Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces

Carl Stiner resumes the account begun in the first chapter. It is Tuesday, October 8th, at the Sigonella NATO Base, Sicily:

As soon as we arrived in Sigonella early Tuesday morning, we began refucling the planes, but we would not take off until later that day, since we had to time our departure to arrive at about dusk at Cyprus (Cyprus would provide us with coverage of the eastern Mediterranean, and a base for the takedown of the ship, if that proved feasible). Meanwhile, we off-loaded the small contingent of SEALs and the two Little Bird gunships that would remain at Sigonella.

This ground delay proved useful, since it gave me my first opportunity during the mission to talk to my commanders face to face. We had lifted off from three bases in three states, assembled en route, and landed sequentially. Now, on the ground at Sigonella, I held a commanders' conference to talk about conducting the operation.

There were blessedly only three possible scenarios:

• First scenario: The ship remains on the high seas and in the vicinity of Cyprus. In that case, we could reach it from there and wouldn't need Navy platforms (ships) for staging and recovering our helicopters. Of the three scenarios, this would be the least complex for us, and would offer us the best conditions for success, since the terrorists wouldn't have a sanctuary, such as, for example, Iran, Libya, or Algeria.

• Second scenario: The ship finds a port somewhere. In this case our operation would be easy or hard depending on the cooperation of the host country. Yet, even if the host country consented to our operation, surprise would be difficult to achieve; we would have to be concerned about the territorial waters issue, and perhaps we'd have local police or military forces to deal with.

• Third scenario: The ship sails beyond the recovery range of our helicopters. In that case, we would need Navy platforms for recovery of our helicopters after our initial assault.

After the conference, I communicated these options to the Pentagon and USEUCOM. Then I talked with the U.S. commander at Sigonella, Bill Spearman, to find out if he had learned anything useful from his Italian counterparts, such as the Italian base commander. We also talked about support I might need when we returned. I knew this was prudent but, at the time, I was convinced it was unnecessary. We were focused on a takedown at sea and never imagined that the action would end up (as it did) back at Sigonella. In any event, I asked Bill to take care of my troops who'd remain at Sigonella and promised to keep in touch through my liaison team there.

By afternoon we had reached our window for reaching Cyprus at dusk. Before boarding the plane, I decided to check with Vice Admiral Moreau (whom Admiral Crowe had designated to work the details and to keep him informed) about what was going on in Washington, to find out if we were cleared into the military base on Cyprus, and to update him on our planning options for the takedown. I did this on the SATCOM, which my radio operator carried (he was always by my side).

Moreau had three messages: Efforts to locate the Achille Lauro were continuing, and the Israelis had been asked to help. The decision had been made to take the ship down; I would receive the "Execute Order" soon. And approval had been granted by "our friends to use Cyprus.[22] That had been expected, but it was good to know.

"We're launching now," I told him, "and are scheduled to arrive by dusk. If the ship can be found today, and it's within range of our helicopters, we might be able to do a takedown before daylight"

"Sounds good," he replied. "I'll pass it on."

Next I decided to check with my liaison officer in Rome. 1 was glad to learn that he had established contact with Ambassador Rabb and was operating from the U.S. embassy. All the pieces were moving into place.

I boarded the plane and we launched. This involved staggering our launch times, which in turn allowed us to sequence our landing in order to accommodate the available ramp space at our destination. No more than four C-141s and two C-5s could be on the ground off-loading at any one time.

ON BOARD THE ACHILLE LAURO

The Achille Lauro had set sail from its home port in Genoa, Italy, on October 3, 1985, with 750 passengers on board, for a seven-day voyage that would include a visit to Ashod, Israel. Most of the crew of 344 were Italian, while the passengers were an international mix of travelers.

On the morning of Monday, October 7, the 633-foot liner had docked at Alexandria, Egypt, to let off passengers who wanted to tour the Pyramids. The ship would loiter off the coast of Egypt and then come back that evening to pick up the passengers at Port Said before continuing the voyage to Israel.

Most of the ninety-seven passengers who had elected to stay behind were too elderly or infirm for a rigorous day among the antiquities. Among these was the sixty-nine-year-old Leon Klinghoffer, wheelchair-bound after two strokes. Klinghoffer was accompanied by his fifty-eight-year-old wife, Marilyn. There were ten other Americans.

During lunch, a pair of Arab-looking men burst into the dining room, firing machine guns in the air. Moments later, the passengers were all flat on the dining-room floor.

When they heard this commotion, the officers standing watch on the bridge were able to send the distress signal that the ship was being hijacked. This was the message received in Goteborg, Sweden, that had been monitored.

As all this was happening, two other Arab-looking terrorists were taking over the bridge. When the ship's captain, Gerardo de Rosa, arrived, the terrorist leader, Majed Molqi, ordered him to put the ship into radio silence and head for the Syrian port, Tartus, which was four-hundred miles away — punctuating his demand with a burst of machine-gun fire into the deck. Syria was a haven for terrorists, and Hafez Assad, the president, exercised considerable leverage over several terrorist organizations.

In all, there were four terrorists — not the twenty claimed by the terrorist leader. But they had the advantage of shock and surprise.

The terrorists, it was later learned, were PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) members. Their original plan had been to wait until the ship entered the Israeli harbor at Ashod, where they would take control of the ship. They would then hold the passengers hostage, while negotiating for the release of fifty other Palestinian terrorists who had been tried, convicted, and sentenced by Israeli courts. But things had not worked out according to plan. The four men had not behaved like normal cruise-liner passengers, a fact noted by an alert ship's steward, who figured lunchtime would give him an opportunity to check out the stateroom they occupied. What he found when he entered was the four men cleaning automatic weapons. Their only choice was to make their move.

When the Achille Lauro arrived off the port of Tartus Tuesday afternoon, the JSOTF was still flying to Cyprus. Though aircraft from the U.S. 6th Fleet were crisscrossing the eastern Mediterranean searching for it, no one other than a few on board the vessel had any idea where the cruise liner was until the terrorists announced their presence near Tartus, where they broadcast a request to land and a demand for the release of the fifty Palestinian terrorists. Their hope was that Syrian President Hafez Assad would provide them a sanctuary and a platform for negotiations. Their hope was misplaced.

Though President Hafez Assad remained friendly to terrorists, he was not at that time friendly to Yasir Arafat's Palestinian Liberation Front terrorists. Assad had fallen out with Arafat, and since Assad had by then identified the Achille Lauro hijackers as members of the PLO, he saw an opportunity to undermine Arafat.

Assad, taking advantage of the opportunity, refused this request.

The terrorists were now in a desperate situation, knowing that they were no longer hidden and increasingly vulnerable to an attack. To deter that, they arranged twenty hostages in a circle out on an open upper deck, visible to aircraft. One of the twenty hostages was Leon Klinghoffer. His wheelchair prevented him from ascending the stairs to the deck and joining the others. "The terrorists ordered me to leave him," his wife Marilyn reported later. "I begged them to let me stay with him. They responded by putting a machine gun to my head and ordered me up the stairs. That was the last time I saw my husband."

Majed Molqi then broadcast threats. Passengers would be killed unless he saw movement on his demands by 3:00 P.M.

At three, Molqi went to where Leon Klinghoffer had been left, moved him near the starboard rail, and shot him in the head and chest. Two of the ship's crew were ordered to throw the body overboard.

Afterward, Captain de Rosa was told to call this information to Tartus.

