and served as a platoon commander with Golf [G] Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines (2/1). Shortly after arriving at Camp Pendleton, the war broke out, and I was deployed with 2/1. I spent thirteen months in Vietnam, and was the commander of Golf Company by the time I returned.
Tom Clancy: Many people came away with vivid impressions of their experiences from Southeast Asia. What were yours? How does your own Vietnam experience effect what you do now?
General Krulak: I think that is a great question because the war has definitely had an impact on much of today's military leadership. I believe that we have a group of idealists at the senior levels of the military today — whether you are talking about a now-retired Colin Powell, a John Shalikashvili, or a Tony Zinni [the current commander of the I MEF]. I'm talking about the folks who came out of that war, particularly those who did multiple tours, who believed that there must be a more clearly defined reason for going to war again. Then, we went through the immediate aftermath of the war, where you had the race-relation and manpower problems which made the choice of a continued military career difficult. For an officer to lead a platoon or a company in Vietnam, come home and face the institutional issues of the day, and still progress up the promotion ladder required a deep-seated set of values — a commitment that next time, things were going to be done differently. No matter how it is described, I think that somewhere in each of us is a touchstone that we reach back to when things are tough. It helps us remember what happened in Vietnam and the promises we made that we would do things differently next time. I remember that even during the war we saw that things could be done better. We all made it through some tough times by sticking to our guns and to our ethos.
Tom Clancy: You did two tours in Vietnam. Would you please talk about them?
General Krulak: I went to Vietnam with the 1st Marine Division on Operation Harvest Moon in early 1965 [one of the earliest Marine operations in Vietnam], and stayed through 1966. I went back in 1969 with the 3rd Marine Division and spent all of my time in the Northern (I Corps) sector. That second tour went through the "Vietnamization" and drawdown phases of the war. What means more to me than a list of operations, dates, and places is what my experiences in Vietnam meant in terms of shaping me as an officer, and that goes back to what I learned about the Corps and Marines during that time. The most important lesson that came out of Vietnam for me was that Marines take care of Marines. I saw this over and over again; young Marines with wives and children back home who had every right to just look out for number one and make it back alive, but they all, to a man, would lay down their own life for the lives of their fellow Marines. Regardless of what was happening with the war on a macro sense, what I was experiencing on the ground with my Marines had a profound effect on me.
Following Vietnam, Chuck Krulak entered the normal career track of a Marine officer, which is to say that he did a variety of things. Some were normal "Marine" jobs, while others had what is now called a "joint" flavor.
Tom Clancy: After Vietnam, where did you serve?
General Krulak: I went back to the Naval Academy as an instructor, and I took with me the deep personal sense of our ethos. It dawned on me that this time [as a midshipman at Annapolis] is a critical period for new Navy and Marine officers. It is where their values — which mean more than anything — will be developed, so I took that responsibility very seriously.
From there I went out and commanded the Marine Barracks at Naval Air Station [NAS], North Island, California, and then went to study at the Army Command and General Staff College [Fort Leavenworth, Kansas]. From there I reported to the 3rd Marine Division, and served as the operations officer [S- 3] of 2nd Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment [2/9]. Then I moved to Headquarters Marine Corps in Washington, D.C., and worked in the Manpower Division, followed by a tour as a student at the National War College [Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.]. After that, I was sent to Hawaii and served as the Fleet Marine Forces Pacific plans officer, then executive officer of the 3rd Marine Regiment, and as commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines [3/3]. I then moved over to head the prepositioning ship program for the staff of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade [MEB], and eventually became the brigade operations officer [G-3]. I then moved back to northern Virginia and spent one of the most challenging years of my life as the military assistant to Mr. Don Latham, the then Undersecretary of Defense for CI [Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence]. I was the oversight officer for the battle management system on the Strategic Defense Initiative. It was incredible to be involved in a system that was definitely on the cutting edge. From there I went to the White House. I was there during the last year of the Reagan Administration [1988] and the first year of the Bush Administration [1989] as Deputy Director of the White House office. Following my White House tour, I was the assistant division commander of the 2nd Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. Then I took over command of the 2nd Force Service Support Group.
Like almost half of the Marine Corps, during the fall and winter of 1990 and early 1991, the junior Krulak, now himself a general, found himself in the sands of Saudi Arabia. Though trained as an infantry Marine, he wound up in a different position — serving as a logistician. As commander of the 2nd Force Service Support Group [FSSG], it was his job to keep over ninety thousand Marines involved in Desert Shield and Desert Storm supplied and fed.
Tom Clancy: Tell us about your work in Southwest Asia during Desert Shield and Desert Storm as head of the 2nd FSSG.
General Krulak: Initially MARCENT [Marine Component, United States Central Command] was going to rotate forces into the theater. But that idea was vetoed. Instead of replacing the existing in-theater forces, we reinforced them to about twice their original strength. So the 2nd Marine Division, the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, and my combat support organization fell in on top of the 1st MEF [composed of the West Coast-based 1st Marine Division, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, and 1st FSSG]. From the two combat service support units [1st and 2nd FSSG], we formed a direct support command that supported the Marine warfighters up front and a general support command to run the ports and bring the supplies into the theater. Then-Brigadier General Jim Brabham commanded the general support unit, and I commanded the direct support unit, which was the 2nd FSSG. My mission was to provide support for two full Marine Divisions, a heavily reinforced Marine Aircraft Wing [West Coast-based 3rd MAW, augmented by the East Coast-based 2nd MAW], the Army's "Tiger" Brigade [from the 2nd Armored Division], and my own 2nd FSSG troops.
After the war, I became MARCENT Forward and commanded the forward-deployed CENTCOM Marine forces responsible for the reconstitution of the Maritime Prepositioning Ships. This was a daunting task that required retrieving equipment spread over one hundred miles across the desert, transporting that equipment to the port of A1 Jubail in Saudi Arabia, then back-loading the equipment on the ships.
