Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1943-1945: Red Steamroller - читать бесплатно онлайн полную версию книги автора Robert A. Forczyk (Plates) #16

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^{T-34 tanks on the production line. By January 1943, Soviet industry was building over 1,000 T-34s per month against Germany’s production of barely 200 medium tanks per month. Although German industry was able to increase production by late 1943, the Soviets continued to enjoy a 3-1 edge in tank production output throughout the critical phase of the war. Stalin’s industrialization programs of the 1930s had prepared the Soviet Union for a war of production and its ability to out-produce Germany was the result of careful planning.}

^{Vyacheslav Malyshev was the Soviet engineer tasked by Stalin with running the Soviet Union’s tank industry. Malyshev was ruthless, but competent, and he let plant managers know what would happen to officials that failed to meet production quotas. Here, he poses with a model of a new heavy tank design which eventually resulted in the JS-2. Malyshev was conservative and did not favour experimentation, but by 1943 he was forced to recognize that the Red Army needed a new tank to counter the German Panthers and Tigers.}

^{A Lend-Lease Matilda tank with a tank unit in the Central Front, January 1943. Although its 2-pounder (40-mm) gun lacked a high explosive shell, the Matilda continued to serve in the infantry support role in the Red Army throughout 1943. The Soviet tankers liked its thick armour, but by 1943 it was completely out-classed by German tanks armed with long 7.5-cm cannons.}

^{An Su-122 self-propelled gun negotiates its way down a very muddy trail. The Red Army was quick to note the value of the German assault guns in the infantry support role and decided to develop its own range of weapons mounted on tank chassis. The Su-122 was normally deployed in a self-propelled artillery regiment and attached to tank or rifle corps. The 122-mm howitzer provided Soviet assault groups with mobile firepower to reduce strongpoints – something that had been missing in 1941–42.}

^{German preparations for Operation Zitadelle were extensive. Here, brand-new Pz IIIs stand next to a mountain of new track, much of which would be used to restore older vehicles. Despite the association of Tigers and Panthers with Kursk, the obsolescent Pz III medium tank still played a very large role in the battle.}

^{A Soviet tank company commander briefs his platoon leaders on their next operation. By the summer of 1943, the Red Army had a leavening of veteran tank crews and commanders, which narrowed the qualitative gap between German and Soviet tank units.}

^{The turret of a Panther Ausf D after an internal explosion had shattered the interior. The Germans were forced to abandon large numbers of derelict Panthers during the retreat to the Dnepr and tried to destroy them when feasible. In 1943, the primary cause of loss of most Panthers was destruction by their own crews.}

^{A German StuG-III assault gun pauses by a burning T-34/76 Model 1942 in the summer of 1943. The StuG-III with the long 7.5-cm cannon was extremely lethal on the defence, but when pressed into offensive roles as at Kursk, it was unable to completely fill in for tanks. (Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-688-0162-23)}

^{This is the same burning T-34 as in the previous photo. One of the assault gun crewmen is going through the pockets of a dead Soviet tanker. (Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-688-0162-24)}

^{A Tiger positioned next to a knocked-out KV-1. It is interesting to note the tanks are roughly equivalent in size and both suffered from transmission problems. By mid-1943, the KV-1 was being phased out because of its poor mobility and insufficient firepower.}

^{Crewmen of a Panther loading 7.5-cm ammunition in a hurried, haphazard manner which begs for an accident. Most tank ammunition is base-activating and can be set off by static electricity, even from human hands. There are few records of non-combat casualties from the Eastern Front, but there must have been considerable losses due to lack of sleep and the strain of combat. As crews grew exhausted in protracted battles like Kursk, tank crewmen were increasingly vulnerable to making mistakes.}

^{A T-34 with its turret blown off after a massive explosion. The introduction of more powerful anti-tank weapons like the long 7.5-cm gun and the 8.8-cm gun transformed the firepower equation on the Eastern Front, which had heretofore favoured the Red Army. High-velocity APCR rounds proved highly lethal at Kursk and it was clear that the T-34’s previous advantage in armoured protection had passed. (Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-220-0630-04A)}