This message may have been picked up by the Israelis, because I was informed later that we had reason to believe someone had been killed, even though by that time the hijackers were claiming that all of the hostages were safe.

Meanwhile, the hijackers had picked another victim, Mildred Hodes.

Though Majed Molqi continued to demand action from Tartus, the Syrians continued to stall.

By this time, the PLO leadership had realized that matters were getting out of hand and it was time to institute damage control. Using a codename, "Abu Khaled," Abu Abbas, who was one of Yasir Arafat's chief lieutenants and a member of his executive council, broadcast a message over an Arab-speaking radio station, directing the terrorists to return to Port Said without harming the hostages.

The Achille Lauro set sail from the vicinity of Tartus somewhere around 4:30 or 5:00 P.M., to take advantage of the coming darkness. The ship again went into radio silence.

When the Achille Lauro first broke radio silence near Tartus, the JSOTF was about midway into its flight to Cyprus, and I was being kept abreast of the intercepted communications between the terrorists and the Tartus port authorities by Vice Admiral Morcau at the Pentagon. At the same time, our liasion officer in Rome was keeping me up to date on developments within the Italian government.

What I learned was that Ambassador Rabb had met with Italian Prime Minister Craxi, Foreign Minister Andreotti, and Defense Minister Spadolini to explain that President Reagan was pleased at the Italian governments collaboration during the hostage crisis, but the U.S. government had learned authoritatively that an American citizen had been murdered and others had been threatened, and that this was "untenable." Rabb stated further that the U.S. government was absolutely unwilling to undertake negotiations, and had decided to attempt a military rescue operation some time Wednesday night.

Meanwhile, the Achille Lauro had vanished again; and again, 6th Fleet aircraft lost it.

CYPRUS

The arrival of darkness also meant that JSOTF aircraft had started landing on Cyprus. We instantly raced into action.

Based on an intelligence guess that the Achille Lauro might not be headed for Egypt but for Larnaca, in Cyprus, which was not far away, we clandestinely rushed forces into position for a takedown, just in case the ship did show up.

Things did not in fact work out that way.

At about daylight, Wednesday, October 9, an Israeli patrol boat spotted the Achille Lauro off the Israeli-Lebanese border heading south — for Egypt.

Even so, the ship was still in international waters and a good distance from Egypt. Earlier we had requested two Navy ships from the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) for platforms from which to launch our helicopters. Meanwhile, three U.S. Navy ships had arrived in the vicinity of the Achille Lauro and were shadowing it from over the horizon. Plans had already been made for positioning the SEAL assault forces onboard the two U.S. Navy platforms. The plan was to conduct a ship takedown just after darkness at 2100 hours, Wednesday night.

Back at Cyprus shortly after daylight, I was finalizing last-minute details for the assault with my commanders when a helicopter landed just outside our hangar. Colonel "Lou" quickly responded, "It's not one of ours; they were all back before daylight." Lou's helicopters had been conducting test flights after reassembly following offloading.

I said, "Sergeant Major, find out who that is. No one else around here has a helo that makes that sound."

The sergeant major rushed outside and quickly returned. "Sir," he said, "we have a couple of guests." Standing there with the sergeant major were two Italian officers, a lieutenant colonel and a major, in flight suits and wearing survival equipment and weapons.

"What are you two up to?" I asked them.

"We are here to recover our ship," the lieutenant colonel said.

"You gotta be shitting me," I said. "Where is the rest of your force?"

"Well, we've had a few maintenance problems on the way," he answered, "and some of my force is broken down on islands between here and our home base, and they will be coming in a little later."

Knowing that whatever he might eventually be able to gather up would be totally inadequate and untrained for ship takedown operations, I said, "We can't wait, we are up against a time crunch."

"I do have a diagram of the ship," he offered, "if that will help any."

Would it! Boy! this was welcome news. Up to that moment, we had had no clear idea of the layout of the Achille Lauro.

For this operation, we had drawn sketches for planning, using other ships as models, but we'd had to guess where the towers, antennas, masses, and the bridge were located on the Achille Lauro. Although we had the best pilots in the world, it is still risky business flying helicopters at night in an assault into the structures of a ship, placing shooters exactly where they ought to be — all under night-vision goggles — and especially on a ship that is likely to be blacked out.

"I'll make you an offer," I said. "You give us that diagram, and we'll take you along on this operation, but keep you out of harm's way. We'll recover your ship, and turn it over to you. No one will ever know that you didn't do it… unless you tell them. You can have all the credit."

He was ecstatic, thinking that he had made the best deal of his life, and he promptly handed me the diagram. What he didn't know was that should Captain de Rosa and his ship drivers be killed during the assault, he could have ended up driving the ship…. You can't just let one float by itself. Of course, we would not have let this actually happen before loaning him a trained ship driver. Yes, our SEALs had people trained for driving ships.

The diagram was a godsend. It was about four feet by eight feet and showed in detail where all the structures were that could cause us problems in darkness. Within an hour, with its help, all our assault forces were able to tweak their plans and brief their troops.

CAIRO

In Cairo, Egypt's Foreign Minister Abdel Meguid was asking the ambassadors of the various countries involved for advice: Would it be best to negotiate or refuse to negotiate? Meanwhile, Yasir Arafat sent Abu Abbas to Cairo to deal with the hijackers.

Yasir Arafat already had a working relationship with the Italian prime minister, as he did with the Egyptian government. In those days, the PLO leader had developed several "under the table agreements — especially with governments that lay within what might be called the PLO area of influence. These governments were afraid that the PLO could bring down their governments if they did not cooperate. These agreements permitted the PLO to operate within those countries.

By Wednesday morning, Arafat claimed to have everything under control. "We have succeeded in bringing the ship back into the waters off Egypt," he announced. "1 can reveal to you that we have a high degree of confidence regarding a positive conclusion to the affair."

Meanwhile, neither the Egyptians nor the Italians were eager to pursue the terrorists once they had arrived in Egypt. For various diplomatic and internal political reasons, they hoped the terrorists on Achille Lauro would simply disappear and the whole affair would go away unnoticed.

As far as the United States was concerned, this was not an option. To the United States, like Israel, a terrorist attack was no different from any other military attack. It could not be met by appeasement. The only option was military action.

Neither position was, strictly speaking, unreasonable, given the needs and premises from which each side started. But compromise and appeasement are not a wise long-term approach to terrorism.

By late Wednesday afternoon, actions were well under way for positioning the assault force of Navy SEALs aboard a Navy ship just out of sight of the Achille Lauro. Four hijackers were not enough to guard hostages, control the crew and the bridge, and maintain a watch over the entire ship. There was every likelihood the SEALs would reach the ship without detection by the terrorists. Come night, they would launch their strike. Once they were aboard, they had no doubt of the outcome.

As the rescue force prepared to strike, events were taking place in Cairo that would make the attack unnecessary.

That evening the Egyptian government announced: "At four-twenty P.M., the hijackers, whose number is four, agreed to surrender without preconditions. They surrendered at five P.M." The statement was soon amplified by the Egyptian Foreign Minister: "The four hijackers have left the ship and are heading out of Egypt." These statements had a subtext: that no harm had been done to any of the passengers. Up until this point, the murder of Leon Klinghoffer had been concealed, based on statements Captain de Rosa had been forced to make over the radio as the liner neared Egypt. "I am the captain," he had said. "I am speaking from my office; and everybody [aboard] is in good health."