Tom Clancy: Since you've been an infantry officer for much of your career, could you tell us your thoughts about the effects of logistics on the success of the war?
General Krulak: My impression is that the success of the Marines in Southwest Asia will go down in history as a victory based on logistics. That's a tough thing to say for a career infantryman. From the very first days of Desert Shield, this was an operation heavily dependent on logistics. Just five days after Iraq invaded Kuwait, the five-ship, Maritime Prepositioning Squadron [MPSRON] 2 was ordered to Saudi Arabia. The following day, three ships of MPSRON 3 were ordered to the region. From receipt of the mission on August 7th until the final off-load on September 7th, the MPSRONs provided supplies and equipment to support over 53,000 Marines and sailors for thirty days. Not only did this effort completely validate the requirement for MPS, it formed the foundation of the tremendous logistic effort to follow.
Regarding the ground war itself, you hear and read a lot about the minefield breaching and "left hook" in the war, as well you should; but to get the Marines prepared to make that assault was a logistical nightmare. The only reason that the logistic part of the war has not gotten its due is that the ground portion was so successful. The difficulty inherent in supporting and sustaining that large a force was tremendous; but it was never really an issue, because the war went so fast. The follow-on support requirements just went away. Had it lasted, it would have been something else. The lessons learned are many and varied. It took about two thousand short tons a day to keep MARCENT in ammunition alone during the ground war. To me the Gulf War proved the accuracy of the maxim "Amateurs study tactics, and professionals study logistics." This is one of the great things about the MAGTF. It has its own tactical and logistical capability. You get everything with one call. Whether you order up a full MEF [a Marine Division/Aircraft Wing/FSSG], or an MEU [SOC], these units have their own logistics base that does not absorb itself as it conducts operations. They carry what they need with them, so that field operations can be sustained for a period of time [usually fifteen to thirty days] without the need for immediate resupply or reinforcement. That's the "expeditionary" part of the Marine Corps today. We have the offshore resources on the amphibious and MPS ships to sustain forces on the land without anyone's permission to base forces ashore.
Following the war and his own homecoming, Brigadier General Krulak began a task as painful as it was important, the drawdown and restructuring of the Marine Corps in the post-Cold War world. Under the so-called Base Force concept, all of the military services were to be downsized, with excess and redundant units and capabilities eliminated. General Krulak's job was to design and supervise this effort for the Marine Corps, without actually destroying it, or its vital capabilities.
Tom Clancy: You came out of Desert Storm, and then what happened?
General Krulak: When General Mundy assumed duty as the 30th Commandant, he assigned me as the head of the Personnel Management Division at Headquarters in Washington. I no sooner took over when he held an off-site meeting with all of his three-stars [Lieutenant Generals]. Out of that meeting came the decision to put together the Force Structure Planning Group [FSPG] to actually develop the plan to take the Corps down to the mandated [Base Force] level of 159,000 personnel. Essentially, we were tasked to take our existing Corps and build a new Corps. So the study group spent the next year working that issue and then, under the direction of General Mundy and with his personal involvement, selling our plan to Congress and the rest of the military services. The key was that, as the FSPG looked at the National Military Strategy and the Marine Corps' role, we determined that we could not meet the needs of this nation at 159,000. Our work showed that the number we actually needed was 177,000, of which we got to keep 174,000 active-duty Marines — a number that was validated by the Department of Defense Bottom-Up Review.
I was then promoted to lieutenant general in October of '92 and went to Quantico to command the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. During my two years there, we as a Corps were formalizing and institutionalizing the combat development process, which was the brainchild of General Gray. From there, I moved back to Hawaii and took over my father's last command, Marine Forces Pacific.
Following in his father's footsteps and commanding the Marine Forces of the Pacific was an honor for Chuck Krulak. But more was to come for the young three-star, as we will soon hear.
Tom Clancy: When you learned that you were being considered for the post of 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, what went through you mind?
General Krulak: My very first thought was, "Am I up to the job?" I questioned whether I was the right man for the job because there were such great people in the running. General Mundy and Secretary [of the Navy] Dalton interviewed every three- and four-star general in the Marine Corps and all were qualified to lead the Corps. We have great generals, and Secretary Dalton made certain that everyone got his day in court. His personal efforts during this process are unmatched in the history of the Navy Secretaries. My second thought was about my wife Zandi, and the pressures that would fall on her. My third thought was that I had a great job as Commander, Marine Forces Pacific, and whatever happened I was going to continue to be challenged.
Tom Clancy: During this time, was there any thought on your part about how close your own father came to being appointed Commandant of the Marine Corps?
General Krulak: No. That was on his mind, though, because the reality is that he came a lot closer than most Marines know he did. He had, in fact, been told that he had the job, and then he didn't get it. So his concern was that history would repeat itself, and I just told him, "Quit worrying about it, because I'm not worrying about it." It was not an issue with me personally. I was not looking for the job. In my opinion, the last thing you want in an organization with this type of deep ethos of service is someone who actually wants or is posturing to be the Commandant. That's an ego issue and the wrong motivation. The job is so hard, so demanding, that if any service chief isn't doing it for what I call the "right thing," then he's going to have a real problem.
Tom Clancy: The day comes and you receive word that the President has nominated you to be the 31 st Commandant of the Marine Corps. What did it feel like?
General Krulak: It was a phenomenal experience. I found out while circling in a plane about five thousand feet above Mt. Suribachi on Iwo Jima. General Mundy, his wife, my wife, and I were headed to Iwo to commemorate the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the invasion of the island. A radio operator handed General Mundy a small yellow message form. He looked at it, and then pulled my wife over to look at it. She looked at it, and started to cry. He then gave it to me, and it said, "The President of the United States has today signed and forwarded to Congress your nomination to be the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps." It was an unbelievable feeling. Every emotion you could possibly think of came over me. You name it: from exhilaration to, "Oh, my God, what is happening?"…to relief…to fear.
