7. Khrushchev

In the middle fifties, when the American historian Richard Pipes was in Leningrad, and travelled by crowded tram through the rubbish-strewn and crumbling imperial quarter of the old Tsarist capital, a woman muttered to him, ‘We live like dogs, don’t we?’ They did. There were queues, filthy and overcrowded living quarters, a fatty diet, and beyond the palaces, St Isaac’s Cathedral, the Admiralty spire, there was foul smoke from the huge factories which disfigured the suburbs over the Neva. There was a plan even just to knock down the old city, to erase its memory. Meanwhile came propaganda from the regime to the effect that the Soviet Union was a model for the universe, and the city bosses rode along the boulevards in curtained black cars, at high speed, insured against the resentments of their subjects, though not against the envy and intrigues of their colleagues. With Nikita Khrushchev, this began to change. Russia entered upon what the St Petersburg poetess Anna Akhmatova called ‘one of our vegetarian periods’.

She herself had undergone the carnivorous ones, living in the urine-stinking corner of what had once been a grand mansion block, losing two husbands, murdered by the system, and having her son imprisoned by it for years. In 1914, when there had been life and hope in St Petersburg, she had been the subject of a superb portrait, by Nathan Altman, and there had been others, in the early twenties, in the period when the Revolution still allowed an innovative cultural life. These paintings, like so many others of that period, had been shoved into basements of the Russian Museum, stored by heroic men and women who knew the secret, and they reappeared only two generations later. Anna Akhmatova’s own poems only officially came back to life in 1987, though they were of course well-known by word of mouth before then. Around the time of Pipes’s visit, not long after Stalin’s death, victims of the system had begun to reappear: products of the camps that were dotted around the north and east of this enormous country, their faces gaunt and toothless, expressing ruined lives. There were tens and then hundreds of thousands of them, and everyone knew what had happened to them. Khrushchev was associated with their release, and in later years he took great pride in it, even regarding this as the main achievement of his life. That was right.

On 25 February 1956, at the 20th Party Congress, he gave one of the most famous speeches ever made. In it — it was put together at the last minute, was being scribbled even after the congress had started — he denounced the ‘cult of personality’. This was code for the monstrous crimes that Stalin had committed against the Party (the even more monstrous ones against society as a whole were ignored). He repeated this five years later, and this time together with the removal of Stalin’s corpse from the Kremlin Mausoleum. Lenin was to reign alone in it, though most of the corpse was made of wax, the original having been attacked by a fungus when it was wrapped in the flag of the Paris Commune, presented by the French government. Khrushchev wanted to get back to Lenin, and especially to the Lenin of 1921, who had carried through economic reform and a flexible response towards the West.

He himself hardly looked like one of Anna Akhmatova’s ‘vegetarians’: on the contrary, a coarse little man, bullying in style, embarrassingly ignorant of Russian culture. As Party boss in Moscow, he tore down old buildings with a vengeance, and when he ran Kiev or Lvov in the Ukraine, he behaved brutally and sometimes, as he himself admitted, murderously. He had survived in Stalin’s closest circle because he could act the peasant clown, and because he could handle the drink that Stalin poured into men, in the expectation that at some point their eyes would flash the truth, as to what they had in mind. His name was not on the mental list drawn up by Stalin for the last great purge, and he played his game carefully, not asserting himself too much and too early. He ostentatiously talked about reform in agriculture and in the Party, to which he wanted the secret police to be subordinated; and he showed willingness to talk to the West, with disarmament in the air. Then Khrushchev kept the powerful interests in check, because he maintained, as apparent equal as head of state in 1955, the blockheaded Nikolay Bulganin, in the name of conservatism and even friendship with China. It was not really until 1957, when he crushed a last-minute rebellion by the old guard, that Khrushchev had power enough to run the Party and the State, in the style of Stalin. But at least he was determined that the Soviet peoples should not have to go on living like dogs. He could show that Stalin had been grossly mistaken, that Communism could both go on developing its power and would also improve the Russians’ miserable standard of living. Why did they live like dogs, whereas their system could put a living dog into orbit round the Earth?