As it happened, each of those statements was false. First, the Egyptian government had agreed to preconditions. They had promised the terrorists safe passage out of Egypt. Second, the hijackers were not yet heading out of Egypt, and would not do so until the next day. Finally, the terrorists had blood very much on their hands.

Even before these facts emerged, the Reagan administration was furious. As far as they were concerned, it was a lousy deal. It's not acceptable for terrorists to take Americans hostage and get away with it. In the words of White House spokesman Larry Speakes: "We believe those responsible should be prosecuted to the maximum extent possible."

On Wednesday evening, after the terrorists had left the ship, the truth about the Klinghoffer murder came out when a distraught Captain de Rosa announced to Marilyn Klinghoffer that her husband had been shot and his body dropped overboard. The rickety structure of Egyptian and Italian whitewash and deception was tumbling down.

When Nicholas Veliotes, the U.S. ambassador to Egypt, learned of the murder, he immediately contacted Meguid to insist "that they prosecute those sons of bitches."

Meguid dodged, claiming — once again — that the terrorists were already out of the country, a claim confirmed by President Hosni Mubarak the next day. "The terrorists have already left Egypt," he announced. "1 don't know where they went, but they possibly went to Tunis.

"When we accepted the hijackers' surrender," he continued, "we did not have this information. This information emerged five hours after the surrender. In the meantime, the hijackers had left the country."

This was a lie. The terrorists were then sitting in an Egypt Air 737 at Al Maza air base near Cairo waiting for a place to fly to. Nobody wanted them.

American intelligence was on the ball, however, and had the tail number of the plane—2843.

Late in the evening of October 9, Vice Admiral Moreau informed me that the terrorists had surrendered and left the Achille Lauro. That meant there was no longer a requirement for an assault on the ship, he concluded, and I could begin my redeployment to home bases.

Shortly after that, I ordered Captain "Bob" to prepare for redeployment. Meanwhile, our airlift, which had remained at their dispersal bases since our arrival, began arriving at the Cyprus base; and starting at around 2200 hours, we began a phased redeployment back to home bases.

Standard operating procedure was to deploy and redeploy as combat-configured entities (task forces) should any requirement for our services develop while en route. The planes all stopped in Sigonella to refuel and then proceeded on back to the States.

By the time daylight Thursday was approaching Cyprus, only three aircraft were left — a C-5 and two C-141s. The C-5, loaded with UH-60 Blackhawks, had developed a bad hydraulic leak from a busted hose. It could not retract its main landing gear and was losing an alarming amount of fluid.

The problem was not the leak itself, but the continued presence of the aircraft at "our friends' " base in daylight, where it would be visible to Soviet spy satellites. Two colonels from our host nation were really getting nervous. They could accept a couple C-141s, but the C-5 would attract too much attention and cause political problems. They wanted it gone.

It was a touchy situation.

The only thing I could think to do was to take a look myself to see if I could come up with something that might help. I crawled up into the C-5's wheel well to look at the broken hose, and as soon as I did, I realized that the "Docs" had some surgical tubing that might work. Sure enough, they had a hose that looked about the right diameter, and the pilot, an experienced older Air Force Reserve lieutenant colonel, agreed to fly the plane if we could stop the leak.

He shut the engines down to take the pressure off the hydraulic system. Then he, a mechanic, and I climbed up in the wheel well, and with hydraulic fluid spraying all over us, repaired the hose well enough so the plane could fly with its wheels down.

They took off just at the break of day and flew at low level to Sigonella, where the plane was fixed properly.

WASHINGTON

For all of Thursday, the four hijackers remained at the air base northeast of Cairo, but now they had a destination. They were to be flown to Tunisia (the new location of the PLO headquarters after they'd been forced out of Beirut by the Israelis).

While this drama was playing out in Cairo, a few members of the NSC staff in Washington came up with a brilliant idea. They were aware, from intelligence intercepts, that the Egypt Air aircraft had not yet left the ground. So why not use planes from the aircraft carrier Saratoga, which was nearby in the Mediterranean, to force the plane down at some friendly airport and take the terrorists into U.S. custody?

After some discussion, the NATO base at Sigonella was chosen as the friendly location that would cause the fewest potential problems. Sicily was Italian, and so was the Achille Lauro. After further discussion, it was determined that intercepting a civilian airliner was indeed physically possible. The President was contacted, and Reagan gave his approval.

Meanwhile I was still on the ground on Cyprus with my two C-141s, awaiting darkness so I could launch for home. I had with me my battle staff, my communications (including my low-level intercept capability), and my medical unit, as well as Captain Bob and two of his SEAL platoons — my reaction team, in case anything unforeseen happened en route.

I was just about to launch Bob's C-141, when I received a call from Vice Admiral Moreau, who briefed me on a concept plan — approved in principle by President Reagan — for capturing the terrorists should they be flown from Egypt to Tunisia. "F-14s from the Saratoga will be responsible for intercepting the Egypt Air plane and forcing it down at Sigonella. You are to follow the plane into Sigonella, capture the terrorists, and fly them back to the U.S. in chains to stand trial. Stand by for word to launch in order to link up with the F-14s that will make the intercept." And then by way of conclusion: "The Italian government has given its approval of all this, both for the landing and for our taking the terrorists."

This last proved to be over-hopeful. At this point the Italian government had no idea that we were going to do anything of the kind, and it's doubtful that they would have approved it if they had known. The mistake was a screwup — a mixed-up communication somewhere along the line. But as it turned out, it was a welcome failure, since it afforded an opportunity to capture the terrorists who had hijacked the ship and killed Leon Klinghoffer.

After my conversation with Art Moreau, I walked over to brief Bob and his men. The first thing I noticed was the look of disappointment on all their faces — disappointment that they'd missed the opportunity to conduct the ship assault and deal appropriately with the criminals who had brutally killed an American. But as soon as I got to the part of my briefing that said we had another opportunity to capture the terrorists, several of the SEALs began forcing themselves to puke out the sleeping pills they had taken so they could sleep on the way home. they were ready for the new mission.

THE INTERCEPT

A secure — and urgent — call came to Rear Admiral Dave Jeremiah on the USS Saratoga from 6th Fleet headquarters. They were to change course and prepare to launch what was called their "alert CAP" (the Combat Air Patrol consisted of two F-14 Tomcat interceptors and an E-2C Hawkeye radar plane, which would direct the fighters). Though the Saratoga's captain had no idea what was going on, or why they were changing course, he couldn't miss the 6th Fleet's urgency, and he launched the alert CAP.

At 7:10 P.M., local time, an F-14 took off, soon followed by an E-2C radar plane. Moments later, the mission came through: "To intercept and divert to Sigonella, Sicil, a Boeing 737 charter with the Achille Lauro hijackers on board now en route from Cairo to Tunis." More F-14s were launched. Eventually, six of them (supported by aerial tankers) made a fence over the Mediterranean between Crete and Egypt.

As I was preparing to launch from Cyprus with my two C-141s shortly after the F-14s had launched, shit once again happened: The pilot informed me that one of the engines on my plane would not start. It was probably a "glow plug" problem, he told me.

"How many glow plugs are in an engine?" I asked the mechanic (we always carried a mechanic on special operations missions as part of the crew). "And how many does it take to start it?"

"There are six per engine," I recall him saying, "but it only takes one good one to start an engine."

"So why can't we take one or two from a good engine and put them in the failed engine to get it going?" I asked.