The actual announcement was unforgettable. We were on top of Mt. Suribachi — virtually on top of some of the most glorious pages of Marine Corps history — when Secretary Dalton made the announcement to the assembled dignitaries, not least of whom were the survivors of that great battle. I was being told by the Secretary of the Navy that I was becoming Commandant at the exact same place where fifty years earlier Navy Secretary James Forrestal had looked over at General Holland M. "Howlin' Mad" Smith and, upon seeing the flag raised at the top of Mount Suribachi, said, "The raising of that flag…means a Marine Corps for the next five hundred years." My feelings were overpowering. There is a family connection here, because Holland M. Smith was my godfather. Now, half a century later, I'm standing where my godfather once stood and Secretary Dalton is telling the godson of that man that he would be the Commandant who would take the Marine Corps into the 21st century. It was a very emotional moment. I thought of my dad immediately. He and my mom were so excited and happy for me. I am convinced it meant more to them then it did to me.
Tom Clancy: Are you yet aware just how important this matter of your becoming Commandant was to the Marines out in the Corps?
General Krulak: No. I often say that they could have picked any of a number of officers to do the job. There were so many great generals who could have done it. I tend to believe that the commandancy makes the officer, not the other way around.
Tom Clancy: During the 1980s and 1990s, the Marine Corps seems to have been blessed with a string of truly great Commandants. Could you give us your thoughts on some of them?
General Krulak: You really need to go back into the 1970s when you talk about the string of great Commandants. That's where we began implementing policies that gave us the quality manpower to operate the equipment and conduct the operations that made us so successful in the 1980s.
General Louis H. Wilson [26th Commandant of the Marine Corps].
General Wilson inherited a Corps riddled with the personnel problems associated with the post-Vietnam era [racial tension, high desertion and discipline rates, recruiting problems, etc.] and tackled these issues with the same ferocity he demonstrated in combat. He literally turned the manpower tide for the Corps. He was determined to improve the quality of the personnel in the Corps to the point where he vowed to go down to "just two Marines if those two are the kind that we want." I call that the "Wilsonian Doctrine," and it began a revolution that is responsible for the quality of Marines we have in the Corps today.
General Robert H. Barrow [27th Commandant of the Marine Corps].
General Barrow expanded on General Wilson's manpower initiatives. He continued to tighten the quality screws; and in 1983 over ninety percent of new recruits were high school graduates. He also launched his own "war on drugs" and issued the policy that put an end to the Corps' tolerance of problem drinkers. The percentage of substance abusers fell from 48 % in 1980 to less than 10 % by 1985, and the Corps became known as a quality institution sought out by some of the best young men and women our country had to offer.
General Paul X. Kelley [28th Commandant of the Marine Corps].
General Kelley's vision of what we were going to need for equipment and his willingness to fight tooth and nail to obtain the funds to modernize the Corps are his great legacy. While we often talk about the warfighting ethos that we took to the desert in Southwest Asia, we should never forget that he was the Commandant who gave us the means and the implements to fight and win on the battlefield. General Kelley is an unsung hero of the Corps. Ironically, some fifteen years later, one of my biggest challenges is equipment modernization, but it's the equipment he fought for during his tenure as Commandant that / must now fight to replace.
General Alfred M. Gray [29th Commandant of the Corps].
General Gray gave the Marine Corps a brilliant mind that saw beyond the immediate moment. He saw a need to totally revamp the way we think, train, and educate ourselves. He cultivated our maneuver warfare mind-set, so that when we went into Desert Shield/Desert Storm, we didn't see the minefields that we faced as insurmountable obstacles; we just searched for the gaps, breached them, and went on. He gave us the doctrine to do that job, and more since then. A great, great man, and a real thinker. Everyone who looked at him saw this rough, tough son-of-a-gun; but he was, and is, smart as a whip.
General Carl E. Mundy [30th Commandant of the Corps].
General Mundy was a kind, wonderful man, but he knew how to fight. Some wondered if he was going to be able to defend the life of the Corps in the post-Cold War drawdown, and he proved to be a bulldog. His leadership in the battle for an end-strength 174,000 Marines was remarkable. General Mundy will also be remembered for his great moral courage and deep love of Corps and country. He articulated the ethos of our Corps as well as any Commandant. General Mundy and his wife Linda brought real meaning to the Marine Corps family and to the concept that Marines take care of their own.
When General Krulak took command in mid-1995, he inherited a Marine Corps whose strength had been for the most part preserved, but which was facing many new challenges: aging equipment, personnel issues, and basic questions about the role of the Corps in the run-up to the 21st century. Grabbing the bull by the horns, he rapidly took control and began to exert his own unique ideas onto the structure of the Marines. He published his now-famous Commandant's Planning Guidance, so that every Marine in the Corps would know what the new boss had planned for them. He also opened up new channels for direct communications of ideas, including Internet access directly to himself. Let's hear his thoughts on this.
Tom Clancy: What has been your philosophy in these early days (summer and fall of 1995) of your tenure as Commandant?
General Krulak: I felt that I had one year from the start of my tenure as Commandant to set the course and speed for what I believed needed to be done. The remaining three years are to be for follow-through. We now have major projects and initiatives started and have generated momentum. During the next three years, we will continue to give course and speed corrections to the things that we see as important. I tried to get us going, with some clear-cut, definitive goals to make sure that everybody involved knew our plan and was prepared to step out and act. That's what the Commandant's Planning Guidance was all about. To let everybody know what my philosophy was and is and then get on board and charge!
