The Atlantic Wall (1): France

THE LIVING SITES

The Atlantic Wall was manned by a variety of troops depending upon type of site and the branch of service. The army was the predominant branch responsible for army coastal artillery sites as well as the numerous smaller strongpoints. The Kreigsmarine was responsible for the navy coastal gun sites as well as supporting sites such as naval surveillance radars. The Luftwaffe was by far the smallest of the three services represented on the Atlantic Wall, taking care of coastal air surveillance radar sites as well as some Flak sites located close to the coast; there were some Luftwaffe field divisions along the Atlantic Wall, but their experiences were essentially the same as those of comparable army infantry divisions.

The army sites were manned by infantry divisions and not specialized fortress troops. There were two principal types of infantry divisions along the coast, static divisions and a smaller number of regular infantry divisions. The static divisions as their name implies were intended for positional defense and lacked the usual assortment of vehicular transport. The personnel in the static divisions were drawn from the bottom on the manpower reserves, typically older men, those with medical problems, and troops recovering from wounds suffered in Russia. The manpower situation became so bad in early 1943 that OB West was forced to adopt a policy of “dilution” of the static divisions under which each of the infantry regiments along the Atlantic Wall would have one Ost (East) battalion substituted for a German battalion in each regiment. The Ost battalions were made up of Soviet prisoners-of-war who “volunteered” for the Wehrmacht rather than starve to death in the camps. By the summer of 1943, the coastal defense divisions were combed out of their best troops, who were sent to the Russian Front. Even in the case of the nominally German battalions, the quality of troops continued to deteriorate with the growing induction of Volksdeutsche from eastern Europe—ethnic Germans who in many cases could not even speak German, as well as Poles drafted from the western Polish provinces incorporated into the Reich after 1939.

^{Some of the coastal batteries were barely completed before D-Day so there was not enough time to cover the sides with earth. This H650 casemate, armed with a 105mm K331(f) gun, was part of HKB Crasville of 5./HKAR.1261 on the Cotentin Peninsula near Videcosville. The rest of the battery used the smaller H671 casemates that lacked the rear ammunition rooms and crew accommodation. (NARA)}

The daily routine for these troops was essentially the same as for other army troops on occupation duty in France with the usual pattern of reveille, inspection, tactical training and guard duty. As the possibility of an Allied invasion increased, tactical exercises became more common, especially surprise alerts and anti-paratrooper field exercises. For most troops, assignment to France was a relief compared to a posting on the Russian Front. Conditions in France varied considerably through the war, with troops assigned to the defenses in 1941–42 recalling ample food and relaxed work conditions, while troops assigned in the autumn of 1943 and early 1944 recalling the general scarcity of food and the increased amount of both training and construction work. The static divisions assigned to coastal defense were poorly equipped with vehicles and could barely manage to transport their own supplies. Fuel shortages after 1942 greatly restricted travel even by officers, and so troops often used horses or bicycles for routine transport.

Prior to D-Day, the coastal defenses were usually at a routine alert level. For a typical infantry division, only about a third of its troops were actually assigned positions in the coastal defenses, with the artillery and support personnel stationed away from the coast. In theory, all troops assigned to the coastal defenses were supposed to be permanently stationed within the strongpoints. In reality, most of the sites except for high-priority areas such as Pas-de-Calais were far behind schedule in constructing sufficient personnel bunkers for the entire garrison. As a result, troops in the infantry battalions allotted to the coast defenses were often garrisoned a short distance from the strongpoints depending on the availability of houses or public buildings that had been requisitioned for barracks. Only a portion of the infantry battalions were assigned to guard duty along the coast at any one time. A typical platoon strongpoint (Wiederstandnest), which would be allotted about 30–40 troops at full alert, would typically have personnel bunkers to accommodate only about half this force, or about 20 men, on a routine basis for guard duties. These personnel bunkers were cramped, poorly ventilated, cold and dank. As the possibility for the Allied invasion increased, alerts increased as well. After April 1944, strongpoints tended to be manned at higher levels and, by late May 1944, most strongpoints along the English Channel were on full alert.

^{The French Schneider 105mm K331(f) gun was used with at least 37 batteries in the Atlantic Wall defenses in a modified version with a partial armored shield to help cover the embrasure opening. This example is in an H650 casemate, part of HKB Azeville of 2./HKAR 1261, on the Cotentin Peninsula. (NARA)}

^{This 75mm enfilade casemate on the Cotentin coast north of Utah Beach has been camouflaged to resemble a house by erecting a false roof over the structure. This particular casemate was built into an anti-tank wall built to prevent easy access off the relatively flat beach, a common type of obstacle on the Atlantic Wall. (NARA)}

In general, the strongpoints were guarded from the defensive positions since they were positioned to overlook the beach. Foot patrols would be conducted at night, but in a restricted pattern due to the extensive use of minefields. In the strongpoints, officers were supposed to dress according to combat conditions, meaning no distinctive insignia or accoutrements such as map cases; in practice this was often ignored until alerts were issued in the spring of 1944.

