Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt - читать бесплатно онлайн полную версию книги автора Robert A. Forczyk (Chapter 1 The Opposing Armoured Forces in 1941) #7

Chapter 1 The Opposing Armoured Forces in 1941

The German Panzerwaffe

The Wehrmacht initially deployed seventeen panzer divisions against the Soviet Union, organized into four Panzergruppen.[1] Nine of the panzer divisions were less than a year old, having been formed from other existing infantry units between August and November 1940, when Hitler decided to double the number of panzer divisions. In practical terms, this meant that nearly half the panzer divisions involved in Barbarossa had no previous campaign experience in their current role. Nor was the internal structure of the panzer divisions uniform: eight were organized with two panzer battalions and nine divisions had three panzer battalions. The Panzergruppen were further divided into ten Armeekorps (mot.), later redesignated in early 1942 as Panzerkorps, with each controlling up to two panzer divisions and up to two motorized infantry units. The Panzergruppe (or Panzerarmee after October 1941) would be the primary German operational-level armoured formation of 1941–42, while the Panzerkorps would be the primary tactical-level formation.[2] Previous campaigns had taught the Wehrmacht the value of concentrating armour, so it was rare for individual panzer divisions, brigades or regiments to operate independently in the first year of the war in the East.

^{Overview – disposition of major German and Soviet armoured units at start of Barbarossa, 22 June 1941 and major battle sites, limit of German advance.}

The bulk of the Panzerwaffe was massed with Heeresgruppe Mitte in the center, with Generaloberst Heinz Guderian’s Panzergruppe 2 and Generaloberst Hermann Hoth’s Panzergruppe 3. These two Panzergruppen had nine panzer divisions with a total of 1,786 tanks, or 57 per cent of the total available for Barbarossa. Guderian, who had fought so hard to promote the concept of an independent panzer branch before the war, now used the credibility that he gained as a corps commander in Poland and France to ensure that he was given the strongest panzer divisions for Operation Barbarossa. Panzergruppe Guderian would start the campaign with nearly 1,000 tanks in thirteen panzer battalions and all five of his divisions were fully equipped with Pz.III medium tanks. In contrast, Hoth’s Panzergruppe 3 had a total of twelve panzer battalions in four panzer divisions, none of which were equipped with Pz.III medium tanks. Instead, Hoth was provided with 507 Czech-made Pz.38(t) light tanks, equipped with the 3.7cm Skoda A7 cannon. The Pz.38(t) tanks were still in production by BMM in Prague and had better mobility than the Pz.III Aus F/G models, but significantly less armour and firepower. Indeed, Hoth’s Panzergruppe was primarily configured as a pursuit force and had negligible anti-armour capability.

Generaloberst Guderian’s Panzergruppe 2 (Heeresgruppe Mitte)

Generaloberst Hoth’s Panzergruppe 3 (Heeresgruppe Mitte)

Generaloberst Höpner’s Panzergruppe 4, which was tasked to support Heeresgruppe Nord’s advance toward Leningrad, was the smallest German armoured formation given an independent mission in Barbarossa. Höpner had three panzer divisions, comprising eight panzer battalions with 590 tanks. His panzer units were all veteran outfits, but equipped with a motley collection of German and Czech-made tanks. In particular, the 6.Panzer-Division was primarily equipped with obsolescent Czech Pz.35(t) light tanks, which had no spare parts available even at the start of the campaign. The Czech Pz.35(t) was not mechanically reliable enough for a protracted campaign and none would remain in front-line combat service after October 1941. The 1.Panzer-Division was particularly fortunate in having two out of its four Schützen Abteilung (rifle battalions) equipped with a total of nearly 200 Sd.Kfz.250 and Sd.Kfz.251 half tracks.

In southern Poland, Generaloberst von Kleist’s Panzergruppe 1 was assembled to spearhead Heeresgruppe Süd’s advance toward Kiev. Kleist was given the second-best equipped Panzergruppe after Guderian, with ten panzer battalions in five panzer divisions, with a total of 730 tanks. Kleist’s command had no Czech-built tanks and a good number of Pz.III medium tanks, but he also had significantly more ground to cover in his objectives than the other Panzergruppen. Abwehr intelligence estimates on Soviet tank strength and dispositions were poor, but sufficient to indicate that Kleist would be up against some of the strongest formations available to the Red Army. Thus, it would come as little surprise that Kleist would need help from at least one other Panzergruppe to complete his mission.

Generaloberst Höpner’s Panzergruppe 4 (Heeresgruppe Nord)

Generaloberst von Kleist’s Panzergruppe 1 (Heeresgruppe Süd)