Tom Clancy: Okay, let's talk about some of the things you are working on within the Corps. First, let's hear what you think of the state of the force that you have inherited. Currently, your authorized end-strength is 174,000 active duty personnel. Will you be able to hold onto that?
General Krulak: I think that it [Marine Corps end-strength] will be under attack almost immediately. In fact, it already is. The Administration [of President Bill Clinton] is locked into the force levels defined by the Bottom-Up Review of 1993; but we have major budget problems in the Department of Defense. Part of the problem is that DoD has more infrastructure [bases and facilities] than there's money to support that infrastructure. I am concerned that there will be pressure to make each of the services smaller, both by reducing personnel and infrastructure, and utilizing the money saved to modernize the armed forces. For the nation, a drawdown of the Marine Corps would be a terrible mistake. The Marine Corps was never a Cold War force. Our mission did not change with the end of the Cold War era, so there is no need for other major changes in the Marine Corps specifically in response to the demise of the Soviet Union. Where we can assist this nation as the other services adjust to the post-Cold War period is to be this country's "risk-balance" force. We provide to the nation the ability to take a risk — in this case allowing the rest of the military services to draw down quickly while still having an organization that is ready to respond. We are the most ready when the nation is the least ready, and you don't want to reduce the only force that provides this nation the capability to react while at the same time assuming the risks associated with the rapid post-Cold War drawdown.
Tom Clancy: There has been some envy on the part of the other services at your success at holding on to a relatively high percentage of your Cold War end-strength. Will you please tell us your perceptions of drawdown process with regard to the Marine Corps?
General Krulak: What General Mundy and the Marine Corps did right was create the Force Structure Planning Group that I spoke of earlier and build a plan that made sense. It was a tremendously rigorous effort to analyze the national military strategy and then balance our capabilities against that strategy. From this we came up with the requirement for a Marine Corps with a personnel base of 177,000 active-duty personnel, of which we actually kept 174,000. Now, when people say that we did not cut our strength, they fail to look at the facts. They fail to see that we went from 198,000 active-duty Marines to 174,000. We cut 50 % of our tanks and 33 % of our tactical aviation strength. We lost a third of our artillery, as well as all six of our Marine Expeditionary Brigade Headquarters units and a quarter of our combat service support units.
What is really critical is that most of our cuts had to come out of our muscle — our combat power — because as a service, we were already very lean. When we did identify our requirement for 177,000, a hard number with no fluff, we still had to cut. That's why at this point, I'm determined to keep our end-strength at 174,000. Having said that, we can't get stuck on a number, because our challenge today is to determine what we need to fight and win the battles of the 21st century. That's my problem: to get to the 21st century, making the best use of technology and our remaining personnel base, while still giving the nation what it needs.
One of the biggest challenges faced by General Krulak is maintaining the flow of new Marine recruits into the Corps. The combination of public perception regarding the drawdown of the military as well as a limited pool of recruiting dollars has made this task ever more difficult. Let's hear the Commandant's thoughts on this tough problem.
Tom Clancy: Talk a little about the raw material of the Marine Corps — the recruits — and the recruiters and the recruiting process. What are your thoughts on the recruiting problems facing the Corps as you continue to search for qualified men and women?
General Krulak: First of all, my respect and love for recruiters knows no bounds. As the former head of the Personnel Management and Personnel Procurement Divisions at Headquarters Marine Corps, recruiting was one of my responsibilities, so I have a very good sense of the recruiting process. We have great recruiters and they're doing a tremendous job.
Nevertheless, we have a couple of problems. First, not all of the American people know that we're hiring. They see the military cutting back, they read about the reductions-in-force, and wonder why they should allow their sons or daughters to join the Corps. They just don't see any career possibilities or longevity in the service today. We can tell from our various youth-attitude surveys that America's youth doesn't know we are hiring. So, the first thing I need to do is to enhance our recruitment advertising. That takes dollars. But at the same time, we need to reach our target market with our message. That message is embodied in our new commercial called Transformation. Transformation symbolizes what the Marine Corps does for this nation: We take America's youth, what you called "raw material," and we transform them into Marines. We instill in them our core values — honor, courage, and commitment. We teach them to be the leaders of tomorrow's Corps and the leaders of their communities and country the day after tomorrow. We recognize that we are recruiting a different kind of American today. They're coming from a different society, with different values than those that have been the hallmark of the Corps' value system. We transform them, and that transformation lasts forever. That's important for our nation and our nation's youth. But they have to know we will do that for them, and that is where advertising comes into play. I won't sacrifice quality for quantity, and I believe the "Wilsonian Doctrine" was the right approach. Like General Wilson, we will willingly sacrifice numbers to get the very best of our youth. Then we will transform them forever…into Marines and, more importantly, productive citizens of this great nation of ours.
Tom Clancy: On to another personnel matter. Could you talk a little about the changing roles for young women in the Marine Corps?
General Krulak: Our women make tremendous contributions to the Corps. I had 201 women under my command during Desert Shield and Storm and I would not have been combat-effective without them. To a Marine, they were superb. As the Commandant, however, I am tasked to train, equip, and provide fighting forces to the regional commanders-in-chief. I have to consider this as we select and procure the right equipment and train the right people to do the job the nation expects of us. It is also my responsibility to ensure the we maximize the effective utilization of those resources. I do not believe that I am maximizing the utilization of the limited resources of the Marine Corps by putting women at the point of a rifle platoon or in units that engage in direct ground combat.
One of the hallmarks of the 1990s has been that as U.S. forces have gotten smaller, they have also gotten busier. Higher operational tempos (Optempos) have resulted in some notable difficulties, even for the Marines. General Krulak has been forced to deal with some unique problems in the areas of morale, as well as some surprising quality-of-life issues. Let's hear what he has to say.
Tom Clancy: Morale always seems to be an issue in the military. Can you talk some about the challenges this presents for you?
