Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces

From JSOTF, Carl Stiner moved on to command the 82d Airborne Division, and from there, now a lieutenant general, he moved up to command the XVIII Airborne Corps — the Army's quick response force: Its lead elements could be "wheels-up" within eighteen hours to go anywhere in the world. At the time, the Corps contained four divisions, two separate combat brigades, and an armored cavalry regiment: The 82nd Airborne Division, 101st Air Assault Division, 10th Mountain Division, 24th Mechanized Division, the 194th Armor Brigade, the 197th Infantry Brigade, and the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment.

On August 5, 1989, while evaluating the 28th Infantry Division at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, during the division's annual summer training, Stiner took an afternoon off to fly to Fort Monroe, Virginia, for General Max Thurman's change-of-command and retirement ceremony. High-ranking officers from every service would be there, as well as key people from the Department of Defense and Congress.

Thurman, the TRADOC commander, was known as a man who got things done — who could successfully take on the toughest jobs. Some years earlier, when Thurman had been a two-star, the Army's recruiting program had been on the rocks, and a number of recruiters were facing courts-martial for untoward activities. General Shy Meyer, the Army Chief of Staff, had picked Thurman to straighten the mess out, and he had, in spades.

Since Stiner had to rush directly from the field to the aircraft, he had no chance to change out of his fatigues. This was just as well; he had to be back in Pennsylvania later that evening to supervise live-fire activities, which would prevent him from attending the evening reception; but he did not want to miss the ceremony itself, and the chance to celebrate his old friend's accomplishments. The two men had known each other since 1973, when Thurman had been the Commander of Division Artillery and Stiner the G-3 Operations Officer in the 82nd Airborne Division. They had served together again from August 1979 to March 1980, this time in the Pentagon, working for General Meyer (Thurman had been the Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation for the Army, while Stiner was the Exec for Staff Action Control).

After the ceremony ended, Stiner stood at the rear of the reviewing stand to greet General Thurman and apologize for missing the reception. "Let's step over here for a minute," Thurman replied. "I have something I want to tell you. But let me get rid of these people." He turned to other well-wishers waiting to shake his hand. "I'll see you all over at the reception," he told them, shooing them off. "I have to talk to Carl Stiner for a couple of minutes. "

He led Stiner to a quiet spot about thirty feet from the reviewing stand. "What 1 am about to tell you is close-hold, he said. After a quick nod from Stiner, he went on. "I am not retiring. The Noriega regime in Panama has got the President very worried. For that reason, I'm being retained on active duty to take command of SOUTHCOM" — the United States Southern Command. SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility included Central and South America, and its mission was mainly security assistance and counterdrug activities. "Though I'm not the CINC yet, I have already talked to Carl Vuono and Admiral Crowe" — Vuono was the Army Chief of Staff and Crowe was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—"and you are my man in Panama. I'm holding you responsible for contingency planning and combat operations that may have to be executed there. I want you to go down and take a look at the staff, the training readiness, and whatever else needs it."

"What about the joint task force already down there?" Stiner asked. U.S. Army South (USARSO), commanded by Army Major General Bernie Loefke, included all the forces already stationed in Panama.

"You absorb it," Thurman answered. "I'm going to hold you responsible for everything. All forces will be under your control."

"Yes, sir."

"The reason I want you is that in XVIII Airborne Corps you've got a headquarters twice the size of SOUTHCOM's, and the best communications, equipment, and trained forces in the Army for conducting contingency opcrations."[24] By that he meant that XVIII Airborne Corps was a warfighting-capable headquarters, while SOUTHCOM, by the nature of its mission, was not.

"Here is how it is going to work. You remember Admiral McCain" — the CINCPAC from 1968 to 1972, who'd operated from Hawaii. Stincr nodded yes. "There was a man in Vietnam by the name of Westmoreland, who was doing the fighting from Saigon." He gave Stiner a hard look. "Me McCain, you Westmoreland. 1 can't give you detailed instructions now, but when I am confirmed by Congress, that is the way it is going to be. Now get with it."

"Yes, sir," Stiner answered. There wasn't much else to say. He understood Thurman's guidance. He knew exactly what had to be done, and how to go about it.

HISTORY

The isthmus of Panama is one of the world's most strategically important pieces of real estate. At its narrowest, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans are barely fifty miles apart, making a link between them feasible. The economic, political, and military ramifications of this fact arc incalculable.

Once part of Colombia, Panama won its independence in 1903—with help from the United States, which was eager to build a canal across the isthmus on terms Colombia had opposed. That same year, the new nation signed the Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty, which allowed the United States to build the canal. The United States also gained control over a "canal zone," extending five miles on either side of the fifty-two-mile-long waterway. The canal project was completed in 1914.

As the years passed, the Panamanian people increasingly resented U.S. control of the Canal. Eventually, the United States recognized their concerns, and President Carter negotiated an agreement whereby the United States promised to cede control by the year 2000 and, until that date, to share many U.S. military installations in Panama with Panamanian defense forces. After the handover, the United States would withdraw its troops, and revert all military installations to the Panamanian government.

None of the treaty provisions pleased the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Treaty or no, the Canal remained strategically vital to the United States.

The U.S. Senate shared many of the Joint Chiefs' concerns. In ratifying the treaty, it inserted a provision that permitted the United States to continue to defend the Panama Canal after 1999.

NORIEGA

Manuel Antonio Noriega rose to power as an intelligence officer for the dictator, Brigadier General Omar Torrijos. After Torrijos's 1983 death in a plane crash, Noriega took over the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF), an organization that included that country's armed forces, police, customs, and investigative services. During his rise to power, Noriega had cultivated friends and patrons within the U.S. intelligence community. After Torrijos's death, he continued this practice, but broadened it, to include clients within Colombia's Medellin drug cartel and arms traffickers.

By 1985, Noriega was in total control of the country.

The first confrontation between Noriega and the United States took place in June 1987, after the former PDF chief of staff, Colonel Roberto Diaz-Herrera, had publicly accused Noriega of involvement not only in the death of Torrijos, but also in the 1985 murder of an opposition leader, Doctor Hugo Spadafora, and in electoral fraud. The Panamanian people, who had never supported Noriega, took to the streets, but Noriega's riot police ruthlessly put down the unarmed demonstrations.

The U.S. Senate promptly passed a resolution calling for the dictator to step down. After a Noriega-inflamed mob attacked the U.S. Embassy, the State Department cut off economic and military aid to Panama. Later, on February 5, 1988, federal judges in Miami and Tampa indicted Noriega and assorted henchmen on numerous counts of drug trafficking. Noriega counterattacked by organizing a harassment campaign against U.S. citizens, setting up obstructions to U.S. rights under the 1977 Panama Canal treaties, and turning to other outlaw states — such as Cuba, Nicaragua, and Libya — for economic and military assistance. Cuba and Nicaragua provided weapons and instructors to help develop "civilian defense committees," which became known as "Dignity Battalions," for intelligence collection and control of the population, while in 1989, Libya contributed $20 million in return for use of Panama as a base to coordinate terrorist activities and insurgent groups in Latin America.

As a result of this military and economic assistance, the PDF grew to a well-equipped and — armed force numbering some 14,000 men.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING: FEBRUARY-NOVEMBER 1988

After the U.S. federal indictments against Noriega, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed General Frederick F. Woerner, Jr., the Commander in Chief of U.S. Southern Command (USCINCSO), to revise existing contingency plans according to the following guidelines: to protect U.S. lives and propcrty; to keep the canal open; to provide for noncombatant evacuation operations in either peaceful or hostile environments; and to develop a plan to assist the government that would eventually replace the Noriega regime.

A series of new plans followed — collectively known as ELABORATE MAZE — which would be executed by Major General Loefke, commander of U.S. Army South (USARSO), as Commander of the Joint Task Force, Panama (JTFP).

These plans envisioned a massive buildup of forces within U.S. bases in Panama. These forces would either intimidate the PDF leaders and cause them to overthrow Noriega, or failing that, invade Panamanian territory and overthrow the PDF.

Though General Woerner's mass approach offered several serious drawbacks, he favored it over the surprise strategy preferred by some planners, which was that, after a period of buildup, forces from the United States, in concert with Special Operations Forces and General Woerner's troops, would conduct a quick, hard, deliberate attack against Noriega and the PDF.

The most serious drawback to the Woerner approach: It was too slow. It gave the bad guys time to recover and respond. Thus, if Noriega escaped capture during the initial assault, he could flee to the hills and organize guerrilla warfare. The nearly 30,000 U.S. citizens living in Panama were also vulnerable to hostage-taking-or worse — not to mention the likelihood of heavy civilian casualties and property damage.

On March 16, 1988, a PDF faction staged a coup attempt at La Comandancia (the PDF headquarters), which Noriega ruthlessly suppressed. Afterward, he purged from the PDF anyone he considered undependable, declared a state of national emergency, cracked down on political opposition, and stepped up anti-U.S. harassment, in the form of severe travel restrictions, searches, and roadblocks.

After reviewing Woerner's plans, the JCS Chairman, Admiral Crowe, asked Woerner to break OPLAN ELABORATE MAZE into four separate operations orders to facilitate execution. General Woerner's staff named these collectively, PRAYER BOOK. The first, KLONDIKE KEY, covered noncombatant evacuation operations. U.S. citizens located throughout Panama would be escorted to assembly areas in Panama City and Colon for evacuation to the United States (Panama City, on the Pacific side of the Canal, is the capital of the country. Colon is the Caribbean gateway).

According to the second, POST TIME, the Panama-stationed 193rd Infantry Brigade and forces deploying from the continental United States and the U.S. Atlantic Command would defend U.S. citizens and installations, and the Panama Canal. The forces from the United States would include a brigade from the Army's 7th Infantry Division, a mechanized infantry battalion from the 5th Mechanized Division, the 6th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and a carrier battle group. These would constitute the bulk of the force that would implement the other two operations orders in the PRAYER BOOK series — BLUE SPOON and BLIND LOGIC.