A Khrushchev would have things to think about. Aside from the grand apartment overlooking the Moskva river and offices in the Tsars’ Kremlin, he had elaborate semi-palaces to which he could retire, whether in the Moscow suburbs or at Pitsunda, on the Black Sea. The Pitsunda place had a huge swimming pool with a view out over the sea, and its glass front could be opened and shut at the touch of a button. Communism had proved itself: it had turned Russia into a superpower, able to defeat Germany at last. Again and again he would go back to this theme, and lectured the Americans that, when they had seized Alaska, they could only do so because the Russian army was feeble, its soldiers flapping in baste shoes. The whole Stalin epic had changed that, though he thought the cost was unnecessarily, cruelly high. Khrushchev therefore had some cards to play and he could look the American President in the eye. In October 1957, timed for the fortieth anniversary of the Revolution, there was a symbol: Sputnik, the first man-made satellite, fired into orbit round the Earth. That little spot of light, moving visibly at night at some speed in the sky, was the calling card of Communism and of Russia’s emergence at last. The Americans had tried to compete, but had failed, farcically, to put even a football-sized one into space: their rocket had risen for a few yards and then settled back on its socket. In other matters, again, the USSR impressed. The violinist David Oistrakh and the pianist Svyatoslav Richter were household names in western Europe and at the Brussels Exhibition of 1958 the Soviet pavilion, with its recordings, caused spines to tingle, whereas the American one just showed off creature-comforts. Khrushchev beamed, and a 21st Party Congress solemnly announced in January 1959 that the USSR would ‘catch up’ by 1970. In October 1961 that turned into ‘1966’; by 1980 there was supposed to be ‘super-abundance’, a claim answered by an historical laugh when the time came. But there were many people in the West who agreed, including the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan (in his diary).

In fact most of it came from the pre-revolutionary world. There was a superb mathematical and musical tradition in old Russia, and Sputnik owed most to equations produced by a Tatar-Polish theoretical physicist called Konstantin Cholkovsky in 1903: even in his native Kaluga at that time, electro-magnetism and the name of James Clerk Maxwell were known. The Bolsheviks had some understanding of what was going on, and did not, initially, make problems for men such as Cholkovsky (who died in 1935 at a great age). Another learned man of the old order, Vladimir Vernadsky (born in 1863: his brother, a notable historian of Russia’s Tatar aspect, emigrated) stayed on, and in 1922 guessed that there was ‘a great revolution’ coming, ‘a source of power’ that would have something to do with radium, on which he became an expert. Scientific institutes were important to the Bolsheviks, and the 17th Party Congress in 1934 announced that the Soviet Union was to be ‘the most technologically advanced state in Europe’. There was some international collaboration (most notably with Piotr Kapitsa, born in 1894, who spent twelve years at the Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge, in the era of Rutherford and the splitting of the atom; but of course there was a strong German link as well). The scientific intelligentsia of that era were extraordinarily well-rounded men and women, good on their music and literature (one of the outstanding Soviet nuclear physicists was Yuli Khariton, born in 1904, who had studied at Cambridge, like Kapitsa, and, back home, had to do with the founding of the Writers’ House). Of course they took their role very seriously indeed, Kapitsa writing to Stalin to say that scientists were the new patriarchs — patriarchs having become quite obsolete.

Vladimir Vernadsky seems to have been the model for Professor Preobrazhensky in Mikhail Bulgakov’s Heart of a Dog, a splendid satire on the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. In it, a gynaecologist of the old school and a man of broad culture (including the proper qualities of vodka and the zakuski, or caviar, to go with it) keeps a large and well-appointed flat in Moscow because he can rejuvenate sexual organs and powerful Party people use his services. He implants the testicles and other glands of a drunken thug into a lovable dog, creating a monstrous dog-man who fits in with the local Communist cell. The book was read out to a chosen audience that contained an informer, who in outrage recorded that the Vernadsky-Preobrazhensky figure complains that Communism had meant the theft of galoshes from the communal hallway, and that this had caused ‘deafening laughter’. The book then vanished, known only to a few people. In Khrushchev’s time, characteristically, the circle in the know grew wider, but the book was not properly published until 1987. A regime capable of such absurdities of censorship would not in ordinary circumstances have been able to produce anything of much sophistication, let alone a pioneering bomb and missile programme. In fact engineers were initially put in charge, and they were so sceptical that they regarded uranium just as a rock, and irradiated themselves. Without the men and women of the late-Tsarist educational system, science and for that matter cultural life of any but the most primitive sort would not have survived. Matters even then became very difficult for many of them, the writers especially, and it was the war that saved them; even the aeronautics expert Sergey Korolev was sent to Kolyma camp, and both A. N. Tupolev and the designer of the katyusha missile system, V. N. Galkovskiy, were imprisoned in a specialist camp, a sharashka. But the scientists were badly needed, and they were given organization (and motivation) that they might otherwise have lost. It is also true that the first Soviet bomb owed something to Western examples, known through espionage, a glory of the regime. Some of the nuclear physicists were anxious for the West to give the secret to the USSR, which they much admired (for some reason, natural scientists lost their minds when it came to the Soviet Union: Sir Julian Huxley had written a particularly silly book about Soviet science, comparing it very favourably with British, just as the British produced penicillin, radar, the cathode-ray tube and the atomic bomb). But the essentials were Russian.