General Krulak: First of all, I have not encountered the kinds of morale problems in 1995 that we had in the past. The morale problems of 1995 are minuscule compared with those, for example, of the 1970s. Nevertheless, the first thing I am doing for morale is to show the individual Marine that their Commandant cares about them, as individuals. So when members of Congress asked what they could do for me as I made my in-calls, I asked for an additional ten to twenty million dollars for things like rain gear and boots instead of dollars for additional amphibious shipping, aircraft, and vehicles. When they said, "What are you talking about?" I said, "What I want to give my Marines is field equipment that is of newer design than the Korean War!" I think they thought I was somewhat "off the-wall," but the bottom line is that the first thing that Marines saw from this Commandant was new boots, rain gear, and the new load-bearing equipment system and backpack.
With the exception of the woodland camouflage pattern, the field jacket that we use today is the same design that our Marines wore in the 1950s. You have sportsmen walking around in state-of-the-art boots, and our current boots are terrible! Our rain suits are made of rubber, which does not breathe, so the Marine wearing it is as wet on the inside as he is outside. Today if a Marine's sleeping bag gets wet, it weighs over 40 1b/18 kg, and we use tents designed back in World War II! Everyone talks about being worried about the "quality of life," but what they fail to understand is that the bulk of an infantryman's life is spent in the field. In the fleet, many Marines spend more time in the field than they do at home. For our forward-deployed Marines, like those in the MEU (SOC)s, this is especially true. We spend money on new barracks and other base facilities, but don't buy our Marines the basic clothing and equipment they need to survive and be comfortable in the field. Secondly, there is the matter of my style of leadership. I don't have many pretenses, so the last thing I want when I stop somewhere is a lot of preparation and fanfare over my visits. Now, there are people who disagree with this philosophy and feel that a visit from the Commandant is cause for a major out-pouring of effort, but the onus ends up on the enlisted Marines who need to be spending their time being Marines, not preparing for my visit. So I try to fly in unannounced; and that precludes excess preparation work and allows me to see my Marines as they are. I want them to know that their Commandant is coming to see them. They now know that, and I learn a lot from my visits talking with the troops. In my discussions with Marines, I hear the usual about what I call external morale issues [barracks, recreational facilities, etc.] and we are already working on these things. What I focus on, however, are the more deep-seated, internal things, such as pride in the organization and making sure that our leaders have what John A. Lejeune [the 13th Commandant of the Corps] called "a self-sacrificing love for the Marine Corps." Those are things that we can always positively influence, regardless of the budget, so those are the areas we need to concentrate on. I have to tell you that Marines, whatever their rank, will respond to this type of approach. They have to know that they will all be treated fairly, and that nobody above them is going to harm them by ruining their career automatically because of a mistake. At the same time, though, that Marine has to know that we will not tolerate lying, cheating, or stealing. As warfighters we must understand the dimensions of physical courage. There are no greater supporters of peace than those who are sworn to risk their lives when war occurs. However, our profession also demands moral courage — the strength of character and the integrity to do what is right. Acts of moral torpitude have no place in the Marine Corps.
While the new Commandant has strong ties to the history and traditions of the Marine Corps, he has a keen appreciation of the usefulness of modern technology to help his Marines. In particular, he has used electronic mail and the Internet to open up direct lines of communications with his Corps. Let him tell you about it.
Tom Clancy: One of your major initiatives has been to open the lines of communication with Marines of all ranks. To accomplish this, you even obtained an address on the Internet. Could you please talk about your new communications systems with your Marines?
General Krulak: It is phenomenal! Some of our best ideas and initiatives originate with the lance corporal and corporals who work, live, eat, and sleep Marine Corps twenty-four hours a day. I don't think a Commandant can effectively lead the Corps without input from Marines. So with this E-Mail and Internet access, they can send their ideas directly to me, and they do. I get messages from corporals to gunnery sergeants, with suggestions telling us how we can do things better in the Marine Corps. I want to focus their suggestions, so I have asked them to think about and address three questions: "What are we doing now that we shouldn't be doing?" "What aren't we doing now that we should be doing?" and "What are we doing now that we could be doing better and how?"
They are answering those questions, and we have made major changes in the Corps today based on their input. We have, or are, considering changes in training, in the promotion system, and in our performance evaluation system. The changes are driven by lance corporals through colonels dialing up and dropping me a note with an idea. You have to see the quality of what they are saying to appreciate just how intelligent they are and how much they care about improving the Corps. It is truly motivating!
One of the most difficult tasks facing General Krulak and the Marine Corps as they head into the 21st century is the need to modernize their equipment during a time when there is very little money and even less support around Washington, D.C., to do so. With their modernization budget (for new and replacement equipment, as well as upgrades/conversions) slashed to almost historic lows, the challenges for the Commandant are immense. Let's hear his thoughts on this.
Tom Clancy: Could you talk now about the Marine Corps modernization budget? Obviously you're making due with an absurdly small amount, compared with the other services. What is the outlook?
General Krulak: Let me preface my comments with some background about our budget. Procurement and modernization for some equipment [Marine aviation, amphibious shipping, and landing craft] are funded by the Department of the Navy. The shortfall you are referencing has to do with what we call "green dollars," or dollars earmarked specifically for Marine Corps procurement. With that as background, the Marine Corps needs a "green" modernization budget between $1 billion and $1.2 billion. That is one of my biggest challenges. We had $474 million in FY-95; and that's less than half of the historic average; and that means we have had to sacrifice either readiness or modernization, because we can't have both at that level. If I don't get that budget up to the necessary level, we'll be in real trouble.