BLUE SPOON called for a joint offensive operation to defeat and dismantle the PDF. It would begin with operations conducted by nearly 12,000 troops already in Panama, and would last up to eight days. During the next two weeks, they would be joined by approximately 10,000 more troops from the United States. Meanwhile, a carrier battle group would interdict air and sea routes to Cuba and provide close air support, while an amphibious task force would provide additional ground troops. In addition to U.S.-based forces listed for POST TIME, the SOUTHCOM Commander would employ a joint task force of special operations forces from SOCOM for operations against the PDF leadership, command-and-control facilities, and airfields. The special operations forces would also rescue hostages, conduct reconnaissance, and locate and seize Manuel Noriega.

The SOUTHCOM Commander would not only exercise overall command of BLUE SPOON, he would be the tactical coordinating command. Together, he, with the Commanders of Joint Task Force Panama and of the Joint Special Operations Task Force, would conduct simultaneous but separate operations.

Once the initial BLUE SPOON assaults had been completed, the joint task force would begin civil military operations under BLIND LOGIC, the fourth operations order in PRAYER BOOK. The civil affairs phase would help reestablish public safety and public health and restore other governmental services, followed by the transfer of control to civilians.

In the longer range, U.S. civil affairs troops would work with a new Panamanian government to restructure the PDF and institutionalize its loyalty to civilian authority and democratic government.

Lieutenant General Thomas W. Kelly, Director of Operations of the Joint Staff (J-3), had differences with SOUTHCOM from the beginning. He was not convinced that SOUTHCOM had enough command-and-control capability to manage, employ, and support all the forces contemplated for BLUE SPOON. Once additional forces from the United States deployed, a Corps Commander would be needed to command and control the whole operation. In his view, the XVIII Airborne Corps had the kind of staff and the rapid deployment capability needed.

During the summer of 1988, General Woerner temporarily resolved this conflict by augmenting his staff with thirteen add-ons and a handful of special operations planners. As he saw it, his staff's expertise and experience with Panama and the PDF made SOUTHCOM fully qualified to serve as the warfighting headquarters for BLUE SPOON, but he also realized that the Corps headquarters would be needed to run the overall operation if the JTFP had to be reinforced with additional major forces from the United States, and on July 5, 1988, he asked Admiral Crowe to include a Corps headquarters in the BLUE SPOON force list. In Woerner's mind, however, the Corps Headquarters would not take over tactical command and control until after the operation began, and only if Woerner decided to deploy the U.S.-based forces on the POST TIME list.

Admiral Crowe approved the CINC's request on October 19, 1988, and directed the Commander of U.S. Army Forces Command,[25] General Joseph T. Palastra, Jr., to revise the force list accordingly. Nine days later, Palastra authorized Lieutenant General John Foss, who was at that time the commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, to establish liaison with SOUTHCOM.

Because he would not have operational control until after BLUE SPOON was under way, and possibly not even then, Foss initially delegated the planning responsibility back to the JTFP Headquarters, but for the next year, he monitored the JTFP planning for the operation.

Meanwhile, Kelly remained unhappy with what he saw as an incremental and disjointed command arrangement, and in November 1988 met with the J-3s from SOUTHCOM and FORSCOM to resolve the issue. His own preference was to deploy the Corps headquarters as a complete package before all the combat forces had deployed, but he could not budge Woerner — even though the SOUTHCOM J-3, Brigadier General Marc Cisncros, agreed with Kelly. It seems that Admiral Crowe also agreed with him, but he did not overrule SOUTHCOM.

ELECTIONS IN PANAMA

On May 7, 1989, after six years of oppression, Panamanians turned out en masse to vote in Noriega-sanctioned elections. He evidently thought his candidates, led by his nominee for president, Carlos Duque, would win casily — especially with the help he'd organized from his friends.

Despite the presence of high-level observers, such as former president Jimmy Carter, and lesser lights from the Catholic Church and the U.S. Congress, Noriega's goon squads and Dignity Battalions did their best to intimidate voters. The people had other ideas, however. The opposition, led by Cuillermo Endara and his vice-presidential running mates, Ricardo Arias Calderon and Guillermo Ford, defeated Noriega's candidates by three to one.

When these results were announced, jubilant Panamanians took to the streets by the thousands.

Noriega did not like what he saw, and on May 10, he annulled the election results — blaming them on foreign interference — then sent the PDF, the national police, and his Dignity Battalions into the streets to put down the demonstrations. Many people were killed, and the opposition leaders went into hiding-after getting dragged out of their victory car and beaten.

All of this increased President Bush's concerns about the safety of the thousands of U.S. citizens in Panama, and he ordered 1,900 additional combat troops to Panama-nearly 1,000 troops of the 7th Infantry Division, from Fort Ord, California; 165 Marines of the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; and 750 troops of the 5th Mechanized Division from Fort Polk, Louisiana. All the units arrived in Panama by May 19.

GETTING TOUCHER

Two months earlier, on March 21, former congressman Dick Cheney had become Secretary of Defense. Cheney immediately looked for new ways to pressure Noriega. Meanwhile, members of the National Security Council staff met to discuss other actions, which resulted in presidential approval of National Security Directive 17, issued on July 22, 1989, which ordered military actions in Panama to assert U.S. treaty rights and keep Noriega and his supporters off balance.

Such actions were graded according to category, and ranged from what were called Category One (low risk/low visibility) through Categories Two and Three (low risk/high visibility and medium risk/high visibility) to Category Four (high risk/high visibility).

Category One actions would include publicizing the evacuation of U.S. dependents, expanding anti-Noriega campaigns in the media and psychological operations, and placing PDF members under escort inside U.S. installations.

In the remaining categories, U.S. troops in Panama would take more active roles.

In Category Two, military police would increase their patrols between U.S. installations, battalion-sized forces would deploy to Panama for intensive exercises, and troops stationed in Panama would practice amphibious and night combat operations.

In Category Three, U.S. forces in Panama would increase their reconnaissance and armed convoys near important PDF installations.

In Category Four, U.S. troops would take full control of several key military facilities, such as Fort Amador, Quarry Heights, and Fort Espinar. Fort Amador is located on a peninsula just southwest of Panama City. SOUTHCOM's headquarters were in Quarry Heights in Panama City, and its Operations Center was in a tunnel dug during Canal construction. Fort Espinar is in the north, near Colon. All of these were joint PDF-U.S. installations.

The President's get-tougher policy also had major policy consequences, since he had moved toward the kind of bolder strategy that General Woerner had resisted. He decided to replace General Woerner.

On June 20, Admiral Crowe recommended General Thurman as Woerner's replacement. Thurman had served in Vietnam and though he had somewhat limited warfighting experience or expertise, he was considered a man of action who could make things happen. With that in mind, Crowe asked Thurman to review the prayer BOOK operations orders-especially BLUE SPOON.

On August 4, the day before his scheduled changc-of-command ceremony Thurman came to Fort Bragg for a pair of briefings on BLUE SPOON: one on the JTFP concept for conventional force operations, the other on the Joint Special Operations Task Force concept of special operations.

Stiner could not attend, but he was represented by his deputy commander, Major General Will Roosma. That night, when Roosma laid out for him the substance of the briefings, along with Thurman's questions and comments, Stiner started getting inklings of what Thurman would tell him directly the next day.

BACK TO PANAMA

After his August 5 meeting with Thurman, Stiner wrapped up his duties with the 28th lnfantry Division, but kept his new role in Panama uppermost in his mind. Getting up to speed on BLUE SPOON was an early priority; so far he had not personally reviewed it.

But his first priority was to get down to Panama and SOUTHCOM.

His last visit there had been a couple of years earlier, as the JSOTF Commander. This one would be very different: He was now totally responsible for the major operation that was shaping up.

His overriding concern was the 30,000 Americans, about 5,000 of whom were U.S. dependents living alongside PDF soldiers on joint military installations. This was a ready-made recipe for mass hostage-taking-or even massacre.

Back at Fort Bragg, he put together the team he would take with him-his chief of staff, Brigadier General Ed Scholes; his G-2 and G-3, Colonels Walters and Needham; and six officers from the intelligence and operations directorates who had taken part in the initial plan review process. He hoped to leave four of them in Panama (with SATCOM capabilities), so he could have daily reports.

The next night, Stiner and his team, dressed as civilians, left Pope Air Force Base in an unmarked special mission aircraft (a C-20 Gulf Stream), and landed around 9:00 P.M. at Howard Air Force Base, across the Canal from Panama City. He was met by Brigadier General Bill Hartzog, who had replaced Marc Cisneros as the SOUTHCOM J-3. Cisneros had moved over to replace Major General Bernie Loefke as commander of U.S. Army South. They spent most of the rest of the night with Bill I lartzog in Quarry Heights, in the tunnel that housed the SOUTHCOM operations center, receiving briefings on BLUE SPOON revisions. Although General Woerner still commanded SOUTHCOM, I lartzog was aware of General Thurman's and Washington's concerns, and had begun rewriting the blue SPOON operations order.

Stiner also learned many necessary details.

On the minus side, the tactical communications facilities in Panama were not nearly adequate for a major contingency operation. On the plus side, there was a combat service support capability — including a major hospital. Somewhat augmented, this capability would do for the initial stages of combat.

The next morning, Stiner and his party, still in civilian clothes, moved a short distance to Fort Clayton, U.S. Army South headquarters. There he linked up with Brigadier General Cisneros; Colonel Mike Snell, the commander of the 193rd brigade; and Colonel Keith Kellogg, the brigade commander who had come in with the 7th Infantry Division contingent during President Bush's May buildup, and who was now operating in the Colon area.