The USSR set up a bomb remarkably quickly. The Americans always had superiority of numbers — nine in 1946, thirteen in 1947, fifty-six in 1949, 1,161 in 1953 — but it had meant an enormous expense (during the war, $2bn, though much of this was on buildings). The Soviet system, with far fewer resources, responded rapidly and the first uranium plant was ready by the end of 1945, with a design similar to that of Enrico Fermi’s atomic pile at Chicago. Uranium (of which the Western powers had cornered 97 per cent in the Belgian Congo and elsewhere) was available at the Jachymov mines in Bohemia (strangely enough its German name, Joachimsthal, lent itself to a silver coin, the Thaler, i.e. ‘dollar’) and convicts were set to work in them. The research was carried out in an old monastery, 250 miles east of Moscow, and the monks’ cells became the laboratories; columns of convicts trudged through it all, and the guards were primitives who thought that plutonium was just old iron. It was there that Y. B. Zeldovitch, an inspired and versatile mathematician, worked out the depth and range of the explosive power, in microseconds; and within three years, in August 1949, the first bomb was successfully tested at Semipalatinsk. Next came the thermonuclear or hydrogen bomb which the Hungaro-American expert Edward Teller likened to the Sun itself, an atomic device being used to trigger a vast explosion. In this, the Russians (in 1952, with the first test) proved to be ahead of the Americans, although they exploded an even more powerful, and immediately usable, one in 1953 (and a later test killed several Japanese fishermen eighty miles away). Soviet tests were also murderous, though this was concealed at the time; they caused the most prominent physicist, Andrey Sakharov, to have his first doubts as to the whole thing; and Igor Kurchatov himself, the director of the Soviet atomic-weapons programme, wrote to Molotov in 1954 to say that war would mean the end of the world. Molotov did not punish him, or publicize the letter, one of Khrushchev’s reasons for subsequently getting rid of him. More generally, a doctrine came up of the ‘nuclear deterrent’, which would make war unthinkable. One of the chief Soviet physicists, Lev Landau, also had doubts as to the morality of the whole enterprise, and he was eavesdropped on in his house by the KGB. He was heard to remark that the first lives to be saved by the nuclear deterrent had been those of the Soviet scientists.

At any rate, Sputnik, launched on 4 October 1957, was followed in November by a dog, and then in 1961 by the first man in space, Yuri Gagarin. Lunik landed a red pennant on the Moon, and was first to photograph its hidden side. Still, whatever these triumphs, there was always Anna Akhmatova’s slum of a city. Food and housing were dismal and the USSR’s transport system was primitive — fewer railways than India. Communism was hated in much of central and eastern Europe; it was maintained only by a Moscow tyranny, and the local powers depended on the Soviet embassies. At home, there were millions of slave labourers (Khrushchev reckoned ten), and once Stalin died there were great revolts among them, as the famous places — Vorkuta, Karaganda, Norilsk — went on strike, organized by Chechens, Ukrainians and Balts. What was Khrushchev to do about it all? Change in the Soviet Union was exceedingly difficult, especially given the presence, in the Politburo and elsewhere, of the old Stalin guard. He did indeed set about reforms, and these were to become compulsive and very deeply unsettling, but in the first instance there was one thing Khrushchev could do, more or less in agreement with the Politburo, and that was to improve relations with the West. It was to be called the ‘first détente’, a word meaning ‘relaxation of tension’, though it also happened to mean ‘trigger’. Experience was to show that the first meaning led straight to the second.