In fact, we're in trouble right now. We have 5-ton trucks that are almost twenty years old. You don't drive a car that is that old, but we'll be sending Marines into combat in those vehicles. Our amphibious assault vehicles [the AAV-7s] are twenty to twenty-five years old. There are problems on the aviation-dollar side as well — we are flying CH-46 medium-lift helicopters that are headed into their fourth decade of service as we are sitting here! We have some real modernization problems that we need to come to grips with as a service and a nation.
Tom Clancy: With that introduction, I'd like to run some of the key modernization programs by you, and get some of your comments on them. Tell me about the V-22.
General Krulak: The V-22 is critical to the nation and Marine Corps. We're going to get it, and get it quicker than anyone thinks we will. Once other services realize the capability that tilt-rotor technology brings, I believe that they will join us in procuring this aircraft. It has all the capabilities of a helicopter in terms of vertical flight, but has the speed and distance more akin to a fixed-wing aircraft. Imagine how useful this aircraft would have been in places like Somalia or Burundi, or might be in Bosnia. We're currently programmed to get the first squadron of V-22s in 2001, but I would like to be able to buy two or three squadrons a year [twenty-four to thirty-six airframes], as opposed to the current planned buy rate of fourteen airframes per year. Again, I believe that once people understand and appreciate how incredibly capable this aircraft is, the buy will be accelerated.
Tom Clancy: How about the Harrier re-manufacture?
General Krulak: The re-manufactured Harrier will be our "bridge" aircraft until the Joint Advanced Strike Technology [JAST]/Joint Strike Fighter [JSF] program gets us to ASTOVL (Advanced Short Takeoff, Vertical Landing — a variant of the JSF). With the updated AV-8B Harrier II Plus, we have an extremely good aircraft that has remarkable capabilities compared to earlier versions of the plane. In fact, thanks to the re-manufacture program, it is virtually a new airplane. It is not, however, the plane we want for the 21st century. That's the ASTOVL strike fighter. Our goal is for the Marine Corps to "neck down" to just one single strike aircraft, the ASTOVL version of JSF. Combine that with the capability of the V-22, the heavy-lift CH-53E, our light attack and utility helicopters, and our support aircraft, and we will have a Marine aircraft wing that brings incredible capability to the combatant commander.
There will be tremendous savings when we pool all the Marines working on or flying in a number of different airframes, and put them all into one of our extremely capable, hard-charging air wings with fewer types of airframes. We will realize significant economies of production, as well as operations and maintenance. When you are talking modernization, you have to think beyond today or tomorrow, and think about the day after tomorrow. That is how we approach everything as Marines. Everyone is excited about the AV-8B Harrier II Plus. Yet while I believe that is great, and it may be doing what we want today, it is a bridge to the ASTOVL strike fighter of the future.
Tom Clancy: Tell me about the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV).
General Krulak: The AAAV is as critical to our future success as the V-22. Seventy percent of the world's population lives within 300 miles [480 kilometers] of a coastline in the littorals. The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era of global instability where regional strife will dominate. While we can't predict exactly where a crisis will occur, there is a good chance it will require a response originating from the sea. If we, as a nation, are going to have forward-deployed forces effective at managing instability around the world, we need the AAAV that operates rapidly in the water from a good standoff distance [up to 25 nm/46 km] as well as on dry land. It will be able to carry Marines, weapons, and equipment under armor with a full nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) over-pressure protection system. It will also give us the ability to engage enemy armor with superior mobility and firepower. It will give us tremendous flexibility in a variety of combat environments and conditions.
Ship-to-shore delivery is not an end unto itself, but a beginning, because you still have to maneuver and fight when you get on dry land. Right now, we don't have a system for moving Marines under armor that can keep up with the M 1A1 tank. You can't have an effective mechanized force if your personnel can't keep up with your tanks and reconnaissance vehicles. The AAAV will give us that capability.
Tom Clancy: What about the Predator and Javelin systems?
General Krulak: We need a solid fire-and-forget anti-armor capability, and these two systems will get us to the future. Like the AV-8B Harrier II Plus though, I see Predator and Javelin as "bridge" systems, to get us the follow-on generations of truly "brilliant" fire and forget anti-armor technology.
Tom Clancy: How does the Lightweight 155mm Howitzer (LW 155) fit into the future?
General Krulak: We really need a true lightweight 155mm howitzer. The current M 198 towed howitzer is just too heavy. The LW 155 will give the MAGTF commander greater operational and tactical flexibility in executing his mission. It maintains the current thirty-kilometer range and lethality; but the increased mobility will significantly improve artillery ship-to-shore movement and increase the survivability, responsiveness, and efficiency of artillery units supporting ground operations. We need this system, and will be selecting a contractor to do the job soon.
Tom Clancy: You talk a lot about technology. Do you envision a role for GPS (Global Positioning System) in the future?
General Krulak: I would like see a GPS receiver on every Marine before the end of my commandancy, but I think one per squad leader is more realistic. This will solve so many of the problems that the ground-maneuver forces have had in the past. It will greatly simplify yet improve our ability to determine where our units are and where the enemy is — the basic battlefield picture.
Tom Clancy: Communications in combat are always a concern. What do you see on the horizon in this area?
General Krulak: I want the individual Marine to be fully integrated from a communication standpoint with all echelons above and below. Take a laptop computer tied into a GPS receiver and you have a real-time picture showing all the locations of friends, foes, etc. With a touch of his finger on the computer screen, this "digitized Marine" will have the capability to call in fire on the enemy with deadly accuracy every time.
The technology is there. What we need to consider is the impact that it will have on how we fight. You give a system like that to every squad leader and you're looking at a completely different battlefield scenario. So the challenge is to take advantage of and field such technologies that will change the existing paradigm of warfare as we know it. In Desert Storm we said, "If you can see a target on the battlefield, then you can kill it." Ten years from now, however, I think we'll be saying, "If you can sense the target, you can kill it!" We need to start thinking seriously about the impact that will have. We need to consider how it will influence the sizes and types of formations on the battlefield. We need to look at how we are going to survive on that battlefield, a battlefield where sensing an enemy is death to them.