For the next two days, Stiner learned everything he could, about Noriega and the PDF on the one hand, and about the training and readiness of forces in Panama on the other.

Noriega had recently stepped up provocations aimed at disrupting what were called "Sand Flea" exercises — training activities allowed by the treaty. IIe then used the media reports of those confrontations to spread his hostile message. Though the U.S. troops involved had performed with exemplary professionalism so far, this kind of thing was a potential flash point for larger conflict and had to be closely watched.

Before Stiner and his team left Panama, Cisneros okayed the installation of Stiner's cell of four smart majors — planners — in the operations center.

His final business was to give Hartzog his assessment:

The revised blue SPOON, Stiner knew, was going to be considerably changed from General Woerner's original plan. In Stiner's view, any successful operation required surprise, overwhelming combat power, and the cover of darkness, to take advantage of the U.S. Army's unequaled night-fighting capabilities. It would not be a slow buildup, but a short, sharp, overwhelming shock.

Even though the commanders he'd met had shown an invaluable knowledge of the PDF and the local environment, Stiner had discovered holes that needed filling. Units in Panama were not as ready and proficient in urban live-fire operations at night as the forces coming in from the United States. This would require an intensified training program. Additionally, the aviation unit was short on pilots, and the majority of crews were not sufficiently proficient in nighttime battalion-size combat air assaults — though in a crunch, Stincr knew that, if he had to, he could make up for it with trained and ready crews already available in the XVIII Airborne Corps aviation battalions.

Back at Fort Bragg, Stiner reviewed his visit to Panama with General Thurman — an experience that had left Stiner particularly unimpressed with the centerpiece of BLUE SPOON, the gradual buildup. The recent buildup in May hadn't deterred Noriega one bit, and there was no guarantee that BLUE SPOON would have more than a fifty-fifty chance of success.

"My people at Bragg," Stiner told his boss, "will get to work on a plan to neutralize Noriega's power base. We plan to take out the PDF and the national police in one fell swoop, and in one night.

"With your blessing, sir, he continued, "I hope to visit Panama again in about two weeks, together with the leaders of the units that I will most likely select for this operation, and I plan to continue visiting Panama frequently until all this is over"

"Drive on," Thurman said. "And keep me informed."

On August 10, 1989, the President nominated General Colin Powell to be the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to take office on October 1. Earlier, General Powell had taken over the United States Forces Command from General Palastra, which had made him Stiner's immediate boss; but he already knew General Powell well from his days at JSOTF, when Powell had been the Executive Assistant to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.

While General Powell was still at FORSCOM, he scheduled a one-day trip to Bragg to get a firsthand look at the XVIII Corps's readiness and planning initiatives for Panama. Though his visit was scheduled for only one day, bad weather kept him at Bragg, and Stiner took advantage of the opportunity to point out the revisions he had in mind for BLUE SPOON.

Powell agreed with Stiner — and Thurman — that the force buildup originally envisaged for BLUE SPOON took too long (twenty-two days) especially if a crisis hit. A quick-strike, one-night operation using the capabilities of the XVIII Airborne Corps and the Special Operations Command was the way to go. Stiner, of course, knew the capabilities of both commands better than anybody else, and he also knew how to meld them together as one fighting team.

"Continue revising the plan," Powell told Stiner.

Later that month, Thurman, Stiner, Hartzog, and Gary Luck, the JSOTF commander, met to get up-to-date. Since April 1988, they concluded, when BLUE SPOON had been published, Noriega had grown increasingly defiant and his forces better equipped and trained. A twenty-two-day buildup could result in prolonged fighting, more casualties, and more opportunities for Noriega to take hostages or escape to the hills to lead a guerrilla war. Stiner wanted a quick strike that would lead to decisive victory.

During September, as the staffs of the XVIII Airborne Corps, SOUTHCOM, and SOCOM continued to revise the plan in that direction, Stiner made another visit to Panama, this time with the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, the Assistant Division Commander of the 7th Infantry Division, the Ranger Regimental Commander, and Gary Luck, along with their operations and intelligence officers — including another of his best planners, to augment the four he'd already left there. Again, they traveled at night in civilian clothes, and in the same C-20 used for the first trip. At Howard AFB, they were met by Hartzog and Cisneros, and went directly to Fort Clayton for briefings.

The next day, the party broke into smaller groups and took off on clandestine reconnaissance missions, to get a better feel for the targets that had been selected, if a contingency operation was launched. Twenty-seven prime targets had been selected. Some key installations and facilities would have to be protected. Other targets would have to be "taken out" — or "neutralized."

Targets to be protected included the Pacora River Bridge, the three locks on the Canal, Madden Dam, the Bridge of Americas (crossing the Canal at Panama City), Howard Air Force Base, the U.S. Embassy, and all U.S. dependents living on military installations shared by the PDF.

Targets to be taken out included the Comandancia and all PDF military installations.

The reconnaissance gave the commanders awareness of what they would actually be facing — though no one knew yet which targets would be assigned to which commander. Stiner later made these decisions, based on his knowledge of unit capabilities. Some targets could be taken only by SOF forces, while others were better suited for conventional units.

Meanwhile, the Senate had confirmed General Thurman as CINC, and on Saturday, September 30, 1989, he took command from General Woerner at SOCOM headquarters in Panama. One day later, at midnight, Colin Powell took over as chairman of the JCS; his welcoming ceremony occurred the next day.

THE OCTOBER 3 COUP ATTEMPT

On Sunday evening, October 1, a woman phoned the CIA station chief in Panama City: "Can you meet me downtown where we can talk? 1 have something that you need to know about." Though she refused to identify herself, the meeting was arranged.

She turned out to be the wife of Major Moises Giroldi, the commander of Noriega's security forces at the Comandancia.

"My husband is very worried about what the Noriega regime is doing to our country," she told the station chief, "and has decided to take action. Tomorrow morning at nine, as Noriega arrives at the Comandancia, my husband and others who oppose him will conduct a coup. We may need U.S. help to block PDF forces moving against the coup. We'll be back in touch."

That night, when the meeting was reported to General Thurman, he immediately went to his command post in the tunnel at Quarry Heights, where he hoped to pick up more news.

Sometime after midnight, a pair of CIA agents went straight from a meeting with Major Giroldi to Quarry Heights, where they confirmed to Thurman that the conspirators planned to grab Noriega at about nine that morning and take control of the Comandancia, thus cutting him off from communications with his field units. However, they might need U.S. help to block the major roads from the west, in case PDF units reacted to the coup.

Once in control, Giroldi planned to talk Noriega into retiring to Chiriqui Province in western Panama, where Noriega had a country house — one of his many luxury homes.

The CIA agents went on to explain that Giroldi, who had played a large part in crushing the coup attempt eighteen months earlier (he'd identified the conspirators, who had then all been jailed and tortured), was not exactly a man of conspicuous integrity, and could not be totally trusted now.

Though he had a bad feeling about the entire CIA report, General Thurman decided to pass it up to the Pentagon, just in case, and at about 2:30 in the morning, he reached General Kelly at home on his secure phone. After Thurman described what was going on, Kelly asked for his thoughts. "My advice is to wait and see what happens," Thurman said.

Soon after that, Generals Kelly and Powell met in the Pentagon with Rear Admiral Ted Shafer, the deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, whose analysts were already busy trying to check out the coup information. The immediate consensus was that the whole thing was likely a trick or a deception; but if not, the plan was ill-conceived and unlikely to succeed.

By this time, Secretary Cheney was in his office for a heads-up from Powell, followed by a further review by Kelly and Shafer. All four then went to the Oval Office to update the President, where Powell recommended holding off on a decision until there was further information. "If there's a coup," Powell told the President, "we need to watch it develop before we act." The President agreed.

That day, the coup did not go off. But Mrs. Giroldi reported it was on for the next morning, October 3.

That morning, Noriega arrived earlier than usual at the Comandancia; the ceremonial guard force met the entourage in the normal way, but then took the dictator into custody — sparking an immediate argument between Noriega and Giroldi. Shots were fired, which General Thurman could hear at his quarters in Quarry Heights about a mile from the Comandancia.

Thurman immediately called Powell with a report.

By 9:00, it was clear a coup was under way, but its outcome was still far from certain. By noon, Panamanian radio announced that a coup was in progress.

Meanwhile, under the guise of a routine exercise, U.S. forces blocked the road to Fort Amador, though the Panamanian 5th Infantry Company based there had not attempted to react. At about the same time, two PDF lieutenants, identified as coup liaison negotiators, arrived at the front gate of Fort Clayton and asked to see Cisneros (now a major general), who spoke fluent Spanish. Thurman told Cisneros to talk to them.

According to the lieutenants, the coup leaders had control of Noriega and his staff, and were now looking for an honorable way for the dictator to step down, yet remain in Panama; but when Cisneros offered to take him into custody at Fort Clayton, the lieutenants refused. They had no intention of turning him over to the United States. They still pressed for a U.S. roadblock at the Bridge of the Americas, however, to prevent Panamanian forces from coming up from Rio Hato.

Cisneros made no promises.

Talking Noriega into stepping down turned out to be a much more formidable undertaking than Giroldi had imagined. What the two men said to each other, we'll never know, but we do know that Noriega out-talked Giroldi. Rather than continue the conversation, Giroldi left Noriega in a locked room for a few minutes, then went off to regroup. It was a fatal mistake: The room had a telephone. Noriega (it was later learned) evidently got in touch with Vicki Amado, his number-one mistress, and asked her to contact the commanders of the 6th and 7th Companies at Rio Hato and the PDF Mechanized Battalion 2000 at Fort Cimarron, some twenty miles northeast of the city.

Soon, a 727 launched from Tocumen International Airport, ten miles east of Panama City, landed at Rio Hato and began shuttling the 6th and 7th Companies back to Tocumen. Meanwhile, Battalion 2000, ten miles farther east at Fort Cimarron, headed to Tocumen with a convoy of trucks and V- 150 and V-300 armored cars. There they picked up the 6th and 7th Companies and went on to the Comandancia.