The work routine changed abruptly in early 1944 due to the need to accelerate construction, Rommel’s insistence on additional shore defenses and the growing difficulty of obtaining labor to conduct construction projects. As a result, most infantry divisions were assigned to conduct their own construction work, usually at the expense of tactical training. Memoirs by German troops from this period recall grueling days of work along the coast implanting beach obstacles, digging trenches, assisting in construction work and improving site camouflage. As mentioned earlier, in 1943 the static divisions underwent a dilution program, substituting roughly one battalion in three with Ost battalions of Soviet prisoners-of-war. In practice, most German commanders were skeptical of the combat value of these troops and, where possible, the battalions were spread out among German units to ensure their dependability.

Army coastal artillery battalions were generally recruited from older age classes not suitable for front-line service and the officers were usually former reserve officers from World War I recalled to duty. These units devoted more time to training than in typical infantry units assigned to coast defense since the rule was that personnel had to be familiar with at least two types of artillery piece. In addition, redundant training was also standard, for example infantry training for guard duty and site defense combined with training as a signals operator; forward observer training as well as unit supply clerk training. This was done both to allow the unit to function even in the event of combat casualties and because the coastal batteries tended to operate below normal tables with minimal personnel.

^{R621 Gruppenstand}

^{The R621 personnel bunker was the single most common type of bunker on the Atlantic Wall with over 1,000 built along the French coast along with the related R501 type. The R621 was designed for a single “group,” meaning 10 soldiers. Construction of this type began in January 1943 and each example required 485m³ of concrete, 23 tonnes of steel reinforcing bar and 3.7 tonnes of other steel. The design was Standard B with walls 2m thick. On flat ground, the bunker was buried flush with the ground, with access to the front entryways via a trench in front of the bunker. Along the coast, it was a common practice to build the bunker into the reverse side of coastal dunes with the front away from the sea. In such a case, a berm or wall was constructed to protect the doors from direct fire. Like most German personnel shelters, the R621 was designed to be gas-proof with a closed ventilation system and associated filters.}

^{Access to the bunker was through a pair of entryways, each guarded by a firing slit from the interior chamber. The entryways both led through armored doors into a center gas lock intended for the soldiers to decontaminate themselves before entering the main room through another armored door. The main room was rather small, 5.8 by 3.5m, and contained three rows of suspended cots three high along the rear wall. Accommodation was spartan, usually a table and chair in the center, a small wood stove, and some form of storage for the troop’s weapons and equipment. The R621 usually included a tobruk firing pit at one end with access from the exterior. There were a number of modifications of this design including the R621a with a pair of tobruk firing pits on either end. The R621 was part of a family of similar personnel shelters, the related R622 Doppelgruppenstand being nearly identical in appearance except that it was large enough for two adjacent rooms to accommodate two groups (20 men). The R621 can be distinguished from the R622 in that it usually had four circular ventilation covers between the two entryways while the R622 had six. These two types of bunkers made up nearly a third of all bombproof fortifications built for the army along the Atlantic Wall. (Artwork by Chris Taylor)}

^{The R621 personnel bunker has a tobruk machine-gun pit on one side for observation and defense. This particular type of bunker was the most common type along the Atlantic Wall in France with over 1,000 built including the related R501. This one is part of StP Düsseldorf on the eastern slope of Cap Blanc-Nez, overlooking Sangatte and the Eurotunnel to the right. (Author’s collection})

^{The perspective of a German soldier manning an observation bunker facing an Atlantic beach from a bunker in the Fifteenth Army east of Dunkirk. The beach obstacles are a mixture of wooden Hemmbalk and tetrahedrons. (NAC P116749 Ken Bell)}

In general, the naval coastal batteries enjoyed a somewhat better personnel situation than the army, especially in the years prior to 1943. However, the Kriegsmarine was subjected to the same personnel difficulties after 1943 and, as a result, the average age of the gunnery personnel along the Atlantic Wall continued to increase. In addition, personnel shortages led to the imposition of emergency war strength tables to the batteries, meaning ten percent under the nominal tables. While this didn’t adversely affect the gun teams, it reduced the ability of the coastal batteries to conduct site defense and frequently forced the navy gun batteries to ask for the assistance of neighboring army units to help conduct defense of the battery strongpoints. As a result, some naval coastal battery strongpoints had a mixture of navy and army personnel. In spite of these problems, the coastal batteries tended to have far better troops than other naval defense units along the Atlantic Wall such as the harbor companies, alarm companies or marine battalions. The naval coastal batteries had higher priority than many army defenses on the Atlantic Wall and so tended to have a more complete complement of personnel bunkers, adequate to house the entire battery. Each battery had a strength of 60–90 troops depending on the type and number of guns.

Although the coastal artillery batteries tended to have more elaborate personnel bunkers and shelters, they also had more need for these defenses. In April 1944, Allied bombers began a systematic campaign against the coastal batteries facing the Channel. The personnel bunkers could generally withstand a direct hit by most bombs, and in reality a heavy air raid on a battery would generally result in only one or two hits on any of the structures. German engineer documents record a few instances of failures of bunkers to air attack, generally due to construction faults. Whether the bunkers were penetrated or not, the bombing campaigns were a frightening prospect for the troops huddled within. While the attacks did not cause heavy casualties among the gun crews, they often compromised the effectiveness of the batteries by ripping up vital communication wires between the fire-control bunkers and the gun casemates, obstructed the gun embrasures with craters and dirt, and tore up communication trenches between the bunkers.