Another challenge facing General Krulak and the Marines, as well as his Navy counterpart, the Chief of Naval Operations, is the need to complete the upgrade of the Navy's fleet of amphibious ships. With the job only half done (about eighteen of the planned thirty-six ships having been delivered by the end of 1995), let's hear the Commandant's thoughts on finishing the job.
Tom Clancy: Let's talk about the U.S. Navy — your other half. Right now the Navy is planning to finish building a fleet of thirty-six state-of-the-art amphibious-warfare ships (LHAs/LHDs/LSDs/LPDs) formed into twelve Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) that will replace the current fleet of almost fifty such ships you currently have. Are these thirty-six ships/twelve ARGs enough to meet your requirements, and are they the right ships for the jobs?[9]
General Krulak: We need to be able to lift three Marine Expeditionary Brigades [MEBs are task-organized and can range in size from twelve thousand to sixteen thousand Marines]. Thirty-six ships can't do that. Congress realizes the need for increased amphibious lift and has put additional resources to this requirement. I believe the need for adequate amphibious lift will become even more apparent in the early 21st century, when eight out of the ten top economies in the world will be found on the rims of Pacific and Indian Oceans. In this scenario, forward-deployed amphibious and naval expeditionary forces will be critical to our ability to manage instability in those geographic areas. I think the ARG concept with a MEU (SOC) embarked meets our needs today, but we will need a different capability in 2005 and 2010, when we are trying to protect our national interests in the littorals of places like the Indian and Pacific Oceans. If you think that twenty B-2A stealth bombers with sixteen guided bombs each comprises a presence, virtual or otherwise, you don't know the Asian people. If you want the people of the Asian rim to feel the presence of American forces, let them see and touch the gray-painted side of a U.S. warship. The U.S. can't survive in the Pacific and Asian regions if all we have to offer is a regional Commander-in-Chief [CinC] flying in on a VC-20 Gulfstream VIP jet to hold a press conference saying that U.S. forces are there, when the truth is that they are a month or more away!
Now, how do you cover areas as vast as that? You cover them with Marines afloat on Navy ships — ships like the recently commissioned USS Carter Hall [LSD-50]. This is a Landing Ship Dock almost nine hundred feet long; not some old LST. I say give those up and use thirty-six warships, amphibious ships of the line! Let us design and configure them, and build the MEU (SOC) of the 21st century. You'll still send out an ARG, but with three of the most phenomenally capable amphibious ships in the world. Each might have one "mini-MEU (SOC)" on board, so that they can cover the vast distances that we will be required to oversee in the 21 st century. They'll use things like video teleconferencing data links for command and control, and will only come together when they have to concentrate and apply their full power to a contingency. So, what I see in the building program of today is the possibility of thirty-six miniature ARGs, each one composed of just one ship with a mini-MEU (SOC) on board.
Tom Clancy: Could you tell us a bit about how you feel about the current amphibious shipbuilding programs?
General Krulak: On Amphibious Assault Ships. The Wasp-class [LHD-1] ships provide us with great capability. In particular, the possibility of upgrading the command and control technology on those vessels so we can effectively interface with virtually any other command and control system makes them into an extremely capable system. You can run exactly the kinds of operations that I described previously with a split-ship ARG, disaster or humanitarian relief, or use it as the headquarters of a Joint Task Force [JTF]. We really need that seventh one [LHD-7]; and there may very well be a press to build an eighth ship as we approach the 21st century and have to counter the kinds of instability that I see happening. The desire to maintain stability will be so great you may actually see a slow growth of forces from their current levels.
The USS Whidbey Island/ Harpers Ferry-class [LSD-41/49] Dock Landing Ships are also doing their jobs well. Like the LHDs, you may also see additional units being built in the early 21 st century, if near-term worldwide instabilities continue to grow. In addition, there are LPD-17-class assault ships. This is the near-term "big ticket" item for us. Just last year it was only a large paper ship. Today it is well on its way to becoming a reality. They are planning to build a total of twelve within the first decade of the 21 st century. The first one is due in 2001. We need to just build that first one, get it out to sea, and then determine what the follow-on units will look like. I don't want production of that first ship to be slowed and priced out of being built by adding more and more systems. I can almost guarantee that the follow-on units will be different from the first one, but we need to get that first one off the line. Also, I want shipyards to be building them at a rapid pace — the quicker we get them the better. But I want that first ship! On Landing Craft. The Landing Craft, Air Cushioned [LCAC] gives us tremendous capability, though I would like to see a smaller version built. We could outfit these with fire-and-forget support weapons that could go in with the AAAVs and be relatively immune to the inshore mine threat. The older conventional landing craft are eventually going to go away. For now, though, we need them for delivery of follow-on equipment to the beach.
Tom Clancy: What is the status of the Maritime Prepositioning Program?
General Krulak: The MPSRONs have been winners, and the program is healthy today. Just as with everything else, though, we must look at what we will need from MPSRON in the 21st century. That is one of the tasks in my planning guidance: to see if the current MPSRON is really the way to go in the future.
I have a feeling that things may be a bit different. Once upon a time, we (the U.S. and Great Britain) managed instability in the world through a system of coaling stations that were used to refuel the warships of the day. Perhaps we need to look at Admiral Bill Owens's [the recently retired Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] mobile-base concept. This is a modular self-propelled floating air/logistics base, which can be moved to a crisis area and would provide the ability to anchor a large support and logistics base right off the coast of a combat zone. We need, however, to look at the trade-off of such a concept with the current MPSRON scheme, which is mainly to haul equipment and supplies, not serve as a core base for their operations.