The forces the coup leaders feared had merely flown over the Comandancia, linked up with other reinforcements, and entered the compound from the eastern side — actions that proved very enlightening to Stiner and his planners as they revised BLUE SPOON.

At this point, it was obvious the coup was over. Shots from inside the Comandancia could be heard — executions. Major Giroldi and his number two, a PDF captain, were taken to Tinajitas (five miles north of the city, and the home of the 1st Infantry Company), tortured until they identified the other coup leaders, and executed.

"The PDF's response to the coup seriously demonstrated considerable military capability and resourcefulness," Carl Stiner remarks. "That day's events made it very apparent to me that if democracy was ever going to succeed in Panama, we had to clean out the whole kit and caboodle, including Noriega, his PDF force, the command-and-control structure (specifically the Comandancia) — and the national police as well. That was not all — as we came to learn. Noriega had placed his disciples in control of every key position in every institution of government, and all of them were on the take in some form or other. They would all have to go."

BOOSTING READINESS

After the failed coup, General Thurman acted to improve readiness: All personnel on duty now wore camouflage fatigues. Marksmanship training was intensified, and everyone — individuals and crews — had to be qualified in their weapon systems. Category three and four exercises were increased, and companies on Sand Flea exercises visited some of the twenty-seven planned targets daily (although the troops involved didn't know this). A nightly helicopter assault exercise was also conducted, to improve proficiency with night-vision goggles.

In order to beef up command and control, General Thurman officially designated Stincr as his war planner and war fighter; and on October 10, Stiner was named commander of Joint Task Force South.[26]

Stiner and his staff were already well ahead of the game with planning revisions to BLUE SPOON. In early September, Major General Will Roosma and a team of planners met with the SOUTHCOM staff to further integrate planning. On October 9, Stiner and his key staff flew to Panama for a contingency planning summit with the CINC — again wearing civilian clothes and traveling in an unmarked airplane. For the next three days, the two staffs worked in the SOUTHCOM command post in Quarry Heights, ironing out operational and tactical details.

Meanwhile, Stiner took time off to make a clandestine helicopter reconnaissance of the likely targets, which was critical for finalizing plan development. He was accompanied by Colonel Mike Snell, the commander of the 193rd Infantry Brigade, who was intimately familiar with the country and PDF locations.

As the meetings were concluding, General Thurman announced that Stiner would be in overall command of all U.S. combat forces in Panama, including special operations forces, and that the contingency plan for Joint Task Force South would include the following objectives, to: protect U.S. lives, key sites, and facilities; capture and deliver Noriega to competent authority; neutralize the Panamanian defense forces; support the establishment of a U.S.-recognized government in Panama; and restructure the PDF as directed by the duly-elected government.

An unwritten but high-priority mission from Washington was to rescue Kurt Muse, a CIA operative who had been arrested by Noriega and imprisoned in the high-security Modelo prison. Muse had been told that he would be executed if U.S. forces launched an attack against Panama. His executioner kept him under constant observation.

To accomplish these objectives, Joint Task Force South would have to either protect or neutralize the twenty-seven major targets. Many of them were in or near Panama City, but several, including the elite companies at Rio Hato, Battalion 2000 at Fort Cimarron, and Torrijos-Tocumen Airport, were some miles from the capital (the airport was dual-use: Tocumen was the civilian side, Torrijos the military). There were also major targets in the Colon area, on the Caribbean side of the country some forty miles northwest of Panama City.

Now that the targets had been determined and prioritized, Stiner and his commanders had to decide on the tactics and forces best suited for each.

At the end of the three days, Stiner summarized his "Commander's Intent" for the operation.[27]

In essence, he said: "Using electronic warfare capabilities to jam PDF communications, together with our EC–C130s (Volant Solo and Compass Call) to override civilian media stations and broadcast our message to the people of Panama, we will take advantage of surprise and darkness to attack or secure all twenty-seven targets simultaneously. A vital part of the operation is the protection of U.S. lives, beginning from H-hour and until stability has been achieved. The key to success is surprise and the simultaneous takedown of the PDF, its command-and-control capability, and the national police. The majority of the fighting must be over by daylight, with our forces in control of the area bounded by Panama City to Colon in the north, and from Rio Hato in the southwest to Fort Cimarron in the northeast. Most Panamanians are our friends, and therefore we must minimize casualtics and collateral damage. We will employ psychological operations at the tactical unit level to try to persuade each installation to surrender without a fight. If this does not achieve results, then measured force will be applied to accomplish the mission. At daylight, because there will be no law and order, the tactical units must be prepared to begin stability operations to protect life and property. To support this requirement, we will begin bringing in the rest of the 7th Infantry Division and the remainder of the 16th Military Police Brigade, beginning at H+4 hours and closing by H+24 hours. The capture of Noriega, the rescue of Kurt Muse from the Modelo prison, and other special mission requirements are the responsibility of the JSOTF. These operations are an integral part of the success of this operation, and will commence concurrently with all other operations at H-hour. I hope that the signal which will be sent by our actions at H-hour will make our job much easier as we fan out to take down PDF units in the rest of the country. If we can achieve some degree of surprise, and if we do this right, I don't expect much staying power out of the PDF."

At the same time, Stiner laid out his warfighting philosophy: "Hit first; surprise the enemy; overwhelm him with heavy combat power; use the cover of darkness to take maximum advantage of our night-fighting capabilities during the initial assault and follow-on attacks, so that our superior forces are on the objectives come dawn; and always fight under favorable conditions."

The party returned to Fort Bragg on October 11 to complete the plan.

During the next week, they worked day and night. For security purposes, planning for General Luck's special missions operations continued at his headquarters, but liaison officers were exchanged between the XVIII Airborne Corps and the Joint Special Operations Task Force to ensure continuity and integration.

The morning after their return, Stiner spoke to the planners at Fort Bragg:

"As I analyze this mission," he explained, "these are the specified and implied tasks that we must be concerned with:

• The priority is to protect U.S. lives and the key sites and facilities in Panama.

• We must capture Noriega and deliver him to competent authority.

• We must neutralize the PDF, and at the same time neutralize the command-and-control mechanism (that is, the Comandancia), as well as the national police.

• We must support the establishment of a U.S.-recognired government.

• We must be prepared to begin stability operations as soon as the fighting is over — because there will be no law and order.

• We must be prepared to engage in necessary nation-building activities to assist the new government get on its feet and begin to meet the expectations of the people.

• We must be prepared to restructure the Panamanian Defense Forces and the national police as the new government decides.

"This is a very difficult and complex mission," he continued. "We must plan to defeat the PDF and the national police in one night, and the next day raise those whom we have fought in a new image — no longer the oppressors of the people, but respected by them. We will be extending our hand to the PDF and then reraising him in a new image as a citizen or national policemen — whatever the new government decides.

"Practically all the fighting must be done in urban terrain — cities and built-up areas. We must limit the collateral damage — which translates to minimum loss of life on both sides — and limit all damage outside of what is strictly necessary to accomplish the mission.

"Accordingly, we will be forced to establish for ourselves specific rules of engagement that will limit our total combat capability. That is, we must limit ourselves to using only direct-fire weapons — individual rifles; machine guns; 66mm LAWs and AT-4 antitank weapons; Sheridan armored reconnaissance vehicles, with their large-caliber main guns; Apache helicopters with their hellfire missiles; AC-130 gunships; and artillery — the last three only in a direct-fire role for building-busting purposes. There'll be no "area fire" weapons, such as mortars and bombing.

"These rules of engagement must be very clear, so that every person involved in this operation has a clear understanding of what he can and cannot do.

"As for planning, the staff is to concentrate on the conventional aspects of this operation, leaving the special operations part to General Luck's headquarters — specifically, the capture of Noriega and his henchmen. The Noriega gang must be neutralized in order to provide an environment where the civilian government can function without threat. All other special mission requirements will also be the responsibility of Luck's command, but when it comes time for execution, the two plans will be integrated. Luck will control the special operations side, reporting to me, the same as the other task force commanders.

"The success of this mission depends in large measure on the effectiveness of small units accomplishing their assigned missions. Therefore, I want to give them maximum flexibility and latitude in making the decisions necessary to accomplish their mission."

He continued: "1 will personally begin work on structuring the command and control arrangements for this operation. These will be simple and direct — no unnecessary layering. As it stands right now, I plan to absorb the U.S. Army South headquarters into my headquarters (Joint Task Force South), making General Marc Cisneros my deputy.

"Because different forces from different services will be involved, we must have a joint CEOI [Command Communications and Electronic Operating Instructions], so we can talk to each other. I want this to be short and to the point, not a Sears, Roebuck catalog. Once it is developed, I plan to have an exercise where we can tweak all our radios and other means of communication, to ensure that we can talk to each other — and once we start this operation, we are not changing frequencies and call signs until it's over. We will conduct this operation with such momentum that it will not matter if the PDF gets hold of one of our CEOIs, because they won't be able to do anything with it anyhow."

"Finally, within four days I want to see a draft plan that I can have in the hands of my major subordinate commanders within five days, to allow them time to study it before our next meeting in Panama, when I plan to have them present."

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Within four days, a draft operations plan was completed. This included command-and-control relationships:

Beginning at the top was General Thurman, CINC South.

Immediately under him was Lieutenant General Stiner, Commander Joint Task Force South. When Stiner's headquarters absorbed the Headquarters of U.S. Army South, Major General Marc Cisneros became Stiner's deputy commander, and Cisneros's staff principals became deputies to the staff principals of the XVIII Airborne Corps.