"We can give it a try," he said.

Four or five of us then deplaned to give the mechanic a hand removing and replacing the engine cowlings, while the mechanic transferred the "glow plugs." This took about thirty minutes.

Now the engine was ready to go. However, because the earlier attempts to start it had "loaded it up" with fuel, the mechanic was concerned about chances of a fire. "Now let's get everybody off the plane," he announced, "and get ready for the fireball if it starts." Everybody quickly deplaned, and the mechanic gave the pilot the signal. The three good engines were started, and then the failed engine was given a try. Nothing happened for maybe thirty seconds, and then some smoke came, and then all of a sudden a flame jetted out as far as the tail of the airplane — or at least that was how it seemed. The pilot smiled and gave a thumbs-up to all of us outside, then we quickly reboarded the aircraft.

After launch, we remained in radio contact with the E-2C, so as not to interfere with the intercept operation. Flying time from Cyprus to Sigonella was about three or four hours.

Back in the United States, at 4:37 P.M., Washington time, President Reagan directed Defense Secretary Weinberger to intercept the plane and its hijackers.

"National Command Authority" is two men, the President and the Secretary of Defense, who is second to the President in control of the armed forces. This means command authority passes through the Defense Secretary on the way down to, say, the 6th Fleet

Weinberger called the Pentagon and gave the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Crowe, the okay to proceed.

Meanwhile, the E-2C watched for the Egypt Air 737. When they picked out likely contacts flying the route from Cairo to Tunis, F-14s then had to check the tail numbers. Around midnight, they began checking out possible radar contacts.

The first two blacked-out aircraft they examined turned out American C- 141 transport planes — our team on the way to Sigonella.

The F-14s intercepted their target two tries later — tail number 2843. A pair of F-14s with lights out now flew, one on each of the commercial aircraft's wingtips. The crew and passengers of the Egypt Air plane were in total ignorance that they'd been bracketed by U.S. fighters.

The formation proceeded westward. No problem. That was where the Americans wanted them to go — for the time being.

Meanwhile, the State Department had asked the Tunisian government to deny the Egyptians permission to land, and the Tunisians had agreed. When the Egyptians tried Athens, they again got a negative response. Their only recourse was to return to Cairo, and Cairo control had to comply with their request.

At this point, the Egyptian pilots got a surprise: "2843, this is Tigertail 603. Over," the E-2C Hawkeye radioed. The Egyptians did not reply.

The Hawkeye repeated: "2843. Tigertail 603." It took four tries before the Egyptians got nerve enough to acknowledge.

"Tigertail 603. Egypt Air 2843. Go ahead."

"Egypt Air 2843. Tigertail 603. Be advised you're being escorted by two F-14s. You are to land immediately… immediately… at Sigonella, Sicily Over."

This can't he, the Egyptian had to be thinking. "Say again. Who is calling?"

"Roger. this is Tigertail 603. I advise you are directed to land immediately, proceed immediately to Sigonella, Sicily. You are being escorted by two interceptor aircraft. Vector 280 for Sigonella, Sicily Over."

"Repeat again," the Egyptian requested.

The E-2C complied: "You are to turn immediately to 280. Head 280 immediately."

The Egyptian had no choice. "Turning right, heading 280."

The F-14s had by then switched on their running lights, and the Egyptian had realized that they were only a few feet from each of his wingtips. "I'm saying you are too close. I'm following your orders. Don't be too close. Please."

"Okay, we'll move away a little bit," the Hawkeye answered (he was actually a hundred miles off). And the F-14s edged away a little. It was time for a change anyway, since the F-14s were too short-ranged to escort the 737 all the way to Sigonella. Soon, these E-14s were replaced by three others, who were to take the Egyptian airliner to Sicily.

AT Sigonella, Bill Spearman was in his office in gym shorts. He'd been playing racquetball when he got word that I needed to talk to him.

"Bill, it's coming," I told him. "You arc the only one that's going to know about it, and you're going to make it happen. We are coming to your location with an Egyptian 737 with the terrorists aboard, followed immediately by my two C-141 s. Get hold of my people that I left there and tell them that I want the 737 to clear the runway immediately, for I will be landing blacked out seconds behind it. Tell them to block and hold that 737 and don't let anybody off or on. When I get there I'll take charge. Also, Bill, I want you to make sure that we are granted permission to land and that the Italians don't try to block us."

Spearman then went to brief the Italian base commander, Colonel Annicchiarici. As it happened, this was Annicchiarici's last day on the job. The next day, a lot of Italian brass would be on hand for his change-of-command ceremony, including an army three-star. Annicchiarici was not especially pleased at the going-away present that we had dropped on his lap; but it thankfully didn't take him long to realize that his friend Bill Spearman had been as much in the dark about it as he was.

"Beel, if you were in uniform, I would have known that you knew about this all along," Annicchiarici told him when he learned about the Egypt Air plane, "but since you are in your shorts, I believe that you didn't know anything about it either."

At about midnight, Italian Prime Minister Craxi received a telephone call from the White House, informing him, in his words "that U.S. military aircraft had intercepted an Egyptian civil aircraft which the U.S. government believed with a reasonable degree of certainty to be carrying the four Palestinians responsible for the hijacking of the Achille Lauro. The U.S. President asked the Italian government for its consent to proceed with the landing of the civil and U.S. military aircraft at Sigonella." They were hoping that the Italians would not want the hijackers and would get themselves off the hook by agreeing to let the Americans take them.

And in fact, Craxi was not pleased to learn that he was on the hook. He wanted the whole terrorist situation as far from Italy as possible.

Craxi didn't know what to do. So he decided to punt. The Egypt Air 737 would be allowed to land at Sigonella base.

Shortly after midnight, my pilot informed me that if things continued to go as planned, we'd be on the ground at Sigonella in about an hour.

I called the Pentagon to give an update and to verify that my mission was to take the terrorists off the plane, place them in chains, and fly them back to the United States to stand trial. (I never could figure out the "bring them back in chains" part. In the first place, I didn't have any chains except for "cargo tie-down chains" on the C-141, and I had already decided that I would put the terrorists on the plane with Captain "Bob" and his two SEAL platoons. 1 couldn't think of anything more secure than that.)

By this time the Chairman and the service chiefs had assembled in a small conference room in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon and were listening to my radio traffic.

Vice Admiral Moreau answered my call.

"We should be on the ground at Sigonella in about an hour," I told him. "The SEAL detachment that I left behind at Sigonella will set the trap and hold the plane until 1 get to it."

"Your mission is as stated," Moreau replied. "And the Italian government has agreed that you can take the terrorists."

"Roger," I said. "Then we shouldn't be on the ground long. My goal is to have everything out of here before daylight."

Craxi's okay did not in fact make much of a difference — except later for official purposes. Admiral Crowe had already directed Jeremiah to bring Egypt Air 2842 into Sigonella whether the Italians liked it or not.

In any event, Craxi's approval did not reach Italian airport approach control at Sigonella, who wanted no part of what was going down. They refused the F-14s permission to land, and told them to go to a civilian airfield nearby.

The Navy squadron commander tried one more time, but directed the Egyptian to follow him in — permission or no. Together, they began their descent toward Sigonella. Approach control's answer was again no.

At this point, the commander used the old pilots' trick. He switched his transponder to emergency mode, declared a fuel emergency (though he had plenty of fuel left), and brought the Egyptian airliner into its final approach. The trouble was, the Egyptian was coming in too low.