The main combat elements of the 1941 Panzer Division were a panzer regiment (some divisions still had panzer brigade headquarters) with two or three panzer battalions; two Schützen (motorized infantry regiments) with a total of four battalions; a Kradschützen battalion (motorcycle infantry); an Aufklärungs Abteilung (reconnaissance battalion); a motorized artillery regiment with a total of thirty-six towed howitzers; a Panzerjäger Abteilung with towed 3.7cm and 5cm Pak guns and a motorized pioneer battalion. Most of the infantry rode in trucks, but panzer divisions were beginning to receive the excellent Sd.Kfz.250 and Sd.Kfz.251 half tracks; about 560 were available at the outset of Barbarossa. Altogether, the panzer division was authorized a total of 5,300 infantry in the five Schützen and Kradschützen battalions. A 1941 panzer division had a total of about 4,100 vehicles. The organization of a Panzer Abteilung (battalion) was far from standardized in June 1941, but its combat elements were authorized two or three light companies (equipped with Pz.III, Pz.35(t) or Pz.38(t)) and one medium company with Pz.IVs. All told, an ideal, full-strength Panzer Abteilung would have between sixty-six and eighty-eight tanks (fifteen to twenty Pz.II, thirty-five to fifty-two Pz.III, fourteen Pz.IV, two Pz.Bef) and 625–780 men.[3] Although a number of obsolete Pz.I light tanks were still in the panzer division, they were not in the panzer regiments but in the panzer pionier-bataillon, where they served as mine-clearing vehicles.

Major sub-units in the Panzer Division

The main German battle tank employed in Operation Barbarossa was the Pz.III, with the newer Ausf G and H models representing the best available to the Panzerwaffe at that time. These models, both armed with the 5cm KwK 38 L/42 cannon, were better in terms of firepower and protection than the T-26 or BT-series light tanks which still comprised the bulk of the Red Army’s tank forces. The Pz.III was intended to defeat enemy tanks and carried a typical basic load of eighty-five armour-piercing and fifteen high-explosive rounds. The standard 5cm Panzergranate 39 armour-piercing round could penetrate up to 47mm of armour at 500 meters, enabling the Pz.III Ausf G or H to defeat all Soviet light tanks at typical battlefield ranges. The Pz.III would even be able to inflict damage on the Soviet T-34, using Panzergranate 38 with flank or rear shots fired from ranges under 500 meters; difficult, but not impossible. The 5cm Panzergranate 40, which had much better armour-piercing capability due to its tungsten penetrator, entered production just before the start of Barbarossa and was available only in limited numbers; for example, Panzergruppe 4 had enough Panzergranate 40 available to equip each Pz.III with just five rounds.[4] While the Pz.III’s antiarmour firepower was modest, its main limitation was its tactical range of barely 100km on a single load of fuel, which was not very impressive.

The Pz.IV medium tanks, armed with the 7.5cm KwK 37 L/24 howitzer, were armed with a mix of fifty-two high explosive rounds, twenty-one armour-piercing rounds (k.Gr.rot.Pz. (APC) or Panzergranate) and seven smoke rounds at the start of Barbarossa.[5] While the 7.5cm k.Gr.rot.Pz. round could penetrate up to 39mm of armour at 500 meters, its low velocity made it poorly-suited for anti-tank combat against T-34 or KV tanks. In an effort to improve firepower, the Germans were developing a new type of High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) rounds for the 7.5cm howitzers on Pz.IVs and StuG III assault guns, but they would not be available until the end of 1941. In actuality, both the Pz.IV and StuG III were only suited for the infantry support role in 1941, leaving the Pz.III as the sole effective dual-purpose tank employed by the Panzerwaffe in Barbarossa. In addition to the panzers, the Wehrmacht deployed twelve Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung with over 200 StuG III assault guns and five Army-Level Panzerjäger-Abteilung equipped with 135 Panzerjäger I tank destroyers. The Panzerjäger I was an improvisation, with the high-velocity Czech-made 4.7cm cannon mounted atop an obsolete Pz.I chassis; the 4.7cm was one of the best anti-tank weapons available to the Wehrmacht at the start of Barbarossa.

Nearly one-quarter of the German battle tanks heading into the Soviet Union were Pz.II light tanks, which were already obsolescent in the previous French campaign. Unlike the Pz.I, the Pz.II still played a major role in German tank platoons and companies. Although often used as a scouting tank, the Pz.II tank had better armoured protection than either the T-26 or BT-series light tanks and its rapid-firing 2cm KwK 30 cannon could penetrate their armour at ranges under 500 meters. The Pz.II would also play a useful role in escorting supply convoys through forested areas infested with Soviet partisans.

Despite much media publicity about Germany’s so-called Blitzkrieg doctrine both during and after the war – which was intended to create the impression of short, successful campaigns – the Panzerwaffe had a relatively amorphous doctrine in 1941. One of the key components of this doctrine was a preference for combined-arms tactics in mixed kampfgruppen; tank-pure tactics were rejected as foolhardy and inefficient. As an example, the 4.Panzer-Division’s Kampfgruppe Eberbach in early July 1941 was comprised of one Panzer-Abteilung, one Kradschützen Kompanie (motorcycle infantry), a Schützen Kompanie (Mechanized Infantry) in SPW half tracks, an artillery battalion (twelve towed 10.5-cm howitzers), two Pioneer Kompanie, part of a Brückenkolonne, one heavy flak battery (8.8cm) and one light flak battery (2cm). All told, Kampfgruppe Eberbach started with about 2,300 troops and 750 vehicles. Other variations included Panzerjäger and Aufklärungs (reconnaissance troops), as well as more infantry. Each panzer division would normally form three kampfgruppen, usually one that was tank-heavy and two that were infantry-heavy.