As Khrushchev contemplated the West, what did he see? He hardly knew it at all (unlike Stalin, who in his revolutionary youth had briefly been in London) but there were certain main lines in his understanding of it, and his younger advisers were clever. Stalin had managed to unite it, with NATO and the pacts that linked almost all of the Soviet Union’s neighbours, however disparate. In 1955, at a meeting of the Politburo, Khrushchev made some sarcastic remarks at the expense of Molotov, whose ‘no’ in international gatherings had become famously obstructive. The USSR under Stalin, he said, had managed to make enemies of everybody — even countries such as Iran and Turkey, which had been friendly since the Revolution and were now allied with the West. Yugoslavia, too, a faithful Communist ally, had been alienated — quite absurd because the place had a strategic position and it could also have been a sort of showcase. Yugoslavia contained seven different and sometimes very different peoples, and had inherited a good bit of poisoned history. Lenin had decreed how such problems should be dealt with: get rid of capitalism, and the brotherhood of peoples would prevail. In Yugoslavia a serious effort was made. Tito, a Croat, had led the resistance, and his partisans, drawn from all the peoples of Yugoslavia, had liberated much of the country even before the Red Army arrived. Tito then ‘built socialism’ in the Moscow-approved manner. However, there were signs of independence that Stalin did not like, and suspicion reigned: a quarrel became open in summer 1948, and the Yugoslav Party was expelled from Cominform. However, this did not break Tito at all. Instead, he gained strong domestic support, approached old allies in Great Britain, received financial and other help from the West, crushed his Stalinist opponents, and proclaimed neutrality. For a very long time to come, Yugoslavia received adulation in the West: all of it, said an apologetic Khrushchev, the fault of Stalin and Molotov.

And now there was also a Germany, again needlessly alienated, firmly anchored in the West, and being rearmed. Moscow might justly take pride in its leaders’ understanding of the dynamics of power politics, and Lenin had known which buttons to press. When in 1919 the international revolution failed to happen, he had made up to the Germans, and played off the Western powers against each other. German officers had trained secretly on Russian soil: German bosses had built up Russian industry during the first Five Year Plan. Why not dangle the carrot of unification before the Germans, in return for economic co-operation and neutrality? For Khrushchev, the time had come for a relaxation of the tensions that had so unnecessarily been built up. It was called ‘peaceful co-existence’, and coincidentally helped him to get rid of Molotov, packed off to run a power plant far away.

The United States had also been misplayed. Left to itself, America would have got on with business, but Stalin had done his work, and the Americans had built up a formidable war machine that had become an important and even indispensable part of American business life. Weapons research and production made California rich and kept universities going; exports of weaponry or aircraft became important for the balance of payments, and a whole political and media machine developed to foster these. Various pacts, underwritten by the American taxpayer, now linked nearly all of the Soviet Union’s neighbours against Moscow. Without Stalin’s ominous threats, that taxpayer (paying a marginal rate of 94 per cent) might have rebelled against this system, but as things were, even Eisenhower growled nuclearly over Korea. In January 1954 Dulles laid out a new ‘doctrine’: the USA would use its enormous nuclear superiority if the Russians attacked in Europe, ran the threat, subsequently modified.

Then there were the British and French. The British had had to go it alone as regards nuclear weaponry, although they could hardly afford it. They had exploded their own first bomb in October 1952 and were obviously looking for some independent role. In the first place, Churchill himself hoped to have a last grand international moment, reconciling the USSR and the rest, and in the early fifties, before German competition properly started, British exports boomed, and there was some life in the British Commonwealth. A third of the world’s trade was conducted in pounds, and money therefore came back to the City of London: Churchill could imagine that he had an independent role. With the French, matters were simpler. There was a large Communist Party; there was a great deal of resentment against Germany; there was cultural resentment of American domination; and there was a colonial war going on, in Vietnam, where Soviet help might be helpful. To have pushed all of them together, in NATO, had been extraordinarily clumsy. Once the Soviets decided to be more cunning the Korean War was wound up within weeks, and a year later, at Geneva, the parallel war in Vietnam was stopped, again with a division in the middle. What of central Europe?

In the air there was the question of disarmament. War might lead to the victory of the proletariat, but it could wipe out the planet as well. Malenkov had said as much, but was driven out by Khrushchev for saying it. Now, accompanied by an old-order totem, Bulganin, Khrushchev started to do his world rounds, visiting the United Nations, England, the USA and elsewhere, and saying much the same things as Malenkov had been overthrown for saying. He had a sort of rough charm, and was at any rate memorable, dropping peasant wisdoms like a caricature Russian: socialism was to have a human face again, and Stalin’s mistakes had to be made good. The moment was quite propitious. A business-minded Right, now mainly dominant in the West, had various uses for the USSR. It could for a start neutralize the public opinion that backed it. When Eisenhower won the election of 1952, he did so on a strongly anti-Communist platform, and his Vice-President, Richard Nixon, had made a name for himself as persecutor of Communists in general. The period of Joseph McCarthy was not long over, and public opinion in some places was strongly in favour of the use of American power: General MacArthur himself had argued for a nuclear strike against the Chinese ports, though Truman had sidelined him over this. In practice, the death of Stalin came as a huge present to Eisenhower, and let him off the Korean hook. He really wanted to go down in history as the man who had stopped a nuclear war. Business should be done.

