Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1943-1945: Red Steamroller - читать бесплатно онлайн полную версию книги автора Robert A. Forczyk (ч. notes)

Footnotes

1

In late 1942, the Waffen-SS had already re-designated their motorized infantry divisions, each of which were equipped with at least one Panzer-Abteilung, as ‘Panzergrenadier-Division’, but the Heer did not similarly re-designate their motorized infantry divisions as such until mid-1943. In the interest of avoiding confusion, I will use the term Panzer-Grenadier-Division for the Heer units in aggregate, but continue to use ‘Infanterie-Division (mot.)’ when referring to specific Heer divisions prior to mid-1943.

2

Total loss, meaning that the tank was beyond repair.

3

Haen recovered and became the battalion commander of the rebuilt Panzer-Abteilung 103, which he led in the Italian Campaign. Remarkably, he survived the war but was shot in US captivity on the day after Germany’s surrender in 1945.

4

On 18 January 1943 Zhukov was promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union and Vasilevsky was promoted to General of the Army.

5

The first unit was a battalion-size motorized infantry unit that was used to guard Hitler’s forward headquarters but had been sent to the Eastern Front and attached to the Großdeutschland Division. The Fegelein Brigade was also motorized infantry. Neither unit had much artillery or anti-tank support.

6

Generalleutnant Arno Jahr committed suicide on 20 January 1943 when his unit was surrounded and General der Infanterie Karl Eibl was killed in action during the retreat on 21 January.

7

In January 1943, the Ostheer reported a total of 82,110 casualties, of which 17,183 occurred in Heeresgruppe Mitte (21 per cent of the total) and 29,023 occurred in Heeresgruppe Nord (35 per cent of the total). While some of AOK 6’s casualties at Stalingrad were not reported until February, the fact that Heeresgruppe Nord and Mitte together suffered over 12,000 dead or missing in January 1943 indicates the ferocity of combat occurring elsewhere on the Eastern Front.

8

General der Infanterie Kurt von Chevallerie, commander of the LIX Armeekorps, was in charge of the overall relief effort. The 20.Infanterie-Division (mot) was also attached to this operation, but had no tanks.

9

Heeresgruppe Don was redesignated as Heeresgruppe Süd on 13 February 1943 when Heeresgruppe B was dissolved. However, Heeresgruppe A remained as a separate command in the Kuban.

10

On 12 February Generalleutnant Erhard Raus took command of this formation and it was renamed Generalkommando z.b.V. Raus.

11

This formation had been established in July 1942 as SS-Panzer-Generalkommando and during the Third Battle of Kharkov in February-March 1943 it was known as the ‘SS-Panzerkorps’. In June 1943 it was redesignated as the II. SS-Panzerkorps and retained this designation for the rest of the war.

12

The 4th Tank Corps was redesignated as 5th Guards Tank Corps (5GTC) on 7 February 1943.

13

Remer would later gain considerable notoriety for crushing the July 20th Plot against Hitler.

14

Herzig was not relieved of command for this lapse in judgment, but was quietly shifted to another assignment after a month. From January–May 1945 he commanded the King Tigers of the s.SS-PanzerAbt.503 in the final battles.

15

In June 1943 Hausser’s SS-Panzerkorps was redesignated as II./SS-Panzerkorps.

16

Panzer-Abteilung 51 was formed from the II./Pz. Regt. 33 (9.Panzer-Division) and Panzer-Abteilung 52 was formed from the I./Pz, Regt. 15 (11.Panzer-Division).

17

On 1 May 1943 the SS-Panzerkorps sent two of its six Panzer-Abteilungen (I./SS-Pz. Rgt. 1 from LSSAH and I./SS-Pz.Rgt. 2 from Das Reich back to Germany for conversion to Panthers.

18

Vatutin took command of the Voronezh Front on 28 March after Golikov was relieved by Stalin.

19

Funklenk or Fkl were radio-controlled demolition vehicles. A team usually consisted of a Pz III control tank and several associated BIVs. The vehicles were driven into the edge of a minefield by a human driver and then detonated by radio command, intending to detonate nearby mines with blast over-pressure. The Germans estimated that at least four BIVs were needed to clear a 100-metre deep lane through a minefield and that this would take two hours to complete. However, a critical flaw was that the Panzerkompanie (Fkl) had no means of marking cleared lanes.

20

Kessel was an odd choice to command a Panzer-Division in such a key battle since he had been head of the Heer’s Personnel Department in 1939–42 and had no recent command experience. Nevertheless, he went on to command a Panzerkorps by late 1944.

21

TUNNY, a sub-set of ULTRA, was involved in intercepting copies of German operational orders. Both the April warning order for Zitadelle and the actual operational plan were passed on to the Soviets by the Soviet spy in Bletchley Park, John Cairncross.

22

Decker and his brigade headquarters did not arrive until 11 July, by which point there were very few Panthers left to command.

23

The engine fires were caused by excessive heat, caused by a rubber liner installed in the engine compartment intended to keep the compartment dry in river-crossings. However, the rubber lining also retained engine heat and resulted in the destruction of a number of Panthers.

24

Saurma was Strachwitz’s brother-in-law. He was wounded by bomb fragments and later died of his injuries.

25

Kotenko survived the war and later recommended one of his battery commanders, who fought to the death, for the Hero of the Soviet Union (HSU) award.