Directly underneath Stiner were six task forces, as follows:1. The Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) was headed by Major General Gary Luck. All special mission forces in Panama were to be under his command and control.2. The Air Component was commanded by Lieutenant General Pete Kemph, the 12th Air Force Commander. All the planning for tactical air support would initially be handled by Brigadier General Bruce Fister, Gary Luck's deputy. After the initial assault, control of all aviation assets would revert to Pete Kemph.3. Task Force Bayonet, headed by Colonel Mike Snell, was to be made up of the 193rd Brigade already stationed in Panama.4. Task Force Pacific was to be headed by Major General Jim Johnson, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division and his Division Ready Brigade (DRB) — approximately 4,000 paratroopers, with all weapons and equipment, including twelve more Sheridans.5. Task Force Atlantic would initially be commanded by Colonel Keith Kellogg, the 7th Infantry Division's 3d Brigade Commander, already in Panama.6. Task Force Semper Fi was headed by Colonel Charles Richardson, commander of the Marine Expeditionary Battalion already brought in during the May 1989 buildup.

These officers were responsible for completing their portion of the plan, and then for rehearsing it.

The units already in Panama (12,000 troops), together with those coming from the United States at H-hour and throughout the first day, would bring the troop total to more than 26,000. By comparison, the earlier version of BLUE SPOON provided only 10,000 additional troops (total: 22,000) over twenty-two days. At H-hour there would be enough forces available to secure twenty-four of the twenty-seven planned targets. The three remaining — Panama Viejo (on the eastern side of Panama City), Tinajitas, and Fort Cimarron — would be secured by battalion air assaults conducted by the 82nd Airborne Division DRB, who would jump into Tocumcn International Airport at H+45 minutes. The airport itself would be taken by Rangers, who were to jump in at H-hour. After landing, the 82nd was to assume operational control of the Rangers and take responsibility for security of the airport.

If all went as planned, the heavy fighting should be over by daylight, with all targets either neutralized or protected, as the case may be.

Later that day, the remaining two brigades of the 7th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General Carmen Cavezza, would arrive from Fort Ord, California, while the remainder of the 16th Military Police Brigade would fly in from Fort Bragg. These units would round out the forces necessary to bring stability and security to Panama City and Colon, and in time to the rest of the country.

On Friday, October 13, Carl Stiner drove from Fort Bragg to Knoxville, Tennessee, for his daughter Carla's wedding the next day at the Ball Camp Baptist Church. Just in case he couldn't make it, he had arranged for his brother Tom to stand in; but in fact, everything worked out fine — with one hang-up. When he linked up with his wife, Sue, at the Holiday Inn, he found her sitting there with a shoe off and pain on her face.

"What's wrong?"

"I broke a bone in my foot yesterday," she answered, "and it hurts bad."

"Arc you going to be able to go through with the wedding?"

"One way or another. This is my first daughter's wedding, and I'm certainly going to do my part. What I want you to do is go out and get me an ace bandage, and wrap my foot real tight. We've got to get on over to the rehearsal."

That I did, Stiner remembers. Sue could always withstand a lot of pain, but what she did that night during the rehearsal and the next evening during the wedding was just out of sight. It was beyond me how she made it through the entire ceremony, walking without a limp, and with a heatific smile on her face.

Talk about courage.

During the reception, at about ten in the evening, I received a call: The Chairman wanted to see me and Gary Luck the following day for a briefing on the revisions to OPLAN BLUE SPOON.

We were stuck with two cars in Knoxville. That meant Sue had to drive one back to Bragg; my other daughter, Laurie, drove the second.

At six the next morning, Sue dropped me off at Cherokee Aviation at Knoxville Airport, where a plane was waiting to fly me to Washington. Then she headed back to North Carolina — in pain. The next day, her foot was placed in a cast, but that didn't do the job; and a month later she had to have screws put in.

Meanwhile, I linked up with Gary Luck in the Pentagon, and we proceeded to the Chairman's office, where I brought General Powell up to speed on the conventional side (pointing out our efforts to make the operation more responsible and decisive), while Gary Luck covered the special mission part. After we had both explained the revised command arrangements and our plans to integrate efforts, General Powell praised the work everyone had put into the plan, then released me to return to Fort Bragg. Gary Luck stayed overnight, and accompanied Powell to the Oval Office to brief the President on his special task forces' mission in Panama.

FINALIZING THE PLAN

On October 19, Stiner, his key staffers, and the commanders of his major units made another civilian clothes visit to Panama, this time in two special mission aircraft. For two days, the warfighting commanders met to discuss the plan and put the final details in place. Joining them were General Thurman and the SOUTHCOM staff; Lieutenant General Pete Kemph; Brigadier General Robin Turnow, the commander of Howard Air Force Base; and Rear Admiral Jerry C. Gnechnow, CINCLANT's representative to the operation.

The meeting started with an intelligence estimate:

The Panamanian Defense Forces numbered almost 13,000 troops, including the national guard, the police, and other separate units, but only 4,000 to 5,000 of these could be counted real combat troops. The ground forces were deployed throughout thirteen military zones, and consisted of two infantry battalions, ten independent companies, one cavalry squadron, a riot control company, and a special forces command, which numbered about four hundred specially trained and equipped troops. PDF army equipment included twenty-eight V-150 and V-300 armored cars. The navy numbered about four hundred sailors and was equipped with twelve high-speed patrol boats, all armed with cannons. The Air Force numbered about five hundred troops and was equipped with thirty-eight fixed-wing aircraft, seventeen helicopters, and numerous air defense weapons systems. There were, finally, up to eighteen paramilitary units—"Dignity Battalions" — but intelligence about these units and their missions was spotty.

Meanwhile, the intelligence agencies had begun to develop a most wanted list — people who would have to be removed or neutralized if there was to be a democratic environment in Panama. In addition to Noriega, up to a hundred others were expected to be on the list: Noriega's disciples and henchmen, those in key government positions, and others wanted for crimes against the people, or simply for racketeering — the whole gang was up to their eyeballs in crime.

Stiner then presented his concept of operations: After an analysis of the mission statement, his "Commander's Intent, the operational command structure, the targets assigned to each major subordinate command, and the allocation of forces, he gave his thoughts on the phasing of the operation:

PHASE I

• Clandestinely deploy JSOTF Headquarters, Army Special Missions Unit, and Special Aviation assets to in-country forward staging base (FSB).

• Infiltrate other needed conventional weapons systems for H-hour activities to in-country FSB.

• Marshall other CONUS [Continental United States] forces for deployment.

PHASE II

• Begin reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S).

• Deploy rangers to CONUS intermediate staging bases (ISBs).

• Deploy selected CONUS forces to in-country FSB.

PHASE III

• Conduct pre H-hour activities — i.e., secure critical facilities.

• II-hour activities.

PHASE IV

• Conduct follow-on/stability operations.

• Handover and redeployment.

• Transition to nation building (Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY).

Stincr concluded by summarizing H-hour activities:

Fire Support: Just before H-hour, the AC-130 gunships will he in orbit with a full load of ammunition and prepared to respond to the fire-support needs of all task forces. Apache helicopters will also be ready to deliver precision fire support against all major targets.

Beginning at H-hour, the following will occur simultaneously:

In conjunction with the opening of comhat activities, JTF South will use EF-111 aircraft to jam all PDF tactical communications, and use EC-13 °Compass Call and Volant Solo aircraft to override all Panamanian media and broadcast this message to the people: "We are the Americans, your friends. We are here to give your freedom back. We will be attacking only those targets that are necessary for that purpose. Stay in your homes and no one will be harmed."

Task Force Red: The 75th Ranger Regiment will conduct concurrent parachute assaults to secure Torrijos-Tocumen International Airport and neutralize the 2nd Infantry Company, and at Rio Hato to neutralize the 4th and 6th PDF Companies, the Sergeant Majors Academy, and the Cadet Academy.

The Joint Special Operations Task Force will conduct operations to rescue Kurt Muse from the Modelo prison; render unusable the airfield at Paitilla (in Panama City), along with Noriega's executive jet located there; disable Noriega's presidential yacht; secure the waters of the Canal south of the Miraflores locks (that is, between the locks and Panama City and the Pacific — about five or six miles); conduct activities as necessary to capture Noriega and other priority targets on the most wanted list; and conduct hostage-rescue operations and other special mission activities as directed.

Task Force Bayonet (the 193rd Brigade): Will conduct operations to neutralize the Comandancia; secure Fort Amador; and neutralize the 5th Independent Company, Ancon DENI stations (PDF intelligence), PDF engineer compound, Balboa Harbor (the harbor at Panama City), and the PDF dog compound.

Task Force Semper Fi: Will conduct operations to secure and protect the Bridge of the Americas; Howard Air Force Base; seize the port of Voca Monte; and neutralize all PDF and Dignity Battalion units in its area of operations (AOR).

[Task Force Semper Fi had initially deployed to Panama as a battalion-size unit, but was now brigade-size after augmentation by U.S. Army attachments.]

Task Force Atlantic [elements of the 7th Infantry Division]: Will be responsible for securing most of the former Canal Zone north of those operations areas in the neighborhood of Panama City. It will conduct operations to secure Fort Sherman and the Caribbean entrance to the Panama Canal; the Gatun Locks; Coco Solo; Fort Espinar; the Madden Dam; rescue political prisoners from the Renacer Prison; and secure Cerro Tigre (a PDF supply complex).

Task Force Pacific: The 82d Airborne Division conducts parachute assault at H+45 at Tocumen Airport; assumes OPCON of 1st Ranger Battalion and security of the airport; beginning within thirty minutes, conducts air assault operations to secure in priority Panama Viejo (a primarily ceremonial cavalry squadron and a 170-man detachment from Noriegas elite and fiercely loyal special operations antiterrorist unit known as the USEAT), Tinajitas (5th Rifle Company), and Fort Cimarron (Battalion 2000).

Following my presentation, each major subordinate commander presented. his portion of the plan and described how he expected to accomplish his mission.