One of the other significant challenges faced by General Krulak is the matter of the extremely high operational tempos (Optempos) that have faced the U.S. military in general, and the U.S. Marine Corps in particular. With future Optempos projected to increase in the years ahead, his thoughts are insightful.
Tom Clancy: Let's talk a bit about the Optempos that the U.S. military in general, and the Marine Corps in particular, has been sustaining over the last few years, particularly in light of the recent cutbacks. Could you talk a little about this and its effects on the Corps?
General Krulak: Marines operate. Marines deploy. It's what we do. It's what the nation needs for us, with our Navy shipmates, to do. Optempo is going to have long term impacts on personnel and is hastening the modernization problem that is rapidly coming upon us. In regard to the latter, we are using our equipment up — going beyond the fatigue and service lives of equipment — earlier than planned. In addition, we are beginning to see maintenance problems as a result of delayed or deferred maintenance. Funding is a problem too. We are going to see lost opportunities to stretch out the life of our equipment without the proper moneys at the right time. This level of Optempos costs us training time and limits our options on how and when we repair things, which in turn gets us out of sync with the planned funding for that repair.
There is also the human cost of high Optempos. You already have problems with the families, wear and tear on the people. What is amazing, though, is that the individual Marines are loving the work, because that's what they came in to the Corps to do in the first place. The wives and families struggle, but the Marines love to work hard! It's a strange dichotomy for us to balance in the future.
The crown jewels of the Marine Corps today are its force of seven MEU (SOC)s. These compact, highly mobile forces are the key to maintaining the United States' capability to "kick in the door" to a hostile coastline, should it be required. General Krulak's thoughts on the future of these forces are important, because they represent the last remaining vestige of our once-robust amphibious capabilities.
Tom Clancy: The MEU (SOC)s. You have seven now, but will that be enough in the future?
General Krulak: I think seven are enough to do the job today, though beyond 2005 to 2010 it will not be. What we will need to do is optimize the number of MEU (SOC)s on the various amphibious platforms that we do have. For example, if you have a V-22 that can carry twenty to twenty-five combat-loaded Marines, compared to the eight to twelve carried by the current CH-46 Sea Knight, you increase your capability to deal with the threat. In addition, you may be able to off-load some of the V-22s onto the LPD-17s, and build the mini-MEU (SOC)s that we talked about earlier.
We have to get "outside of the box" in our thinking. We need to package the the MEU (SOC) with the capability to do the mission we are tasked to do, but do so in the minimum possible space aboard the ships. I mentioned earlier the "digitized Marine" squad leader who can call down accurate killing fire on anybody in a matter of seconds. We have to consider what kind of capability that kind of Marine brings to our warfighting ability. I don't know what the implications are today, but I do know that I had better find the answer if the Marine Corps is going to remain relevant in the 21st century. In my planning guidance I directed the establishment of the Warfighting Lab at Quantico to look at these types of issues. As we develop various concepts of how we should fight or train or equip Marines, they will be tested under a concept called Sea Dragon. Because of new technologies that will be available to the Marines and sailors of the 21st century, in ten years you will see a MAGTF that has much greater capability and can cover more ground than the current MEU (SOC). The size of these units may be dictated more by technology and the capabilities of the individual ships than anything else. The question is just what systems do we really need on the modern battlefield for an expeditionary MAGTF. Do we need an M1 tank or perhaps a more mobile vehicle armed with fire-and-forget anti-armor missiles? Do we need a light tracked vehicle or a derivative of the current wheeled Light Armored Vehicle [LAV]? These are the questions the Warfighting Lab and Sea Dragon will address. We are looking forward into the 2010 time frame and checking into a number of other things — equipment, combat support, all kinds of things. Do you think that the United States Marine Corps will look the same in ten years as it does today? I don't think so!
As we closed out our chat with the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Krulak shared some of his visions of the future, both on the roles and missions of the service as well as the ethos of the Corps in general.
Tom Clancy: Could you talk about the Marine Corps in ten to twenty years in terms of its mission?
General Krulak: I see us as the premier crisis-response force in the world. And I define crisis response as everything from major regional contingencies to disaster relief. Some military forces are so specialized they are like a window washer who only washes square or round windows. I'm telling you that we do windows! You tell me what you want done, I will configure a force for your needs. We are the most flexible military force in the world today. When you tie us to the capabilities of our sister service, the U.S. Navy, we offer a completely unique set of capabilities.
Tom Ctancy: Do you feel good about what you see in the Marine Corps today and in the future?
General Krulak: Absolutely. The capabilities resident in the Marine Corps have been found to be of use and value to the nation. It's interesting that we are not doing things much different today from what we did during the Cold War and before Desert Storm. We are doing it a little more frequently, but we have not changed our philosophy much; and in the future we are going to become even more valuable. The Marine Corps that I inherited has always done just two things for this country. First, we make Marines; and they are a different type of person in their souls and their minds. Secondly, we win battles. We don't necessarily win major wars by ourselves; that is the job of the U.S. Army. We have, however, been the ones winning the early battles. If we ever stop doing either one of those things, we are finished. Therefore, all of my focus is on making Marines and winning battles. The United States of America needs the Marines.
By the time you read this, General Krulak will be at least halfway through his four-year tour as Commandant of the Marine Corps. His goals and visions will have been scrutinized, the first hard results of his initiatives will have been seen, and his programs will be showing signs of life. Yet, it is perhaps his own persona and character that will be the defining aspect of his commandancy. He has brought the Corps back to its roots, showing a hereditary line back to the qualities that have always made the Marines special to the United States. He truly is a warrior prince of the Marine Corps, and will be an important force as they enter the 21st century. In spite of the shortage of funds and the cutbacks that have been at the core of recent Marine Corps history, there will always be Marines. Trust the son of Brute Krulak to keep that promise.