The commander told the Egyptian to break off his approach, which he did. He then circled around to try again.

Meanwhile, in the Sigonella tower, a Navy lieutenant pushed the Italian controller out of the way, took the mike, and radioed the Egyptian permission to land.

Once the Egypt Air plane was safely on the runway, the F-14s took aerial photos of the plane and headed back to the carrier — their part of the operation now complete.

My team took over from there.

SIGONELLA

As the Egypt Air plane rolled down the main runway to a taxiway at the end, where it was directed to stop, the SEALs who had remained at Sigonella raced to meet it in pickup trucks and set up a perimeter around it.

Soon after that, my two C-141 s landed, with lights out, and stopped on the active runway where the Egypt Air had pulled off. Moments later, we added the men on the C-141 s to the SEALs already surrounding Egypt Air 2843.

On the way to Sigonella, Captain Bob and I had been in constant contact, planning and coordinating what his SEALs had to do in order to secure the Egyptian plane and take control of the terrorists.

One of the two team leaders, Lieutenant "Bo," was to assemble his assault team off the tarmac behind the 737, and be prepared to assault the plane on order, should a takedown become necessary.

Lieutenant "Randy" was to establish a security perimeter around the plane, but outside the security already being provided by the team we had previously dropped off in Sigonella.

Bob also placed his snipers in firing positions where they could see what was happening inside the plane,

By about 2:00 A.M., Friday, October 11, Bob and I had established our command post under the tail of the plane. When I looked, I could see lights on inside and a couple people walking around.

Bob and I went to the nose of the 737 and plugged into the intercom jack. I identified myself and asked the pilot who he had on board. IIe did not answer.

"If you don't cooperate, we'll find out one way or another," I told him.

That brought an answer. "I have my crew and an 'ambassador' on board," the pilot said, leaving open the possibility that there may be additional people on the plane.

"Then come down off the plane," I told him. "And bring the ambassador with you."

Before they opened the door, Bob told me that his snipers were reporting armed men in uniform. "No sweat, boss," he told me. "They've got them in their sights."

The door opened and the pilot, followed by the "ambassador," came down the ladder. They were both very nervous, particularly the "ambassador." They got even more nervous when they saw the SEAL shooters, all in black combat gear and equipped for business.

I was very suspicious of the "ambassador." Although he was dressed in a business suit, I figured him for a general officer, perhaps from the Egyptian Intelligence Service, who had been sent along to ensure that everything went right in Tunisia.

When I met him, the "ambassador" produced an authentic-looking diplomatic passport and a letter claiming he was an authorized representative of the Egyptian government.

"My orders are to take the terrorists off the plane and fly them back to the U.S. to stand trial for killing Leon Klinghoffcr," T told him.

This seemed to make him even more nervous, and he asked if anybody had an aspirin.

"We can handle that," I said.

In the air on the way to Sigonella, I'd felt a headache coming on. By then it was October 11, and none of us had had more than a couple of hours sleep since October 7. When I'd asked our team doctor for a couple of aspirin, Darrel had stuffed what felt like a handfull of aspirin into my pocket.

I accommodated the ambassador with about half of what I had, and he gulped down several of them. He then asked for a cigarette, and one of my radio operators satisfied that request. At that point he wanted to make an urgent telephone call. I told him we would escort him over to base operations (Bill Spearman's operations center) and assist him with his call.

As he was escorted to the operations center, I sent one of my intelligence officers along with a couple of our people to tap the phone. They were to stay with him as long as necessary, and keep me posted on what they were hearing.

The person he needed to talk to so urgently, as it turned out, was Abdel Meguid, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, to whom he described the terrible situation he was in and asked for guidance.

"You'll just have to sort things out as best you can," he was told, "until a decision about what to do can be reached."

He stayed on the phone most of the day with various people back in Egypt — remaining very concerned about the uncertainty of the predicament they were in. But he was even more worried about the consequences that could result from the high-level passengers they had on board (who weren't identified at this point, but it was clear he wasn't talking about the terrorists).

The intelligence information from his conversations was relayed to me, and proved very useful later.

Once we had the pilot and the ambassador off the plane, I decided to go aboard myself, accompanied by SEAL Lieutenant Commander "Pat," and see who was on it.

Inside, the plane had been configured in a VIP executive mode, with three "working tables." At one table on the far side of the plane sat the four terrorists, unarmed and easy to identify. Three of them appeared to be in their twenties, and one looked to be a little younger. Next to them at another table sat eight to ten members of Egypt's counterterrorist force (Force 777), all of them in uniform and all armed with automatic pistols. At another table on the right sat two men in civilian clothes — evidently big shots. One was very Arab in appearance and very tough-looking. The other was younger, redheaded and freckle-faced, and resembled no ethnic group in the region that was familiar to me. There also were the copilot, the navigator, and about four other crew members.

Although they were armed, I did not consider the 777 guards to be a threat. As it happened, we had trained the 777 Force a few years back, but we knew they had not kept up their proficiency, and now they found themselves at the mercy of those who had trained them — the best in the world. And they knew it.

After we had looked around, Pat and I left the plane.

Back at my command post beneath the tail of the plane, I was joined by Colonel "Frank" and several members of the battle staff who would add their brains and experience to mine. Bob also positioned his executive officer, Commander "Tom," with "Frank." Those two were capable of handling anything.

Meanwhile, Bob was firmly in command of security. I told Frank to manage the door and keep an eye on those still inside the plane.

About fifteen minutes after we landed and took control of the plane, Italian troops of all kinds began showing up and taking up positions outside of our positions — Army troops, Carabinieri (police), and even young green conscripts with World War II weapons (the same bunch had recently been in Bill Spearman's motor pool, shooting at birds). The whole affair was kind of comical. They were showing up in anything available to carry them — pickup trucks, motor bikes, cars, and even three-wheeled construction carts with five or six guys in their dump buckets.

The sudden appearance of armed American forces taking over part of his base had so astonished Colonel Annicchiarici, that he'd decided he had to do something. He immediately ordered his own troops into action.

About the same time, a couple Italian officers showed up and tried to board the plane, to see who was on it, but were turned away by Frank and Tom.

So this was the situation not too long after midnight on Friday, October 11:

We had the plane surrounded with two rings of about eighty to ninety heavily armed shooters and snipers positioned at strategic locations. However, the outer ring of our security was now directly facing the Italians — eyeball to eyeball. Though I figured they had us outnumbered by about three to one, I wasn't worried about them taking us on. They knew better than that. However, I was concerned that something unanticipated, like a vehicle backfiring, could cause one of their young, jumpy troops to open fire. If that happened, several people would die, mainly Italians.

About this time, Bill Spearman showed up at the plane with Colonel Annicchiarici, followed soon after that by an Italian Army three-star (whose name I do not recall), who had come to officiate at the change of command. As it soon turned out, we were lucky to have the three-star there. He was friendly and intelligent, and did what he could to help the two sides — his and ours — navigate a difficult situation. Over the next twenty-four hours, the two of us came to work closely together to sort out this complex situation.

After we'd been introduced, I explained our mission and my understanding of the Italian government's position — that is, that they had agreed to turn the terrorists over to us.

"If it were up to me," he replied, "I would give them to you in a minute. But I have received no word to this effect, and you must understand where that leaves me."