Another key component of the German doctrine was extensive use of radios in tactical vehicles to ensure effective command and control. German panzer units operated company, battalion, regiment and division-level radio networks, which enabled timely sharing of combat information and provided German commanders with excellent situational awareness. Using the Medium Frequency (MF) Fu-8 or Very High Frequency (VHF) Fu-6 radios mounted on a Panzerbefehlswagen III (armoured command vehicle) or a Sd.Kfz.250/3 half track, a German panzer kampfgruppe commander could exercise command over a 40km radius while moving and up to 70km while stationary. German panzer platoon and company radio nets relied upon the VHF Fu-2 and Fu-5 radios, with a 2–4km radius of control. The mounting of radios in every panzer allowed the Germans to get the most out of their available armour and mass it where it was needed most.

Furthermore, the use of the Enigma encryption device gave the Germans a secure means of communicating orders between divisions, corps and armies. Although German panzer units lacked direct air-ground communications with Luftwaffe units in June 1941, requests for air support could be passed from forward kampfgruppen up through the division radio net in a reasonable period of time.

German operational and tactical-level panzer doctrine incorporated elements of the Stosstruppen tactics of 1918, with a preference for infiltration and encirclement, rather than costly, frontal attacks. The Germans also learned first-hand in the streets of Warsaw on 8 September 1939 that panzer divisions fared poorly in cities, although this lesson would often be ignored during the Russo-German War. Instead, the panzer divisions were intended to create a breach in the enemy front on favorable terrain – with help from infantry, artillery and the Luftwaffe – and then advance rapidly to encircle the enemy’s main body before they could react. The panzers would push boldly ahead of the non-motorized infantry divisions, who would have to rely upon assault-gun batteries for close support in completing the breakthrough battle. German doctrine assumed that once enemy units were encircled in a kessel, that they would either quickly surrender or be annihilated with concentric attacks. The doctrinal preference was to use pairs of panzer divisions or corps to encircle an enemy with double envelopments, rather than the riskier single-envelopment approach. Thus, the German doctrinal solution to the Red Army was to conduct successive battles of encirclement until the best Soviet units were demolished.

However, the doctrine employed by the German Panzerwaffe had two primary flaws, which had not appeared in previous campaigns. First, the Germans could not logistically sustain a series of panzer encirclements indefinitely; eventually fuel shortages and mechanical defects would bring the advance to a halt and that might give the enemy a chance to recover. Second, the doctrine was developed at a time when anti-tank defenses were relatively weak, which enabled panzer divisions to run roughshod over most infantry divisions caught in open terrain. Yet as Soviet anti-tank defenses steadily improved in 1942–43, German panzer leaders continued to believe that enemy infantry could not stop an envelopment from occurring.

The men leading the panzers into the Soviet Union were a well-trained and professional cadre, but nearly one-third had little or no direct experience with tanks. Indeed, many German senior armour leaders in 1941 were still learning their trade and not completely aware of the capabilities and limitations of tanks. Half of the top thirty-one panzer leaders came from the infantry branch and one-third from the cavalry. At the most senior level, Generaloberst Ewald von Kleist of Panzergruppe 1 had more experience with commanding large panzer formations than any other officer in any army, although he had never actually served in a panzer unit. Generaloberst Heinz Guderian, commander of Panzergruppe 2, had commanded a panzer division and led his motorized corps in Poland and France, but was the only non-combat arms officer in command of panzer units in Operation Barbarossa. As a signal corps officer turned mechanization advocate, Guderian remained something of a dilettante throughout his career and had the impulsive, undisciplined nature of a military maverick – he was not a team player, but an individualist. Six of the ten commanders of motorized corps in June 1941 had previous battle command experience with a corps, but three – including General der Infanterie Erich von Manstein – had no personal experience with panzer units. Only three panzer corps commanders: General der Panzertruppen Georg-Hans Reinhardt, General der Panzertruppen Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg and General der Panzertruppe Rudolf Schmidt had both extensive corps command experience and had previously led a panzer division in battle. Hitler’s creation of ten new panzer divisions in late 1940 diluted the division leadership pool somewhat and, by the start of Barbarossa, only eight of the seventeen panzer division commanders had previous division command experience and five of the seventeen were new to the Panzerwaffe. A number of the new panzer division commanders, such as Generalleutnant Walter Model, had primarily been staff officers with limited command experience. The German officers tended to be older than their Soviet counterparts due to Stalin’s purge of the Red Army, with the average age of the top thirty-one panzer commanders being fifty-three.