Toward the end of the first day, each commander made a clandestine reconnaissance of his targets. That night, they made adjustments to their plans, and these were briefed and finalized the next day in open session, with everyone present. That way, the process was coordinated, and each commander was familiar with the overall plan and its details.

Toward the end of the second day, three fire support concerns came up:

First: The fire support systems available at H-hour were not powerful enough for the 193d Brigade's building-busting mission in and around the Comandancia. Although the 82d Airborne would be dropping twelve Sheridans at H+45, these would not be available for support of the 193d brigade as they entered the built-up area near the Comandancia.

Second: It was feared that low cloud cover could limit the effectiveness of the AC-130 gunships. Given the kind of "surgical" fighting planned for built-up areas, an additional highly accurate fire support system was needed.

Third: Colonel Buck Kernan, commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment, pointed out that the airfield at Rio Hato, the only available drop zone for the parachute assault, was close to the 6th and 7th PDF Companies, two of Noriega's best. If surprise was not achieved, his Rangers could take heavy casualties during the jump. For that reason, Kernan asked for air strikes against these two companies' barracks.

"This was a serious problem," Carl Stiner observes, "because air strikes against the PDF had been ruled out by the Secretary of Defense, on the grounds that most of them were our friends — just misguided — and if at all possible, we had to give them a chance to surrender.

"We had to find another way to deal with this threat. In fact, over the coming days, we had to come up with solutions to each of these three problems — and we did."

At the end of the conference, the commanders discussed the various employment options — the time necessary to round up all the planes and crews and get them to the right bases for loading the assault troops. BLUE SPOON would most likely be launched following a Noriega-inspired provocation. He had already stepped up the frequency of these events, a flash point was always possible.

The urgency of the provocation would determine the launch time available. The deliberate employment option was based on a forty-eight-to-sixty-hour notification — plenty of time.

However, there always remained a strong possibility that Noriega would create an incident requiring a quicker response than BLUE SPOON allowed. To cover that possibility, two corollary plans had to be worked out: a no-notice response (in case of a hostage situation or a threat to a key facility — such as the canal locks), and a short-notice response (less urgent, but still requiring action within fourteen to sixteen hours).

In either case, the initial response would have to come from forces already in place — seven U.S. combat battalions, including a Special Forces battalion, and aviation support; General Luck's forces would follow on from CONUS within twelve hours. Responsibility for both the no-notice and short-notice option was laid on General Cisneros, the U.S. Army South commander, who was tasked to develop these plans.

On the way back to Fort Bragg, Stiner worked on fire support issues: The 193rd Brigade H-hour problem at the Comandancia was relatively easy to solve. They would clandestinely pre-position four Sheridans, with their large-caliber main guns; six Apache helicopters, with their hellfire missiles; and three OH-58 scout helicopters. A few days later, he put this into a formal request, and on November 7th, Secretary Cheney signed the deployment order.

Buck Kernan's problem with the drop at Rio Hato was tougher. They had to keep the PDF from killing Rangers when they were most vulnerable — descending in parachutes — but they also had to do all they could to avoid killing PDF, if that was prudently possible.

The answer, when it hit Stiner, was logical: "We don't have to kill PDF in their barracks. We just have to put them in no condition to fight." A way had to be found to stun them long enough — five minutes would do it — for the C-130s to get safely across the drop zone. Once the Rangers were on the ground, they could do the rest.

Offset bombing[28]— for shock and awe — was the solution. The question, then, was by what?

He first considered using F-111s, with their standard 750-pound bombs; then called his air component commander, Pete Kcmph, to get his views. What he wanted, he explained, was to create five minutes of shock and confusion by dropping bombs maybe 150 to 200 meters from the 4th and 6th PDF Companies barracks.

"I'm thinking of using F-111s," Stiner told Kemph.

"There is a much more accurate system," Kemph replied. "The F-117. And it can carry bigger bombs — two thousand pounds."

"But F-117s are black," Stiner said — secret.

"For something as critical as this, it could probably be brought out," Kcmph pointed out. "I'll tell you what. The next time you are down in Panama, I'll send the F-117 wing commander down with bomb data, and you can decide for yourself."

Not long after that, Stiner reviewed the data with the wing commander, and there was simply no comparison. The F-117s could put 2,000-pound bombs exactly where he wanted them. With the F-111s, there was a significant risk of error. In due course, the Secretary of Defense approved an F-117 drop of two bombs at Rio Hato in support of the Rangers.

Toward the end of October, General Carl Vuono, Army Chief of Staff, asked Stiner and Luck to come to Washington to bring him up to date — primarily to make sure they were getting the support they needed.

"This is the most sophisticated thing I've ever seen," he announced when he'd heard the details. "Over three hundred planes and helicopters in one small area, attacking twenty-seven targets at night. You'd better rehearse this thing all you can."

"It's not going to be as messy as it looks," Stiner explained. "A lot of detailed flight planning has already gone into it. All the pilots are proficient with night-vision goggles, and the AC-130s can illuminate the key targets with their infrared searchlights; the night will look like daytime. We'll own the night.

"Our units can do this. We've trained them that way. "

Vuono liked what he'd heard and pledged his support.

Planning continued until October 30, 1989, when General Thurman signed USCINSCO OPORD 1-90 (BLUE SPOON), making BLUE SPOON official — though planning did not stop there. Stiner's planners completed the Corps plan a few days later, and he signed it as ready to execute on November 4. Gary Luck's planners completed their plan the same day.

On November 3, Thurman, Stiner, and Luck gave the BLUE SPOON briefing to the Joint Chiefs in the Pentagon in a room called the Tank. Though the Chiefs were generally supportive, like Vuono, they questioned the plan's complexity. Assurances of the capabilities and readiness of the forces convinced them, and they approved it.

Meanwhile, the Sheridans and Apaches were set to deploy on the nights of November 15 and 16. The Sheridans would go the first night on a C-5 aircraft, and the Apaches the following night on another C-5.

Stiner took advantage of the transportation to set up another commanders' conference in Panama. Accompanying him on the C-5 hauling the Sheridans were Colonels Needham, G-3 (operations), and Walters, G-2 (intelligence); Colonel Bill Mason, Corps Signal Officer; and Major Huntoon, one of the chief planners. Three days later, he was joined at Fort Clayton by his major subordinate commanders and staff officers.

The four Sheridans and their crews arrived at Howard AFB at about midnight. For the sake of operational security, the crews had removed their 82nd Airborne division patches and sewed on 5th Mech Division patches.

With their swim shrouds raised to break up their outline, the tanks were loaded on tractor trailers and taken to the mechanized battalion's nearby motor pool and placed inside large tents, where they'd remain until needed — though the crews drove them two nights a week in the motor pool to keep the seals lubricated to prevent leaking.

In order to familiarize themselves with the environment, the Sheridan crews accompanied the mechanized battalion on their daily Sand Flea exercises, which let them eyeball the targets they'd hit — though they had no idea that was what they were doing.

The C-5 carrying the six Apaches landed at Howard the next night at midnight. They were off-loaded and rolled into hangar number one for reassembly. They remained there during the day, but the crews flew them at night — to familiarize themselves with flying in Panama and to condition the locals to the sound of Apaches.

At the commanders' conference, each commander briefed Stiner on the details of his plan. All of this was generally satisfactory, but Stiner was still uncomfortable with the level of the crew proficiency for executing battalion-size air assaults at night. A program of intensified training was initiated to correct this.

BOMB THREAT

On November 18, word came to General Thurman that the Medellin drug cartel was planning attacks against Americans in Panama in retaliation for U.S. counterdrug assistance in Colombia. The source stated that three car bombs had already been positioned in a Panama City warehouse, ready to be moved to American targets and activated, and that a three-person terrorist team, expert at fabricating false identities and gaining access to U.S. installations, was already operating within Panama. The source providing this information had been given a lie-detector test, and had passed.

"We have no choice," Thurman said to Stiner. "We have to take that kind of threat seriously. That means you are stood up, my friend" — meaning he was activating Joint Task Force South immediately for its wartime mission. "I will increase the alert status to the maximum for all installations and troops. You're in charge. So start operating now."

"Yes, sir, >> Stiner replied.

When Thurman told Powell what he had done, Powell was a little bent out of shape; only the SECDEF has authority to activate a Joint Task Force. But Secretary Cheney, recalling the Beirut bombing of U.S. Marines, did not contest Thurman's action.

Stiner sent his commanders back to their units in the United States to begin rehearsals, but he and his staff remained behind in Panama to oversee the increased security.

Carl Stiner continues:

All U.S. installations were "closed," checkpoints were manned by armed guards, nothing was admitted without a thorough inspection and proper identification, and SOUTHCOM flew in explosive detection dogs — not enough of them, it turned out, to suit the MPs. They started hollering for more.

"Shit," I told them, "you don't need a trained dog, what you need is 'deterrent' dogs to spread out among the ones you've already got. So get out and catch you some."

They did, and it was a sight to behold. As the trained dogs were crawling underneath the cars, the deterrent dogs were as often as not hosing down the hubcaps.

All our security measures quickly resulted in virtual gridlock. Traffic lined up to get on installations was sometimes over a mile long.

Meanwhile, our people had located the warehouse where the car bombs had supposedly been placed, and I'd gone to General Thurman to see if he couldn't get Panama-based FBI or DEA personnel in there to check it out; but it turned out they had no legal authority. Neither was it technically legal to use U.S. military personnel, since a deployment order for a military operation in Panama had not been published by the Secretary of Defense.

We still needed somehow to get into that warehouse, which was guarded twenty-four hours a day by an armed guard. I told Thurman that it would be unconscionable to let one of those bombs explode, and that I would take care of it. The guard agreed to cooperate and willingly unlocked the door. There were no car bombs, and no evidence there ever had been.

The whole thing was a hoax.

On November 27, with approval from Washington, the Joint Task Force was dissolved and I returned home.