"Maybe the word just hadn't gotten down to you yet," I told him. "How about you going back up the tape to check, while I check with my ambassador in Rome?"

He agreed.

I contacted my liasion officer and told him to get Ambassador Rabb on the horn. When Ambassador Rabb came on the radio five minutes later, I explained that we had forced the Egyptian airliner down at Sigonella with the four terrorists on board and that my orders were to take the terrorists and fly them back to the States to stand trial, and it was my understanding that the Italian government had agreed to turn them over to me.

"You've done what?" he blurted, taken aback. I could tell from his reaction that he didn't know anything about any part of this. But he said he

About fifteen minutes later, the Italian lieutenant general returned. "I have gone all the way back to the Minister of Defense," he said, "and no one knows about any such agreement.

"You must understand," he added, "that it was an Italian ship that was hijacked, and this is Italian soil, with Italian jurisdiction. And we just can't afford to turn them over."

"Let me check with Washington to see if there is a misunderstanding."

Still standing by the plane, with the Italian three-star close by, I made another call to the Pentagon. I don't recall who answered, but it sounded like Admiral Moreau, and I knew that all the chiefs were listening.

"I want to bring you up to speed and to reverify my mission," I said. "Here is the situation: We have the plane. I have verified that the four terrorists are on board, along with eight to ten armed guards from the 777 Force, which I do not consider a threat. Also there are two other men, one a tough-looking Arab in his mid-forties, who has to be important, and a younger redheaded, freckled-face guy sitting at a table with him. We have not been able to identify these two. I have already taken the pilot off the plane, along with another individual who claims to be an ambassador. He is now calling back to Egypt and we are monitoring his phone conversations. Mostly he is requesting guidance to deal with the terrible situation they have ended up in.

"The Italian base commander here at Sigonella felt that he had to react," I continued. "I think more to save face than anything else. In my estimation, they have positioned about three hundred or so troops in a perimeter around us. We are eyeball to eyeball. I have an Italian three-star with me. He has called all the way back to his Ministry of Defense and can find no one with any knowledge of an agreement to turn over the terrorists to us. I have also talked to Ambassador Rabb, and he has no knowledge of such an agreement.

"I am not worried about our situation. We have the firepower to prevail. But I am concerned about the immaturity of the Italian troops, some of whom arc green conscripts, as well as the absence of anybody with the ability to control them in this tense situation. A backfire from a motorbike or construction cart could precipitate a shooting incident that could lead to a lot of Italian casualties. And I don't believe that our beef is with our ally, the Italians, but rather with the terrorists.

"Now with this picture, I just want to reverify that my mission is to take the terrorists off the plane and bring them back to the U.S."

After I finished, I got a "wait out."

About five minutes later, a response came — I thought from Secretary Weinberger, but it could have been Admiral Crowe, since I had never heard his voice over SATCOM: "You are the ranking American on the scene, and you do what you think is right."

I "rogered" the message. Which was exactly what I wanted to hear. It gave me the latitude to do what I thought would turn out best.

By this time it was about 4:00 A.M. We had been on the ground now for approximately two hours, trying to sort this mess out. During that time, I had occasionally overheard discussions between Italian officers, including some disagreements. There were apparently questions about which "magistrates" (judges) ought to have jurisdiction over the terrorists. The Italian justice system was complex, and there'd be plenty of magistrates involved, all with differing responsibilities. This could conceivably further complicate a conclusion that would be in the best interest of the United States.

After listening to all this for a while, and doing some thinking on my own, I'd come to my main conclusion: No matter how complex the Italian justice system was, and how many magistrates would be involved, we had to somehow find a way to fix responsibility for prosecuting the terrorists on the shoulders of the Italian government. We needed to find a way to hold their feet to the fire inescapably.

A little later, a way to do that came to me.

About that time, my counterpart, the Italian three-star, and I moved the short distance to the base commander's office, which was where he had to make his calls anyhow, to find a more suitable place to discuss the issues at hand.

When we got there, I made a proposal that I thought would be in the best interest of both governments. "The first thing we've got to do," I told him, "is un-mingle the troops, to minimize the possibility of a shooting incident between the United States and Italy that could leave a lot of dead or wounded Italians lying on this tarmac when the sun comes up — a situation you and 1 must avoid.

"Once we have done that, I will take the Force 777 guards off the plane, disarm them, and take them to a secure holding area. Then we will take the rest of the air crew off, leaving only the terrorists and the two unidentified individuals on the plane.

"Once that's done, 1 will reduce our security force to a minimum visible presence around the plane.

"Come daylight, you or whoever you designate can enter the plane and take the remainder off one at a time. Then, you, along with a two-man detail that I provide, will take them to whatever location the district attorney designates for charging and lock up; and we will assist in verification/identification." What I had in mind was to fly in some of the former hostages from Egypt and put the terrorists before a lineup, but I didn't spring this on the lieutenant general until later.

The lieutenant general seemed to like that idea and, with a nod of his head, asked for a few minutes to discuss the proposal with his higher-ups. He picked up the phone, and then about fifteen minutes later told me that the proposal was agreeable.

Soon after that, he ordered the Italian troops surrounding the aircraft to withdraw, and judging from their reaction, they were relieved to do so. But it was good to see that they left with no animosity.

Meanwille, the White House was calling Craxi again: The President felt strongly about bringing the terrorists to justice, the Italian was told.

The Italian prime minister claimed that he personally had no problem giving the hijackers up to the Americans; but this was an Italian legal matter, and Italian courts had jurisdiction.

During the next hour, we disarmed the 777 Force guards, removed them from the plane, and took them to a holding place where they could get some food and rest (under armed escort). Next, the power was shut down on the plane, and the crew was removed and reunited with the captain elsewhere on the base.

This left only the four terrorists and the two unidentified individuals on the plane.

At this point, in order to lower the anxiety level of the Italians, we reduced our guard force around the plane to six visible SEALs, but a reaction force remained nearby, if needed.

At daybreak, Colonel Annicchiarici, accompanied by several armed guards and a paddy wagon, showed up with the Egyptian "ambassador." The colonel and the ambassador boarded the plane, and after maybe two hours of negotiations, they persuaded the four hijackers to surrender. They were loaded in the paddy wagon and placed in a military jail at the air base. Later, they were taken downtown and arraigned before the local Italian district attorney.

The two remaining unidentified men, however, were by this time claiming diplomatic immunity as PLO envoys, and refused to leave the plane. The tough looking one was carrying an Iraqi diplomatic passport with a name on it that 1 forget, but we suspected — and could not yet positively prove — that he was the terrorist mastermind, Abu Abbas. The other one, the redhead, turned out to be the political officer of the Cairo PLO office — a functionary (as we later found out) by the name of Hassan.

If Abbas actually turned out to be on the plane, and we could bring him to trial, we would have achieved a far more significant victory in the war against terrorism than just grabbing the four hijackers. He was the mastermind and organizer; they were nothing but hit men.

Unfortunately, we had not yet identified him, and more important, he was on Italian soil. Prime Minister Craxi wanted no part in bringing Abbas to justice. The Italian prime minister stonewalled. His intention all along was to get Abbas out of Italy as fast as an aircraft could be found to carry him and a safe haven could be found to take him in (this last came from a source inside the Italian government).

Meanwhile, positively confirming whether or not the tough-looking Palestinian was Abbas became our priority. We did this using photos that the Agency sent us over SATCOM — a fairly recent technology that our people had developed.