How should the USSR respond? It mattered that Khrushchev himself had great faith in Communism, and was confident of the future, but for the moment he needed calm. After all, the USSR had made enemies of all of her neighbours except China, and China was a potential rival: Mao wanted the bomb. This time, in the context of possible German reunification, a new idea emerged in Moscow: a ‘security plan’ that involved ‘security guarantees in Europe’ and ‘a project for a treaty of collective security in Europe’. It was meant to establish permanent pan-European institutions, and not to include the Americans or NATO; foreign forces were to be withdrawn. The proposals were intelligent enough, and the immediate aim was clearly to prevent any European Defence Community. Appeal needed to be made to German pacifism — to rope the Germans into some overall European ‘structure’, which would be neutral. Beyond that lay the hope of detaching Europe from the USA. The Russians were generally agile when it came to managing these large-scale multinational bodies, their own foreign affairs being on the whole less messily conceived and executed than other countries’. Eventually, Molotov’s plan, put forward again and again, was realized with the Helsinki Conference of 1975, and it had some temptations in a Europe that might otherwise be the scene of nuclear war and was anyway on occasion resentful of the Americans. In 1954, in the very short run, the Molotov suggestion was successful enough in France, when the Paris parliament failed to ratify the EDC on 30 August. But that failure was not very significant: German rearmament was anyway going ahead.

Khrushchev needed to show that Communism did not need to mean labour camps. His Stalin speech was symbolic: rules would prevail henceforth. The Party, which was the essential institution, would be restored, whereas Stalin had considered just abolishing it and Beria had meant to turn it into a sort of baroque Scout and Girl Guide organization. The Central Committee, expanded by one third to 340 souls, met more often (six times in 1958) and congresses were held every four years, although the speeches, vetted beforehand, were ritualistic and, to an outsider, an ordeal: as John Keep says, ‘only by close examination could one detect here and there a slight emphasis that reflected some local or occupational interest’. Even the word glasnost was used, when its proceedings were published, but its real nerve was a secretariat, employing thousands, that operated in extreme secrecy. There was a Department of Agitation and Propaganda which covered the media and cultural life generally, and the number of people involved rose from 6 million in 1957 to 36 million in 1964. Party members doubled, to 12 million. The proportion of ‘specialists’ — engineers, for instance — went up, and there was more room for men in their thirties. At the 20th Congress, that of the Stalin speech, more than half of the eighty-four national or regional secretaries were replaced, and Khrushchev finally defeated the old guard in 1957 because over half of the Central Committee members were new appointments. In 1960-61 he repeated the anti-Stalin drive, and replaced fifty-five of the (now) 114 national and regional secretaries. At any rate, the personnel, if not the structure, was de-Stalinized, and there were no more mass killings. When Khrushchev was finally overthrown in 1964, he took pride in the fact that he had not been killed. That went together with a certain cultural liberalization, in that books open about some of the horrors of Stalin’s time were published, though there were limits. Still, whatever these limits, observers in the West could safely conclude that things were getting better, that business could be done. By 1955, when Khrushchev had established his authority, a half-thaw occurred in the Cold War.

The first sign of movement in Moscow came when on 8 February 1955 Molotov at last said that there might be a Staatsvertrag (‘state treaty’) over the restoration of Austria — no need to wait for a German treaty, he said. Earlier, the USSR had refused any Austrian arrangement: the country was on the Czechoslovak and Hungarian borders, and might make these countries unstable. But Austrian independence was a useful carrot to have on offer. Now, fearing that the western zones of Austria might be incorporated in the new western Germany, and wanting to show the Germans what might be achieved, the Russians recognized and evacuated Austria. A Staatsvertrag was signed in the Belvedere Palace on 15 May, and the Red Army moved out quite quickly. The Austrian chancellor, Julius Raab, spent three days in Moscow discussing these arrangements, and Austrian neutrality was solemnly declared by the parliament in October. In this case, the neutrality meant certain rewards — for instance, the placing of international bodies (including the new Atomic Energy Commission) in Vienna — but it also had its questionable side, in that Vienna became something of an espionage capital, and, like Finland, a place where Moscow might maintain agents of influence. The most obvious of these was one Kurt Waldheim, who slipped and slithered his way from the staff of an Army Group in the Balkans to the Austrian foreign ministry, where he connived in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and was rewarded to become secretary-general of the United Nations. In this same period, the Soviet bases in Finland were also given up, partly on the grounds that they made the Swedes nervous, and caused them secretly to co-operate with the West. This again, as with Austria’s Waldheim, was to prove its uses with Sweden’s Olof Palme. In May 1955 Khrushchev visited Tito, in an attempt to make up, but there, one Communist seeing through another, he had a guarded welcome, and Tito was enjoying his role as arbiter between East and West; Yugoslavia also became an important pioneer of the ‘Third World’, made money out of Arab shipping, oil and construction, and was cheerfully represented as every country’s favourite neutral. West Germany was once more well and truly on the map, and in 1955 Adenauer was invited to Moscow for resumption of diplomatic relations — one present being the return to Germany of the prisoners of war who had been cruelly kept back, including the few thousand survivors of Stalingrad and the men who had been in Hitler’s Bunker to the very end.