At the platoon, company, battalion and regiment level, German tankers were very well trained in operating their vehicles and there was a high proportion of combat veterans. All had been trained at either Panzertruppen Schule I in Munster or Panzertruppen Schule II in Wünsdorf, which helped to standardize skill levels across the Panzerwaffe. Most panzer divisions passed the winter of 1940–41 in France or Germany, with considerable time spent in gunnery and maneuver training. Units rotated through training areas such as Grafenwöhr or Warthe, as well as gunnery training at the Putlos range on the Baltic. The German tank crews were extremely well-trained in their basic tasks of driving, loading and gunnery and were cross-trained in order to fill gaps created by casualties. German tankers were also trained to conduct routine maintenance, but they were not so handy at mending thrown track, conducting battlefield recovery or repairing simple defects; they tended to wait for their I-Gruppe (Instandsetzungsgrupe, Repair Group) mechanics to arrive. This type of casual attitude was not an issue in the French campaign, but in Russia it often led to tanks being abandoned. At the start of Barbarossa, most panzer commanders were proven junior officers or NCOs. It is also important to note the role played by other members of the panzer company and battalion, particularly the Spieß who played the role of company first sergeant. The real strength of the German Heer (Army) lay in its carefully groomed NCO corps, consisting of men who could easily assume higher positions when necessary to fill gaps created by combat losses. German training also put great stress on individual initiative and problemsolving, which produced a very aggressive and dynamic quality in combat; soldiers were encouraged to act quickly and not wait to be told. At the beginning of Barbarossa, the German panzer soldiers in general also had very high morale: they believed that they were on a winning team and that the campaign would be over quickly, with the survivors being well-rewarded by a grateful Fatherland. The Fascist philosophy of the Third Reich, replete with parades, medals, hero-worship and neo-Gothic heraldry, helped to create a generation of over-achievers who sought to gain recognition through dedicated service and self-sacrificing behavior. As it turned out, excellent training, an aggressive spirit and high morale were major factors in explaining the Panzerwaffe’s successes in 1941–42, as well as its subsequent defeats.

The ability of the panzer divisions to achieve decisive operational-level success in the Soviet Union rested squarely on the ability of the corps- and army-level logistical echelons to sustain the panzer spearheads with fuel and ammunition, as well as replacement crews and vehicles. However, the German logistical system was not robust enough to conduct a protracted campaign in the Soviet Union, over vast distances and in all weather conditions.

A 1941 panzer division required one V.S. (Verbrauchssatz) of fuel, equivalent to 125cbm (m³)[6] or 125,000 liters or 92.3 tons, to move all of its vehicles a distance of 100km on roads. German doctrine specified that each panzer division needed four V.S. of fuel stockpiled in order to begin an offensive, which would give it a theoretical range of 400km, although the poor state of Russian roads meant that one V.S. was often only sufficient to move a division 40–50km. In order to reach distant objectives such as Moscow or the eastern Ukraine, the Germans would require dozens of V.S. for each panzer division. However, the logistical capabilities of the Wehrmacht were grossly insufficient for an operation on this scale. The Third Reich perennially suffered from inadequate fuel production and even a short duration campaign on the scale of Operation Barbarossa would severely diminish the available fuel reserves. The Panzergruppen were allocated sufficient fuel for a two-month operation, with only limited reserves available to sustain any operations beyond the summer months. Even if the fuel was available, sustaining the armoured spearheads into the depths of the Soviet Union was nearly impossible, since the Panzergruppen lacked the organic transportation resources to efficiently move fuel more than 50km beyond a railhead. Each panzer division started with three organic fuel companies with a total of thirty trucks that could carry 75cbm of fuel or 0.6 V.S. Consequently, a panzer division could exhaust its entire fuel stockpile in a two-day advance and then become immobilized until more fuel was brought forward; this happened repeatedly during Operation Barbarossa in 1941 and Operation Blau in 1942. Rapid advances left the nearest railheads far in the rear, which made resupply far more time-consuming than anticipated. Armoured operations by both sides would be constrained by the slow progress of their rail repair units.

German fuel shortages were exacerbated by the general shortage of wheeled vehicles in the Wehrmacht, which was only temporarily made good by the use of thousands of captured British, French and Russian trucks. Unfortunately, these second-hand vehicles broke down at an alarming rate during Barbarossa, due to lack of spare parts and the poor condition of Russian roads. The panzer division’s mobility was based just as much on the Opel 36S medium cargo truck as it was on its tanks, but German domestic production of this key vehicle was never enough to satisfy authorized levels, never mind combat and non-combat losses. Further adding to German logistic problems, Hitler was so confident of a Russian collapse that only three weeks after Barbarossa began he ordered German industry to curtail ammunition production for the army by autumn 1941.[7] When the campaign did not end as expected, the German army found itself running dangerously short of artillery and anti-tank ammunition in December 1941. In short, Germany’s panzer forces were powerful and well-led forces, moderately well-equipped, but fragile due to their unpreparedness for a protracted campaign.

The Red Army’s Tank Force

In June 1941, the Red Army had the enormous total of 18,700 serviceable tanks available, plus another 4,500 tanks under repair. About 63 per cent of the available armour – over 14,000 tanks – were deployed in the twenty-eight mechanized corps authorized between July 1940 and March 1941. Another 1,700 tanks were included in five separate tank or mechanized divisions deployed in the Far East and Transbaikal and 6,000 were deployed with cavalry units, training schools, repair facilities and storage depots.[8] Soviet armour units were in the early stages of re-equipping with the KV-series heavy tanks and T-34 medium tank, but out of 385 KV-I and 185 KV-II built by mid-June 1941, only 433 had been issued to troop units. Similarly, about 1,000 T-34 tanks were built before the German invasion and 903 had arrived at units.