Before we'd had this technology, photographs and additional maps had had to be flown to us at night out of Washington (or wherever) by special courier flight. Even after engineers in the corporate electronics industry had told us time and again that it couldn't be done earlier that year, a young army captain had designed the circuitry and all the necessary systems for a device that would let us send pictures and drawings over SATCOM. Captain "Rich" was at the time assigned to the our Intelligence Directorate, and he was one of the smartest and hardest-working young officers I have ever known.

After the captain[23] designed the system, which we called "PIRATE," industry built us two of them. We gave one to the Agency, and we had the other one with us.

By means of PIRATE, the Agency sent us the photographs of Palestinian leaders. And these permitted us to positively identify our guy as Abu Abbas.

Now that the terrorists were in Italian custody, I decided it was a good time to reduce our signature. It was daylight now and the press had begun to show up outside the fence with their long telephoto lenses. For that reason, I told Captain Bob and his SEALs that they were released to head back to home base.

They launched at 0900 hours, feeling good about themselves and their accomplishments in the war against terrorism.

Meanwhile, 1 stayed behind with my assault CP and a few other essential personnel in order to see this thing through to a "satisfactory" ending.

ABBAS AND HASSAN

During the standoff between American and Italian troops, Italian officials had contacted the Egyptian Ambassador to Rome, Ychia Rifaat, stating that Italy intended to take custody of the four hijackers and prosecute them, and that the two PLO representatives would have to leave the plane and furnish testimony.

In response to this, the Egyptian government agreed to the handing over of the four hijackers to Italian judicial authorities. But the disposition of the two PLO emissaries was another thing again. The Palestinians, the Egyptians announced, were covered by diplomatic immunity; they had been brought to Sigonella against their will, and they had no intention of getting off the plane. In fact, the Egyptian government argued, the plane itself was on a special governmental mission, and benefited from diplomatic immunity under international law. As long as the two Palestinians remained aboard, they were on Egyptian territory, and the Egyptian government declared it was prepared to "defend, if necessary, the inviolability of the plane with arms."

Finally, at about 0900 on Friday, October 11, Ambassador Rifaat delivered a formal diplomatic note, in which the Egyptian government sought a clarification of the legal status of the Egypt Air plane and its occupants, and requested that the plane be allowed to leave Sigonella immediately, along with all its remaining passengers.

About 10:00 that same morning, a small brown executive jet landed and parked at the end of the runway near the Egypt Air 737. Two well-dressed middle-age men deplaned and approached the 737. One claimed to be from Rome representing the Italian government. The other, probably an Arab, never spoke. After their credentials were confirmed by my Italian three-star counterpart (he told me they were both from the Italian government), we agreed to let them board the plane to talk to the two Palestinians (no one was yet admitting that they were in fact Abbas and Hassan), and they remained there for about an hour before returning to their plane and departing.

I didn't actually buy the story they gave me. Their behavior made me suspicious that they were somehow going to try to smuggle Abu Abbas and Hassan out of Sigonella, and perhaps out of Italy. This would confirm what I'd already learned from my Italian three-star counterpart, who'd dropped pretty clear indications from time to time that the Italian government was trying to find an easy, no-pain way out of the dilemma they felt they were in.

I called Vice Admiral Moreau, explained my concerns, and asked if he could find a Navy T-39, which is a small, executive-type jet, from somewhere nearby and send it to me so we could follow them, should my fears turn out to be accurate.

I had already selected four of my best people for my "chase team" — Lieutenant Colonel "Dick," Major "Johnny," Command Sergeant Major "Rick," and one of our best SATCOM radio operators — when at about 2:00 P.M., a pair of Navy lieutenants showed up saying that their squadron, VR 24, located on Sigonella, had been tapped for the mission, and they were my pilots, reporting for instructions.

"Where's your plane?"

"In the hangar, sir," they answered, "at the end of the taxiway."

I joined the two pilots up with the four on my chase team. "What I want you to do," I told all six of them, "is to get the jet ready to launch on very short notice, but keep it hidden. Then I want you to sit in it and wait for my instructions. If they try to smuggle Abbas out of country by plane, you're to launch immediately, tuck right up under its tail, and follow it to wherever it goes. Your mission is not to recapture Abbas, but just to report to me. I'll tell you what to do."

Meanwhile, I had continued my internal debate about the best way to pin responsibility on the Italians for bringing the terrorists to trial so that they could not wriggle out of it and strict justice would be done. The moment had come, I felt, to recommend to my Italian three-star counterpart that we fly the American hostages in from Cairo (they were then at the American Embassy). Once they were here, we'd set up a lineup under the close watch of whatever magistrates had responsibility, and let the hostages identify the terrorists.

"This should be possible," he told me. "And perhaps it's a good idea."

"Then would you contact the local district attorney and set this up sometime later in the evening?" I asked. "And I'll work on getting an airplane to bring the hostages here."

About an hour later, he reported that the district attorney had agreed to my proposal, but would like a two-hour notice to arrange the lineup in the presence of the magistrates.

I then called Vice Admiral Moreau to ask for a C-141 to bring the American hostages to Sigonella. I also pointed out to him how important it was for the hostages to positively identify the terrorists before the magistrates who would have ultimate responsibility for their trials.

"That's a good idea," he said. "I'll work it and get back to you."

Just before dusk, the executive jet returned, taxied to the end of the runway, turned around, and stopped, but kept its engines running and its landing lights on. The two men I'd met before got off the plane, approached the 737, and again asked permission to board. They stayed on board for half an hour, then took off again.

All of this strengthened my suspicion that someone was setting up the machinery to get Abu Abbas and his partner out of the country.

Shortly after dark, the Italian base commander, the Egyptian "ambassador," and the Egypt Air crew showed up at the 737. Twenty minutes later a panel truck arrived with the Egyptian 777 guard force. At about 9:30 P.M., the 737's engines were started. At the same time, the Italians began to move trucks and construction equipment to block the entrances to the main runway. The only one they left open was the one the 737 would travel.

I called the Navy T-39. "Get ready," I told them. "The 737 has cranked up. It will probably make a dash for the runway very soon."

At about 9:50 P.M., the Egyptian 737 turned around and headed toward the end of the active runway. He began his takeoff run at about 10:00 P.M.

The T-39 began his own takeoff run at the same time. Since access to the main runway was blocked, the T-39 took off down the taxiway, which paralleled the main runway; and the two aircraft passed each other going in opposite directions, with Italian officers diving in the ditches as the T-39 roared over their heads.

Just after liftoff, the T-39 made a hard right turn and took up its trail position as I'd instructed.

Meanwhile, the Italians launched four jet interceptors from another base to try to drive the T-39 off and escort the 737 to its destination. Some very heated conversations took place between the interceptor pilots and the T- 39 crew, but to no avail. The T-39 crew continued their mission.

The Egyptian 737 flew to Fuciamo Airport, an auxiliary field next to Rome's main international airport, Leonardo da Vinci.

When permission to land the T-39 was denied, the T-39 pilots declared a tactical emergency and set down right behind the Egyptian 737. The Egyptian 737 taxied to a position near the VIP lounge, and the T-39 parked beside it. Abu Abbas and his companion exited the plane and went inside. About an hour later, they emerged, dressed in Italian air force officers' flight suits, and boarded a waiting Yugoslav civilian airliner which had been delayed for a scheduled flight to Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

Meanwhile, Ambassador Rabb had presented the Italian government with a request for the arrest of Abbas preparatory to his extradition. Craxi continued to stonewall. This request, he said, "did not, in the Justice Minister's opinion, satisfy the factual and substantive requirements laid down by Italian law…. This being so, there was no longer any legal basis… [for] detaining Abbas, since at the time he was on board an aircraft which enjoyed extraterritorial status."