At any rate, here was a grinning Khrushchev going round the West, even being received with rapture by ambitious hostesses in California and talking agriculture with prominent American farmers. A machinery for East-West relations was coming into existence. At the United Nations and in foreign ministries, a bureaucracy was to emerge, with an interest in common matters, such as disarmament talks or ‘summits’, which were supposed, generally quite wrongly, to make for personal friendships that would solve the various international problems. Quite soon, American farmers were saving the Soviet population from the consequences of Moscow’s misdeeds over agriculture (in 1914 Russia had been the greatest grain exporter in the world). Grain exports started in 1955, and were generally paid for, through a credit system, by the American taxpayer. However, there was an obvious problem, in that the People’s Democracies that Stalin had set up were considerable counter-propaganda. The contrast between Austria and Hungary was illustrative. Vienna was remaking itself as an historic city. Budapest, its twin, was still pockmarked by bullet holes, the splendid boulevards of nineteenth-century Pest dimly lit, empty, and marked only by occasional dingy shops. Any appeal to the West would mean getting rid of the little Stalinists who ran these places, each with its own miniature Iron Curtain, complete with savage Alsatians (a stuffed one, in heroic biting mode, was on display in the Prague museum of the security police, which occupied part of the old German university).

Getting rid of these little Stalinists was not easy. Czechoslovakia had her own native Communist movement of some strength, but in Poland and Hungary Communism was the imposition of a small minority. The local Communists kept power by Stalinist methods — in Hungary a labour camp at Récsk, in Romania a much larger one in the foetid Danube Delta — and crammed peasants into collective farms or towns and cities, which were swamped. Cracow, an historic baroque town in southern Poland, Catholic and middle-class in character, acquired a huge steelworks, Nowa Huta, to introduce a proletarian element. To combat religion, sport was used: Katowice had a huge smog-bound stadium in its centre. Churches, independent organizations of all sorts, contacts with foreigners or emigrants all came under severe censure, and a secret police, the UB, had its spies everywhere. In East Germany the situation was still harsher. Meanwhile, a good proportion of anything that these countries produced went to the USSR. The cities were dominated by lorries carting building rubble around, spewing out Soviet-refined oil, which had its own unmistakable smell. In Stalin’s last years, there had been grotesque political trials, in which senior Communist stalwarts, generally Jewish, were tortured into confessions as to British espionage and the like. The problem here was the example of Tito, whose enmity Stalin himself had created, but whose example, as an independent national-minded Communist, might prove tempting to other of the satellite country leaderships.

