The Atlantic Wall (1): France

AFTERMATH

The commander of German forces in the west in 1944, Generalfeld-marschall Gerd von Rundstedt was scathing in his later assessment: “The Atlantic Wall was an enormous bluff, less for the enemy than for the German people. Hitler never saw the Atlantic Wall, not even one part of it! He was satisfied if Organization Todt reported that so many tonnes of steel and so many cubic meters of concrete had been used.” The Atlantic Wall failed to deter or seriously challenge the Allied amphibious invasion of France, and indeed, the coastal defenses in Normandy were in most cases overcome in a few hours fighting. The task of defending so long a coastline was impossible, especially given the limitations of Germany’s wartime economy. The Atlantic Wall in France consumed some 17,000,000m³ of concrete compared to about 12,000,000m³ for the Maginot Line, and even then it never came near to the density needed to stop a determined attack. The program was symptomatic of Nazi Germany’s inability to provide rational and efficient direction to its defense economy due to Hitler’s amateur enthusiasms. The Wehrmacht through the war was usually short of tanks, ammunition, and other war essentials, due in no small measure to the flagrant squandering of resources on dubious schemes such as this one.

An argument can be made that the heavy fortifications along the Pas-de-Calais forced the Allies to stage their attack further away from the German frontier in Normandy, but this hardly explains the extravagant wastage of concrete and steel at so many other sites along the French coast where there was no plausible threat of Allied invasion. Furthermore, it is debatable whether the Allied selection of Normandy was prompted primarily by the Atlantic Wall defenses around Calais rather than the formidable concentration of German divisions, including much of the Panzer force, in this area. Indeed, it can also be argued that Normandy was a more fortuitous location for confronting the Wehrmacht in France since it extended the German logistical lines, making them more vulnerable to the ravages of Allied airpower. Given Hitler’s penchant for “stand to the death” orders, the Atlantic Wall proved to be a trap for the nearly 200,000 German troops who were ordered defend the isolated Festung ports.

^{This “Café Hotel Bar” is in fact a camouflaged SK bunker for a Skoda 47mm Festungpak 36(t) and the armored ball mount for the gun is evident in the false door window. This bunker was part of the Le Havre HaK 022 strongpoint. (NARA)}

^{A fairly typical example of an enfilade casemate for a Skoda 47mm Festungpak 36(t), one of two located on the right flank of strongpoint WN10 to the north of Utah Beach on the Cotentin Peninsula. The metal enclosure for the ball mount is still present, though the gun itself has long since been scrapped. (Author’s collection)}

The Atlantic Wall was more firmly rooted in Hitler’s romantic fervor for architectural grandeur than in German military doctrine. Coastal fortification has fallen out of favor since then, and the Atlantic Wall is likely to remain the last major example of this long European tradition.

^{Of the four massive casemates of MKB Todt, the westernmost is preserved as a museum, two are enveloped in woods and the one closest to the sea is the best exposed. As can be seen, the steel carapace over the embrasure, as well as the gun, have been scrapped, but otherwise the casemate is reasonably intact. (Author’s collection)}