26

Lebedev was a very experienced tanker who had fought in the Russo-Finnish War in 1940, the Luga River line in 1941, around Voronezh in 1942 and in the Ostrogozhsk– Rossosh Offensive in early 1943. He was part of the new breed of veteran Soviet tankers that would lead the drive to the west in 1943–45.

27

Tebbe had previously commander Panzer-Abteilung 116 in 1942–43. Despite being replaced for his failure of leadership during Zitadelle, Tebbe would command another Panther-Abteilung, I./Pz. Regt. 16, during the Battle of the Bulge in 1944.

28

It is not uncommon inside a cramped tank turret to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, particularly when fatigued and stressed. Accidental injuries inside tank turrets are not uncommon and usually very serious. Strachwitz apparently suffered a crushed arm and shoulder.

29

Both George Nipe and Valeriy Zamulin claim that Hoth was aware of 5 GTA’s approach or at least that the Soviets were planning a major counterstroke. Perhaps, but the Lage Ost situation maps for 11 July 1943 do not indicate it and the general alarm noted in German accounts of Prokhorovka suggest genuine surprise that the Soviets were mounting such a large-scale armoured attack.

30

Franz Bäke (1898–1978) was a pre-war dentist and reserve officer, who rose very rapidly in the Panzertruppe. He served as a tank platoon leader in Pz 35s in Poland, a company commander in France in 1940, then a battalion commander in 1942. He led II./Pz.Rgt. 11 in Wintergewitter, the Third Battle of Kharkov and Zitadelle in 1942–43. In November 1943, he was promoted to Oberstleutnant d. R. and given command of Panzer-Regiment 11.

31

Carell, aka SS-Obersturmbannführer Paul Karl Schmidt, was the press spokesman for the Third Reich’s Foreign Ministry and the creator of the highly-successful Signal magazine. He was a major component of the Third Reich’s propaganda machine but was not indicted after the war and reinvented himself as ‘Paul Carell.’ His books are interesting and well-written, but also convey the German wartime propaganda line that the Soviets only won due to superior numbers.

32

Interestingly, after the fall of the Soviet Union Koltunov admitted that he had exaggerated German losses and had been part of an official white-washing about Soviet losses at Kursk.

33

The Pak41 was Germany’s best towed anti-tank gun, introduced in April 1942, but only 150 were built. It used the tapered-bore principle to produce an exceptional muzzle velocity of 1,125 m/second. Using Hartkern rounds, the Pak 41 could defeat the KV-1’s thick frontal armour out to 2,000 metres.

34

Sky-lining is a common tactical mistake made by inexperienced (or incautious) tankers, which entails moving with the vehicles’ outline clearly visible on high ground with a rising or setting sun behind it. Normally, tanks traverse high ground along the ‘military crest of the hill’ (i.e. 10 metres below the actual crest) in order to avoid this dangerous mistake.

35

Named after Count Pyotr A. Rumyantsev-Zadonaisky (1725–96), one of Catherine the Great’s generals. The Stavka named a number of large operations after heroes from Catherine’s wars and the later Napoleonic Wars, including Rumyantsev, Kutusov, Suvorov and Bagration. The Communist ability to use the names of formerly-reviled aristocrats to add lustre to military operations was amazing, akin to Orwell’s ‘double-think’.

36

General-major Boris S. Bakharov was relieved of command after Prokhorovka – one of the few heads to roll for that disaster. Thereafter, the 18 TC was commanded by his deputy for a time.

37

Panzer-Abteilung 51 had been sent to Bryansk to refit after Zitadelle and was in the process of receiving 96 factory-fresh Panthers. The battalion was attached to Großdeutschland.

38

Manganese and molybdenum were added to steel in armour plate on tanks to improve hardening. Without these ores, German armour plate was significantly more susceptible to armour-piercing ammunition. The two primary manganese ore mines were located at Marganets and Ordzhonikidze on the northern/western bank of the Dnepr.

39

Eberbach commanded three different Panzerkorps between 15 October and 15 November 1943. This was a ridiculous misuse of one of Germany’s best senior panzer leaders. Balck was also being bounced around between commands.

40

The Soviet cavalry corps of late 1943 was vastly different from the earlier Red Army cavalry formations. The 1 GCC included three tank regiments with an authorized strength of 90 T-34s and 21 T-70s, as well as an SAP with 20 SU-76 self-propelled guns. The corps had an authorized strength of 21,000 men, 19,000 horses and several hundred trucks.

41

This division was formed from the remnants of the 60.Infanterie-Division (mot.) destroyed at Stalingrad. When it arrived at Narva, it had no attached tanks.

42

Either von Manstein or Hube could have anticipated these supply problems and ensured that III Panzerkorps was provided with tracked RSO supply vehicles which could move through mud, or coordinate with the Luftwaffe to provide the panzer spearheads with air drops, but they only made minimal efforts to ensure Breith got fuel and ammunition to his forward units. German operational planning during Wanda was sub-par.

43

On 27 January 1944, Hitler ordered the Sd.Kfz.164 ‘Hornisse’ tank destroyer renamed as the ‘Nashorn’. This vehicle was similar to the Sd.Kfz.165 ‘Hummel’ self-propelled 15cm howitzer, since both were based on the Pz IV chassis.

44

Von Edelsheim commanded Panzergrenadier-Regiment 26 in the original 24.Panzer-Division at Stalingrad but was flown out of the pocket in November 1942.

45

Most of the tungsten core ammunition had been withdrawn from service after Kursk due to shortage of this vital metal, but Tiger units still received some APCR rounds.