Now, as part of a strategy to make the USSR less repellent in Western and especially German eyes, Khrushchev attempted to make conditions in the People’s Democracies less oppressive. He would try to find popular and national Communist leaders to replace the various Stalinist oppressors. Even in 1953 there were modest changes: George Soros visited Budapest, for instance. The chief idea (Molotov did not like it) was to make Communism less unpopular, by associating it with nationalism (and Khrushchev went to Warsaw and Prague in 1954, also with a view to minor relaxations). The local Stalin-appointed leaderships got in the way; the furniture would have to be changed. This was not easy. The satellite leaders each had his own network and support system, and in Czechoslovakia, which was still quite an advanced country, with a genuine proletariat, Klement Gottwald and his successor, Antonín Novotný, were not at all easy to shake. Even, they could claim to have taken over the country because of electoral popularity rather than through the Red Army. The country was anyway made up of two nations, Czech and Slovak, and in so far as there were ‘national’ Communists, they were likely to be Slovak, men such as Gustáv Husák and Alexandr Dubček. Poland was the greatest headache — the largest of these countries, and, as everyone knew, likely to be strongly anti-Soviet if freed from Moscow’s control. Hungary, though much smaller, was similar. As with Poland, she was tightly controlled by a small knot of mainly Jewish Communists — Mátyás Rákosi, a veteran of pre-war prison; Ernő Gerő, a veteran of the Spanish Civil War and much else in particular; others, including a female or two. These people were an embarrassment and the Hungarians’ security police, the AVO, were famously horrible. On the other hand, once they were removed, who else? Khrushchev interfered, but not with much forcefulness. One of the worst AVO men, Vladimir Farkas, was removed. More, a man with long associations in Moscow was moved back into a position of power. Imre Nagy was not Jewish. He was of a poor and provincial Protestant background, and in Hungary the Protestant minorities in the past had been substantial, creative, the backbone of the national cause and, before 1867, sometimes persecuted by the Catholic establishment of the Austrian empire. Nagy as a young soldier had been made prisoner by the Russians in the First World War and, like many such, including figures as diverse as Tito in Yugoslavia and Ernst Reuter, mayor of Berlin at the time of the blockade, had become a Communist. In the 1930s he had lived in Moscow, and had survived the killings that Stalin launched against foreign Communists not protected by their own embassy. Nagy was widely assumed to have been an informer — perhaps trying to get rid of rivals within the Party, such as its leader, Béla Kun. He came back to Budapest in 1945, and was minister of agriculture. As such, he protested against the grotesque misuse that was made of farmers, and was sidelined; under pressure from the USSR, he was reinstated, as prime minister, in 1953, but he did not replace Rákosi as Party secretary, and, since in that system the Party constituted the real power, he was rapidly pushed aside through committee manoeuvring by the Rákosi-Gerő team. In the same way, on a much grander scale in Moscow, Malenkov, head of the government, was outmanoeuvred by Khrushchev, who ran the Party. But now, Khrushchev wanted to be rid of Rákosi.

The long-accepted account of the Hungarian national uprising that followed ran along heroic lines. In 1848 there had been a great revolt against the Austrian empire, and it had had an operatic quality — barricades, student demonstrations, public rhetoric, epic poems by writers and, behind the scenes, calculations by clever aristocrats. Updated, this meant the masses, bare hands against tanks. This was legend: manipulative noblemen had been at work. The same, in much different form, happened again: 1956 was a stage revolution that got out of hand. The Stalin speech in February 1956 was supposed to have been secret, but Khrushchev did not mean or expect this to remain the case, and the rumours of it spread. Upsetting Rákosi meant organizing some well-placed demonstration against him, and a useful forum was the Writers’ Union. Under Communism, writers were a privileged breed, with special restaurants and guaranteed royalties, and their union was a natural home for writers who knew that they were not in the first class. It was also heavily bureaucratized by the Party. On the anniversary of the start of the 1848 uprising, a national day, some students — their union, too, heavily bureaucratized — laid a national flag at the statue of the great poet of 1848, Sándor Petőfi. The writers followed, with a carefully worded resolution as to the need for this or that alteration of the Party’s ways. Rákosi, dented, carried on, but the new developments were obvious enough. Then came news of events in Poland, which stimulated the opposition to continue.

The Stalin report had given the visiting Polish leader, Bolesław Bierut, a heart attack; of which he died. Khrushchev went to the funeral, and stayed for the election of Bierut’s successor. He tried both to excuse his own Stalinist past, and to explain how the monster had ruled; when someone anonymous broke out with a ‘no’, Khrushchev retorted, quite accurately, that that kind of objection, to a Soviet leader, would have been unthinkable before his, Khrushchev’s, report, and, ‘as the saying goes, the fool becomes smart afterwards’. Khrushchev then vastly alarmed his Polish audience when he praised Stalin’s imposition of a quota — 2 per cent — for Jews in important places, including the universities. What, in a very muddled and offensive way, he was doing was to make his audience elect as leader a ‘national’ and non-Jewish figure. They did not know what to do; the interim successor figures toyed with change, and events then brought on a crisis. Tito had arrived in Moscow early in June and at the end of the month, at Poznan, working-class restiveness resulted in a huge anti-Soviet demonstration and a strike that was only crushed by tanks and security troops in thousands; over seventy people were killed, and hundreds wounded. It mattered that, in Poland, there was a very widely popular Church which had a long tradition of working-class Catholicism. The priests were politically, by implication, far more powerful in Poland than elsewhere in the bloc and they became important in the sequel. The Communists themselves did not even, for years, imprison the Cardinal, as had happened in Hungary, and only latterly kept him under house arrest in the southern mountains.