A total of eighteen of the Red Army’s twenty-eight mechanized corps were stationed in the five border districts in the west, with a total of 10,688 tanks, of which roughly 83 per cent were serviceable. Four more mechanized corps were deployed in central Russia, as second echelon forces. None of these formations had existed for even a year and only one had been able to conduct division-level training before Barbarossa began. Consequently, the level of corps and division-level training and experience within these mechanized corps was negligible in June 1941 and severely reduced their combat effectiveness. Unlike the German panzer units, the structure of the Soviet mechanized corps and its component tank and mechanized divisions was fairly uniform in June 1941, even though many units were only partially-equipped skeletons. On paper, the Soviet mechanized corps was a powerful formation that could field two tank divisions, a mechanized division, a motorcycle regiment and a motorized engineer battalion; altogether an impressive total of nine–twelve tank, nine infantry and six artillery battalions, with over 37,000 men and 6,000 vehicles. Compared to the German panzer divisions, the Soviet mechanized corps was tank-heavy, with insufficient infantry and artillery. However, the various deficiencies of the mechanized corps and their constituent divisions rapidly became irrelevant as they were destroyed or disbanded within the first three weeks of the campaign. The Soviet Stavka disbanded all remaining mechanized corps on 15 July 1941 and converted their remnants into tank brigades, which became the de facto primary Soviet armoured formation for the rest of the year. Forced onto the defensive by the violence of the German invasion, the Red Army was forced to disperse its remaining armour and commit it in the infantry support role.

Initially, the Red Army’s best armour was concentrated in the south near Kiev because that is where the Soviet general staff expected the Germans to make their main effort, but the remaining armour units were spread thinly in Lithuania and Byelorussia. The Northwestern Front’s 8th Army defended a 155km-wide front along the Lithuanian-East Prussian border with five rifle divisions and General-major Nikolai M. Shestopalov’s 12th Mechanized Corps, which had a total of 725 tanks and ninety-six armoured cars.[9]

Shestopalov’s corps had no modern tanks – BT-7s and T-26s – and it was dispersed across a 110km-wide area. Over 30 per cent of his tanks were non-operational.[10] The 12th Mechanized Corps had most of its artillery, but less than half its authorized trucks or radios, which made a war of movement or command and control difficult. On the other hand, the 12th Mechanized Corps had a fairly well-trained cadre, including Colonel Ivan Chernyakhovsky, commander of the 28th Tank Division. The remainder of the Lithuanian border was defended by the 11th Army, which had eight rifle divisions and General-major Aleksei V. Kurkin’s 3rd Mechanized Corps. Kurkin’s command had 630 tanks, including fifty-one KV heavy tanks and fifty T-34 medium tanks, but its constituent divisions were dispersed across a wide area. Altogether, the Red Army had a total of 1,355 tanks defending the Lithuanian border, although the majority were T-26 and BT-7 light tanks. In addition, the Northern Front had another 1,431 tanks available as reinforcements, with the 1st Mechanized Corps stationed near Pskov and the 10th Mechanized Corps near Leningrad; however, these were second-echelon formations equipped primarily with older light tanks, including BT-2 and BT-5s. The Red Army’s armour force in the Baltic Special Military District was inadequate in quality and was poorly deployed from the start, but also enjoyed the advantage of terrain that favored the defender, with its numerous rivers, marshes and forests.

Soviet Armour Forces in the Northwest and Northern Fronts, 22 June 1941

Although the Red Army concentrated six mechanized corps with 2,200 tanks in the Western Front to defend the Bialystok salient, the only formation with any real combat capability was General-major Mikhail G. Khatskilevich’s 6th Mechanized Corps. Khatskilevich had nearly half the tanks in the Western Front under his command, including four heavy tank battalions with 114 KV heavy tanks and seven medium battalions with 238 T-34 tanks. In contrast, the 11th, 13th and 14th Mechanized Corps were at half strength or less and equipped primarily with T-26 light tanks. These four first-echelon corps – assigned to support the 3rd, 4th and 10th Armies – were arrayed in an arc from Grodno to Bialystok to Brest, and deployed 30–60km behind the border. Further back, between Baranovichi and Minsk, the Western Front had the 17th and 20th Mechanized Corps in second echelon, but these were both cadre formations with only 129 light tanks between them. General Dmitri Pavlov, who had been instrumental in guided Soviet tank developments in the late 1930s as head of the ABTU, was now in command of the Western Front and he had the four first echelon mechanized corps positioned to support his twelve front-line rifle divisions. Pavlov essentially committed all his armour to a positional infantry support role, leaving no room for maneuver options.