The bomb hoax was not a total loss, however. The security measures had turned out to be a good exercise in readiness.

PROVOCATIONS

As units rehearsed their plans in the United States and Panama, the situation in Panama was swiftly deteriorating. Dignity Battalions were increasing their provocations, and Noriega was busy firing up the PDF with machete-waving personal appearances.

Back in the States, Stiner was involved in rehearsals or on the road, making certain that all the major commands from all the services were aware of all the details of the plan and prepared to support their part in the operation.

He made three trips to the Pentagon to brief General Powell, and he also briefed Admiral Frank Kelso, Commander of the U.S. Atlantic Command (who was responsible for providing cover for the airlift armada as it passed Cuba); General Hansford T. Johnson, the Commander of the Military Airlift Command, who would be providing the airlift; General Edwin H. Burba, U.S. Army Forces Command Commander; and General Jim Lindsay, Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command.

In late November and early December, conventional and special operations forces conducted detailed rehearsals at Fort Bragg and Eglin Air Force Base, and in Panama. Since operational security was a major concern, rehearsals were masked as routine training exercises. Only senior commanders and staff knew about the link with the actual contingency plan.

As the situation in Panama continued to deteriorate, Stiner grew more and more convinced that it was just a matter of time before the plan would have to be implemented. Every unit was rehearsed and ready, but training continued, to maintain unit readiness. Now came the waiting.

The National Command Authority had never wanted a preemptive strike, since the universal perception would be that it was an "invasion of a small and unprepared foe by the world's strongest nation" — taking a sledgehammer to a flea. Instead, they wanted a trigger incident that would justify the operation in the eyes of the world.

On December 15, the Noriega-appointed National Assembly voted to make him head of government and "maximum leader of the struggle for national liberation." Another resolution stated, "The Republic of Panama is declared to be in a state of war with the United States, as long as U.S. aggression in the form of economic sanctions imposed in 1988 continues."

TRIGGER

At about 9:30 P.M. on Saturday, December 16, four young officers, just off duty at SOUTHCOM headquarters, were driving downtown for a pizza, when they were stopped at a PDF roadblock near the Comandancia. The PDF soldiers began beating on the car, trying to drag the Americans out. The driver sped away. The PDF opened fire. Barely a minute later, when it was all over, one officer had been shot in the ankle and Marine First Lieutenant Robert Paz had been mortally wounded.

Shortly afterward, the PDF stopped Navy Lieutenant Adam Curtis and his wife, Bonnie, who had witnessed the shooting incident, at the same roadblock. They were taken to the Comandancia and interrogated in the presence of a PDF officer. There, Curtis was kicked in the head and groin, and his wife was threatened sexually, then made to lean against a wall. She eventually collapsed on the floor. When the lieutenant protested, the PDF interrogators shoved wads of paper into his mouth, put a gun to his head, and again kicked him several times in the groin. "Your husband will never perform in bed again," one of the interrogators told Bonnie.

After four hours of this, the PDF abruptly released them.

General Thurman learned of these incidents at 11:00 P.M., in Washington, where he'd gone for meetings. He immediately flew back to Panama.

About the same time, the liaison team in Panama got word to Stiner at Fort Bragg.

Meanwhile, Noriega had issued a communique that blamed the shooting incident on the four U.S. officers, alleging they had broken through a PDF checkpoint, shot at the Comandancia, and wounded three Panamanians — a soldier, a civilian, and a one-year-old girl.

The next morning, Sunday, December 17, Stiner got a secure phone call from Lieutenant General Kelley: "General Thurman is recommending the implementation of the OPLAN," Kelley told him. "The Chairman, the SECDEF, and I are about to brief the President. Is there anything you want to pass on?"

"Yes, there is," Stiner answered. "What happened is unfortunate; there is nothing we can do to bring back Lieutenant Paz or relieve the pain and suffering of the Navy lieutenant and his wife. But what we can do is clean up this mess once and for all by implementing the full OPLAN, and that is my recommendation. We are prepared to do it right."

Stiner continued:

"We need a decision on H-hour, and I'd like to have it established at 0100 hours. I have three reasons:

"First, that's when the tide is highest in Panama (it fluctuates some forty-three feet there). The SEALs have to swim to some of their targets in order to place their explosive charges. If we pick the wrong time, they'd have to walk across mudflats, thus compromising their operations, and greatly increasing the risk of not being able to accomplish these critical missions at H-hour.

"Second, we want to minimize possibilities for hostage situations. For that, we need a time when there is little chance that a wide-body civilian jet, and several hundred passengers, will be landing at Torrijos Tocumen International Airport. We have been watching the airport for a couple of months, and seldom does a large jet land after midnight.

"Third, we have three major targets that we cannot secure at H-hour. After it jumps at H+45, the 82nd Airborne Division needs four hours to make three battalion-size combat air assaults before daylight. With H-hour at 0100, we believe that most of the fighting will be over come daylight."

Kelley promised to pass this on to the President and get back to Stiner after the meeting. He called back at 5:15 that afternoon: "The President has made the decision to go," he said. "And you've got what you wanted. H-hour will be at 0100.

"The President also wants you to pass on to the commanders and troops his total trust and confidence in their ability to accomplish the mission, and that he'll be praying for them."

Stiner immediately called his stateside commanders to give them the word. A couple of hours later, he assembled his staff at the XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters to review the sequencing of operations that would follow on the President's decision.

Shortly, the official "Execute Order" was published by Secretary Cheney. It established H-hour as 0100 hours, 20 December 1989.

That night, Brigadier General Ed Scholes, XVIII Airborne Corps Chief of Staff, left for Fort Clayton with a contingent of headquarters staff officers to establish a small command post to handle pre-H-hour details from that end.

At 0900, Monday, the eighteenth, the XVIII Airborne Corps called an emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE) to serve as a cover and no-notice order for executing Corps Plan 90-2. This initiated the 82nd Airborne's eighteen-hour planning-and-alert procedure, a normal routine which would cover deployment, though only key personnel knew this.

Later in the afternoon, Stiner, key members of his Corps staff, and an advance command element from the 82nd Airborne Division, led by Brigadier General Joe Kinzer, took off for HowardAir Force Base in two unmarked C- 20s. The entire contingent traveled once again in civilian clothes; they did not change into battle dress until Tuesday night.

Meanwhile, there'd been a major command change. Gary Luck was being promoted to Lieutenant General and would now command U.S. Army Special Forces Command; Major General Wayne Downing was taking over as commander of the JSOTF. Since General Downing's background was filled with Airborne, Ranger, and Special Operations assignments, including combat in Vietnam, there was no loss in command continuity. He had been completely read-in on the plan, and had participated in all the rehearsals.

By the time the Execute Order was published, a large part of the special operations forces had already clandestinely infiltrated into Panama; the rest were scheduled to be infiltrated before H-hour. At 0100 on Monday morning, General Downing left for Panama with a contingent of his forces.

The force he would command totaled approximately 4,400 and was composed of special operations, psychological operations, and civil affairs units from the Army, Air Force, and the Navy. The largest special operations component, and its principal assault force, was the 75th Ranger Regiment, dubbed Task Force Red.

CARL Stiner comments:

Gary Luck had done an outstanding job integrating the joint special operations activities into the overall plan, and now he would not have the opportunity to execute them. On that count, I had to feel sorry for him. On the other hand, his promotion was long overdue and he would do an equally outstanding job commanding the Army's Special Operations Command and go on to command the XVIII Airborne Corps in Operation DESERT STORM, less than a year away.

PRE-H-HOUR

Maintaining operational security had from the outset been crucial to the plan. Without it, we could forget about achieving surprise. And without surprise, there would certainly be greater casualties — on both sides. The troops stationed in Panama gave me the most concern in this regard. Some lived off-base, some had Panamanian girlfriends, some of the families had maids, and all our installations had Panamanian workers — a ready-made situation for a compromise.

One of my main reasons for going down to Panama early was to meet with the commanders there to determine how to best alert the troops for the operation without compromising security. And of course, I could control the pre-H-hour activities better there than I could back at Bragg.

There was no doubt; the troops in Panama were ready. All units were already in a high state of alert and could be assembled in two hours. They'd had intensified training; they'd eyeballed every target they would take down; and commanders had even prepared handy "battle books," which provided the complete tactical plan for each target. For the sake of security, however, units below battalion level had deliberately not been briefed. And now this would have to be done for real, and quickly.

After landing at Howard Air Force Base on Monday night, I went straight to Fort Clayton and assembled all my commanders down to battalion level to tell them the operation was a go, at 0100 hours, 20 December — twenty-eight hours away. We then decided to call the junior officers in for briefing at 8:00 P.M. the next day, and the troops sequestered and briefed at 9:00. This would allow four hours for detailed briefings at company level, issue of ammo, and preparation for movement to attach positions. Both Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations teams (equipped with portable lowdspeakers and precut scripts) had previously been assigned to all company-level combat units.

Meanwhile, General Thurman and I had one other major concern — the security of the rightfully elected government, Endara, Ford, and Calderon, in hiding since their heating in May. Although Green Berets stationed in Panama had been keeping an eye on them and had responsibility for a rescue mission (if needed), the truth was that Noriega could have taken them anytime he wanted.

The Deputy Chief of Mission, John Bushnell (the Ambassador was on home leave), solved that problem by inviting the three men to dinner at his quarters on Howard Air Force Base, Tuesday evening, December 19. After dinner, they were flown by helicopter to Quarry Heights, where they were briefed on the operation by General Thurman.

Just before midnight, a Panamanian judge was provided space in Thurman's headquarters, and there officially swore in Endara as president, and Ford and Calderon as vice presidents. After the ceremony, they were taken to a safe house on Fort Clayton, where they prepared the speeches they would deliver the morning after H-hour.

The United States immediately recognized the Endara government.