When the Poles met to elect a new Politburo on 19 October, they elected Władysław Gomułka. He, back in 1948, had had some popularity (he was not a Jew, though his wife was), had been expelled from the Party for the usual heresies, and in 1951 was arrested (though, again, interned rather than purge-tried). Now he was brought back, to enormous waves of public enthusiasm, and when Khrushchev wanted an invitation to Warsaw it was refused. He came, uninvited, with a retinue of senior Soviet politicians and generals, in full-dress uniform; he threatened to order the troops into Warsaw. There was a high scene at the airport, but Gomułka won Khrushchev round: there would be yet another enormous Polish rising unless the Polish Communists were allowed to order things their own way. Khrushchev flew back to Moscow, still in two minds but in the end resigned. There was to be a Polish ‘national Communism’, with Gomułka in charge (and the Cardinal always there to advise prudence). There were tempestuous scenes in Poland, and they were transmitted to Hungary. On 23 October Budapest exploded as well, this time organized by the students. Thousands strong, they moved towards the parliament, and towards the radio station, where they wanted to be on air; they tore down the huge Stalin statue in the Városliget. There was firing by the AVO that evening, but the police were overwhelmed and fled. The fact was that there was no Church to calm tempers; nor was there a Gomułka. The Hungarian Stalinists were hated, and Hungary as a country had faced vast humiliation, whereas, though Poland had been ruined, she had at least counted among the victors, and the Communists, though detested, had had their human face. Khrushchev detected that the Hungarian situation would be much more explosive and, though he did encounter criticism, moved in troops on 24 October. But they met resistance from Molotov cocktails and the like, and the Hungarian army went over to the rebellion. Gerő speedily went, replaced by János Kádár, who, like Gomułka, had been a victim of the Stalinists, but the fighting went on, with hundreds of dead Hungarians and Soviet soldiers. Even Marshall Zhukov now thought that the troops should be withdrawn, and others in the Politburo agreed. On 30 October Khrushchev was ready to withdraw from Hungary altogether and issued a placating statement. But by then events in Budapest were out of control and a mob sacked the Party headquarters; the AVO men were identified by their light-coloured shoes, and lynched (hanged from the trees). Hungarian tanks defected and Nagy now said he would leave the Soviet alliance, the Warsaw Pact. Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov, the head of ideology, were in Budapest, and Nagy also talked to them about a Soviet withdrawal from Hungary. Khrushchev had been very much in doubt up to that point, and now he began to see the dangers in further concession — as he said to Tito, it would mean ‘capitalists’ on the Soviet border. To begin with, the Chinese had been all for a Polish solution but Mao Tse-tung, too, urged force on the evening of 30 October, when he learned of the lynchings and on the 31st Khrushchev told the Praesidium that the USSR must restore order. Several days before, Khrushchev had noted that the British and French were embroiled in Suez and had said the USSR should not be similarly embroiled. But he went ahead. Mikoyan protested. Khrushchev just said that ‘bloodshed’ then would spare much worse bloodshed later on.

Then he went off to talk to the Poles (at Brest-Litovsk) and to Hungary’s neighbours. They were worried that a non-Communist Hungary would make trouble over the borders with the Hungarian minorities. In the 1920s and 1930s, there had been an alliance of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia against Hungary, known as the ‘Little Entente’, and it now made a shadowy reappearance. Khrushchev made an especial appeal to Tito, who made him fly to his country retreat on the island of Brioni, one of the Quarnero group at the head of the Adriatic, where storms frequently blew. He flew into a terrible one over the mountains, and then had to cross a wild sea: Malenkov was very ill. Tito — himself recently revealed to have been, like Nagy, a one-time agent of the NKVD — gave the Russians his support, and their troops would move in on Budapest again. It took several days of fighting for Budapest to be brought back under control, under a new government, Kádár’s, which started off with severe repression, while 200,000 people fled the country. Nagy was shabbily tricked into the Yugoslav embassy, with other leading figures, was promised asylum, and was kidnapped to Romania, where he was kept for two years in seclusion. Then, bizarrely, he was tried and executed — his remains thrown into an unmarked prison grave. He said, before his death, that history would rehabilitate him; the only thing he feared, he added, was that it would be his executioners who did the rehabilitating, and there he was completely right. His eventual rehabilitation, in 1989, was part of the Communists’ struggle to survive. But 1956 had another curious effect, that Moscow would from now on handle the Hungarians with a certain amount of care.

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