Soviet Armour Forces in the Western Front, 22 June 1941

The Kiev Military District, soon to become the Western Front under General-Polkovnik Mikhail P. Kirponos, had a total of eight mechanized corps with over 4,400 tanks deployed in the region. Kirponos deployed the five strongest of these mechanized corps in his first echelon near the border, between Lvov and Rovno; these corps had between 45 and 90 per cent of their equipment. Among these, General-major Andrey Vlasov’s[11] 4th Mechanized Corps was the best-equipped armoured formation in the Red Army of June 1941, with 101 KV heavy tanks and 313 T-34 tanks. On paper, Vlasov’s corps was as strong as any German Panzergruppe and, in addition to its new tanks, had a full complement of artillery and over 2,000 trucks. Strikingly, the thirty-nine-year-old Vlasov had no previous experience with tanks, but was a rising star in the post-purge Red Army. Kirponos’ second echelon of armour consisted of three cadre mechanized corps deployed west of Kiev; these formations were equipped solely with light tanks and had between 20 and 40 per cent of their equipment. Further south, the Odessa Military District had two partly-equipped mechanized corps defending the Romanian border with 700 light tanks and a single battalion of T-34s. In central Russia, in the Moscow, Orel and Volga military districts, there were four more partly-equipped mechanized corps, with 2,000 light tanks but no KV or T-34 tanks. Another 5,000 Soviet light tanks were beyond the reach of the Wehrmacht, located in the Caucasus, Transbaykal, Central Asian and Far Eastern military districts. Even more important were the 15,000–20,000 tankers in these districts, who would provide the Stavka with a ready reserve of at least partly-trained armour crewmen to form new tank brigades.

After mid-July 1941, the primary Soviet armoured formations were the tank regiment and the tank brigade. At the outset of the war in the East, each Soviet mechanized corps had five tank regiments: two in each of its two constituent tank divisions and one in the mechanized division. The tank regiments were intended to function as part of a combined-arms structure within a division and were tank-pure formations with no organic infantry or artillery; each tank regiment in the tank divisions was authorized three tank battalions with a total of sixty-two tanks. However, once the mechanized corps began to disintegrate under the hammer blows of the German Panzergruppen, the Stavka opted to rely upon independent tank brigades both for expediency of formation and simplicity of command and control. The tank brigades authorized in late August 1941 were based upon the remnants of the mechanized corps and were supposed to have three tank battalions with a total of ninety-one tanks and a motorized infantry battalion. However, as Soviet losses mounted and industry could not yet replace them, the size of the tank brigade continued to shrink. In September, the tank brigade was reduced to two tank battalions with sixty-seven tanks and in December to only forty-six tanks and the infantry battalion was omitted.

Soviet Armour Forces in the Southwest Front, 22 June 1941

Prior to the war, most Soviet tank battalions were usually comprised of only one tank model, but the number of tanks could vary from thirty to fifty. The new T-34 and KV-1 tanks were being fielded by battalions, so there was little integration with existing models prior to the German invasion. The Soviet tank battalion was much smaller than its German counterpart and grew increasingly leaner throughout 1941. Typically, the Soviet tank battalion had a headquarters, an eighty-man maintenance company, a reconnaissance platoon with three BA-10 or BA-20 armoured cars, a twenty-one-man medical section, some fuel and ammunition elements and three tank companies. The Red Army kept tinkering with the size of tank platoons prior to the war, trying out 3-, 4- and 5-tank platoon configurations. Heavy tanks were normally kept in 5-tank platoons, but the light and medium tanks quickly abandoned the pre-war 4-tank platoon and relied upon a 3-tank platoon structure for most of the war.

Although the new KV-I, KV-II and T-34 tanks attract much attention in estimates of the Red Army’s relative combat power in June 1941, these tanks comprised barely 12 per cent of the available Soviet armoured forces at the outset of Barbarossa and were initially rendered nearly combat ineffective by a host of logistical and training defects. Many of these modern tanks had only arrived at their units a few weeks or months prior to Barbarossa and had been stored in warehouses, pending summer training in 1941. Very few crews had trained on either of these new tanks and they were so dissimilar to the earlier light tanks that even experienced tankers needed a transition course before they could effectively use these vehicles in combat. However, far more serious was the shortage of 76.2mm main-gun ammunition for the KV-I and T-34 and the almost complete absence of 152mm ammunition for the KV-II. The more fortunate T-34 tank battalions had a single basic load of ammunition – often with no armour-piercing rounds – while the less fortunate units had only been issued machine-gun ammunition. The fuel shortage was even worse, with most Soviet heavy and medium tanks having no more than one basic load of fuel, enough for a few days operation. Most of the fuel in forward depots was gasoline for the T-26 and BT-series light tanks, but diesel fuel for T-34s and KVs was still in short supply. Spare parts for the new tanks were virtually non-existent. Consequently, the only real advantage enjoyed by the T-34 and KV tanks at the outset of Barbarossa was the enormous effort required by the Germans to destroy them, but otherwise their innate firepower and mobility advantages were squandered by inadequate logistic readiness.

The main Soviet battle tanks employed in 1941 were the T-26 and the BT-7 light tanks, which comprised nearly 80 per cent of the available armour. The T-26 had been designed as an infantry support tank and reflected early-1930s thinking on tank design. About one-third of the operational T-26s in June 1941 were improved models built in 1939–40, but the rest were older models with negligible combat capability. Compared to the German Pz.III Ausf. G or H models, even the newer models of the T-26 were clearly inferior in mobility and protection. The T-26’s greatest weakness was its powerplant, derived from a GAZ truck engine and lacking in mechanical reliability. Between 30 and 40 per cent of the available T-26 light tanks were inoperative at the start of the campaign and most of the remainder suffered mechanical breakdowns after a few weeks of operations. The BT-series light tanks were more capable opponents, particularly the upgraded BT-7M model which first appeared in 1939. The BT-7M employed the same V-2 diesel tank engine as the T-34, giving it greatly superior mobility and reliability over the Pz.III. Unlike the T-26, the BT-7M had thicker, sloped armour, making it closer in protection to the Pz.III. Unfortunately, the KhPZ had ceased manufacturing the BT-7M just before Barbarossa began, in order to concentrate on T-34 production. Both the T-26 and BT-7 mounted the 45mm 20K cannon which – at least on paper – was comparable to the 5cm KwK 38 L/42 on the Pz.III.