Shortly after the plane took off for Belgrade, Ambassador Rabb arrived at the Chigi Palace, the official residence of the Italian Prime Minister, to protest the release of Abbas. As he left, Rabb told reporters, "I'm not happy about what happened here today."

The State Department scrambled to prepare another extradition request for Yugoslavia; it was actually delivered before Abbas landed in Belgrade. But it was a lost cause. Yugoslavia had diplomatic relations with the PLO, and Abbas, as a member of the PLO's executive council, enjoyed diplomatic immunity. Two days later Abbas flew on to Aden, South Yemen, and from there to Baghdad.

At about 11:00 P.M. October 11, a C-141 from Cairo landed, with twelve American hostages aboard. We took five of them, including Marilyn Klinghoffer, to the jail downtown; the others remained in the VIP lounge. At the jail, the district attorney had arranged a very professional lineup (with magistrates present, as well as my Italian three-star counterpart). The five Americans positively and without hesitation identified the four terrorists as the ones who had hijacked the ship.

When the time came for Marilyn Klinghoffer to take a close look at Majiad al-Molqi, she spat in his face, then turned to me. "Let me have your pistol," she told me, her voice cold with rage. "I want to shoot him."

"I know how you feel," I told her. "I'd want to do the same thing. But you have to understand that it would only further complicate matters. It's best to let the Italian courts handle this thing in the appropriate way."

She looked at me and said, "It hurts, but I guess you are right. Please pass my thanks to all your troops for what they have done for us."

At about midnight, I took the hostages back to their C-141, which was waiting with its engines running, and prepared to launch.

In the meantime, all our people who'd remained behind with me had loaded my C-141, and were also prepared to launch… except we couldn't go anywhere. The Italians had blocked the plane with construction equipment.

Meanwhile, I went over to the plane that would carry the hostages home, to say "goodbye." While 1 was there, the lieutenant general arrived.

After thanking him for his cooperation, I told him, "In my judgment, we've together been able to bring about the best possible ending for this complex incident.

"Shortly," I also told him, "the hostages will be taking off for the United States, and I plan to be about thirty seconds behind them."

He then looked me straight in the eyes and said, "We have decided that you're not going anywhere."

"What do you mean by that?" I said.

"You have created all this mess, and we just can't let you fly away from it."

1 looked him in the eye. "Did you bring along clean underwear and a shaving kit?" I asked.

"No, why?"

"Then I hope the ones you're wearing are clean, because if you don't unblock my plane, you arc getting ready to take a free ride to the United States — with me."

He looked at me for a moment, smiled, and then said, "Good luck, my friend."

Moments later, on his order, the construction equipment that blocked my plane was removed, and we took off, following the C-141 carrying the hostages.

It was a new day, Saturday, October 12, 1985.

For all of us in the JSOTF, as well as the Navy participants (Rear Admiral Dave Jeremiah, his staff, and all the crews of the USS Saratoga), things had gone very well. They had all done an outstanding job, with utmost proficiency and professional competence. We had been able to bring about a successful conclusion to a very complex and high-stakes situation.

When we landed back at Pope Air Force Base, my aide handed me a card, which indicated that although this was only the twelfth of October, we had already been on the road for 154 days that year, had been in fifteen different countries, and had flown 197,000 miles. Some of these missions had gone well, others had been frustrating; but all of them had been rewarding learning experiences in the war against terrorism, and many close relationships had been developed with our allies.

I was amused to learn later that warrants for my arrest had been issued by both Italy and Egypt. However, for the next two years I continued to travel on missions through both countries, usually in a plain flight suit, without ever being questioned or delayed.

In fact, forty-one days after the Achille Lauro incident, we found ourselves back in Sigonella again to deal with an Egyptian Air flight that had been hijacked to Malta.

On this mission I remained in constant radio contact with Major General Robert Weigand, who was stationed in Egypt and was accompanying the Egyptian 777 Force on an Egyptian C-130 to Malta to undertake a rescue operation for the hostages on the Egypt airliner. Bob had told me that the Egyptians had requested our assistance in breaching the airliner.

While we were readying our helicopters for assisting the Egyptians, Captain Bill Spearman showed up and said, "Your friends want to see you down at the airfield VIP lounge."

"What friends?" I said.

"Your Italian friends."

"Bill," 1 told him, "I don't have time to fool with them. We've got a hijacking to contend with, and the Egyptians need our assistance."

"You've got to go meet with them," he insisted.

We went back and forth for a few more minutes, until I finally consented to go with him, but only for ten minutes.

And since I was uncertain about their mood, 1 decided to take along a couple Special Forces escorts for company.

When I walked into the lounge, four or five Italian senior officers (though not my three-star friend) jumped up and said, "Welcome back! We knew you were coming!"

"How did you know that?"

"Because your plane used the same call sign as last time," they said, smiling.

My concerns turned out to be far misplaced. The get-together was very jovial.

And then, as I was leaving, the Italians announced, "We thought the operation with the ship went well; it was the politicians that screwed things up."

Unfortunately, after readying a Blackhawk and two of our best breachers for the flight to Malta, it turned out we were not able to assist the Egyptians.

We learned later that a Libyan employee in the control tower at Malta had convinced the Maltese to stipulate that assistance could only be flown in by an Italian helicopter, knowing full well the time it would take to get clearance for such a mission from Rome. The Egyptians, meanwhile, went ahead with the operation. In the process, they used far more explosives than were necessary, resulting in the death of sixty passengers, making it the bloodiest hijacking up to that time.

CONSEQUENCES

My earlier fears about the capacity and responsiveness of the Italian judicial system proved to be misplaced. The Italian judicial authorities not only quickly brought the hijackers to trial, they widened their investigation, and were able to identify many others involved in the conspiracy that led to the hijacking of the Achille Lauro. The investigation was completed in record time and the cases were brought to trial before the Genoa Assize Court in 1986.

The following received sentences as indicated.

PLO officials deemed ultimately responsible:

• Abu Abbas: life in absentia

• Ozzudin Badrakham (a PLO accomplice): life in absentia

• Ziad el-Omar (a PLO accomplice): life in absentia

HIJACKERS

• Magied al-Molqi: thirty years

• Ibrahim Abdel Atif: twenty-four years

• Ahmed al-Hassan: fifteen years

• Abdullah Ali-Hammad: charges dropped; he was a minor at the time

ACCOMPLICES

• Youssef Saad: six years (for furnishing funds and weapons)

• Abdul Rahim Khalid: seven years (for furnishing funds and weapons)

• Mohammed Issa Abbas: six months, added to an existing seven years (for possession of weapons and explosives)

• Said Candura: eight months (for possession of forged passports)

Some years later, before I left active duty as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command, my wife, Sue, and I were invited to Egypt by the Egyptian Minister of Defense on behalf of President Mubarak. They invited me to review Egyptian special-operations capabilities and the assistance the United States could provide Egyptian forces in dealing with the terrorist threat then causing internal problems — terrorist attacks on tourist buses, bombings, and the like.

We could not have been treated better, and the follow-up to that visit has been beneficial to both countries.