Meanwhile, we had several people tracking Noriega, and they had a fairly good handle on where he was about eighty percent of the time. That turned out not to he good enough.

On Tuesday the nineteenth, he had spent most of the day in the Colon area. Late that afternoon, his entourage left Colon and headed for Panama City — or so we thought. We later learned that somewhere between Colon and Panama City, the convoy had split in two, one part headed east to a rest camp near Torrijos-Tocumen International Airport, where Noriega had a rendezvous with a prostitute (arranged by his aide, Captain Gaitan — a true bad guy; he'd reportedly murdered three people). The other part proceeded on to the Comandancia, where a Noriega look-alike got out, was greeted by the honor guard, and proceeded inside.

Based on information our people provided, Wayne Downing and I both quickly realized that this man was not Noriega.

But where was the real one? We didn't know.

Back in the States, marshaling had been completed and troops were loading and launching from fourteen different bases. Since the plan called for radio silence, we conducted everything up until H-hour from a Master Execution Checklist. As long as a unit was on schedule, there was no need for reports; we broke radio silence only when something happened that might keep a unit from accomplishing its mission at the specified time.

So far, so good. Everything seemed to be on track — including command and control: I had overall control from my headquarters in Panama, while Downing provided an alternate command post in that country. He had complete communications and the ability to control the whole operation. Airborne over the Atlantic in an EC-130 was the Deputy Corps Commander, Major General Will Roosma, with a complete battle staff and all the communications necessary to control the operation. And back at Fort Bragg was another fully manned command center, also capable of controlling the operation.

A total of 253 fixed-wing aircraft and 80 helicopters were to be involved in D Day activities. On the next page is a listing by type and number.

Some of these aircraft, such as the thirty-five KC-10 and KC-135 tankers, would assume orbit positions outside the immediate operational area so as not to interfere with combat activities.

All those carrying troops or in troop support missions would assemble over the Gulf of Mexico, drop down below Cuba's radar coverage and proceed through the Yucatan Gap, and then on to Panama and their specific target areas. Just in case any were challenged by Castro's air force, twelve F- 15 fighters were aloft near Cuba and ready to respond.

All crews involved in the combat operation would wear night-vision goggles. All troop-carrying aircraft, including heavy equipment drop operations, would fly blached-out, and were to be AWADS-equipped (technology for all weather conditions). All crews flying special operations forces would be SOLL-11 qualified (able to make blacked-out landings in total darkness).

D DAY FIXEL

The first call from a commander came at about 6:00 P.M., an hour before the 82nd's scheduled takeoff time, from Major General Jim Johnson, Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division: A severe ice storm had hit Pope Air Force Base and it would be impossible to launch all his troops as scheduled. The twenty-eight C-141 heavy drop aircraft had been loaded and pre-positioned at Charleston. No problem as far as they were concerned. The problem was with the troop-carrying C-141s. There was not enough de-icing equipment to launch the twenty personnel birds at one time. At this point, he had only eight ready to launch, and it would be three to four hours before he could launch the rest of the force.

I was not surprised when he asked for a delay, but I denied it. "Send those eight on, " I told him, "and send the rest as soon as the others can be de-iced."

Of course, I knew there was no getting around a delay, which would mean that three key targets — Panama Viejo, Tinajitas, and Fort Cimarron — could not all be taken before daylight. Two of them, probably Tinajitas and Fort Cimarron, would have to be taken in the morning, which would likely mean more casualties. You have to adjust for the unforeseen in any complex operation.

Meanwhile, a thick fog had moved in at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, where the tanker aircraft had been assembled. Though it was so thick that a truck had to lead each plane to the end of the runway for takeoff, all the aircraft launched on time.

Delaying H-hour for the entire operation would have resulted in serious consequences, as I well knew. Commanders are trained and entrusted to wake these kinds of judgments, and to develop alternative plans.

Accordingly, I called Johnson back ten minutes after his call. "Your first priority," I told him, "is to take Panama Viejo, and if possible Tinajitas, before daylight. Fort Cimarron," which was farther from Panama City, "can be taken later in the day. I'll take responsibility for containing Tinajitas and Fort Cimarron by keeping AC-130s nearby until you can conduct your air assaults."

We knew in advance that the PDF had established a nest of sixteen heavy mortars near Tinajitas, which could range all of Panama City and Howard Air Force Base. For that reason, they had already been targeted for AC-130 strikes at H-hour, and afterward if required.

Those mortars had given us other concerns: Since the nineteen C-130s carrying Rangers to Rio Hato and Torrijos would have been in the air for seven hours, they'd be practically running on fumes when they made their drop. Because they were not air-refuelable, we had to have fuel for them in Panama; the plan was to land them at Howard — about forty miles from Rio Hato. But, because the PDF mortars might be firing on Howard, an alternative plan had to be developed. We therefore planned to land two C-5s ou the civilian runway at Torrijos-Tocumen, where they could serve as "wet wing filling stations" for the C-130s, if nesessary. The C-5s were to land immediately after the Rangers had secured the field and cleared the runway of obstacles.

As it turned out, we had no problem using Howard, but still used the C-5s for refueling helicopters, particularly those supporting the 82nd's three air assaults.

As we got closer to H-hour, Downing and I monitored PDF command nets to determine if they had any inkling of our operation.

And then we got a kick in the gut.

At 1830 I got a call from Bragg: Dan Rather had just announced on the CBS Evening News, "U.S. military transport planes have left Fort Bragg, North Carolina, home of the Army's elite 82nd Airborne paratroopers. The Pentagon declines to say whether or not they are bound for Panama. It will say only that the Bragg-based XVIII Corps has been conducting what the Army calls an airborne readiness exercise." And on the NBC Evening News, Ed Rabel reported, "United States C-141 Starlifters flew into Panama this afternoon, one landing every ten minutes. At the same time these aircraft were arriving, security was tightened around the air base. U.S. soldiers could be seen in full combat gear on roads around the base." At the end of his brief report, Rabel noted, "No one here could confirm that these aircraft were part of a U. S. invasion group, but tensions on both sides are high this evening over the possibility of a U.S. strike."

Washington had also received a report that a PDF soldier had overheard U.S. soldiers discussing H-hour, and had sent this information up the chain to Noriega; but I didn't believe it for a minute. All U. S. servicemen were locked up and preparing for the attack at the time when this was alleged to have happened.

However they got it — from reports in our media or otherwise — t he PDF apparently picked up word of the operation, now only three hours away. At 10:00 P.M., our listeners began hearing conversations among PDF commanders that indicated they knew something was up. One PDF commander told another: "Tonight is the night, the ball game starts at one o'clock"; others called in their troops and ordered weapons to be issued. There were enough such indicators to convince me to recommend to Thurman that we should advance H-hour. My plan was to attach earlier with the troops already in Panama, to gain as much advantage as possible. The Rangers and the 82nd would just have to attach as scheduled.

I had first hoped to move H-hour ahead by thirty minutes, and Thurman approved that. But after checking again with Wayne Downing, who'd be running the three concurrent critical actions — rescue Kurt Muse, attack the Comandancia, and neutralize Patilla Airfield, Noriega's jet, and the presidential yacht — he and I realized that a thirty-minute advance might be pushing the envelope a bit. So we settled for fifteen minutes, which Thurman approved.

H-hour for all units in Panama was therefore set for 12:45 A.M.

TWENTY-SEVEN MINUTES TO GO

Now everything was on track. Most of the facilities that had to be protected had already been clandestinely secured. Special Forces reconnaissance teams had been covertly inserted in the vicinity of the major targets where they could report the latest information. Units were loaded and ready to move. Communications hot lines had long since been established to the major supporting commands — LANTCOM, SOCOM, the Air Mobility Command, and of course our parent headquarters, SOUTHCOM, only a short distance away in the tunnel at Quarry Heights, where General Thurman would remain the first night.

Though sporadic gunfire could be heard throughout Panama City, by then that was usually the case on any night.

As all troops well know, "Shit happens."

We didn't expect airliners at Torrijos-Tocumen after midnight. This night turned out to be an exception. At 12:40 A.M., a Brazilian wide-body landed, with more than three hundred people on board. At 0100 hours, when the Rangers dropped, these people would either be inside the terminal getting fleeced by the PDF and the customs agents or still unloading. Either way, we had problems.

I called Downing to tell him to prepare for a mass hostage situation at the airport.

"We'll be standing by," he answered. "But remember, we have four rifle companies in that battalion, and one has responsibility for securing the terminal and the control tower. They should be able to handle the situation."

"Let's hope so," I said.

With only minutes remaining, combat was fast approaching. The AC-130 gunships and Apaches were airborne and ready to start preparatory fires on key objectives. The four Sheridan tanks brought in on October- 15 were now approaching firing positions on Anton Hill. They'd engage the Comandancia with their main guns at precisely 0045 hours. Twenty-five Special Forces soldiers from Task Force Black were aboard three Blackhawk helicopters en route to secure the Pacora River bridge, which was critical in keeping Battalion 2000 out of the fight at the airport.

During the planning phase, we had ruled out destroying the bridge. It was the only way for people in much of eastern Panama to get to Panama City. That meant the bridge had to be secured and protected.

All units in Panama were "locked and loaded" (rounds chambered and weapons cocleed) and moving to their assault objectives. Once again, men had to resort to a barbaric way of settling differences. Hopefully, the dying would last no longer than about four hours.

During the final minutes before H-hour, I learned from Thurman that the name of the operation had been changed to Operation JUST CAUSE. General Jim Lindsay of USSOCOM had called General Kelley: "Do you want your grandchildren to ask you, 'What were things like back there in BLUE SPOON?' "And Kelley had agreed: BLUE SPOON didn't sound like anything anybody would ever want to be proud of.

"I sure am glad Jim Lindsay made that call," I told Thurman, "because what we're about to spill blood over certainly is a just cause. ' "