Unfortunately, the 45mm gun was undermined by poor quality control in the manufacture of its BR-240 APBC rounds, with steel penetrators that shattered on impact and had difficulty penetrating the armour on the Pz.III and Pz.IV at ranges beyond a few hundred meters. The remaining Soviet armour, including the T-35 heavy tank, the T-28 medium tank, the older BT-2/5 series and the T-37/38/40 light tanks were too obsolescent and too few in number to matter much in the tank battles of 1941–42.

Doctrinally, the Soviet preference for armoured units throughout the war was to maintain three types of units: large formations for independent mobile operations, separate battalion, regiment or brigade-size formations for infantry support and separate RVGK (Reserve of Supreme High Command) units under direct Stavka control. After the dissolution of the mechanized corps in July 1941, the Red Army was left with only infantry support units until spring 1942. While the materiel-poor Red Army of late 1941 could not afford to set aside units for the RVGK until it was clear that Moscow would not fall, this became a priority in 1942 and would eventually provide the Stavka with an advantage that the OKH rarely enjoyed on the Eastern Front – an appreciable reserve of armour that could be shifted to critical fronts.

Soviet armoured tactics at the start of the war were very basic because the level of training was so low in most units. Tank platoons and companies were primarily taught to attack on line to simplify command and control, although wedge formations were also possible. Soviet tank platoons attacked in very dense formations, often with only five meters between vehicles. Soviet tank commanders usually lacked binoculars and were taught to operate ‘buttoned-up’ in combat – which drastically reduced their situational awareness versus German tankers. Since the Soviet Union had not developed an armoured personnel carrier analogous to the German Sd.Kfz.251 – a serious deficiency – Soviet tanks did not operate as closely with their attached motorized infantry as German panzer kampfgruppen did. Taken together, these bunched-up and nearly-blind Soviet tank-pure formations proved easy pickings for German panzer and panzerjäger units. Another tactical consideration was the tendency of the Red Army to substitute ‘scripted’ by-the-book methods for common sense; Soviet armoured tactics in 1941–42 were entirely proscriptive in nature. Indeed, the influence of Marxist dialectical materialism on Soviet military theory led to a slavish devotion to ‘scientific approaches’ to military problems. If an attack failed with heavy losses, Soviet political commissars blamed commanders for not following ‘the playbook,’ while refusing to admit that school-taught tactics needed to be modified to suit battlefield realities.

None of the officers who commanded the Red Army’s mechanized corps in June 1941 had been in their position for more than a year when the German invasion began, and most only for a few months. Soviet mechanized corps commanders were considerably younger than their German counterparts – an average age of forty-four versus an average of fifty-three for the Germans – and less experienced. Some 58 per cent of the mechanized corps commanders had no prior experience with tank or mechanized units and 16 per cent had no prior experience with commanding large formations. After the purges gutted much of the original cadre of experienced Soviet tank officers and the original mechanized corps disbanded in 1939, the new mechanized corps recreated in 1940–41 were heavily staffed with cavalry officers; by June 1941, half the mechanized corps were commanded by cavalrymen. However, it would be a mistake to generalize all the Soviet tank commanders of 1941 as incapable. In particular, General-major Semen M. Krivoshein, commander of the 25th Mechanized Corps in the Volga Military District (MD), was one of the most experienced tankers in the Red Army; he had successfully commanded tank units in Spain, the Far East, Finland and Poland. Indeed, Krivoshein was easily as experienced and capable as most of the German panzer division or corps commanders of 1941. Although only thirty-nine years old in 1941, General-major General Dmitri D. Lelyushenko, commander of the 21st Mechanized Corps, was another experienced and capable Soviet tanker. Most of the Soviet tank officers were graduates of the Frunze Military Academy or VAMM, but some, such as General-major Mikhail P. Petrov, had negligible civilian or military education (in his case, limited to a fourth-grade education), which put them at a huge disadvantage when matched against the Wehrmacht’s Generalstab-trained panzer generals. Among the commanders with no tank experience was General-major Konstantin K. Rokossovsky, a cavalry officer who would quickly demonstrate an aptitude for combined-arms warfare. Overall, the Red Army’s tank leadership in June 1941 was a mixed bag, with a few exceptional officers, a large batch of moderately-capable but inexperienced officers, and a healthy number of chair-warmers.