^{The crew of an SU-76M assault gun in action. This open-topped vehicle offered only minimal crew protection but the mobile firepower it offered helped greatly as the Red Army began advancing westward in 1943. Prior to this, the Red Army was generally dependent upon towed artillery and offensives petered out as advancing units out ran their fire support. Once the SU-76M reached the front in numbers, the tempo of the Soviet offensive became more aggressive.}

^{Soviet T-34s enroute to Zhitomir, November 1943. Rybalko’s rapid breakout from the Lyutezh bridgehead and exploitation toward the southwest caught the Germans completely by surprise. Note that the T-34s carry desant infantry.}

^{A Soviet KV-85 tank captured during the German counter-attack near Radomyschyl in early December 1943. This tank was sent back to Germany for technical evaluation but there was little for the Germans to learn from it. The KV-85 was only produced in limited numbers as a way of getting an 85-mm equipped tank into the field in 1943, until the T-34/85 and JS-2 were fielded in 1944. (Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-708-0270-13A)}

^{Soviet Lend-Lease Churchill tanks entering Kiev, November 1943. The heavily-armoured Churchill proved to be an excellent breakthrough tank and remained in Soviet service until the end of the war.}

^{T-34s advance with infantry across a frozen field, winter 1943/44. Note these latest-model T-34s are equipped with the cupola, but the tank commanders are still ‘buttoned up’. This Soviet habit contributed to poor situational awareness and heavy casualties throughout much of the war. Despite ample evidence that tank commanders should keep their heads up as long as possible, the Red Army continued to teach this flawed habit long after the war.}

^{A German Pz IV advancing with an infantry section. Note that one of the grenadiers is carrying a magnetic hollow charge anti-tank mine. By the winter of 1943/44, German armour was increasingly employed in small counter-attacks against Soviet penetrations. Note the head of the German tank commander is just visible, giving him good situational awareness. (Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-277-0835-29)}

^{The recapture of Zhitomir in late November 1943 was a minor tactical victory, but von Manstein’s armoured counter-offensive failed to destroy Rybalko’s 3 GTA or recover Kiev. The 4. Panzerarmee managed to temporarily halt the Soviet steamroller with its fresh Panzer-Divisionen, but could not stop Vatutin’s massive offensive which began on 24 December 1943.}

^{A Kampfgruppe from 1.Panzer-Division advances during the effort to relieve the Korsun Pocket in February 1944. Initially, mobility was good over hard-packed snow, but a early thaw brought deep mud that greatly reduced German mobility. Like most of these rescue operations, the Germans were forced to operate under conditions that were poorly suited to the kind of mobile operations they favoured and they tended to degenerate into slugging matches to break through to trapped troops before they were annihilated.}

^{German infantry ride atop a Pz IV tank during the winter of 1944. During the breakout from Hube’s pocket, 1.Panzerarmee had very few tanks, SPWs or trucks and had to conduct a mobile operation with very meagre resources. The fact that the breakout succeeded testifies to the determination and skill of the German Panzertruppen and Panzergrenadiers, even as the Third Reich slid inevitably toward defeat. (Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-277-0835-04)}

^{A German grenadier with a Panzerfaust observes a burning T-34 in a village. The introduction of the cheap, easy-to-produce Panzerfaust anti-tank weapon in the autumn of 1943 was a potential game-changer since it finally provided the German infantryman with a reliable weapon to stop enemy tanks. However, by the time that it was introduced, the Heer was running out of trained infantrymen.}

^{A late-model Pz IV alongside a knocked-out late-model T-34/76 in the Ukraine, early 1944. The size comparison of these two medium tanks is interesting, as well as the effect of thick mud upon operations.}

^{A Panther from SS-Wiking in a wood line in Poland, September 1944. Note that trees have been cleared to create a clear field of fire in front of the Panther.}

^{A Lend-Lease Sherman in Red Army service. By mid-1944, the Red Army had a considerable number of Shermans and particularly liked the models with the 76-mm gun. Like the T-34, the Sherman was automotively reliable and was excellent in the exploitation role.}

^{A JS-2 lies disabled in the streets of an East Prussian town. The 122-mm gun on the JS-2 was a powerful weapon with the potential to destroy Tigers and Panthers at long-range, but like most heavy tanks, it was ill-suited for urban combat.}

^{Another JS-2 has come to grief in a German city street, which was far too narrow for armoured operations. In this type of urban environment, the Panzerfaust could knock out even heavy tanks with point-blank shots.}