At the division, brigade, regiment and battalion levels, the situation was about the same, although there were far more unfilled vacancies, with many units still awaiting 25 to 50 per cent of their junior officers from training units. Pre-war officer training required between one and two years and the rapid formation of so many mechanized units temporarily overwhelmed the tank training schools administered by the GABTU. For example, the premier Orel Tank Training School (BTU) had begun training 800 junior officers in September 1940 to operate as T-34 platoon leaders, and the first would be available in the late summer of 1941. In the interim, the Red Army did have a number of outstanding mid-level tank officers, such as Polkovnik Pavel Rotmistrov and Polkovnik Mikhail E. Katukov, who were quite capable of handling a tank brigade or division-size force in combat, if given the opportunity. At the company and platoon level, most extant junior officers were the products of hasty training and few could read a map or direct more than their own tank in battle. Although the enlisted ranks had not been damaged by Stalin’s purges, the rapid expansion of 1940–41 created a great shortage of trained drivers and gunners that had not yet been made good by June 1941. Thousands of conscripts had been sent to six-month tank training schools at Orel and Leningrad, but were still in the pipeline when the invasion began. Lacking a solid NCO corps like the Wehrmacht, the Red Army had few unit-level trainers and had to rely upon centralized training facilities, and there was no one in most tank units to enforce training standards. Few crewmen were cross-trained on other crew functions, which meant that it was difficult to replace casualties. Soviet driver training was particularly inadequate; before the invasion, the Soviet general staff training directorate had issued a directive that the obsolete T-27 tankette would be the primary vehicle used for training in order to save wear and tear on the Red Army’s main battle tanks. Unfortunately, the handling characteristics of the 2.7-ton T-27 were so dissimilar that operating it in no way prepared novice drivers to operate the 32-ton T-34 or 45-ton KV-1. The number of hours allocated to driver training during the hectic re-formation of the mechanized corps was minimal, particularly for the newer tanks. Consequently, Soviet tank crews had numerous accidents during road movements in 1941, often resulting in the loss of tanks.

On the whole, Soviet tank training was overly mechanical in nature, geared to produce soldiers who performed tasks by rote, not by personal initiative. Gunnery training was also inadequate, with sub-caliber firing often substituted for actual main gun firing. In 1945, when the Red Army overran German gunnery ranges in East Prussia and Silesia, Soviet tankers were amazed to find tank gunnery ranges with pop-up targets and moving targets mounted on sleds – none of which existed in the Soviet Union even at the end of the war. Instead, most Soviet crews were fortunate if they had fired four shells at a stationary plywood target before heading off to their unit. In combat, Soviet tankers often fired off all their ammunition as fast as possible, since they had not been taught about the need to conserve rounds.[12] Stalinist-era paranoia also had a negative influence on maintenance training in Soviet tank units. During the purges, the NKVD had created the threat of internal ‘wreckers’, or counter-revolutionary saboteurs, so the RKKA general staff – not wanting to appear in collusion with anti-regime forces – issued a directive that forbade tank crews from conducting routine maintenance without proper (i.e. political officer) supervision. Concerned that soldiers might willfully contaminate the oil or fuel in their tank engines, political officers simply forbade most routine maintenance at unit level and directed that any work be conducted by supervised technicians at army-level depots.

Soviet armoured operations at the outset of the war were severely hampered by inadequate logistic preparations. Logistics was never a strong suit of the Red Army and operational planning was still tied to a reliance on railroads and fixed supply bases, which proved very vulnerable to the German style of Blitzkrieg. Tank ammunition, particularly 76.2mm armour-piercing rounds, was in short supply and few KV or T-34 tanks had more than one basic load in June 1941. About one-quarter of the available ammunition was stored in supply dumps near the western border, which were quickly overrun in the first weeks of Barbarossa. Even worse, most of the Red Army’s fuel reserves were held back in depots around Moscow, Orel and Kharkov, leaving the forward units with only enough fuel for 1–2 weeks of operations.[13] Simply put, the superficial appearance of combat-readiness among even the best-equipped mechanized corps was quickly exposed as false when tank units were found to have only enough fuel and ammunition for brief combat operations. A Soviet 1941 tank division required one-third less fuel than a German panzer division, about 60–70 tons, but too few GAZ and ZIS-5 fuel tankers were available to move it with the tanks. The logistical infrastructure to enable true mechanized maneuver operations – which had often been identified as a key weakness in pre-war maneuvers – simply did not exist in June 1941.

Among the many deficiencies of the Red Army’s mechanized forces in June 1941, the aspect that sealed the fate of the pre-war mechanized corps was the lack of effective radios. Most of the mechanized corps only had about half of their authorized radios and most of those available dated back to 1933–34. While Soviet industry had pulled ahead of the Germans in terms of tank development, it had fallen behind in terms of communications technology.[14] Unlike the Germans, only tanks operated by company or battalion commanders were equipped with radios, although some platoon leaders were just getting them in June 1941. Soviet command tanks, usually a BT-5, BT-7 or T-34, mounted a HF 71-TK-3 Model 1939 radio set. The 3-watt output of the 71-TK-3 transmitter was weak compared to the 20 or 30-watt transmitters on German command tanks, and this Soviet radio had an effective range of only about 6km. Of course, radius becomes a moot point when only one tank in ten even carried a radio. Even the most modern Soviet tanks, such as the KV and the T-34, were saddled with these underpowered and obsolescent radios, with which only one or two tanks in a company were equipped. The failure of the Red Army leadership to insist on equipping all tanks with modern radios – as Guderian had done for the Panzerwaffe – rendered effective command and control over large Soviet armoured formations virtually impossible at the outset of the war. Lacking effective communications, Soviet armoured units were forced to rely upon flags, messengers and dangerous follow-the-leader formations.